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With

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THE GLASS CEILING EFFECT ON WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP IN THE KENYAN PUBLIC SECTOR

Obuya Bagaka and Muthoni Gachire¹

Women aspiring for senior leadership positions face a myriad of challenges, often referred to as the glass-ceiling effect. Using a sample of 90 women leaders who are currently working in the Kenyan public service, a pilot survey was administered to test whether or not public organisations have put in place gender-sensitive policies to mainstream gender issues. Preliminary results suggest that the glass-ceiling effect does exist in the Kenyan public service. Further, the findings indicate that public organisations do not have policies in place to mitigate gender bias in the Kenyan public sector. Among other things, the study recommends a broader analysis be undertaken to unearth the lack of organisational action in mainstreaming gender issues.

INTRODUCTION

Women aspiring for elite leadership positions in many organisations including the public sector face an invisible barrier that has often been referred to as the "glass-ceiling effect". This is a global phenomenon which discriminates women and relegates them to lower-level leadership positions in most organisations. This disproportionate representation has been linked to high rates of absolute poverty levels among women (50%) as compared to men (30%) [United Nations (UN), 2001].

A number of organisational practices have been cited as causes of the glass-ceiling effect which includes: human capital dynamics – where women are likely to have less educational opportunities than men; and domestic work and career progression conflicts – where women assume the traditionally prescribed roles of child bearing and domestic responsibilities at the expense of their careers (Northouse, 2007).

Research studies on leader-effectiveness and performance have continuously shown that

both men and women have proven effectiveness in leadership positions, although women leaders tend to be more democratic and participative in their leadership roles than their male counterparts (Northouse, 2001; 2007). Despite lack of evidence that men are more effective as leaders than women, organisational prejudices still continue to relegate women to lower cadres in organisational structures.

To reverse this trend, a number of organisations including the United Nations in its Millennium Development Goal number three: *Promote gender equality and empower women*, call upon governments to, among other things, empower women in employment and ensure their inclusion in governance and decision-making organs at higher levels (UN, 2001; p.25). Enabling women to take more leadership roles has been linked to improved organisational productivity (Forsty, 2006), an increased pool of human resources and a more representative society (Northouse, 2007) and also promotes equal opportunities for all (UN, 2001).

The lack of women's representation at the

highest leadership positions in most organisations produces unequal and discriminatory social environments for women. Women in Kenya for instance are slightly more than 50% of the population (GOK Population Census Report, 2010).

However, women are a distinct minority in all decision making positions. As summarised in Table 1 below, the distribution of women leaders in the National Assembly and other key public organisations is proportionately lower than their male counterparts. The low

representation of women in positions where major policy decisions are enacted means that women issues are often forgotten leading organisations to craft policies that may potentially affect women negatively. If organisations are to mainstream gender equity, efforts must be made at the organisational level to craft policies that are gender-sensitive. This however, can only happen if more women are adequately represented at the decision and policy making levels.

Table1: Women in Decision Making Positions

Rank	June 2003				April 2008			
	Women	Men	Total	% Women	Women	Men	Total	% Women
Ministers	3	26	29	10.3	7	33	40	17.5
Assistant Ministers	4	39	43	9.3	6	46	52	11.5
National Assembly	18	204	222	8.1	19	202	221	8.6
Permanent Secretaries	3	21	24	12.5	6	38	44	13.6
Ambassadors/High Commissioners	7	27	34	20.6	11	29	40	27.5
Provincial Commissioners	0	8	8		1	7	8	12.5
District Commissioners	3	68	71	4.2	7	131	138	5.1
Councillors	377	2460	2837	13.3	393	2093	2486	15.8

Source: Judicial Service Commission (2007). DPM Compliment Statistics Unit 2007

Problem Statement

Although the public sector is the largest employer in Kenya, women constitute only 24.3% of the total public sector workforce. Despite being few, a majority of the women working in the public sector occupy lower-level ranks in job groups A-D (Country Progress Report, 2003). For instance, only six out of 44 (13.6%) of Permanent Secretaries are women (GOK-Directorate of Personnel Management [DPM], 2009).

While it is too early to assess the effect of the 2006 presidential directive mandating 30% of new appointments and promotions for women, initial indications show that the directive has not been adhered to. For example, the most recent statistics from the Public Service Commission, which is responsible for the hiring and promotion of all public sector employees, reveal that out of the 905 people appointed and promoted between April and June 2010, 685 were men and 220 were women (Daily Nation, July 20, 2010). Although the judiciary appears to exceed the 30% threshold, a majority of its 37% women employees occupy lower cadres such as district and resident magistrates. In particular, of the 15 Court of Appeal Judges, only one is a female (UN-MDG Status Report, 2007).

The skewed nature of distribution of leadership positions among women in the Kenyan public service is not coincidental. In fact, it suggests the existence of the glass-ceiling effect within organisational setting in the public service. The government, however, is conscious of this skewed distribution and has taken measures to help women ascend to leadership positions including the presidential directive of 2006. Other measures include the adoption of Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on

“Gender Equality and Development”, which recognises that without a comprehensive framework for guiding gender mainstreaming within different sectors involved in development “enormous resources may continue to be misplaced” (GOK-Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006). Other recent initiatives include a government-driven campaign for an eventual promulgation of a new constitution which promises a more gender-sensitive and inclusive political and economic environment for women as outlined in Articles 56, 97 & 98 (GOK-Constitution, 2010). These Articles provide for increased women representation in both the National Parliament (National Assembly and the Senate) and in the County governments by requiring that no more than two thirds of membership shall be from one gender (GOK-Constitution, 2010).

Notwithstanding the promise of change, leadership studies have found that constitutional and legislative provisions alone may have little impact in changing the organisational structures dominated by masculine thinking that discriminate against women. It has been documented that women who ascend to leadership positions are often assigned to non-authoritative positions. Instead, they are assigned socially prescribed roles with limited budgetary and decision making authority within an agency (Northouse, 2007). The masculine thinking has been cited as the source of inimical organisational practices that covertly or overtly discriminate against women from ascending to leadership positions (Small, 1995).

Kenya is a party to several international and regional instruments that seek to promote gender equality. They include the Beijing

Conference (1976); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW ratified in 1981); International Conference on Population and Development (1994); Millennium Development Goals (2000); Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of Women in Africa (2003) and Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004).

Despite these ratifications, women continue to experience the glass-ceiling effect in all levels of decision making positions especially in the public sphere. Thus, despite the enactment of legislations and ratification of a number of conventions seeking to empower women in Kenya, women continue to lag behind in decision making positions.

It is for this reason that this study seeks to examine the question: *To what extent do organisational barriers and prejudices within the public service hinder women from ascending to leadership positions?*

Understanding organisational barriers that thwart women from attaining leadership positions is important so as to outline possible strategies to curb gender-related biases. In addition, this study's findings will form the basis for operationalising the constitutional provisions outlined in the new Constitution. The study's findings were based on empirical data collected from an on-going study involving 200 women public servants attending various courses at the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) between June and August 2010. The findings are reported using both descriptive and inferential statistics.

Literature Review

In examining organisational practices that hinder women from ascending to top leadership positions in government, this study subscribes to the feminist theory that seeks to bring about social change, emancipate women and enhance women's lives in organisational settings because by doing so it creates social equity (McNabb, 2008).

As a research approach, feminism seeks to empower women, overcome oppression, and transform society as a means of achieving equality between men and women (Small, 1995). Using the feminist lens, one is able to unearth the social conditions of women in a sexist and patriarchal society in order to enlighten citizens about practices that have produced unequal and discriminatory societal and organisational settings. Further, given that most organisational settings are organised in ways that sustain patriarchy and thus tend to support sexism, a feminist analysis seeks change in these organisational settings and practices (Waller, 2005; Ironstone-Catterall, 2006).

The world over, the glass-ceiling effect has often been blamed for women's inability to get into the top leadership positions. The term "glass-ceiling effect" refers to the unofficial and invisible barrier that prevents women from advancing up the corporate ladder into management or leadership positions (Blackmore, 1999). While legislation has helped to eliminate formal gender discrimination in the workplaces, gender inequality has not vanished (FASSET Report, 2009). Gender inequality has meant that women's economic and political contributions are limited thus impacting on their overall development (Bagaka, 2009).

A number of organisational factors have been attributed to contributing to the glass-ceiling effect. Firstly, the concept of an "ideal" employee in most organisational settings often tends to be oriented towards a male employee. Such ideal employee is assumed to be one who can work for long hours and without any interruptions. Closely examined, such attributes fit a male employee and often foster organisational priorities (Northouse, 2007). In this regard, organisations tend to be characterised by promotions based on extreme working conditions that favour men such as long working requirements of up to 65 hours per week, high levels of competitiveness and bedrock of unbroken service (FASSET Report, 2009). These extreme expectations are unattainable for most women because of their domestic responsibilities that make it impossible for them to give to their jobs the level of devotion that would enable them to reach the top management levels.

Secondly, gender stereotypes tend to negatively affect women from being aggressive in taking leadership positions. For instance, it has been noted that women have to work much harder than men to earn respect and prove their capabilities. Whereas men who employ forceful, competitive, independent, rational and assertive styles are seen as effective leaders, the opposite is true of women (Northouse, 2007; Rosenbach and Taylor, 2006). These gender stereotypes not only lead to biased judgments but also tend to relegate women into lower positions.

Furthermore, women who try to emulate the 'desired' male leadership characteristics are negatively perceived as "too manly" (Northouse, 2007). Gender stereotyping has

relegated women to certain positions that are viewed as "natural traits" for women rather than acquired skills. This has defined women's employment into specific sectors such as education, health care, support staff, and advertising. As such, this has led to the "feminisation" of some jobs, also known as occupational segregation (Green, 2006). This feminisation of jobs has meant that women have a difficult time ascending to positions that are male dominated leaving them to occupy lower positions that are less well paying but also increases the gender wage gap (South African National Editors Forum, 2007).

Thirdly, women who do advance to the top management levels are those that are perceived not to be a threat to male colleagues. These are women who will tend to keep the status quo and do little to destabilise the accepted norms and thus will do little to promote change for women. This means that the few women that get to the top often act as "gatekeepers" preventing other women from getting to the top (Northouse, 2001).

Women also tend to lack confidence in their own abilities, a phenomenon often referred to as the "inner glass-ceiling effect" (FASSET, 2009). Research findings have supported this claim that women tend to be less confident in their own abilities and are "less driven by competition and tend to be more risk averse than men" (Lawless and Fox, 2008). This gender differences in self-perceptions of qualifications do not stem from gender differences in direct political experiences, but stems from women's inability to transfer their professional success and political exposure to their own potential candidacies (Lawless and Fox, 2008). Often, this is because women do

not get as much encouragement to run for office compared to men given that are perceived as lacking leadership qualities to run for political office.

This lack of encouragement or recruitment seems to be the single factor that hints why women not only hesitate to compete for top level positions but also tend to underrate their capabilities much more than men.

Work obligations and domestic chores conflicts have also been cited as the reason why women miss out from competitively ascending to leadership positions (Hochschild and Machung, 1989). The dilemma to pursue both a career and raise a family at the same time is one that men seldom have to confront. Whereas men are able to progress in their careers without much interruption, women are rarely able to do this due to their domestic responsibilities. This role creates conflict between women's domestic chores and their office work often interrupting their careers and sometimes for long periods of time. This conflict has also been attributed to the gender wage gap because it has been said that "motherhood for professional women carries a 7% economic penalty per child (Business Day Management Review, 2006).

Futhermore, such career interruption lessens years of experience required for senior positions thus disqualifying many women from the top positions. In order to attract women on the job, many organisations in the Western world have put in place gender sensitive facilities that are particularly attractive to women. They include the provision of flexible hours that allow workers to choose the time that they can come to the office, so long as they can accomplish their

tasks and work within the allocated time limit. Other attractive facilities include near or on-site day centres and private breastfeeding rooms for mothers with young children. Day care facilities have been found to boost employee morale, reduce turnover and absenteeism and increase productivity (Hahn, 2007).

Interpersonal conflict is an inevitable aspect in any workplace and sometimes this can lead to workplace harassment. Whereas general workplace harassment does not target victims because of their gender, sexual harassment does (Lopez, Hodson and Roscigno, 2009). It has been argued that sexual harassment is a way of stressing male dominance or maintaining their power in the workplace. Further, Blackstone (2004) argues that sexual relations with female co-workers in an organisational setting, reduces them to sexual objects and diminishes their role as colleagues, thus reinforcing male power. Related to this dominance perspective is the gender role spillover theory which suggests that men harass women because they are accustomed to dealing with women in a subordinate role in the domestic and social spheres. As such, this behaviour is carried over in the workplace and eventually can lead to an environment of sexual harassment (Lopez et al., 2009).

These theories suggest the existence of a process of demeaning the dignity of the other in order to protect or elevate one's own status. The presence of sexual harassment in the workplace therefore may be an indication that men view women as subordinates and as sexual objects and thus not eligible for top leadership positions. It has been argued that women need a helping hand especially through affirmative action to overcome the many

obstacles that exists in order to be competitive.

Although affirmative action has increased women's participation in politics, there is concern that female representation particularly in African countries, has not translated into women's empowerment in influencing organisational policy decisions (Consultation Report, 2007). It seems that sometimes affirmative action has provided women with an opportunity to be "seen" but not always to be "heard". Affirmative action sometimes has further jeopardised women because it has been viewed as giving unfair advantage to women and minorities by hiring them even when they are not qualified for the positions. Affirmative action is regarded as a quota system that is intended to ensure a certain group of people who have historically not had equal opportunities to be represented at all levels of decision-making bodies. Unfortunately, providing special seats for those who have historically been marginalised has created much resentment particularly from those who have not benefited from it (Heilman, 1994). Furthermore, there is some evidence that quotas lead to unintended negative consequences for those that seek to benefit.

While affirmative action, legislative measures or constitutional provisions can be helpful, available evidence suggests that these measures have had little impact in reversing the glass-ceiling effect on organisational settings. To emancipate women at the workplace, there is need to unearth biases that are deeply constructed in organisational practices that foster unequal and discriminatory organisational opportunities. This can be done by pointing out insensitive

organisational practices against women as a means of enlightening citizens of organisational barriers, though inimical to a patriarchal setting, also disadvantage women.

This paper therefore reports the results of a self-assessment survey instrument administered to women leaders working in the Kenyan public service. The goal of this survey was to examine existing organisations barriers that prevent them from ascending to leadership positions as reported in the sections that follow.

Methodology, Data Collection and Analysis

This paper employs descriptive and inferential statistics to test organisational practices that hinder women leaders from ascending to senior leadership positions in the public service. As conceived in this paper, organisational practices include policies or lack of policies designed to mainstream gender equity and availability of gender-sensitive facilities at the workplace.

Descriptive statistics were obtained to assess the level of agreement or disagreement with the existence of organisational practices that encourage gender-mainstreaming workplaces. Descriptive statistics were obtained by use of crosstabs with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 17 for Windows.

With regard to inferential statistics, it was hypothesised that public organisations with gender-sensitive policies were likely to foster a sexist-free environment, will put in place policies that break the glass-ceiling effect, and will pay cognisance to the natural roles of women as mothers and thus not by-pass them for promotion or any other leadership

opportunities. To obtain inferential statistics, partial correlations were obtained for organisational practices and sexist attitudes, glass-ceiling effects, domestic/work conflicts and women leadership qualities.

The main purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which there exists gender-sensitive organisational policies designed to break the glass-ceiling effects that hinder women from ascending to senior leadership positions. The population of this exploratory study comprised of different groups of women from various ministries in the Kenyan

Government public sector who were attending various courses in senior management and leadership training programmes at the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) between June and August 2010.

Participants for these training programmes were drawn from a pool of public managers in job groups L and above and adequately represented most government ministries. The data were collected using unstructured interviews and questionnaire surveys. Table 2 summarises demographic information of the respondents.

Table 2: Number of years served in the public service * Respondent's current job group Cross-tabulation

Number of years served in the public service	Respondent's current job group					Total
	L-M	N-P	Q-R	S-T	Above T	
0-5 Years	1	2	0	1	0	4
6-10 Years	2	0	1	0	0	3
11-15 Years	4	4	0	1	0	9
16-20 Years	7	6	2	0	0	15
21-25 Years	9	11	3	1	0	24
26 and above	12	6	3	0	1	22
Total	35	29	9	3	1	77

From Table 2, it can be observed that about 80% of the respondents had served in the public service for over 16 years and thus can be said to have substantial work experience.

Although over 29% of the respondents had served in the public service for over 26 years, only one (1) occupied a senior policy level position (job group T and above). On the contrary, over 83% of the respondents occupied lower-middle level managerial positions (job groups L-P). In line with the glass-ceiling effect, even with the natural career progression within the civil service one would expect more women to be represented at the upper echelons leadership positions. Ten respondents were initially purposely selected and interviewed on different aspects of the glass-ceiling effects and other dimensions that encourage or hinder gender mainstreaming in their workplaces.

Each interview lasted about 10 minutes and data were collected in form of notes taken during the interviews. Responses from the interviews and a review of the literature fed into the information utilised in the construction of the wider questionnaire survey described below.

A self-administered survey was given to this convenient sample of senior women public managers working in the public service. A total of 100 questionnaires were distributed out of which 90 usable questionnaires (75%) were returned and analysed. The items used tested the participants' self-assessment of their organisations' policies on gender mainstreaming. Excluding the five demographical items, the survey instrument had a total of 20 closed-ended items grouped into five dimensions. These dimensions

include: the glass-ceiling effect, sexist attitudes, home and work conflicts, organisational policies, organisation-sensitive facilities and women leadership qualities. The selection of these dimensions (variable indicators) was based on prior research and from the unstructured interviews as reviewed above. A cluster of 3-5 items corresponding to a particular dimension asked respondents to rate their perceptions, or feelings toward that dimension and were measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 being 'strongly disagree' and 5 being 'strongly agree'.

Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Version 17.0 for Windows). Descriptive statistics, including means and percentages were obtained to summarise the data. Crosstabs were obtained and reported for the demographic data and to obtain percentages. Further, principal component analysis was done to create indices for the various dimensions which were used to generate inferential statistics. The five indices were extracted using the varimax rotation.

Research Findings

As previously mentioned, the task of this paper was to assess the extent to which there exists organisational practices that promote a gender-sensitive workplace. Thus, the results are organised in three ways.

First, descriptive statistics are presented from the five main dimensions. Second, factor loadings are presented from which the five indices were created. Third, Pearson correlation coefficients are presented showing the relationship between the various dimensions outlined above followed by a discussion of the findings.

Respondents were asked to self-assess the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with various items in the questionnaire with respect

to the five dimensions of interest in this study. Table 3 summarises their responses.

Table 3: Levels of Agreement or Disagreement on Various Gender-Mainstreaming Issues

Item	Percent (%) of Agree	Percent (%) of Disagree
Glass - Ceiling Effect		
In my position I am able to make real important decisions (n = 77)	44%	27%
As a woman leader, my ideas are seriously listened to and implemented (n = 77)	44%	25%
As a woman leader I feel I have to work twice as hard as my male counterparts to get recognition (n = 77)	62%	23%
Promotion at the highest levels of leadership in my organization is based on performance (n = 77)	36%	44%
As a woman leader, I sometimes experience discrimination when it comes to promotion or training opportunities (n = 77)	47%	44%

As shown, most respondents, 44%, agreed that they make important decisions at their workplaces. Although this is encouraging, one wonders what real important decisions are made by workers relegated to lower-mid level managerial positions. Those who are able to make the real important decisions in the public sector are those in job groups Q and above. In this survey, only 13% of the respondents fall in those job groups. 62% of the respondents felt that as women they have

to work twice as hard as their male counterpart. This is in agreement with other literature.

Table 4: Levels of Agreement or Disagreement on gender stereotyping home/work conflicts at the workplace

Item	Percent (%) of Agree	Percent (%) of Disagree
Gender Stereotyping		
I have heard sexist comments/jokes being made in my organization (n = 87)	63%	25%
I/my colleague have experienced sexual harassment in my organization (n = 85)	40%	39%
I find women leaders to be more stubborn than male leaders (n = 76)	32%	51%
Home/Work Conflicts		
Women of child bearing ages tend to be by-passed for promotion or other opportunities (n = 75)	44%	37%
I tend to hesitate to take up promotional opportunities for fear of home/work conflicts (n = 75)	21%	75%
Women Leadership Qualities		
I know a woman in my organization I find inspiring and encouraging to subordinates (n = 77)	60%	27%
I know a woman in my organization that is very secure, delegates and allows others to grow (n = 76)	50%	29%

The fact that 58% of respondents have worked 16 years and above, and without much promotion, may further confirm that women tend to be by-passed by promotional opportunities.

In addition, 44% felt that promotion to the highest level was not based on performance

and 47% of them also felt that they had been discriminated against in appointments and training opportunities. Respondents were asked to rate the level of agreement or disagreement to issues related to gender stereotyping and home and work conflicts and how they impacted their willingness to take a leadership position at their workplaces. Table

4 summarises the findings.

As indicated in Table 4, a majority of the respondents (63%) agree that they have heard sexist comments/jokes made in their organisations. This finding may be an indication of either organisational tolerance and insensitivity of sexual harassment at the workplace or a lack of organisational policies to curb the vice. About 40% of the respondents said that they had experienced sexual harassment at their workplaces. As mentioned in the literature, sexual harassment or sexist jokes are usually a good indicator of the kind of attitude that is present in regard to women and the issue of male power and privilege (Blackstone, 2004).

On whether the respondents felt women leaders were more stubborn than their male counterparts, 51% disagreed and 32% thought that that was the case. This majority view goes contrary to the theoretical claim that women are their own enemy. Although a majority of the respondents (44%) agree that their natural reproductive role of child-bearing negatively affected their promotional opportunities, most of them (75%) do not hesitate to take up promotional opportunities due to possible home and work conflicts.

Literature from the Western world appears to suggest the contrary that women will hesitate to take promotional opportunities due to home and work conflict (Hochschild, 1989; Kellerman and Rhode, 2006). Our findings, however, appear to be different perhaps due to the cultural and labour economic context of raising a child in Kenya. Whereas in the West, few mothers can afford house-helpers to assist them in raising their children while they attend office duties, in Kenya like other third

world countries, domestic labour is cheap and this allows a working mother to comfortably attend to office duties.

This therefore gives Kenyan women the freedom to be able to concentrate on the office duties without much career interruption. The finding may further support the claim that the reason Kenyan women are not rising to top leadership positions is not because they are not willing to take up the positions due to home/work conflicts per se, but it may be simply the issue of the glass-ceiling effect.

Many organisations in Kenya do not have policies such as flexible hours or near or on-site day care centres that would only be helpful particularly for women.

Table 5: Existence of Organisational policies & gender-sensitive facilities

Organization policies	Percent (%) of Agree	Percent (%) of Disagree
My organization has clear policies on flexible working hours (n = 85)	14%	78%
My organization has clear policies on sexual harrasment (n = 87)	31%	41%
My organization has clear policies on maternity Leave (n = 85)	85%	10%
My organization has clear policies on promotion criteria (n = 84)	44%	36%
In my organization, women receive the same benefits as married men on housing allowance (n = 84)	82%	15%
In my organization, women receive the same benefits as married men on health insurance (n = 87)	78%	14%
Organizational Gender - Sensitive Facilities		
My organization has gender sensitive facilities in the following areas:		
Toilets with hooks on the back of the doors (n = 73)	38%	55%
Sanitary hygiene containers (n = 78)	72%	27%
Condoms (n = 77)	56%	32%
Private breast-feeding rooms (n = 77)	8%	87%
Near or on-site daycare/nursery (n = 75)	12%	86%

Given that domestic house-helps are affordable and readily available, many Kenyan women may not need flexible working hours nor on-site day cares as compared to women in most developed countries where domestic help is rather expensive. This is an added advantage to the Kenyan employers because providing flexible

hours and/or on-site day care is an expensive endeavour. Given this added advantage, one would think that this would allow Kenyan women to be competitively employed at the same level with men as they do not require extra time off (except for maternity leave). Unfortunately, this does not seem to give Kenyan women any added advantage.

Table 4 further reveals that a majority of women in the public sector (60%) do have role models that are inspiring and encourage subordinates. Further, a majority of the respondents agree that they are aware of a woman who is secure, delegate duties and thus builds the capacity for others to grow. These findings are contrary to mainstream literature which argues that women fail to ascent to top leadership positions because they lack role models at the top to emulate and for mentorship (See Northouse, 2007).

Further, our findings contradict the notion that women tend to be insecure, lack confidence, are risk averse and are less competitive than men (FASSET, 2009; Lawless and Fox, 2008).

Having assessed common gender stereotypes that tend to affect women leadership potentials, respondents were asked agree or disagree with whether their organisation had gender-sensitive policies and whether their organisations provide sensitive facilities to mainstream gender equality. Table 5 summarises the responses.

As observed in Table 5, a majority of respondents agree that their organisations have policies put in place for same health insurance as men (72%), same housing benefits for both men and women (82%) and clear maternity leave (85%). By and large, these high levels of agreement on existence of these policies emanate from legal requirements that mandate organisations to have them. For those that are not mandatory and require organisational initiatives, the level of agreement drops drastically e.g., clear policies on flexible working hours 14%; clear policies on sexual harassment 31%; and clear

policies on promotions 44%. This shows that on their own, organisations have not made efforts to craft gender-sensitive policies.

With regard to whether organisations have gender-sensitive facilities at the workplace such as toilets with hooks, 38% agreed; sanitary hygiene containers, 72% agree; condoms, 56% agreed; private breast-feeding rooms, 8% agreed; and near or on-site day care/nursery, 12% agreed. For reasons offered above in relation to cultural and economic context of raising a child in Kenya, it is not surprising that the level of agreement about the existence of on-site day care is low. However, the lack of private breast-feeding rooms in most public organisation is wanting and shows the level of insensitivity of organisations to the natural reproductive role of women employees.

Beyond these descriptive statistics, principal component analysis was done to create indices of the five dimensions reflected in tables 2 and 3 above.

Table 6 presents the factor loading extracted from the principal component analysis.

