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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THREATS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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AJPAM GUIDE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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Authors are advised to ensure that their articles;

a. Present new knowledge in the field of Public Administration and Management.
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c. Generate discussions that can lead to mapping out solutions to challenges of Public Administration and Management.
d. Express perspectives from different African Regions.
e. Contain, as far as possible, implications for public sector managers and administrators.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Shin Kue Ryu[1], Rym Kaki[2], and Gedeon Mudacumura[3]

This is the second collaborative issue between the members of American Society for Public Administration's Section on African Public Administration (SAPA) and the African Journal of Public Administration and Management, which is the flagship journal for the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). The special issue is built on the SAPA Symposium held in 2022 in Jacksonville, Florida, USA titled, *"Democratic Governance in Africa: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities."* The symposium brought together various dedicated scholars and practitioners researching public administration and management of the African continent. It was a groundbreaking event as it became one of three full-day symposia held at the ASPA conference. Not only is it reflective of the burgeoning interest in African development governance but also scholarship befitting to the size of the continent and the rapidly growing youth population under the age of 25 reaching close to 60% of the 1.2 billion total African population .

The six papers presented in this issue should be read within the emerging and dynamic context of Africa. By titles alone, they might be mistakenly read as disparate topics. However, they are intertwined by a common thread. They all offer valuable insight to the dynamism and shifting tides within Africa's public sector. In doing so, it abets in the indispensable ontological and epistemological collective process gripping the body of the scholars working on African affairs. At the aggregate level, the herein published papers all provide valuable building blocks to the grand enterprise of articulating idiosyncratic theories separating African public administration and management from the rest of the world. This is an enterprise all our SAPA members are engaged in partnership with our counterparts AAPAM. The African Journal of Public Administration and Management (AJPAM), offers an outlet to share and report our members' own endeavors and efforts onto the matter.

Timing of the issue is to be reckoned with as the world is still reeling back from the era defining global COVID pandemic. African member nations were not immune to the pandemic's disruptive blow. The rippling effects of the pandemic penetrated all facets of individuals and institutions. It brought the focus back to the role of institutions and

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public sector governance as individuals were at mercy to public assistance either be it medical for prevention and treatment or via social regulation to manage outbreaks. The public health threat generated correlated and consequential effects on the economy and interactions with public service delivering institutions. Due to the widespread reverberating impact across societies and communities, its imprints were left on political leadership both electorally and in executive agencies.

The symposium aimed to bring together all concerns through a thematic umbrella title, *"Democratic Governance in Africa: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities."* Its aim was to recognize the rippling effect of the pandemic and post-pandemic era on broader state-society relations through highlighting democratic struggles and governance systems of African member nations with its respective institutional tools and procedures. These governance inquiries span beyond just individuals and institutions to domestic societal groups operating often in neglected realms thinly address through traditional government budgets along with international engagements. The open system nature in governance is multifaceted and diverse. The collection of papers in this issue captures that vibrant and distinct attributes and landscape of African nations.

The included articles span wide in coverage from macro-comparative studies to sector and country specific case studies. Collectively, they encompass and reflect the directions of our members. The opening article of the special issue by Dr. Oluwole Owoye is titled, *"The Nexus between the Quality of Governance, Industrialization, and Economic Growth: Evidence from the 10 Most Industrialized African Countries."* The author extends his research on on-going macro-level indicator comparisons among African countries. Dr. Owoye is particularly keen on identifying the governance trends within the leading countries of industrialization in Africa: South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritius, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, and Namibia. In the process, he formulates the governance-industrialization-induced growth model using three distinct quality indexes derived from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators. His study contributes to the broader political economy literature on cross-country comparison studies of African nations and their macro-level movements correlated with industrialization. It extends the broader literature examining the relationship between governance and development paths (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000) while recognizing the multi-dimensional attributes and institutions when governance is examined in the specific country contexts (Fukuyama, 2004). His research further opens to the specific politics-bureaucracy arrangements and relationship that are contextually driven (*Dasandi and Marc, 2017*).

The second article by Dr. John Osae-Kwapong conducts a longitudinal study on changes within the Afrobarometer survey for Ghana. The longitudinal approach lends insight to how political leadership and administrative reforms leaves an imprint on citizen satisfaction on government performance. The country's citizens have continuously expressed their support for democracy. However, as the data shows, the regime preference does not automatically translate to public sector performance. This lends insight to the often forgotten disconnect between the preferred method of leadership determination and government performance. Examination of such disconnect shines light to the existing cannon of works in comparative politics such as Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture Revisited and Woo-Cumings' The Developmental State while paying homage to public administration cannons such as Goodsell's The Case for Bureaucracy and Meier and O'Toole Jr.'s Bureaucracy in a Democratic State . Dr. Osae-Kwapong's work further highlights disconnect between democracy and government performance is complicated by its variation across different sectors. An argument furthered by Fukuyama that state-building requires a tailored approach as not all states functions are trouble in poorly performing states: an argument that scholars and practitioners of public administration know so well.

The third article co-authored by Dr. Bakry Elmedi and Dr. Crystal Murphy presents a qualitative case study for the conceptual development of Resistance Committees. They carefully lay important groundwork for how Resistance Committees, as recognized by the populace, arose and were sustained in Sudan's democratic governance. The study engages in the valuable conceptual discussion on its attributes and operating characteristics. Given the impressionable impact in Sudan's democracy, it is important to better define the conceptual term through the case study. By doing so, it lends insight to the generalizability of the term as well as its idiosyncratic identifiers separating it from other civilian mobilization movements witnessed in other country context in recent years. The work contributes to the broader scholarly agenda for African public administration and management by identifying and delving deeper into its distinguishing attributes and characteristics. Their research raises the question on whether social movements conceptual frameworks developed from U.S. settings carry generalizability to African contexts where democracy is still very contentious and under threat .

Dr. Cecilia IdikaKalu's article on "*Forging security in Fragile States"* follows Drs. Elmedi and Murphy's works and highlights social agents operating within sovereign boundaries but not bounded by jurisdictional authority. Due to the unique history of African states, governance institutions deviate from the strong Weberian definition of the state as they are often superimposed on predating and overriding social cleavages . Recognizing order in civil society organizations as a vital prerequisite for development, Dr. IdikaKalu's work raises the question on how the lingering atmosphere of violent insecurity from terrorist group activities could be addressed via help of international organizations in areas experiencing weak or limited state capacity. She presents an exploratory discussion by dissecting local agency in Nigeria.

Dr. Laila El Baradei and Ms. Mariam Walid examine an emerging challenge in Egypt's public administrative system: the growing need to invest in capacity enhancement in Egypt's large civil servant pool. Their research provides insight to past administrative policies that resulted in an enlarged public employee roster. The historical examination offers a stark contrast to the administrative evolutions found in the U.S. . Operating with such parameters set by path administrative decisions, Egypt has embarked on establishing a new administrative capital. With the launch of a significant transition, the authors examine how well existing public servants are trained to couple such large capital asset investments attached to the move. To optimize social benefits from the public investments, it is essential to ensure technical capacity enhancement training modules are offered to the operators and supervisors of those investments. Recognizing its significance, the authors provide insight to the importance of untangling institutional fragmentation and discordance on such initiatives while highlighting its importance. Moreover, they underscore the relevance of the different nature of public service employment and motivation which is an added dimension beyond technical competency

Dr. Ephrem Kwaa-Aidoo and Ms. Erika Osae co-authored the last article that examined the integration and adoption of information, communication, and technology (ICT) developments in Ghana's institutions of higher learning. They raised this question recognizing the digital revolution which is now a vital interlocutor in public communications and public service delivery . The importance of ICT was pronounced during the pandemic as many higher education institutions adopted online teaching modules . The authors' study examines the conduit role governance structure and practices play in adopting and strengthening ICT infrastructure to aid the mission of the higher institutions. It highlights the challenges in existing governance structures that stunts the incorporation of user demand and input within the organization. By doing so, it exposes the disconnection between ICT investment decision bodies and the outstanding needs of tertiary educators. In this sense, it speaks in a similar tone of known common challenges of street-level bureaucracy where those at the end of the implementation chain are forced to cope with emerging challenges unrecognized by those up in the policy making decision chain . It exposes existing barriers to adopting ICT-driven changes in Africa especially at a time when “leapfrogging” development opportunities are being identified and emphasized .

The running theme of this special issue's articles points out the multifaceted governance challenges confronting the African continent. Collectively, their content extends existing concepts, theories, and frameworks with intellectual lineage in the United States. With the exception of Dr. Kwaa-Aidoo and Ms. Osae who are based in Ghana, this is due to academic home of all our authors. Because we are anchored in the U.S., our research must make linkage with existing body of work generated by our peers on the continent. Such a linkage is critical since SAPA's goal is to build a comprehensive body of African public governance knowledge from both the academic and practitioners in the diaspora as well as our peers on the continent. By engaging in the bidirectional dialogue on validity and generalizability of existing scholarship, it helps us serve our role to see what works and to modify and/or create new concepts, theories, and frameworks. This is reflected in this special issue, and it is SAPA's mandate to generate more debates and discussion in our search for pragmatic means and ways of fostering effective African democratic governance. This will materialize once the imperatives of democratic governance (e.g., transparency, accountability, fairness, and integrity) are realized and sustained through making rapid socioeconomic progress .

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The Nexus Between the Quality of Governance, Industrialization, and Economic Growth: Evidence from the 10 Most Industrialized African Countries

Oluwole Owoye,[1] Ph.D., Olugbenga A. Onafowora,[2] Ph.D.

Abstract

This paper provides country-specific assessments of the relationships between governance quality, industrialization, and economic growth in the 10 most industrialized African countries (MIACs). The "Africa Industrialization Index 2022" (AII) developed by the African Development Bank (AfDB) identified South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritius, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, and Namibia as the 10 MIACs. Given AfDB's acknowledgement that industrialization is fundamental to growth, this study asserts that industrialization requires an environment of functionally effective governance; therefore, this study poses some pertinent research questions. What is the strength of the associations between governance quality, industrialization, and economic growth in each of the 10 MIACs? Do these 10 MIACs have functionally effective governance and/or functionally ineffective governance performance? Is governance quality growth-enhancing or growth-retarding or growth-neutral in the 10 MIACs? To answer these research questions, the World Bank's World Governance Indicators are utilizedto construct three distinct governance quality indexes: political governance quality (PGQ), economic governance quality (EGQ), and social governance quality (SGQ) to show the governance performance locations of these 10 MIACs over the past two decade of the 21st century. To ascertain the strength of the relationships between PGQ, EGQ, SGQ, AII, and economic growth in 10 MIACs, this paper provides the country-specific correlation matrix, and thereafter use the difference-in-difference statistical technique to assess the progress in PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ over the 2000-2020 period. Finally, a parsimonious governance-industrialization-induced growth model is usedto identify the countries where governance-industrialization is growth-enhancing or growth-retarding or growth-neutral. In terms of policy implications, the 10 MIACs need governance reforms in order to achieve sustainable industrialization in the 21st century.

Key words: Governance, Quality, Industrialization, Growth-enhancing, Growth-retarding, Growth-neutral. JEL Classification: G38, H11, O10

Context and Introduction

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The World Population Review [WPR (2023)] used the United Nations' annual Human Development Index (HDI) to identify Mauritius, Seychelles, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, South Africa, Gabon, Botswana, and Morocco as the 10 most developed African countries in 2021/22. According to WPR (2023), "A developed country is one that boasts features such as a mature and varied economy, a stable and functional government, a robust infrastructure, a strong educational system, ample job opportunities, comprehensive health and social services, and a high degree of personal freedom. Countries that fall slightly short of these goals are classified as developing countries. Those that fall far short are designated the least developed countries and become eligible for specific United Nations assistance programs."

In the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, Benson (2022) used the health care index scores to identify and classify South Africa, Kenya, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, and Morocco as the seven African countries with the best health care systems in Africa. The issue of health care caught the attention of governments in African countries at the beginning of the 21st century, which led to the 2001 Abuja Declaration during which the governments of all African countries pledged to devote 15 percent of their gross domestic products to funding their health care systems. Recently, the African Development Bank developed *"Africa Industrialization Index 2022"* with which it identified South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritius, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, and Namibia as the 10 MIACs. Apart from Algeria, six of these seven African countries with the best health care systems are also among these industrialized African countries.

It is important to point out that the idea of classifying African countries into different groups is not new or unique. Many international institutions and/or agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Funds, and the World Health Organization have classified African countries into different groups over the past couple of decades. The African Development Bank recognizes the importance of industrialization in achieving long term economic growth and development outcomes, but importantly, this study asserts that industrialization requires functionally effective governance because this was what laid the foundation for "The Industrial Revolution" that spanned the 1750 - 1840 period in Britain[1]. In other words, the strength and survival of industrialization in achieving sustainable economic growth and long term development outcomes depend on the governance structure; therefore, this study poses some research questions. What is the strength of the associations between governance quality, industrialization, and economic growth in each of these 10 MIACs? Do these 10 MIACs have functionally effective governance and/or functionally ineffective governance performance in the past two decades of the 21st century? How many of these 10 African countries made progress in governance quality in the second decade compared to the first decade of the 21st century? Is governance quality or industrialization *growth-enhancing or growth-retarding or growth-neutral* in the10 MIACs?

This paper contributes to the literature by answering these research questions to show the level of governance performance in these industrialized African countries in the first two decades of the 21st century. The first contribution of the paper is the utilization of the six governance indicators developed by the World Bank to construct three distinct governance quality indexes: political governance quality (PGQ), economic governance quality (EGQ), and social governance quality (SGQ). The constructed PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indices are then used to classify countries into the functionally effective governance (FEG) performance for scores ranging between 0 and 2.5 and/or the functionally ineffective governance (FIG) performance categories for scores ranging between 0 and –2.5.Within the 0 to 2.5 range of FEG, scores from 0 to 0.83, 0.84 to1.66, and 1.67 to 2.5 are viewed as minimum, medium, and maximum governance quality, respectively. Within the 0 to –2.5 range of FIG, scores from 0 to –0.83, –0.84 to –1.66, and –1.67 to –2.5 are considered as bad, worse, and worst governance quality, respectively.

Another contribution of the paper is the computation of country-specific correlation matrix to verify the strength of the associations between PGQ, EGQ, SGQ, AII, and economic growth (Y_t) in the 10 MIACs. The estimated results of the correlation matrix showed that the associations between PGQ, EGQ, SGQ, AII, and Y_t varied among the 10 MIACs. The next contribution of the paper is the utilization of the difference-in-difference estimation method to assess the transitions within and/or across the FEG and FIG performance categories in the past two decades for the PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indexes for each of the 10 MIACs. The estimated results showed that governance quality remained unchanged or worsened in overwhelming majority of the countries in the sample while some countries experienced minor improvements in governance quality while in the bad governance range of FIG. An

[1]The factors that started the Industrial Revolution in Britain were the uniqueness of British economic life, the systems and practices of political administration, and the prevailing religious ideas in Britain, which also transitioned to other economies worldwide – see Industrial Revolution in Britain: Causes and Effects - GeeksforGeeks.

additional contribution of the paper is the graphical illustrations to show the governance performance stations (GPS), based on the estimated results. This is intended to provide policymakers in the 10 MIACs with a clear view of their current governance position.

Since experts cannot rely solely on the results of the country-specific correlation matrix for significant policy prescriptions because correlation does not imply causation, another important contribution of this paper is the utilization of a parsimonious governance-industrialization-induced growth regression to show which countries in the sample where PGQ, EGQ, SGQ, and AII are *growth-enhancing or growth-retarding or growth-neutral*. The estimated results also varied among the 10 MIACs. Importantly, the country-specific correlation matrix, the difference-in-difference statistical method, and the governance-industrialization-induced growth regression results are meant to show that the 10 MIACs are not homogeneous; therefore, a balanced panel regression could yield erroneous and misleading results with respect to policy implications and prescriptions.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of studies that examine the causal relationship between public governance performance and sustainable economic growth. Section 3 provides the conceptual framework and utilizes computed data to show the trends of the 10 MIACs in the FEG and/or FIG performance categories. Section 4 provides the estimated results based on the difference-in-difference method used to measure the transitions within and across the FEG and/or FIG categories. Section 5 concludes with some policy implications and prescriptions for public governance reforms.

Literature Review

The emergence of governance matters, which Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a 1999b, 2002) developed and quantified in the late 1990s and early 2000s changed how growth theorists now explain economic growth and development outcomes in less developed countries. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003, 2005, 2006, 2009) used a larger sample of countries to document the strong positive association between each of the six aggregate governance indicators capturing various dimensions of public governance and three development outcomes (measured by per capita incomes, infant mortality, and adult literacy) to answer their question about how much governance matters for development outcomes. Their study used a series of cross-sectional parsimonious regressions of per capita incomes, infant mortality, and adult literacy on each of the six governance indicators and they found that improvements in governance have a very large payoff in terms of development outcomes. Over the past two decades, the significance of good governance in economic growth and development outcomes gained attention, thus studies such as Acemoglu *et al*. (2001), Amdt and Oman (2006), Dixit (2009), Ahlerup *et al*. (2016), and Ekpo (2021), and others have emphasized the importance of better governance performance in the formulations and implementations of successful policies with focus on economic growth. According to Arulrajah (2015), the prevalence of good governance is also important for organizational sustainability, which entails the eight major characteristics of good governance. These eight characteristics include the participation by both men and women as a key cornerstone of good governance, consensus orientation, accountability is another key requirement of good governance, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness, and following the rule of law.

The United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA, 2007) also emphasized the strong correlation between good governance and economic growth and better development outcomes in their detailed review of the literature about public governance indicators. UNDESA's study provided different definitions of governance, what constitutes "good" governance, why it is necessary to evaluate governance, and how to conduct the evaluation of governance. According to UNDESA (2007), there exist many definitions of governance in the literature due to the inherent diversity in national traditions and public culture, and that this could be distilled into just three main types of governance, which Nzongola-Ntalaja's (2003) study laid out as political or public governance considered to be fundamental to governing political institutions, economic governance needed for governing economic institutions, and social governance necessary for governing social institutions.

From UNDESA's perspectives, political or public governance reflects the authority of the State and relates to the process by which a society organizes its affairs and manages itself, which can be evaluated using two governance indicators: voice and accountability and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. For economic governance, its authority is enhanced by the private sector and relates to the policies, the processes or organizational mechanisms that are necessary to produce and distribute goods and services, which can be measured by two other governance indicators: government effectiveness and regulatory quality. For social governance, its authority is the civil society, including citizens and non-for-profit organizations, which relates to a system of values and beliefs that are necessary for social behaviors to happen and for public decisions to be taken. The effectiveness of social governance can be evaluated by two governance indicators: rule of law and control of corruption. Importantly, UNDESA (2007) pointed out that the evaluations and the instruments used to conduct the evaluations of good governance are crucial not only for the strong positive association with better development outcomes, but also, good governance can convey good signal to domestic investors, international agencies, and external donors. In a related study, Dixit (2009) considered economic governance as important because markets, and economic activities and transactions more generally, cannot function well in the absence of effective economic governance; therefore, good governance is needed to secure three essential prerequisites of market economies: the security of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and collective actions.

Ndulu and O'Connell (1999) used a political economy approach to argue that Africa countries' economic growth record reflected a groping towards satisfactory modes of national governance under objectively difficult political and social circumstances since these countries gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Ndulu and O'Connell (1999, p. 60) argued that, "Governance affects long-term growth not only through policy distortions and transactions costs, but also via capacity to handle external economic shocks as they occur." Many studies have examined the issue of governance and growth in African countries from different dimensions. Some studies have used the panel framework within the generalized methods moments (GMM) to analyze governance and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or in a group of countries in different economic communities in Africa in which the studies either affirmed or refuted the strong positive association between better governance and better development outcomes, which Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003, 2005, 2006, 2009)esta-blished with the six governance indicators [Habtamu (2008), Omoteso and Ishola (2014), and Egharevba (2017)].

Orayo and Mose (2016) used panel data of governance indicators covering the 1999-2013 period to examine the causal relationship between good governance and economic growth among the countries in the East Africa Community (EAC). The study showed political stability and regulatory quality to be negatively related to economic growth rates in these EAC countries thus the urgent call for more effective regulation on both public and private institutions. Using panel data covering 27 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1996-2014, Jeleta and Takyii (2017) examined the causal relationship between institutional quality and economic growth; and they found a long-run relationship between institutional quality and economic growth thus the recommendation to enhance institutional quality in SSA countries. Similarly, Salawu *et al.* (2018) employed panel data covering the 1996-2016 period to examine the impact of governance on economic growth in Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa. Their empirical results showed that governance has positive effect on economic growth in Ghana and South Africa because they have better governance performance when compared to Nigeria, and that the relationship is negative because of bad governance in Nigeria.

Afolabi (2019) utilized the six governance indicators covering 2002-2016 period for West African countries in a GMM model to show that voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law are positively related to development; and that "in the long run, all governance indicators are directly related to development in West African countries, with political stability and regulatory quality having the largest impact." Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) investigated the role of governance in explaining the sub-optimal economic growth performance of African economies while controlling for the conventional sources of growth; and their results suggested that good governance or lack thereof contributes to the gaps in income per capita between richer and poorer African countries. In addition, their results indicated that the role of governance on economic growth depends on the type and the level of income growth of countries under consideration.

Adzima and Baita (2019) also examined the impact of governance on economic growth in SSA countries, and they found that governance positively influenced economic growth in SSA countries thus their recommendation that "effective governance and the rule of law should be strengthened to improve the performance of governance on economic growth." In related studies, Ekpo (2016a, 2016b 2018) continued to examine the relationship between governance, growth, and development in SSA countries using panel data. According to Ekpo (2021), government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law are negatively related to growth while voice and accountability as well as political stability have statistically significant positive impact on growth. Ekpo (2021) distinguished between growth and development by emphasizing that "regulatory quality, size of government, political stability, and government effectiveness are positively linked to development but not growth," thus the call for improvement in SSA countries.

