Much has been written about public administration in Africa by people who have themselves not worked as civil servants or managers of public institutions. Furthermore, many books and articles have been written by non-Africans, involved in research and teaching in Africa. This book is primarily aimed at rectifying this imbalance. The material in this volume has been written by "insiders"—practising African civil servants and managers. As such the book is unique because it is the first major publication presenting the views of African public servants on a wide range of issues which they have faced in their day-to-day work after independence. The issues dealt with include changing role of the African administrator after independence; the problem of localizing (Africanizing) the public service; the task of establishing appropriate organizational structures for the administration of development; the issue of what should be done by the civil service proper and what by public enterprises; and finally, what improvements could be made in the process of making policies?

The book is based on papers and discussions at twelve-Inter-African Public Administration Seminars held since 1962 in different parts of Africa. More recently these seminars have been held under the auspices of the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). Only the most relevant papers to the above issues have been selected for publication in this volume together with a cross-section of the most important points raised in the seminar discussions.

The Editors are both Professors of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and also members of AAPAM.

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A DECADE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

Anthony H. Rweyemamu & Goran Hyden

KENYA LITERATURE BUREAU

Management and Administration Series: No. 5

A DECADE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

Editors:
ANTHONY H. RWEYEMAMU
GORAN HYDEN

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Editors' Preface

This book has been sponsored by the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). The Editors were appointed by the Executive Committee of AAPAM in July 1973. As Editors our task was to make a selection of representative papers and views expressed at the twelve Inter-African Public Administration Seminars from 1962 to 1973. As far as possible we have tried to present the papers in their original form, and in order to provide some focus for the readers, the material has been grouped into five sections, each reflecting a major problem area covered by the seminars. We have tried to ensure that a wide range of the views expressed at these seminars are presented below while at the same time indicating stand-points commonly shared by the participants. Each section is therefore prefaced by an introduction by one of the editors. The introductions are meant to reflect opinions expressed in seminar discussions and also to enable the Editors to provide a broader interpretation of the issues raised.

Selection of papers as well as points of view that were raised in the seminar discussions has not been an easy exercise for us. There are a number of interesting papers and issues that we have had to leave out. Yet, we believe that the book as it stands does provide a representative selection of views held by senior African civil servants and managers of public institutions in the first decade after independence.

We would like to express our gratitude to the Ford Foundation which, in addition to providing financial support for the twelve seminars, made the publication of this volume possible. Finally, we wish to record our great appreciation of Mrs. Linda Roemer, who very efficiently assisted us in the painful task of editing the volume.

GORAN HYDEN
ANTHONY H. RWEYEMAMU

Dar es Salaam
September 1974

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Foreword

D. A. ANDERSON

As one of the people responsible for the first Inter-African Public Administration Seminar held in Dar es Salaam in June 1962, I am happy to write a Foreword for this book.

That first seminar was unpretentious. It was attended by less than twenty people, from Nigeria and Ghana in West Africa, and from Malawi and Somalia as well as the three East African countries. In East Africa only Somalia (July 1960) and Tanzania (December 1961) were independent countries though the road ahead for the others was clear. By the time of the third seminar held in Kampala in November 1964, all participants came from independent African countries.

The 1962 seminar had as its theme "Some Aspects of Staffing Policy in the Developing Countries in Africa". In the introduction to the discussion notes prepared for the seminar it was stated that it was organized in the belief that many of the staffing problems of the new African states are common. "The object is not to teach skills nor to identify abstract principles or academic theories of Public Administration. It is intended to provide an opportunity for practising administrators to pool their knowledge and experience in the examination of practical problems which have been, are being, or might be met in the administration of public services in the new African States."

The aspect of staffing policy on which the discussions centred was the transition from a colonial to a national civil service—Africanization. In Tanzania, the host country, this was a major controversial policy issue. West African countries had been organizing and implementing Africanization programmes for nearly a decade and it was hoped that their experience might have some relevance to the East African situation. The ensuing exchange of views revealed significantly that while there was little difficulty in reaching agreement on the definition of end objectives, the differing historical, societal, and ethnic backgrounds together with the great disparity in financial and human resources between different countries clearly indicated the need for each country to chart its own individual course to meet the necessities of its own situation. This early discovery of the diversity of environments imposing different designs for action was a healthy learning experience for participants from both East and West Africa. It will be remembered that this was the time when many persuasive voices were urging immediate creation of political pan-

Africanism without regard for the practical constraints deriving from differing local conditions.

When that first seminar was convened in 1962 there was no clear plan to serialize the exchanges. This grew from the seminar itself and the new vistas it opened on opportunities for the civil service to take an initiative of its own in intra-African cooperation.

Thus the character and purposes of the seminars was established early. There was a homogeneity of occupational background. All were African senior administrators in the civil service, that is to say they represented the top layer of direction in the institutions of their governments. In this capacity they had dual roles, first as senior advisers on the values to be adopted and the ends to be sought by the new, often inexperienced Ministers, and second as chief executives responsible for the execution of large blocks of government business. This dichotomy is reflected in many of the discussions. The issue is raised directly in the programme notes for the Kampala seminar in 1964. "Many civil servants prefer to distinguish between the high-level civil servant who is a professional administrator, a manager and an organizer; and the political adviser on programmes and objectives. There is a need for both and frequently the need cannot be met in one person."

This sense of belonging to a common profession, with common or recognisably similar problems and threats—in their advisory roles the tensions with Ministers, party officials, members of the legislature; in their executive functions friction with the more specialized professional officers and trade unions—led to the development of an intimate "clubbish" atmosphere which strengthened as familiar faces appeared at succeeding seminars. The personal friendships which developed particularly during the early seminars, had good and not so good results. On the positive side it led to a valuable and unique network of informal communications across the continent in anglophone countries. The network was at a level of influence and competence to assure optimum effectiveness in communication and service. Its coverage was not limited to the participants at the seminars. Each participant had his own national network of influence and communication into which he could introduce anybody seeking help or information. Thus, following the 1962 seminar there was a remarkable growth of correspondence and intra-African travel by African civil servants, the results of which can be seen in much standardization of techniques within civil services and in the provision of some technical assistance, particularly from West Africa to eastern and southern African countries.

On the negative side, the close personal friendships, the elevated rankings of most participants, and the high proportion of "repeaters" at the seminars, gave the series an elitist image which may have given offence in some countries.

Many of the leading participants were uncomfortably aware of the danger of the seminars sinking into an annual gathering of elderly, senior civil servants, decreasing in numbers and declining in relevance. Some efforts were

made to ensure annual injections of fresh participants, but the seminars have never quite rid themselves of what one participant has referred to as 'the housewives club' atmosphere where the substance of the formal discussions is not so important as the renewal of personal contacts. This has been largely responsible for delaying the institutionalization of the seminars and the widening of participation. At the Enugu seminar in 1963 a number of senior specialist civil servants (engineers, doctors, etc.) were brought into the seminar to present their own points to the assembled seminar of professional non-specialists. The experiment was not repeated. Similarly the question of attaching the seminars to an existing organization—the O.A.U., E.C.A., East African Staff College—was for a time raised in a ritual fashion at each annual evaluation without any resolute action being taken.

The strong desire to preserve the intimacy and privacy of the exchanges also deterred expansion of participation to non-English-speaking Africans. Some efforts indeed were made to attract English-speaking Africans from francophone countries, but, not surprisingly, with little success. One English-speaking academic from Louvanium University in Zaire attended the Accra seminar in 1967, but there was no follow-up. The organizers of the Liberian seminar in 1969 issued general invitations to neighbouring states to send participants but without response.

From the beginning, therefore, the seminars appear to have been seen as primarily an association of senior practising civil servants drawn from the non-specialist administrative class and from anglophone African countries. Their exchanges were concerned with practical operating problems and in particular the problems associated with the transition from colonialism to independence and the identification of a role for the civil service and its senior managers in that process.

But the senior government officials who, in the early 1960s, constituted these seminars, lived their professional lives in a highly politicized atmosphere where the only alternative to planned change was often involuntary uncontrolled change. It was, therefore, not surprising that from the start participants showed a tendency to plan changes in the character of the seminars. At the third seminar in Kampala it was finally agreed that future seminars would study selected problem areas in depth and that the preparation of papers to facilitate such studies should be commissioned for each seminar. It is a selection of these papers which forms the substance of this book.

The preparation of papers enabled the seminars to make a more permanent contribution to contemporary thinking on many of the important issues of the first decade of African independence. This innovation also opened the way for academics to join the seminars, and the character of the discussions became thereby subtly changed. Assertions from experience were liable to be challenged on the ground of principle, and there tended to be a more conscious effort to search for scientific principles of general application in the practice of public administration. The strongly practical bias of the discussions was not

submerged, but the addition of the academics tended to lead to more structured and systematic discussion. I believe that the intellectual quality of the discussions is at a much higher level now than in 1962. This is not, of course, entirely due to the advent of the academics, but their presence undoubtedly reduced some of the eclecticism of participation and enriched the general quality of the seminars.