Table 6: Factor Loadings

Item	Factor Loadings	Variance Explained (VE)
Glass-Ceiling Effect (KMO =x .500)		
In my position I am able to make real important decisions	0.771	62%
As a woman leader, my ideas are seriously listened to and implemented	0.874	
Promotion at the highest levels of leadership in my organization is based on performance	0.704	
Sexist Attitudes (KMO = .500)		
I have heard sexist comments/jokes being made in my organization	0.861	74%
I/my colleague have experienced sexual harassment in my organization	0.861	
Home/Work Conflicts (KMO = .500)		
Women of child bearing ages tend to be passed for promotion or other opportunities	0.755	57%
I tend to hesitate to take up promotional opportunities for fear of home/work conflicts	0.755	

Women Leadership Qualities (KMO = .500)		
I know a woman in my organization I find inspiring and encouraging to subordinates	0.925	86%
I know a woman in my organization that is very secure, delegates and allows others to grow.	0.925	
Organizational Practices (KMO = .600)		
My organization has clear policies on flexible working hours	-0.125	34%
My organization has clear policies on sexual harassment	0.079	
My organization has clear policies on maternity leave	0.702	
My organization has clear policies on promotion criteria	0.007	
In my organization, women receive the same benefits as married men on housing allowance	0.894	
In my organization, women receive the same benefits as married men on health insurance	0.866	
Organizational Gender - Sensitive Facilities (KMO = .516)		
My organization has gender sensitive facilities in the following areas:		43%
Toilets with hooks on the back of the doors	0.112	
Sanitary hygiene containers	-0.709	
Condoms	-0.475	
Private breast-feeding rooms	-0.832	
Near or on-site daycare/nursery	0.848	

Given that some factor loadings within some dimensions were below the generally acceptable level of 0.70, only factor loadings within this acceptable level or above were used to create dimensional indices. These

indices were then correlated as summarised in Table 7. In this Table, we sought to examine bivariate relationships between any of the five dimensions (factor/indices) and organisational policies.

Ordinarily, one would expect that where there exists sexual harassment, there would be organisational policies in place to mitigate against that. The same can be said of home/work conflicts. Out of the five dimensions (indices), all but one gender-sensitive facilities is significant = -0.235; ($p < 0.05$). This negative correlation indicates that although there could be demand for more gender-sensitive facilities, there seems to be less organisational enthusiasm to craft policies to deal with those demands. The lack of significance on four other dimensions suggests that then existing glass-ceiling effect has not triggered organisations to formulate policies to ameliorate the effects.

Table 7: Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Variable/Dimension	Organizational Policies
Glass-ceiling effect	0.194 (.093)
Sexist attitudes	.028 (.811)
Home/work conflicts	.147 (.208)
Women leadership qualities	0.073 (.532)
Gender-sensitive facilities	-0.235 (0.050)

<=0.05 (2-tailed) - Numbers in italics represent significant levels
 ** Correlation is significant at the .05 (2-tailed)

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of this paper was to examine the extent to which organisational barriers hinder women from ascending to top leadership positions. This goal was informed by the reasoning that in the absence of organisational commitment to ameliorate the glass-ceiling

effect, legal provisions and constitutional mandates on their own may not do much. In line with the feminist thinking, it is only through exposing organisational barriers in a male-dominated environment that we are able to unearth organisational settings that overtly or covertly disadvantage women. The findings of this study suggest that public sector organisations in Kenya are insensitive to gender-neutral issues.

Because of these insensitivities, most public organisations have not initiated on their own policies to mitigate overt sexual harassment at workplaces, gender stereotypes against women leadership capabilities and the obvious glass-ceiling effect in the public service.

While the new constitution provides for some form of affirmative action by mandating that 47 seats for women in the National Assembly; 16 in the Senate; and one third in the devolved County governments; and for equal opportunities for appointment, training and advancement at all levels of the public service, it is important that that the special seats for women advance the women emancipation agenda.

In addition to the constitutional provisions, there must be a paradigm shift among the policy makers in understanding that women cannot use the same work experiences or progression as men due to their reproductive roles and physical differences. Research indicates that unless organisations have a genuine "commitment to equity and diversity that place priority on accommodating workers with family, community or other socially valued commitments" then much of the legislative work will have little impact on promoting women to decision making

positions (Kellerman and Rhode, 2006).

Finally, there is a need for awareness of how gender stereotyping affects people's attitudes and judgments in the workplace. For there to be a genuine implementation of the new constitution in regard to placing women in leadership positions, there is need to shift from the typical stereotypes that have led to the feminisation of certain sectors that relegate women to the lower and less powerful positions. It is therefore critical that the new laws against discrimination are enforced.

Additionally, women themselves will need to be proactive and demand change of the mindset at the workplace. Rather than wait for the organisation to craft gender-sensitive policies, they should take measures to initiate them. The new Kenyan constitution has made significant strides in recognising women and their need for equal rights both in the public sector and private sphere. If well implemented, it will give women an opportunity to contribute to Kenya's economic, political and social structures thus enhancing the country's development.

Given that this study was exploratory, it offers a snapshot of a moving picture that requires a bigger sample and perhaps a longitudinal study to generalise the reported findings.

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ARE THE YOUTH CORRUPT? A STUDY OF GHANAIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

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The paper assesses the conditions under which the youth of Ghana will be predisposed to corruption. It examines corruption among the youth, which is rarely researched on in Ghana and argues that, in order to reduce corruption in future, the role of leadership is important. It draws on the responses of 538 students to questions built around a hypothetical case exemplifying the situation in the Ghanaian Public Service. The paper established that more than half of Ghanaian youth are likely to be corrupt if they found themselves in a problematic situation and that if this was not controlled, corruption could be on the increase when these young ones take on the mantles of leadership. The implication of the findings is that unless vigorous efforts are made at combating corruption in Ghana, a new generation of corrupt officials will emerge to replace the current corps of officials thereby perpetrating the canker of corruption in Ghana. It proposes for the future a number of possible measures to reducing corruption, including sustained and vigorous education, a reasonable public compensation system, a whistle-blowing mechanism, a naming to shame, and an incentive to do good policies.

INTRODUCTION

The youth are often referred to as the future of every country and for that matter, our world. I take exception to this statement because not every youth will be a good future of a country. An ethically minded youth will be well positioned for use by the country in its development efforts and consequently qualify as the future of the country. A corrupt and unethically minded youth on the other hand will constitute a bane of any country as their behaviour will not contribute positively towards its development efforts. A high propensity of the youth to be corrupt will therefore threaten the development and the very existence of a nation.

Corruption can be described as one of the biggest societal ills that the world, especially the developing world, has known. In spite of the efforts made at combating it, there has

been little concrete progress as there is widespread corruption in developing countries where the society has learned to live with it as an integral part of their culture.

Corruption is said to be the greatest development challenge of our time. It is the greatest obstacle in our fight against poverty (Murungi, 2004). Public officials have often been at the receiving end of the accusation of perpetration on this monster. However, we fail to acknowledge that perpetrators of corruption do not remain in office forever, but that successive generations have grown to inherit the canker with its devastating impacts. Whereas efforts to combat corruption are worthwhile in all societies, I consider that in developing countries, the need is even much more worthwhile. All avenues must be explored for combating it as it is a complex moral, social, political and

economic problem that transcends the limits of law, crime and punishment. It is fundamentally a question of personal belief, ethics, cultural attitudes and behaviour (Murungi, 2004).

The Concept of Corruption

Corruption, though an undesirable phenomenon to the right thinking mind, it is blessed with several definitions and it is said not to have a single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition. Attempts to develop such a definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems (UN, 2003). For instance, Transparency International (TI) defines corruption operationally as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI distinguishes between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.

Corruption is "behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status" (Khan 1996).

The National Anti-Corruption Programme (NACP) of Kenya defines corruption as "any behaviour of a civil servant or a person of an equivalent status that is non-compliant with the given powers or established standards of ethics or the promotion of such behaviour, seeking benefit for him or other persons and thus undermining the interests of persons and

the state" (NACP Secretariat, 2006). Satarov et al (2009) argue that corrupt behaviour is a type of opportunistic behaviour by an agent in which the agent uses the resources of the principal not to accomplish the goals of the principal but for the agent's own purposes.

I consider corruption to be a process. Corruption is first and foremost a mental process which is eventually acted out after the cost-benefits of the implications have been calculated. In this vein, I define corruption as the intention to and/or act of acquiring what will otherwise not be due to a person in authority. An intention of a public official to be corrupt is as dangerous, if not more dangerous, than acting corruptly. In this regard, one's behaviour in a hypothetical case is likely to be acted out in real life should variables remain constant.

Does Corruption Hurt?

Yes it does, and there is evidence to that effect. Corruption bites all classes of people. However, as succinctly captured by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "...corruption hurts poor people in developing countries disproportionately. It affects their daily life in many different ways, and tends to make them even poorer, by denying them their rightful share of economic resources or life-saving aid", (UN, 2004). Chetwynd et al (2003) analyse the impact of corruption by espousing two models: economic and governance.

Economically, they argue that corruption hurts through impacting investment and entrepreneurship, distorting markets, and undermining productivity; it worsens income inequality and is associated with slower economic growth and affects poverty levels.

On governance, they have asserted that corruption reduces governance capacity, which, in turn, increases poverty conditions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2006) asserts that corruption is the primary threat to good governance, sustainable economic development, democratic process and fair business practices. It argues further that in today's interconnected world, corruption's corrosive effects are experienced not only where corruption is perpetrated, but also reverberate throughout the global economy and society.

The United States Office of Government Ethics (2000) intimates that the harmful effects of corruption are especially severe on the poor, who are hardest hit by economic decline, are most reliant on the provision of public services, and are least capable of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and the misappropriation of economic privileges. As captured in the argument of Robinson, 1998 (and cited by Salifu, 2008): while corruption is a feature of all societies to varying degrees, it is a particular concern for developing countries because it undermines economic growth, discourages foreign investment and reduces the resources available for infrastructure, public services and anti-poverty programmes.

Corruption hurts growth, impairs capital accumulation, reduces the effectiveness of development aid, and increases income inequality and poverty (Anwar and Schacter, 2004). Lanza (2004) and Langseth (1997) agree that corruption causes distortion of allocation: it causes decisions to be weighed in terms of money, not human need. It may also undermine political institutions by

weakening the legitimacy and accountability of governments (Johnston, 1997, cited by Salifu, 2008).

Vaknin (2003) expounds that corruption is negative as "it is widely accepted that corruption retards growth by deterring foreign investment and encouraging brain drain". He argues further that "it leads to the mis-allocation of economic resources and distorts competition". Again, he avers that corruption "demolishes the tenuous trust between citizen and the state". It casts civil and government institutions in doubt, it tarnishes the entire political class, and, thus, endangers the democratic system.

World Bank (WB) President Paul Wolfowitz, Jakarta speech, April 11, 2006 Cited in Africa Youth Trust, (2009), has made the point forcefully as follows:

"Today one of the biggest threats to development in many countries is corruption. It weakens fundamental systems, it distorts markets, and it encourages people to apply their skills and energies in non-productive ways. In the end, governments and citizens will pay a price, a price in lower incomes [and] lower investment..."

In spite of the evidence on the cost of corruption, Svensson (2005) argues that the differential effect of corruption is an important area for further research because there is no convincing evidence on the effects of corruption. He cites China for being able to grow fast while being ranked among the most corrupt countries and wondered whether corruption was less harmful in China. In spite of the expression of doubt by Svensson (2005), corruption is generally perceived to

hurt.

Corruption has been said to have several causative factors. While some attribute it to economic reasons, others have attributed it to the greedy nature of man but others still believe that corruption is cultural. I think that every human being is intrinsically selfish and corrupt but this is restrained under certain conditions. If those conditions are removed, most people will exhibit some corrupt tendencies.

Langseth, et al (1997) point out that those who argue from the economic stand point say that poverty is at the root of the problem; without poverty there would be no corruption. However, if poverty were the cause of corruption, it would be hard to explain why industrialised countries are beset by scandals, very few of which involve anyone who might be categorised as "poor". Again, whereas poor public servants will often be found to be corrupt, the grandest forms of corruption seldom involve the poor.

The indication is that even if poverty is a cause in developing countries, it cannot be the only one. Insecurity has also been found to be a cause of corruption. Proponents of this argument include Woode (1997). He intimates that job insecurity creates fear and anxiety in the public servant who engages in practices considered unethical to cushion against sudden loss of job.

Interacting with public officials has revealed that living among the poor or witnessing extreme poverty ignites fear of becoming poor in public servants who adopt clandestine operations to brace themselves against loss of

jobs especially in a highly politicised environment.

The other argument that corruption has cultural underpinning has been put forward by some. According to this argument, certain cultural practices both at the organisational and society levels help to sustain corruption. However, Bo Rothstein (2007) cites evidence from the TI reports on Hong Kong and Singapore to buttress his arguments that corruption is not culturally determined. In buttressing the point on why corruption cannot be culturally determined, Karklins (2005, cited in Bo Rothstein, 2007) argues that in corrupt systems, the perpetrators do not internalise the corrupt practices as ethically legitimate but often push the blame on to 'the system' for forcing them to be corrupt. The Ghanaian culture values gift giving and generosity is considered a virtue. However, the same culture abhors illegitimate acquisition of wealth. Money acquired illegitimately is referred to as 'sikafi' (dirty money) in the Akan culture. Gifts from people alleged to have made 'sikafi' are refused. The cultural relativistic argument therefore is weak.

From the above, it appears that the more plausible reason why corruption flourishes is systemic failure – when systems meant to enhance ethical behaviours in the public sector fail, when there is decline in public morality, when the battle against corruption is monopolised by the State, when leadership does not show enough commitment, when the systems fail to provide basic needs, when the gains from corruption is more than the pain to be derived when caught – then corruption will flourish.

However, as argued by Bo Rothstein (2007), the search for the causes and solutions of corruption, often ignores the inbuilt inertia (or path-dependency) of corrupt institutional systems. He quotes from Robert Harris as follows:

“...just as a predominantly non-corrupt system will self-correct to deal with corrupt individuals and the legislative or political flaws that facilitated their corruption, so will a predominantly corrupt system self-correct to maintain its corruption following a purge.” (Robert, 2003, p.63)

Corruption is therefore very difficult to eradicate as it has become a 'mafia' perpetrated by beneficiaries. When the private returns to corruption are high or due to weak institutions, the likelihood or consequence of detection are limited, individuals are more inclined to act corruptly (Barr and Danila, 2006).

Are the Youth Corrupt?

Although the propensity to be corrupt among the youth is less researched, anecdotal evidence suggests that the youth exhibit very high tendencies of corruption. Igbuzor (2005), argues that the youth of today are as corrupt if not more corrupt than the old people. He avers that the youth are “involved in the manipulation of primordial values such as ethnicity and religion to further their selfish interest”. He attributes this to the fact that the youth in Africa are being socialised into corruption by the social reality in which they are living. He intimates: “Over the years, as the incidence, magnitude and extent of corruption increased, the youth were socialised into corruption by their lived social reality”.

In the same vein, Woode (1997), states that the Ghana public service may not be essentially corrupt; what is corrupt is the Ghanaian society. He argues that since the public servant is a product of the Ghanaian society, his corrupt nature can only be cured if the society is itself cured of the disease of corruption. Africa Youth Trust (2009) therefore argues that the success of an effective intervention against a social evil is greatly determined by its trans-generational perpetuity. According to Reichert (2001), one of the troubles now is a tendency of corruption among the youth and cheating in examinations is widespread in many areas.

Failing school children can buy credits and distinctions on custom-made certificates. Reichert (2001) argues that the youth often use fraudulent or borrowed school certificates when seeking jobs and for places in institutions of higher learning, and to Igbuzor (2005), “the youth in Nigeria as in other African countries grapple with the problem of corruption ranging from examination malpractices to fraud and embezzlement just like the adults”.

Reichert (2001) asserts further that more adult leaders are willing to corrupt young people and use them for them to advance their political aspirations and that the youth is “learning how to play the corruption game very well”.

To deal with corruption therefore requires that we heed the advice of Ntewewe (2004) that:

The battle against corruption cannot be fought and won by continuing to deal with the older leadership that we say is corrupt. It also needs the new ideas from those who will run

economies and the state in the years to come, it needs the fresh blood of the youth who possess both the capability and will to shape a prescribed path for their own future.

Indeed the youth should constitute key actors in the fight against corruption but the youth is appears to getting contaminated with the canker. As captured in a local Ghanaian proverb: *how can a rotten fish advise dried fish to be mindful of its stink?*

Objectives, Method and Design

This paper set out to investigate the propensity to be corrupt among Ghanaian youth using a sample of youth from Ghanaian universities as a case study. Specifically, the paper sought to:

- investigate the reaction of university students to a hypothetical corruption scenario
- assess the risks the youth will be prepared to take in their quest for wealth through corruption.

The study was conducted in four universities in Ghana – three public and one private. The students who participated in the study were among those that the researcher taught in these universities between 2007 and 2009. These included students in diploma, first and second degree programmes.

The paper adopts a survey research design and a non-probability sampling regime. All students who attended lectures on the day of the survey were given the opportunity to participate in the survey. A questionnaire was used as the data collection instrument. The questionnaire consisted of ten questions framed around a hypothetical case (see appendix A) of a young graduate employed in a government ministry and who works as the

Special Assistant to the Chief Director (the administrative head of the ministry). The young graduate is confronted with several life challenges but is presented a golden opportunity to make some money to solve the challenges. The young graduate is offered money and a car as “gifts” by a building contractor determined to win a government contract. After respondents had unanimously agreed that the offer was a bribe and not a gift, they were asked to assume the position of the young graduate and show their reaction to the scenario by responding to the questions. Respondents are asked to explain their answers if they so desired. A total of 538 responses were collected and analysed. After the survey, students were offered the opportunity to comment on the case and indicate their reaction.

The study relies on the Social Cognitive Theory of Albert Bandura. Bandura (1989) argues that contrary to the argument that human behaviour should be explained in terms of one-sided determinism, where behaviour is construed as being shaped and controlled either by environmental influences or by internal dispositions, “reciprocal causation, human behaviour, cognition and other personal factors, and environmental influences all operate as interacting determinants that influence each other bi-directionally”. This he called “Triadic Reciprocal Determinism” which identifies three levels of interactions including interaction between thought, affect and action; interactive relation between personal characteristics and environmental influences; and influence between behaviour and the environment and that ultimately man is both a product and producer of their environment.

The implication of this theory for this paper lies in its ability to help explain the bi-directional impact of various elements causing and being shaped by corruption.

The Research Problem

Over a period of ten years, Ghana has oscillated between the scores 3.3 and 3.9 on the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Short of being called a perception, occurrences in the public administration and political cycles confirm that Ghana's score cannot just be a perception. Almost on a daily basis, newspaper and whistle-blower reports indicate that the incidence and magnitude of corruption in Ghana is on the increase. Although there has

been two successful changes in governments, the fight against corruption appears to be a child's play as perpetrators are continually treated with kid's gloves. Whereas slogans and "war songs" such as "zero tolerance for corruption" have been fashioned, corruption still persists. As depicted by Table 1 below, Ghana's CPI has improved slightly since 2007 but has never gone pass the 4.0 score over the 10 years period. What is more, young people are heavily laden with corrupt tendencies as practices such as internet fraud, examination malpractices among others are on the increase. This study was therefore undertaken to investigate the extent to which the youth exhibit corrupt tendencies.

Table 1: CPI scores of Ghana between 2000 and 2009

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
CPI score	3.5	3.4	3.9	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.9	3.9

Source: Extracted from Transparency International (TI) records

Results and Discussions

Demographic characteristics of participants often influence their behaviour and this study took two demographic variables into consideration - age and gender. Age is a significant variable in social research because as a factor, it influences the subject in various ways.

Table 2 below shows the age and gender distribution of the various students who responded to the questionnaire. The modal age range was 21-25 years with 37.7%. The age range of 16-20 years constituted 11.0%, whereas those within the ages of 41-45 constituted 4.6%. Those within the ages of 26-30, 31-35 and 36-40 are 21.6%, 10.0% and

8.2% respectively, but 6.9% of the respondents did not answer. Majority of the respondents were female, to be precise 41.8% of them as against 36.1% male respondents, while 22.1% of the respondents did not indicate their gender.

The study included students of various levels. 33.5% are in 400, 8.9% in 300 and 3.5% in 200. Also, 36.0% are diploma students whereas 6.7% decided not to answer the question. A summarised form of the data is captured in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

FREQUENCY	PERCENT		FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE	
AGE			GENDER		
16-20	59	11.0	Male	194	36.1
21-25	203	37.7	Female	225	41.8
26-30	116	21.6	Not answered	119	22.1
31-35	54	10.0			
36-40	44	8.2			
41-45	25	4.6			
Not answered	37	6.9			
TOTAL	538	100.0	TOTAL	538	100.0
			LEVEL		
			Diploma	263	48.9
			100	3	0.6
			200	19	3.5
			300	48	8.9
			400	180	33.5
			Not answered	25	4.6
			TOTAL	538	100.0

This section of the study presents the general frequencies of the respondents and these has been summarised in Table 3 below. It presents the responses to the 10 questions posed after the hypothetical case. The first question asked respondents whether or not they will accept the 'gift' just by the face value of the case. In other words, without any consideration, will they accept the gift? Majority (55.6%) of the participants will accept the gift as against 43.3% who will not accept such a gift. 0.5% of the respondents declined to answer this question. The reasons assigned by respondents who will accept the 'gift' is that there are problems which needed to be solved and this 'gift' had come at an opportune time.

One student remarked "this contract is huge and the contractor should be reasonable – the money and the car being offered are not commensurate with the size of the contract – I will negotiate for a higher value". On the other hand, those who said they will not accept the 'gift' said they believed strongly in dignity and integrity and no matter how desperate they were, they intended to hold on to this virtue. This is in consonance with the argument by the OECD (2003) that the short-term gains of winning a contract by bribery can be quickly negated by the consequences of a reputation loss in case of exposure.

To find out which age group will be more prone to corruption, the researcher uses bivariate cross-tabulation where the various

age categories were to cross against corruption to show the association of these two variables. Of the 56.6% of the respondents who will accept the gift, the most corruption prone age group is 31-35 years. About 66.7% of the age group will accept the gift as against the other age groups where the percentages of those who will accept remain below 60%. Although research evidence does not indicate consensus on the influence of gender on corrupt tendencies, cultural stereotypes hold that females are generally more ethical in their behaviours than are males (Loo, 2003). In this study, although more females than males were captured, the responses show that men are generally more prone to corruption than women. 61.9% of the males will accept that 'gift' as compared to 57.3% of the females.

It was established that when respondents become sure that the gift was not a set up by a superior officer, there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who will now accept it. 58.7% of the respondents will accept the gift and 40.9% will not accept it if they were sure it was not a set up. Respondents said since they did not ask for the gift, accepting it was alright. Some of those who will decline the gift insisted on dignity and integrity and that their decision to refuse the gift will not depend on whether or not it was a set-up. This implies that an additional 3.1% of the respondents will accept the gift if they were sure that this was not a set-up. For this group of students, a whistle-blower mechanism where information concerning their activities can be leaked to authorities can prevent them from becoming corrupt.

When asked whether or not they will accept the gift if they doubted the source and

suspected that it was a set up, the percentage reduces drastically to 29.4%. In other words, almost half of the percentage (29.3%) that will accept the gift will refuse it if they suspected that this gift could be a set-up. As the safety certainty level reduces, the percentage that will not accept the gift increases to 69.7%. This confirms the point made by Rose-Ackerman (1997) that the higher that probability that corruption will be detected and punished, the lower the effective benefits available.

However, unlike the arguments of Rose-Ackerman (1997) that if the likelihood of detection and punishment is high, either the supply of or the demand for bribes may fall to zero, a significant proportion of the respondent will still accept the gift even when they know that it is a set-up.

In an attempt to establish whether respondents are actually predisposed to corruption because the salary stated is meager, the respondents were asked what they will do were their salaries more than the stated 300 Cedis (about US\$ 200) a month. The reason for the question is that, a significant number of public employees receive just about that amount as monthly salary. As aptly captured by Cooper-Enchia (2008), "many of the problems associated with poor performance, lack of professionalism and corruption in the public service are related to low compensation levels and ineffective pay administration". Indeed, the responses show that most of the respondents will refrain from corruption if their salaries were higher. If respondents had a higher salary, 35.7% will still accept the gift but most of them (64.1%) will decline it. This confirms the assertion by Cooper-Enchia (2008).

Closely related to the issue of higher salary is the availability of financial support in the form of loans to respondents. 63.9% of the respondents will decline to accept the gift if they could access loans to finance their commitments. The 35.7% respondents who will accept irrespective of availability of loans stated that they must build a future for themselves and their children so more money from the gift will cushion them for the future. Other reasons included the fact that loans will have to be paid back which will eventually put financial burden on the recipient in future.

The researcher also sought to find out the level of risk respondents are prepared to take in their quest to be corrupt. The question "If you were sure that an anti-corruption agency will find you out through their vigorous investigation, will you accept the 'gift'?" was posed. Only 16.5% of the respondents will dare an anti-corruption agency. If participants are sure that their act would be found out through the rigorous investigative processes of anti-corruption agencies, 83.1% of them will not accept the gift. The most cited reason is the protection of personal reputation and the fear of being jailed. The responses depict the point raised by Barr and Danila (2006) that when the private returns to corruption are high or due to weak institutions, the likelihood or consequence of detection are limited, individuals are more inclined to act corruptly.

The percentage of those who will accept the gift reduces even further if respondents were sure that once arrested, they could get jailed for years. In this case only 13.0% of the respondents will dare take a risk. Most of these respondents said they will return after jail to enjoy the booty. On the contrary, if respondents could get jailed for years when

caught, 86.6% of them will not accept the gift because a jail term will jeopardise their future.

To curb corruption therefore will require an independent, fast and responsive judicial system that is not corrupt itself. This way, corrupt officials will get their due punishment which will deter others from engaging in corrupt practices. This is consistent with what Abbink, et al (2002, cited in Cameron, et al, 2006) reported that with a threat of high penalties when discovered, the propensity to corrupt significantly reduces.

When asked whether they will accept the gift if they knew that their boss has been accepting such 'gifts', 51.5% responded in the affirmative. The most cited reason is that the boss should show the example for them to emulate and that if he has been accepting such gifts without any punishment then they will emulate him. 47.6% will reject the gift even if they knew that their boss has been accepting such gifts. They cite personal integrity reasons as the basis for their refusal.

Majority (58.0%) of the participants responded that if they were not religious and were sure that there was no heaven, they will accept the gift. For these respondents, their propensity to be corrupt is dependent on their religious disposition. This implies that propensity to be corrupt can be influenced by religion. For some respondents (41.3%) however, they will still decline to accept the gift even if they were not religious and were not hopeful of making it to heaven.

Table 3: General Frequencies

QUESTIONS	YES%	NO%	ANS.%	TOTAL%
1. Will you accept the gift	55.6	44.1	0.4	100.0
2. If you were sure that this is a not a set up	58.7	40.9	0.4	100.0
3. If you were not sure that this is a set up	29.4	69.7	0.9	100.0
4. If your salary was higher than GH¢ 300	35.7	64.1	0.2	100.0
5. If you could get a loan	35.7	63.9	0.4	100.0
6. If you were sure that an anti-corruption agency	16.5	83.1	0.4	100.0
7. If you were sure that when caught you will be jailed	13.0	86.6	0.4	100.0
8. If you know that your boss has been accepting such gifts	51.6	47.6	0.9	100.0
9. If you were not religious and you were sure that there was no heaven	58.0	41.3	0.7	100.0
10. In situations like this, will you consider shame as a barrier	39.4	59.9	0.7	100.0

Most of the respondents (59.9%) will not consider shame as a barrier and will decline the 'gift' as they consider shame as a social sanction that is very difficult to erase but 39.4% of them will accept the 'gift' whether or not they get ashamed.