According to Hammadi *et al*. (2019), SSA countries tend to lag behind countries in most other regions of the world in terms of governance and the perceptions of corruption, and that weak governance undermines economic performance through various channels, including deficiencies in government functions and distortions to economic incentives. They recommended that SSA countries could strengthen their economic performance by improving governance and reducing corruption, which could be associated with large growth dividends in the long run. Recently, the AfDB (2022) developed the AII based on performance, direct and indirect determinants. The indirect determinants addressed how well African countries created an enabling environment for industrialization, macroeconomic stability, sound institutions, and infrastructure.

Conceptual Framework

The progress in governance quality in the industrialized African countries can be measured by the six governance indicators developed by the World Bank. As noted earlier, the improvement made in political governance quality (PGQ) can be evaluated using voice and accountability (VA) and political stability and absence of violence (PV) scores. The advancement in economic governance quality (EGQ) can be measured using government effectiveness (GE) and regulatory quality (RQ) scores; and the progress in social governance quality (SGQ) can be evaluated by the rule of law (RL) and control of corruption (CC) scores.

To put succinctly, this paper constructs three unique PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indices as:

1. PGQ Index = ½(VA+PV)

2. EGQ Index = ½ (GE+RQ)

3. SGQ Index = ½ (RL+CC)

covering the first two decades of the 21st century. Applying the same scores provided by the World Bank as the guideline, countries with PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ in the 0 to 2.5 scores are classified as FEG while those countries with scores ranging between 0 and –2.5 are deemed as FIG. Based on the data computed for equations (1)–(3), Figures 1–3 provide the graphical illustrations of the trends in PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ. With respect to PGQ Index illustrated graphically in Figure 1, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa consistently remained in the FEG category throughout the sample period. Between 2002 and 2004, Senegal was in the FEG category, but transitioned into bad governance range (0 to –0.83) in FIG for almost a decade and did not return to the minimum governance range in the FEG category until 2014. In contrast, Tunisia, Morocco, and Kenya consistently remained in the bad governance range (0 to –0.83) in the FIG category throughout the sample period while Egypt, Eswatini, and Nigeria remained in the worse governance range (–0.83 to –1.66) for most or the entire sample period.

The *EGQ Index* illustrated in Figure 2



Figure 1: Trends in Political Governance Quality

showed that Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa also remained in the FEG category throughout the sample period. Only Mauritius reached the medium governance quality range (0.84 to 1.66) since 2010. Prior to 2010, Tunisia was in the minimum governance quality range (0 to 0.83) in the FEG category, but transitioned into the FIG category since 2011. Again, Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Kenya, Eswatini, and Nigeria remained in different ranges (bad governance quality range:0 to –0.83, worse governance quality range: –0.84to –1.66, and worst governance quality range:–1.67 to –2.50) in the FIG category throughout the sample period.

With respect to the S*GQ Index* illustrated in Figure 3, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa remained in the minimum range (0 to 0.83) in the FEG category as observed in Figures 1 and 2, while Tunisia, Senegal, Morocco, Egypt, Eswatini, Kenya, and Nigeria remained in different ranges (bad range:0 to –0.83 and worse range: –0.83 to –1.66) in the FIG category throughout the sample period. What stands out from these graphical illustrations is that the two largest economies in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa) are among these industrialized countries, and both are in different terrains with respect to governance quality. While South Africa is among the top three countries in the minimum governance quality range (0 to 0.83) with respect to PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indexes

Figure 2: Trends in Economic Governance Quality



Figure 3: Trends in Social Governance Quality



during the entire sample period, Nigeria is the only country among the group of 10 countries that exhibited the worst governance quality and remained consistently in the worse governance quality range (–0.83 to –1.66) in these three indexes.

Data and Estimated Results

Given the graphical illustrations of how many among 10 MIACs have FEG and/or FIG performance in the 21st century, the next issue is to examine the relationships between governance quality, industrialization, and economic growth in each country. This section provides the statistical validation of the associations between governance quality (PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ), industrialization (AII), and economic growth (Yt) in the 10 MIACs by using the 2010-2021 AII scores provided by the AfDB. Thereafter, the focus is on how many among the10 MIACs made progress in governance quality in the second decade compared to the first decade of the 21st century. The estimated correlation coefficients matrix provided in Table 1 shows positive correlations between Yt and AII in South Africa, Tunisia, Mauritius, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, and Namibia, but negative correlations in Morocco, Egypt, and Kenya. Furthermore, PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ are positively correlated to Yt in South Africa and Senegal; and more importantly, South Africa and Senegal are the only two countries in the group where PGQ, EGQ, SGQ, and AII are strongly correlated.

Interpretatively, effective governance as measured by PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ is fundamental to effective and sustainable industrialization, which may explain why South Africa is the leader among the 10 MIACs (AfDB, 2022) and why Senegal continued to show tremendous progress in industrialization in the past decade[2]. The strength of the associations between these data variables in South Africa and Senegal further lends credence to the importance of functionally effective governance and industrialization in achieving sustainable economic growth and development. Based on the statistical validations of the correlations between functionally effective and/or ineffective governance, industrialization, and economic growth in the 10 MIACs, which the AfDB identified in the second decade of the 21st century, the next statistical approach is the use of the difference-in-difference (DID) statistical method. The DID or the difference-in-means (DIM)[3] is used to provide answers to the questions as to whether any of these 10 MIACs experienced progress or positive improvements, negative changes, and/or stationary governance performance in the second decade in comparison to the first decade of the 21st century. It is important to note that the DID or DIM estimator method is commonly used in economics and other social sciences as the summary statistics in meta-analysis when measuring outcomes made on the same scale of variables over a period of time, normally

[2]See https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-industrialization-index-2022.

[3]For more about the difference-in-differences or the difference-in-means method, see Athey and Imbens (2006, 2017), Stock and Watson (2019), Wooldridge (2016), Lechner (2011), and Bertrand et al. (2004).

Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Governance Quality, Africa Industrialization Index, andEconomic Growth in 10 MIACs, 2010-2021

1. South Africa

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.30	1			
EGQ	0.82	0.63	1		
SGQ	0.42	0.66	0.54	1	
AII	0.77	0.73	0.92	0.47	**1**

2. Morocco

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.01	1			
EGQ	-0.38	-0.49	1		
SGQ	-0.05	0.66	-0.51	1	
AII	-0.32	0.42	-0.48	0.21	1

3. Egypt

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.09	1			
EGQ	0.12	0.17	1		
SGQ	0.32	0.34	0.32	1	
AII	-0.09	-0.58	0.11	-0.37	1

4. Tunisia

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Yt	1				
PGQ	-0.46	1			
EGQ	0.20	-0.31	1		
SGQ	-0.41	0.80	-0.54	1	
AII	0.20	-0.50	0.24	-0.69	1

5. Mauritius

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.35	1			
EGQ	-0.25	-0.27	1		
SGQ	-0.36	0.05	-0.24	1	
AII	0.42	0.31	0.65	-0.50	1

6. Eswatini

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.01	1			
EGQ	0.14	-0.38	1		
SGQ	-0.19	-0.28	0.01	1	
AII	0.43	0.58	-0.16	-0.15	1

7. Senegal

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.38	1			
EGQ	0.04	0.79	1		
SGQ	0.52	0.84	0.58	1	
AII	0.08	0.86	0.89	0.63	1

8. Nigeria

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	-0.79	1			
EGQ	0.34	-0.54	1		
SGQ	-0.73	0.83	-0.49	1	
AII	0.17	-0.15	-0.22	0.01	1

9. Kenya

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	-0.06	1			
EGQ	0.52	0.03	1		
SGQ	-0.08	0.26	0.58	1	
AII	-0.01	0.42	0.04	0.68	1

10. Namibia

	Y_t	*PGQ*	*EGQ*	*SGQ*	*AII*
Y_t	1				
PGQ	0.30	1			
EGQ	0.72	0.71	1		
SGQ	-0.63	-0.18	-0.31	1	
AII	0.01	-0.44	-0.15	0.12	1

Source: Computed by the authors using the 2010-2021 data on AII provided by the African Development Bank (2022).

before and after.

The computed data for PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indexes cover 10 years of the first decade and 10 years of the second decade of the 21^{st} century; therefore, the DID assessment of the public governance quality, economic governance quality, and social governance quality can be written in three separate sets of null hypotheses (H_0) and alternative hypotheses (H_A) for each of the10 MIACs in the sample. That is:
To find the mean with which to test the changes in the first decade (subscript d1) and

$$\text{(a) } H_0: \overline{PGQ}_{d2} = \overline{PGQ}_{d1} \text{ versus } H_A: \overline{PGQ}_{d2} \neq \overline{PGQ}_{d1},$$

$$\text{(b) } H_0: \overline{EGQ}_{d2} = \overline{EGQ}_{d1} \text{ versus } H_A: \overline{EGQ}_{d2} \neq \overline{EGQ}_{d1},$$

and

$$\text{(c) } H_0: \overline{SGQ}_{d2} = \overline{SGQ}_{d1} \text{ versus } H_A: \overline{SGQ}_{d2} \neq \overline{SGQ}_{d1}$$

second decade (subscript d2), ΣPGQ_{d1} and ΣPGQ_{d2}; ΣEGQ_{d1} and ΣEGQ_{d2}; and ΣSGQ_{d1} and ΣSGQ_{d2} are the sums of each computed governance index in both decades. The difference (D) for each index: $D|PGQ = PGQ_{d2} - PGQ_{d1}$, $D|EGQ = EGQ_{d2} - EGQ_{d1}$, and $D|SGQ = SGQ_{d2} - SGQ_{d1}$ while $D^2|PGQ$ and $\Sigma D^2|PGQ$, $D^2|EGQ$ and $\Sigma D^2|EGQ$, and $D^2|SGQ$ and $\Sigma D^2|SGQ$ are the square difference and the sum of the square difference, respectively.

To make meaningful comparison between the first and second decades of the 21^{st} century, the standard deviations, the standard errors, and the t-values are estimated, respectively, as:
for each of the 10 MIACs in the sample given the degree of freedom as *df* = N – 1. The

$$S_{D_{PGQ}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N}\sum D_{PGQ}^2 - \left(\Delta\overline{PGQ}\right)^2}\,;\ S_{D_{EGQ}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N}\sum D_{EGQ}^2 - \left(\Delta\overline{EGQ}\right)^2}\,;\ \text{and } S_{D_{SGQ}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N}\sum D_{SGQ}^2 - \left(\Delta\overline{SGQ}\right)^2} \quad (4),$$

$$S_{\overline{D}_{PGQ}} = \frac{S_{D_{PGQ}}}{\sqrt{N-1}},\ S_{\overline{D}_{EGQ}} = \frac{S_{D_{EGQ}}}{\sqrt{N-1}},\ \text{and } S_{\overline{D}_{SGQ}} = \frac{S_{D_{SGQ}}}{\sqrt{N-1}} \quad (5),$$

and

$$t_{PGQ} = \frac{\Delta\overline{PGQ}}{S_{\overline{D}_{PGQ}}},\ t_{EGQ} = \frac{\Delta\overline{EGQ}}{S_{\overline{D}_{EGQ}}},\ \text{and } t_{SGQ} = \frac{\Delta\overline{SGQ}}{S_{\overline{D}_{SGQ}}} \quad (6)$$

results for tests of the H_0 and H_A hypotheses for public governance quality *(PGQ)* are reported in Tables 2 in which the H_0 is rejected in favor of the H_A in four of the 10 industrialized African countries in the sample. For these four countries, minor progress or improvements ($\overline{PGQ}_{d2} > \overline{PGQ}_{d1}$) in PGQ occurred in Tunisia and Senegal while PGQ worsened ($\overline{PGQ}_{d2} < \overline{PGQ}_{d1}$) in Egypt and Eswatini. In contrast, the H_0: $\overline{PGQ}_{d2} = \overline{PGQ}_{d1}$ is confirmed in South Africa, Morocco, Mauritius, Nigeria, Kenya, and Namibia.

The estimated results for the H_0 and H_A hypotheses with respect to EGQ are

Table 2: Public Governance Qualityin the 10 MIACs

	Countries	$\overline{PGQ}_{2ndD}$	$S^2{}_{2ndD}$	$\overline{PGQ}_{1stD}$	$S^2{}_{1stD}$	$\Delta\overline{PGQ}$	*t*-value
1.	South Africa	0.24	0.001	0.28	0.005	-0.04	-1.36
2.	Morocco	-0.53	0.002	-0.55	0.009	0.03	0.82
3.	Egypt	-1.30	0.008	-0.89	0.009	-0.41	-13.22*
4.	Tunisia	-0.36	0.009	-0.52	0.021	0.16	2.51*
5.	Mauritius	0.87	0.003	0.87	0.006	0.00	0.09
6.	Eswatini	-0.87	0.005	-0.72	0.004	-0.15	-5.15*
7.	Senegal	0.07	0.004	-0.11	0.022	0.18	2.65*
8.	Nigeria	-1.24	0.011	-1.31	0.014	0.07	0.91
9.	Kenya	-0.72	0.002	-0.77	0.011	0.05	1.70
10.	Namibia	0.62	0.002	0.55	0.039	0.07	0.92

Note * indicates statistically significant t-values at 0.05 marginal significance level.

reported in Table 3. The H_0 is rejected in favor of the H_A in six of the 10 industrialized African countries covered in our sample. Among these six countries, Mauritius and Kenya showed some progress in economic governance quality in the second decade ($\overline{EGQ}_{d2} > \overline{EGQ}_{d1}$) while EGQ worsened in South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia and Namibia ($\overline{EGQ}_{d2} < \overline{EGQ}_{d1}$). In contrast, EGQ remained unchanged in Morocco, Eswatini, Senegal, and Nigeria. The estimated results for the SGQ reported in Table 4 show that the H_0 is rejected in seven of the 10 MIACs in the sample. While Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya showed minor improvements among these seven countries, SGQ worsened in South Africa, Egypt, and Mauritius. The H_0 is confirmed in Morocco, Tunisia, and Namibia because SGQ remained unchanged in both decades.

Based on computed scores for PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ; Panels A, B, and C of Figure 4 provide the histograms simply dubbed the governance performance stations (GPS), which the policymakers in these 10 MIACs can use to find their locations in the FEG quality range (0 to 2.5) and/or in the FIG quality range (0 to –2.5) in the first two decades of the 21st century. These GPS graphical illustrations are particularly important

Table 3: Economic Governance Quality in the 10 MIACs

	Countries	$\overline{EGQ}_{2ndD}$	$S^2{}_{2ndD}$	$\overline{EGQ}_{1stD}$	$S^2{}_{1stD}$	$\Delta\overline{EGQ}$	*t*-value
1.	South Africa	0.27	0.011	0.58	0.015	-0.31	-14.16*
2.	Morocco	-0.14	0.004	-0.18	0.005	0.04	1.32
3.	Egypt	-0.65	0.076	-0.37	0.008	-0.28	-3.40*
4.	Tunisia	-0.25	0.005	0.21	0.007	-0.46	-12.68*
5.	Mauritius	0.99	0.004	0.66	0.019	0.33	5.56*
6.	Eswatini	-0.56	0.007	-0.64	0.021	0.08	1.35
7.	Senegal	-0.22	0.007	-0.28	0.013	0.06	0.98
8.	Nigeria	-0.94	0.004	-0.99	0.012	0.05	1.19
9.	Kenya	-0.33	0.002	-0.40	0.002	0.07	2.60*
10.	Namibia	0.04	0.003	0.14	0.009	-0.10	-4.13*

Note * indicates statistically significant ***t*-values** at 0.05 marginal significance level.

Table 4: Social Governance Quality in the 10 MIACs

	Countries	$\overline{SGQ}_{2ndD}$	$S^2{}_{2ndD}$	$\overline{SGQ}_{1stD}$	$S^2{}_{1stD}$	$\Delta\overline{SGQ}$	*t*-value
1.	South Africa	0.02	0.003	0.23	0.007	-0.21	-15.34*
2.	Morocco	-0.21	0.004	-0.23	0.009	0.02	0.48
3.	Egypt	-0.57	0.003	-0.36	0.011	-0.21	-4.80*
4.	Tunisia	-0.05	0.002	-0.04	0.007	-0.01	-0.32
5.	Mauritius	0.57	0.007	0.69	0.003	-0.12	-4.15*
6.	Eswatini	-0.39	0.008	-0.51	0.013	0.12	2.38*
7.	Senegal	-0.11	0.007	-0.23	0.049	0.12	2.31*
8.	Nigeria	-1.04	0.008	-1.20	0.028	0.16	4.99*
9.	Kenya	-0.73	0.013	-0.94	0.004	0.21	4.05*
10.	Namibia	0.29	0.002	0.22	0.014	0.07	1.93

Note * indicates statistically significant t-values at 0.05 marginal significance level.

because the achievement of the Agenda 2063 requires solid industrialization between now and 2063; therefore, the policymakers in these countries need to know their current location in order to plan on how to transition into the correct FEG range as they move forward in strengthening and solidifying their industrialization process.

Given the degree of variations in the correlations in the 10 MIACs, the next research issue is whether governance quality is growth-enhancing or growth-retarding or growth-neutral in these 10 MIACs. To analyze the impact of the three distinct measures of governance performance, industrialization, and other indicators on economic growth in the 10 MIACs, this paper follows the empirical specification by Kaufmann, Kray, and Zoido-Lobatón(1999b) in which they expressed the logarithm of real GDP per capita as a linear function of governance quality and an error term. The governance-industrialization-induced growth model is expressed as:

Figure 4: Locations of Governance Quality in the First Two Decades of the 21st Century



$$Y_{it}=f(PGQ_{it},EGQ_{it},SGQ_{it},AII_{it},\boldsymbol{Z}) \qquad (7)$$

where Y_{it} is the growth rates of real GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and taken as the relevant dependent variable for country *i* in period *t*, PGQ_{it}, EGQ_{it}, SGQ_{it}, and AII_{it} are as defined earlier, and Z is a vector of other explanatory variables (such as physical capital, human capital, investment and savings, trade openness, inflation rate, and technology) that studies consider as significant determinants of economic growth.

Since the Harrod-Domar growth model of 1939 and 1946 [Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946)] and the emergence of the exogenous growth model, which Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) amplified, the consensus among economic growth theorists is the accumulation of physical capital. The endogenous growth theorists also emphasize that trade openness, inflation rate, and technology are fundamental to economic growth. Given the voluminous replications over the past several decades using different variables, this study focuses exclusively on governance quality measured by PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ; therefore, it follows Kaufman *et al*. (1999a, 1991b) by specifying the governance-induced growth regression equation, which is expressed as:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 PGQ_{it} + \delta_2 EGQ_{it} + \delta_3 SGQ_{it} + e_{it} \quad (8)$$

and the governance-industrialization-induced growth regression equation is expressed as:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 PGQ_{it} + \delta_2 EGQ_{it} + \delta_3 SGQ_{it} + \beta_i AII_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (9)$$

where the pertinent explanatory variables in equations(8) and (9)are as defined and explained earlier while e_{it} and ε_{it} are the error terms for country *i* in period *t* with $E(e_{it}) = 0, E(e^2_{it}) = \quad E(\varepsilon_{it}) = 0, E(\varepsilon^2_{it}) =$ and . The main issue is whether the relevant estimated coefficients (δ1, δ2, and δ3) in equations (8) and (9) are positive or negative and statistically significant or insignificant at the standard marginal significance level.

For clarity, the governance-induced growth model specified in equation (8) can be viewed from three perspectives. Governance quality could be: (i) *growth-enhancing* if the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant, (ii) *growth-retarding* if the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant, and (iii) *growth-neutral* if the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Similarly, for equation (9), the focus is on whether βi is positive or negative and statistically significant. This is intended to show that industrialization could be: (i) *growth-enhancing*, (ii) *growth-retarding*, and (iii) *growth-neutral* in each of the 10 MIACs.

Table 5: Regression Results for the 10 MIACs

	Countries	*PGQ*	*t-stat*	*EGQ*	*t-stat*	*SGQ*	*t-stat*	R^2
1.	South Africa	10.81	1.03	10.74*	2.29	3.80	0.69	0.60
2.	Morocco	5.23	0.35	-16.85	-1..35	-0.78	-0.07	0.10
3.	Egypt	5.38	0.97	2.53	0.55	-5.75	-0.55	0.10
4.	Tunisia	-5.55	-1.05	9.07*	2.97	-4.21	-0.52	0.49
5.	Mauritius	0.28	0.02	-12.84*	-2.28	-18.88	-1.44	0.26
6.	Eswatini	7.90	1.38	0.91	0.15	-13.28*	-2.30	0.34
7.	Senegal	1.84	0.50	7.93	1.39	5.70	1.54	0.19
8.	Nigeria	-10.33*	-3.07	-4.22	0.49	-21.60*	-4.13	0.62
9.	Kenya	10.38	1.03	27.03	1.44	-1.02	-0.13	0.23
10	Namibia	1.71	0.26	25.25*	2.10	-22.19*	-2.43	0.40

Note: *indicates statistically significant t-statisticat0.05marginal significance level.