Although the possibility of establishing an African professional association or Staff College was raised regularly at the seminars, it was not until the meeting in Gaborones in 1970 that the seminar participants took a decision to establish the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), thereby achieving that institutionalization which had been talked about since 1962. The creation of AAPAM simultaneously conferred the seal of professionalism on the practitioners of administration and management in the public sector.

With the creation of AAPAM a new phase began. The way is opened for a broadly based association of Africans concerned with all aspects of administration and management including practice, research, consultancy and teaching. The danger of exclusivity may have been avoided and with broader based membership the Association should be enabled to expand its activities beyond the seminars to research, advice and publication on issues of general concern to the health of the profession.

This seems a suitable point to stop and take stock of the developments and achievements of the past ten years. The editors of this book are to be congratulated on their selection of papers to be published and their illuminating commentaries introducing each section. The book will, I believe, make a significant contribution to our understanding of the issues and the attitudes which dominated the thinking of the leaders of thought and action in public administration during the formative first decade of independence.

This is, however, but a beginning. Many of the members of AAPAM were at the heart of the decision making processes in the early post-independence years. They are part of the history of their countries and can make a unique contemporary contribution to the understanding of the formative influences, constraints and pressures which determined many of the decisions affecting the character of the public services. In his paper published in this book, Robert Gardiner counsels the administrators to consistency of action and systematic advancement towards goals. As a distinguished administrator and successful practical politician, Mr. Gardiner knows well that consistency and system represent the qualities needed for only one facet of the administrators' task in developing Africa. These senior administrators have had to demonstrate qualities of imaginative innovation and boldness in decision-making as their governments stretched outwards towards new fields of public activity; they have had to concern themselves with establishing values and identifying ends as well as means. Often with little formai training for their task, sometimes without the full confidencè of the political leaders above them, and supported

by an inadequate infrastructure below, the responsibilities they shouldered have been incommensurately greater than those of the colonial civil servants whom they superseded. Their achievements have been great and should be recorded as part of the history of their country. They are not fully understood even by those of us who are close to them.

Mr. Adu in his paper published here, comments that administrators have been backward in studying and understanding the nature of change that is taking place in their societies. Mr. Adu, like Mr. Gardiner, is one of the outstanding administrators of this age, and it is good that he can stand back and undertake a critical self-appraisal. This capacity for self-criticism runs as a repetitive theme throughout the seminar reports and it is healthy. But we need to have a more objective retrospective view of the administrators in the first decade. Given the success with which they have on the whole performed their dual role of pioneers/innovators and consolidators/systematizers, it seems likely that they did indeed have a basic understanding of the nature of change—though they did not systematically study the process and principles of change and did not often articulate their understanding of it.

Certain it is, that in most of the countries participating in these seminars, the organization, functions, and character of the public service are much changed from the institutions inherited at independence. This did not take place without the active participation of the senior managers of the public service; nor have the changes been unrelated to other developments in their countries. The civil service in Nigeria is much different in organization, function and ethos from that of Tanzania. It is the nature of change in their societies which is reflected in the public service. I do not think it should be otherwise, but this could not easily happen if the senior managers did not in fact have a shrewd insight into the nature of that change. They are indeed a part of it.

These issues of the nature of change reflected in the public services and of the role of the senior public servants in channelling and mobilizing change should be the subject of further comparative studies by AAPAM. Future generations of civil servants should have access to authoritative studies of the role of the founders in the development of their public services. It is a worthy role for AAPAM to make this possible.

What has been achieved by the seminars over the years since 1962? What is different in kind or in quality because of these meetings? There has been no formal evaluation of the programme. That is something which AAPAM might in due course undertake. As I have noted above, the purpose of the first seminar in 1962 was to bring the experience of the West Africans to bear on the urgent problems of Africanization and related transitional matters in the East African civil service.

The participants of that seminar sought to continue the association on an annual basis to provide an opportunity for practising administrators to pool

their knowledge and experience in the examination of practical problems in the administration of the public services in the new African states.

The record of the second seminar at Enugu states:

> As practical administrators, participants had not sought an artificial unanimity of view on the strategy or the tactics of administration for economic development (the theme of the Enugu seminar). There had been a free exchange of views formed from participants' own experience: this had revealed wide areas of similarity of problems and objectives in different countries: it had also revealed differences in the political, economic, social, and cultural environments in which these problems had to be tackled. . . . Participants felt that they had been enriched in their professional capacities by the experience of having their views carefully examined in such an expert forum. They had been forced to review their own conclusions and deductions from their own experiences, in the light of the equally valid and relevant experience of others in the same field of endeavour. This had been a salutary caution against professional arrogance or over-confidence. . . . But participants agreed that the most important long term value of these seminars is the enlargement of understanding between administrators in different countries. From this should spring lasting friendships and growing intra-African consultation and cooperation at the official level. In this way as these seminars continue there should develop an even larger circle of African Public Servants who, without derogating from their own national loyalties, come to regard their friends in other public services as their colleagues.

This statement provides some objectives against which the seminars can be measured—an understanding that non-operational factors in a situation affect the choice of administrative means to reach an objective, that a different choice of means did not imply different ends: an enrichment of the professional capacities of the leading public servants in Africa through rigorous professional exchanges with their peers; and a widening network of personal communication throughout Africa. These are indeed worthwhile objectives and any significant progress towards their achievement would be important for the general improvement of the public services. We cannot measure this objectively, but there are some indicators that the communications network between senior administrators was effective in the transfer and adaptation of ideas.

Some tools and processes of administration used in different countries show remarkable similarities, and the pedigree of some can in fact be traced. The use of schemes of services and job analysis techniques, as the systems analysis on which staffing and training programmes for Africanization is based, spread from West Africa to East Africa and from there to Southern Africa, without major changes.

The shift of emphasis from Africanization to professionalization of the

public services occurred about the same time in a number of countries in Eastern and West Africa. The editors of this book see a causative link between Africanization and professionalization. Whether this is so or not—and I have reservations—there is certainly a sequential link. The choice of Africanization as the first priority in time was one made almost universally by English-speaking African countries after independence. The need for improving the quality of training and performance did not derive from the Africanization programme; it was always present but was deferred in time.

Similarly the reorganization of the structure of the services in different African countries has followed recognisably similar patterns. The editors have greatly criticized the lack of sensitivity of the participants to the real problems of restructuring the public services. It might be more accurate to say that they recognized this as a problem which would have to be tackled in the future, but postponed serious study until the more urgent needs had been met. When they did decide the time had come to act, there was much common ground in their approach and in their conclusions. In particular the consensus on the need to decentralize is remarkable both in regard to its articulation and its timing. It may not be too fanciful to speculate that the wide communications network on issues of public administration, and the increased interest in other African countries arising from the seminars, may have contributed to this phenomenon. This is not to underestimate the decisive influences of the politial leaders in formulating objectivess and deciding policies for their societies as a whole. The contribution of the civil servants was more directly focused on the means of achieving the ends defined by their countries' political leaders.

Throughout the sixties there has been a significant sharing of scarce skills and experience between African countries, particularly in sensitive areas. The secondment of magistrates from Nigeria to Tanzania is one example of timely intra-African technical assistance. Many special commissions established in Eastern and Southern Africa during these years have had eminent West African Chairmen—Messrs Adu, Okoh and Sarpong from Ghana, Chief Udoji from Nigeria and Mr Lule from Sierra Leone may be cited as successful examples of this intra-African exchange which, while it was not officially sponsored by the seminars, represented an attitude which was strongly endorsed and advanced in these seminars—the attitude that Africa should look to its own internal resources before looking outside for aid.

Thus, while it is as yet impossible to quantify the impact of the seminars on the public administration scene in Africa, it seems likely that they did have a continuing impact not confined to those directly participating, and that it has been of some continuing importance in the development of institutions and attitudes within the public services. That trend is likely to be heightened if AAPAM is able to widen the base of the seminars and the publication of studies deriving from them.

Meanwhile this book is a most creditable beginning to AAPAM publications, I am glad to be associated with it.

Introduction

J. O. UDOJI

Each of the five sections of this book has its own particular introduction. These set the stage for the selected background papers that follow. This introduction, then, will not emulate those who present so well the papers that constitute the main body of this book. Rather, I shall attempt here to introduce the reader to two subjects that should help him read to this book more easily, with better understanding and thus, I hope, more enjoyment. These are: (i) the reason why this book was prepared and published, (ii) the role of the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) in relation to the seminar series which forms the basis of this book.

Down through the years since the 1962 Dar es Salaam Seminar there have been repeated requests for copies of these seminar reports. These have not come only from those who were associated with the seminars, but have come from as far away as Canada, the United States, Europe and Australia. In large part, I attribute this widespread interest to the dearth of written materials, particularly from the early and mid-1960s, on public administration in the newly independent African nations. This was particularly true of writings that reflected the experiences and feelings of those men upon whose shoulders lay the burden of translating Africa's aspirations into achievements. In fact, it was not until my old friend and colleague, A. L. Adu of Ghana, published his book in 1969, *The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa* that a current and comprehensive work by a veteran practitioner was available on this subject. Primarily because of their work demands, these men had little time to reflect on and document the surging stream of events in which they were engulfed Just staying afloat was often their immediate concern.