Policy Implications

In view of the findings of the study, a number of policy measures will contribute to the fight against corruption. It must be emphasised that it takes a strong leadership to build institutions and it takes strong institutions to bring deviant leaders into order.

Top on the agenda of antidotes for corruption is the influence of leadership. A strong political and organisational leadership will be a *sine qua non* to the fight against corruption. As per the Social Cognitive Theory,

leadership will not only leave their desirable behaviours on the followers, but they will also institute a culture of punishment for deviants to help stem corrupt tendencies in their followers. In the light of this, my most preferred leader is one who is able to look his/her deviant brother in the face and say to him "get behind me, you devil"; one who is able to crack the whip if it has to be.

In terms of policy, I consider a number of other recommendations as valuable such as sustained education, a reasonable public compensation system and minimum wage legislation, a whistle-blowing mechanism, a name-to-shame policy and an incentive-to-do-good policy.

- **Vigorous and sustained education**

This study reveals that corruption is not only a

current problem but will remain a huge problem in the next few decades. It is anticipated that corruption will increase unless systematic efforts are made to combat and prevent its hiking. In this light, it is recommended that all stakeholders – state and state agencies, media, the private sector, and civil society organisations including the religious organisations – must engage in a prolific, prudent and sustained public education about corruption and more importantly how citizens can be part of the fight for corruption reduction.

At the school level, I think the education service should partner with the National Commission for Civil Education (NCCE) to design programmes for use by the centre for school-targeted interventions. Contrary to opinions that such a programme should be part of the school curriculum, I consider that the programme should be managed by the NCCE as one run by the school system would lose its appeal and is likely to become just “one of the subjects”.

- **Review of public compensation system and minimum wage legislation**

The general pretence in Ghana is where everybody knows that public sector wages and salaries are woefully inadequate to cater for the needs of workers. That governments continue to pay such salaries must stop somewhere. Some people will not be easily corrupted if their salaries were capable of taking care of their basic necessities of life and to provide them with a certain modicum of respectability and comfort. With higher salaries, the trade-off risk increases and this will likely reduce the motivation to be corrupt. One may argue and rightly so that corruption

is not perpetrated by only lowly paid staff, but the point here is that, the more the people who get out of corruption because they can afford their basic needs, the bigger the pool of workers who may be willing to report big-time corruption.

- **Whistle-blowing mechanism**

Whistle-blowing is considered one of the ways by which corrupt officials can get exposed without them knowing who exposed them. A well conscripted whistle-blowing regime with mechanisms for anonymity would endanger and put corrupt officials in a high risk zone and this may consequently reduce their tendencies to be corrupt.

It is not enough to have whistle-blowing laws as these, devoid of the commitment of administrative agencies and especially political leaders to enforce, is tantamount to a lawless system. Such laws only end up exciting people and get whistle-blowers into trouble as corrupt officials are known to resort to retaliation as a mechanism to compel them into submission.

As the agency responsible for fighting corruption, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) should be empowered to receive whistle-blowers' information and be capable of not only investigating but also prosecuting the perpetrators of corruption. As it stands, CHRAJ is incapable of prosecuting offenders because the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which establishes it does not grant the powers.

- **A name-to-shame policy**

One of the strongest anti-corruption measures is probably the policy of name-to-shame. As is the saying “do not wash your dirty linen in

public”, most corrupt officials will not want their corrupt acts to be known in public. In Ghana, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament for the first time, held public hearings over the Auditor-General's reports in 2007. These hearings were telecast live on Ghana National TV network. Chief Directors¹ appeared before the committees accompanied by their sector Ministers to answer question relating to their expenditures. Culpable officers were seen very panicky in the process and most showed very embarrassed demeanour. Another example in Ghana was the public hearing of the investigation into the operations of the “Ghana at 50” secretariat. Several District Coordinating Directors² appearing before the secretariat looked on “sheepishly” as they could not account for monies disbursed for the celebration of Ghana's 50th anniversary. A “name-to-shame” policy would discourage some people from acting irresponsibly.

- **Incentive-to-do-good policy**

Whereas million of dollars are spent at various levels to combat corruption, no efforts are usually made in the fight to reward those “doing good”. Ghana spends several million Cedis either chasing corrupt officials or prosecuting them while those “doing good” continue to struggle on a daily basis to make a living. A “doing good” policy should aim at instituting an incentive programme for people who after several years of work have no record of corruption against them.

Conclusion

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon especially in the developing countries mostly because of weak institutions. Whereas the fight to combat it continues, it is important to spread the fight across generations instead of

concentrating only on the older generation. The need to target the younger generation is a way of ensuring that the old order of corrupt officials does not give place to a new one. It is important to recognise that the fight against corruption will succeed only if new cohorts of corrupt official are not bred to replace the outgoing ones.

As espoused in this study, there will remain a critical corps of young people who will exhibit hardcore propensities to be corrupt. However, for most others, they will be corrupt only under certain conditions. The design of anti-corruption strategies should therefore be multi-prong and multi-targeted. It should be understood that no one single strategy will succeed in dealing with corruption across generations and even within a generation. Policy makers and anti-corruption institutions should remember that their efforts will be considered successful when a new generation of corrupt officials does not take over from an older one to perpetrate corruption.

¹Administrative heads of government ministries

²Administrative heads of local government agencies known in Ghana as district assemblies

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APPENDIX A

This is a hypothetical case but it mirrors some challenges faced by employees in Ghana. Assuming that you found yourself in a situation like this, indicate in the questions below how you will react. Your identity is not required in this study.

Please indicate your level.....

Age:..... Sex:.....

As the special assistant to the Chief Director (CD), you are assigned to pre-evaluating contract documents before the tender board meets on them. This is usually the chief director's job. However because of pressure of work and the confidence he has in you, he has decided to assign the job to you. He has therefore warned you not to disclose this to anyone. Nobody in the ministry knows that you have been assigned this responsibility except the CD. No one in the ministry except the CD knows your house. You have been doing this extremely well and for the past five years, any contractor you ranked 1st eventually won the contract.

Your salary is GH¢300, and your rent of 80 Ghana cedis per month is due for payment next month for a two-year rent advance. Your wife has lost the father and must give him a befitting burial. She demands GH¢2,000 from you for this purpose. Your inability to immediately provide this amount has created some misunderstanding at home. Your son just passed Junior High School and you need GH¢500

to send him to Senior High School. You live in Kasoa and getting to work has been very tedious because of difficulties in getting tro-tro in the mornings. The personnel manager has therefore threatened to transfer you if the habitual lateness continues.

A contract is up for award, and as usual the CD has given the documents to you for pre-evaluation.

A man you know to be a big-time contractor comes to 'see' you with a petition. He says: "young man, you know I have put in a bid for this contract, and you know I have the capacity to execute the job. But I also know that there are equally qualified contractors, so I want you to help me win this contract and I promise you, we shall celebrate afterwards. To demonstrate my commitment to the deal, please take these 'gifts', don't refuse, it is mutual benefit."

He then hands to you an envelope he claims contains GH¢10,000, and keys to a car he bought for his son which was not registered because the son has travelled out of the country.

Comment on the following taking a critical evaluation of your situation:

1. Will you accept the gifts?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
2. If you were sure that this is not a set-up (trap) by your boss, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
3. If you were not sure whether this was a set-up (trap) by your boss, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer

4. If your salary was higher than GHe 300, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
5. If you could get a loan to finance your problems, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
6. If you were sure that an anti-corruption agency will find this out through their vigorous investigation, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
7. If you were sure that when caught, you could be jailed for years, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
8. If you know that your boss has been accepting such 'gifts' will you accept your gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
9. If you were not religious and you were sure that there was no heaven, will you accept the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer
10. In a situation like this, will you consider shame as a barrier to your accepting the gift?
Yes []
No []
You may explain your answer

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ADAPTING TO GLOBAL IMPERATIVES: AFRICA'S PUBLIC SECTOR IN CHANGING TIMES

Tunji Olaopa³

Abstract

The world in which we live is experiencing breakneck changes that are re-configuring the way we perceive who and what we are. Institutions and social formations are equally responding to the dynamics of these changing times. The concern with regards to the nature and values of the "public administration architecture" is how the public sector can hope to meet and adapt to the rapid rate of technological and social change defining the new knowledge society with a constraining industrial age bureaucratic approach. In this essay, we argue that if the African public administration, and specifically the public sector, hope to succeed in this evolving knowledge society, then it must find a means of adapting to global transformations determined by the four factors of: globalisation, technology, demographics and democracy, as well as the challenges posed by the New Public Management paradigm. These, we argue, will arm the public sector with the unique capacity and response mechanism which constantly strives to create a viable synthesis between the old and the new in its desire to achieve a stimulating service delivery system and uphold the public interests.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of change is a very interesting one. Indeed, the only condition of man is a permanent state of transition. We dare add that this dynamic transformation applies equally to institutions and organisations too (Daft, 2008; Webb and Cleary, 1994). This is truer of public administration and the public service which for the past few decades have manifested the dynamics of transformation in response to changing times (Bourgon, 2007: 7). History everywhere is the space of energetic change and transformation, and there are quite a few historical events the coalition of which has challenged the evolution of public administration and the management of the public sector in the 20th and the 21st centuries. We can point at the World War II, the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR, the incredible ICT revolution (giving birth to the World Wide Web and the

Internet), the expansion of the European Union, the rise of China, the growing incidence of state and trans-border terrorism (e.g. the September 11, 2001 attack on the US), and even the election of the first black president in the United States. All these tremendous historical changes have in one way or the other impacted on the evolution of the public sector from what we used to know.

In this essay, we are therefore concerned with charting some of the paths that the African public sector should take in response to the dynamics of today's global realities. There are fundamentally four significant factors which have contributed tremendously in channeling the public sector through some of its most significant changes in recent times. These factors include globalisation, technology, demographics and democracy (Peters, 1996). The impact of these factors on the public sector will be determined especially in their

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dynamic relationship with one another.

In responding to these four factors, the public sector and its administration, in the attempt to uphold the public interest, must thus occupy a unique space which can only be characterised as being “not entirely of the past; [and] not yet of the future” (Bourgon, 2007: 8). This gives us an intimation of a dynamic evolution and a response mechanism which strives continually to create a viable synthesis between the old and the new. The dynamism integrates, that is, past strengths, current knowledge and future challenges. In the next section, we will begin by examining the anatomy of the declining public sector within the ambit of the several vectors of change motivated by the factors of globalisation, democracy, demographics and technology. Following this, we will further analyse why globalisation—as one of the factors—cannot really spell the doom of the public sector in spite of the growing decline of the nation-state in global affairs. The next two sections will deal with the attitudinal and the institutional innovations expected of the public service in Africa and developing countries in general in hoping to impact the citizenry in the 21st century.

The Changing Times and the Status Quo Vanguard

The factors of globalisation, technology, demographics and democracy are crucial in the analysis of the public sector because the public sector has come under a lot of tension lately due to what can be called “complicity by association”: the public sector is an important aspect of the state whose obituary is currently being written under globalisation (Spicer, 2007). Thus, according to global

theorists, if the state is declining in power and relevance, then the public sector must also give way to market forces and market-based competition. In short, the public sector in the global age is suffering a legitimisation crisis. Its relevance, usefulness and appropriateness are under severe interrogation. In this essay, therefore, we will be looking at how these four factors, especially globalisation, have acted as both the antagonist as well as the motivator of developments in the public sector. Before we go into this however, we need to answer the question: Why is the public sector in decline in the first place?

The answer to this question depends by and large on the role of the state in a global world, and the lesson such a state has learnt. In talking about a declining public sector, our attention immediately shifts to the third world where the states are battling with their vulnerability to the global processes. This vulnerability, in large part, is a consequence of their weak institutional framework, and the lukewarmness or even lack of readiness to make necessary adjustment. Most government bureaucracies are structured in such a way that makes it possible to preserve the tradition of administration that makes the public sector “a great rock in the tideline”. The public sector managers are therefore traditionally located so as to limit the damage of change management in their respective organisations. The result is that change—in terms of size, orientation or evaluation—is rendered ineffective in the re-engineering of the organisation. Decline is the inevitable consequence of such compromised change (Olaopa, 2008; Bean and Radford, 2002).

In most of the new states in Sub-Saharan

Africa, decline set in around 1975 (Rasheed and Balogun, 1995: 32-36). Consider the case of Nigeria. On the eve of decolonisation, Nigeria inherited the British public administration model which arguably is her strongest colonial legacy. This traditional model of the civil service was founded on several features: a lifetime career that encourages a progressive advancement from enlistment to retirement; professional enclosure; a uniformity of rules and regulations; emasculation of discretion; predictable promotion based on seniority; and so on. Decolonisation however required the Nigerianisation of the Civil Service through the process of replacing expatriates with qualified Nigerians. This Nigerianisation scheme as well as other necessary reforms of the Service (under such able administrators like S. O. Adebó in the West, Jerome Udoji in the East and Ali Akilu in the North) was carried out with the vision that would protect the public interest and transform the society within the dynamics of a consciously induced and planned framework. This vision was complemented by a huge revenue windfall from abundant oil resources in the early 70s. This led to an equally huge public sector investment and institutional expansion outstripped unfortunately by unbridled enthusiasm. The watershed was achieved when the dynamics of manpower utilisation broke down as a result of unguarded expansion, vague job descriptions and the arbitrary employment of officers with unproven capacities. In other words, "job classification, grading and posting, gradually became susceptible to easy adjustments through politically motivated policies that managed inter-class contest for power and rewards and unplanned and technically irrational responses to industrial unions'

pressure for wage reviews" (Olaopa, 2008: 4).

The impetus for the modernisation of the civil service was recognised by seasoned service elite who saw the need for professionalism as well as the necessity for all-encompassing system change in line with global trends that define performance in public services. This was the occasion, for example, for the Adebó's 1971 wage review and the Udoji Commission of 1974. Unfortunately, however, "the nation missed the opportunity to lay the basic infrastructure of a performance/result-oriented management system" suggested by these reform commissions. On the contrary, "inspired by excess oil revenue, only the remuneration component of the reform was implemented, thus setting wages in Nigeria beyond productivity improvement levels in national economy" (Ibid: 5). The consequence of this and many other unprofessional practices after 1975 is the creation of a public service.

...under the weight of a set of dysfunctional and unabating policy, process, capacity, resources and performance gaps. These gaps condition and are conditioned by a workforce structure with too many people doing too little, too few people doing too much, and too many doing virtually nothing, in a technical sense of speaking.... [There was also] the breakdown of its internal control mechanism, an uncanny mix of virtual abandonment of due process... on the one hand, and over-reliance on it, on the other [as well as a] whole 'passion without knowledge' reform actions in one breath, and "conception-reality gaps" in reform blueprints, on the other (Ibid: xi).

Our first answer, therefore, to the decline of the public sector in Africa and third world states like Nigeria, then, is the loss of the institutional and administrative capacity to facilitate the goals of the civil service institutions. In this regard, performance was consequently displaced by a mix of disjointed incrementalism and change management characterised by "muddling through" (Spicer, 2007). In the end, the goal of government in improving the quality of life of the citizens through an adequate service delivery became inextricably lost in the labyrinth of a corrupt bureaucracy absorbed into the political competition over the allocation of resources. The second answer to the decline of the public sector in our contemporary time is the crisis of Keynesianism as a theory of government size and intervention in public policies and expenditures (relative to the private sector). The logic of Keynesianism is that the more the size of the state in the economy, the more the operation of the public sector, especially the bureaucracies. Yet, the same bureaucracy is assiduously locking people out of a civil engagement with government and an understanding of the public interest. This crisis coincided with the period, in the 80s, when the economies of the new states in Africa started going into decline. The states as well as their various public sectors were therefore ill-prepared (in terms of strong democratic institutions and the domestic strategies for institutional reforms) to meet the wave of economic liberalisation and democratisation that were sweeping the continents. Therefore, these public sectors could not take advantage of the potentials these global processes have for public administration.

The Templates of Change for the Public Sector

From the 1970s, Keynesianism as a theory of managing national economies started declining. This was because some western countries experienced a combination of high unemployment and inflation (i.e. a stagflation) which contradicted Keynesian economics and returned economic thinkers to the theories of classical economics. Classical liberalism holds that it is the market rather than government fiscal policy that solely determines economic growth. This return to classical economics is one of the drivers of the globalising trends. Globalisation is simply the process by which the experiences of day to day life are boosted by the telecommunication revolution into an interconnected pattern. It is a process basically marked by the breakdown of time and space as we know it, making it possible for events to have a global impact for people millions of miles away from one another.

One of the first proposed casualties of this global process is the state which one commentator described as being too small for most issues of global concerns now (i.e. pollution, crime, terrorism, etc), and indeed too big for some urgent national issue (i.e. the welfare of its citizens). Once the state is effectively buried, it is believed, the public sector will also automatically withdraw from its many roles in the regulation of public life. This would supposedly leave the way open for the triumph of market enterprise on the ashes of Keynesianism.

But then, the state has refused to wither away from social and public life in spite of the apocalyptic prophecies of global theorists.

Rather, opponents of globalisation and neo-liberalism have argued that the state has been underestimated as a significant conduit through which global influences and process are mediated. More important they argued that global theorists, in their optimism, have equally overlooked the negative impact and consequences of too much dependency on the market economy. This argument seems to have been borne out by the recent and definitely painful experience of the global economic meltdown which has critically challenged the faith we used to have in the market economies, 'the rational man' theory of economics, and the 'Davos culture'. The meltdown simply signals a serious reconsideration of Keynesianism and the significance of governmental oversight and regulation in the arbitration of public life as well as the role of the public sector in that oversight.

This is not to say that the public sector has actually justified its function as the mediator of public life nor has it been living up to its rationale. In spite of this, however, it is still too early to insist therefore on the irrelevance of the public sector in the age of globalisation. What we can hope for, rather, is that globalisation will instigate a changing, more re-organised, role for the public sector in the management of national public services through the production of conditions favourable for its own expansion and value. Thus, one vital aspect of globalisation, for us in this essay, is the ways and means by which national agencies and organisations are squaring up to the vectors of change motivated by the factors of globalisation, technology, demographics and democracy in an increasingly inter-dependent world.

Taken together, the vectors that motivate the transformation of the public sector include:

- The decline of the Nation-state and the privatisation of welfare: The combination of global markets, technological interdependence and the people's disillusionment with government's (non-) performance leads to the current consensus about the changing form of the nation-state especially from its historical centralised form to a more adaptable decentralised form under the onslaught of global market and other socio-political events. The consequence of this fragmentation of the state is that the original operational space of the state, i.e. service delivery in education, healthcare, pension, social security, and so on, are being taken over by more local and global forces. Government, in order to regain its relevance is faced with the challenge of reclaiming its status as a responsive service provider with a difference.
- The digital deficit and the growth of knowledge: The globalisation of communication and information technologies has heightened the significance of education as a vector of global change. This globalisation of education not only challenges the state's capacity to satisfy the demand for education, but also creates a vast knowledgeable society defined by learning. In spite of the enormous advantages of the IT revolution, there is still a huge divide between the developed and the developing countries. Thus, most of the public sectors in the developing countries are left with an infrastructural and capacity development deficit which

affects their ability to deal with their knowledge management system.

- **Poverty and the global economic inequality:** In benefitting a small group of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (20% of the global population), globalisation has also ensured that such inequality would lead to poverty (affecting 80% of the world population who live on less than US\$2 a day). This makes poverty a global phenomenon and poverty alleviation a serious national challenge.
- **Environmental degradation:** The gains of economic liberalisation and the lifting of barriers on trade and commerce have triggered immense benefit for the states of the developed countries. However, this has also led to the threat of environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources as well as industrial pollution, deforestation, rampant urbanisation, soil degradation, climate change, etc. The challenge for any sector is in combining the openness to the global economy with policies that protect the environment for the sake of the people.
- **The demographic factors:** The public sector in most developing countries also has to contend with the demographic issue of ageing as it relates to the morbidity and mortality as well as mobility of workers resulting in the loss of the public sector workforce (DeLong, 2004; Peters, 1996). For instance, the incidence of HIV/AIDS and the digital divide has a significant impact on population loss of skilled workers, especially to the technologically developed states. The government of

developing countries therefore needed to confront the problem of an exponential increase in the young citizens and an equally alarming decrease in skilled workers either due to morbidity or migration. There is also challenge for policy makers of converting the debilitating "brain drain" syndrome into a stimulating "brain gain."

- **The changing structure of work and the ascent of women:** Tied to the preceding point is the ongoing transformation of the structure of work and the workplace enabled by the global trends in technologies and ideas. Apart from the de-emphasis on the white-collar job, the growing obsolescence of the office space and emergence of teleworking, and the move away from manufacturing to the service sector, there has been a backlash against a patriarchal bureaucracy given the proliferation of a substantial number of politically and economically active women into the domain of work (Peters, 1996: 109ff). This poses a challenge to the male-dominated public sector under the pressure to change in order to be relevant.
- **Corruption and criminal networks:** This, no doubt, is one of the banes of the public sector in most developing countries. Corruption undermines the fundamental rationale of the public sector by juxtaposing the economic interest of the individual with that of the public interest to the detriment of the latter. The governments of these countries are therefore challenged to find ways of undermining the corrupt and criminal tendencies of the workers in order to foster a commitment to the public interest.

The challenge these vectors pose for the organisation of the public sector especially in Africa, we must note, go beyond reshaping what someone has called the "public administration architecture" alone. It is really a challenge which requires a new approach to value, methodology and productivity in a competitive world. The public sector manager in Africa must attempt to overcome the rampant capacity deficit stemming from:

- Failure to adjust dynamically to changing time and circumstances, as well as the failure to grasp opportunity and cope with emerging constraints;
- Failure to be proactive, strategic and to take the initiative. Passivity in the face of crucial decision that must be made; and
- Uncritical acceptance of "universal solution" not suited to the context of the receiving country or public sector, and externally induced reforms that come with empty promises.

Due to the abysmal performance or rather non-performance of the African state, there has been a lot of pressure on African governments to capitulate to private sector initiatives in governance. This is more so that the public sector reforms carried out by most African countries have failed to yield the expected transformation due to a number of factors like corruption, inefficiency, lack of accountability and most significantly, ineffective management practices. Public sector management in Africa is especially impeded by the institutional peculiarities inherited from colonialism. The reforms therefore did not lead to cost containment and quality improvement.

The challenge in public sector management,

therefore, is that of fashioning an alternative framework for organising and managing public services and hence redefining the role of the state in governance around the issues of efficiency, representation, participation and accountability. This is important because in the first place, the public service remains the tool available to the government for the implementation of developmental goals and objectives. They are the most important face the African governments can turn to their citizens. In the second place, the public service also serves as the critical pivot for the growth of the African economies. They are saddled with the creation of an enabling environment within which all the other sectors of the economy can perform. The bad news is that the African public sector has been too over-extended, ill-equipped and too lethargic to perform these critical functions.

In order to benefit from the advantages opened up by globalisation, technology, democracy and demographics as well as the motivations provided by the vectors of change we highlighted earlier, African states must develop very strong attitudinal and institutional capacities to face the adjustment cost and beneficial impact of global change. In the next two sections, we will examine the two dimensions of the capacity deficit which the public sector in Africa must address in order to appropriate the advantages of evolving with the best in the global world.

Attitudinal Challenges: The Demands of Good Governance

The first capacity deficit which prevents adaptation to positive changes is the lack of a conceptual and normative framework which will guide the development of the policy and

programmes of action of the public sector. Commentators writing in the *Futurist* (Vol. 37: 2003) on the economic, societal and environmental trends shaping the future argue that in the world economy, "Labour markets will remain tight particularly in skilled fields. This calls for new creativity in recruiting, benefits, and perks, especially profit sharing. This hyper-competitive business environment demands new emphasis on rewarding speed, creativity, and innovation within the workforce." The implication is that to meet the challenges of a rapidly globalising world, the state and the public sector must evolve the necessary strategies to combat their rampant capacity deficit. Specifically, combating the capacity deficit involves putting in place not only policy frameworks, but also strong and trusted conceptual and normative structures which are able to command and receive the citizens' allegiance and commitment to the efforts aimed at improving the quality of life through infrastructural development.

In this regard, one of the fundamental questions that the public sector must answer in these changing times is the question of restoring trust in government and its institutions (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992: 14-15). The citizens of a state expect the government via its institutions not only to be legitimate and sincere but also responsible and responsive to their needs (Bourgon, 2007: 13, 17). This expectation is only justified since the government equally requires that the citizens be dutiful taxpayers. A good government is therefore recognised by the amount of trust that the citizens place in its public institutions and in its decisions. When all these are lacking, it becomes quite difficult for any government to succeed in governance.

We can therefore say that the issue of trust in government is fundamentally the question of good governance (Rashced and Balogun, 1995). This translates, for the managers of the public sector, as the question of balancing accountability and transparency to the government and the people in the maximisation of public interest. It is equally a question of responsively engaging the citizens proactively in public governance. The question of democracy and good governance brings to the fore the fundamental rationale of government and the public sector: This is the commitment to the people and the enhancement of the public good.

There are three reasons why this question is important: One, good governance of the public services ensures that the public sector confronts the negative perception of the people that the government is not interested in their welfare and that the management of the public sector is really not geared towards realising the public interest. This is crucial because the people's matters are the end point of government's policies. Two, operational methodologies of the public sector, when guided by democratic ethics and principles, inevitably lead to good management and good performance, good public engagement and eventually good outcomes. This in turn ultimately reflects on the perception of the people about the objective and performance of the public sector. Three, the good governance of the public sector makes it possible for new innovations and creative administering of the public sector and its services.

Within the context of this essay, we take the issue of good governance as a kind of template which allows the positioning of the public

sector capacities for better performance.

The *Good Governance Standard for Public Services* (2004) lists six core principles that spell out the meaning of good governance which ought to guide the conduct of public sector service delivery for the sake of the people. These principles are:

- Good governance means focusing on the purpose of the public sector and the intended outcome for the citizens.
- Good governance means performing effectively in clearly defined roles and functions.
- Good governance flows from the promotion and practice of those values—selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, leadership and honesty—which underpin the policy making processes and that make for a shared culture in the promotion of the public interest.
- Good governance involves taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risks.
- Good governance involves developing the capacity and capability of the public sector organisation for effectiveness.
- Finally, good governance means making accountability real, first to the public on whose behalf they are working, and second to the government which owns the authority with which they work.

Old Bureaucrats and the Emerging Public Sector in Africa

The second dimension of the capacity deficit of the public sector involves its inability to respond to change and innovations (Rasheed and Balogun, 1995: 49). We said earlier that rather than emasculating the public sector,

globalisation would lead to the creation of a dynamic space within which the sector can evolve to meet the challenges of the changing times. This dynamism requires a high level of competence, knowledge, sophistication and adaptability to the wide and complex range of issues thrown up for the public sector in a rapidly globalising world. How is such a proactive, strategic and creative public sector to be developed?