Table 6 Regression Results for the 10 MIACs

	Countries	*PGQ*	*t-Stat*	*EGQ*	*t-stat*	*SGQ*	*t-stat*	*AII*	*t-stat*	R^2
1.	South Africa	6.40	0.47	61.2*	2.57	15.4	1.49	200.9*	2.78	0.85
2.	Morocco	15.6	0.49	-60.3*	-2.58	-27.7	-1.25	-127.6*	-2.30	0.59
3.	Egypt	-0.7	-0.02	0.2	0.03	25.2	0.73	12.8	0.05	0.10
4.	Tunisia	-13.3	-0.56	0.2	0.02	-15.9	-0.26	-48.5	-0.24	0.23
5.	Mauritius	-46.2	-1.59	-101.8*	-3.12	3.5	0.20	732.6*	2.96	0.73
6.	Eswatini	-17.4	-0.83	3.4	0.26	-7.0	-0.56	236.9	1.56	0.32
7.	Senegal	12.2	0.74	-4.4	-0.33	5.2	0.72	-74.9	-0.69	0.43
8.	Nigeria	-21.3	-1.31	-6.4	-0.35	-10.0	-0.51	10.2	0.20	0.66
9.	Kenya	- 9.8	-0.78	103.5*	5.74	-39.5*	-4.75	313.1*	3.77	0.85
10.	Namibia	-36.9	-1.15	78.9*	2.83	-47.2*	-2.66	12.5	0.90	0.77

Note: *indicates statistically significant t-statistic at 0.05 marginal significance level

The estimated results for equation (8) reported in Table 5 show that the statistically significant positive and negative relationships between the three indexes (PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ) of governance quality and real GDP growth vary widely among these industrialized African countries. In South Africa, Tunisia, and Namibia, EGQ is positive and statistically significant and growth-enhancing, but negative and statistically significant and growth-retarding in Mauritius. Among the 10 MIACs, Nigeria – considered as the largest economy in Africa – has the worst case scenario because PGQ and SGQ are negative and statistically significant, thus *growth-retarding*. In Eswatini and Namibia, SGQ is growth-retarding. Finally, PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ are statistically insignificant and are therefore growth-neutral in Morocco, Egypt, Senegal, and Kenya.

The estimated results for equation (9) reported in Table 6, based on the AII data provided by the AfDB, indicated that industrialization is growth-enhancing in South Africa, Mauritius, and Kenya. In contrast, it is growth-retarding in Morocco and growth-neutral in Egypt, Tunisia, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, and Namibia. It is important to point out that the estimated results of the country-specific correlation matrix, the difference-in-difference statistical method, and the governance-induced growth regressions show that the 10 MIACs are not homogeneous. These results are clear indications that a balanced or unbalanced panel regression model could circumvent the heterogeneity as manifested by the country-specific characteristics, thus leading to misleading results and erroneous inferences with respect to policy prescriptions and implications.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This paper complements the plethora of studies that have emphasized the importance of functionally effective governance in economic growth and development outcomes in less developed countries by providing the estimated country-specific correlations matrix intended to show whether or not industrialization is positively or negatively correlated to economic growth in the 10 MIACs. Among these countries, South Africa and Senegal stand out as the two countries where the quality of governance and indus-trialization are positive and strongly correlated. This is interesting because the Industrial Revolution that spanned the 1750-1840 period occurred because of "the uniqueness of British economic life, the systems and practices of political administration, and the prevailing religious ideas in Britain," all of which are reflective in EGQ, PGQ, and SGQ. In addition, there is a positive correlation between governance quality (as measured by PGQ, EGQ, and SGQ indexes) and economic growth in South Africa, Egypt, and Senegal where these measures are also pair-wise positively correlated. In Morocco and Mauritius, EGQ and SGQ are negatively correlated to economic growth while PGQ and SGQ are negatively correlated to economic growth in Tunisia, Nigeria, and Kenya over the past two decades.

The estimated governance-induced growth regression results reveal that the coefficients of PGQ and SGQ are negative and statistically significant in explaining economic growth in Nigeria while SGQ is growth-retarding in Eswatini and Namibia. Interpretatively, governance quality as measured by PGQ and SGQ are growth-retarding in Nigeria. On the positive side, governance quality as measured by EGQ is positive and statistically significant in South Africa, Tunisia, and Namibia. In a nutshell, the multiple regression results reveal the variations in the relationships between governance quality, industrialization, and sustainable economic growth in the 10 MIACs.

These results have important implications in this era of globalization where many growth theorists have established that good governance is fundamental to sustainable economic growth and better development outcomes. In terms of policy implications, being identified and/or classified as one of the most industrialized countries is not sufficient to guarantee the solidification of industrialization necessary to achieve sustainable economic growth and development outcomes in the 21st century. Therefore, the governments and policymakers in these 10 MIACs need effective coordination and collaboration in leaderships at the economic, political, and social institutions in order to achieve solid improvements in governance reforms, especially in those seven countries (Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Eswatini, Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya) where governance is growth-retarding and/or growth-neutral. According to economic historians, the Industrial Revolution, which occurred in Britain, is a clear indication of the success of industrialization in an environment of functionally effective governance.

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What Do Ghanaian Citizens Want? Are They Getting It? And The Consequences for The Political Transition to Democracy.

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Abstract

Political transitions to democracy continue to generate interest among public administrators. Fully aware of the economic and social needs of citizens, what happens to democracy when citizens feel like they are getting or not getting what they want from the government? Drawing on data over multiple years from the Afrobarometer survey, and using Ghana as a case study, this study tests a) what happens to citizens' support for democracy, support for elections, and satisfaction with democracy in periods of dissatisfaction as well as satisfaction with government efforts to meet their needs. The results of the multiple regression analysis show that there is an overall effect on satisfaction with the way democracy is working, but a very limited effect on support for democracy and elections. In discussions about the consequences of political transitions and the role of public administration it is important to recognize these nuances. It is helpful to not ask the consequences for democracy but rather which aspect of the democratic experience of citizens public administration has a direct way of shaping.

Key words: Afrobarometer, democracy, government performance, policy priorities, political transitions.

Introduction

Political transitions, the change from one type of political regime to another, are not new to countries like Ghana. The country has experience with transitions from one party state to military rule and from military rule to multiparty democracy. The most recent transition to multiparty democracy took place around the same period billed as the year in which the third wave of democratization finally reached the shores of the African continent (Huntington 1991).

The political transitions conversation appears to fall into three main themes. First, there is a great focus on how well democracy has been embraced by citizens. Typically, this theme examines the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy is working. Whether using single country case studies (Darga, 2018; Conroy-Krutz & Kerr 2015; Awuah Mensha & Gyaimah Boadi 2003; Kang 2015) or multiple country cases (Alemika 2007; Bentley, Han & Penar 2015; Berman 2018; Magalhaes 2016, Pew Center 2019) there is little contention about the growing dissatisfaction with democracy. The second theme examines the decline in the quality of democratic regimes often described as a global recession of democracy (Diamond 2015). There are dissenting voices who argue that democracy's footprints are more firmly implanted than the literature suggests (Levitsky & Way 2015).

The third theme examines a paradox about democracy which reveals itself in three ways - a healthy support for democracy, a growing dissatisfaction with democracy, but also a rejection of non-democratic alternatives (Gyimah Boadi & Awuah Mensah 2003; Dorseet 2012). Following in the argument of the consequences of democratic transitions (Carbone 2009), this paper examines political transitions from a public administration perspective. It is interested in three essential questions. First, what do citizens say they want from the government? Second, to what extent do citizens feel they are getting the things they want from government? And finally, what are the consequences for democracy when citizens feel they are getting or not getting what they want from govern ment? Drawing on public opinion data from the Afrobarometer survey and using Ghana as a case study, the study answers these questions.

To provide context the study begins by first addressing how Ghanaians feel about the political transition in three key areas – *support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and support for elections.*

There is strong support for democracy among Ghanaians with a significant development over the years. Support for democracy declined by twenty-five (25) percentage points between 1999 and 2002 mainly because of what may be referred to as a period of democratic uncertainty in which as many as four out of ten Ghanaians (37%) answered *"don't know"* to the question of whether they support democracy or not. The period of

Table 1 – Citizens' assessment of key aspects of the transition

Year	Support for Democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	Support for elections
1999	77%	54%	-
2002	52%	46%	87%
2005	77%	70%	90%
2008	78%	80%	86%
2012	82%	74%	93%
2014	68%	56%	87%
2017	81%	78%	81%
2019	76%	66%	82%
2022	77%	51%	84%

(Source:Afrobarometer data 1999-2022)

democratic uncertainty has vanished with only one percent (1%) of Ghanaians, as of the most recent survey round in 2022, saying they don't know whether they support democracy or not.

When asked *"Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Ghana]?"* Ghana has experienced periods of high satisfaction (2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, 2019) and periods of low satisfaction (1999, 2002, 2014, 2022). The year 2022 represents a historic low in satisfaction with the way democracy is working. This is worrying because in other periods of low satisfaction, Ghanaians were in a state of democratic uncertainty - fourteen percent (14%) in 1999, thirty-six percent (36%) in 2002, and eight percent (8%) in 2014. In 2022 there was no democratic uncertainty among Ghanaians presently (See Appendix A, Table 2 for more details).

The last contextual point addresses the country's democracy deficit which calculates the difference between citizen support for democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy is working. A positive number (surplus) means that citizens are getting more democracy (satisfaction) than they demand (support). A negative number (deficit) means that citizens are getting less democracy (satisfaction) than they demand (support). In 1999, six years after the political transition, Ghana's democracy experienced a large deficit. However, starting in 2002, the deficit greatly improved and eventually culminated in a small surplus in 2008. The democracy deficits re-emerged in 2012 and grew further in 2014. The trend slowed considerably in 2017. However, the democracy deficit has grown since then, reaching a historic level in 2022. (See Appendix A, Table 3 for more details).

Table 2: Policy priorities of Ghanaians

	Top 3 Choices From 1st Response		
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
2002	Unemployment	Poverty	Management of the economy
2005	Unemployment	Education	Management of the economy
2008	Unemployment	Poverty	Management of the economy
2012	Unemployment	Education	Health
2014	Management of the economy	Unemployment	Education
2017	Unemployment	Infrastructure/roads	Education
2019	Infrastructure/roads	Unemployment	Education
2022	Management of the economy	Poverty	Infrastructure/roads

(Source: Afrobarometer data 2002-2022)

So, what do Ghanaian citizens say they want from their democratic government?

In the Afrobarometer survey respondents are asked, *"In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?"* Respondents are allowed three choices with the first treated as their highest priority. The priorities of Ghanaians are very clear with un-employment as number one. Over the eight times that this question has been asked the top three priorities of Ghanaians can be listed in the following order –1) unemployment, 2) the economy, and 3) education. Ghanaians also place priority on other areas such as health, poverty, and infrastructure. The priorities of Ghanaians have not changed over time meaning they are clear about what they want from government.

Results/Findings

Are Ghanaians getting what they want from government?

The table below shows how Ghanaians have evaluated not just their priorities but other important public problems that governments try to solve. On each of the items, the survey asks, "how well or badly would you say the current government is

Table 3: Evaluation of key social and economic goods

Social goods	1999	2002	2005	2008	2012	2014	2017	2019	2022
Reducing crime	57%	63%	71%	64%	61%	40%	60%	43%	27%
Improving basic health services	54%	63%	73%	84%	63%	36%	64%	62%	41%
Addressing educational needs	49%	64%	70%	83%	59%	34%	80%	74%	38%
Delivering household water	-	56%	59%	63%	48%	31%	60%	56%	30%
Providing a reliable supply of electricity	-	-	-	65%	50%	23%	71%	68%	50%
Economic Goods									
Managing the economy	-	67%	59%	68%	46%	25%	66%	51%	18%
Creating jobs	39%	45%	39%	54%	32%	21%	45%	42%	16%
Keeping prices stable	34%	57%	38%	37%	23%	17%	44%	29%	6%
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	32%	36%	29%	36%	36%	19%	37%	29%	8%

(Source:Afrobarometer data 1999-2022)

handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The table shows the percentage who answered, "fairly well or very well". The various priorities and other important problems are classified under two main categories – social goods and economic goods.

In the maiden round (1999) of the survey, on the delivery of economic goods no more than four out of ten Ghanaians rated the government's performance as fairly well or very well. On the delivery of social goods about five out of ten Ghanaians rated the government's performance well. This was driven mainly by how they viewed the government's efforts at reducing crime.

In 2002 government was seen as delivering social goods better than economic goods with significant improvements in the areas of improving basic health services (+9) and addressing the educational needs of Ghanaians (+15). Evaluation of how well the government was delivering economic goods also significantly improved driven mainly by how well citizens felt government was handling efforts at keeping prices stable.

In 2005 the emerging pattern that government delivers social goods better than economic goods persisted with evaluation of government performance significantly improving. There was a decline in how well Ghanaians felt the government was delivering economic goods. Across the economic goods examined, the decline ranged between seven percentage points and nineteen percentage points.

The year 2008 was a very positive year with citizens feeling they were getting what they want. There was improvement in how Ghanaians evaluated the delivery of social goods especially in education. The only social good to see a reduced score was how well the government was handling crime. Even then it received the approval of six out of ten Ghanaians. On the delivery of economic goods, the positive ratings of government performance compared to the previous round was driven by two important areas: management of the economy; (+19) and creation of jobs (+15).

A period of decline set in from 2012. The percentage of Ghanaians saying they are getting what they want from government showed significant declines: addressing educational needs (-24);improving basic health services (-22); managing the economy (-22); creating jobs (-22); infrastructure (-17); and delivering household water (-15). The decline worsened in 2014 with the percentage of Ghanaians saying they are getting what they want from governments dropping by between six and twenty-seven percentage points over the previous round across social and economic goods.

The period of decline however began to reverse in 2017.Ghanaians felt good about how well government was delivering social goods. Addressing educational needs of Ghanaians received the highest approval of Ghanaians with eighty percent (80%) saying that the government was handling their educational needs well. Overall, the improvement in the evaluation of the delivery of social goods ranged anywhere between twenty and forty-six percentage points. Just as the delivery of social goods improved, the same could be said for the delivery of economic goods, especially on the management of the economy (+41). There were other improvements in the delivery of economic goods – job creation (+24); price stability (+27) and income inequality (+18).

The reversal stalled and, in some cases, there was a slight decline in 2019. By 2022 the percentage of Ghanaians saying they are getting what they want from government across had declined significantly to historic lows.

In summary, Ghanaians sometimes get what they want, and other times do not. They have experienced periods of high as well as low satisfaction with government efforts to address the things they want. What do these periods of highs and lows then mean for the political transition to democratic government which the country embarked on in 1993?

The paper has so far described a) support for democracy; b) support for elections; c) satisfaction with democracy; and d) how well Ghanaians feel they are getting the necessary economic and social goods from the government.

What does it matter for democracy if citizens feel they are getting what they want from the government?

Alternatively, what does it matter for democracy if citizens feel they are not getting what they want from the government? Six data points (2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2022) are examined in this section mainly because all the specific social and economic goods have been consistently asked across these survey rounds. Additionally, the responses to each of the questions across both categories (social and economic) are combined into an overall score for government performance. The score ranges from a low of 0 (citizens feel they are not getting what they want from the government) to a high of 36 (citizens feel they are getting what they want from government). In addition, the regression controls for the effects of trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship. Trust in government ranges from 0 (No trust in government) to 32 (A lot of trust in government). Corruption in government ranges from 0 (high corruption in government) to 20(No corruption in government). The partisanship variables show the percentage of citizens who describe themselves as feeling close to the ruling party in a particular survey year.

(See Appendix B for full details of the variables for this section of the paper).
The regression tests the following relationships:

A. Citizens' evaluation of government performance and its effect on support for democracy, controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship.

B. Citizens' evaluation of government performance and its effect on support for elections, controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship.

C. Citizens' evaluation of government performance and its effect on satisfaction with democracy, controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship.

Table 4: Citizen Evaluation of the governance environment

	2008	2012	2014	2017	2019	2022
Central government performance (max. score of 36)	24.4	20.5	16.3	21.8	20.9	15.8
Trust in government (max score of 32)	21.75	19.93	17.27	20.19	18.23	15.70
Corruption in government (max score of 20)	12.06	12.46	10.42	11.55	11.43	11.44
Percentage of Ghanaians who are partisans of the ruling party	63%	43%	43%	66%	58%	53%

(Source:Afrobarometer data 1999-2022)

First, the overall central government performance falls into two distinct periods. There are periods of satisfaction with government performance (2008, 2012, 2017, and 2019). This can be translated as the periods in which citizens tend to generally feel they are getting what they want from the government. There are also periods of dissatisfaction with government performance (2014, and 2022). This can be translated as the periods in which citizens tend to generally feel they are not getting what they want from the government. The other aspects of the governance environment show a) declining trust in governance; b) some amount of corruption in government; and c) periods of high partisanship (2008, 2017, 2019, 2022) as well as low partisanship (2012, 2014).

What happens to democracy when citizens tend to generally feel they are getting what they want from the government?

The first relationship tests for the effects on support for democracy controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship. The overall regression was statistically significant on three occasions (2012, 2017, and 2019). On those three occasions, it was only once (2017) that government performance had the strongest effect on support for democracy. In the other two instances (2012 and 2019) government performance did not have a significant effect on support for democracy. Instead, it was corruption in government.

The second relationship tests for the effects on support for elections controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship. The overall regression was statistically significant on three occasions (2012, 2017, and 2019). However, none of the variables had a significant effect on support for elections in 2017. In 2012 and 2019, government performance had no significant effect on support for elections, rather it was corruption in government (2012) and partisanship (2019) that affected citizen support for elections.

The third relationship tests the effects on satisfaction with the way democracy is working. The overall regression was statistically significant on all four occasions (2008, 2012, 2017, and 2019). On all four occasions, government performance had a significant effect on satisfaction with democracy. On three occasions (2008, 2012, 2017), government performance had the strongest effect, among the variables, on satisfaction with democracy.

To sum up, based on the results, when citizens feel like they are getting what they want from government, it does affect their satisfaction with the way democracy is working, has very limited effect on their support for democracy, and essentially has no real effect on their support for elections.

What happens to democracy when citizens feel they are not getting what they want from the government?

The paper identifies two of such periods – 2014 and 2022. On the first relationship testing the effects on support for democracy, controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship, the overall regression was significant on one occasion (2014). Even though government performance had a significant effect on support for democracy, corruption in government had the strongest effect on support for democracy.

On the second relationship testing the effects on support for elections controlling for trust in government, corruption in government, and partisanship, the overall regression was significant on both occasions (2014 and 2022). In 2014, government performance had the strongest effect on support for elections. In 2022, government performance had no effect on support for elections.

On the third relationship testing the effects on satisfaction with the way democracy is working, the overall regression was significant on both occasions (2014 and 2022). Additionally, on both occasions, government performance had the strongest effect on satisfaction with democracy.

To sum up, based on the results, when citizens feel like they are not getting what they want from government, it does affect their satisfaction with the way democracy is working, but has very limited effect on their support for democracy as well as their preference for choosing leaders through elections.

Discussion

There is no doubt that the political transition to democracy is well embraced by Ghanaians. There is a strong preference for democracy as well as support for using elections to choose leaders. Satisfaction with the transition has however hit an all-time low. Do citizens feel like they are getting what they want from the government given their priorities and other social and economic needs? Not always. Ghanaians have expressed high levels of satisfaction in some years but also low levels of satisfaction in other years. The study has shown that the consequences for democracy of citizens feeling they are getting what they want or not from government are much nuanced. Overall, though the key takeaway is this - it does have the potential to chip away at the gains made in the political transition to democracy. Nothing in these results, especially in instances where government performance had no effect on support for democracy or elections, must be construed as government performance does not matter in certain circumstances because government performance always matters. Rather, the takeaway is to explore further what poses the threats to citizens continued support for democracy and elections. This is very important because the next phase of political transitions is the consolidation of democracy phase.

Given the nature of the results seen, especially how government performance affects citizen satisfaction with democracy, it raises the question of the permissible role of the public administration system in ensuring citizen satisfaction with democracy. Does this require an active political role for public administrators? If so, this may mean that public administrators will have to rethink their apolitical posture in the policy making process and become advocates for what citizens want. They may also have to become the voice of citizens in helping them express their dissatisfaction with the government. However, in doing so, do public administrators risk becoming partisan actors thereby losing some of the legitimacy that comes with their strictly technical role in the governance set up?

Conclusion

The study is based on a single country over multiple years. How well will this model hold up in a different country, sub regional or overall regional context? As of 2022, thirty-seven countries have participated in the Afrobarometer survey. It will be helpful to the discourse to conduct further studies that test the proposition in this study with cases beyond Ghana to see how well the model holds up. In addition, it will also be helpful to factor in the social identities of citizens, how that plays a role in both their sense of whether they are getting what they want from government and how that ultimately shapes the attitudes towards their experiences with the political transition to democracy. Lastly, in discussions about the consequences of political transitions and the role of public administration it is important to recognize that the consequences are very nuanced. It is therefore helpful to not ask the consequences for democracy but more importantly which aspect of democratic experience of citizens does public administration have a direct way of shaping.

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Appendix A

Table 1: Democratic uncertainty among citizens

Survey Year	Support for democracy	Satisfaction with democracy
1999	-	14%
2002	37%	36%
2005	11%	14%
2008	5%	4%
2012	2%	1%
2014	13%	8%
2017	2%	2%
2019	2%	2%
2022	1%	1%
The percentage of citizens who answered "don't know" to the question of support for democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy is working.		

(Source:Afrobarometer data 1999-2022)

Table 2: Democracy deficit

Year	Support for Democracy	Satisfaction with democracy	Democracy Deficit
1999	77%	54%	-23
2002	52%	46%	-6
2005	77%	70%	-7
2008	78%	80%	+2
2012	82%	74%	-8
2014	68%	56%	-12
2017	81%	78%	-3
2019	76%	66%	-10
2022	77%	51%	-26
The democracy deficit calculates the difference between citizen satisfaction with the way democracy is working and their support for democracy.			

(Source:Afrobarometer data 1999-2022)

Appendix B

Codebook of the variables

Trust in government

How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? The following institutions were selected - President; Members of Parliament; Elected local government; Ruling Party; Opposition Political Parties; National Electoral Commission; Police; Judges and Magistrates. Respondents are presented with the following response choices - not at all, just a little, somewhat, a lot, don't know, and refused to answer. The items are recorded to a scale of 0 (don't know) to a lot (4). Respondents who refused to answer are eliminated. An index of government performance that combines the scores for all the items is then constructed. The new scale ranged from 0 (No trust in government) to 32 (A lot of trust in government).