Be that as it may, these Inter-African Public Administration Seminars have served as a forum whereby once a year these men, normally so engrossed in the demands of their daily tasks, could have a brief respite to exchange views and offer suggestions and ideas to each other. Thus, the findings of these gatherings proved a great interest to all who were concerned with the growth, change and development of public administration in independent Africa. There was so much demand for the seminar reports that the stock of many became depleted and they were thus unobtainable. By early 1972, the Executive Committee of AAPAM had to decide how to

meet this situation of inadequate supply and continuing demand. The reader should bear in mind that one of the objectives of AAPAM set forth in its constitution is "to foster affiliation and maintain liaison with international bodies and organizations interested in the progress of public administration and management", and one of the methods whereby this objective can be achieved is "distribution and exchange of document".

Several alternatives were considered by the Executive Committee, the more obvious among which was the simple reprinting of those reports in short supply. Another was reprinting all the reports and issuing them in two bound volumes, 1962-67 and 1968-72. A more attractive option was a separate book that would incorporate many of the papers that were presented in this seminar series, together with some explanatory material that would present them in a more meaningful perspective, one that would reflect the areas of attention, the causes for concern and the manner of management that occupied the talents and energies of Africa's top public administrators over the past decade.

And thus came this book that tells the story of this unique seminar series and the emergence from it of AAPAM as a pan-African professional association whose purpose is the furtherance of public administration and management. It tells of a time that differs markedly from today. It was, to paraphrase Dickens, "The best of times and the worst of times". It was a time of doubt and decision, of failure and fulfilment, of problems and progress, of revision and reform. Above all, it was a time that was challenging, exciting and gratifying to those of us who were in the midst of the struggle to bring into being responsible and responsive public administrations for the new nations of Africa.

Almost from the beginning of this seminar series, there were calls to form an organization that would ensure continuity of this experience and give to other African public administrators and managers the proceedings of these meetings. But it was not until 1971 at Freetown the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) was inaugurated. There, in his inaugural address the Association's first President, Dr. Robert Ouko stated:

> As Dr. Robert Gardiner, a founder member of this Association has warned, the substance of this colonial tradition has disappeared but the form lingers on in many administration practices. Many of Africa's problems will have to be solved largely by herself, and the international community has called upon the less developed countries of the world to carry themselves as far as possible in the field of promoting development. It is in this spirit that the African Association for Public Administration and Management has been established and launched. The Association seeks to foster the professionalization of public research and comparative studies, an increasing appreciation

of the value and importance of public administration and management. We also seek to promote the adoption of more effective and adequate administrative and management systems and practices, and to foster affiliation and maintain liaison with the international bodies and organizations interested in the progress of public administration and management.

We hope to be able to achieve these aims in a number of ways. Firstly, by establishing standing committees in research and documentation on special problems related to administrative and management practices. Secondly, by organizing training seminars, short courses and conferences on specific issues. Thirdly, by distributing and exchanging documents and by publishing research and occasional papers in our journal for promoting the development of administrative and management science in Africa. Fourthly, by providing consultancy services to professional training centres, governments and bodies interested in the progress of African administration and management. Last but by no means least, by promoting intercountry schemes of exchange of public servants and managers.

It is upon this inaugural statement that AAPAM has based its programme. In the past two years, it has published four reprints of articles germane to the field of public administration and management in Africa. It has issued three newsletters to its individual and corporate members. Both these activities are continuing. Also, in conjunction with the East African Staff College and with the support of the Ford Foundation, AAPAM sponsored a workshop on the case study method for African teachers of management which was held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1972. All these efforts, of course, are in addition to organizing and conducting the annual seminar. But time does not stand still. Things change, especially here in Africa. AAPAM, therefore, cannot be satisfied with its accomplishments, nor view with ease the current scene of public administration and management in Africa. Rather, it must seek out the priority actions required to meet the management demands of development. As managers we must, in the best tradition of our profession, seek opportunities and exploit them to best advantage, taking reasonable risks to achieve optimal return on our investments.

Looking to the future, then, AAPAM plans to initiate a number of additional activities that will help achieve the objectives of the Association, the principal one of which is to foster the development of competent administrators and managers for the rapid economic and social development of Africa. These areas of study are:

(1) Coordination of initiatives in management training;
(2) Qualifications and training for the administrators and managers;
(3) Policies and practices of housing for public servants;

(4) Salary structure and administration throughout the public sector;
(5) Wages and incomes policies and their effect on rural and urban employment;
(6) Staffing mobility between the public and private sectors, and within the various services of the public sector; and
(7) Relevance of research in Africa for immediate application of management methods and techniques to solving the problems of development.

AAPAM is uniquely qualified and able to undertake such efforts, and to ensure that the findings of such efforts show results. With its membership, both individual and corporate, AAPAM has access to the resources needed, both to carry out such studies and research and to see that action is taken upon it. Its individual members include cabinet ministers, heads of civil services, governors of central banks, managers of public enterprises, principals of training institutions, university professors, and prominent business executives. Its corporate members include training institutions, universities and government agencies throughout Anglophone Africa. That is, the Association has the wherewithal to discover what needs doing and then to help see that it gets done.

The work plan for these activities should follow these lines:
(1) AAPAM will assess the need and design the study;
(2) It will also determine the priority areas and the countries and institutions to be studied;
(3) It will then commission the conduct of the studies to its national chapters and corporate members;
(4) It will monitor progress and offer advice and assistance to those who are carrying out the studies;
(5) It will convene a small, expert workshop to review and evaluate the findings and conclusions of the study, particularly to assess its practical relevance to working and training situations in Africa;
(6) It will publish the findings for broad dissemination to all those concerned with effecting the reforms recommended by the studies; and
(7) AAPAM will review periodically, both through its annual seminars and individual contacts, the progress and success of these reform actions.

There are two aspects of these activities that should be noted apart from their intrinsic benefit to public administration and management in Africa. These are: (i) that AAPAM is not another management development and training institution crowding into the field, but rather a broadly recognized and supported professional association that works with and through existing organizations and institutions, and (ii) that AAPAM emphasizes practical

and useful studies to find relevant, applicable answers to immediate problems, not to do the research into theory or substance that is already the prerogative by many academic institutions. Here again, the experience and the position of the AAPAM membership comes into the force, since it can recognize and demarcate the major problems facing the African nations, it can work with regional and national institutions to find solutions to the problems of the senior public servants, the decision-makers who can take effective action to achieve results. In fact, it is in such ways that the attractive, but illusive goal of directing regional resources to meet regional needs can be met. As H.E. Dr. Siaka Stevens, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, said in his opening address to the Tenth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar, "Another reason why we attach importance to the seminar is that it provides a practical step to the much-talked-of regional cooperation in Africa".

There is now a widespread recognition that the single major constraint to rapid development in Africa is the critical shortage of administrative and managerial skills. This is the challenge that faces AAPAM. As a professional association with top level membership throughout Anglophone Africa, it has the capacity and the framework within which programmes and activities such as those mentioned above can be undertaken. Since it works through and with existing institutions, it can get results far more quickly, efficiently and economically than could yet another institution. I hope, then, that we can see this book as a vantage point, offering both a view of the past and a vision into the future of public administration and management in Africa.

J. O. Udoji,
Secretary-General, AAPAM.

Part One

The Changing Role of the African Administrator

G. HYDEN

The role of the African administrator, in the post-independence period, to be fully comprehended, must be seen both in its organizational and its societal context. The fluidity and problems of his role result from two basic tensions inherent in all African societies in recent years: (a) the attempt by the African society—through a mass party or any other means—to overpower the inherited colonial government bureaucracy and (b) the attempt by the new political leaders to depend on the government bureaucracy—dominated by members of a conspicuous social elite—to develop and change the society. The African society has lived in an ambiguous love-and-hate relationship with its bureaucracy. While in the absence of a well-developed private sector and/or massive popular participation in the development process, the society has been forced to depend on the bureaucracy for developmental initiative and action, it has simultaneously expressed strong aversion and reservations against its style of action.

It is clear that the role of the African administrator at the time of independence was not a well-defined one. The role definitions prevailing during the colonial time were outdated. The new, emerging African society wanted to put its stamp on government administration. It must not be a law-and-order type of administration but one committed to development. The societal pressures for change were definitely spilling over into government bureaucracy, whose main quality before independence had been its ability to isolate itself from exactly these pressures.

The role ambiguity of the African administrator is a recurrent theme in the AAPAM seminars, whose participants have had long personal experience of the tensions thereby created. It is this group of civil servants, who, on behalf of their fellow-administrators, have been engaged in the search for an "identity" for the new African administrator. The seminar deliberations during the first decade of African public administration have dwelt on a wide variety of issues relating to this search for identity. In this section we shall pay special attention to the following issues raised by the participating administrators:

(1) the relations between administrators and national politicians;
(2) the relations between administrators and the governed; and
(3) the relations among different categories of civil servants.