One of the drivers that must motivate the evolving public sector away from what it used to be is the amount of turbulence and complexity, especially on public policy issues that has been thrown up by the environment of constant change. As such, the tools and strategies that enabled the old bureaucratic system to function effectively would break down in today's world (Bourgon, 2007). The first challenge the public sector must confront is that of coming to term with the exigencies of a knowledge society (Bourgon, 2007; Drucker, 1995; Shipman and Shipman, 2006).

The shift to a new kind of society called the knowledge society was made possible by the revolution in modern information and communication technologies that brought new expectations to the process of service delivery by the public managers. This is not to say that the old public sector had nothing to do with knowledge since the very act of governing is based on knowledge. However, unlike the old public sector, service delivery in the new public sector must be a knowledge-based *learning* (or, formal educational) activity depending on the accumulation of a vast amount of knowledge and information both from the organisation, the human capital working for it, the government and the citizens

(Drucker, 1995: 227).

The challenge is therefore to develop a strong public sector knowledge management that would enable the public managers to cope with the modern knowledge economies as well as work with the enormous knowledge accumulated in the course of their work for a smooth service delivery to the people. For instance, the adoption of a system of *accrual accounting* would be consistent with a knowledge-based public sector. This system acts as a supplement to the cash accounting system in such a way that ensures that the financial information management is current, and also gives a meaningful analysis of the resources usage within a department. It should be noted that this challenge goes beyond the mere rehabilitation of the old and ill-equipped workforce. It is a challenge of displacement that substitutes the experience-based traditional blue- and white-collar workers with the learning-based knowledge workers. The knowledge bureaucrat will be formally educated, skilled, and must possess the ability to *acquire* and *apply* theoretical and analytical knowledge (Ibid: 236-237). This requires not only a habit of continuous learning, but also a different approach to work as well as a different mind-set. For instance, the knowledge worker of the public sector, especially in Africa, must be a specialist who is trained to understand and work in, and switch between, different teams with enormous performance capacities within the context of an organisation (which is the actual unit of performance rather than the individual) (Ibid: 240-242). This requirement confronts the "generalist" orientation of most public sectors in Africa.

As a corollary, the second challenge the public sector in Africa must surmount is its original emphasis on predictability, stability and repetitive tasks in a unified bureaucratic system in favour of a flexibility framework that seeks to adapt to a growing complexity of public goods and services (Bourgon, 2007: 10). For instance, as we noted earlier, a growing proportion of government's services are knowledge-based and so cannot be repetitive, codified or even prescribed. These services, contrary to the old bureaucratic rationale, also required a high level of discretion. This is simply because the services provided today most often requires an interaction between the citizens and the public servant providing the service. This flexibility to manoeuvre within the unifying philosophy and institutional framework therefore provide the public manager with the needed guidance in making the right decision. Significantly and under the influence of the technological vector of change, this flexibility points at a multi-level governance framework as the interdependence between public decision-making and service delivery on the one hand and local, regional and national actors on the other. In other words, it points at a substantial level of decentralised co-operation among various public, private, semi-private and non-profit actors in public service delivery. It also points at an equally substantial collaboration between the public and the private sectors especially in the transference of competitive skills from the private to the public sector. Such a partnership could only enhance national development (Bourgon, 2007: 11).

The third challenge the public sector must overcome is the rule of rational impartiality which insists that public servants only *execute* policy decisions made by politicians. This

implies a necessary separation between politics and policies which is supposed to prevent political interference in the implementation of public policies. Again, reality is much more complex than this perspective. The separation has not only been difficult, but also equally undesirable. Rather than remaining impartial, a lot depends on the public servant to contribute to the achievement of a desired public policy outcome through the formulation of a robust policy analysis, identification of viable policy options and the assessment of the impact of various policy choices. S/he can do all these adequately if allowed to freely interact with those who possess the political will to determine the direction of a new public policy (Bourgon, 2007: 10-11). Such interaction involves those among public servants in local, regional and national organisations; those between public servants and elected officials at all the levels; and those between elected officials and citizens who claim a larger voice in the policy decisions. The declining clout of the nation-state vis-à-vis other global and private actors demands better service delivery which can no longer afford such separation.

The fourth level of challenge to the public sector in Africa derives from the need for the modernisation of its performance capacity (OECD, 2004). The need for a performance management is a significant concession to NPM. This arises in the face of rampant poverty, the increasing demands for accountability and the pressure that government should justify its existence in the lives of the citizens. Given the growing urge to privatise welfare, it became crucial to empower the public sector manager under the assumption that delegating to him such authority, unhampered by rules and regulation

would increase performance and enhance the public good. The modern public sector is tilting towards a performance- or result-based budgeting, management and reporting as a means of shifting the public sector focus from input and how the service is provided, to output and the achieved results (Ibid: 1). This involves writing into the formal management of the public sector goals, targets, indicators and measures, evaluation and an incentive system relating to results. The system of performance contracting is one such way to increase the performance of the public sector workforce. This involves specifying the standards of performance of the quantifiable targets which the government requires the public sector managers to meet over a stated period of time.

Another key challenge to the public sector in the 21st century is the modernisation of the human resource management (HRM) of the public sector. It has been said that “public employees in very real sense put flesh on the backbones of government.” Traditionally, HRM encompasses the personnel functions of recruitment, selection, training, motivation, compensation, evaluation, discipline and termination of employees. Yet, many of these functions have been contested in this century from the perspectives of the four factors we have been analysing. For instance, the idea of collective bargaining, internal labour market system (ILM), career service, unitary personnel system, tenured public service, and so on are being jettisoned in favour of newer—NPM-influenced—developments.

HRM today must be formulated in such a way as to make it more responsive to the changing needs of government and citizens, as well as

adapting to the changing patterns of employment and inter-sectoral relations (Bourgon, 2007: 14). Specifically, the challenge posed by the new public management (NPM) is to "let the manager manage" (Barzelay, 2001). The specific challenge of this slogan for the public manager in Africa is that of how to harness the advantages of NPM for a better service delivery in a situation of acute disillusionment with government's capacity to perform. The concern of the public manager however is that in managing HR, "public" must not be sacrificed to the "private." Thus, while the issues of flexi-timing, contractual appointment, individual wage bargaining, market-based recruitment, mobility programmes/secondments, performance pay, professionalisation, etc., are now significant for public sector management, care must be taken to ensure they do not lead to the effacement of the publicness of the public sector. The further challenge is to co-ordinate the often fragmented HRM programmes in Africa and the third world to annex the role of the public servants to service delivery; adapt the public sector to the changing technological innovations in order to attract the best human resources from around the world (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992); create a new employment contract which will adapt the requirements of innovative technologies with a flexible mobility demanded by the new workforce of digital nomads; and arrest the critical labour shortage resulting from the mobility of skilled knowledge workers to the developed countries.

The public sector in Africa must also come to term with strategies for annexing changes that promised improved performance. One of the interesting strategies involves what is called

concept engineering. This is the anticipation of the evolution of what the customer (or the citizens in the case of the public sector) would be like in the near and far future through scenario planning (Peters, 1996: 187ff). Scenario planning examines various possible scenarios that may coincide with what the customer/citizen may turn out to be. The public sector becomes anachronistic if it fails to anticipate what the citizen wants.

Finally, there is the challenge of decentralising the highly hierarchical public sector. Decentralisation involves the transfer of authority or responsibility for decision making, planning, management or resource allocation from the central government to its various administrative units, local government, regional authorities, parastatal organisations and non-governmental organisations. In the context of the public sector, especially in Africa, decentralisation means:

- The provision of high quality service by government for the citizens;
- Increasing managerial autonomy; demanding, measuring and rewarding organisational and individual performance;
- Enabling managers to acquire human and technological resources to meet performance targets;
- Creating a receptiveness to competition and an open-mindedness about which public purposes should be performed by public servants as opposed to the private sector;
- Empowering citizens through their enhanced participation in decision making and development planning and

management;

- Improving economic and managerial efficiency or effectiveness; and
- Enhancing better governance.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis of the challenges faced by the public sector in Africa in these times of change may actually read like a science fiction of impossible expectations. Yet, these challenges spell the inevitable future, if there is to be any hope of a progressive re-engineering for the sake of the people (Mutahaba, 1995). There have actually been significant changes in countries like Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius, Cameroon, Benin, Guinea Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo and so on. The challenge is to continue building on the capacity development that annexes the changes available to the public sector in a rapidly globalising world. Failure to do so only shifts the responsibility of government to the private sector while the death of government in the life of the citizens and in the global world is hastened.

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REFORMING PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

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This study focuses on key issues regarding policy implementation challenges of the Service Delivery Policy (SDP) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which has been under implementation since 2001. SDP is one of the sub-programmes of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) of the FDRE. Because the implementation problems were revolving around the policy statements, this study examines the main policy elements in terms of their practicality and their problems of implementation so that a comprehensive insight could be gained.

Following the broad analyses that were made for the data collected from four respondent groups, overall data interpretations were made to have a vivid picture about the nature of the problems or implementation challenges of the policy. The study notes that some of the policy statements/elements could not be implemented effectively because of intrinsic deficiencies and general impracticality perceived by the actual civil servants who were the main policy implementers.

INTRODUCTION

Initiatives like Structural Adjustment Programme, Good Governance of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and some donors have resulted in policy changes and reform measures in most of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries and in developing countries. In Ethiopia, the Government's interest in changing the public administration/civil service system of the previous regime (Dergue) gave the FDRE impetus for taking measures in developing a comprehensive package such as the Capacity Building Programmes. One of the Capacity Building Programme activities of the FDRE is the Reform Programme in the Civil Service sector. Hence, in the year 2001, the FDRE designed new policy documents to reform the Ethiopian Civil Service in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service in all public institutions.

The policies were directly applicable to federal ministries, commissions, public

authorities/enterprises and municipal administrations, as well as other agencies financed from the regular budget of the Federal Government.

The overall rationale (aim) of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) of the FDRE was to alleviate the drawbacks and wrong practices of the Dergue (the previous military regime, from 1974 to 1991) civil service, and to build an efficient and effective civil service system, which would aid in facilitating the country's developments in federal democratic, economic, and social aspects.

The civil service reform programme (CSRP) has five components/sub-programmes to improve: (1) Top management systems; (2) Governance of financial resources management and control; (3) Accountability and transparency; (4) Governance of human resources management and control; and (5) Public service delivery.

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The focus of this study is to investigate the major implementation problems of the initially launched Service Delivery Policy and particularly its implementation challenges in all of the institutions selected for the pilot programme.

Research Methodology

The Service Delivery Policy (SDP) statements seem "ideal" as they are developed based on the basic concepts and principles of modern service delivery (New Public Management) and considering reform practices of a few countries (from least developing countries to developed countries). As perceived by stakeholders of the Policy (particularly by the Civil Servants), the practicality or implementation of some of the policy statements is questionable because of the complexity surrounding the Policy: policy requirements, numerous bottlenecks and contextual factors.

That is why in most piloted institutions and other institutions that have been trying to apply these policy statements (the Policy), have encountered implementation challenges. Because the implementation problems were revolving around the Policy statements, this study attempted to examine the main policy statements (elements) in terms of their practicality and their problems of implementation so that comprehensive insight could be gained about both the implementation (stage) and the challenges of implementing the SDP.

Generally, the research attempted to identify the major Policy implementation variables and implementation challenges that were common in the subject civil service organisations. Specifically, the research has

tried to find answers for the listed five Research Questions.

The following institutions, which were selected by the FDRE Government for the pilot-testing programme, are subjects of this study, namely: (1) Investment Commission (now Agency); (2) Customs Authority; (3) Social Security Authority; (4) Immigration and Nationality Affairs Main Office; and (5) City Government of Addis Ababa Transport Branch Office. Including the two branches of the Ethiopian Customs Authority (Airport and Kaliti) and the Social Security Addis Ababa Branch Office, thus, subject organisations of this study are seven different organisations.

Subjects/officials were also referred from the Co-ordination Office of the Reform—Civil Service Reform Programme Office (CSRPO), under the FDRE's Ministry of Capacity Building.

Both qualitative and quantitative research approaches were used. In order to figure out the degree of implementation and the implementation challenges of the Policy, analyses of the responses from the four respondent groups are made with reference to the main Policy statements. Taking into consideration that many intertwined factors influence an organisation's service provision (service standard/quality), as is the case in most public policy researches/analyses, the study used Policy intervention as the study variable. Because of the nature of the problem (Policy analysis), descriptive research method and analytical research method were used complementarily. In addition, document analysis (which was not actually made in themes) could provide further insights about the implementation challenges of the Policy in

each subject organisation.

The following secondary sources were consulted to complement the primary data: Service Delivery Policy (April 2001); nine main policy-related Government documents (reports/researches); previous researches on FDRE's SDP and literature review, specific on Service Delivery Policies/Reforms; and executing agencies' service delivery baseline survey results, strategic plans and reports related to the SDP.

Four types of questionnaires were distributed, sequentially, to: Clients of the subject organisations (Questionnaire Type I, collected 419); Civil servants in the subject organisations (Questionnaire Type II, collected 279); Concerned officials of the subject organisations—managers/directors and section heads of the Reform Offices of the executing institutions (Questionnaire Type III, collected 10); and Officials of the Civil Service Reform Programme Office/CSRP-O (Questionnaire Type IV, collected 6). More than 90 per cent of the distributed questionnaires were collected from each sample group. To keep the confidentiality of the subjects' responses and to increase the credibility of responses (except questionnaires collected from client/subjects), questionnaires from the rest of the subjects were collected in sealed envelopes. Questionnaires Type I and Type II were distributed randomly to the clients and to the civil servants of the subject organisations, respectively.

For the third and the fourth groups, Questionnaires Type III and IV, respectively, were distributed selectively because of the limited number of managers and by virtue of

the office they held.

Quantitative analysis was made for responses obtained through the questionnaires. Analysis and presentation of the findings from the four respondent groups were made following the sequence of questionnaire distribution/collection (i.e., Clients' responses, civil servants' responses, officials' responses from the subject organisations, and finally, officials' responses from the Civil Service Reform Programme Office).

In order to evaluate the degree of execution of the Policy and to comment on the appropriateness of the strategies and the directions set for the Service Delivery Policy, response-analysis will be made in terms of some main Policy statements, performance indicators and expected outcomes.

In almost all the items of the study (in four types of distributed questionnaires, five-scale Likert scale was uniformly and consistently used to gather and analyse the data. SPSS software was used to analyse the data obtained from the civil servants. For responses of same/similar items (that appeared in all the four types of questionnaires), comparisons were made between/among responses. Frequency tables, pie charts, area graphs, bar graphs, paretopographs, and cross-tables (involving Pearson Chi-square significance test value) were used to display the findings. Along the single frequency (univariate) tables, cross-tabulations (2X2 bivariate table analysis) were made to support the analysis and to figure out if relationships (direct or indirect) existed between the two variables (the independent and the dependent variables). A test of statistical independence (Chi-square significance value) was also used to see the

relevance or the association between the responses of the items of Questionnaire Type II (filled by the civil servants).

Research Findings

Although broad analyses and interpretations were given in the original study paper, it is necessary to make overall interpretation (for the findings from the four respondent groups) based on the constructs. It is believed that a concise picture about the nature of the problems/implementation challenges of the Policy and the study results would best be presented by way of classifying the data collected into seven themes or challenge areas: (1) policy communication and awareness/knowledge; (2) policy requirements—inputs/resources and capacity; (3) policy executing civil service institutions; (4) policy directing and leading; (5) policy implementers (civil servants); (6) policy monitoring, evaluation and reporting; (7) policy design and restructuring.

• Policy Communication and Awareness/Knowledge

Civil servants (actual implementers of the SDP) were required to implement the policy without having gained the required awareness and knowledge, even though the policy itself clearly stated that active participation of the civil servants was the primary and the mandatory factor in order to effectively implement it. Compared to what was stated, policy-related activities in communicating, in creating awareness/understanding of the policy and in bringing the required behavioural changes were very minimal leaving the largest proportion of the civil servants (particularly the front-line workers) to execute a policy which they did not thoroughly understand.

Induction and explanation to civil servants would have effects in developing positive attitude towards the CSRP/SDP. Failure to do so and lack of adequate communication in turn had adversely influenced attitudes of workers and their belief in the possibility of providing better service to the public by implementing the SDP in an effective way. It is also possible to conclude that workers would be unable to implement government policies, directives and strategies effectively and rightly so if they did not understand cautiously and clearly. Misunderstanding or little understanding of the policies, directives, strategies, tactics, etc. would inevitably result in confusion and creating challenges during actual implementation by civil servants as the majority of the respondents of this study were non-managerial workers who had direct contact with clients in their respective organisation.

Inadequate and ineffective communication activities were made to create the necessary awareness to clients/public about the spirit of the policy and its implementation by either the executing organisations or by any other responsible government body. This would let clients inadequately or inappropriately try to exercise their right to service from the executing institutions. Failure to make consultations with clients and failure to take their opinions/comments on executing organisations' service delivery perceptions would certainly have had an influence.

There existed a direct association between civil servants' understanding/knowledge of the CSRP (especially the SDP) and their attitude towards the CSRP/the SDP. However, failure to accomplish primary activities adequately, such as making consultations on the Policy and

its implementation with the main implementers of the policy (civil servants) and making successful manifestations on the necessity and appropriateness of the policy by responsible bodies could have made the civil servants to be suspicious of the policy and its implementation.

Most members of the civil service, especially the front-line workers, had not carefully understood the policy statements, the requirements, the directives, the tactics and the strategies of the policy and the expected outcomes. How could an implementer who has not understood and who has not been well communicated to about a policy successfully implement it properly (tell/witness policy related issues)? This surely did not help get the possible right suggestions for successful implementation of the SDP from the civil servant who did not certainly know the objectives of the policy and his/her obligations in implementing it. A degree of knowledge could significantly influence their belief about and their commitment to successfully implement the policy.

Lack of adequate participation of workers in planning, implementation and evaluation of the service delivery policy had also resulted in lack of understanding of the policy.

• **Policy Requirements—Inputs, Resources and Capacity**

What implementation challenges had been observed related to the policy requirements? Overall interpretation is provided on policy requirements and inputs; and both institutional and individual capacity limitations.

Those problems and necessary conditions and

policy inputs which were identified by Government and by previous researches on the SDP were still lacking or unavailable for successful implementation.

After all these years, capacity limitations (both individual and institutional) and a poor compensation scheme were cited as the major reasons for the dissatisfaction by the majority of the civil servants, which have had negative implications (adverse effects) on the implementation of the SDP. These reward-related dissatisfaction causes had resulted in high turnover rate of staff from the executing institutions, including staff from the main government policy executing responsible unit as well.

According to the Government policy document, one of the problems and drawbacks of the Ethiopian civil service in service delivery was that resource constraints could not let public institutions improve their services to the desired level.

Problems related to financing and other resources had existed in all of the subject organisations. It was found out that successful implementation of the policy would be possible only when such resources were provided to the implementers adequately. Then, it can be concluded that like the human resource-related (capacity and motivation) problems, lack resources for service delivery could be mentioned as a major challenge.

Activities in shaping policy processes were done late after the introduction (in the course of implementation) of the policy. Policy processes like administrative (such as sound human resource administration), organisational (such as the recent BPR

activities), and political activities (such as clearing principal-agent relationship and getting commitment and leadership for the policy) and developing positive attitudes (especially attitudes of civil servants) towards the policy could have shaped the transformation of policy inputs into policy outputs and impacts.

The government taskforce report also revealed the existence of an overall system failure in the civil service was also manifest because of the poorly trained and highly demoralised staff and the inadequate and/or inappropriate skills among managers and staffs.

These problems could also be taken as the major ones affecting the civil servants' role in implementing the policy or in providing quality services to their clients. It is not surprising that almost all workers had expressed their training needs on the areas of customer handling, work-related problem solving, ICT/computer application, and/or reform related areas so that they would improve their service delivery and work competency.

Capacity limitation and lack of qualified trainers could be regarded as challenges for the implementation of the policy which implied that training/capacity building would be considered as a tool for implementing reform programmes (including the Service Delivery Policy).

• Policy Executing Civil Service Institutions

As witnessed by both subject clients and civil servants, among the seven subject organisations, INVEST was in a better

position to provide standard and quality services to its clients and implementing the SDP in a better way throughout all these years (since the implementation of the SDP). Those detailed directives and strategies of the policy were not even being applied by all sections of each organisation equally and uniformly. This varying level of implementation of the policy clearly indicates that implementation variables seemed to be contextual.

Variations in the level of implementation in the seven subject organisations (even in the two branches of the Customs Authority) were evident because of a number of organisation-specific issues, such as staff competency, institutional capacity, resources, number/qualification of staff, number of clients to be served, structure and size of the organisation and many other reasons.

Although the majority of the respondents believed that better results had been observed in the service delivery of their organisation since the implementation of the policy began, a number of civil servants had expressed their doubt that better services would have been provided to the public. This result indicates the existence of challenges in the course of implementing the Policy. Similarly, almost none of the concerned officials in the executing organisations and none of the CSRP-O agreed that the policy outcomes or policy performance indicators of the SDP were achieved as desired. This again means that the policy was not implemented satisfactorily as evaluated by these respondents.

Despite this fact, the Government had not made the right policy interventions for improved achievements of the policy objectives and/or for better policy

execution/performance.

In conclusion, even if the most parts of the policy outcomes were not achieved, it is possible to surely say that implementation of the Service Delivery Policy in these organisations had been bringing positive results in the provision of better services to the public. Thus, had it been possible to identify and give remedies to implementation challenges and variables by both the Government and the executing organisations timely, better results would have been clearly seen in public service provision. Absence of sound and transparent performance evaluation and appraisal system in the institutions had its own contribution in dissatisfying workers as this cause of dissatisfaction, as a result, would adversely have affected civil servants' provision of services to their clients.

Denial of workers' expectations in rewarding best performers or outstanding performers in the organisation would not let workers show commitment and effort to deliver services in a more satisfactory manner as possible or as desired.

It is evident that if appropriate actions were taken in the design and implementation of the compensation scheme, civil servants' commitment and co-operation would have been higher during implementation of the policy. Achievements and acceptance of BPR work in the seven implementing organisations were different either because of workers' attitudes towards the BPR or because of the appropriateness of the design and the implementation of the BPR initial work. Although BPR works were not actually done by involving employees, in general, more than

half of the subject civil servants (and also all subject 'officials in charge' in the executing organisations and officials in the CSRP-O) believed that re-engineering was useful in facilitating work and providing better services to the public. Thus, BPR work, if done in a better and refined way, would largely help the implementation of the policy and the provision of better/quality services to the public.

Insufficient co-ordination of policy implementation and failure to execute the Human Resource Management Reform Sub-programme simultaneously with the SDP had significantly hampered implementation of the latter. With regard to the diagonal effects of the implementation of the other sub-programme on the SDP, particularly of Result-oriented System and the Performance-based Compensation scheme, were the major causes for civil servants' dissatisfaction and even had resulted in turnover of skilled personnel from the executing organisations. This obviously had negative impacts on the implementation of the policy and the delivery of quality services to the public.

Civil servants also noted that failure to integrate the service delivery sub-programme with the other civil service sub-programmes and failure to implement all policy strategies and other service delivery policy-relevant activities simultaneously, such as rewarding best performers, performance-based compensation system, trainings and developments had resulted in dissatisfaction and scepticism on the part of most civil servants. In particular, the late and improper execution of the Human Resource Management Reform Sub-programme would result high turnover of qualified staff. In many cases, the effectiveness of the Service

Delivery Reform Sub-programme had suffered from the ineffective implementation of the other Reform Sub-programmes (especially the Human Resource Management Sub-programme, particularly the result-oriented and the Performance-based pay systems). Thus, there was a need to ensure that the policy work is co-ordinated and sequenced effectively.

• **Policy Directing and Leading**

Problems were also identified related to policy direction and leadership, particularly from the part of civil servants and responsible executing officials. The CSRPO existed but showed weak reform-related work relationships and inadequate regular consultations with the executing institutions in the planning and implementation of strategies. It was the belief of the executing public organisations that the Civil Service Reform Office, which was mainly formed for the successful implementation of the reforms, had not satisfactorily been providing the necessary technical and other support to them. Due to its engagement in a lot of responsibilities and its capacity limitations, the CSRPO was not playing its role sufficiently and properly. It could not give the required supports or timely and adequately respond to the requests of the executing organisations in their effort of implementing the reform programme.

Dependence on one reform-supporting and co-ordinating organ (CSRPO), failure to staff the agency with the required experts for the reform, and the weak and infrequent communication and consultation with the CSRPO had their own impacts to effectively introduce and execute the CSRPO (the SDP). For similar reasons, the office was not capable

of appropriately making comprehensive policy monitoring and evaluation activities that these researches/reports would certainly have great contributions in improving the policy and its implementation in each public institution and in the entire civil service.

Insufficient staffing and capacity of both executing institutions and the Civil Service Reform Programme Office and other spheres of the Government, as well as the weak linkages between them, had worked against the successful implementation of policies.

With regards to CSRPO responsible officers and managers of the executing organisations, variations were observed on the consideration/importance. Even, in IMMIG there was no a separately established office to closely run the Programme. As was also claimed by the staff of these offices, almost all of the Reform offices that were responsible in implementing the Reform Programmes were stifled to play their expected roles because they were engaged in the varied routines and administrative tasks of their respective organisation.

Compared to responses of the rest subject organisations, workers of INVEST witnessed that their organisation's CSRPO office had brought significant changes in the implementation of the Civil Service Reform Programmes since its establishment. Thus, it can be said that along other organisational-specific variables (inputs, resources, capacity/competencies of staff), the contribution of CSRPO Office in the provision of better services and in helping the implementation of the policy was clear.

High-level political commitment and support

is an essential prerequisite for successful reform but is not sufficient in itself. Ownership of reform programmes is vital for reform implementation. Support for reforms is not only essential from the political and administrative leadership, but also from the rank file workers. Support from the latter type of workers (most of them were front-line workers) is vital to reforms like Service Delivery Reform (SDP), in particular. The largest proportion of the respondents in all the subject organisations did not certainly respond that management's engagement in administrative issues and administrative control could not allow it to lead the successful implementation of the policy.

• Policy Implementers (Civil Servants)

The lessons of implementation literature are straightforward: successful policy making is difficult, and its challenges are exacerbated by complexity. Human services will always be the most difficult case. Related to this fact, another key finding from the actual policy implementers was that SDP's implementation had suffered from the absence of a people-driven process. It was evident that the increasing imbalances in wages between the public (executing institutions) and private sector, leading to a brain-drain from the public sector. This was also true for positions that were held by staff mainly responsible for the reform programmes, the executing organisations and for staff of the CSRPO, as well. The high turnover rate and the frequent shifting of staff would have negative impacts on reform execution—leaving the executing institutions and the CSRPO from getting the advantage of policy learning in the course of implementation activities (policy execution, monitoring, evaluation and restructuring).