Corruption in government

How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? The following institutions were selected – President and officials in his office; Members of Parliament; Elected local government; Police; Judges and Magistrates. Respondents are presented with the following response choices - none of them, some of them, most of them, all of them all, and refused to answer. The items are recorded to a scale of 0 (don't know) to none of them (4). Respondents who refused to answer are eliminated. An index of corruption in government that combines the scores for all the items is then constructed. The new scale ranged from 0 (high corruption in government) to 20 (No corruption in government).

Central government performance

"Now let's speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The following items were selected – managing the economy; creating jobs; narrowing incomes between the rich and poor; keeping prices stable; improving basic health services; addressing education needs; reducing crime; providing water and sanitation services; providing reliable electricity. Respondents are presented with the following response choices - very badly, fairly badly, fairly well, very well, don't know, refused to answer. The items are recorded on a scale from 0 (don't know) to 5 (fairly well). Respondents who refused to answer are eliminated. An index of government performance that combines the scores for all the items is then constructed. The new scale ranges from 0 (no satisfaction with government performance) to 36 (high satisfaction with government performance)

Support for democracy

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have; STATEMENT 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.; Refused; Don't know recorded to a scale 0 = don't know; 1= For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have; 2 = In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; 3 = Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

Support for elections

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. [Probe for strength of opinion: Do you agree or strongly agree? 1-We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections. 2-Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders. Responses -Agree very strongly with 1; Agree with 1, Agree with 2, Agree very strongly with 2, Agree with neither, Refused, Don't know recoded as scale to 0= Don't know, 1 = Agree with neither; 2= Agree strongly with 2, 3 = Agree with 2, 4= agree with 1, 5=agree strongly with 1.

Satisfaction with democracy

Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Ghana]? Are you: The country is not a democracy; Not at all satisfied; Not very satisfied; Fairly satisfied; Very satisfied; Don't know; Refused; recorded to 0 = Don't know; 1 = the country is not a democracy; 2 = not at all satisfied; 3 = not very satisfied; 4 = fairly satisfied; 5 = very satisfied.

Partisanship

Respondents are first asked "Do you feel close to any particular political party?" with the options of yes, no, don't know, and refused to answer. The follow up question then asks, "If Yes, which party?" Respondents are presented with the response choices of the various political parties in the country, other, don't know, refused to answer, not applicable (those who answered no to the first part of the question). Responses to the follow up question is used to construct a dummy variable of Party affiliation, where 1 = Ruling party partisan and 0 = not ruling party partisan which includes all other political party affiliations, those who answered other, and those who answered do not feel close to any political party.

Appendix C
Results of multiple linear regression

Table 1, Effect of central government performance on support for democracy, 2008-2022

	Slope	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
2008					
Central government performance	.004	.005	.031	.697	.486
Trust in government	.008	.005	.062	1.490	.137
Corruption in government	.013	.007	.075	1.928	.054
Partisanship	.045	.067	.028	.672	.502
F(3.094, p<.05); r=.133; r^2=.018' constant = 2.214					
2012					
Central government performance	-.006	.003	-.059	-1.811	.070
Trust in government	-.001	.003	-.014	-.449	.654
Corruption in government	.021	.005	.106	3.796	<.001
Partisanship	-.005	.040	-.004	-.132	.895
F(4.517, p<.01); r = .116; r2 = .013; constant = 2.638					
2014					
Central government performance	-.011	.005	-.078	-2.237	.025
Trust in government	.002	.005	.015	.445	.656
Corruption in government	.034	.007	.136	4.579	<.001
Partisanship	-.250	.070	-.117	-3.594	<.001
F (11.879, p<.001); r= .190; r2=.036; constant =2.264					
2017					
Central government performance	.007	.003	.078	2.474	.014
Trust in government	.005	.003	.049	1.692	.091
Corruption in government	.010	.004	.068	2.407	.016
Partisanship	.057	.039	.046	1.461	.144
F(8.222, p<.001); r = .158, r2=.025; constant = 2.345					
2019					
Central government performance	.001	.003	.010	.269	.788
Trust in government	.007	.003	.070	2.169	.030
Corruption in government	.021	.005	.125	4.079	<.001
Partisanship	-.050	.044	-.039	-1.135	.256
F(6.653, p<.001); r=.153; r2=.023; constant = 2.337					

2022					
Central government performance	.006	.004	.054	1.461	.144
Trust in government	.003	.004	.023	.642	.521
Corruption in government	-.007	.006	-.039	-1.167	.244
Partisanship	.071	.041	.059	1.731	.084
F(2.754, p<.05); r=.103, r2=.011; constant =2.618					

Table 2, Effect of central government performance on satisfaction with democracy, 2008-2022.

	Slope	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
2008					
Central government performance	.034	.007	.202	5.027	<.001
Trust in government	.035	.007	.191	5.036	<.001
Corruption in government	.037	.009	.140	3.965	<.001
Partisanship	.250	.090	.106	2.780	.006
F(40.874, p<.001); r=.439; r^2=.193’ constant = 2.021					
2012	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	.021	.004	.154	4.864	<.001
Trust in government	.013	.005	.088	2.911	.004
Corruption in government	-.002	.008	-.007	-.256	.798
Partisanship	.051	.056	.029	.916	.360
F(17.026, p<.01); r = .221; r2 = .049; constant = 3.289					

2014	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	.025	.007	.136	3.861	<.001
Trust in government	.009	.007	.046	1.358	.175
Corruption in government	.027	.009	.085	2.898	.004
Partisanship	-.206	.090	-.074	-2.291	.022
F (11.166, p<.001); r= .184; r2=.034; constant =2.599					
2017	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	.027	.004	.186	6.113	<.001
Trust in government	.018	.005	.108	3.848	<.001
Corruption in government	.021	.007	.088	3.193	.001
Partisanship	.049	.061	.024	.799	.424
F(26.511, p<.001); r = .281, r2=.079; constant = 2.777					

2019	Slope	Std. Error	β	t-ratio	Prob.
Central government performance	.020	.005	.122	3.579	<.001
Trust in government	.032	.005	.180	5.796	<.001
Corruption in government	.004	.008	.015	.489	.625
Partisanship	.154	.070	.073	2.202	.028
F(6.653, p<.001); r=.295; r2=.087; constant = 2.670					
2022	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	.060	.006	.343	10.151	<.001
Trust in government	.013	.006	.068	2.036	.042
Corruption in government	-.002	.010	-.007	-.222	.824
Partisanship	.088	.064	.043	1.380	.168
F(47.337, p<.05); r=.395, r2=.156; constant =2.331					

Table 3, Effect of central government performance on support for elections, 2008-2022

2008	Slope	Std. Error	β	t-ratio	Prob.
Central government performance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Trust in government	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Corruption in government	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Partisanship	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
*Overall regression not statistically significant.					

2012	Slope	Std. Error	β	t-ratio	Prob.
Central government performance	.005	.004	.046	1.431	.153
Trust in government	-.007	.004	-.054	-1.758	.079
Corruption in government	.020	.006	.087	3.101	.002
Partisanship	-.122	.047	-.082	-2.582	.010
F(4.753, p<.01); r = .119; r2 = .014; constant = 4.458					
2014	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	-.017	.004	-.134	-3.796	<.001
Trust in government	.011	.005	.083	2.436	.015
Corruption in government	.004	.006	.018	.594	.552
Partisanship	-.097	.062	-.052	-1.574	.116
F (6.249, p<.001); r= .139; r2=.019; constant =4.620					

2017	Slope	Std. Error	β	t-ratio	Prob.
Central government performance	.007	.005	.042	1.336	.182
Trust in government	.008	.005	.042	1.449	.147
Corruption in government	.010	.008	.036	1.276	.202
Partisanship	.064	.073	.028	.884	.377
F(3.082, p<.05); r = .097, r2=.009; constant = 3.898					
2019	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	.008	.006	.046	1.308	.191
Trust in government	.011	.006	.060	1.869	.062
Corruption in government	-.010	.009	-.034	-1.112	.266
Partisanship	.171	.077	.076	2.206	.028
F(5.198, p<.001); r=.135; r2=.018; constant = 3.964					
2022	**Slope**	**Std. Error**	**β**	**t-ratio**	**Prob.**
Central government performance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Trust in government	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Corruption in government	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Partisanship	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
*Overall regression not statistically significant.					

Resistance Committees and their Roles in the Sudan's Democratic Transition

Dr. Bakry Elmedi and Dr. Crystal Murphy

Abstract

In Sudan, locally based civic groups emerged as powerful community and protest organizing mechanisms. They came to be referred to as Resistance Committees in the years that followed an uprising in 2013 and particularly with the countrywide popular protests that led to removal of President Al-Bashir in April 2019 and the formation of a transitional government in August 2019. The Resistance Committees have played a significant role in the ongoing sociopolitical changes and have gone through phases of development in terms of their organizational design and their political roles. This paper describes the essence and the political role of RCs in Sudan's democratic transition from the perspectives of committee members. The study offers six main findings related to the essence of RCs, namely the heterogeneity of their organizational structures, whose flexibility has enhanced participation. This openness, together with a mediatized narrative about the RCs as a limitless hero, interplays with longstanding Sudanese cultural and political practices, resulting in their broad age inclusion and less representative gender composition. Since the openness does not preclude membership in traditional political parties, there is a common overlap which represents RC members' multifaceted political lives. There is great variation in views about RCs' perceived political role(s) in the resistance to military rule and building a successful democratic transition.

Key words: Resistance Committees, Leadership, Democratic transition

Introduction

The focus and admiration of social movements and how they developed innovative ways to mobilize, organize and effect change have captured the interests and imagination for social scientists in academic circles since 1960s. Recently, there has been an ignited passion for examining social movements with new theoretical tools, especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the wide popular protests around the world.

In Sudan, the idea of Resistance Committees (RCs) was born out of the September uprising in 2013, where Bashir's regime brutally slaughtered over 200 protesters in one day in broad daylight. It would be inaccurate to indicate that RCs fully developed with clear orientation in terms of their characteristics and essence back then. The concept initially was to localize the protests in neighborhoods and to protect the resistance movement from the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by security forces. By 2021, there were an estimated 7,238 RCs across Sudan, according to a survey by the Carter Center.

The evolution of resistance committees during the December Revolution of 2018 reflected some similarities and differences from their beginnings in 2013. The focus on localized organization of protests continued and with experience, became more effective through and after the Sit-in Strikes in front of the Sudanese Armed Forces Headquarters in April 2019 and in many cities across the country. This trend in organizing continued after the signing of the constitutional charters between Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a large political coalition of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups, and the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the political leadership that assumed power after the removal of al-Bashir. The agreement created a new political landscape and led to the formation of the transitional government in September 2019. RCs continued organizing protests and other actions during the short-lived transition period and reached a reinvigorated second wave of the revolution after the military coup of October 25th 2021.

Since the coup until now RCs across Sudan have been working to leverage the organizations they have developed—however unique each is—toward the profound political change they wish to see. Several RCs have attempted to organize themselves as more formal units, through developing bylaws and requiring formal membership at local levels. Many developed political declarations, in which they outlined their views about the current political affairs and the path for change. Since the coup there has also been some coordination across some—but certainly not all—RCs across various parts of the country. The pervasiveness of RCs across Sudan has led analysts worldwide to surmise their role in the democratic transition.

Rather than the image created about what they are doing or what they ought to do by outsiders, this study investigates the role of RCs in Sudan's demo-cratization process based on their members' views. There are widespread perceptions about RCs role in the political process, in the social imagination of Sudanese people, as well as the international community. Often these views take on a mythologized imaginary of RCs as a messiah who will resolve all of Sudan's historic political woes. Conceptually, this paper aims to answer two questions: First, in essence what are the Resistance Committees from the perspectives of engaged and active members? And second, what roles do RCs play in Sudan's democratic transition?

This paper has six sections. The first provides an introduction of the political context to set the stage for the following analysis. The second provides theoretical examination of organizational structures from the literature on political resistance, organizational design and leadership modalities. This literature review serves as a framework for characterizing RCs and their role in contemporary Sudan, and a prism through which analysts of socio-political movements may approach. The fourth section covers the methodology used to conduct this study. This paper relied heavily on field observations and engagement with various RCs for three years, as well as individual and group interviews. Section 5 provides a summary of findings. These observations describe realities on the ground and their implications. The sixth section provides concluding remarks.

The Political Context

In December 2018, widespread peaceful protests against corruption, unemployment and poverty erupted in Sudan, including in the capital Khartoum, and dozens of innocent protesters were killed by the Sudanese security forces in their violent crackdown on the protests. Nevertheless, and in large part due to the coordination activities of Resistance Committees across Sudan, the protests persisted. On April 11, 2019, because of the continued protests, the Sudanese military removed former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir from power, suspended the country's constitution and imposed a three-month state of emergency. The Sit-in protests continued, as protestors demanded full civilian rule.

On 3 June 2019, security forces attacked the Sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, killing at least 127 people. Security forces, which included the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, tried to conceal their violations by dumping dead bodies weighted with bricks in the river Nile, of which around 40 floated to the surface according to the Sudanese Doctors' Committee; and hundreds of people had been arrested and detained. After this horrific day, amidst internet shutdown, the RCs quietly organized until 30 June, when massive protests reemerged.

On 17 July 2019, after African Union intervention, the Sudanese civilian "Forces for Freedom and Change" a coalition of the existing civilian political class, and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) comprised of the most powerful remaining military men, agreed to share power in a three-year transition period, with elections scheduled for 2023. People were skeptical because of the long history of the military meddling in politics and the fact that the TMC did not show signs that it would work for a meaningful democratic transformation. During this so-called "Transitional Period," RCs continued organizing. They organized marches, barricaded streets following austerity measures and market adjustments, protests honoring martyrs among many others.

On 25 October 2021, the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, took control of the government in a coup. The Sudanese military arrested the top civilian government officials, including civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. It took full control of Sudanese political structures and resources. The experience of the coup stopping the power-sharing agreement cast a shadow of doubt over the military's sincerity about military-civilian partnership and its continued claims for supporting transition to democratic governance.

Meanwhile, military and paramilitary

establishments used the state's institutions as a façade to legitimize their political existence and enrich their shareholders. Their enrichment from national resources happened alongside surging rates of hunger and costs of living, chronic electricity cuts, and fuel shortages nationwide. These events in Sudan created a challenging path for a smooth democratic transition.

Within an hour of the coup's first arrests, Sudanese civilians initiated another campaign of peaceful resistance against the military regime. Resistance Committees put up barricades to protect their neighbors, and met to share updates amidst internet shutdowns. While the international community called for the re-instatement of the dissolved government, the vast majority of "the street" shouted that "there is no going back" to the untrustworthy military as "partners."

Despite the complexities, Sudanese people have continued demanding a political system with constitutional arrangements that would bring about true justice, protect and expand their hard-earned freedoms and build lasting peace and stability, and full-fledged democratic governance and civilian rule. The sacrifices paid for bringing about this system since the coup are huge. Over 116people were killed in the protests, over seven thousand injured, and thousands have been arrested since the October 2021 coup. In addition to killing, the authorities systematically used torture and rape as a weapon to break the resistance, which is documented by human rights groups. Resistance Committees and other political actors have been in the forefront of the resistance by leading peaceful protests to ensure that Sudan revolutionary aspirations are not dead and their sacrifices would not be in vain.

Within this complex and volatile political context, this paper examines the role of resistance committees in Sudan's democratization process. It does this after painting a picture of their essence based on the views of their own members and is informed by conceptual prisms from literature on organizational structure, leadership and social movements.

Theoretical Relevance

This section provides theoretical examination of organizational structures from the literature on political resistance movements, organizational design and leadership modalities. It focuses on four theoretical areas, albeit not in great depth but rather to create the lens through which the analysis of RCs may be seen, and from which implications may be drawn ahead. The first theoretical area deals with the demographic changes as a factor that drives social actions and activism. The second area looks at organizational design and the concept of efficiency as a way of creating value. The third brings literature on leadership and links it to how the new social movements are evolving in their leadership styles as a response to changing and shifting environments. The last theoretical area discusses social movement efficacy, which has historical roots in structuralism and more recently explores the impact of social movement organizations in charting a path towards politically oriented action.

Demographics as Conditions for Organizing Pattern

There has been a growing attention to the role demographic factors play in recent political movements. Africa is known to be the youngest continent with a median age of 25 years. These (well-educated) youth are the 12 million young people entering the job market every year while only 3 million formal jobs are created (World Bank, 2022). Sudan is no exception to the pattern: Estimates indicate that 65 percent of Sudanese population is under the age of 45, with a median age of 19 years old and 35 percent of the total population living in urban centers (World Meter, 2022). This young population phenomenon is creating new social dynamism characterized by uncharted political territories, amidst the practical realities of economic stagnation, growing unemployment rates and lack of prospects about the future. Intergenerational cultural differences have also been noted as an influencer in shaping social and political behaviors.

Organizational Design: Top-Down or Horizontal

Whether governments, businesses, or social movements: organizations of all types have interests in achieving their objectives. The top-down model has dominated the ancient and modern eras of human civilizations. Industrial analysts who sought after designing organizations for maximum efficiency, initially focused on time and motions. The field of "scientific management" eventually developed guidelines based on specialization, span of control, authority, and delegation of responsibility. (Taylor: 1911; Fayol" 1919 and 1949; Urwick, 1937; Gulick and Urwick, 1937). Weber described the "monocratic bureaucracy" as an ideal form to maximize, prescribing division of labor, separation of personal from official property and impersonal ties, whereby through hierarchy of offices, all was authenticated by a single leader. The hierarchical model is often credited for the most prosperous period in documented human history (in analyses that ignore the widespread theft of human life and resources). There is a compelling body of research suggesting that the top-down model also stifles creativity and works to justify the realities of the present at the expense of future possibilities.

The structural model has evolved. Now, there are many versions of less hierarchical organizations, sometimes referred to as flat organizations. The principle of rigid objectives as the most rational form of aligning resources is by itself an antithesis of constant change in environment characterizing the 21st century (Postrel, 1998). Experiments in organizational structure and decision-making practices are central to these transformations.

After decades of failed economic development strategies, mainly industrialization through import substitution, international development research came to an overdue conclusion; people's participation in policies and strategies intended to affect their lives is the most important factor in determining the outcomes (Stiglitz 2000; Oakley 1995). Research in management, particularly decision-making processes, suggests that when people are involved in the process, they are likely to commit to the final choice, which is crucial to implementation (Patterson, Grenny, McMillan, & Switzler, 2012). With its emphasis on efficiency, this school of thought has focused on identifying which types of decisions require constituents' involvement. RCs in Sudan have developed organizational models that are attempting to achieve efficient outcomes and maximize common good without following the hierarchical model, incorporating a wide variety of inclusive decision-making procedures across the country.

Leadership: Democratized, Shared and Distributed

Recent leadership innovations have characterized informal organizations leading political change in countries experiencing revolutions worldwide, relevant to the case of Resistance Committees in Sudan. The interesting and similar trend among some of the movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Zuccotti Park in New York, and RCs in Sudan is that they do not have known leaders who were in control of actions carried out by these movements. This is the same phenomenon that is spanning from emerging new organizational design, behavioral change, economic development, management decision-making observations.

Early studies on leadership paid too much attention to the personal qualities of a leader in what has come to be known as the traits approach. The assumption is that these personal traits are the major underpinnings of successful and effective leadership (Stogdill, 1948, 1974). The traits approach failed to explain why an effective leader in one context fails in another. As a result, leadership studies started to focus on the process and relations, i.e. what takes place when successful leaders conduct the act of leading (Burns, 1978, & Bass, 1985). This approach attempted to explain effective leadership by examining the process.
Focusing on how leadership might be

practiced in public organizations, Denhardt, Denhardt & Aristigueta (2013) defined shared leadership as a style of leadership that observes "clusters of individuals working and growing together. Leadership is seen as a function that operates within a group-not the property of a single individual but rather an activity in which many participate". (p. 228) Shared leadership is a common feature of most Sudanese RCs in the way the members work and grow together in their daily struggle against oppression. Yet, shared leadership is not synonymous with group decision-making. Even though decisions made under shared leadership might relatively be similar to the process of group decision-making, group decision making tends to deal with a specific problem or situation where a group of people go through a process of interaction to produce an outcome (Moscovici & Zavalloni 1969) Shared leadership differs from group decision-making in the fact that it is a continuous function not an event. Contrary to top-down leadership, shared leadership promotes the idea of individuals growing together as equals. Resistance Committees, in their loose structure and the way they make decisions, reflect to a large extent the concept of shared leadership and collective decision-making.

Social Movements: Efficacy and Social Value Creation

Traditionally, grand theories on social movements have linked the phenomenon of social movement to history and society (Jasper, 2010), indicating that "[s]ocial movements are composed of individuals and their interactions. Rational-choice approaches recognize this but, their version of the calculating individual is too abstract to be realistic or helpful" (p 965). Since the 1960s, research focusing on social movements, resistance, and collective action flourished under the inspiration of several such theories. Charles Tilly, Alain Touraine and Mancur Olson each developed fruitful research paradigms influenced by Marxist analysis, which were basically macro-sociological structuralists. There are many versions and variations of theoretical lenses that emerged out of these paradigms: an American version which emphasized the mobilization of resources and inter-actions with the state and a French version that focused on the historical stage of a programmed or postindustrial society and its characteristic conflict. A third paradigm drew on [...] the assumptions of microeconomics (Jasper, 2010, 965).

By the beginning of this millennium theorists began recognizing the historical and generalizable inadequacy of those theories and are synthesizing the insights of the older schools while adding dimensions they overlooked (see for example, Touraine 1997, 2009). The trend is a bracketing of big structures in favor of a concern for the foundations of social and political action (Jasper, 2010). Therein lay questions about movements' social value as well as their ability to achieve their goals and this leads to asking the question: What makes a social movement effective?