RELATIONS TO POLITICIANS

There is no doubt, reading the seminar reports, that one of the main issues through the years has been that of defining a constructive relationship between civil servants, notably the top cadre, and national politicians. It is not a problem that has disappeared as the year of political independence has become increasingly distant. What is political guidance and what is political interference? The question is as valid today as it was ten years ago. This must be seen against the political instability, in some countries political turbulence, that has characterized the years after independence. Political leaders have come and gone. It has not been an institutionalized transfer of power from one political party to another, as the case would be in the Westminster model, but often extensive changes in the basic government institutions. For the administrators to represent continuity under such circumstances has not been an easy task. As Chief Udoji's paper, reprinted below, indicates, this type of experience has caused frustrations and led to resignations and movements away from the civil service. There seem to be two aspects of the role of the national politicians with which the civil servants have been particularly disturbed: (a) the inclination on the part of many politicians to engage in excessive control of the civil servants; and (b) the inability on the part of many politicians to represent the national interest.

The Problem of Excessive Control

In principle, what political leaders state about the role of civil servants may not differ very much from the principles adhered to elsewhere in the world. What the then Prime Minister of Uganda, Milton Obote, told the conference participants in 1964 about the need for loyalty to the party in power and a clear understanding of the respective roles played by politicians and senior administrators are points that any political leader would support. But when it comes to putting these principles into practice it seems the African situation is filled with tensions. What does loyalty to the party in power imply? Where is the borderline between the role of the politician and that of the senior administrator? These questions have been extensively discussed at the seminars, notably in 1964, 1965, 1967 and 1970.

The 1964 seminar noted that since the civil servants had in fact identified themselves with the struggle for national independence "it could therefore be said that civil servants had been involved in politics from the beginning" (1964, p. 17). Yet, it was recognized that a distinction had to be made between party politics and national politics. The civil servant should be involved in the latter, but not allow himself to be drawn into the former. A second differentiation should also be made between the long-term and the short-term interests of the nation: "A civil servant's main interest tended to be in the long-term policy while a politician inevitably had to concern

himself to a considerable extent with the short-run effects of the decisions he made" (1964, p. 17).

The civil servant must demonstrate his loyalty to the government not only by the way in which he tenders his advice but also by the way in which he executes government policy. One major difficulty in fulfilling his duty has been that decisions are taken at the political level "not only on matters of general policy but on how that policy should be put into effect before they had been given an opportunity to tender advice" (1964, p. 18). Only at the expense of the attractiveness of the civil service as a career could administrators acquiesce in the argument that the civil service should merely be the executive wing of the party. It was, therefore, desirable to find a middle road. One suggestion put forward at the 1964 seminar was that the staff of the ruling party should be strengthened; a cadre of high calibre officials with its own fixed establishment and provision for promotion on merit should be introduced. A second proposal was that by creating committees or working parties on which party officials and civil servants worked together, the latter could be more closely associated with the formulation of policy. In this context it was suggested that useful lessons could be learnt from the Soviet Union, China and Eastern European countries; even the United States system of "brain trusts", under which eminent people in various fields were invited to examine difficult problems and to give their advice before political decisions are taken, was mentioned. It was the opinion of the seminar, however, that Ministers alone should be answerable for activities within their portfolios.

The feeling that civil servants ought to be given more autonomy by politicians and ought to participate more in policy formulation was expressed again at the 1965 seminar. While recognizing that there was a need for changing the prevailing attitudes among civil servants towards politicians, seminar participants expressed suspicion of the "indoctrination" approach which had been used in some countries, notably Ghana. "This approach particularly when used on a large scale carries the danger of a subjective and irrational application of half digested theories and enthusiasm to the recipient's own personal choice of what is important—with consequent confusion in the machine" (1965, p. 12). At the same time the Tanzanian experiment of bringing civil servants into the governing political party was noted with considerable interest—if not unanimous support. This experiment seems to have relieved somewhat the tensions between civil servants and politicians, to have given the civil servant a political forum hitherto denied him and to have reduced the remoteness of the civil service from current affairs.

As Adu stresses in his paper on *The Administrator and Change* it is important not to over-rate the ability of the civil servant to bring about political, economic and social change or even to influence it. The machinery

of government itself imposes a major constraint on the administrator as an agent of change. Yet, continues Adu, the administrator has been too timid in the past in exercising his role as an innovator and as an instrument for progress. This timidity may appear surprising given the fact that before independence civil servants were their own bosses and made the decisions now taken by politicians. Civil servants must realize that the potential for influencing decisions is very great and they should fully exploit it. But the 1967 seminar expresses the opinion that the root of the problem is the eagerness of politicians to see general orders and other regulations which have guided the administrators all along thrown overboard: "While the politician considers these regulations as a colonial heritage and, therefore, obstructive in nature, the administrator considers them as making for consistency in administration as well as making for a systematic advancement towards objectives and providing the necessary safeguard for professional ethics" (1967, p. 18). For the administrators the rules were a guarantee for an impersonal type of control, for the politicians the abolition of the rules an opportunity to exercise more personal control over the civil servants.

Chief Udoji in his paper maintains that politicians do not see how they can discharge their ministerial duties without controlling civil servants. How can they be held responsible for the official actions and conduct of civil servants if they have no part in their appointment, deployment and discipline? He argues that the fact that patronage or "spoils" exist in other countries is no reason for introducing it in Africa. In Britain, the whole system of civil service appointments by ministers is formalized and does not amount to interference. In Africa, however, where traditions and conventions are not yet well established "ministerial control" could easily be interpreted as "absolute discretion".

The 1970 seminar which addressed itself to Chief Udoji's paper agreed that one major cause of uneasiness is the strong desire of politicians to control the civil service:

> There is no objection to civil servants being controlled by politicians, in fact it is one of the principles of democratic governments that the civil service should be under the control of politicians in the sense that the former should carry out with enthusiasm the policies of the duly elected representatives of the people. But there is a distinction between the civil service being responsive to political policies and the civil service being politicized. Politicization does not mean indulging in party or national politics but it means being more political than politicians in the conduct of official business. It means playing the role of politicians instead of that of civil servants.... A politicized civil servant plays the role of a politician in that he tailors his views to the political sensibilities of his political master. He is in fact a sycophant and a time server (1970, p. 25).

This has led to lobbying, rumour-mongering and behind-the-scenes manoeuvres—a kind of civil service politics that has the effeect of destroying efficiency and morale. From the tone of the seminar reports one can only conclude that this problem of excessive control has not declined in importance over the years.

Inability of Politicians to Represent National Interest

In the early years of independence politicians were, by virtue of their involvement in the successful campaign for political independence, regarded as true representatives of the national interest. The suspicion was rather that civil servants would not necessarily identify with it. Milton Obote's opening address to the 1964 seminar reflects this sentiment: "They (the civil servants) must . . . devote all their loyalty to the nation and not to any single component part of the nation" (1964, p. 7).

With increasing political instability in many countries soon after independence, however, civil servants' notion of politicians became more sceptical. More and more, the civil servants began to see themselves as representing the national interest, while accusing the politicians of sectionalism. This is well documented in the 1965 report which states:

> In the new African States, the Public Service was subject to new pressures from party politics, tribal interests and often selfish ambitions. Too often these pressures were decisive, with damaging effects on the morale, morals and efficiency of the Civil Service. Because of the narrow sectional interests of many politicians, the Civil Servant was forced into the role of custodian of the national interest. It was he rather than the political leader who thought of the whole community.

The factor underlying this problem is well summarized by Robert Gardiner in his paper reprinted below, when he says that ministers are often too approachable and liable to accede to requests without adequate grounds, while civil servants, on the other hand, often are too unapproachable and liable to refuse requests without examining the cases adequately. This leads to a proliferation of personal approaches to ministers who are considered the only persons in the ministries with the power and desire to help.

This notion among members of the public is understandable given the experience of the colonial administration which effectively shut itself off from such pressures. Yet, the fact is that these pressures on politicians and their inclination to accept them have radically changed the conditions of work for the civil servants after independence. The reaction of participants in the AAPAM seminars has been that of trying to reinforce the need for integrity in the service. The civil service must set an example in this respect if the public is going to gain confidence in the government. The 1967 report emphasizes this point by stating that if people holding top posts resist

pressures from family and friends to favour their kith and kin, the general public will come to accept it as the normal practice (1967, p. 20).

RELATIONS AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS

One important question in this context is how to ensure that the roles played by civil servants can be protected from parochial pressures. Seminar discussions have particularly focused on the role of Public Service Commissions. At no time have participants really viewed this institution as a safeguard against arbitrary appointments. In 1963, most participants agreed that there are valid reasons for senior civil servants to be appointed by the President or the Prime Minister (1963, p. 14). The following year it was noted that these commissions were not in tune with the desire for rapid progress. Admittedly this fact could not be exclusively blamed on the commissions because they normally function within narrow limits prescribed by the Government. Yet, the Public Service Commission ought to be more actively involved in the management of the civil service:

> There is a need in each country for a body to keep the structure under review and to advise how it should be adjusted to meet modern requirements... this might be an appropriate function for Public Service Commissions; that they should cease to act as central personnel management offices and should become management agencies to advise and assist the executive departments of government (1964, p. 9).