Highly motivated and qualified employees are the key elements in public policy implementation. For one or another reason, it was evident that including Government appointees, there was high turnover of skilled professionals who were largely responsible for the close execution of the Service Delivery Policy and/or the Civil Service Reform Programme.

According to the Government document, one of the problems and drawbacks of the Ethiopian civil service in the delivery of services was that the civil servants had not developed positive attitude towards public service to the desired extent (FDRE, April 2001:3). With this regard, change of behaviour (in customer handling) could be observed from the part of the workers as perceived by the majority of the clients. Half of the subject workers also shared this opinion while other half of them did not believe that most workers had positive attitudes towards their clients.

Contrary to the workers' responses, sampled officials in CSRPO shared the latter respondents' opinion that it would not be possible to say that most workers in the public organisation had considered themselves as civil servants and had been developing the necessary awareness about public service provision. This level of variation indicated as more had to be done in creating awareness on the obligations and responsibilities of civil servants, in handling customers and changing their attitudes. In another token, those workers who had served relatively for many years in civil service institutions witnessed that workers had been trying to serve the public showing good behaviours and had recognised that they were employed to serve the public. Therefore, it can be concluded that there

existed a direct relationship between the service years of workers and their beliefs that workers had been changing their behaviour in treating/receiving their clients.

These results clearly showed that not all workers in the civil service had unanimously revealed that most civil servants were serving the public honestly and diligently, as one of the primary requirements to work in the civil service.

Response variations were also evident in obligations of civil servants in implementing Government policies, in that about 60% of workers of AARTO, IMMIG, and S.O.S (A.A) confirmed that as long as they were working in government offices, civil servants had to implement government policies whether they accepted them or not. On average, only about half (53 per cent) of the sampled workers believed that civil servants had obligations to implement government policies. Quite a few numbers of the workers of the organisations did not certainly know that they were required to implement government policies wholeheartedly as long as they are part of the civil service. In addition, based on their responses for the other items, it is possible to say that enough awareness had not been made by the executing organisation on the workers' obligation of implementing SDP.

Surprisingly, no clear or measurable resistance had been observed from the part of the civil servants on the implementation of the policy because of lack of confidence in the policy itself.

Almost the same observations and opinions were made by all types of subjects (workers/civil servants, officials in the

executing organisations and officials in the CSRP-O) about civil servants' understanding/knowledge of the SDP, attitude towards the policy and its implementation. Overall, officials in charge of the executing organisation seemed optimistic than officials of the CSRP-O in the responses given for these items—for items on civil servants' knowledge/understanding of the SDP; attitude towards the policy and its implementation. It is impossible to say that most workers of the subject organisations had the required knowledge/understanding of the policy, or developed positive attitudes towards the CSRP, especially the Service Delivery Policy, and its implementation. However, most respondents believed that some progresses had been observed since the implementation, including those who did not respond that civil servants had good understanding of the policy. Among those who had doubts on the implementation of the policy, majority of the respondents witnessed that improvements had resulted in service provision in their organisations.

- **Policy Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting**

Policy outcomes should be monitored because they are believed to enhance the satisfaction of some needs, values, or opportunities whose outcomes are observable as means of resolving policy problem. At the same time, some policy outcomes shall be monitored because they may inhibit the satisfaction of some needs, values, or opportunities. The priorities and instruments of reform programmes could also be changed over time. Reliable, continuous and extensive/aggressive monitoring and evaluation of the SDP were lacking, as also observed by both the civil servants and the officials.

Regarding the design and the effectiveness of the monitoring system, it can be said that the Government did not clearly specify monitoring and evaluation guidelines to see the stage of implementation of the policy.

Absence of effective monitoring mechanisms, difficulty of maintaining information/data about the execution of the policy and the tendency of presenting falsified reports on the degree of execution of the policy in the executing organisations were taken as causes for ineffective and poor monitoring and evaluation of the policy. A couple of subjects, for example, warned that presenting such exaggerated and falsified reports would mislead the Government from clearly seeing the status of the policy execution.

No comprehensive and formal monitoring and evaluation researches were made by the CSRP-O on the overall implementation and identification of implementation problems of the SDP for taking corrective measures. Meetings of the Steering Committee, evaluation of monthly reports of the executing organisations, and some field visits were mentioned as the monitoring and evaluation means that the Office had used to arrive at conclusion of the state of the SDP's implementation. Absence of making regular policy monitoring and evaluation (both by the executing organisations and by the CSRP-O) could not let the Government know to what extent the policy was being implemented and to take corrective measures to solve implementation problems.

Presenting exaggerated and falsified reports could not enable the Government to clearly see the stage of the policy execution and could not let it take the right interventions in time.

Unless mechanisms are developed for the proper and timely monitoring and evaluation of SDP, the implementation will be jeopardised as a result of failure of obtaining factual data from the executing organisations and then taking the necessary corrective actions (by the Government).

Though initiations had been made by the executing organisations during the introduction of the SDP to conduct service delivery surveys, executing organisations had not conducted these study as needed or as frequently as possible because of time, capacity and resource constraints. However, officials in charge noted that frequent surveys could have been made on service provision of their organisations in order to gather opinions of their clients at least twice a year.

• Policy Design and Restructuring

Mokgoro (2004) emphasises that: "Planning the implementation of policy should be an integral part of policy design. Very often policy under-performance occurs because implementation has not been well thought through and planned."

Similarly, policy development, implementation and service delivery need to be consolidated so that a more coherent policy and strategy system with ongoing review and performance management mechanisms shall be developed. Designing the SDP based on the NPM (service delivery concepts) and the reform initiative experiences of different countries (ranging from LDCs to developed countries), and its contribution for improving service delivery of the executing organisations was recognised by significant number of respondents who had the chance to refer the policy document.

However, these respondents (who were mainly officials of the executing organisations and officials of the CSRP-O) expressed their fear that it would not be easy to fully and appropriately implement what were stated in the Service Delivery Policy mainly because of the limited capacity in the executing organisations (staff and institutions) and the capacity of the Country. It was not surprising that most civil servants (particularly, those who were front-line workers) could not comment on the content of the policy and other policy relevant documents or whether the policy was written for clear and easy understanding by them because they did not have easy access to them. Contrary to the responses of the subject civil servants, both officials of the executing organisations and officials of the CSRP-O expressed their agreement that the SDP was designed and written in a clear language and explanation. Both officials also believed that the SDP was designed in a way that the civil servant would serve the public in a transparent and accountable manner.

However, these same respondents could not easily understand many questions that were designed based on the policy and other policy relevant documents.

The application of policy analysis in designing and in implementing public policy, such as SDP, would yield policy relevant knowledge that directly affects assumptions. No satisfactory policy analysis was made specific to SDP and its implementation challenges in the course of its implementation.

Except the taskforce's problem identification of the Dergue's (former regime's) civil service

and customisation/use of experiences of South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, the USA, the UK and Canada, no enough policy debates and broad consultation (at least with civil servants) were made to design the policy. Besides, adequate and sound forecasting of the Policy was not made while designing the Policy. Except the broad risk areas that were put for the policy, in no relevant policy document, including the main Service Delivery Policy, were sound policy forecasts and consequences stated. Nothing was stated in the policy about its possible implementation problems/risks, its political sustainability, its support or resistance during implementation, what future interventions to take, how to improve its implementation, and/or when to, or conditions for restructuring or modification/redesign of the policy.

As regards the content of the policy, a clear distinction would be made between the interrelated concepts of policy implementation, performance, instruments, strategies, impacts, values, policy outcomes, objectives in the SDP.

These terms were found to be confusing for those who were primarily responsible in explaining and directing the implementation of the policy. For example, it was impossible to obtain specific and direct responses by the help of the questionnaires from significant number of these personnel about policy problems, outcomes, impacts, indicators, restructuring, gaps, monitoring, evaluation and debates.

Although it was mandatory to include these terms in the policy briefly, clarifications and explanations should have been provided (in other supporting directions or references), at least to those concerned officials in the civil

service executing organisation.

Policies are continuously transformed by implementing actions that simultaneously alter resources and objectives. It is not policy design but redesign that goes on most of the time. Contrary to this fact, no major policy modifications or additions have been made since the issuance of the FDRE's Service Delivery Policy in April 2001.

Except efforts that have been taking place in re-engineering almost all civil service institutions at all levels, like most developing countries, it seems that there is a fear to analytically appreciate the resulting complexity of the SDP-implementation variations or policy consequences.

CONCLUSION

Though there existed complex and many socio-cultural, political and resource/economic problems in the country during the execution of the reforms of the civil service (including SDP), the evidence suggest that reform measures were too comprehensive and seemed ambitious. Still, it was possible to observe some improvements on institutions' service delivery, behaviour of civil servants and their clients as the result of the policy intervention. It is possible to say that executing organisations started developing annual plans for service provisions, set service objectives, tried to set service standards and worked towards the implementation of plans. Efforts were also made to develop a sense of civil service on the part of the workers. Although it could not be said the policy had resulted in positive reactions or accepted behaviours on the part of the civil servants, but workers seemed to be punctual, were engaging in their work and

tried to provide better services to their clients after the intervention. Civil servants had been developing positive attitudes towards serving their clients (the public) and handling them in a better manner.

Certain behaviours could also be observed on the part of the public or some clients of the organisations. Clients were beginning to demand for their rights and make their complaints on organisations' poor service provision.

Sometimes, some clients of the executing organisations were willing to comment on service delivery issues and even suggesting how they would prefer to get the services from public organisations.

As Brynard (2005:20) has suggested, "on no other variable does the analytic literature on service delivery policy implementation appear as unanimous as on the need for effective implementation capacity". Capacity limitations (both individual and institutional) and the poor compensation scheme were seen as the major reasons for the dissatisfactions of the majority of the civil servants. Also, this study identified capacity as the major challenging variable followed by employees' dissatisfaction, resource constraints and lack of knowledge about the policy. In spite of giving less considerations to some necessary policy requirements, lack of resources for implementing the policy, both individual and institutional capacity limitations, inadequate communication and lack of knowledge (of the civil servants) and failure to continually and sustainably execute the policy, a few civil service organisations were found to be in a better position of implementation. As witnessed by both subject clients and

organisation's civil servants, among the seven subject organisations, the Ethiopian Investment Agency was in a better position to provide quality services to its clients and had been implementing the SDP in a better way since the introduction of the SDP.

The varying level of implementation of the policy clearly indicates that implementation variables were also contextual (i.e. specific to each executing institution). Variations in policy performance in the seven organisations (even in the two branches of the Customs Authority) were evident because of different of issues experienced in regard to staff competency, institutional capacity, availability of resources, number/qualification of staff, number of clients to be served, structure and size of the organisation and many other factors.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AARTO: City Government of Addis Ababa Transport Branch Office—Subject Organisation

Amharic: Official/National Language in Ethiopia (Questionnaires were presented in Amharic).

BPR: Business Process Re-engineering

CSR: Civil Service Reform

CSRP: Civil Service Reform Programme (of Ethiopia/EPRDF)

CSRP-O: Civil Service Reform Programme Office (under

the FDRE's Ministry of Capacity Building)—Subject Organisation

CUST (AP): FDRE, Customs Authority (Airport Branch)—Subject Organisation

CUST (KL): FDRE, Customs Authority (Kaliti Branch)—Subject Organisation

Dergue: The previous military regime in Ethiopia which was overthrown by EPRDF in May 1991

EPRDF: The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (in power since May 1991 and introduced the Reform)

FDRE: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

IMMIG: FDRE, Immigration and Nationality Affairs Main Office—Subject Organisation

INVEST: FDRE, Investment Commission (now Agency)—Subject Organisation

NPM: New Public Management

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (countries)

SDP: Service Delivery Policy (One of the sub-programmes of the CSRP and this study topic)

SDS: Service Delivery (baseline) Survey

SO.S (AA): Social Security Addis Ababa Branch Office—Subject Organisation

SO.S (FD): FDRE, Social Security Authority—Subject Organisation

'Officials in Charge': Responsible officials/respondents from the executing organisations for the CSR, such as CSR Department heads, managers/directors and other concerned officials.

'Officials in CSRP-O': Respondents from the Civil Service Reform Programme Office such as sub-programme group leaders, section heads, monitoring and evaluation experts/team, director, etc.

'Woreda': Amharic term to mean Local Government Level (below Zonal or Sub-city Level).

GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL IMAGE: THE CASE OF NIGERIA

Abdulrasheed A. Muhammad¹

Nigeria emerged at independence in 1960 as a potentially great nation. This is by virtue of its vast population and mineral endowment. This potential greatness has however, remained a mirage as the country continues to suffer significant setbacks in its developmental efforts.

Much of the goodwill which the country initially enjoyed at independence has declined drastically. A major fallout of this is the recurrent image and credibility crisis which the country has continued to face. Worst still, this problem has failed to subside in spite of successive governments' efforts at managing it. This paper argues that most of this is a result of the limited effort being made to sell Nigeria creditably to her own population at home and abroad. At the same time, most of the governance crises that underpin or precipitated the image remain and need to be tackled decisively. In addition there is the continuing failure of the Nigerian state to develop capacity to manage new challenges. So, for the country to come out of its current international image problem, it is imperative that the government addresses the fundamental issues and endeavour to re-focus attention on the re-branding efforts.

INTRODUCTION

That Nigeria is 'a giant of Africa' is a common phrase across the continent and even beyond. But the substance of this supposed greatness has remained more of utopian than reality. As Osaghae (1998) aptly captured it, Nigeria since independence has remained at best 'a crippled giant'. This assertion cannot be divorced from the problems that have marred governance process in the country since independence. A staggering reality that the country is currently faces serious image and credibility crises abroad. Indeed, juxtaposing the country's position at independence with contemporary circumstances reveal a situation of high expectations but dashed hopes.

To be sure, the country emerged at independence under a Westminster parliamentary democracy. Aside the prospects offered by independence and the known ideals and prospects that accompany a

democratic society (see, Hadenius, 1997; Muhammad, 2006; Bratton and De Wall, 1997; Omafume, 1997), Nigeria's credentials at independence which set the tone and optimism for its future greatness include a relatively stable political entity, a robust economic base especially with the discovery and exploitation of oil resources, a disciplined and professional military base and a massive population figure which currently stands at about 140 million from the initial 53 million at independence. All these no doubt, accorded the country profound respect both at the domestic realm and internationally.

Nigeria's strong economic base, among other factors, has been observed to inform the dynamism that characterised the country's foreign policy shortly after independence (Osaghae, 1998; Aluko, 1981). In addition, Nigeria parades a rich cultural heritage which in spite of inherent diversities marks it

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out among other countries in the continent. For instance, the country is composed of multiplicity of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups adjudged by sociologists and anthropologists to be no less than 250 groups (Otite, 1990, Barbour, Nnoli, 1978). It is commonly asserted that Nigeria is the 10th most populous country in the world while in every four black Africans, one is a Nigerian (Gulrez, 2002). Little surprise therefore that the country played host to the Festival of African Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.

In spite of disruptive events such as the military coups of 1966, the 13-month civil war and crops of political upheavals especially in the western region among several other internal crises (Akinwunmi, 2004; Gofwen, 2004; Osaghae, 1998; Falola, 1998; Albert, 1998, Akinola, 1981; Ojiako, 1981), Nigeria for several years after independence, enjoyed considerable goodwill and followership from several of African countries and some others beyond the continent. Indeed, Nigeria's leadership role in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) attests to this feat.

Given this favourable context, it was only a matter of time before Nigeria would become an inevitable force to reckon with within and outside the continent. However, this was never to be, following the emergence of series of crises bordering on absence good governance and effective leadership in the country.

It must be emphasised that Nigeria's descent from grace to grass took a gradual process that was characterised by several contradictions in

governance under successive governments. Also, while governance crises in Nigeria was majorly concerned with rescuing the downturn economy in the first two and a half decade after independence, it assumed a more complex dimension in the mid-1990s and ever since seems to have continued with intensity. For instance, it is axiomatic to note that the democratic transition without end (Diamond, Kirk-Greene, Oyediran, eds., 1997) that characterised the Babangida military regime (1985-1993) was a major dent on the country's image among the community of nations.

Unfortunately, the situation became worse under the General Sanni Abacha regime that succeeded the Babangida administration. In fact, opinion seems to crystallise that the Abacha era, with all its maneuverings and manipulation of existing cleavages, was the darkest part of Nigeria's socio, political and economic history since independence (Abegunrin, 1999; Ibeanu, 1994). The apparent brutality of the regime, flagrant violation and abuse of fundamental human rights, disregard for democratic norms, a host of international sanctions led to the emergence of Nigeria as a pariah state within the international community. The sudden death of General Sanni Abacha in June 1998 and the consequent ascension to power of General Abdulsalami Abubakar seemed to place Nigeria on hold among the community of nations. This was because the regime was caught between continuing the path of regression and that of attempting to salvage the already battered image. But wisdom prevailed, perhaps due to untiring domestic and international pressures for democratisation and/or self-conviction of the military ruler, as the regime quickly began a transition process that eventually saw the restoration of

democratic rule in May 1999 under President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Democracy came with its hopes and prospects. However, contrary to the high expectation on restoration of democracy as capable of serving as springboard to mend and re-launch Nigeria's already battered image, the problem took a new dimension with the emergence of new threats that compounded existing problems. Like in the preceding administrations, these issues such as perennial ethno-religious conflicts, intra- and inter-party disputes, executive-legislature wrangling, corruption and other economic crimes, insecurity and hostage-taking in some parts of the country among others were largely a fallout of governance crises in the country.

But while the existence of some crop of crises cannot be completely ruled out in the governance process, the current situation in Nigeria which gave rise to and sustained the image problem cannot be completely divorced from inability of the state to develop capacity that would enable it respond adequately to new and existing challenges.

Thus, how have crises at the realm of governance affected or is affecting Nigeria's external image? What have been the trends and dimensions of the image crises in Nigeria and what options exist for their effective management?

Investigating these issues forms the crux of this paper.

Understanding Governance

Governance as a concept is as old as human civilisation but not until the latter part of 1980s did the concept become so popular in

development literature (Alcantara, 1998; Johnson, 1997). In recent times, however, it is difficult to find a publication on development issues that does not rely on its use. Johnson (1997) even notes that the first classic political science essays on the subject talked about the concept of "governability", which made the rule of law the core of development.

However, with the end of the Cold War, "governability" gave way to the concept of governance which simply put implies the process of decision-making and implementation.

According to Opaku (1995), it is the fundamental process by which the lives and dreams of a people are jointly pursued through deliberate and systematic strategies that help maximum realisation of their potentials. For Alcantara (1998), it suggests the exercise of authority within a given sphere. What this definition suggests is that it is a concept that is applicable to any level of organisation be it a state entity or otherwise. In other words, while one can hardly talk about governance without talking about the state, governance goes beyond the state to encompass other stakeholders that may be corporate or individuals (Saliu, 2010). This view was also shared by Bello-Imam (1997) that it is the mechanism whereby an institution or organisation incorporates "the participation of relevant interest groups in defining the scope and content of its work including capacity to mediate among these interests when they enter into conflict and the means whereby it demonstrates accountability to those who support it".

It must be noted that governance from the definitions above also involves development,

by the state, of a strong capacity to reconcile opposing interests that gives rise to conflict, effectiveness and efficiency in the management of resources as well as responsiveness on the part of the state. Generally speaking, the idea of governance involves threading a worthy pattern of good while at the same time, avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad. It is in this context that scholars tend to distinguish between good governance and bad governance. While the former represents a positive action taken by the government or an organisation to achieve a goal and its outcome, the latter represents dereliction in upholding the former. Placing it in political context, governance thus is a political process whereby constituted political authorities make decisions for the benefit of the citizens. This is in accord with the position of the World Bank (1991), that governance implies the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs. This definition implies increased capacity of the state to respond adequately to whatever challenges that may arise from time to time in the process of administering the political entity.

This perspective, shared by this paper, also reflects the general tendency among authors in conceptualising the notion of governance as it relates to the political entity (see, Stephen, 2002; Johnson, 1997). Following from the above therefore, governance can be described as a deliberate and strategic effort by the political authority in a state to galvanise its human and material resources for the purpose of attaining the objectives of statehood. This includes capacity to mediate conflicts, provide for the welfare of its citizens, minimise stress and strain on the system as well as guarantee physical and symbolic

presence of the entity through policies and actions that promote its image and credibility within the community of nations.

Conversely, therefore, governance crises imply the inability of the state to fully mobilise, in an effective manner, its human and material capital for the benefit of the state and its citizens. Symptoms of such crises include persistent conflicts, dwindling economic base, persistent economic crimes, declining confidence of citizens in the ability of the state to cater for their needs, leading to the search for alternative means to survive the harsh terrain and, in response, inconsistent and incoherent moves on the part of government which are suggestive of a panic situation among other domestic challenges.

Given the fact that there is profound linkage between the domestic and external environments of a country, it is little surprise therefore that such domestic challenges are usually potent enough to cause unfavourable backlash for the country within the international system.

Nigeria's Image Problem in Perspective

There is no doubt that contemporary international relations is characterised by attempts by states to build their image and credibility in the international arena. This becomes necessary given the challenges posed by rapid globalisation and increasing interdependence.

Xiufang and Chitty (2009) have rightly observed that current pre-occupation with image building by countries serves a dual function. First, it creates domestic political support, and second, it enlarges a country's international influence.

As earlier noted, a staggering reality for Nigeria is the image and credibility problem that have persisted for quite some time. While it may not be readily possible to explain, in quantitative terms, the effect which this situation has on the country, the impact which this has on how the country is perceived within the international arena is nonetheless cause for concern. Moreover, in politics, perception is often more important than reality since it determines the extent of support and patronage available to the state within and outside its territorial area.

For instance, one may want to query why in spite of the country's commitment to multilateralism and African Centre Piece Policy (Big Brother Africa Policy), there were oppositions to its candidature for a permanent seat in the United Nation's Security Council. For sure, the principles of multilateralism and African Centre Piece, which Nigeria adopted since independence as a cornerstone of her foreign policy, have only made the best out of her as a universal donor. The country has participated and is still participating in several peace keeping and conflict mediation efforts in Africa and other parts of the globe (Bukarambe, 2010; Sani, 2010; Saliu, 2009). This has also come with commitment of human and material resources to such efforts.

Unfortunately, the image of a universal donor has not been accompanied by a 'universal recipient'. Also, Nigeria has lost several bids to host international tournaments such as the Commonwealth Games, hosting the Miss World beauty pageant etc. due to what can be described as unfavourable international public opinion. It is axiomatic to note that the unfavourable public opinion was precipitated by domestic challenges and inability of the

state to manage them.

For instance in 2007, Nigeria lost its bid to host the 2014 edition of the Commonwealth Games due to rising tension in the Niger Delta and spate of insecurity and political assassinations rampant in the country then. Earlier, in 2002, the Miss World contest was moved to London from Nigeria after riots by Muslim youths opposed to the show left several people dead in the city of Kaduna and some other parts of the North (BBC News, November 23, 2002; Thisday Newspaper, November 24, 2002).

Taking a cue down history, Nigeria's image and credibility problems came to the fore during the reign of Gen. Sanni Abacha. Although before then, there was some resentment to some state policies in the country by the international community. This ranged from the indiscriminate and draconian policies of the Buhari/Idiagbon military regime (1984–1985) to the flagrant violation of human and democratic rights of the citizens by the Babangida military regime (Ajayi, 2005; Momoh, and Adejumo, 2002). As Ajayi (2005) notes, the nation's emerging image crises deepened greatly under Babangida because the regime "advanced corruption and bribery to a level of state policy, and thereby compounding the moral image of the nation as a very corrupt country. Prospective foreign investors increasingly found it difficult to do business in Nigeria as much was spent on fringe... kickbacks and bribes to bureaucrats" (p 54).

The image crisis, however, went awry during the Abacha regime especially with its staggering record of human rights abuse, excessive looting of public treasury, and abuse of powers. As a fall out of the economic crises

and widening poverty under the regime, there were also cases of deviation from the citizens in their desperate move to survive the harsh economic terrain. Consequently, tendencies such as drug peddling, money laundering, 419 and a host of economic crimes became rampant among Nigerians during the period.

Thus, during the period, Nigeria acquired the status of a pariah state, with hosts of economic and other sanctions from several of its allies and international organisations in addition to being at the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, recall by countries of their diplomatic officers and suspension from the Commonwealth and other international organisations among others.

The sudden death of General Sanni Abacha in June 1998 and the consequent assumption of power by General Abdul Salami Abubakar, however, merely served as a pause on the growing negative international image of the country.

In other words, the 11-month period of Abdul Salami's rule (June 1998 to May 1999) was a period of maintaining the status quo when there was neither a decline nor any growth in how the country was perceived in the international system. It must be stated however, that the progress towards democratisation under General Abdul Salami was suggestive to many of a likely springboard for the re-launch and rehabilitation of the already dented image. Thus, at the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, there were hopes of a possible rebound by Nigeria within and outside the country.

Perhaps in recognition of the magnitude of the

problem and attendant losses to the country, the new democratic administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo began a process of reforming the entire socio-political and economic landscapes of the country. High points of the reforms include institutionalising and strengthening the fight against corruption through establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), right-sizing and down-sizing in the civil service, health sector reform, education reforms and political reforms among others.

Indeed, it was the era of reforms which have come with varying degrees of successes (see, Enweremadu and Okafor, 2009; Saliu, Amali and Olawepo, eds. 2008; Alli, 2005). Also, in order to drive the point of an emerging new Nigeria to the international community, the President embarked on shuttle diplomacy with the intent to convince the international community of the commitment of his administration to the reform programmes. The effort would soon pay off with the re-admission of Nigeria to the Commonwealth of Nations from which it was suspended during the Abacha regime; lifting of embargoes on the country; favourable comments on Nigeria by the international community and improved corruption rating. However, it was only a matter of time before President Obasanjo's tactics of shuttle diplomacy earned the title of 'a flying president' among Nigerians.

While, the option of shuttle diplomacy is an effective and potent strategy often adopted by states in international relations, the seeming excesses with which it was explored in the country especially in the first 180 days of the administration and the fact that the

government was slow in responding to new and emergent domestic challenges, accounted for the unfavourable domestic opinion on the President's visits abroad. This position would be appreciated when it is realised that Nigeria, right from the inception of the new democratic administration in 1999 was characterised by hosts of ethno-religious violence in parts of the country, political disputes and assassinations, executive-legislature wrangling, violence in the Niger Delta, intra-executive disputes, deepening economic crises and rising level of poverty among others.

All these are issues of governance which the state could not resolve soon enough. From this standpoint therefore, it could be reasoned that the government's attempt to redeem Nigeria's image is more of external polishing than attempts at resolving domestic challenges which gave rise to poor external perception in the first place. This was the prevailing situation under President Obasanjo, while the issues were not resolved before he handed power over to another civilian administration headed by Umar Musa Yar'adua.