Maximalist movements seek to unseat power. Most social movements' frameworks define a win as doing so within a year of the peak (Chenowith 2020). By such metrics, many analysts deemed the 2019 downfall of Bashir a success. But the countless Sudanese who remained at the Sit-in strikes knew better than to leave on that day: their goals were greater than one man. The majority of the RC movements in Sudan have generally adopted a maximalist “Three Nos” stance, by which they have continued to demand full civilian rule until this day (El Gizouli 2020).

In terms of outcomes, scholars of social movements stress that far more important than the size of protests is the capacity they represent (Chenowith 2020, Tufekci 2017, 2018). Non-violent movements are more successful than armed movements (Chenowith and Stephan 2012) and for the vast majority of the RC movement this commitment is strong. Yet other organizational design features shape the fate of movements. Focusing on contemporary movement structure, Zeynep Tufekci (2018) finds linkages between the speed and scale at which recent protests worldwide can be organized, thanks to new technologies and the internet. But importantly, unless protest participants organize actions beyond that day, the trajectory will be limited (see also Bayat 2017). In terms of movement composition, “a mass uprising is more likely to succeed when it includes a larger proportion and more diverse cross-section of the nation's population” (Chenowith 2020, p. 78).

Methodology

The design of this study is a grounded case study approach. In terms of data collection, the study relied on three techniques: field observations, individual interviews and focus group discussions. The field observations included over three dozen protests, marches, debates, conferences, sit-ins and events over three years. There were additionally over 45 meetings with over 120 members from at least 27 different RCs in-person and virtually throughout 2022. Individual interviews were conducted with 13 members from different RCs all over the country, seven from Khartoum state and six from other states. Three focus group discussions were conducted with RC members from Khartoum State, White Nile State, Gedarif State and Jazeera State. The interviews and focus group selections were done by snowball selection. There was no pursuit of country-wide representation beyond a secondary interest in how RCs in Khartoum as the largest urban center in the country differ from RCs in rural areas in other states. The tools used for data gathering were both structured and unstructured interviews to allow for discovery. No subject identifiers were recorded, given the sensitive nature of the political entities under study.

The data was analyzed using a mix of priori themes derived from the research questions and themes emerging from the data. The authors used codes, categories, and themes to create an account, as typical when producing grounded theory. A final focus group discussion was conducted to validate the results of the study.

This study is limited to the scope of the questions about the essence of RCs and their practiced as well as aspired political roles. As a case study, the findings paint a good picture about RCs and the trajectory of evolution. However, these findings cannot be generalized about all RCs given the nature of each region, area and neighborhood.

Findings

This section provides observations about the Resistance Committees structures. There are six major observations; four of which pertain to the nature and essence of RCs and the final two relate to their structures and roles in the political process in today's Sudan and its democratic transition.

The first observation is that there is little agreement on what constitutes RCs organizationally. While RCs have since 2013 been political organizations with aspirations of becoming change agents against military rule, they have no unified or clearly defined structures as discussed in the theoretical relevance section. Different RCs benefit from different organizational structural designs.

The general features shared by RCs in any neighborhood are: rejecting the political status and the desire to undo the military regime. Beyond that, there is no single or shared strategy about how members may arrive at the ends of overcoming the military regime. It is not unusual to encounter members from different committees with very different views about what the RC is in essence and its role in the broader political context. Within one state and one city, members of RCs have very different views about what the committee is.

Speaking to this point, a participant stated that “resistance committees are bodies to coordinate among activists who want to resist the political regime in their area”. Another added “our early experience in the RC started as a body to exact demands on the states at the local level and then we evolved into an alliance between those who demand public services and those who demand political change". A third participant suggested that:

RCs have gone through three rounds of evolvement: first, the beginning of the revolution in 2018 to organize the resistance; second, after the formation of the first transitional government the RCs transformed themselves into becoming the voice of the revolutionaries in their areas to ensure the delivery of services; and third after the coup of October 2021, RCs became a full political force with clear political demands.

Structurally, RCs across the country have taken different approaches to developing their political future beyond the protest movement. While the RC movement as a whole has remained leaderless and has relied upon a set of spokes-people for collaborative projects (such as draft Charters) (see Khalafallah & Davies 2022), each RC has its own internal leadership and decision-making structure. Country-wide, the individual RCs have generally adopted leaderless and group decision making procedures, at least in principle. However, when discussed in comparison, study respondents noted that the appearance of these practices varied quite greatly. Sometimes these are based on many factors including practices of historical political organizations, members' schedules, cultural gender roles, and others: there was no uniformity.

In terms of Committee composition, the general motif is openness to known neighbors. A few RCs in Khartoum state attempted to develop bylaws and become member-based: however, the majority of RCs maintained a loose structure and instead of bylaws or membership, they relied on knowledge of each other since the basic form of organization is living in the same area. Commenting on the fluid nature of RCs, a participant noted that "RCs were able to mobilize people in neighborhoods because they are not rigid in their structure or demand membership; most of the residents in their neighbor-hood know each other."

Study participants commonly acknowledged that while the loose structure is inviting and seen as a positive, others suggested that the somewhat random nature of association means "not being organized at a level that is rep-resentative of the entire neighborhood" might become an issue when claiming a voice in such a diverse place. In any case, RCs across the country have different approaches, some of which are working to enhance political strength and others which may not, but the important thing is that the design depends on the members' own wishes.

The second observation is that the RCs' loose structural design helped them to mobilize people from various backgrounds. Similar to the roles played by Kifaya, April 6 and the National Association for Change during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 (see

Elmedni, 2013), RCs in Sudan have been instrumental in organizing and maintaining the sit-in strikes all over the country as well as maintaining the momentum for weekly protests or what came to be known as mawakib protest processions, especially after the coup of October 25th 2021.

Their success in mobilizing is reflected in their ability to build broader coalitions to engage groups who joined the protests without previous affiliation, as well as those with preexisting political relations. During the sit-in strike in front of the Sudan Armed Forces, when political parties were rushing to engage in a dialogue with the ailing regime, RCs developed their networks and their networking capacities that still prove to be effective. The flexible organizational structures and shared leadership protected these groups from pressure, control, hijacking and blackmail. They also allowed people to join them without feeling pressure to commit to something beyond the vision of change and actions of resistance.

The most important characteristic of the RCs is that they preached an agenda of change and not an ideological doctrine. In a similar yet separate way from movements in Egypt, Tunisia and the U.S., the looseness of association, the ideology-free orientation made the committees open to people from diverse ideological backgrounds. The RCs created a civic space for people to grow together and share a purpose. One of the participants who worked in a resistance committee in Darfur as well as in Khartoum commented that:

What has made it a lot easier to take part in the committee is the fact that many members have previous encounters or acquaintances with each other, which helped the committees to mobilize and move in new political spaces much better than political parties and other civil society organizations.

Organizing actions around local knowledge allowed participation without having to forsake ideological views, professional or partisan associations. In the vast majority of RCs, people with religious or political ideological viewpoints and practices are not excluded from the group, so long as they are neighbors and decry military rule.

The third observation is that there are distinct differences between RCs' handling of partisanship. Importantly, members of political parties are frequently also part of RCs in Khartoum as well as in other states. One of the study participants in the group interview indicated that the committees they worked with in 13 states are “not organized like we see in Khartoum state,” to describe the relationship between RCs and formal party membership. In Khartoum, politically affiliated members of RCs are expected to separate between party membership and RC involvement.

Practicing this is complicated. Some focus group participants described an apparent competition among political parties to dominate the Tansiqiat coordination body through which various resistance committees are represented in making collective decisions about how to organize the protests, i.e. the gathering points, the path of the protests and the destinations passing through multiple neighborhoods. In other states, the RCs are composed almost entirely of members of political parties and/or traditional leaders of the people's committees, with very limited engagement from individuals who are not otherwise politically affiliated. While openness is the norm across the country, in a minority of reported cases there are RCs which instituted bans of members who affiliated with the National Congress Party (aka Kizan).

This is an especially important organizational feature because analysts cannot afford to presume that the actions of RCs are competing or fully mutually exclusive with party members. The RC protest "street" demands since the coup have been consistently the "Three Nos": no negotiation, no power sharing with the military and no settlement. Yet a broad coalition of parties—many of which find overlapping membership with RCs—has continuously engaged in negotiation with the military through the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and other channels with varied degrees of opacity. In short, RCs are composed of individuals with multifaceted political practices.

The fourth observation is that there is a riff between the mediatized imagery of a youth and women-led revolution and the composition of the committees. The dominant media discourse is that the December Revolution is a youth revolution, which makes it easy for observers to assume that RCs are also made up by young people. In reality, people from all walks of life are taking part in RCs as well as the political protests. While youths constitute a major bulk of active RCs' members, there are committees with equal representation of various age groups. However, this breadth has not translated to the (albeit avowedly) non-leadership roles of spokes-people and representatives, and neither has it been made clear in viral imagery which tends to capture the bold youth at protest front-lines more than meetings, kitchens and other behind-the-scenes contributions.

Despite the fact that women's active role in the December revolution has been well documented, almost all RCs are dominated and controlled by males from all age groups across the country. Within each RC studied, there were differing views and practices on the role of women in them in particular, and in political behavior in general. There are RCs that have a large share of middle-aged men, and while not mutually exclusive, there are still many other committees composed entirely of men who believe that women have no place in committees and must keep to their traditional household roles. Members also stated strong belief that women must have the right to participate and there have been several initiatives encouraging women to participate in the committees, with varied success. One participant in Khartoum State said she was the sole female who attended the last 20-person meeting, which was held at 8pm on a school night: not a convenient time for mothers. Suffice it to say, the workings out of cultural paradigms organizationally has shaped some of the leadership differences noted in the observations above.

The fifth observation is that the shadowy nature of RCs allowed them to be mythologized as entities with unbreakable spirit and strong capacities to organize and surprise with tactics that the junta did not know how to suppress. RCs planned underground meetings, placed flyers on car windshields, painted graffiti announcing protests, shared viral internet posts of brave protesters returning teargas canisters, built body shields adorned with the likenesses of martyrs, organized medical aid and water distribution, among other tactics. All these activities raised awareness about the RCs themselves and about how to participate in the mowakib. (Incidentally, most of the viral imagery is of youth, which may be exacerbating the notion that RCs are solely comprised of youth.) Through all these elements, people see that participating in mowakib is a socially praised activity.

Some of this larger-than-life narrative appears to be engineered from beyond the RCs as well: security forces use social media campaigns to create a toxic political climate, and international media and embassies naming RCs as actors have likewise played some part in the iterative mythology.

Regardless of the origins, the mythologized image of RCs has had mixed results. It contributed to building confidence in their abilities and served them well: large swaths of the public believed them and participated. The mythologizing of RCs also played a role in their ability to create new meaning through redefining what constitutes value. In Sudan, through involvement in Resistance Committees, Sudanese are engaged in redefining the concept of value through the process of social construction of meaning. While studying hard and graduating college remains a valued achievement, it has become equally true that one can create value by participating in protests and community organizing through RCs. Some young people have even gained notoriety for having "iconic" photos of their participation going viral on social media. And, it has happened that this particular social value for some such participants (i.e. spokespeople, artists and icons) has created economic value as well, with attention and opportunities in global media from the international community. Experientially, the actions expressly aiming to topple military rule have a latent effect of building community: within the mowakib protests themselves, there is a high degree of social cooperation in terms of guiding people to safety and joining together with song. Many participants thusly refer to the Sit-in at Army Headquarters in positive terms such as “heaven on earth” and describe how the mowakib have fostered many new social possibilities including but certainly not limited to participating in Rcs.

Still, characterizing RCs as a singular body with clear powers and capacities has also fomented challenges. Specifically, the elevation in the social imagination created pressure for RCs to insert themselves in formal political space without much experience of politics. This context created a difficult environment for open discourse, especially when there was intense pressure to overthrow the coup.

The sixth and final observation is that there is no singular perspective as to what roles RCs should play in Sudan's democratic transformation. The majority of participants from RCs believe that RCs should be the leading voice of the resistance. The majority also backed working with other political actors to influence the design of the constitutional arrangement and the setup of the government. There are voices, albeit minority voices, among RCs members who claim that they are the only true representative of the aspiration of Sudanese people and therefore RCs should not only influence the political process during the transitional period but should transform themselves into formal political organizations so as to govern.

Some voices from some RCs suggest that RCs could replace the existing political parties, other professional associations, and trade unions. Indeed, several study participants argued that RCs are the actual leaders of the streets. One stated that “if RCs were left alone to lead without interference from political parties and other competing groups, they can unify Sudanese people around one project, defeat the junta and lead the country.”

While the ambition of RC representativeness is widely held as an exciting prospect, many also recognize the presently limited capacity for them to undertake such activities. For instance, one participant who believed that RCs could lead the country out of the coup turmoil better than political parties, when asked if RCs can do this with their current organizational design, said that “they have to evolve” and admitted they had no specific idea what that would entail.

There is little agreement about how or when RCs might undertake such political roles. Some surmise this should begin immediately, with constituting the majority in the Transitional Legislative Council then selecting the Prime Minister and the states' governors. Commenting on the role RCs should play, a focus group participant suggested that "the RCs should focus on organizing and concentrate on the act of resistance to topple the regime and after defeating the regime should become part of the legislative council to monitor the transitional government." Another participant suggested instead that "RCs should shape the condition for the political practice through issuing declaration of principles that can set the parameters and conditions for the political landscape in the country." However, there is not unanimous support for such ambitions. Yet another participant actually worried about the outsized ambition, and lamented that;

"RCs in Khartoum are trying to monopolize the political action and declare themselves as the only legitimate political actor in the country, as such members within these committees have very varying views about the role of RCs in the political process, but there is no agreement as to what role they should play beyond the resistance. Different people have different views."

Concluding Remarks

Resistance Committees have come a long way from their inception in 2013, learning through the praxis and evolving to become effective tools for organizing political resistance. They have by existence expanded civic participation spaces, broadening the public sphere for more people to join. The genius of Resistance Committees in the Sudanese political context does not emanate only from the fact that they are loosely structured horizontal organizations or that while not apolitical entities; they remained nonpartisan favoring actions over ideology. The decisive factors in their successful capture of the Sudanese political imagination are their fluidity and flexibility, which make them appear as leaderless movements. Mythologizing RCs as political entities capable of doing anything elevated them to the level of legends, which partially contributed to building their confidence and made it easy for people to participate.

In terms of what are the RCs, it is clear that there is no agreement on what constitutes RCs in essence beyond the fact that they are tools for organizing political resistance at a local level in neighborhoods. The agreement among all who participated in the study is that the common denominator among all members in any given RCs is that they live in the same area, they all reject the political status and they all actively resist the military rule and want to replace it with civilian rule. The political declarations issued collaboratively by several RCs across the country in May 2022 likewise contained openness to interpretation: there remains no consensus about what constitutes a civilian rule in terms of the nature of and mechanics of the political system.

As for what roles RCs should play in the country's democratic transition, RC members see themselves as part of a political fabric, and that RCs have distinct characteristics from the other political actors, and to that end RCs expect to play a role along other actors. There are other, albeit fewer, voices among RCs members who insist that RCs are the only genuine representation of Sudanese people. This analysis finds that this claim may signify in practice more of a prescriptive ideal than a factual description of the current condition. While RCs memberships are open, and while RCs could plausibly represent people against the regime better than political parties or civil society initiatives, there is no assurance that RCs represent all revolutionary constituents in an empirical or socially endorsed way. From a political standpoint representation can only be resolved through polling census, election or some form of consensus.

The lack of a singular definition of the RCs allows for individual members to hold ideological and party fidelities simultaneously. In this way RC members can ebb and flow and push their dreams through a variety of techniques inside and out of the RCs. They can be energized with their neighbors as they meet on the street and take that momentum forward. What matters is that they have continued to meet and strategize, and that they have developed latent leadership confidence and talents over time. What matters is that they continue building according to members' preferences, as is the spirit of democracy. One concept that every person in every interview or focus group agreed upon: they are not giving up and they are not going back to military rule.

Postscript

This article was submitted for review in November 2022 and was revised July 2023. On 15 April 2023, horrific war broke out between the national armed forces and paramilitary RSF, with little regard for the Sudanese civilians in their crosshairs. Millions of Sudanese have fled their homes for safety, especially from Khartoum and Darfur states, and millions more remain stuck in dire situations. Innumerable Resistance Committee members who could flee have scattered geographically and have used their networks to deliver urgent needs such as food, water, and medical care among those who could not. Many, many RCs in states receiving displaced Sudanese and foreign nationals have wielded their networks to initiate projects helping people survive, in the context of a severely delayed and inadequate international humanitarian response typically seen in contemporary conflicts. Future research could track the shape of RCs through and beyond the war. The authors observed many of these efforts first-hand during this challenging time and note that despite the heterogeneity described throughout the article, these efforts are ostensibly public service provision and public administration: the activities we expect from governments worldwide.

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Forging Security in Fragile States: Dissecting Local Agency in Nigeria

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Abstract

Several states in the Global South are defined by state fragility, with conflict driven by terror groups remaining an indicator of this fragility. Al Shabab, Boko Haram/ISWA, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, among other terror groups, have afflicted African countries with mass casualty attacks. The correlation between levels of economic development and the state of fragility is well established (OECD, 2010, Acemoglu and Robin, 2012). States and the larger international community have a responsibility to protect populations from varied forms of violence, with the potential of mass atrocities, socio-economic decline and fragility. While this is the expectation, a lot is left to be done. The agenda of supranational organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank still require a depth of investment in local engagement to effectively proffer aid with lasting solutions. This paper addresses the circumstances under which local agency can inhibit insecurity and by association, state fragility. It seeks to engage the question: How do we build veritable, coordinated frameworks with local value systems and structures that address the twin problems of violent insecurity and state fragility? The northeastern part of Nigeria serves as a case study.

Key words: Security, Fragility, Local Mechanisms, Governance

Introduction

Several States in the global south continue to grapple with the challenge of state fragility or weakness (Albertson and Moran, 2017) principally due to weak state capacity or weak state legitimacy, leaving the citizenry vulnerable to a range of shocks. State fragility is an outcome of the country's failure to meet key needs of their citizens with the shortcomings being three core gaps: security gap, capacity gap and legitimacy gap. Whereas a security gap implies the state does not provide adequate protection to its citizens, the capacity gap connotes the state's failure to fully provide adequate services, and the legitimacy gap is tantamount to the authority of the state being not fully accepted.

The World Bank also deems a country 'fragile' because: either it is eligible for assistance in form of grants from the International Development Association (IDA); has had a UN peacekeeping mission in the last three years; or has received a 'governance' score of less than 3.2 (as per the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index of the World Bank). A fragile state might also denote a state's growing inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force in its declared territory. While a fragile state might still occasionally exercise military authority or sovereignty over its declared territory, its claim grows weaker as the logistical mechanism through which it exercises power grows weaker.

Nigeria is not an exception because of its insecurity challenge that has taken on unprecedented dimensions in its decline. This decline has snowballed over decades, and it is worth considering why speedy action to curb the tide has not happened. What the inhibitions are to coordinated effective results in moving back the dial on conflict in this context is the question worth interrogating. In Nigeria, efforts to stop the twin attacks of ISWA/Boko Haram and Bandits have been stalled by insufficient political commitment, institutional challenges, systemic corruption and infidelity to policy arrangements. The afore-mentioned factors combined have eroded public trust, resulting in a cycle of conflict and poverty that perpetuates itself. The relationship between fragility and socio-economic development is complex in terms of a multi-layered mechanism of expression and the impact on overall national development.

The weakness of state institutions, deteriorating governance, lack of capacity and disruption relating to on-going armed conflict and violent insecurity are characteristics of fragility. This negatively impacts on social cohesion and development, economic growth, and the general well-being of a population. In a vicious cycle, this has the potential to deepen state fragility, further exacerbating decline in stability and economic growth. In states where resilience capacity is eroded due to insecurity, fragility is a bigger threat.

In all efforts to effectively tackle state fragility in Nigeria, harnessing local agency has been the missing link yet it can serve as an inhibitor to insecurity and by association state fragility. The gap this study bridges is at the intersection of research, policy and practice by states and development organizations to counter violent extremism and its casualties. This paper serves to demonstrate the circumstances under which local agency can be harnessed to counter state fragility by building veritable, coordinated frameworks with local value systems and structures that address violent insecurity and state fragility, using northeastern Nigeria as a case study. The study deepens an understanding of the nature of insecurity and fragility experienced in Nigeria. It offers insights and a nuanced understanding of the drivers of insecurity and fragility while proffering clear policy prescriptions useful to the state and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO's). This is critical for emerging reflections on the State fragility- conflict nexus.

This paper sets off with conceptualizing the states, conflict and fragility nexus;

engages Nigeria's policy regimes, and the work of neoliberal institutions like the World Bank. The paper then details the agency and communion in local mechanisms for atrocity prevention as the lenses (theory) through which this phenomenon is examined. It details the approach through which data to examine this phenomenon was acquired, discusses findings and their implication to countering state fragility in Nigeria.

Background

The northeastern part of Nigeria has been ravaged by conflict induced by various radical extremist groups including Boko Haram, ISWA and armed bandits. This has snowballed into fatalities and displacement for millions of people from their homes (Times Premium, 2021; Al-jazeera, 2021). Internally displaced persons camps provide shelter, food and safety for many within the region. It has been labeled a human rights crisis for many reasons, including the continued abuse and kidnapping of school age children, especially girls, by these radical groups. Local groups are deeply involved in important aspects of human rights protection, including: humanitarian relief, care packs for the displaced, advocacy against stigma and re-integration of abductees, capacity-building, and small grants for economic empowerment. Some local women groups involved include the Women in New Nigeria, Borno Women's Development Initiative, the University of Maiduguri Muslim Women's Group, the Borno State Christian Association women's wing, Hope in Legislative for the vulnerable and marginalized and Al Ansar. Many groups face the challenge of being ignored by INGO programs in supporting the vulnerable population (Imam *et al*., 2020).