The 1970 seminar devoted a long time to discussing the problems facing Public Service Commissions in Africa. The main difficulty arose out of the fact that the commission was a remote and negative institution. It was quasi-judicial and unable to sympathize with the wishes and aspirations of politicians. Also to civil servants it was remote as it had no responsibility over matters such as creation and grading of posts, specifying of qualifications, training and posting. Another difficulty was that the elite in society was excluded; politicians and top civil servants did not qualify and hence some commissions were manned by persons of low calibre. Under such circumstances it was not uncommon that heads of departments would come into open conflict with the Public Service Commission whose power they viewed with jealousy.

Participants in this seminar were divided in their opinions about what to do with the commissions. Some thought that these institutions should be scrapped and their functions transferred to a central personnel agency. They maintained that it was wrong to separate powers of appointment, promotion and discipline from those of general staff development. Some countries, notably Botswana and Ghana, had already taken steps in this direction.

The emasculation or abolition of the Public Service Commission was

rejected by another group of participants who argued that given the present level of social and political development in African countries it still fulfilled an important role. The commission could make appointments on the basis of merit. On the other hand it was argued that those who supported the retention of the Public Service Commission in its present form were at least a decade out of date. They were laying undue emphasis on integrity and the protective functions of the commission. Nowadays the managerial functions should be given first priority; if the commission was not constituted or unable to perform such functions it had no right to exist merely to ensure that the right persons were employed and protected.

The 1970 seminar also addressed itself to the concept of a career civil service for top civil servants. Almost all the participants came from countries which operated a career system for all established permanent and pensionable staff. Chief Udoji's paper on the subject, however. was critical of the concept. Some participants agreed with Udoji that the career system had been prematurely introduced in Africa:

> It took developed countries decades to develop and establish the concepts and practices of a career system. African countries on the other hand, are operating the system with its various concepts without being socially and politically ready for it (1970, p. 26).

They maintained that a career system will only be firmly established when there is professionalism in the service. The career system should not be regarded as an alternative to patronage but as *attributes* of a highly developed and efficient service.

Very few African governments have been able to appoint their own nationals into the civil service without granting them permanent status or bringing them wholly into the career system. Yet experience shows that many administrators may only want to serve for a limited period in order to gain experience before setting up their own business or transfer to other institutions. Secondly, the complexity of government activity requires bringing in experts for specific assignments. Under such circumstances contract appointments would be more convenient than permanent tenure. It was also noted that such appointments would facilitate the exclusion of inefficient officers.

The point about greater interchange of senior staff between the civil service and other occupations had been raised in 1964, but it was then regarded as full of practical difficulties. By 1970, the prevailing view was that these "practical difficulties" had to be tackled.

As Gardiner states in his paper the expansion and diversification of the civil service to meet the development needs after independence presented many problems within the service; one of them was to deepen the dichotomy between the generalist administrator and the professional man or the technologist. In 1963, a group of professional officers attending the seminar gave their views on what is wrong in the relationship between administrators

and professional officers. These factors include: (a) promotion prospects, status and prestige are far better in the administrative service than in the professional services; (b) many administrative officers suffer from a "boss complex" in their relations with professional officers; (c) professional advice should not be subject to quasi-professional criticism by administrative officers on its way to the Minister; (d) the separate functions of the administrative and professional sides of a ministry should be clearly defined; and (e) a professional officer should be eligible for appointment to the top post in a ministry.

The administrative officers did not agree with all these points. They pointed out that promotion prospects are rapidly declining in the administrative service and it is not likely to expand at the same rate as professional services. (This has certainly been true in the ten years which have passed since these comments were made). It was agreed that administrative officers should not give instructions on professional matters to professional officers. Similarly it was agreed that submission of professional advice through a Permanent Secretary should not preclude the chief professional officer from direct access to the Minister. While it was conceded that some professional officers have become successful Permanent Secretaries these are exceptions. The administrative officers maintained that administration is just as skilled work as any other profession (1963, pp. 14-16).[1]

The relationship between generalists and professionals came up again in 1964. The discussion then focused on what could be done to increase the attractiveness of the professional career. The seminar noted that:

> Experience had shown that it was not only a matter of salary. Before a post became more attractive than another one it must also carry much prestige, or at least as much prestige, for its holder. In the long run this involved a change in social attitudes; society must give the same respect to its experienced agriculturalists and engineers that it gave to its senior administrators (1964, p. 21).

In 1967, it was recognized by the seminar participants that the technologist is now challenging the generalist administrator competence to cope with his present functions of increasing economic and social development. He wants the administrator to have some specialist training to perform his functions efficiently:

> It is, therefore, not in the interest of developing countries to have young inexperienced, generalist administrators promoted to head ministries, mainly because they are in the administrative class. This is because every mistake they make in running their ministries affects the rapid development of their countries adversely. On the other hand, it would be unwise to switch the really scarcely trained manpower from the professional field to the purely administrative field. It would

> be better to provide all the necessary incentives for the technologist so as to make him practise his speciality with enthusiasm. It is clear that it is not higher salaries that the technologist is after; he is after self-fulfilment. He feels that he must have a fair share of the wielding of power (1967, p. 19).

In more recent years the relationship between generalists and professionals has disappeared from the agenda and instead focus has been given to professionalization of the generalist cadre. This topic will be dealt with in the next section. We shall now turn to a discussion of the relations between civil servants and the public.

RELATIONS TO THE GOVERNED

The public view of the government service in Africa has been one of suspicion. During the colonial time the prevailing attitude was to avoid the government; if it brought anything to the people it was trouble. The general aloofness of the colonial civil servant only reinforced these feelings. To a large extent the same attitudes have survived independence. Politicians as well as African administrators have realized that a change must be brought about. Civil service attitudes must be brought in line with current political and social philosophy. The 1965 seminar recorded that:

> There was still too much of a tendency for Civil Servants to regard themselves as privileged intellectual elite removed on the one hand from the politicians to whom they pay submissive lip-service only and on the other hand from the masses from whom they are socially distinct. Somehow the Civil Service must become more integrated into all levels of society and identified with the social and governmental revolution which is taking place around it (1965, p. 13).

One way of achieving this integration would be through voluntary part-time social work. The civil servants ought to get involved in community work on a voluntary basis.

Integration was also one of the key concepts at the 1967 seminar. A good deal of the administrator's resources should be devoted to achieving a more integrated society. Tribalism and sectionalism have to be overcome and civil servants cannot isolate themselves from this effort.

Popular consultation and participation were discussed in 1968, when two background papers—both reprinted below—treated relations with the governed. The minority opinion was that in some communities the people did not really know what was good for them and that what African countries wanted was tough, dedicated and knowledgeable government servants who could push development. This view, however, was criticized by the majority who claimed that this was an imperialist argument. People know what they

want and what is good for them. These popular wishes may have a low priority in the national plan but it was through education and persuasion that Government could convince people to change. The spirit of self-reliance should not be quelled. In stressing the need for senior civil servants to participation, the 1968 seminar noted:

> This they could do through the maintenance of an efficient system of communication to and from the masses. In particular, junior field officers who came in close contact with the people should be trained not only in their particular job but in the aims and objectives of Government and in the manner of dealing with the public with courtesy, sympathy and understanding (1968, p. 18).

Popular participation, however, may be meaningless if it is only on the terms set by the Government. The people must be able to control their governing institutions. This can rarely be done directly by each citizen. Certain agencies are created to facilitate such control. The most important of these institutions is usually believed to be the Parliament. At the 1970 seminar when this matter was discussed participants were rather sceptical about the role of Parliament as an agency of control of the civil service. They noted that there is a tendency for governments to use their majority to bulldoze measures through Parliament. This is particularly so where members are not of a high calibre and where sectional and party loyalties override loyalty to the nation. They agreed with the view in one of the background papers that "the result is that what should serve as the people's watchdog connives at the misdeeds of administration" (1970, p. 18).

The Ombudsman was considered an important addition to existing external control systems. Unfortunately the institution had at that time only operated in one African country—Tanzania. Participants noted that the demand for establishment of the office was growing in some countries as complaints about corruption, nepotism and excessive bureaucracy became louder in and out of Parliament. The majority seemed to agree that the Ombudsman was going to be of advantage not only to the governed but also to the civil servants themselves.

While the Ombudsman may help to institutionalize the role of the administrator in new African states, seminar participants felt that the press was still far from being an effective corrective mechanism. The foreign-owned press is timid and unable to criticize governments while the locally owned press still suffers from lack of professionalism and other handicaps. An independent and indigenous press can in the long run help the ordinary citizens to protect themselves from the mercy of officious and sometimes corrupt bureaucrats.