It is important to note that, a cardinal policy of the Yar'adua government was the pursuit of a seven-point agenda meant to transform Nigeria from the depths of development to one of sustainable development. These included: Power and Energy, Food Security and Agriculture, Wealth Creation and Employment, Mass Transportation, Land Reform, Security and Qualitative and Functional Education. This perhaps may have been informed by the administration's believe in the resolution of domestic challenges that often gives rise to external negativities. In line with this philosophy, the administration

decided to grant amnesty to insurgents in the Niger Delta as a way of resolving the crises which have turned the region to a hotbed of violence, kidnapping and arson. Indeed, the Niger Delta crisis is one that has grossly affected Nigeria's image both locally and abroad. It portrays the country as one that is grossly insecure with some nations warning their nationals from visiting the region. But at the heart of these crises is the issue of marginalisation and prolonged neglect of the region by successive Nigerian governments even though the region harbours the bulk of the country's oil resource.

Thus, what started as a mere protest in the 1990s later degenerated into serious conflict that is now assuming different dimensions. Under the amnesty package, militants are given opportunity to voluntarily surrender their arms to the state in exchange for rehabilitation and empowerment by the government. This feat produced resounding success as thousands of erstwhile militants have been accommodated under the programme. Thus, it received encomium and admiration from most Nigerians as well as foreign bodies. In addition, the administration established the Ministry of Niger Delta as a bureaucratic response to the challenges posed by the crises.

In a way, the establishment of a ministry can be described as a panic move on the part of the government that is unwarranted and unnecessary. This is because, several programmes and policies such as the 13 per cent derivation, establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission and the Amnesty package among others, have been put in place by the government.

These are more pragmatic and pro-active in orientation than the new bureaucratic measure. Perhaps the government ought to have been more concerned with understanding why the problem persists in spite of the already existing more practical approaches and to make necessary adjustments.

Moreover, given the inherent problems of bureaucracy as slow and contrived, it is doubtful whether the bureaucratisation option can yield any meaningful result. Second, although the Niger Delta issue is very volatile, it is certainly not the only volatile issue in the country. Others include persistent ethno-religious violence in several parts of the country including indignity conflicts in the Plateau State. It is puzzling then to note why the government has not established a Ministry of Indignity or Religious Affairs to address these equally volatile issues. In another sense, where there is an outburst of equal magnitude from another part of the country, would a similar ministry be established to that effect? Yet, there is nothing to suggest that the Niger Delta crisis is dying out in spite of several resources already pumped into managing it.

Another major point of the Yar'adua administration targeted towards relaunching Nigeria in the international scene was the establishment, through the Ministry of Information, of the 'Re-Branding Nigeria' project. Before then, there was the Heart of Africa Foundation which was aimed at turning Nigeria into a tourist and business destination. However, it was only a matter of time before the initiative, which was private-public collaboration, died out naturally. The project consisted of radio and television jingles to project the image of the country as

well as promoting the image of the country through diplomacy. Indeed, it is doubtful whether this approach can produce the desired result given the fact that the country is still characterised by internal contradictions that gave rise to the problems in the first place. Why then, has the problem persisted?

Understanding the Basis

The central thesis of this paper is that the image problem which Nigeria is currently facing was informed by crises and contradictions in governance. Part of this understanding is that some of these crises have not been addressed while the state has not responded adequately to emerging ones. For instance, first, while the economic crunch may be a basis for deviant tendencies among citizens, there seems not to be any significant improvement in the living standard of most Nigerians for decades. Indeed, the number of people living below poverty lines despite several intervention agencies by the government seems to be on the increase.

The UNDP report (2010), indicates that between 1980 and 1996, the percentage of the core poor rose from 6.2 per cent to 29.3 per cent, although it declined to 22.0 per cent in 2004. Also, the 2010 Global Monitoring Report (GMR) of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), revealed that about 92 per cent of the Nigerian population survive on less than US\$2 daily, while about 71 per cent survive on less than US\$1 daily. In such a situation of increasing abject poverty, citizens may tend to take to sabotage activities, at home and abroad, that profits them as a form of insurance against the worst effect of economic crunch. Thus, activities such as drug peddling, international prostitution, child trafficking and

a host of others that erodes Nigeria's credibility in the international system becomes prevalent.

Second, weak legal and enforcement mechanisms may yet be a major factor against effective governance. This is because, even where mechanisms are put in place to check some tendencies that may attract negative image for the country, enforcement frameworks are usually weak or ineffective. At times, they become politicised and as such fail to function optimally. A case in point is government's efforts at combating corruption in Nigeria.

In this context, the principal agencies so established are the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). However, the politicisation of these agencies especially under the reigns of President Obasanjo amid other problems (see, Muhammad, Forthcoming), is a major albatross on their effective performance. Consequently, there seem to be doubts about the efficacy of the anti-corruption agencies.

According to the 2010 Standards Compliance Report of the e-Standard Forum – a body whose mission is to monitor and report a country's economic, financial, and political conditions – Nigeria achieves very low overall compliance with international standards and codes, with a score of 11.67 out of 100 in our Standards Compliance Index. It also suffers from the legacy of decades of misguided policies, corruption, the poor state of basic infrastructure, and weak institutions (e-Standard, 2010). In a situation such as this, the likelihood that the country will command

greater respect within the community of nations is remote.

Only recently, the government set up a special commission to review the country's electoral processes (Uwais Commission). This was an aftermath of irregularities that characterised the 2007 presidential elections. Although the report of the commission has never been officially made public, many have wished that the report be followed up and implemented to the letter, but the government seems to have maintained a position that it is bound by the constitution not the report (Daily Trust, June 15, 2010). This has given rise to suspicion that the government has tacitly brushed the report aside, giving the image of a non-conforming authority.

Third, it is also noteworthy that poor information management strategy forms part of the reason for the lingering governance crises in the country. It has been noted that in Africa, Nigeria has the biggest and most virile media community (Ozhekome, 2009). This community, which includes both print and electronic media (including the Internet) has continued to grow since the advent of democracy and liberalisation of political space. Interestingly as well, majority shares are owned by the state. Given the advent of new technologies in broadcasting and information dissemination such as satellites and computer systems, information exchange has become more complex and faster. The implication is that in the process of information exchange, nations and countries are continuously formed or reformed in the minds of other countries (Ozhekome, 2009). Thus, what may appear to be a domestic affair of one country often generates some definite perceptions for it from the international

community.

It is ironical that in spite of the fact that in Nigeria the government seems to own a majority of the media, it is only being used for propaganda purposes rather than advancing the image of the country. Beyond this, information often spills beyond the nose of the government to the extent that it becomes difficult to track.

Often, the government is caught between giving below what is expected in terms of information dissemination or non-disclosure of necessary information to the citizens. For instance, poor information management on President Yar'adua's illness, no doubt, had negative impact on Nigeria's image among the community of nations. If anything, it portrayed the country badly as news about the President's illness was more readily obtained from foreign media than what local media provided. Another instance in the past was the inappropriate handling of the Nigerian government's position on United States stand over the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Shortly after the attack, the US had vowed to dislodge Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from anywhere they may be, a position which was supported by the Nigerian government. Unfortunately, the manner and context of disclosing the information by the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido, prompted religious violence in some parts of the North with its attendant loss of human and material resources.

Thus, the best which poor information management can do for a country is to widen and escalate the rate of crises with all its attendant negativities on the country. At another level, the country's response to

negative reportage from other countries often ends up in complications. It is a truism that today, Nigeria is often portrayed by most foreign media as a drug-peddling society, corruption ridding, politically volatile and ethnically divisive among others yet, the best the country would do is to employ a combination of strategies that include denial, silence and admission of guilt (Okigbo, 2007). The government's response to foreign reports on the Niger Delta crisis is a case in point.

There is also the leadership and leadership style dimension to the governance and image crises. Indeed, Nigeria since independence has not been fortunate with dynamic and well-focused political leadership – be it military or civilian.

For instance, every military regime often claims to seize power in order to stamp out corruption, bad governance and rescue the ailing economy. Observable trends with all military regimes in Nigeria have shown that one is not a credible alternative to the other much as the military is no better than the civilian regimes they overthrow. Indeed, trends have shown that leadership in Nigeria is characterised by stiff competition among the elites as well as political competition is seen as warfare resulting in politically motivated killings and assassinations, all leading on the one hand, to a pathological conception of politics as means to achieving some ends and on the other hand insecurity of lives and properties. The end result of this whole process is that good governance is relegated to the background while corruption, abuse of office and arbitrary sharing of political perquisites takes centre-stage.

Concluding Comments

It needs to be acknowledged that successive governments have made efforts to manage Nigeria's external image problem to the best advantage of the country.

Unfortunately, problems persist. As already noted in this work, this persistence can be attributed to the fact that, there are crises and contradictions in the countries governance process such that while some of the issues that gave rise to the problem subsists, other new ones have continue to emerge. Besides, the government remains weakly capacitated to manage such issues. As a possible way forward, I would like to propose the following suggestions:

- Since the issue of perennial conflict has remained a major bane of governance in the country, the government should take a holistic view of all conflicts (ethnic, religious, political, economic etc) as not mutually exclusive. Thus the amnesty granted to militants in the Niger Delta region could be extended to other individuals and groups throughout the country who may be in possession of firearms and dangerous weapons. First, this will help the government to mop up the huge array of firearms already in circulation and which often increase the propensity of violence in whatever form. Second, it would help reduce the level of security threats on the state;
- There should be more focused attempt at combating corruption and economic crimes. While current efforts are commendable, the relevant institutions should be strengthened and their operations divorced of political

manipulations in order to increase the level of confidence of the international community in the agencies;

- Information is crucial to the attainment of any organisational or individual objective. However, effective management of such information is of no less significance. Therefore, the government needs effective information management strategies in order to effectively curtail contradictions that may arise in the course of governance;
- The focus of the current rebranding campaign seems to be more of external and little on internal re-orientation in attitudes. This needs not to be so. Rebranding a country comprising divergent peoples and individuals may be an exercise in futility if attempt is not made to re-orientate the individuals that comprise it as well. This is because it is the aggregate make-up and orientation of these individuals that gives the political entity its character and not the other way round. Therefore, efforts at rebranding should be inward looking as well; not just externally oriented.

In conclusion, Nigeria is a country of immense potentials. But for this to be translated into reality, she requires deliberate efforts to resolve the series of contradictions that characterise governance in the state. While the current situation is not a hopeless one, concrete actions must be taken by the state to arrest the decline in international confidence and better enable government to address new and emergent challenges. Nigeria's image problem is a direct reflection of a wider governance crisis in the country.

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APPLICATION OF E-GOVERNANCE IN ENHANCING CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM BANGLADESH

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E-Governance has emerged as a transitional media for establishing an effective and efficient civil service system. A well-functioning civil service management system is the envy of developed and developing countries alike. The civil service plays a pre-dominant role in bringing about social change and development. To make the transitional process of the civil service management faster and easier, E-Governance is regarded as a problem remedying technique. Application in civil service management can be designed in such a manner that proper departmental systems of the management activities can be improved but in accordance with essential principles. Civil service management cannot manage its efficiency and effectiveness due to traditional modes of operation, inadequate infrastructure, a lack of legal framework, and lack of maintenance and resource capabilities. This paper illustrates ways in which E-Governance can be adopted and why using Information and Communication Technology (ICT) can strengthen information flow among inter-civil service agencies. It offers pertinent suggestions not just for Bangladesh but other developing countries, including in Africa.

INTRODUCTION

E-Governance is an innovative 'modus operandi' in governing state and maintaining administration that have received a tremendous boost in the present day world. It inaugurated the application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in deliverance of electronic services to the people through responsive organisational management. Public services are provided through an administrative structure of a country and so civil service management plays a significant role in this regard.

Ipsa facto, Bangladesh is an administrative country: public life is always directly involved with government machineries and their functions. With the onset of the information revolution, developing countries have looked at E-Touch as a possible new tool to solve age-old traditions and problems of civil service such as, bad governance and

sluggish economic growth. The Civil Service of Bangladesh has been seeking to re-orientate itself and stay informed of global changes of the latest technological innovations.

While E-Governance ensures efficiency and effectiveness in administrative culture, it also manages all forms of interaction between the electorate and the civil servants in electronic mode. The civil service of Bangladesh is traditional in servicing and managing nature.

Recently, Bangladesh has been setting the stage for the gradual proliferation of E-Government services throughout the country. Under the SICT (Support to ICT Taskforce) programme, several ministries and government departments have undertaken major E-Governance projects in their daily operation but these are still not remarkable changes. The study is undertaken to unravel the interdependency of E-Governance and

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professionally skilled civil service management by facing the challenges of the 21st Century. The study also attempts to diagnose the present problems and prospects of civil service in coping with E-Governance.

Civil Service Management

Civil service management is a comprehensive issue. Some scholars have defined it as an institution or a caste, an organising society or a social category. Professor Finer suggests that the civil service is a body of officials permanent, paid and skilled. Max Weber, the Father of Bureaucratic Management, defines the civil service as an administrative body of appointed officials (Sharma and Sadana, 1998:339). Laski applied the term civil service to a system of Government, monopolised solely by officials and thus jeopardising the liberties of ordinary citizens. (Sharma and Sadana, 1998:338). The book "*Bureaucratic Self Preservation*" concludes that the civil service is "an idea and embodiment of a structural adjustment, has been staunchly defended as a necessity and at the same time vigorously condemned" (Khan, 1980:24).

Management is a strategy towards the achievement of welfare ends in accordance with the managerial means rather than decisions making. The concept of civil service management is constantly changing, and at the present format, civil service or civil service management terms are now widely used to describe an institution rather than officials employed in them. The type of civil service structuring is, to a large extent, conditioned by the culture of the society; its values, ideas and even institutions (Tendero, 2006:64). In recent years, civil service management has been defined on the basis of

interests and focuses on particularism of different issues.

Martin Albrow identifies seven more concepts related to civil service management: rational organisation, organisational inefficiency, rule by officials, public administration, administered by officials, the organisation and finally, modern society (Khan, 180:25-26).

Concept of E-Governance

The term E-Governance or digital governance refers to governance process in which Information and Communication Technology (ICT) assist civil service management by managing and monitoring decision making and service providing actions. E-Governance is a form of E-Business in governance comprising of processes and structures involved in the deliverance of electronic services to the public, viz. citizens (Pravhu, 2005:1). This involves contact with business partners of the government by introducing electronic communication between the people and central government.

Generally, E-Governance can be defined as the application of electronic resources in:

- The interaction between government and citizens and government and businesses;
- Internal government operations to simplify and improve democratic government and business aspects of governance.

Moreover, scholars illustrated that E-Governance is the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to support good governance.

Beside this, E-Governance implies E-

democracy, wherein all forms of interaction between the electorate (i.e. general people) and the elected (i.e. the government) are performed electronically (Pravhu, 2005:1). The E-Governance system can be viewed as the interaction between the following: G to G (Government to Government); G to C (services of the Government to Citizens); C to G (Interaction of the Citizens with the Government); G to B (Services of the Government to Business); G to E (Government to Employees) (Chowdhury, 2008:29).

With increasing focus on technology, E-Governance coincides with civil service management and has changed the interaction and operation system. With the advent of present welfare state form, the civil service of Bangladesh is also enthusiastic to adopt this latest technological trend, E-Governance, as it facilitates "Any Time Any Where" access to government resources (Rahman, 2008:33).

Literature Review

A review of relevant literature is necessary to gain a better insight into E-Governance in the civil service management of Bangladesh. It also helps to acquire information and understand the present trend of E-Governance in the process of civil service management. In the book "E-Governance: Concepts and Case Studies", Pravhu gives a transparent picture of the application of E-Governance in the operation of state machineries, with the exposition of the principles and the provisions of a number of case studies on E-Governance. This comprehensive book on E-Governance encompasses the entire spectrum of E-Governance to its chronological evolution, historical background, and different models, and necessary infrastructural and manpower

facilities, in addition to data warehousing facilities, in the implementation of E-Governance projects.

The Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society – 2002 reflects the effective and efficient use of IT in the organisational management which also declared that it must serve the mutually supportive goals of creating sustainable economic growth in the country. It encompasses enhancing public welfare and fostering social cohesion to fully realise its potential to strengthen democracy, increase transparency and accountability in governance, promote human rights, enlarge cultural diversity and foster international peace and stability through adaptation of E-Governance.

A research report named "E-Governance and Developing Countries: Introduction and Examples, Research Report-3" pointed out that E-Governance is a new contour of good governance which starts with an elaborate definition of E-Governance and then presents a general but hypothetical model of E-Governance. The "Study on E-Government in Bangladesh: Conducted by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute" highlights the most orientated operation mode of the Roads and Highway Department of the Communication Ministry, The Hajj Management Website of the Religious Affairs Ministry, Bangladesh Bank and the Electronic Birth and Death Registration project of the Rajshahi City Corporation.

The paper "Problems of E-Governance in Bangladesh and Possible Steps Towards Solutions" clarifies the concepts related to E-Governance and defines the difference between E-Governance and E-Government.

They have mentioned some selected E-Government projects in Bangladesh in the Ministry of Finance, National Board of Revenue, Ministry of Science and ICT, Ministry of Communication and Bangladesh Planning Commission.

In the book "E-Governance in DC's and LDC's: Lesson for Bangladesh", the author traced out the current situation of E-Government implementation phase and tried to locate how the developed countries have been able to establish E-Government successfully in their public and private organisations, and why the developing countries are grasping the inevitability of adopting E-Governance system. "Prospects of E-Governance in Bangladesh" focuses on the prospects of E-Governance in Bangladesh. It argues that in light of the E-Government projects already underway, it has strong prospects for some notable growth of E-Governance in the near future.

Another research report "Electronic Democracy for Russia: A View on the State of Art: Problems and Prospects" pointed out the present Russian political stability for adopting ICT in their government activities and created foundation for efficient government service. The researcher, in his paper, "How Americans Get in Touch With Government" lays emphasis on the measures that have been undertaken by the U.S.A. government to adopt E-Governance in their administrative (public and private) sector. The writer has pointed out in his paper "Theory and Practice of Public Administration in the Philippines" that these optimise the possibility of carrying out administrative functions in accordance with calculable rules regardless of persons performing or affected by the functions and

that administration becomes rational and depersonalised.

Rationale of the study

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has become a common phenomenon in administrative management system in the late 1990s whereas civil service is now more determined to decentralise their activities at the find local and central level as a better service provider. The civil service of Bangladesh has been suffering from inefficiency and wastages of resources which in turn leads to deterioration of public services system. Civil service, in the age of global competition, should emerge as an efficient and effective organisational structure that is service focused, responsible, accountable and transparent, which can be achieved only through E-Governance.

E-Governance enables the civil service system to get information on decisions from the political authority and transfer it to the least part of the country. E-Governance can perform easily within the civil service management to improvise its efficiency through direct interaction with other government agencies or departments if needed. In addition, it helps to boost communication pattern with the private sector.

Unfortunately, it is a matter of regret there are no studies as of yet that have undertaken research into the application of E-Governance in the civil service management of Bangladesh which would have thus allowed us to conduct a study on the inevitability and challenges and prospects of E-Governance in administering an effective and efficient civil service system.

Objectives and Methodology

The study has been achieved on a critical review of both primary and secondary data. Primary data has been obtained from fifty respondents, through the interviewing of policy makers, civil servants, academicians and general officials. This data has been collected from 50 respondents through a self-administered questionnaire through purposive sampling process. Secondary data was collected from various online Publications, Websites, Web portals, Newspapers, Articles, IT magazines and Research Centers. The study is interested in the effects of E-Governance in the civil service management of Bangladesh. The objectives are as following:

- To generate a compound idea about the current status of ICT implementation stage for understanding the rationale behind adaptation of E-Governance at civil service operations;
- To learn about how the efficiency and effectiveness of civil service can be ensured through strategic application of different issues of E-Governance;
- To conceptualise the quality aspect of governance within civil service management through application of E-Governance;
- To trace out the challenges of present civil service organisation in adaptation of E-Governance from central to local level.

Conceptual Framework

E-Governance is the process of electronic contact between the government and the general people in providing services and communication using Internet, Networks and other digital technologies. It is the use of Internet and digital technology to execute all

the business processes in the government's operation system. The civil service of Bangladesh is suffering from a traditional administrative system in its documentation and servicing system.

The study has investigated the role of E-Governance in the effectiveness and efficiency of civil servants. The independent variable of the study is the application of E-Governance which is divided into three areas: E-Management, E-Learning and resources. The dependent variable of the study is the efficiency and effectiveness of civil service management in Bangladesh.

The efficiency and effectiveness of civil service management cannot be achieved immediately, but it is possible to reach such standards through the application of E-Governance in its managerial functions. E-Governance allows the civil service system to maintain transparent and accountable communication with the people and the private sector.

Management Information Systems (MIS) can ensure the active participation of field and junior level officials in the policy and decision making process. It also facilitates the inter-governmental communication and co-ordination process among the branches and departments of public administration.

The application of E-Governance ensures the transparent monitoring and evaluation process in administration. Enhancing E-learning in society provides skilled and trained manpower for the civil service organisation and change to the present hereditary culture of the civil servants. Besides this, E-Education in the present education system creates scope for

both local and grass-root level people in the participation of government functions. All of these facilities require legislative framework to provide legal authorisation to electronic documents and other electronic resources.

The Government of Bangladesh is largely dependent on foreign donors. Hence, development partners are always giving advice and direction to the government on building infrastructure for E-Governance.

Most of the financial resources allocated are still misused in this sector which makes slow progress of the infrastructural development process. The term efficiency describes the "state" or "quality" of being efficient where efficient refers to "productive with minimum waste or effort" (Illustrated Oxford Dictionary, 1998:259). On this basis of meaning, civil service efficiency refers to the performance of the bureaucrats in reducing wastages of resources and their effort in the operation of civil service management systems ensuring a quality service system. With the application of E-Governance, the traditional civil service management of Bangladesh can change its motives and reintroduce itself as a target-orientated development administration.

Findings and Results

E-Governance has already offered numerous systematic benefits and advanced E-Touch for corporate sectors of the government. The study analyses the variables of E-Governance in the management of the Bangladesh civil service, which incorporates the three types of domains: E-Management; E-learning and resources.

• E-Management and civil service

During the past few decades in Bangladesh, civil service has come to be responsible in organising and regulating the defense and law and order maintenance with justice. At the moment, the civil bureaucracy wants to reposition itself with the motive of social welfare and human resource development. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been increasingly used to improve the communication services of the government to the citizens which required SMART (Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsive and Transparent) E-Governance system to keep up with the present globalised world. E-Governance, in the long term, facilitates quality and equitable delivery of the services and works to improvise the direct interaction of the government with the general people and other business and industries.

Citizen of the state will be empowered through their access to information of all sectors of the state governance system. E-Governance improves internal interaction and communication through the effective use of Electronic Management Information System (EMIS). 76% of the total respondents believe that E-Governance can improve the dissemination of information system within the civil service management and also improve their interaction with the citizen and the corporate sector of the state (Table-1). They also recommend that the civil service will be more effective when information flows from top to bottom through E-MIS. E-Technologies such as preparing websites, internet connectivity, internet accessibility, email etc. Civil servants of the bureaucracy can easily communicate with each other, and the citizen and business sectors through Local Area Network (LAN) or Optical Fiber Network

(OFN). Most of the respondents (84%) state that the application of E-Governance may be a better alternative to develop an inter-government communication system and a public-private partnership (Table-2). It helps to improve the congenial atmosphere among the public-private interaction.

E-MIS helps to improve the transparency and accountability of civil servants to the respective bosses and the inter-department information exchange system. The policies and strategies will be more effective and applicable when the bureaucratic organisation is restructured according to hierarchy and the flow of information is arranged accordingly. It will be easier to maintain discipline and structural equity from field level central administration through the use of E-Technologies, but unfortunately the policies on ICT are still largely focused on central administration, as expressed by 78% (Table-3). Civil servants can easily adopt Digital Information Security Zone (DISZ) through the use of data warehouses for long term protection of policies and information.

E-Governance encompasses the efficiency and effectiveness of civil service by developing a smooth co-ordination system across the administration. Holistic coordination system can be introduced in the civil service management by applying a digital network system (i.e. Data warehousing and Data mining). In the study, 80% of respondents believe that the application of E-Governance can improve the co-ordination process among field and policy level administration (Table-4).

Various types of rural or central level meetings can be held without the necessity of

physical appearance through the use of video-conferencing, saving time and money. Instant electronic access to data and automated report generation facilities enhance and accelerate bureaucratic decision making. This type of faster decision-making can help avoid huge amounts of economic expenditure. 66% of the total respondents believe that E-Governance is the only alternative to develop quick and quality decisions by ensuring effective participation of the local level officials and people (Table-5). The civil servants will be able to set up a One Stop Service (OSS) for the purposes of preserving the citizen's demand and an exchange of views.

The civil bureaucracy can easily complete their development projects by improvising the monitoring and evaluation process. E-Governance can allow higher officials to monitor and evaluate running projects via E-Technologies such as Geographic Information System (GIS) where 74% of respondents agreed that E-Governance can improve the monitoring and evaluation process of the development projects of civil service management (Table-6).

The **transaction** process of the civil service will be more effective and dynamic by using E-Commerce system (i.e. E-Tender notification and procurement). On the other hand, Annual Confidential Report (ACR) preparation will be made easier by analysing information from the 'Bureau-Information Database'. The civil service department will be more effective and efficient using bureaucratic websites to connect the civil service organisation with international organisations via the Information Super Highway (ISP).

• E-Learning and civil service

The civil service of Bangladesh inherited its learning process from, British bureaucratic practices but increasing challenges of the 21st Century demand new methods. The civil service management can avoid existing manual processes and procedures, they require new and dynamic policies and legislative framework in the ICT sector. In the present context, the officials are not efficient enough to keep up with both the E-Governance system and use of E-Technologies. The civil service management has to arrange adequate training facilities in the IT sector for their officials. In this regard 68% of respondents agreed that IT training can develop skills of the civil servants and it must be arranged for the central policy makers and field level officials (Table-7).

Training in the ICT sector will improve the quality of the civil servants in servicing and quick interactions with the people. The most recognised benefit of E-Governance is the empowerment of field level personnel in the decision making process. The job of the civil servants is still largely administrative but E-Governance can change the practices of officials by encouraging an organised and service-orientated bureaucratic culture. 66% of respondents believe that E-Governance can develop the bureaucratic culture and norms through the reduction of corruption (Table-8). Similarly, a vast number of respondents (66%) state that E-Education can change the present traditional mode of operation in civil service management and provide more skilled manpower to the civil service department (Table-9).

• Resources

The previous policy (2002) has no

effectiveness in the introduction of E-Governance throughout the administration of the government. There is no specific legal framework on the IT sector for the civil service management. The manual processes of the administration are usually obsolete and inefficient and thus need legal support from the authority. The authority should provide adequate legal requisite legislations for systematic use of E-Governance technologies in the present civil service environment. Thus 66% of the respondents believe that the present legislative framework cannot provide adequate support to the electronic documents and communication system, such as digital signatures which remain illegal in document papers or digital written documents which are not acceptable to government offices (Table-10).