Imam *et al* (2020), among others, have documented the various human rights challenges that millions face, especially women in the context of terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. Local agency in sync with foreign actors will amplify results in safeguarding the integrity of human rights. This also ties in with their need to participate in local peace-building mechanisms advanced by international, regional, and national actors. Such engagement will give them agency, which reflects choice in their processes and could be useful for the larger context of sub-Saharan Africa. Locally driven approaches to de-radicalization are also critical to interventions. Practitioners have also operated in silos, creating duplication of programs with the same purpose. This necessitates developing a local atrocity prevention framework that will be comprehensive in scope but have local women at the core as vital actors.

States, Conflict and Fragility

The weakness of state institutions, deteriorating governance environments, and lack of capacity and/or disruption relating to on-going or recent armed conflict/crisis or violent insecurity are major characteristics of fragility. Fragility impacts negatively on social cohesion and development, economic growth, and employment which also have the potential to aggravate state fragility and further dent growth and stability prospects. In these environments, resilience capacity is heavily eroded, and fragility is made an even bigger problem.

The notion of 'new wars' is heavily contested; though we employ this to explain the sources, nature and level of insecurity in Nigeria. Alex De Waal (2009), for example, argues that Mary Kaldor's concept of "new wars" is a description of conflicts in less governed countries and not a description of new conflicts. So, what are these "New Wars"? According to Kaldor (2005), at the core of the "new wars" is that globalization has transformed the fundamental characteristics of war, making it impossible for armed conflict to develop through the distinct phases as articulated by Carl von Clausewitz (1950). It is not a war between two conventional armies and between states, but between states and non-state actors such as ragtag insurgents, rebels or terrorists who specialize in instilling fear by brutalizing civilians.

New wars are also characterized by violence between varying combinations of state and non-state networks, groups and gangs, fighting not for an ideology but for identity politics such as ethnicity, religion and related ideologies. These "wars" hold the civilian population in its grip through violence, fear and terror. These conflicts are also funded through predatory means, such as illegal extraction of valuable minerals, and not through the state. In essence, the new type of warfare is a predatory social condition. It is about the breakdown of legitimacy. New wars have little to do with technology and more to do with social relations of warfare. They represent a new type of warfare associated with globalization and the disintegration of states, particularly in the post-Cold War era.

The 'Old Wars' defined/outlined/described by Clausewitz are wars between states fought by armed forces in uniform, wherein the decisive encounter was battle. By contrast, new wars take place in the context of the disintegration of states, mostly authoritarian states under the impact of globalization. New wars are fought by networks of state and non-state actors, often without uniforms, and sometimes they have distinctive signs. They are new wars where battles are rare, and violence is directed against civilians as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics or ethnic cleansing. They are wars where taxation is falling and war finance consists of loot and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue.

Conflicts described as new wars are characterized by the fact that distinctions between combatant and noncombatant, and legitimate violence and criminality are blurred. These are wars which exacerbate the disintegration of the state – declines in GDP, loss of tax revenue, and loss of legitimacy, among others. Above all, they construct new sectarian identities, mostly religious, ethnic, or tribal, that undermine the sense of a shared political community. Indeed, this could be considered the purpose of these wars. They recreate the sense of political community along new divisive lines through the manufacture of fear and hate. They establish new friend-enemy distinctions.

The World Bank (2020) indicates that countries with cycles of conflict are likely to have poverty rates 20 percent more than those less inclined to such. The development issues in fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) spread across borders with terrorism, the displacement of people, and reduced trade. The World Bank also predicts 46 percent of the poor in the world will live in fragile, conflict-ridden places by 2030. Nigeria is an example of this kind of fragile state. Vulnerability and the embedding of poverty in FCV contexts results as marginalized groups lack support. The correlation between levels of economic development and the state of fragility is by and large well established (OECD, 2010). The relationship between fragility and socio-economic development, defined as progress by Amartya Sen (2000), is complex in terms of the transmission mechanism and the impact on overall national development. The UNHCR (2019) shows how displacement increases the pre-existing vulnerabilities, marginalization, and discrimination for persons with intersecting identities. Gender-based violence is a critical issue as 52 percent of all internally displaced persons are women, according to the UNHCR (2019).

Nigeria and Policy Regimes

According to Carter and May (2020), policy regimes are arrangements of governance to engage policy problems. These policy regimes are made up of three elements: ideas, institutional arrangements, and interests (May and Jochim, 2013, 3). Ideas are the rationales around which policy goals are made and implemented (Carter and May, 2020, 233). At the core of the policy regime perspective is the idea that interactions between the three regime elements (ideas, institutional arrangements, and interests) are associated with the relative strength of a crisis and conflict response. According to Carter & May (2020), this relative strength is known by policy regime scholars as “coherence,” indicating the fidelity, effectiveness, and consistency of actions targeted at achieving policy goals. In the context of Nigeria, this can be aptly articulated as ineffective, inconsistent, and fraught with systemic problems.

The World Bank and State Fragility

This paper works with the World Bank's conceptualization of State fragility. This is a broad categorization of fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) based on the nature and severity of challenges in the state. This grouping is updated and published annually by the World Bank Group (WBG). It is collated using global indicators, with two main groups of countries: First are those countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility. This is based on the quality of policy, institutions and manifestations of fragility. The second group includes the countries affected by violent conflict, based on a threshold number of conflict-related deaths relative to the population. This category includes two sub-categories based on the intensity of violence: countries in high-intensity conflict and countries in medium-intensity conflict where Nigeria features.[2]

In the study of state fragility and intervention design, the World Bank has mechanisms in place, referred to as pillars of engagement. The specific pillars relevant to this paper are: Preventing violent conflict and interpersonal violence; Remaining engaged during crises and active conflicts; Helping countries transition out of fragility and mitigating the spillovers of fragility, conflict and violence (World Bank 2000). The World Bank states flexibility and adaptation to individual country contexts as a major means of operationalizing their strategy for FCV. This work looks at the dynamics of the regime at work and community mechanisms at the local level in Nigeria to understand how this and other humanitarian intervention can be deployed. In studying the local context, we can connect measures proposed at the global level and country level.

Theory: Agency and Communion in Local Mechanisms for Atrocity Prevention

Many countries in conflict prone regions in Africa lack the infrastructure and capacity to manage the full spectrum of issues that conflict presents. It is acknowledged by other scholars that local mechanisms in tandem with national structures are important means for protection and peace-building. Using concepts of agency and communion from social psychology, Chan *et.al* (2018)

[1]World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025
[2]Countries in medium-intensity conflict are defined as (i) countries with lower intensity conflict, as measured by (a) an absolute number of conflict deaths above 250 according to ACLED and 150according to UCDPvii; and (b) between 2 and 10 per 100,000 population according to ACLED and between 1 and 10 according to UCDP; or (ii) countries with a rapid deterioration of the security situation, as measured by (a) an absolute number of conflict deaths above 250 according to ACLED and 150 according to UCDP; (b) a lower number of conflict deaths relative to the populationbetween 1 and 2 (ACLED) and 0.5 and 1 (UCDP) and (c) more than a doubling of the number of casualties in the last year (World Bank 2022)

explore how assessing people on the grounds of agency and communion aids understanding of their need to thrive and adapt. This is important in the African context because it helps to build functional mechanisms to advance human rights, and to ensure protection and thriving at a local level on the basis of three things: first, the knowledge and choices of individuals in their communities becomes a driving component of prevention and protection mechanisms. Second, their agency facilitates the use of roles and processes the people are already in sync with. Third, following Szczesny *et.al's* (2018) thoughts, it encompasses the pre-existing ramifications for gender stereotypes and gender identity within these contexts, including division of labor and leadership roles.

This approach to policy design and implementation in local human rights prevention is relevant because it engages the individuals need to thrive and leverages their time-trusted means for ensuring peace to build dependable mechanisms. While preventive strategies around security assistance and building institutions are important, local agency by clear participation will ensure positive results. A key part of this is gendered participation and inclusion. Women, for example, should be key participants in these local processes because their exclusion may be a predictor of failure in effective local peace building mechanisms (Long and Kuehnast, 2020). This is also significant because of their role in the family and community in Africa. The understanding of how to approach this has evolved, as shown in various existing frameworks for local peace building. By extension, agency and communion as part of a design for atrocity prevention is essential because it is based on the needs of local individuals to participate in these processes that affect them directly and works with their understanding of how to thrive in their circumstance.

Methodology

This study seeks to deepen knowledge of policy and practice for local engagement that addresses state fragility and growing insecurity with the policy regime in Nigeria. This paper recognizes the challenges of empirically based assessments and evaluation of local mechanisms, and the role they can play in the wider policy framework of human rights and fragility. To provide context and deeper insight, this paper uses case studies to bridge the gap between the normative and evidence based local agency in fragility and conflict prevention. The methodology is designed around a literature review of the case study and primary data collection. Five women and four staff of non-profits and government agencies, who have experienced Boko Haram violent extremism, were interviewed in the study.

It draws on methods and tools from policy and human rights and is also based on the author's experience in case study research on people affected directly by the Boko Haram Insurgency in northeast Nigeria. The human rights framework is used broadly in terms of principles, ideas, and values. The human rights framework strictly refers to the set of principles contained in the universal declaration of human rights, with its attendant norms.

This study employs a case study methodology to better examine in depth the phenomenon of insecurity in a fragile context. In relying on the strategies proffered by Stephen Van Evera (1997:88) for selecting cases, the following were identified before selecting the Boko Haram Insurgency: First, in the history of women as suicide bombers globally, Boko Haram has the highest number of female suicide bombers, providing a data-rich case. Data on this case is available from other scholars who have studied in this area, as well as from media and archival data. Second, policy prescriptions from this case may be relevant to the other states given similar contexts. Third, it is a case with important consequences for Human Security, conflict in fragility, and policy implications for intervention and aid.

The selection of Nigeria as a case study is informed by this framework. In human rights claims, the measure of 'political space' is determined, first, by the fact of ongoing armed or violent conflict. Second, it is determined by the presence and level of functioning of institutional (civilian) governance structures, freedom of expression, rule of law and open access to information (Cohen *et al*., 2001: 126). Primary data sources are from semi-structured, open-ended interviews with individuals who have experienced Boko Haram attacks, displacement, and government response to these. Secondary sources drawn upon in this study include academic publications, texts, local and international journal publications. This research also incorporated media publications by international sources as well as internet sources, Government agency websites and online fora.

Socio-Economic Situation, Conflict and Fragility

In academic research, consensus on the relationship between poverty and socioeconomic conditions with terrorism is still developing. Various scholars over time have carried out empirical research in this area, controlling for other variables like the strength of institutions, education, type of regime, and demography in the state. This has produced different outcomes affecting generalizability and reliability of conclusions reached. While some align in

[1]Gurr (1970)
[2]Testas(2004)

accepting this theory, others do not. Carrying out empirical analysis on insurgencies and 127 civil wars, Fearon &Laitin (2003) showed that poverty had a positive relationship with domestic conflict as well as large population sizes, and with political instability in states that are not strong financially. They concluded these conditions gave insurgents good opportunity for recruiting others (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Other researchers with this perspective are Gurr (1970)[3] and Testas (2004).[4] Some only partly agree with the correlation between poverty and conflict, and have pointed this out in their work: Lichbach (1989), for example, posited the "Economic Inequality-Political Conflict puzzle." Another example is Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks's (2015) study, which showed a nontrivial effect for countries that are less developed. Other scholars who conclude that no relationship exists from their analysis are Krueger and Maleckova (2003); Berrebi (2007); Bravo and Dias (2006); and Shafiq and Sinno (2010). The nature of the environment where people involved in terrorist groups live may inform their participation for the benefits they may receive. Research on the reasons why insurgency and terrorism may thrive show that socio-economic environment is a critical predictor. The response of people to their immediate environment may be associated with participation in these organizations (Meagher, 2014; Mustapha, 2014). Governance failure, corruption, economic marginalization leading to poverty, unemployment, inequality, and hunger are challenges faced by people in Nigeria in varying degrees. According to Matfess (2017), and corroborated by Walker(2016), some women in the Boko Haram group exercise agency in joining their ranks to make their quality of life better.

Discussion of findings

Findings from the interviews carried out in this case study align with the literature on poverty and radicalization. Women who have experienced Boko Haram and the perspectives they share show many sides of suffering from poverty and conflict. Their experiences and perspectives also showed how some people return to their captors (Boko Haram) or subscribe to their camps to get aid and benefits. The interviews with staff of nonprofits and emergency agencies in the area also point to the challenges experienced because of infrastructure deficiency, institutional failures, and policy in-consistency.

Policy "incoherence" results in more loss of lives, increased displacement, and erosion of government legitimacy because of reduced trust. In the face of unabating attacks by ISWA, Boko Haram and bandits in the region, the response from the government is inadequate. Radicalization is associated with poverty in some cases (Schmidt, 2013), with literature indicating that radicalization may be as a result of unfulfilled responsibilities by the government as among the factors driving fragility, in the context of Northeastern Nigeria, radical groups offer economic prospects. Contrary to the norm, insurgent groups like Boko Haram are viewed saviors due to the role they are playing by filling in the vacuum where government has failed to provide the required services. Victims are seen to associate with insurgent groups in northeast Nigeria due to the security gap that the government of Nigeria has not worked to fill effectively. In some areas, the government is seen to have abdicated its responsibility to protect the citizenry. As a result, the loyalty of the citizenry has fallen to the insurgents for protection and survival.

Policy regime scholars point out that even meaningful policy efforts are susceptible to deterioration over time (May and Jochim, 2013; Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013) and can cause interest-based backlash that threatens to hamper the energy behind policy endeavor. This is true for development partners like World Bank in tackling state fragility in Nigeria. The World Bank has relied much on Nigeria's institutional frameworks that insurgents have rendered ineffective in tackling state fragility in the Boko Haram ravaged states of northeastern Nigeria. Tackling FCV drivers involves addressing cross-border challenges and, where relevant, developing effective regional approaches. While the World Bank Group operates primarily from a country-based model, it is sometimes critical to develop regional and cross-border programs and approaches. It is these regional programs that would target herdsmen, ISWA, bandits that are nomadic in orientation traversing the porous borders across of Chad, Mali, Cameroon-all experiencing medium conflict and making it easier for them to retreat and reorganize. Identifying priority regional activities critically aimed at reducing the FCV risk are important. However, they can only be effective where a regional concerted approach evolves and is effected.

Consultations and capacity building with a localized approach engaging local intelligence, knowledge and networks is equally important. This should be a human rights approach that depends on the cooperation between actors at different levels: community-based organizations, local human rights NGOs, international NGOs, and allies in governmental and intergovernmental institutions. Whereas international NGOs and other development partners may have approaches that seem workable, local actors understand the terrain better and therefore can proffer better and effective contextualized responses or solutions when engaged. A bottom-up approach requires that the human rights experiences of communities set the agenda for the entire network in the locality. Whether this occurs and how the interactions among these actors translate into practice across all the levels of each human rights act is crucial for exploration in the localization case study research. Interactions and alliances formed between local and international actors depend on various contextual elements, including access to information, expertise, skills, and resources. It is argued that intermediary actors, more often than NGOs supporting grassroots groups, lose touch with the communities and issues that gave birth to their activism. The NGOs, in the process of protecting the human rights of the citizens, use a paternalistic approach and exclude grassroots communities from the critical decisions affecting them. Recent case study research that assessed the impact of implementing participatory human rights in local communities affected by foreign investments asserts that the participation of community members enriches the evaluation's outcome, leads the local actors to understand the human rights framework better, and achieves a shared sense of empowerment.[5]

Overall, participatory methodologies hold the central goal of empowering the communities at hand by creating methodologies that actively engage them in the process, thus empowering those directly affected to assess and take hold of their communities' situations. A vital capacity building component is needed to achieve such an objective successfully. There ought to be a networking mechanism, a process whereby NGO's and the local community can develop an effective interaction; faith-based, youth/children CSOs, women and human rights groups can be engaged in capacity building, technical assistance and advocacy in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. A recent example of community engagement was the nationwide protests against police brutality, which required the government on 11 October to abolish SARS units. This is a classical example of how communities can be mobilized to determine systems that work for them and participate in forming and implementing them if the government of Nigeria is to restore trust and/or legitimacy among the people of northeastern Nigeria.

Weaponization of women is a natural evolution of the “new wars” where the motive is to instill fear and terrorize the larger population. Acknowledging the geographical, historical, and cultural specificity in looking at women in the global south (Mohanty, 1991) in this case, the woman and mass violence in Nigeria, this lens should guide aid and

[5]Rights & Democracy, 2007: 33

[6]GImam, A., Biu, H., and Yahi, M., (2020) Women's informal peacebuilding in Northeast Nigeria. CMI Brief | (Aug 2020) Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Brief no. 2020:09) 6

development interventions. There is more to be understood about the radicalization and de-radicalization of women associated with violent extremist groups. What is certain is women within and outside of these groups in fragile, conflict context play a major role in stabilization or escalation of conflict as they play out. This requires further study.

Conclusion

As expressed in the interviews with women who have experienced Boko Haram, the challenges run deep and require a "whole community approach". Some of the needs include economic and psycho-social support for loss of family members and source of livelihood, the reintegration of kidnapped persons, sexually abused persons and advocacy to avoid stigmatization.[6] Local organizations who already enjoy the support of USAID indirectly or directly must benefit from funding that allows them build capacity in the communities affected. This caters for vulnerable and at-risk-youth, separated and orphaned children and places them in educational facilities. Local intelligence must also foster the creation and sustenance of safe-space educational spaces for women and girls. This in turn supports their education and safeguards against sexual and gender-based violence, given its trend in the terrain. While the state is at the core of atrocity prevention, African states and societies have measures for the prevention, mitigation and protection from human rights abuses and atrocities. In examining the behavior of African states, which sometimes leads to violation of human rights,we argue that sometimes functions that define the state, like social services, are lacking, and "state-mechanisms' fall to other groups within the state who exist outside the boundaries of governance structures. It is worth noting that these groups or societal structures wield capacity for human rights protection.

Agency and communion provides direction for policy design on local atrocity prevention frameworks that is practical on many levels. In Sub-Saharan Africa specifically, it facilitates meeting and advancing the need of individuals to participate directly in mechanisms for protection. It is also important because it provides a more efficient and judicious use of donor funds. Vulnerable groups and women make up a large share of these casualties. Policy for delivering humanitarian aid, ensuring human rights and engaging violent extremism should be designed in consultation with local organizations already working with vulnerable groups and women. The work of these groups should not only be funded, but also recognized and integrated into plans by global agencies to facilitate effective, and context-specific solutions.

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Capacity Building for Public Servants: Intensive Efforts before the Move to the New Administrative Capital in Egypt

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Abstract:

This paper addresses the quality of public servants' training and capacity building programs in Egypt against the backdrop of the move to the new Administrative Capital. Based on a systems model, the paper discusses the institutions, structures and processes for delivering training programs to prepare select public servants for the task ahead of them. Findings point out that the landscape for delivering public service training in Egypt has changed. New institutions have come up, while others have been revamped. Purposive in-depth interviews with representatives of government, international development agencies, and training beneficiaries help identify some of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges related to the training process. While the training of government employees is now receiving more attention than ever before, is tackling new updated topics, and is supported by funding from international development partners, yet there are concerns about sustainability of funding and long-term impact.

Key Words: Capacity Building, Training - Civil Servants, Egypt, New Administrative Capital

Introduction

Capacity building is a requirement for all public sector employees all over the world. The ultimate goal is to enable them to perform their jobs effectively. Continuous capacity building and development is key to government employees acquiring the needed skills and competencies for performing their jobs, and for better achieving their organizations' missions (Rusaw & Fisher, 2017).

Capacity building of public employees is more than just offering them training workshops. Training is just one element amongst many that may have an impact on the improved capacity of public servants. Whilst training is generally perceived to be relatively short term and focused on enhancing the skills and

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capacities of employees; capacity building is longer term, has more focus on application, may cover changes in the organizational motivation system and culture to enable improvements in individual performance, and consequently lead to improvements in the organizational performance (Rusaw et Fisher, 2017). Moreover, capacity building of individual public servants is just one element in the overall public service capacity. In fact, public service capacity was perceived as being comprised of three levels: societal or national level, organizational level, and individual level; the latter being focused on developing the knowledge and skills of the individual public servant so that he/she can perform the job at hand more productively (Vyas *et al*, 2013). The capacity of individual public servants in any one country is influenced by: the education system in that country, the education yields as reflected on the capacity of potential recruits to the civil service, the recruitment system in place, the compensation provided, the on-the job training and learning, the resources and equipment available to the civil servant, the management and motivation system, and lastly, the formal training provided (World Bank, 2017). Thus, training provided to public servants is just one factor, among many others that may lead to an improvement in their actual performance, and their performance on the job is one factor among many others that may ultimately lead to an improved level of government effectiveness.

Figure 1 based on the World Bank Good Governance Indicators and the perception of Governance Effectiveness shows how Egypt fares in comparison to a number of other African nations and over time. As seen, perceived government effectiveness in Egypt in 2020 improved over what it was like in 2015, but did not reach earlier achieved levels in 2010, 2005 or 2000. This is despite all the capacity building and training efforts expended over the years. In 2020, Egypt's perceived government effectiveness is comparable to Ethiopia, but falls back from levels achieved in Morocco, Rwanda or South Africa, three other African countries that are doing relatively well as regards government effectiveness.