Both Mr Nyagah and Mr Mchauru, in their papers reprinted below, draw attention to some of the factors that have actualized the need for more effective control of the civil service: the tendency among administrators to

develop and perpetuate class stratification and the desire to get rich quickly by use of their official position. The social elite position of the administrators has often impinged on their official position as government servants. It has been difficult for many such people to distinguish between their role as public servant and that of private citizen. This can only be understood with reference to the peculiar social position of civil servants in contemporary Africa. The seminar discussions and background papers, although referring to the problem frequently, offer little analysis of this issue. It may, therefore, be appropriate to go a step beyond the actual seminar records and see what two prominent African observers have said. Ukpabi Asika, himself a senior administrator, has explained the social position of African civil servants and politicians in the following manner:

> Because the governing middle class is characteristically non-entrepreneurial it lacks the organic interest which motivated the classic-type European middle class to promote an internal national market and economy, and hence to establish nationalism, in the form of mercantilism. As managers, achievement and success is eminently individual and non-sociational. Since, at any given moment, there exist only a few officers, and the expansion of the number is not ultimately their concern, there is pathological fear of competition and hence the competition that there is, is mediated by patronage, nepotism and tribalism.[2]

This problem has been further reinforced by what Subramaniam, with reference to the Indian middle class, calls the exogenetic impulse, i.e. the dependence of the middle class on the colonial administration and foreign companies for its development.[3] Both lack of entrepreneuralism and dependence on externally controlled institutions have led to a sense of insecurity among politicians and civil servants in many African societies. It is only natural, therefore, if the emergent indigenous middle class tries to establish itself as a propertied class and leaves its status as a salariat. With specific reference to Kenya, John Okumu has noted that what we observe is:

> the attempt of the new middle class to shake itself loose from the embrace of external finance through a conscious and deliberate attempt to acquire productive property, and to transform itself from a governing group to actual middle class, and thereby succeed in becoming a genuine reference group, the norm-setter in society.[4]

The African civil servant, then, should not be viewed as a passive pawn in the international economic system. He is actively engaged both at the professional and the societal level to establish his own identity. Given the historical coincidences of African development in the twentieth century the ambition at one level is not always compatible with that at the other level.

This does to a large extent explain the peculiar tensions in the development of the role of the African administrator today.

FOOTNOTES

1 For a discussion of these issues, see also Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), *Nigerian Administration and its Political Setting* (London: Hutchinson, 1969).
2 Ukpabi Asika, "The Uses of Literacy", *Nigerian Opinion* (Vol. 3, No. 3), January 1967, p. 154.
3 V. Subramaniam, *The Managerial Class of India* (All India Management Association), New Delhi, 1971), p. 41.
4 John Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting", in G. Hyden, R. H. Jackson and J. J. Okumu, *Development Administration. The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 37.

From Colonial Rule to Local Administration

R. K. A. GARDINER

The change from colonial status to independence is, in a sense, a transition from rule by Governors to that by representatives of the people. Governors were appointed by foreign metropolitan powers each setting its distinctive stamp on the territories which it ruled. The administrative systems of territories formerly governed by France have a great deal in common; the same is true of former British territories irrespective of their location. The two systems show striking differences which will take some time to modify as independent African states strive to find solutions to the challenges and problems facing them. It is in this search for solutions that national administrations would be moulded into varying patterns.

Colonial Governors, too, sometimes left their individual impression on the administration and the territories which they governed. In the case of Guggisberg (Governor of the Gold Coast, 1919-1927), the foundations of many of the achievements for which he is best remembered were laid long before he took office; Takoradi Harbour, Korle Bu Hospital and Achimota were all mooted before his time, but it is very doubtful if they would have developed in the form they did and at the time they did without his influence.

Each colonial Governor was a power in the land. The trappings of office and the panoply of governorship conferred an importance independent of the men in office—the timorous, the indolent, and the ineffective could hide behind the façade of office while the courageous, the diligent and the brilliant could stand out above it.

In the absence of a government based on Presidential authority or Ministerial responsibility a political and organizational framework of administration rested on the supremacy of the Governor and, through him, on the metropolitan power. The Governor represented a curb on internal power; and his political officers—advising traditional rulers—controlled the tempo, form and content of local political action. The Governor could be, and occasionally was, removed; but this rarely happened overtly as a result of pressure from within the country which he governed. To all intents and purposes the Governor represented arbitrary power.

Governorship, however, tended to create its own precedents and conventions and so each Governor regarded himself as acting within a framework

of laws, regulations, customs and traditions which obliged him and his subordinates to conform to a set pattern of behaviour. Arbitrariness was possible because of the lack of an informed public and an effective press; but it was curbed, to a certain extent, by the existence of Colonial General Orders, as a strict code of conduct, the Colonial Office and the Metropolitan Parliament. This resulted in a relative stability of administration, free from blatant abuses, but it in turn delayed the development of national political leadership, civic consciousness and appreciation of the implications of independence.

Independence has not provided the relative stability of government which is necessary for the creation and development of an effective administration. In this respect it can be inferred that the civil services of most African countries have never had the opportunity to develop and "find their feet".

Part of the cause of the instability was a decline in the observance of Colonial General Orders, Rules, Regulations and Procedures which were not replaced by satisfactory substitutes. Feeling that the General Orders and Regulations were merely a European invention designed to keep a tight grip on the population rather than a necessary mechanism which should work with precision, people tended to deride them. In some cases, laws on the statute book were considered inappropriate to the new situation; they were ignored or even flouted and this led to uncertainty in the administration and the discredit of law itself. In other cases old laws were abolished and replaced by new ones which were passed without proper thought being given to their possible consequences or to their full implementation. There is need for a general legal and procedural frame of reference; if the old one is inappropriate, a new one in conformity with the needs of the times must be devised and put into operation. A vacuum is dangerous; and so is turbulence: both are frustrating to progress and costly.

The general legal and procedural framework should be the embodiment of political ideals, needs and policy decisions. It makes possible consistency of administration and systematic advancement towards goals. One of the faults of the colonial system of orders, rules and regulations was that they were developed centrally and applied universally, often with little real regard to local conditions, aspirations, customs and traditions. Independence has given the opportunity to remedy this, but has that opportunity always been taken? There are still many laws on the statute books whose main purpose was to bolster colonial policies; there are many laws which do not embody national aspirations or meet the development needs of newly-independent states. Even today, at some African airports, nationals travelling abroad are handed forms in which they are required to declare whether they are "native" or European. The regulations for retirement were introduced largely to suit the convenience of expatriate staff who, for health reasons, were discouraged from remaining too long in the tropics. Although improved medicine and hygiene have made this proviso practically redundant, the

retirement age remains exactly as it was. Another anomaly is to be found in the civil service regulation which requires that certain grades of artisan should produce apprenticeship qualifications, when in fact no local apprenticeship system exists.

The colonial Governor was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as well as the senior civil administrator. In many ways the colonial civil service could be considered as an extension of the Armed Forces; its principal functions were the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes. The attitude of the administration to trade, industry, agriculture and the development of natural resources was *laissez faire*. The "gentlemen" of the civil service felt profound disdain for commerce and industry; they little more than held the ring for commercial interests. The result of this policy—or lack of it—was that development was unplanned; exploitation of natural resources was undertaken in piecemeal fashion by, or under pressure from, private companies and individuals; technical development was sporadic; efforts were concentrated on making maximum profit in the short run, without planning for effective long-term use of resources. Sometimes governments were compelled to step in, either to prevent gross abuses or to sponsor projects which commercial interests were unable or unwilling to undertake. The construction of harbours and the extension of railways are cases in point. In Ghana, the extension of the railway from Accra to Ashanti and in East Africa from Nairobi to Uganda, facilitated the transportation of goods; and the existence of Takoradi Harbour put an end to the congestion, waste of time, loss, deterioration and high insurance rates which were the result of shipping produce, especially cocoa, through the surf ports. Further, the establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board, an official agency for the local purchase and sale of cocoa abroad, ended the evils committed by middlemen.

The attitudes of present administrators—not to mention some ministers and politicians—are still largely conditioned by this history and these traditions, which are no longer relevant in an independent country bent on developing and exploiting its economic resources. The structure and training of the civil service is still oriented mainly to the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes; departments concerned with economic development, trade, industrial promotion, agricultural extension and manpower development are still regarded in many influential quarters as rather troublesome fifth wheels to the chariot. The civil service personnel system is still geared to the recruitment of "gentlemen" for the general staff and to ensuring that every established post is at all times occupied by an official of the appropriate seniority, however, frequent and disruptive the transfers necessary to do this may be.

Continuing the military analogy, the "gentlemen" of the general staff consider themselves far superior to those in the technical branches and enjoy

an equivalent status. The technical officer rarely has the opportunity of transfer or promotion into the general service. Many able men have been lost to the senior echelons through rigid adherence to this tradition. Guggisberg was the brilliant exception; from a military background and service as a surveyor—a technical grade—he was made Governor. The establishment was outraged and foretold disaster. But Guggisberg thrived and benefited from his previous experience. Now, more than ever, there is need for rethinking the policies of recruitment, development and promotion to ensure that competent men and women from technical fields as well as those from the administration have the opportunity to reach the highest levels in the public service.