A legal framework also helps to attach the other departments within a structure and can protect the misuse of E-Technologies. It will be used as a networked guideline for the total administration and provides legal sanction and support to civil servants in order to access the internet. The civil bureaucracy believes in the philosophy, the 'Right man for the right place'. Skilled and trained manpower are mandatory for the development of present civil service management of Bangladesh where 84% respondent recognize that the application of E-Governance in civil service management is suffering from managerial and technological maintenance due to a shortage in skilled and trained manpower (Table-11).

The civil service organisation needs to take immediate measures to train present employees to use the E-Governance system effectively and efficiently. The Government of Bangladesh has been largely dependent on the

development partners and donor agencies for development projects in the IT sector where there has been keen interest to see E-Democracy in the administrative pattern. They have invested a huge amount of foreign currencies to introduce E-Governance in civil service management. In that regard, 74% of the respondents believe that the government is dependent on the donors to implement the ICT projects within public sector management, which prevents the civil bureaucracy from taking decisions against the interest of respective donors (Table-12). The civil service organisation should reform and re-organise the administrative and management system enforcing technological resources as 76% of respondents agreed that present civil service infrastructure cannot keep up with the E-Governance system (Table-13).

In one sense, government has failed to provide adequate financial support to the civil service management in terms of the application of E-Governance. On the other hand, this allocated financial support has been misused, meaning that no transparent or accountable mode can be found in the appropriate use of currency.

Indeed 62% of the total respondents believe that allocated money for the ICT sector is misused by the concerned authority and there is no transparency and accountability (Table-14). It is difficult to continue the traditional administrative system in the present global perspective so it needs computerised networking systems and data warehouses which can ensure the establishment of E-Democracy in the civil service management.

Challenges for the Application of E-Governance in Civil Service Management in Bangladesh

E-Governance is operated at the intersection of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and governance processes of the government. The operational mode of the E-Governance process is divided into three overlapping domains: E-Administration, E-Servicing and e-Society.

It is also conducive to our civil service practices to improvise the quality of services and related facility departments. E-Governance has already been launched at a marginal stage but has faced some problems of preparedness because the Bangladesh civil service management is not ready to cope with these changes. The traditionalist culture and does not favour new technological ideas in Bangladesh.

The study deals with the following issue by summarising the present status and indicating the challenges associated with the issues.

- **Traditional civil service management**

The civil service of Bangladesh is deeply rooted in the past, having inherited its mechanism from Pakistan through British colonial rule. The present form of administrative management has derived from colonial legacy which in turn suffers from previous policies of extraction and structural composition. Unsurprisingly the performance of the civil service management has been deteriorating and civil servants are increasingly demotivated in their professional careers. While the government of Bangladesh has taken some measures to introduce advanced technological innovation (i.e. E-

Governance), bureaucrats are passive and lack the enthusiasm required for sustaining E-technology.

The management is constrained by the maintenance of a colonial hierarchical rank of order in their administrative system, and the constant 'Siring' of their bosses.

- **Inadequate ICT infrastructure of bureaucratic management**

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has not yet been expanded gradually in the civil service management of Bangladesh. The present form of civil service is unable to engage with the Global Information Superhighway (GIS) due to political instability and the unwillingness of government officials and bureaucrats. Internet access facilities have not been decentralised into the local level.

Consequently, bureaucrats are less technologically equipped. The government of Bangladesh failed to provide adequate financial support to the administration to rearrange the administrative structure to use E-technologies.

- **Lack of legal framework**

The government of Bangladesh could not formulate any composed Act or rules for the ICT sector (Except ICT policy 2002) which can facilitate the civil service organisation in their management system. On the other hand, civil bureaucracy is not modernised enough to maintain the growing demands of the application of E-Governance. Upto now, E-Mail and digital filing system have no official value and legal authorisation in government offices. The government did not make any co-ordinated policies to protect cyber crime or

build up any central Certificate Authority for the purposes of digital certification and authentication.

- **Technological maintenance problem**

The civil service of Bangladesh has no present or future integrated plan to develop the maintenance system of E-Technologies, with no equipment or the level of expertise or professionalism to handle large scale integrated E-Government projects.

The government did not give any legal or financial support to the local software companies to develop their maintenance system which makes them inefficient and ineffective in long term support or maintenance.

- **Financial insufficiency and dependency on donors**

The government of Bangladesh cannot afford to fund development projects on E-Governance in the civil administration. Thus foreign donors, or so-called development partners have got the opportunity to invest in the sector which only makes the administration dependent on the donors in their policy making or official secrecy maintenance system.

- **Managerial complexity of civil administration**

The civil bureaucracy is in a desperate need to build internal capacity within or across the administration to manage their IT related projects and co-ordinate the transition system of E-Governance.

Only some selected ministries and government offices have accessibility to adopt

the management of IT technologies, but many others are still grappling with this adjustment. The bureaucracy has not made any central unit or authority to co-ordinate different IT related projects throughout the administration.

- **Lack of skilled human resources**

For a country of more than 145 million people, the number of trained personnel in the IT sector is meager with approximately 1,630 incoming students from public Universities, 2,370 private Universities and 1,100 from Polytechnic institutes. The whole E-Governance maintenance system needs more skilled personnel. This shortage means that our government offices are unable to provide proper planning and maintenance. The present administration has no immediate plan to recruit IT personnel or specialists through B.C.S. competitive examination.

- **Lack of trainer and training programmers for officials**

Although the training is a vital necessity for familiarisation of users with computers or other E-Technologies and their application, the civil service management does not have a specialised unit to continue the computerization projects due to inadequate trainers and training programmes. The training programmes and projects are regularly needed as they are arranged at arbitrary periods, not during the implementation phase of E-Government projects.

- **Preparedness of field administration**

The field administration of civil service management has no urgency to adopt E-Technologies and understand the application of E-Governance. It is not possible to apply E-

Technologies as it is impossible to reach E-management without the enthusiasm of the field level civil servants. All the decisions and policies are dominated by field administrators, but the application of E-Governance is still central administration based.

- **Lack of bureaucratic awareness about ICT**

Bureaucrats believe that E-Governance is regressive in their daily operations. Unfortunately, they are limiting their E-Governance application to basic typing. This behaviour is an attempt to resist any kind of change of their familiar working environment. Secondly, many bureaucrats fear the increasing computerisation of different units will make many personnel redundant and finally, they believe that computers are meant for low level administrative work.

- **Lack of E-Education of civil servants**

The government has taken some initiatives to introduce E-Education programmes from central to local administration. Presently, the civil service management needs a lot of IT officials but government lacks a pragmatic or authentic initiative to introduce effective E-Education programmes for newly appointed officials except in some training programmes.

- **Digital division in civil service management**

The civil service management has already divided into two groups with the intention of using E-Technologies: privileged group (i.e. secretary or additional secretary etc) and unprivileged group (Upazila and Union level officials such as U.N.O).

- **National security and official secrecy**

The bureaucrats are worried about maintaining national security in the application of E-Technologies such as Internet, video image, S.M.S., M.S.S. etc. Rather, traditional civil service management has a tendency to maintain their internal decisions and policies within the top level management.

- **Linguistic problem**

The civil servants are facing a linguistic problem in the English version of the E-Technologies because they are familiar with the Bangla word. Another major issue is that none of the font maintains the international standard — UNICODE which makes it difficult to use Bangla content on the Internet with Bangla font.

- **Irregular power supply**

With about 30% of the population of Bangladesh having access to electricity, the question of providing access to computers to a large section of the population has two main problems: continuous internal connectivity and missing important documents or files. The government cannot manage a sufficient power supply for wide spread ICT programmes.

CONCLUSION

The issue of E-Governance is critically relevant to Bangladesh and other developing countries, including those in Africa. As a method of good governance, it can help in providing transparent and accountable systems and dissemination of information among the inter-governmental processes and procedures.

As an administrative policy, the development

and welfare activities of government are dependent on the success of civil service administration. Civil service is an inevitable institution for socioeconomic progress of the country and continues the development projects and programmes. The civil service management of Bangladesh is still suffering from their colonial mode of operation but should introduce E-Governance systems to examine their efficiency and effectiveness. The application of E-Governance can change the present trend in recruitment, coordination, decision making, inter-departmental communication system, performance appraisal and ACR preparation.

If the government and the concerned authority fail to take co-ordinated policies in the ICT sector, the Bangladesh administrative system will be unable to adapt or progress with present technological advances in government management. E-Governance would be a quixotic and abortive effort to remove the shortcomings of the civil service management. Bangladesh, and developing countries governments, should take immediate measures for the implementation of E-Governance at all levels of their administration.

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Table-1: E-Governance can improve the dissemination process of information within civil service management.

Can e-Governance ensure highest level of dissemination of information?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	18	20	76%
No	2	3	12%
No comment	5	2	14%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-2: The application of E-Governance can develop inter-governmental and public-private partnerships by using E-Technologies.

Can e-Governance ensure highest level of dissemination of information?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	22	20	84%
No	3	3	12%
No comment	0	2	4%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-3: Policies and strategies of government are still central administration orientated.

Are government policies on ICT implemented in transaction process of administration?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	21	18	76%
No	2	6	16%
No comment	2	1	6%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-4: E-Governance can easily co-ordinate the field and policy level of civil service management.

Is it possible to co-ordinate the whole administration through e-Governance?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	18	22	80%
No	5	3	16%
No comment	2	0	4%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-5: E-Governance can ensure an effective and efficient decision making system through field level civil servants and people's participation.

Will decision making process be more effective through application of e-Governance?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	17	16	66%
No	3	5	16%
No comment	5	4	18%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-6: E-Governance will improve the monitoring and evaluation process through the application of e-Technologies in every step of development projects.

Can e-Technology make transparent and accountable monitoring and evaluation process?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	15	22	74%
No	2	3	12%
No comment	8	0	16%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-7: IT training can develop the bureaucratic skill in profession and servicing.

If IT training can develop the skill of civil servant?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	16	18	68%
No	8	5	26%
No comment	1	2	6%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-8: E-Governance can improve culture and norms in administration through the reduction of “red tape” and other means of corruption.

Can e-Governance ensure highest level of dissemination of information?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	17	16	66%
No	6	7	26%
No comment	2	2	8%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-9: E-Education can change the traditional mode of operation and transaction process.

Can e-Education change the present traditional civil service management?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	15	18	66%
No	7	6	26%
No comment	3	1	8%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-10: Present legislative framework on ICT is not enough to provide legal support for electronic documents or communication system.

Is it necessary to formulate co-ordinated legislative framework for ICT sector?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	14	19	66%
No	1	4	10%
No comment	10	2	24%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-11: Application of E-Governance is suffering from managerial and technological maintenance due to specialisation/expertise.

Can IT cadre change the present transaction of civil service management?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	20	22	84%
No	3	2	10%
No comment	2	1	6%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-12: The government of Bangladesh is largely dependent on donors for development projects of ICT.

Do foreign donors influence the government in expanding e-Technologies and projects?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	21	16	74%
No	3	7	20%
No comment	1	2	6%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-13: Present civil service structure can't keep up with the application of E-Governance.

Is it possible for present physical infrastructure to expand e-Technologies at field administration?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	18	20	76%
No	5	3	16%
No comment	2	2	8%
Total	25	25	100%

Table-14: Financial allocation on ICT is not used properly or in a transparent and accountable manner.

Is financial allocation system transparent and accountable?	Number of respondents		Percentage(%)
	General people	Bureaucrats	
Yes	20	16	62%
No	3	8	22%
No comment	2	1	6%
Total	25	25	100%

THE OMBUDSMAN, POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND CORRUPTION: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Najmul Abedin¹

Two hundred years ago when the first classical or legislative ombudsman office was created in Scandinavia, its main functions were to redress grievances and complaints of citizens against public bureaucracies/administration and also to protect their rights and liberties from the excesses of the latter. However, in the course of past fifty so years, it has enormously proliferated and spread at an accelerated speed to various continents with the result that new schools of thought with varying thoughts and ideas have emerged. Some of these schools of thought want the ombudsman to have more and additional powers. Power, first and foremost, to look into or investigate not only the actions of the public bureaucracies but also the decisions and policies of the highest political authority, including ministerial authority, and, secondly, the allegations of corruption in the public sector organisations. The original or classical school of thought strongly opposes such ideas or changes. This article critically and argumentatively examines the views and ideas of opposing schools of thoughts. It sheds light on the different standpoints, thereby offering useful perspectives to assess the contributions of each to an ever-growing ombudsman field.

INTRODUCTION

Generally speaking, this article is a conceptual and somewhat theoretical study of the two issues indicated above. Although it has not focused on any specific region or continent, it has a fairly considerable bearing on and relevance to the ombudsman concept and institution in some parts of all the six inhabited continents. They are looked at from both evolutionary/historical and relatively contemporary perspectives. Their global and comparative dimensions are also emphasised. In doing that, both old and relatively recent source materials are used. The discussion in this section serves as the background against which the views, ideas, and arguments of opposing schools of thought are examined in other sections.

The classical/legislative ombudsman office originated in Sweden towards the very beginning of the 19th century. However, for a

long period of time it operated in a few Scandinavian countries and was virtually unknown to the rest of the world. For a wide variety of reasons, since the 1960s it proliferated and spread like a wild fire to various continents at a "breathtaking speed", to quote Sir John Robertson (1998, p. 114), the former Chief Ombudsman of New Zealand. Hence, as Professor Ayeni (2000, p. 92) observed, this "development is accentuated by the astonishing growth of the institution, about a four-fold increase" in the 1990s alone.

Towards the very end of the 20th century, Professors Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings (2000, p. 1) also observed that "Forty or so years ago the ombudsman institution was confined to a handful of countries, and the word 'ombudsman' meant nothing to most people outside of Scandinavia. [But] Nowadays, in the late 1990s, the office is a global phenomenon, estimated to be operative in something like ninety countries." And by

"May 2007 the institutional membership of the I.O.I. [International Ombudsman Institute] stood at 146 classical and human rights ombudsman offices [not including other types of ombudsman offices], illustrative of the popularity of the institution both at national and sub-national [as well as at the international or regional] levels... with a consequential increase in the interest in research and scholarship on the ombudsman concept" (Reif, 2005, p. 1; also Abedin, 2010, pp. 224-226).

A development of such enormous magnitude at a global scale may be referred to as "ombudsman explosion" (Anderson, 1980, p. 282) or ombudsman tidal wave or ombudsman tsunami. In the course of the transplantation of the ombudsman institution in such a wide variety of socio-political cultures, it "has shown remarkable adaptability" (Rowat, 1984a, p. 207).

In certain countries or in some parts of the world the roles, functions and salient features of this institution have changed or are different, in varying degrees, in a number of key areas. These differences range from minor to major differences with the consequence that some of them are different in certain degrees from the original/classical/legislative/Swedish/human rights model. Such change or deviation or distortion partially resulted from rapid proliferation and accelerated spread of the ombudsman institution in a relatively short period of time and also because of its adoption by so many countries with varying ideologies, cultures and values. As a result, there has been increasing conceptual and functional diversity of this institution, and a number of relatively new schools of thought have

emerged. It seems that perhaps some of them are not intimately familiar with the historical, philosophical, conceptual, functional or operational aspects of the ombudsman institution and, above all, with its unique nature of *modus operandi*. Thus in less than fifty years various types or models of ombudsman institution have emerged with varying structural, organisational, operational functional, and conceptual features, and in some countries they are operating side by side with classical/legislative and human rights model (Gregory, 2000, pp. 1-20; Rowat, 2007, pp. 42-52).

Generally speaking, most ombudsman offices in Europe, the Caribbean, Australia, and some other parts of the world have the salient features of classical/legislative/human rights ombudsman.

It is interesting to note that during the early phase of the rapid expansion (late 1960s) of this institution the late Professor Emeritus Donald C. Rowat (1968, p. xxiv), who played a leading and pioneering role in popularising the ombudsman concept and idea in the English-speaking world, aptly observed that it was not surprising that rapid growth and expansion of the ombudsman institution would make it "all too easy to lose sight of the essential features of the original ombudsman system." He was, in fact, very right and prophetic.

Shortly before his death (2008) he forcefully wrote that the efforts should be made "to restore the original concept [of ombudsman] as the desired objective" (2007, p. 42).

Professor Scott had also indicated that "adaptation of the institution to the rich diversity of cultures in these countries has

inevitably meant some degree of transformation" (Scott, 1984, p. 214), though he also was not in favour of major changes.

It was strongly suggested by the original or classical school that in order "to avoid public confusion ... the use of the term 'ombudsman' [or such synonymous terms as parliamentary commissioner, public defender, etc.] should ... be restricted only to institutions which have [the]...unique combination of [certain specific] characteristics [discussed in the next paragraph]. Otherwise, the vital importance of one or other of these characteristics may be forgotten when so-called ombudsman plans are being proposed" (Rowat, 1968, p. xxiv).

But the suggestion has been ignored in some parts of the world. Mr. Bernard Frank (1975, p. 55), a former chairman of the Ombudsman Committee of the International Bar Association (IBA) and also of such a committee of the American Bar Association (ABA), echoed the sentiment of the IBA in the following words: "It is unfortunate that the term 'ombudsman' has been and is increasingly used throughout the world to mean any ombudsman like complaint-handling mechanism whether governmental or nongovernmental. This is particularly true in the United States" and also in many developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. Both classical ombudsmen and so called non-classical ombudsmen (e.g., executive ombudsmen, private sector ombudsmen, etc.) operate side by side especially in the USA.

The late Professor Emeritus Rowat, as noted above, expressed his frustration because some ombudsman offices have considerably deviated from the Swedish, i.e.,

classical/legislative model with the result that there are now a number of deviant or distorted ombudsman offices (Rowat, 2007, p. 42, also pp. 43-51). Generally speaking, as Professor Larry Hill (2000, p. 5), a leading authority on the ombudsman institution observes, the holders of non-classical ombudsman offices are loosely and usually referred to as "quasi-ombudsmen" whereas the classical model is called "the real ombudsman."

Before addressing the two issues raised at the beginning of this article, let us briefly look at the "unique combination" of the salient features and the principal roles and functions of the classical/legislative model for a useful and meaningful comparison with those of other or deviant models or the views and ideas of some other schools of thought. Such comparison is essential for adequately and analytically respond to these questions.

The classical school argues that "Since its creation the...[Swedish] ombudsman office has been the model for the public sector ombudsman, and set the definition that is still accepted today: a public sector office [directly or indirectly] appointed by the legislature [see footnote] to receive and investigate citizen complaints against administrative acts [i.e. policy implementation acts by the bureaucracy, not policy formulation, i.e. political acts] of government" (US Ombudsman Association, p. 1; also see Reif, 2004, p. 2; Rowat, 2007, pp. 42-51) or, in other words, to "monitor and regulate the administrative activities of the executive branch" (Reif, 2009, p. xiii; Rudholm, 1968, p. 22; Kastari, 1968, p. 58; Wennergren, 1968, p. 12; Stacey, 1978, pp. 1-3).

Hence, it may be observed that the

ombudsman, "an independent and non-partisan officer" of Parliament receives and investigates citizen complaints against administrative actions or inactions of government agencies or functionaries (Rowat, 1968, p. xxiv; also see US Ombudsman Association, 1995, p. 1; Harvard Student Legislative Reference Bureau, 1965, pp. 213-215). His/Her responsibilities are also to protect individual rights and liberties against "bureaucratic wrong doing," "maladministration," "administrative injustice," and the "excesses of the bureaucracy" (US Ombudsman Association, 1995, pp. 1-4; also Rowat, 1998, preface & conclusion), and to "defend the law against official abuses affecting the interests of individuals" (Marx, 1968, p. 256).

Therefore, in a nutshell, his/her two primary goals and objectives, or in other words, key roles and functions are: First, to redress or amend grievances or complaints against maladministration, and unfair bureaucratic (not political) actions, decisions and excesses in order to ensure good governance and transparency, and thus to provide remedy and satisfaction to those who have suffered injustice; Second, to promote, protect and defend human rights in both specific and broad senses from administrative excesses (Gregory, *et al.*, 2000, pp. 9-10). It may be noted that he/she "enjoys a surprising amount of independence ... from the legislature" (Frank, 1975, p. 57) in conducting investigation of a specific complaint or grievance, even though he/she acts as an "Officer of Parliament" (i.e., as a legislative agent or arm), submits his/her report to it, and is accountable, in a very general way or in a very broad sense of the term, to it.

The Ombudsman versus the Highest Political/Ministerial Authority

The concept of "Ministerial Responsibility in the Westminster Model" has considerable bearing on this question or issue. It has considerable relevance to and implications for the ombudsman institution in the countries with the Westminster type of parliamentary/cabinet system of government, e.g., a good number of British Commonwealth countries.

During the early phase of the proliferation and spread of the ombudsman institution one of controversial issues was whether it should be empowered to investigate decisions made at the highest political level (Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago, 1972, para. 95). This concern was expressed because of the differences between the style operation of the governments in the Westminster system and in Sweden, where this office had originated long ago, and also in Finland.

Let us look at the explanation below: Unlike most other countries in the democratic world, strictly speaking, "Ministers [in Sweden] are not responsible for the day-to-day administration" of their respective Ministries (Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago, 1974, para. 360). They are mainly involved in planning and providing or producing regulations and policy directions for the guidance of the members of the civil service. The Ministers "issue and give general directions which are carried out by the civil servants who can be called to account. The civil ombudsman [and his/her colleagues/deputies] in Sweden is an official appointed by Parliament to ensure that the civil service works according to the prescribed rules [and ministerial directives] and that any acts of

maladministration are corrected. The administrative processes of decision making are quite open" (Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago, 1974, para. 360).

Such openness further facilitates the work of the ombudsman in that part of the world. Thus, unlike other countries, ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland have the authority, as a last resort, to impose sanctions and require the public agencies/civil service to accept and implement their decisions, though they prefer and primarily rely on recommendations, suggestions, persuasion, and the expression of their views (Frank, 1975, p. 57).

The dilemma of the countries, that were inclined to adopt this office, was how an ombudsman would fit and operate in the Westminster type of parliamentary/cabinet form of government where the Ministers were responsible or accountable to Parliament for the operation of their respective Ministries. If the ombudsman was given the power to challenge the ministerial decision, then it might appear that the Minister's responsibility or accountability was to him/her and not exclusively to Parliament.

However, in New Zealand, the first commonwealth and the first English-speaking country to adopt the ombudsman institution in 1962, a solution to the problem was worked out. Thanks to Sir Guy Powell, the first ombudsman of New Zealand, the system was a great success in that country with the result that it removed such apprehension and served as a model and precedent for the British Commonwealth countries, as well as for other countries, and blazed a trail. There, as Professor Hill (1976, p. 303), whose doctoral thesis at Princeton University, USA, was on

the ombudsman system in New Zealand, succinctly observed that "the nascent ombudsman's powers [in New Zealand] were restrained in ways designed to insure that he would not be a threat to Ministers' constitutional positions. Particularly, he was denied jurisdiction over the personal decisions of Ministers.

But considerable potential for mischief remained in the provision that allowed him to investigate the recommendations of civil servants to their Ministers. The intent of this measure was to prevent administrators from hiding behind their Ministers' authority, but the practical result was to lay bare the components of ministerial decision making to the ombudsman's – and eventually to the public's – scrutiny."

The Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago (1974, para. 363) further elaborated the above observation in the following passage: "If in the course of his investigation it should appear that the action complained of may have resulted from a policy decision at the ministerial level, he should be entitled to call for the advice tended to the Minister by his public [i.e. civil] service advisers before the decision was taken.

Where the Minister accepted and acted upon the recommendations of his advisers, they [advisers, not the Minister] can be questioned by the Ombudsman [in order to find facts, but not to recommend reversal of the Ministerial decision]. But where the Minister did not accept their advice or acted without advice ... the Ombudsman would so report [but would not question or challenge the ministerial decision or policy]. This procedure preserves the basic principle of ministerial responsibility

to Parliament. The Ombudsman would not intervene between the Minister and Parliament.”

Here the key issue is that such step facilitates transparency but does not challenge the Ministerial decision.

Developed as well as developing democracies with Westminster model were impressed with the New Zealand experience because the ministerial decision was not subject to the ombudsman's inquiry or challenge, but only the advice by senior civil servants “upon which he may have acted” (Constitution Commission of Trinidad & Tobago, 1972, para. 95; Govt. of Trinidad & Tobago, *McKell Report*, 1974, paras. 106-107). A large number of countries incorporated similar principle or provision in their Constitutions or Ombudsman Acts.

For example, the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago (Govt. of Trinidad & Tobago, Act 4 of 1976, secs. 94(1), 93(1)) provides that in “investigating any matter leading to, resulting from or connected with the decision of a Minister, the ombudsman shall not inquire into or question the policy of the Minister in accordance which the decision was made.” But he/she “shall ... investigate any advice given or recommendation made to a Minister.”

Here it may be indicated that when the Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago asked various organisations and individuals for their opinion, the Trinidad-Tobago Labour Congress went to the extent of suggesting that the ombudsman should have the power to investigate the complaints against Ministers, Judges, and even their

wives if corruption issue was involved (Govt. of Trinidad & Tobago, *McKell Report*, 1974, para. 106). The Public (i.e., Civil) Service Association felt that if the Minister had not accepted the advice tendered by the civil service advisers (i.e., Permanent Secretary or Under Secretary of a Ministry and the like) or had acted without their advice, it should be made public. But, on the other hand, the Association wanted to protect its members by not suggesting that reports that would reveal that the Ministers acted on their advice should also be made public. In response to the Commission's recommendation that the practice of official secrecy and civil service anonymity should also be relaxed, it envisaged that “serious conflict will arise” if that recommendation was translated into practice “without qualification” (Govt. of Trinidad & Tobago, *McKell Report*, 1974, para. 107). The question of ministerial responsibility and related matters generated a good deal of controversies in Trinidad and Tobago and some other parts of the world.

Such school of thought, that includes varying numbers of individuals, groups or associations, commissions/committees, is strongly in favour of empowering the ombudsman office to investigate, question and challenge the highest political authority in various continent in the developing world. Examples of some countries where this school of thought is very strong are India, Bangladesh, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, etc. (Asian Ombudsman Association, 2009, paras. 26-110; The Law Commission of Bangladesh, 2000, paras 103-115; The Law Commission of India, 2000, quoted in *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 8-12; The Daily Star, May 8, 2000). In Bangladesh the Ombudsman Act of 1980 appears to be somewhat silent or

vague about this matter. The Law Commission of Bangladesh (2000) seemed not to be happy about it and observed that "only 'actions' of 'public officers' as defined in section 2 of the Act can be investigated by the Ombudsman; but the Act does not seem to include certain important public functionaries such as ministers, members of parliament, etc. within the ambit of 'public officers'" (The Law Commission of Bangladesh, 2000, p. 9). This Commission and a number of concerned individuals and organisations are strongly in favour of their inclusion.