Figure 1: Perceived Government Effectiveness in Egypt over time from 2000-2020 and in Comparison, with a number of other African Countries:



Source: Kaufmann Dl, A Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2020), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home

Although over time, a few scholars have expressed their skepticism about the guaranteed positive impact of training workshops on desired improved organizational effectiveness in the public sector (Kroll & Moynihan, 2015), many others have pointed out to contradictory evidence (Morten, 2019). Training matters, and works in most cases, but with a number of caveats, including: starting with a needs assessment, addressing specific capacity gaps, being well designed, having a feedback system, linking classroom learning to practice, extending over a reasonable time frame, and combining between a number of these features in the same training (Seidle *et al*, 2016; Berman, 2015; Kroll & Moynihan, 2015; Brown, 2002). That is why most governments continue to invest heavily in training.

Research problem & questions

The main features of the research problem under study are that the landscape of the institutions providing capacity building for public employees in Egypt has witnessed a lot of changes recently. There is great focus on offering training to the select group of employees to be moved to the New Administrative Capital. However, the process needs more transparency. There is a lot of ambiguity even regarding the actual number of public employees in Egypt, with different sources sharing different estimates.

In 2022, Egypt's population reached nearly 103 million (CAPMAS, 2022, webpage). The total number of employed persons (15 years and above) in 2020 was reported as 26 million (CAPMAS, 2022, webpage).This population is served with an overwhelming number of government employees, reaching in one estimate nearly 6.4 million (MoPED, 2014), or in another estimate “approximately 7 million” as stated by President Sisi in a televised event (Ten TV, 2016, Feb. 24), or a more conserved estimate of 5.02 million by CAPMAS (2017). This means that nearly 26% of all employed persons in Egypt work in the government sector and that there is a public official for every 15 citizens. Over the past decades there were always announcements by top officials regarding the very limited budget available for training per employee. One shocking figure by the former Director of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA) was that in 2012 there was only a budget of EGP 10 (Less than $1) for training per government employee per year, while in other neighboring countries like Kuwait, the budget was EGP 70 thousand per year (Egynews, 2022). Things have changed over time.

Recently in Egypt, the decision was made to establish a New Administrative Capital and to gradually have it as the central location for core executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. Construction on the new site, in the suburbs of the current Cairo capital, is going on at a fast pace and the move of the government employees has started in 2023, after several delays. Capacity building programs are being designed and implemented to target the select few who will be moved to the new capital, and by select few is meant the nearly 40to 50 thousand employees to be moved (IDSC, 2021) out of the total of 5 to 7 million total. New training modalities are being used, new institutions assigned with the training and different sources of budgets are tapped on to cover the training and capacity building expenditures. Very little is published in a transparent manner about the training and capacity building programs offered to government employees in Egypt. We only get to learn glimpses about what is happening with reference to government employees' capacity building efforts from the brief announcements in the news, every now and then, as sporadically announced by government officials.

The purpose of the current paper is to explore the changes that have taken place in the capacity building and training programs for Egyptian public servants over time, the extent of the changes implemented in the institutional structures responsible for managing and delivering the training, and explore what strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges are there.

The main research questions are: What are the current institutional arrangements, modalities and overall landscape of the training provided to the Egyptian public servants nominated for the move to the New Administrative Capital? And how are these trainings perceived by the experts and government beneficiaries?

Conceptual Framework

Figure 2 shows the visualization of a systems model for the capacity building of Egyptian government employees moving to the new Administrative Capital:

- The inputs identify the main reason for the intensive training provided to the selected calibers of public servants which is the intended move to the New Administrative Capital and being ready for the new style of modernized and technology-based work systems. The move to the new Capital has also been associated with the start of a "New Republic" for Egypt.
- The process covers the capacity building strategy or strategies developed by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration, and other partners, the different organizations used to deliver the training, the modalities used, the timing and the frequency.
- The Outputs would be the number of calibers who actually go through the training and currently being estimated as nearly 40 thousand public servants.
- The outcomes or results of the capacity building effort can be distinguished on three different levels: the perceived improvement on the individual level, the perceived improvement on the organizational level and finally the perceived improvement in the level of government effectiveness on the national level.
- The set of external variables towards the right-hand side of the diagram remind us that these outcomes will be influenced by a number of other factors. The perceived individual performance will be influenced by the calibers who received the training, their readiness to learn and implement change. The sought improvements in the organizational performance will be affected by the mandates of that organization and their complexity. The perception of national government

effectiveness will be influenced by the national governance system in place, the level of trust by citizens and other externalities, such as any crises situations, the COVID-19 pandemic over the past two years being a case in point.

Figure 2: Conceptual Model for Capacity Building Process for Egyptian Government Employees Moving to the New Administrative Capital



Source: Systems Model inspired and adapted from: Labin et al (2012), "A Research Synthesis of the Evaluation Capacity Building Literature", American Journal of Evaluation, 33 (3), 307-338, and other literature reviewed.

Methodology

The methodology used in this exploratory research depends on desk research, examination of published academic literature and grey literature (websites, YouTube videos and official Facebook pages). Additionally, five in-depth interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of top-level government officials managing training programs in their organizations, representatives of international development agencies funding trainings in government, and representatives of training beneficiaries. The duration of each of the interviews was between forty-five minutes to one hour. They were conducted and recorded over Zoom based on the informed consent of the interviewees. The purpose of the interviews was to explore how the trainings were perceived and what were the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges identified.

The Egyptian Training & Capacity Building Context

Before we get into an exploration of the new training and capacity building programs provided to the Egyptian public servants nominated for the move to the New Administrative Capital, a little background about the Egyptian public service context and the Egyptian public servants is needed.

Who are the public servants in Egypt?

In general, the Egyptian public service has always been characterized as being overstaffed. We have more public servants than what the work needs. The reason for the overstaffing goes back to the 1950s, when President Nasser, in an attempt to win over citizens' support, encourage citizens to join higher education, following the 1952 coup d'état/revolution, allowed unprecedented increasing numbers of appointments to the public service sector. By virtue of Law 14/1963, jobs in the government sector were automatically guaranteed for all university graduates. This job guarantee policy continued until 1978. However, decades afterwards, during the time of Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, over-hiring in government continued for reasons related to political stability purposes (Kawamura, 2022). Even following the January 25 Revolution in 2011, massive additional appointments to the government bureaucracy took place during President Morsi's era, when, to appease the public, hundreds of thousands of contractual employees were given tenure. In a publicized speech by President Sisi, he mentions that one million employees were added in 2011 without there being any need for them; that now there are nearly 6.5 or 7 million employees; that although we need maximum one million employees we cannot let go of the excess; these employees support families so we cannot let them go. “It is a bill we all have to pay”, says the President (Sada ElBalad, 2018).

Because of the security of government positions, the shorter working hours, the stable income, and the option of extended paid and unpaid leaves, compared to the private sector, jobs in the government sector have always been in high demand (Barsoum, 2016). Although recently some argue that the public service jobs are gradually losing their earlier appeal with many private sector organizations offering better working conditions and salaries, and recruitment to the civil service becoming more difficult (Gould-Williams *et al*, 2015).

Starting 2018, according to the director of the CAOA, a new count for civil servants was initiated to update their personnel files, and so far, they have managed to register 3.182 million employees, but the effort was suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic (ETC TV, 2021). This is a much lower figure than the earlier counts surpassing 6.8 million. Despite these large numbers, there are reported deficits in some specializations, such as engineers, IT programmers and experts, physicians and healthcare professionals. Appointments to the government bureaucracy is said to take place only in these announced deficit areas (ETC TV, 2021).

Overview of Capacity Building & Training in the Egyptian Bureaucracy

Capacity building and training of public servants is considered part and parcel of any public administration reform efforts. Up to 2014, Egypt had a Minister of State for Administrative reform dedicated to the planning and oversight of public administration reform on a national level in coordination with different line ministries. From 2014 to 2017, the public administration reform portfolio was placed under the umbrella of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA) with direct reporting to the Prime Minister. In 2017, the administrative reform portfolio was moved to the Ministry of Planning and the name of the Ministry was changed to the 'Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform'. However, lately with a partial cabinet re-shuffle in 2019, the public administration reform portfolio got dissected and split amongst a number of entities, and no minister has the overall oversight for public administration reforms planning and implementation. The current situation sees the Digital Transformation/E-Government agenda with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, the Human Resource Management with the Central Agency for Organization and Administration, and the training and capacity building function even more divided across many other entities.

A Higher Committee for Administrative Reform was established in 2017, headed by the Prime Minister, for the purpose of “developing governmental services and preparing qualified cadres” (SIS, 2017, May 26). The Committee had as members the Minister of Planning, the Director of CAOA, the Minister of Local Development and the Minister of Finance. In 2019, a technical secretariat affiliated to the Committee was formed, based on a decree by the Ministry of Planning, with the responsibility of following up on the implementation of public administration reform plans, and including the plan for the move to the new Administrative capital, and the training of the selected calibers (Abdel Tawab, 2019, July 8). However, in 2019 through the ministerial restructuring process, the public administration portfolio was removed from the Minister of Planning (Reuters, 2019, Dec. 22).

All governmental units in the Egyptian bureaucracy are mandated by law to invest in training their employees. Article 7 of the Egyptian Civil Service Law No. 81/2016 states that each government unit has to train and develop the capacity of its employees for the purpose of developing the culture of civil service and its role in society. The unit can establish a center for Human Resource Development for the training, orientation and development of its employees. It can also contract out the training to centers and agencies, but these have to be approved by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA) (Egypt Civil Service Law 81/2016).

Landscape of Capacity Building and Training of Public Employees in Egypt

Several governmental bodies are responsible for delivering training programs to Egyptian civil servants. Some of these training organizations have been there since the 1960s and the 1950s, others have been recently established and some have taken on new identities and had their mandates shifted. Amongst the traditional government entities responsible for capacity building and training of public employees are: The Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA), the Leadership Development Institute (LDI) and the Sadat Academy for Management Sciences. Whilst amongst the new set of governmental entities, either newly established or revamped, are the National Academy for Youth Training and Rehabilitation, the National Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development, the National Academy for Fighting Corruption, and the training arm of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Additionally, there are multiple contracted out training activities by government to the nonprofit and private sector, and ample partnerships with the international development agencies to support with the needed capacity building and training efforts.

The Traditional Training Agencies: The Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA)

Established in 1964, to replace another outdated government agency with the name of Diwan Al-Muwazafeen (Employees' Bureau), "it is the main entity responsible for improving the quality of civil service, enhancing efficiency, realizing fair treatment of all government employees, and ensuring the effective delivery by all executive bodies of their responsibilities in delivering goods and services" (Law No. 118/1964, Article 3). CAOA is thus responsible for managing all human resources in the public sector institutions, and establishing their organograms, whether ministries, service or economic agencies, or local units. According to the 1964 law for the establishment of CAOA, it is mandated to develop the training plan for all government employees, develop their competencies and provide them with the needed technical assistance (Law No. 118/1964, Article 5.4). Additionally, it is also mandated with formulating public administration reform policies and plans, suggest means for developing organizational competencies and enhance leadership effectiveness, productivity and improved performance (Law No. 118/1964, Article 5.9).

In practice, according to the current director of CAOA, all governmental entities are mandated to implement their own training programs to their employees, they have their budgets and they develop their own training plans but these have to be approved by CAOA to make sure there is no duplication between the programs offered independently by the different gover-nment units and what CAOA offers. CAOA is responsible for training all supervisory and leadership cadres in the public service. It also offers a list of training programs for free and different entities can nominate participants to join. There is a national strategic plan for training where there are five paths identified:

- o Bedaya [The Start]: for all new entrants to the public service;
- o Job Career Paths: that differ based on the planned career paths to be pursued;
- o Middle Level Managers Training Programs;
- o Top Leadership Training Programs;
- o New Beginning Program: for those on their way to retiring to help them plan for their lives after retirement (ETC TV, 2021).

The Leadership Development Institute

Originally called the Leadership Development Institute for the Public Enterprise Sector and established way back in 1964, in 2020 by virtue of a prime ministerial decree number 1147/2020, the affiliation of the institute was transferred to the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA) (Egypt Official Gazette, 2020, June 9). Thus, it seems CAOA's influence is being expanded, and the Leadership Development Institute originally affiliated to the Public Enterprise Sector and used earlier for implementing obligatory training to leaders before their promotion, is being placed under the umbrella of CAOA. Additionally, CAOA's director, with a ministerial title, is heavily involved in the re-orientation and capacity building of the public employees to be moved to the new administrative capital.

Sadat Academy for Management Sciences

Established in 1981, it is a public agency practicing a scientific activity and is affiliated to the Prime Minister. It aims at building managerial capacity in all sectors, fields and levels nationwide. This includes supervising the training of government employees if requested by any administrative or economic government organization and in agreement with CAOA (Presidential Decree 127/1981). As the name implies, the Academy was named after the late President Sadat (1970-1981). The intention was to use it for building managerial capacity in all sectors as 'poor management' during that era was often pinpointed as the main reason for many of the ailments striking the Egyptian institutions. However, overtime, with successive Presidents for the Republic, the Sadat Academy no longer was perceived as the panacea for resolving 'poor management' issues in Egypt. Gradually, the shift was made more towards academic degrees and less towards executive training and capacity building.

The Newer Training Agencies

The National Academy for Youth Training and Rehabilitation

Established as an economic agency directly affiliated to the President of the Republic and mandated with the human development of youth in all sectors of the state and continuously developing their competencies and skills. For that purpose, it is responsible for developing training policies for all young people in Egypt in all sectors, in coordination with the respective entities, and in accordance with the national administrative reform plans. It is responsible as well for developing training plans for all training centers, monitoring their implementation, reviewing the contents of training programs and authorizing their content, overseeing all training centers and evaluating their performance, and imposing fines on entities that violate the set professional standards. It is responsible for authorizing trainers, conducting research in the fields of public policy and public administration, and organizing specialized training programs to young people in management, banking, politics, science and other fields "to build a cadre of highly qualified young people capable of leadership in all sectors" (Presidential Decree No. 434/ 2017).

The National Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development

(NIGSD): The institute established in 2020 is affiliated to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. It is a public economic organization with consultative, training and research mandates It is the new face of the earlier

National Management Institute which was founded early in 1954. The new identity was decided upon to be more in line with Egypt's Sustainable Development Strategy 2030. Its training mandate focuses on raising the capacity of government employees in areas related to governance, competitiveness and sustainable develop-ment. This should take place in cooperation with the Leadership Development Institute affiliated to the Central Agency for Organization and Administration. NIGSD is considered the official training arm of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (Law No. 1880/2020; NIGSD, website; DARPE, Website).In an attempt to show how updated its work is, in February 2022, the NIGSD organized a conference about “Good Governance in the Virtual World Metaverse”(MoPED, 2022, February 24).

The National Academy for Fighting Corruption (NAFC)

The National Academy for Fighting Corruption is affiliated to the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), the government entity res-ponsible for monitoring the performance of the executive branch of government, making sure all governmental entities abide by the rule of law and all public employees work for objective of public service. ACA works on investigating crimes and violations related to the performance of public jobs in all government organizations (Law No. 54/1964 and its amendments). In 2014, the law for the establishment of the ACA was amended to establish the National Academy for Fighting Corruption. The NAFC is mandated with the development and training of members of the ACA and others, through organizing training workshops, conferences, seminars, disseminating ethical values, and offering diplomas and master degrees in the fields of corruption fighting systems (Ahram Gate, 2017, October 13). Headed by an army general, it organized the first African Symposium for Fighting Corruption (TenTVEg, 2019, June 12).

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT)

Currently the MCIT is responsible for implementing Egypt's Digital Transformation Strategy, the new terminology used to refer to e-government services. More governmental digital services have been added. MCIT's website states that: “In alignment with Egypt vision 2030, and Egypt's digital transformation strategy, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has an all-encompassing vision and plan, laying the foundations for the transformation of Egypt into a digital society” (MCIT, website).The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) is the main entity responsible for building the digital capacity of the

Egyptian public servants to be moved to the new capital. Amongst the topics covered in the Digital Capacity Building programs are: computer skills, information systems and digital transformation, digital project management, digital transformation program to combat corruption. Additionally, through the Institute of Information Technology, six thousand trainees were graduated in fields that would be needed by future professions, such as the Internet of things, information security, and artificial intelligence (Alaa El Din, 2021; Daily News Egypt, 2021, December 30). It is reported that nearly fifty thousand government employees have been trained by MCIT including those who will be moved to the new administrative capital and employees in the digital transformation units. (Daily News Egypt, 2021, December 30).

External Service Providers such as: AUC and FEPS

Occasionally, training activities are contracted out to be implemented by external non-governmental entities, such as Cairo University or the American University in Cairo (AUC). A number of programs targeting mid and senior level government employees are offered through the Executive Training arm of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy (GAPP) at AUC. Under the umbrella title of 'Transforming Public Service', a number of programs are offered with titles such as: Governance Excellence Certificate, Leadership in a Challenging Environment, and Advanced Public Policy Research (GAPP Executive Education, web page).

Content of the New Training Programs

Training for Select employees to be moved to the new Administrative Capital:

With the planned move to the New Administrative Capital (the Capital-to-be still does not have a unique name), government employees to be moved need to undergo intensive training. According to government officials nearly thirty-eight thousand employees will be transferred to the new capital starting 2022, out of nearly a total of 6.8 million. Intensive training and capacity building are being provided to this batch. The director of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration, Saleh El Sheikh, announced, in January 2021, that nearly twenty thousand employees who will move to the new capital have received training (Asharq Al-Awsat, 8 Jan., 2021; Extra News, 2020).

A needs assessment was performed before the decision to move employees to the new capital. A number of entities participated in the needs assessment of government employees to determine what are the competencies and traits that need to be acquired by the contemporary

Egyptian public servant. Experts from the field of sociology and psychology identified thirteen different competencies that include: discipline, willingness to learn and develop, language skills, both Arabic and foreign languages, general knowledge, technical skills related to the job and computer skills. Next assessments were conducted to test for the prevalence of those competencies amongst currently employed employees, before training was to start. Among the entities that participated in conducting the assessment were: The Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Communications, the Systems Department affiliated to the Military Forces, and the Institute of Behavioral and Psychological Sciences affiliated to the Military forces. Training started with the employees nominated for the move to the New Administrative Capital. Over an eight months period, four bundles of training programs were offered to the employees nominated for the move to the new capital:

- Basics of the Civil Service Job: National security, change management, national mega projects including the infrastructure and roads networks projects, the Sustainable Development Strategy SDS, Corruption fighting strategy, GOE institutions.
- Competencies Bundle: 11 competencies were identified including effective communication.
- Specialization Bundle: The content depends on where the employees work whether in Human Resources Management or in the Policy Support units affiliated to ministerial offices, or elsewhere.
- Computer Applications Bundle: the employees will get training on the software applications that they will use in their new workplaces in the new Administrative Capital (Extra News, 2020). The first batch of trained employees who are expected to move to the new capital belong to 119 different government organization (Mehawar TV, 2021).

The Presidential Program for Qualifying Executives for Leadership

Aside from the training programs offered and organized through CAOA, the Presidential Leadership Program (PLP) was started by President Sisi in 2015, targeting Egyptian youth from all over Egypt to prepare them for leadership roles in government. The program is considered an independent entity directly affiliated to the Presidency and implemented through a number of academic, civil society and state institutions (Presidency website, n.d.). In the recruitment for PLP, young people are encouraged to apply to achieve a number of objectives, including: developing their competencies and skills, understanding political and government systems, “getting promoted to leadership positions in record time”, participating in national development and implementing positive change. The PLP graduates upon completion of the ten months program receive a professional certificate from the National Training Academy, the short name for the National Academy for Youth Training and Rehabilitation. The training content covers three main pillars: political and security sciences, management and leadership sciences, and social and local administration sciences. Training methods combine between lectures, simulations and organized meetings and discussions with prominent national thought leaders. The program is offered free of charge (PLP website, n.d.)

The National Initiative for the "Professional Government Official"

The idea was introduced jointly by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development and the National Training Academy. It fulfills a need to develop the capacity of the government employee who will be responsible for implementing the directives received from leaders. The curriculum based on a needs-assessment covers new topics like social intelligence, how to deal with the public, the smile as an important skill that any public employee should be trained on, teamwork, presentation and communication skills. The training is divided into three phases over 45 days, each phase extends over 15 days that the trainee spends at the Academy then he goes back to his job for three weeks to implement and practice what was learnt during the training. In Phase II of the training he/she shares the feedback from the application of the skills learnt and receives additional training related to 'institutional change', laws and re-gulations, national security issues and how to deal with the media. During Phase III, the employee learns about: Digital Transformation, Creativity, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things (Kotb, 9 Nov., 2019).

Training & Capacity Building Perceived Outcomes:

In order to assess quality of the training and capacity building efforts directed to government employees moving to the new Administrative Capital in Egypt, feedback was solicited from the purposive in-depth interviews conducted with three government officials in a top-level managerial position, and recent recipients of training, and with two representatives of international development agencies responsible for managing training programs in government. Through the in-depth interviews, both the positives and challenges related to the training process were discussed. Responses were tabulated in a SWOT analysis format.

Strengths

On discussing the strengths of the training, respondents pointed out to several positive aspects, including the fact that offering training to government employees is on the government's

Sustainable Development Strategy, that the issue is receiving much more attention compared to earlier times, that donors are funding generously, that new updated topics are being discussed, and that new tools and techniques are being implemented, such as competency frameworks to decide on training needs, and knowledge sharing platforms.