Under the colonial regime, the efficiency and productivity of the public service was ensured by the development of an elite of expatriates, chosen by highly selective methods of recruitment and blooded in the atmosphere of a Spartan military caste—often separated from family but wedded to a strict concept of service and the rigid social code of the club. The "army spirit" was developed to keep administrators together and to shape their loyalties and codes of conduct. The national pride of the expatriates imposed certain standards, some of them, it must be admitted, rather unnecessary. Today the substance of the colonial tradition has disappeared, but the form lingers on in many administrative practices. Court procedure provides a case in point. In the colonial days interpreters were employed to facilitate the work of expatriate magistrates or judges who did not understand the local language. These court interpreters still retain their posts, with the result that one sometimes witnesses the curious situation in which an indigenous magistrate or judge has to listen to interpretation from a local language which he fully understands. Where is the nationalism and the sense of professional competence which would make the civil servant proud of his profession? New standards of conduct and of loyalty need to be set. New norms of performance need to be adopted to meet new situations and new opportunities.

The old external constraints of the colonial and the metropolitan parliament have been removed. The new states are exposed to all the conflicting influences and pressures of international relations. A new distinction between political and administrative officers has arisen. The development of ministerial responsibility imposed the need for new relationships between political chiefs and administrators. Each needs to have understanding and sympathy for the problems of the other.

Under the colonial system, the separation of powers was very fragmentary; the real legislative power rested in Westminster. When Legislative Councils developed, they consisted largely of and were dominated by official members—the administrators. Much of the judicial function was carried out by the administrators—for example, the District Commissioners were the judges in

the local courts. There was little distinction between political and administrative functions—the real political power was in London and the administrators doubled as politicians, for such decisions as needed to be taken locally. With the advent of independence, there came a need for the separation of legislative, judicial and executive powers and institutions. Political heads were appointed to ministries and to the provinces; the relationships between them and the administrators had to be established. Senior administrators who had been used to the old system, under which their predecessors had been both administrators and political heads, found it difficult to adapt to the new situation under which their functions had radically changed. They had no experience and little training for working under a system of ministerial responsibility. The politicians, too had no experience of working with administrators. (In many cases their careers had been built on opposition to the ruling power in colonial days). They often regarded the civil servants' attempts to ensure that administration was in accordance with the law as obstruction. Adding to this the new and extended tasks and functions assumed by the new governments, it is not difficult to see that almost intolerable burdens were imposed on the inadequate numbers of administrators at hand.

The expansion and diversification of the civil service to meet the new situation presented many problems. There was an acute shortage of people with the necessary technical skills; there was a need for completely rethinking the administrative structure and there were pressing tasks of current administration—all of which diverted attention from planning and preparing for the future. In the wake of independence, understandably, came the demand for the immediate elimination of all vestiges of the former status. In particular, in a number of countries there was the desire to replace all expatriate administrators by African at once. It now seems that this policy may have been pursued too far and too fast. The civil service has now been established as an indigenous one and this can be taken for granted, but there are gaps which the training of local personnel has not yet been able to fill. Economic and social development calls for the expansion not only of the services directly involved, but also of the administration in general. It also calls for new skills. In these circumstances there needs to be a considered policy for the recruitment and retention of expatriates until indigenous staff can be educated, recruited, trained and allowed to gain experience.

The practice of indirect rule enhanced the position of the traditional rulers, though it also limited the scope of their activities. The new political leaders came from different social groups; they were often in opposition to the traditional rulers and even condemned the whole system of tribal chieftaincy. In some countries, with the advent of independence and the overturning of the old system, efforts were made to take away the functions of the traditional rulers entirely or to limit their role to a ceremonial one. This was sometimes vigorously opposed, not only by the traditional rulers them-

selves, but also by the people. It was inevitable, of course, that some of the traditional rulers who were also natural leaders should be transmuted into political leaders. As leadership became institutionalized under the new system, it was often realized that traditional rulers had a role to play and that it was unwise to try to eliminate them merely because they had collaborated with the colonial regime.

The governors and their staffs had limited opportunities to discover the real needs and aspirations of the people. They were of a different race, a different culture, a different tradition. They had difficulty in making real contact, even when they tried. Their pattern of life practically excluded social contact with the local inhabitants. It is not surprising, therefore, that they developed the belief that they knew what was good for the people better than the people knew themselves. They built up their ideas on very limited information and imputed their own interpretations and conclusions to the local inhabitants. Many local politicians and administrators who had studied abroad were considered to have acquired the culture and the standards as well as the learning of the countries in which they had been. Thus they were thought to have grown away from and to have lost contact with the mass of the people in their own countries. When independence came, therefore, it was assumed that many of the new elite were in little better shape than the old to understand the needs and aspirations of the people.

The new governments are dedicated to the service and the improvement of the lot of the people. They have to interpret the people's desires. They have to involve the people in government objectives. They need the people's co-operation in economic and social development. To some extent, the new government's link with the people has come through political parties—whether a one-party or a multi-party system has been adopted. That link is necessarily a political one. The political leaders attempt to circumvent the administrators. The administrators, in keeping with past traditions, tend to feel that they know best the needs and desires of the people. This makes for further tensions between the politicians and administrators. The situation is difficult to resolve, but the solution may come at least in part through the development of local government and administration.

At time it is possible to observe similarities in the behaviour of governors and leaders of parties in power in newly independent states. For example, almost all achievements in Guggisberg's time were attributed to him. This tradition is consciously followed by prime ministers and presidents who seek credit for all developments during their term of office. They sometimes sponsor spectacular and wasteful projects for the same reason. Such leaders act as if they were accountable to no one. This was the impression which governors created; and the reaction—or lack of immediate reaction—to arbitrary acts of party bosses confirms the notion that the people regard politicians in office

as the exclusive source of all forms of power. The ex-President of Ghana warned his opponents frequently that he would show them where power lay.

Under colonial rule local government, strictly speaking, existed only in certain municipalities. In the country at large, local councils and district councils were merely agencies of the central administration charged with the collection of taxes and with a limited jurisdiction in the local courts. Attempts were made to encourage local participation, but never local self-government. Local participation was at two levels, the political and the technical or executive. Guggisberg was a great advocate of the capabilities and potential of the local population, and insisted on localization of administrative and technical posts formerly occupied by expatriates though this was resented by many of his colleagues as a breach of the caste system. But even Guggisberg regarded political takeover as a very remote possibility.

African politicians in Guggisberg's day felt that the opportunities offered to them to take part in municipal government were poor substitute for participation in policy formulation at the centre, which was reserved to expatriates. This helped to engender a feeling that service in local administration, either as a member or as an administrator, was a poor second best to service with the central administration. This feeling was reinforced as far as the administrators were concerned, by the poor salaries, conditions and prospects in local government service. These conditions and attitudes have carried over after independence to the detriment of local administration.

The needs of development and planning demand wide popular participation. One of the most promising ways to secure this is through effective and imaginative local administration. Ways must be found to attract able and energetic men to take part in it, as members and as administrators. They and the local people must be given an effective say and an effective part to play in the framing of plans and in their implementation. We must get away from old prejudices and preconceptions and develop systems of local governments and administration in keeping with the conditions and needs of an independent developing country.

The importation of ready-made systems from England or elsewhere, as was tried in some cases towards the end of the colonial era, is no solution. Take, for example, the political party system. Most African states have borrowed the party system from Europe and a number of them have, since independence, evolved single parties. The fact that in many instances the single party system has proved inadequate, is no reason for a wholesale adoption of the party system as practised in the West. Britain and France, which had the largest number of colonies in Africa, are class societies. African societies are plural societies. "What is wrong with the parties in new states is not that they exist, but that their inheritance from European political philosophy is the language and tactics of the class war, rather than the

language and tactics of groups whose problem is to live in coalition with each other".[1]

Corruption, self-interest and nepotism in the public service arise from a variety of reasons. Politicians who have sponsored legitimate causes may feel justified in accepting rewards from those who benefit from the success of their efforts. In a society where local, family and tribal ties are stronger than nationalism, it is perhaps natural that politicians and civil servants should feel compelled to give preference to members of family and tribal groups when employing staff and administering social benefits. When administrators on relatively low salaries have the duty to allocate contracts, incentives offered by those making bids may be too much to resist. The spread of the one-party system had led to new temptations to the public servant. He is sometimes asked to solicit or collect contributions to party funds. On the one hand, such funds need not be accounted for so strictly as government money; on the other hand, those making contributions often expect favours in return. These evils are difficult to deal with unless the root causes are removed. It is, however, possible to devise administrative systems which make it more difficult to practise them. A feeling among public servants and public alike, that such practices are wrong and should not be tolerated, would go a long way towards stamping them out.

Ministers are often too approachable and liable to accede to requests without adequate grounds; civil servants are often too unapproachable and liable to refuse requests without examining the case adequately. This leads to a proliferation of personal approaches to ministers, who are considered to be the only persons in the ministries with the power and the desire to help. It increases the difficulties of the civil servants and widens the gulf between them and their political chiefs.