The original or classical school of thought, however, feels that when the ombudsman office was originally created, and later also, it was not intended to investigate and question or challenge the decisions or policies of the highest political, i.e. ministerial authority. We should be mindful of the fact that historically and traditionally, the original and primary role of the ombudsman is to monitor the applied side of public policy, i.e., policy implementation phase, not the policy formulation phase.

The policy implementation is primarily the responsibility of the bureaucracy/administration, whereas policy formulation, which is rather an outcome of the political process, is primarily the responsibility of the political or elected authority. This point may be further spelled out clearly and adequately. As noted above, administrative activities of the executive branch mean the policy implementation phase is dealt with by the bureaucracy/administration, whereas political decision or dimension of the executive branch means policy formulation phase is dealt with by the highest political i.e. ministerial authority; in other words, by the

elected officials. The responsibility of the ombudsman is to look at the policy implementation phase, i.e., the bureaucratic/administrative decisions or actions but not at the policy formulation phase (political dimension), i.e. decisions of the highest political/ministerial authority or elected officials.

In other words, as noted above, he/she is supposed to examine or investigate the actions or decisions of the bureaucratic/administrative agencies, to redress grievances and complaints against them, and to protect people's rights and liberties from them, but not to monitor political authority or elected officials. The US Ombudsman Association (1995, pp. 1-3, esp. 3) also states that an ombudsman "does not have the power to investigate [i] the people who appoint the ombudsman and [ii] other elected officials, or [iii] to have the power to look at the judicial acts of courts." Such views or ideas are part of what is referred to as "ombudsman philosophy" or "ombudsman approach" (The Law Commission of Trinidad & Tobago, 1998, pp. 21-23) which is pursued in most parts of developed democracies as well as in a number of developing democracies, e.g., most Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

However, in a good number of non-democratic countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America this is not an issue in view of the fact that no institutions including even judiciary, legislature and the like are in varying degrees, not independent of the executive branch which is head and shoulder above all other branches and institutions, they are under its thumb. The classical/legislative/human rights ombudsman institution does not or cannot exist in such political environment. In

practice, it exists either on paper or in reality operates as a quasi-ombudsman, e.g., so called executive ombudsman and the like, and becomes subservient to the executive authority.

There are a number of related issues that the classical school strongly feels about may be discussed here: Basic argument is that in a democracy, sovereignty belongs to the people or the nation.

Philosophically and theoretically speaking, Parliament is the microcosm of the nation or people. Its members collectively represent the sovereign people and exercise the sovereign power on their behalf.

The Cabinet is its executive committee and the cabinet members are also its members. Therefore, it is felt that ombudsman should not have the authority to investigate, question or challenge the official actions or decisions of the highest political authority, i.e., peoples' representatives or, in other words, elected officials such as Ministers and the Members of Parliament.

Historically and traditionally, and under special provisions of the law or constitution, courts of law (or especially a Constitutional Court, if there is one) or special tribunal may look into the legitimacy or constitutionality of the decision, actions or activities of the highest political authority of the nation.

Some also think that for performing its functions effectively and successfully, the ombudsman office needs the cooperation and support of the legislative as well as from the highest executive authority. Such cooperation and support are rather indispensable. Any

attempt to investigate them may create a hostile and confrontational environment. (Abedin, 1911, forthcoming).

Perhaps it is not out of place to indicate that in the UK, which has one of the most successful, efficient, and effective ombudsman systems both at the national and sub-national levels, aggrieved persons have no direct access to the ombudsmen called Parliamentary Commissioners. All grievances have to be channeled through the Member of Parliament/MP (in whose constituency the grievance/complaint originated) and to whom the findings of the investigation are also reported. This arrangement is due to the fact that in the UK, one of the most developed and mature democracies in world, the political convention and tradition require that the traditional role of the MPs as the guardian of the rights and liberties of the citizens of their respective constituencies must be strictly safeguarded (Gregory, *et al.*, pp. 2-3, 91-95; Marshall, 1968, pp. 87-96; Stacey, 1978, pp. vii-ix). However, this requirement in the UK is rather an exception and a unique case and fits well in the mature British political culture. But such practice may not be suitable and adopted elsewhere. The common people should have direct and easy access to the ombudsman.

The Ombudsman and Investigation of Corruption

Another fast emerging schools of thought wants to use this institution as a potent weapon against corruption in the public sector. It wants that the ombudsman should be empowered to investigate general allegations of corruption in public office. There has been an increasing demand for establishing ombudsman offices with considerable powers primarily to fight corruption or to provide such powers to

existing offices. A good number of developing countries are either inclined to equip or have already equipped their ombudsmen with varying powers to deal with corruption. South Korea, Philippines, Macao, Vietnam, Yemen, Japan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Hong Kong, some states in India and a number of other countries in various parts of the developing world, "have entrusted their ombudsmen with specific anticorruption functions" (Asian Ombudsman Association, 2009, paras. 29-33; also Kaifmann, *et al.*, 2009, pp. 1-57; Asian Development Bank, 2004). Donor countries in the West and donor organisations have also contributed enormously to such development. These countries and the organisations like IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB)/African Development Fund (ADF), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the like argue that political and bureaucratic corruption and maladministration seriously undermine the development process.

They are of the opinion that the office of the ombudsman should be created or the existing ones should be used as one of the tools for fighting corruption (Asian Ombudsman Association, 2009, paras. 29-38; World Bank, 2001, pp. 49-56; Asian Development Bank, 2004, pp. 32-35; Govt. of Bangladesh, 2000, vol. 1, pp. xi-xiv, chs. 2, 3, 6; The Law Commission of Bangladesh, 2000, pp. 9-11; Obaidullah, 1999, pp. 163-170; Siddiqui, 1996, pp. 107-109; Ahmed, March 19, 20, 1991; *Om-Gov Email*, March 22, April 20, 1999; Kabir, May 8, 2000).

Like the international donor organisations, some organisations or commissions/committees in some countries, e.g., Bangladesh and

India, express their views strongly in favour of appointing ombudsmen or to provide the existing or future ombudsman institutions with powers to fight widespread corruption in public sector organisations. It wants to make provision for forfeiting the unlawfully acquired property by the members of public organisations, and for investigating the actions of elected officials like Ministers, Members of Parliament, and some other elected public functionaries by the ombudsman. Like the Indian Law Commission, the Law Commission of Bangladesh was of the opinion that:

"The main deficiency in the [Ombudsman] Act [of 1980] appears to be that ... 'Acts of corruption', 'illegal acquisition of property' etc. by public functionaries are outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman... We are... of the view that if acts of corruption of public functionaries are kept out of the jurisdiction of the ombudsman... this institution will be virtually ineffective and will not be able to meet the expectation of the nation. So, in our view, suitable provisions should be made in the Act in order to enable the ombudsman to investigate cases of corrupt practices by public functionaries along with cases of maladministration by them" (Law Commission of Bangladesh, 2000, pp. 9, 11).

In a nutshell, some organisations, institutions, commissions/committees, groups and individuals are in favour of providing the ombudsman with much wider power in order to utilise this institution for fighting corruption.

The original/classical school, which has a diametrically opposite view, strongly feels that debate on whether the office of the

Ombudsman should be given the power to investigate corruption and the decisions of the higher political authority is a serious matter that needs to be carefully examined. It strongly opposes the idea of using the Ombudsman office as a weapon for fighting corruption because it would be a radical departure from the ombudsman concept, approach and philosophy. It believes that the ombudsman should serve the special and unique needs for which it was originally created. He/She is, in fact, a mediator, facilitator, negotiator, counselor, people's watchdog, and public defender without non-adversarial approach.

He/She is rather a "friend, philosopher and guide", but not a police officer, prosecutor or military type drill sergeant or master sergeant. Especially in the developing world, the common people, that is, "small" or "little" or "lesser" people usually turn to ombudsman (Scott, 1984, p. 214).

The ombudsman approach is, in fact, a different and unique type of grievance management approach: The ombudsman's approach is rather persuasion or mediation.

He/She avoids confrontational or adversarial relationship with the bureaucracy. Thus, this approach provides what is called alternative strategy or style of grievance management and conflict resolution. Such approach is not likely to be very effective in conducting investigation in the allegations of corruption or for fighting corruption.

It is argued that if investigation of corruption is added to the responsibilities of the ombudsman office, then the nature, style of operation, and present roles and functions of

this office will be negatively impacted upon in varying degrees. Let us briefly look at them: During the early phase (1960s and 70s) of the spread of the ombudsman system to various parts of the world a number of developing countries equipped their ombudsman with the power to investigate corruption. However, developed democracies and many developing democracies usually did not consider such move or change.

The ombudsman plan in a number of states in India, as the Professor Emeritus Rowat observed, "can hardly be classed as a genuine ombudsman plan" because they "are exclusively for serious allegations of misconduct or corruption rather than ordinary administrative grievances" (Rowat, 1983, pp.660-668, esp. 664; also Rowat, 1983, 926-929, esp. 928). In fact, these states (especially Rajasthan) in India "departed far from the original concept of ombudsman institution" (Rowat, 1984b, pp. 1-32, esp. 1-2).

No doubt, like Indian judiciary, Indian ombudsman institution is fiercely independent. But they have not been very successful in dealing with the problem of corruption, though they are geared, in varying degrees, to fight corruption. In India "the great concern with political corruption" and "allegations of misconduct against officials and ministers" have made a number of state ombudsman systems "far less effective than they should be ... Because the Indians had high hopes that the ombudsman system could be turned into an instrument to fight corruption, Indian scholars tend to regard the state plans as a failure" (Rowat, 1984a, p. 210). On the contrary, a limited number of state ombudsman plans in India "that have handled general administrative grievances have done

much good work at remedying the kind of complaint with which an ombudsman ordinarily deals" (Rowat, 1984a, p. 210).

No doubt, in a large number developing countries corruption is so pervasive and widespread that it may be considered rather a way of life and is accepted as a part of social, economic, political and administrative cultures and values.

Bribes and big tips are considered service charges. In some of these countries most politicians and bureaucrats, both at the higher and lower levels, are corrupt to the backbone and rotten to the core.

There is "hardly any sphere of life left untouched by corruption in our society" (The Law Commission of Bangladesh, 2000, p. 10; also Khan, 2007, pp. 98-101). But, it is also generally felt by the classical school that if the ombudsman is given the responsibility of dealing with corruption and/or higher political authorities, the chances are that he/she is likely to fail in varying degrees. The vital interests of the powerful and influential class which includes members of the political elites, higher bureaucracy and clientele group will be adversely and personally affected and negatively impacted upon.

As a result, they will fight back tooth and nail, marginalise his/her role, significance and importance, and try to discredit him/her. He/she also will not receive their cooperation in performing his/her usual and normal duties or responsibilities as ombudsman.

Particularly in those countries where there is great concern with political corruption and misconduct, a good number of complaints are

made against high-ranking political officials and even against Ministers and the Members of Parliament.

Some governments, therefore, being fearful of exposure, limit "their ombudsman's independence, powers and budgets, and have delayed laying their annual reports before the legislature, sometimes for years.

Also, their complaint and investigation procedures are unnecessarily formal and elaborate" (Rowat, 1984a, p. 210). It is also argued that, as noted above, the ombudsman is an officer or instrument of the legislature.

Therefore, a contradictory or paradoxical situation will be created, if he/she is empowered to investigate elected officials like Minister, the Members of the Parliament and the like. As noted above, the US Ombudsman Association (1995, p. 3) strongly feels that the ombudsman must not investigate the people who appoint him/her and other elected officials.

Moreover, if he/she is provided with the power to investigate corruption, then his/her role will become similar to that of a police officer or a prosecutor or a bureau of anticorruption and other similar institutions. The very essence of original concept of ombudsman as the redresser of grievances and complaints, and the defender or protector of individual rights and liberties against bureaucratic/administrative actions, excesses and wrong doing, will undergo radical transformation. The focus of this office will be lost and its style of operation will change considerably. Furthermore, an institution that should or does not have the power to impose its decision is not a very suitable institution to deal with

corruption.

The Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago (and also the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago) aptly observes that in the course of the "investigation of a complaint of a specific injustice to a person or group of persons arising from maladministration", the Ombudsman "may find proof or evidence tending to provide that corruption was the cause. In such a case, in addition to recommending measures to remedy the injustice he would report his findings on corruption to the relevant authorities for continuation of the investigation and such action as may be appropriate" (The Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago, 1974, para. 364; also The Constitution Commission of Trinidad & Tobago, 1972, para. 97; Govt. of Trinidad & Tobago, 1976, *Constitution*, sec. 94(3)). This is very much in line with the views and ideas of original/classical school of ombudsman. One of the universally accepted principles is that "a genuine ombudsman institution" is "designed to redress personal grievances" of which corruption may be "an incidental or associated factor" (Rowat, 1984b, p. 2). But he/she is not supposed to investigate a case or allegation of corruption.

But definitely that does not mean that corruption at the various levels of government, and various types of political wrongs and misdeeds should not be dealt with effectively and decisively. On the contrary, different offices or functionaries with separate names or titles and with strong and effective investigative and prosecutorial powers and tools should be created exclusively for the purpose of fighting corruption. They should also be provided with adequate human, financial and technical resources. But the

ombudsman office should be kept out of this and it should be given the opportunities and appropriate support so that it can perform its usual roles and responsibilities effectively and efficiently and in a unique way.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion it may be observed, in a nutshell, that the original or the classical school of thought is not in favour of empowering the ombudsman to investigate the decisions of the highest political authority and allegations of corruption because it will be a radical departure from the fundamental and basic ombudsman concept, philosophy and approach and such departure will render it less effective in performing its regular and traditional roles and functions.

On the other hand, the relatively recent or new school(s) of thought strongly feels that without such power or authority this institution will be ineffective and viewed as a toothless tiger. The jury is still out on these different perspectives.

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² For the reasons and the details of the accelerated spread of this institution see Abedin, 1986, pp. 333-353).

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US Ombudsman Association, Om-Gov Email (On a regular basis Om-Gov Email provides a wide variety of information on the Ombudsman institution across the world);

Wennergren, Bertil (1968), "The Rise and Growth of Swedish Institutions for Defending the Citizen Against Official Wrongs" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 377.

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When it is said that the ombudsman is appointed by the legislature, it actually means a number of things: For example, it may mean that the legislature is meaningfully involved, directly or indirectly, in the process of the appointment, or is instrumental in his/her appointment; or the Head of the State or some other authority may appoint him/her in consultation with or on the advice of the legislature or key legislative figures; or he/she may appoint him/her in consultation with the leader of the majority party (i.e., the Prime Minister) and the leader of the minority party (i.e., the Shadow Prime Minister), or his/her appointment is ratified by the simple (i.e., 50 plus %) or special/extraordinary (two-thirds, three-fourths, etc.) majority in the legislature, so and so forth. In a nutshell, in the case of classical or legislative ombudsman, a meaningful participation in the appointment process by the legislature is required or a must. Secondly, it is responsible to the legislature in a very general way though it is independent of it in conducting investigation of individual complaint or issue.

BOOK REVIEWS

Decentralisation in Commonwealth Africa: Experiences from Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania.

Edited by: Janet Kathyola and Oluwatoyin Job,

*London, United Kingdom, Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, 2011,
291 pp.*

The theme for the 33rd Annual Roundtable Conference of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) which was held in Lilongwe, Malawi from 14th to 18th November 2011 was **Strengthening Citizen Engagement through Decentralisation to Enhance Public Service Delivery in Africa**. Some of the key issues discussed included: theoretical and conceptual perspectives of decentralisation and citizens' engagement; policy and legal frameworks for efficacious and effective decentralisation; assessing the record of decentralisation in Africa since independence as well as governance, fiscal and human resource related issues. Most significantly however, was the Special Session that focused on Country Case Studies. One of the outstanding presentations during the Session was that by Janet Kathyola and Oluwatoyin Job of the Commonwealth Secretariat, titled: **Decentralisation in Commonwealth Africa: Experiences from Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania**.

The aim of decentralisation which is one form of the governance reform initiatives adopted by many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is to deliver effective services to all citizens and to deepen democracy through active popular participation in local governance. These

objectives are in line with global efforts to reduce poverty and open the democratic space. Majority of countries in Africa are at different stages of decentralisation supported by International Development Organizations (IDOs) with the aim of building institutional capacity to improve governance and public service delivery. By the end of the last century, most African countries had revisited decentralisation policies and programmes as part of their overall governance and macro-economic reforms. It is pertinent to know the experiences of these countries.

The book, **Decentralisation in Commonwealth Africa: Experiences from Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania** is a "result of the agreement made during the 4th Commonwealth Heads of African Public Services meeting held in Magaliesburg, South Africa in July 2007, that the Commonwealth Secretariat should assist member countries in Africa to document and publish the progress that African Public Services are making in improving public services".

It is against this background that "research was undertaken in these five countries: Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania who were the first to submit their country reports to the Commonwealth

Secretariat". The book is divided into seven chapters, with the five country reports each constituting a chapter (chapters 2 to 6). The first chapter provides an overview of the study, the conceptual/review of decentralisation and the methodology that guided the research. The final chapter undertakes a comparative review and highlights the challenges presented by decentralisation, lessons learned and suggestions on ways to improve some of the weaknesses in implementation.

Chapter one sets out the conceptual and methodological approaches to the study. The literature review of decentralisation notes that it is a "multifaceted concept that involves a transition from a governance structure where power, resources, and capacity are centrally concentrated to one in which they are dispersed to sub-national actors". Decentralisation is therefore, essentially the transfer of some authority, responsibilities, resources and accountability arrangements from the central government to a lower level of government, quasi-organizations or the private sector with the aim of achieving specific objectives. It is equally regarded as the institutional structure that defines the relationship between central government and sub-national governments or organizations in terms of authority, responsibility, accountability, and finances.

The review examines the diverse forms of decentralisation such as Deconcentration ("which occurs when the central government redistributes some of its decision-making authority and financial and management responsibilities to its subordinate or field agencies"); Delegation ("which involves the transfer of responsibility for public functions

from the central government to semi-autonomous organizations that are not wholly controlled by the central government, but are ultimately accountable to it"); Devolution (whereby the central government "transfers not only responsibility but also authority for decision-making, resources, and accountability to an autonomous and legally constituted local government"); Divestment and Co-production as well as Sectoral decentralization. In addition, the review treated the different components of decentralisation such as: transfer of responsibility; transfer of authority; transfer of resources; and transfer of accountability.

The study used a combination of three analytical frameworks. The first was the analyses of the process of decentralization focusing on the transfer of the four key components of any decentralisation programmes - responsibility, authority, resources (human, fiscal and natural) and accountability arrangements. The second framework approached decentralisation as a policy process that must be initiated and sustained by a coalition of political forces in a polity. The third was the use of an institutional analytical framework that focused on the existing institutional incentives and constraints on decentralised structures based on the assumption of "human rationality".

Three types of data collection methods were adopted. The first was based on the report that the countries submitted to the Commonwealth Secretariat for validation. Second, the country reports were assessed by experts to determine their level of "adequacy" in terms of providing information on various aspects of decentralisation. Finally, based on the review of country reports, "a two-week rapid field

survey" of the five countries was conducted to fill the gaps identified in the initial reports followed by a "stakeholders' workshop" in Gaborone, Botswana to give an opportunity to the countries to review the final papers and provide input into the publication of the book.

Chapter two which is **Decentralisation in Botswana** deals with decentralisation implementation in Botswana. It covers the circumstances that led to the adoption of decentralisation; the type of decentralisation being pursued; achievements so far; and the challenges and suggestions for improvement. The chapter is further divided into six sections. The first section provides a short introduction of Botswana and a "detailed explanation of the methodology" adopted in compiling the chapter. Section two provides the socio-cultural, political, economic, and historical context under which decentralisation should be understood in Botswana while sections three and four address decentralisation in practice by analyzing local councils and other local institutions involved. Section five assesses the contributions of decentralisation in terms of service provision and empowerment of local institutions for long-term growth and sustainability, while section six highlights the lessons, challenges and suggestions for improvements.

Two major findings are highlighted: First, decentralisation has made "a lot of progress as far as delivery services is concerned". Secondly, despite initial commitment to local governance resulting in the creation of local councils, "full decentralisation has not been achieved".

Chapter three is **Decentralisation in**

Cameroon. The chapter examines the legal, fiscal, political and administrative environment and the level of organization of its key actors in conducting the state's service-delivery responsibilities. The legal framework for decentralisation in Cameroon is found in Law 2004/17, which states that "decentralisation shall consist of devolution by the state of special powers and appropriate resources to regional and local authorities". Additional laws were promulgated in 2004 setting out the rules applicable to the regions and councils.

Major findings show that Cameroon "has had a long history of municipal governance in her cities, and especially in Western Cameroon". The ministerial structure until recently has been the key framework for service delivery, however, from 2010 council mayors have been charged with additional responsibilities for service delivery based on "a phased transfer of jurisdiction from sector ministries". The process of transfer of jurisdiction will be on a yearly cumulative basis that is expected to be completed by 2014. Although much success has been achieved in the setting up of legal structures with successive laws covering virtually all areas of administration, the study notes that Cameroon's "unique dichotomous colonial identity has influenced the structure of the post-colonial state", along with the complex heterogeneous ethnic structure, and so its decentralisation requires "sensitive management".

Chapter four, deals with **Decentralisation in Ghana**. It traces the trajectory of decentralisation implementation in Ghana. Like the chapter on Botswana, it covers the circumstances that led to the adoption of decentralisation; the type of decentralisation

being pursued; achievements so far; and the challenges and suggestions for improvements. The current decentralisation in Ghana was inspired not only by the Provisional National Defence Council's populist philosophy of 'power to the people' but also by the military government's support for the structural adjustment programme prescribed by the IMF/World Bank. Since then Ghana's decentralisation has also been seen as "a rolling-back of the role of the state and an expansion of the private sector and other non-state institutions".

Under the current decentralisation policy, Ghana's local development process has become a shared responsibility between the central government, district assemblies, civil society organizations, the private sector and communities, although the policy "intends to make local government institutions more autonomous, more responsive to local needs, and technically capable of expanding and improving service delivery". The chapter provides evidence that Ghana's decentralisation policy has ensured that more people now have access to Local Government administration. It concludes that the "intent and purpose of Ghana's decentralisation policy points to devolution, but what is being practiced now is a mixed bag of nominal devolution and deconcentration".

Chapter five traces the trajectory of **Decentralization in Mozambique** and its implementation. It is divided into six sections. The first section provides a short introduction to Mozambique and the detailed explanation of the methodology adopted for the country study and report writing. Section two summarizes the historical, geographical, economic, social, cultural, political, and

institutional context in which Mozambique's decentralisation policy should be understood. Sections three, four and five analyse devolution, deconcentration and market decentralisation in Mozambique, while section six highlights the achievements of decentralisation, the challenges and lessons, and provides suggestions on ways to improve on the policy implementation in the country.

It is noted that decentralisation in Mozambique "manifests in the political, fiscal, administrative and accountability reforms that have taken place in the country in terms of the relationship between the centre, provinces, districts and municipalities". Two critical achievements of decentralisation are highlighted: the expansion of service delivery and gradual improvement of voter turnout at municipal elections. Some challenges facing the implementation of decentralisation in the country are: the non formal adoption of a policy document on decentralisation so far; the need for the central government to change the attitude and mindset of some central government and provincial government bureaucrats, who "constantly use the excuse of inadequate capacity at the DA level to hold back the decentralisation process"; and the passage of new laws which weaken the autonomy of donors, civil society, academics, etc who would want to see further strengthening of municipalities in the country.

Chapter six which deals with **Decentralisation in Tanzania** examines the process of decentralisation by devolution in Tanzania. Like most of the chapters on Country cases, the chapter is equally divided into six sections. Section one provides a short introduction to Tanzania and a detailed explanation of the methodology adopted as

well as the socio-cultural, political, economic and historical context under which decentralisation should be understood in Tanzania. Section two, discusses the structure of the Tanzanian government and the adoption of a Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) in which the policy of decentralisation by devolution is embedded. Sections three, four and five showcase the status of implementation, successes, and challenges, while a description of the second stage of the Local Government Reform Programme and conclusion end the chapter.

It is noted in the chapter that the general objective of decentralisation by devolution or 'D-by-D' policy in Tanzania is 'to improve public service delivery under a Local Government Reform Programme'. The implementation strategy entails "decentralising government functions, responsibilities and resources to local authorities and strengthening the capacity of local authorities". Local governments are therefore, factored into all the implementation plans and programmes of MKUKUTA – the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction.

Chapter seven deals with **Cross-Cutting Issues, Challenges, Good Practices and Possible Intervention Opportunities**. It provides a comparative analyses of the following: Profile of the case study countries; current Decentralisation Policies and Practices; sectoral decentralisation, institutional and policy choices; political decentralisation; central-local fiscal relationship; human resource management at local level; and participation and service delivery.

Under Lessons and Challenges, the section draws together the different strands of facts and findings on the five country cases and these include:

- Importance of context in understanding decentralisation;
- Close links between democratization and decentralisation;
- Conceptual and policy ambivalence and confusion in respect of decentralisation;
- Governance of cities and rural communities;
- Primacy of politics in the analysis of the sustenance of decentralisation reforms;
- Role of donors vis-à-vis other national actors;
- Inadequate emphasis on the human and financial resources options and
- Weak links to new institutional actors involved in local governance.

Among the Good Practices and Potential Interventions, the study highlights some of the following good practices: Clear articulation of policy choice; Learning from past experiences; Decentralisation co-ordination agency; Constitutional protection for local governments; Mandatory central transfers to local authorities; Enhanced capacity of local government chief executive; Human resource management for effective decentralised governance; Quotas for women; and the Inclusion of traditional chiefs in local

governments.

On areas of potential intervention and ways forward, the following joint actions or “entry points” by the countries in collaboration with the Commonwealth Secretariat were suggested:

- The need to improve the capacity of national governments to support and sustain decentralisation;
- The use of central transfers to leverage potential domestic financial resources;
- The need to explore other human resource management (HRM) options;
- The need to reconcile central-led planning to decentralisation; and
- The need to use external actors to improve policy dialogue on decentralisation.

The study concludes that on the whole, “all countries have endeavoured to implement the devolution and deconcentration forms of decentralisation”. However, whereas some have articulated the difference between the two forms and made a choice- for example Tanzania- others have not, Some have pursued devolution in their municipalities but not in the rural areas (Mozambique), others have not made such fine distinction in policy but have pursued similar goals in practice.

On the whole the book is well written and the research thorough. It provides practitioners and academics with useful policy discourse on the practice of decentralisation in Africa. The

study can also serve as a peer review document for African countries on decentralisation. I suggest that since the study was limited to countries in the Western, Eastern and Southern Africa, it may be desirable for the Commonwealth Secretariat to fill this gap by conducting a second study of countries from Northern and Central Africa to have a complete picture of Decentralisation in Africa.

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