- Training Part of National Vision: "Transparency and raising government effectiveness are men-tioned in Egypt's Sustainable Development Strategy 2030. Government is more serious about training than before" (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Enhanced Attention: "More spending by the Egyptian government is taking place on training because they have to. This is much more than before" (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Donors Interested: "We receive a lot of training opportunities from donor agencies" (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- New Topics: "We received training on digital transformation and information technology [in preparation for the move to the new capital]" (SM, Training Manager Judiciary Sector and beneficiary, 10 August, 2023). "More and newer topics are being offered in training such as 'Digital Transformation', 'Corruption', and 'Planning' on both a strategic level and an operational level"(SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- "We received WHO training, like how to do safety surveillance for pharmaceutical products" (MH– Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- Needs Assessment: "We sat for an exam - assuming we were moving to the New Administrative Capital – English and Arabic language exam, computer, IQ, religious and political values, hypothetical behavioral questions" (MH – Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- Competency Matrix:"[Nominating candidates for training] Lately we started having a competency matrix, that shows who needs training in what. The competency matrix was a requirement for accreditation of our agency by WHO" (MH – Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- Knowledge Sharing: "Those who attend training are asked to share any documents, materials and recordings on the shared drive once they return" (MH – Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).

Weaknesses

There were also several weaknesses pointed out relating to the speedy and diluted nature of the training provided in a compressed format, the lack of funding directed to CAOA, the main governmental entity responsible for managing the GOE's human resources, and the occasional absence of needs assessment.

- Diluted Content: "Some of the courses we got were not sufficiently comprehensive. For three weeks, we were introduced to a different topic each day, such as: cyber security, national security, crisis management, project management. The training was held at the National Training Academy. A day is too little, but it was better than nothing" (MH– Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- Limited Budget to Traditional Training Entities: "The training budget goes to NTA. This makes CAOA a dead body. There is no budget and they depend highly on donor funding to implement trainings" (Development partner employee 2, 9 August, 2022).
- Absence of Needs Assessment: "There was no needs assessment performed before the 'Leaders Development' program because it was offered to all managers in the organization" (MH– Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).

Opportunities

Despite these weaknesses, respondents pointed out to several key opportunities represented in the possible continued generous funding by development partners, the fact that when proper selection of trainees is done based on real needs and potential, there is an opportunity for extending the positive impact of the training from the individual to the organization and society as a whole.

- Donor Funding: "I attended trainings funded by the Spanish Development Agency, I went to Japan on a study tour"(SM, Training Manager Judiciary Sector and beneficiary, 10 August, 2022).
- Careful Selection of Trainees: "Selection of beneficiaries for TOT determines how the organization at large will benefit from the training. You should not select your friends or people about to retire" (SM, Training Manager Judiciary Sector and beneficiary, 10 August, 2022).
- Needs Assessment:"We need to focus most importantly on the trainee's needs to raise his efficiency and thus contribute to societal value"(SM, Training Manager Judiciary Sector and beneficiary, 10 August, 2022).

Challenges

Lastly, the respondents pointed out to a number of important challenges they perceived in the implemented trainings, including the occasional absence of a clear vision from the receiving organization, questionable financial sustainability as a result of the difficult economic situation, language barrier when international donors are implementing trainings in languages other than Arabic, the fact that government employees who receive trainings are sometimes moved to other departments, or quit, and it is a lost investment. They also pointed out to how the group of employees to be moved to the new capital may be perceived with animosity by their peers, to the conflicting agendas of donors and government entities implementing the training, the difficulty of implementing the high level of digitization at the new capital, and lastly how the training by nature has an intangible impact that is difficult to capture.

- Occasional Absence of Vision: “When the receiving government organization does not have a clear vision for what it requires from the training, the training will futile. Having a clear vision is key to effective training” (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Sustainability: “We are not sure whether the GOE will be able to continue the same level of spending on training of government employees because of the current difficult economic situation” (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Language Challenge:“Many of the received training opportunities funded by donor agencies require English language and not everyone speaks English in government”(SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Turnover:“The Government suffers from a high turnover rate. They may receive the training and then leave” (MH– Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- “Some of the government employees receive the first round of training on a technical issue and when it is time for the second round, we found they have move to another department” (SS-Leadership Position in a Sovereign Ministry, 15 June, 2022).
- Animosity: “Those who are moving to the new capital are currently called 'A listers' by their peers based on the assessments, privileges and als the trainings provided to them and not to others” (Development partner organization employee 1, 7 August, 2022).
- Conflicting Agendas: “Donors have an agenda. One time they want to focus on 'violence against women'. Another time they want to focus on gender equality. They come with money to spend and these agendas do not fit 100% with the national agendas. [The training] may not necessarily 'hook' with the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries may come eat, play with their mobiles, and leave” (SM, Training Manager Judiciary Sector and beneficiary, 10 August, 2022).

- Intangible Impact: "The impact of the training is intangible. It is not 1+1 =2 because it is about skills and competencies. We cannot relate the impact of the training to any direct change in the employee's performance" (MH– Training Beneficiary & Manager in the Health Sector, 30 June 2022).
- Digital Challenge: "The move to the new capital includes a lot of digital transformation. Many government organizations started using e-learning platforms. This was not done in a systematic process (Development partner organization employee 2, 9 August, 2022).

Conclusion

There are a lot of concentrated efforts on building the capacity of the forty thousand employees who were nominated for the move to the new Administrative Capital. Going back to the conceptual model:

The inputs: Needs Assessment were performed by specialized agencies to determine the competencies needed in the 'Contemporary Egyptian public servant'. Amongst the specialized centers involved in determining the needed competencies were a couple affiliated to the military forces. Multiple partnerships and grants have been received from international development partners to support the capacity building efforts for Egyptian government employees. Training budget for CAOA, the traditional entity mandated with managing civil servants, has been cut.

The process: Some of the main governmental organizations responsible for identifying training needs and delivering training to public employees, have been either been changed, or replaced by others. New updated topics are being discussed, and new tools and techniques are being implemented in delivering the training, such as competency frameworks to decide on training needs, and knowledge sharing platforms.

The outputs: The forty thousand employees nominated for the move to the new Administrative Capital have received the training needed and are still continuously provided with trainings as planned.

The outcomes: Experts have perceived a number of positives related to the training conducted including the increased attention by government and the high level of digitization. They have also identified a number of key challenges, including the conflicting agenda of donors and recipient entities, and the speedy delivery.As for the impact of the training on the personal, organizational and societal level, the insights gleaned from the interviews point to how training is perceived as effective when it is demand driven, and meets real needs and objectives. To have a positive impact on the organization, we should make sure the employee continues in the position to be able to implement what was learnt. As for the impact on a national level, it was pointed that the correlation is intangible and difficult to capture.

Training is just one element in capacity building of individuals. To make the move from individual capacity building, to organizational outcomes, and next to national outcomes, the political, economic, cultural and social contexts do matter. Policymakers should always keep in mind the systems model when developing the capacity of their government employees with the hope of improving the overall government effectiveness.

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Exploring IT Governance Structures and Practices in Higher Education institutions in Ghana: Exploring the gaps and opportunities

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic compelled African nations to be innovative in the provision of education, health and ICT infrastructure in general. To be able to catch up with the world, African states were compelled during the pandemic to prioritise ICT infrastructure and its governance. Prior to the pandemic, ICT was not prioritised although it was gradually gaining currency. Despite increases in mobile phone penetration and internet usage, ICT infrastructure in the education sector has generally remained inadequate. The government of Ghana has embarked on a digitalization agenda through the provision of ICT infrastructure in most spheres of the economy. In the higher education environment, some investments have been made although there are differences in its implementation. The study looks at ICT governance in two higher education institutions in Ghana, as it examines the governance structures and practices in these institutions within the context of well accepted IT governance frameworks and literature. It further discusses the capacity of these governance structures and practices to meet organizational needs especially in making appropriate infrastructural decisions. The paper is situated in the qualitative paradigm of research that uses key informant interviews and secondary sources of data. The study confirms other studies that decision making is more complex and goes beyond decision rights. It recommends an all-inclusive process in decision making processes where all other actors are involved and end user departments have more control in all IT investment decisions. It further recommends that public procurement processes are reviewed to support a more effective procurement process.

Key words – IT infrastructure, IT governance, IT Governance Framework, Higher Education, University

Introduction

Information Technology (IT) governance is a critical component of any business. The primary aim of IT governance is to assure that the use of information and technology generates business value, oversees management's performance and mitigates the risks associated with using information and technology. IT governance is important because expectations of IT investments and what is actually achieved often do not match. University Boards usually expect management to deliver IT solutions of the right quality, on time and on budget, harness and exploit IT to return business value, leverage IT to increase efficiency and productivity while managing IT risks. Structure mechanisms, process mechanisms, and relational mechanisms are three types of IT governance mechanisms .

IT governance is composed of a set of practices grouped into three categories: decision-making structures, processes, and relational mechanisms . Information technology governance (ITG) has been acknowledged as a critical organizational capability for IT strategic alignment and business delivery via IT. In a study of 146 public organizations in Brazil, it was found that IT performance is positively related with organizational performance, that IT-business relationships influence IT performance. Also IT performance is likewise strongly correlated with organizational performance –. Yet decision structures and process maturity were found to have no significant correlation with IT performance.

To determine how critical IT is to sustaining and growing the organisation, one needs to determine among others the extent to which the organisational benefits accrued is justified by the cost. Additionally ensure that the reporting level of the most senior IT manager is commensurate with the importance of IT. It is also expected that IT should be a regular item on the agenda of the board and addressed in a structured manner with questions being occasionally raised by the board. The board is expected to approve IT strategy and regularly be informed of major IT initiatives, their status and issues . Ineffective IT governance is likely to be a root cause of the negative experiences many boards have had with IT, which has resulted in business losses, damaged or weakened competitive positions, missing deadlines, higher than expected cost and lower than anticipated quality. Others include negative enterprise efficiency and core processes resulting from poor quality of IT deliverables.

Purpose of Research

The Government of Ghana embarked on a digitalization agenda through the provision of ICT infrastructure in most spheres of the economy including the education sector. Higher education institutions were beneficiaries of this agenda. However, in the higher education environment, some investments have been made though its implementation has differed due to practices, protocols, and procurement procedures. It is in the light of this that this study examines IT governance in 2 higher education institutions in Ghana with a focus on University of Education, Winneba and the University of Professional Studies, Accra (UEW & UPSA). The paper examines the IT governance structure and relationship mechanisms in UEW and UPSA and how these affects IT investment planning and decision making.

The significance of this is to understand how IT projects are chosen and how this could affect the value that these investments generate for the universities. Although there are 16 public institutions in Ghana, these two were selected by adopting a convenience sampling method. The two universities were chosen because they were the two readily accessible universities that represented a large public university and a relatively small public university.

IT framework and Concepts

IT governance is a defined structure that integrates IT strategy with business strategy and captures the overall structure and dynamic behaviour of an organization. Business, IT embedded processes, organizational behaviour, and inter and intra-organizational connections are all impacted by IT governance and its structure. Governance is fundamentally about establishing policies. Hence IT governance is necessarily all about putting structures in place to ensure that organisations' IT strategies, including IT investments, are aligned with their business strategies, and that they stay on track to meet their strategic goals . It is also about putting in place effective ways to measure the organisational IT performance. Failure of IT initiatives to bring innovation or deliver the promised benefits is largely a failure of IT governance.

To achieve the fullest impact of IT initiatives, board members should take an active role in IT strategy or similar committees whilst Chief Executives provide organisational structures to support the implementation of IT strategy. Chief Information officers on the other hand must be business-oriented and act as a link between IT and the rest of the company. The first step is to conceptualize an IT governance model and the next step is to execute it as a long-term solution within the organization and this involves ensuring that the model is applied as an integral part of running the organisation.

As alluded to earlier, IT governance is made up of decision-making structures, processes, and relational mechanisms. It is however important that in implementing IT governance, a mix of structures, procedures, and relational mechanisms are required to ensure success not for each component to work in silos. It is worth noting that there are sometimes conflicting internal and even external factors that must be combined in a way that might be unique to an organisation .

Governance Structures

Ghildyal and Chang (2017) suggest that an indicator of good IT governance is the awareness and understanding of concepts of IT governance by key decision makers and that these translate into an organisation performance of over 20% compared to similar organisations. These results especially relate to decision making and implementation processes and expected outcomes. The existence of relevant functions such as IT executives and a variety of IT committees are examples of structures. The way the IT function is organized and where the IT decision-making power is based within the organization are key factors in effective IT governance. Haes and Grembergen (2004) describe a contemporary hybrid model where infrastructure control is centralized for purposes of standardisation and efficiency whilst application control is decentralized for effectiveness and flexibility.

Xue *et al* (2008) propose three main elements that could affect IT governance. These are the organization's IT investment characteristics, its external environment, and its internal context. IT investments can be classified into four organizational levels based on their functional scope and boundary-spanning requirements: departmental, inter-departmental, enterprise, and inter-organizational. In a study of 146 public organizations in Brazil, it was found that IT performance is positively related with organizational performance, that IT-business relationships influence IT performance. Also IT performance is likewise strongly correlated with organizational performance –. Decision structures and process maturity were however found to have no significant correlation with IT performance.

This position is however contradicted by Xue *et al.* (2008) arguing that investment decision goes beyond the decision right and that there are actors who make inputs to IT investment during the pre-decision stage. Quoting Maritan's (2001) study, Xue *et al.* (2008) describes a four-stage decision model that organizations use to make IT investment decision. This includes initiation, development, management and the final stage where approval is given. At this stage the project receives the desired authorisation and funds get released. Although organizations may assign decision rights based on known norms, the actual patterns of IT governance are dependent on contextual considerations. Allocating final decision rights is only one aspect of IT governance; while organisations may assign decision rights by convention, the actual pattern of IT governance are determined by contextual circumstances . The structures, institutions, and legal framework of corporate governance are however developed and administered by individuals whose behaviour are shaped by cultural and personal concepts of hope, ambition, greed, fear, uncertainty, and hubris, as well as by their social code. Their decisions are in certain cases influenced by their backgrounds bringing the agency problem to the fore. West African societies are thought to be egalitarian on the grid-group cultural model hence there is a likelihood that decision makers in organisations might be inclined to adhere to the interest of their small group.

Processes Alignment

IT governance processes refers to the mechanisms for strategic decision making and monitoring. There are several frameworks that have been accepted over time as the standard guides to IT governance processes. These will include mechanisms as proposed in the strategic alignment model. This refers to the four fundamental domains of strategic choice that must be aligned to help achieve strategic business IT alignment. These are business strategy, information technology strategy, organisational infrastructure and processes, information technology infrastructure and processes . It is expected that a well designed and implemented IT governance program will enable this strategic alignment.

Though Boards might not be technically inclined and might rely on the lower layers of the organisation, they are expected to ascertain that IT strategy is aligned with enterprise strategy and that IT delivers against the strategy through clear expectations and measurement. They are also expected to steer IT strategy by addressing investment levels and allocation, balancing investments between supporting and expanding the business, and making thoughtful judgments about where IT resources should be spent. Other key functions include the creation of a culture of openness and collaboration among the various units of the organisation.

Another framework that guides IT governance process is the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT). COBIT is an IT governance standard which has 34 identified IT processes corresponding to high-level control objectives and management objectives. A key control objective of COBIT is to optimise the placement of the IT function. It recommends that the reporting line of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and representation of IT function within senior management should be commensurate with the importance of IT within the organisation –. Haes *et. al.*, (2004) indicates that the desired placement is for the CIO to report directly to the Chief Executive which will be the Vice Chancellor in the case of a public university.

Methods

The study adopted a qualitative approach to enable a thorough examination of the issues with its associated nuances to provide a deeper understanding of the IT governance practices within the two Universities; The University of Education, Winneba and the University of Professional Studies, Accra

The University of Education, Winneba is a teacher education institution established first as a University College in 1992 and in

2004 the University of Education Act, Act 672 was enacted to upgrade it to the status of a full-fledged University. The University of Education, Winneba has 9 faculties/schools and a research institute. The University of Professional Studies, Accra is a university with a unique mandate to provide academic and professional education. The university attained a full-fledged university status on 1st September 2008, under the University of Professional Studies Act, 2012 (Act 850). Then in 2016, the university received recognition by Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programmes (ACBSP). It has a combined student and staff population of over eighteen thousand and offers various postgraduate, under-graduate, diploma and certificate courses

Data was collected through a review of the literature covering university statutes, policies and directives and the intent of IT governance within the institutions. Interviews were also conducted to understand the IT governance as practiced within the institutions. In all, 6 key informant interviews were conducted comprising 3 high level IT staff and 3 heads of user departments. By way of data management and analysis, voice recordings of the interviews were done and transcribed. The data was organised into themes reflecting the research questions. Some handwritten notes were taken in the course of the interviews to augment the process. Analysis was done following the precise sequence (Yin, 2014). The results point to a confirmation of the complexities in decision rights. Schutt (1996) noted that informed consent and voluntary research participation is an ethical requirement. As such, ethical behaviours were exercised in line with the demands of ethical legislation and requirements.

Limitations of the study

Although the paper is relevant to Public Administration and Management in Africa as it points out gaps in IT governance in public academic institutions and makes proposals on what public institutions need to do to leverage on ICT in service delivery, the use of a qualitative approach and focusing on the case of two public universities naturally does not lend itself to generalization of the results to all public universities since qualitative studies are not intended for generalisations . Nevertheless, public universities across Ghana operate with similar statutes; hence, the results could be generalised to those public universities.

Results and Discussions

This section discusses the results from the themes that emerged as presented below.

Governance Structures and IT Investment Decision Making -

The University council represents the

board in the case of the Public University in Ghana. The statutes of the University of Education, Winneba, indicates that the university council is made up of representatives from stakeholders including one representative each from the Education Service, professional teacher organisations, five members from staff unions, three from students and alumni, a representative from the higher education regulatory agency and four from government. In that situation there is no representation, at the board level, of specific skills in ICT. There is however, an ICT board though not specified in the university's statutes, it is meant to serve as an advisory board on ICT investments and other decisions. A key informant through the in-depth interview confirms this with the expression:

> *"The board has representation from each faculty however meetings are not regular and meetings could be once a year."*

This corroborates statutes from both Universities which indicate investment decision are therefore proposed either by the user departments, directorate of ICT services and approved by the executive management. There are however, cases where proposals for IT investment emanate directly from management. A key informant expressed it in this manner.

> *"Investment decisions that come from the user departments and faculties are minor investments like procurement of equipment like laptops and projectors into investment and operational decision by the end users."*

It was also found that the nature of the investment affected the way such decision originates and how the decision is made. This was further explained by another key informant as;

> *"Generally, investment decisions in relation to large IT investments or University wide projects are normally taken by the Directorate of ICT or by the university top management. Whilst small investment that affect individual departments are usually taken by the department in question. However, in all those decisions the ICT directorates provide specifications and provide technical guidance to the procurement process."*

This is in line with literature as indicated by that IT investment decision rights in certain cases lie with departments as indicated above. By extension the heads of these departments are responsible for making these decisions on behalf of the departments they lead. In relation to this, respondents indicated that heads of academic faculties and departments are academics who are normally appointed for a period between one and six years and are expected to hand over to other academics when their term of office ends. These claims were also supported by findings from a key respondent senior manager from one of the institutions who noted that:

> *"Normally these academics are neither trained nor experienced managers or technology savvy and are ill equipped to assess the technology environment for the purpose of making the right technology investment decisions."*

The narration corroborates findings from Yidana et.al (2012) where most of the academics in a study at the University of Education, Winneba, found over 80% to have no knowledge and skills in the application of ICTs in teaching which their primary professional activity was. With a time-bound term of office, there is likelihood that such heads will devote more efforts into decisions with a short-term impact and not strategic projects like ICT.

In practice, heads of IT directorates in both institutions report to the registrar and are therefore not categorised as members of the management committee. This indicates that ICT might not be viewed as having very high level of importance within the institutions as indicated by ISACA (2019).

ICT investment decisions can be boundedly rational and or political, and they normally reflect the internal arrangement of connections, authorities, and communications. A key informant from one institution expressed that in the quote:

> *"…… the origin of investment decisions in some cases comes from individuals who are not people with decision rights but might have knowledge or an interest in those decisions. Hence, they advocate for such investments and in some cases are able to succeed in getting those investment decisions made."*

IT Investment Planning and Budgeting

Typically, the Departments in both institutions have budgets for which some IT investment decision are made. The quantum of the budget is meagre especially when it is meant to fund all departmental expenses and investments including ICT investments. Departmental budgets are therefore predictably limited in the IT investments that it can be used for. The interview confirms the expression:

> *"… that such investments are however meant to be aligned to the corporate strategic plan."*

There is also central ICT budget which funds all other kinds of investments and largely planned for by the Directorate of ICT services. There are however cases where departments with limited budgets or investment ideas that are enterprise wide propose those investment and if approved are carried out.

External Characteristics

A key factor that affects IT governance patterns is the external environment .The community, consumers, suppliers, competitors, governments including regulators, industry associations, and other social and economic elements that influence organizational IT governance decision-making processes make up an organization's external environment. Respondents indicated that as with all public institutions in Ghana, one of the key influencers in the investment process is the compliance with the public procurement law which governs the processes used to acquire resources including IT investment. A key informant summed up IT investment decisions as:

"The law affects the choice of vendors and the approving authority among many other things. This in turn affects IT investment decision as certain investment choices could lead to delays."

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study confirms Xue *et al.* (2008) position that decision making is more complex and goes beyond decision rights. The study confirms that there are other actors who are involved in decision making though they do not have formal decision rights. It is recommended that these actors should be formally involved in the decision-making process to make IT investment decisions binding at all levels. This was evident in the findings of the study which revealed the complexities involved in the process. Since decision rights involves initiation, development, and final stages where approval is given, it is also recommended that all actors along the chain of decision making ensure procurement processes do not just follow trends to influence the nature of IT investment, rather to meet the needs of the end users and have strategic value.

The study also found that actors with formal decision rights regarding IT investments are not always equipped with the competencies or desire to make decisions that could have a strategic impact. It is recommended that organisational processes be put in place to ensure that these deficiencies do not result in poor investment decisions. Due to the limited coverage of the study, it is recommended that it be replicated in more public universities to further understand the nature of IT governance in public universities.

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