To sum up, a civil servant can function efficiently and without abuse only within an accepted legal and procedural framework. The time for the disregard of general orders, rules, regulations and procedures is past. We must modify them, or devise new ones to replace them for where there are no rules there can be no justice. Equally important is the need to recognize that the policy of government must reflect the aspirations of the people, and that the civil servant, in implementing these policies, must attempt to appreciate the thoughts and feelings of the people. This is the civil servant's dilemma: to carry out policies while remaining aware of their full implications and to avoid playing up to the whims and caprices of politicians. It is for civil servants more perhaps than for any other group in the community to obey the Biblical injunction not to "follow a multitude to do evil".

FOOTNOTE

1 W. A. Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.), p. 69.

The Administrator and Change

A. L. ADU

The old Africa which had existed for centuries has been swept away. In the immediate post-colonial period, there was hope and belief that independence could solve most of the problems of the continent, but that period has now turned into a nightmare of shattered hopes, both politically and economically, and the frustrations of everyday life are threatening to blind the vision of the few remaining genuine leaders on the continent. Today, when almost the entire continent of Africa consists of sovereign states, African leaders and peoples find themselves living in conditions of internal stress and strain compounded by external pressures which they have neither the men nor the economic power to control. Looking at Africa as a whole, one can say that the political revolution that brought African leaders to power has failed to satisfy the economic and social needs of the people. This has led to the overthrow, in many cases, of the elected governments by their Armed Forces and in others to the emergency of one-party states, usually under the strong leadership of politicians who led the struggle against the erstwhile colonial power.

Colonialism has undoubtedly left its impact on the political, economic and social life of Africa, an impact which could be described as catastrophic. Societies and tribes were under colonialism either split or decimated; countries were created arbitrarily according to the economic desires of the colonial powers and, generally speaking, the colonial period left behind such a wave of destruction that Africans are still suffering from its effects not only on their politics and economies but also on their culture and personality.

POLITICAL CHANGE

One of the political legacies of the colonial period is, therefore, the need to build a sense of nationhood in states whose boundaries, except in a very few cases, have no logical reason for existence. Although common existence under colonial rule is not an unusual basis for the creation of nations since there are precedents in other continents, the problem in Africa is that there was not enough time for integration to go far enough in creating a common sense of belonging among the tribes and societies of any of the states. In any case, the object of the colonial powers was not to encourage the creation of states in the territories under their control but rather to promote their own politics, economy and trade.

The result consequently is that all African states have had to devote a great deal of energy and resources to the task of nation-building and political integration. Regionalism, tribalism and social factionalism as well as religious differences have been potent factors in the political lives of African states. The post-colonial political developments have had their impact on progress towards the achievement of the integration of the differing tribes and peoples within the nation-states. This progress has, however, been much slower than had been confidently hoped, and indeed in a few states integration policies have lamentably failed in their purpose and disintegration faces them. Even in those states where significant progress has taken place, it is not possible to say with any degree of confidence that stability has yet been achieved.

Another area of political change has been the impact of European values, attitudes and institutions on the political life of African societies. These factors, while they have had a profound effect on African political development, have not been strong enough to create lasting institutional and attitudinal bases for political developments.

All African states inherited so-called democratic political institutions together with the ideologies and attitudes which go with these institutions. We are all familiar with ideas like universal adult franchise, democratic legislatures, loyal oppositions, the rule of law, the usual human rights and freedoms, and so on. The revolutions in African governments since independence which have led to strong central rule, the suppression or lack of opposition and the rush of military takeovers, are a clear demonstration that these institutions have not in fact been planted on fruitful and receptive ground. They could not have been firmly accepted by the peoples of Africa generally because they were probably alien to the local political circumstances, the psychology of the people and their attitudes to change.

Furthermore, the task of achieving orderly political change and reasonable stability has been made more difficult by the fact that African states were pitch-forked into international politics immediately on the attainment of independence. The external relations machineries of African governments, and the experience of handling relations between states, were not highly developed, nor had they the time to acquire the experience for the sophisticated tasks required of them in international forms. The organisation of the relations of African states with other states, the need to participate in the discussion of major international issues, the duties and functions which they were called upon to discharge within the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations and its Agencies and other international organizations have all imposed a strain on the resources of African states, have involved them in other people's quarrels and generally have further complicated the political life of these states.

One task which African states could not escape was. and has been, the total liberation of the continent of Africa from foreign political rule, from economic exploitation and from racialism. This task in particular has been

very demanding on the resources of all African states but especially of those states which operate on the frontiers of these major problems.

The overall political picture in Africa is, therefore, one of the great fluidity and varying degrees of stability. The changes which characterize this situation are not always clear and distinct and not always forseeable. It is likely that this fluid and unstable situation will persist for some time to come and that this generation of politicians and administrators is bound to operate under conditions of uncertainty, of experimentation and of insecurity. This calls for qualities of adaptability and flexibility as well as of clearness of purpose and integrity.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In the economic and social fields, the countries of Africa are attempting to achieve in fifty years what took four hundred years in Europe and America. The targets which governments in Africa have set themselves, and which in turn are determined by the aspirations of their people, are most ambitious. The resources available to them, including resources in finance and trained manpower, have proved totally inadequate for these ambitious programmes.

Nevertheless, the developments and progress that have taken place in the past few years have been staggering in scope as anyone who travels the length and breadth of Africa can see for himself. The ability of the African peoples and their governments to adapt themselves to these changes has been truly surprising considering the degree and burden of responsibility which this has involved.

As in the political field, it has been necessary to graft European concepts, institutions and practices on to an African stock which has not always been a healthy host to the new ideas. Quite often, not enough prior investigation, research and study had been done before the introduction of new concepts, new institutions and new practices. Quite often too, African states have been all too content to allow the momentum of the colonial economy to carry them through to the period of independence with untidy accretions being added without serious regard to the consequences.

The major problem in the African context has, therefore, been the adoption of policies which would lead the states into economic independence to match the attainment of political independence.

In this task there are certain positive advantages which are available to African states. For instance, where Europe, and America at a later stage, had to invest technology step by step to promote its advancement in the fields of economic development, Africa can now benefit by taking knowledge as it exists and adopting it through study and investigation to apply to local circumstances. This fact is tremendously important because it enables Africa to accelerate its agricultural, industrial and social development provided, of course, this process is characterized by the application of the right policies.

Another factor is that African education which has made tremendous developmental progress, has been largely secular and egalitarian in tone and has, therefore, avoided some of the inequalities and sufferings of classical economic growth in European countries. Those concerned with setting the tone for African aspirations in education realized that their action must be through the mass of the population by starting rather than ending with a democratic and egalitarian society.

This development, however, has its serious weakness. Education has not always been appropriately oriented to the social and economic needs of the African states and it has gone far in advance of employment opportunity. The resulting influx of unemployable youth into urban centres is a familiar situation in all African countries. Moreover, the policies, content, variety and quality of education have produced some serious distortions. There are grave shortages of specific types of trained manpower, particularly in the fields of science, technology, technical training and training for rural/agricultural work, and these have seriously hampered economic and social development. On the other hand, there are major surpluses of other skills, particularly in the white-collar areas, which have created social and political problems.

Again, improvement in health methods and health education have been an undoubted blessing to the people of Africa. Infant mortality has improved and people are living longer. A healthier labour force means greater productivity. But improved health facilities have brought in their wake problems of population outstripping the resources to provide work, social security, housing and other social facilities at a time when the indigenous social fabric is itself crumbling.

Even the ordinary layman can see that the present situation in most African states dictates that the chief hope of accelerated growth in African societies lies in the rapid growth of productive employment at the level of the 80 to 90 per cent rural population. This growth has to be brought about with a minimum of monetary capital and extreme economy in social overheads, as well as reliance on mass human energy and intelligence rather than on expensive plant. There are many examples, known to all of us, where failure to appreciate the need to organize policy within this context had led to unhealthy distortions in the pattern of economic development, to extravagance, to waste and to corruption.

The hope of African advancement in this area, therefore, lies in the re-orientation of the formal and public/adult educational systems to ensure that they are geared to the needs of the economy and to the directions in which a healthy social change could take place. It depends primarily, however, on the adoption of the right economic policies, the establishment of sound development plans and the existence of efficient machinery for translating plans into healthy reality. The pattern of economic and social change depends naturally on the political ideology motivating the government of any particular state. Given this political ideology, however, it is an

imperative necessity that attention should be directed to planning, education and orientation systems which are consonant with it. Whatever the pattern of political policies, it is important that such unhealthy distortions which have already appeared in African societies as premature flights from the rural areas, unemployment at a time of scarcities in trained manpower, urban pathological situations, poor housing, juvenile delinquency and increases in incidence of crime should be guarded against by the promotion of the right policies of planning, education, orientation and social development.

ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

It is important not to over-rate the ability of the Administrator to bring about political, economic and social change or even to influence it. There is a major constraint imposed by the machinery of government within which the Administrator operates. The ministerial system, emphasizing, as it does, the role of the politician in policy decision-making, provides great concentration of power in the centre usually at the party political level but also at the level of the political head of government. African governments have not been notable for their ability to delegate responsibility from the centre to the regions and districts and from politicians to public servants.

In spite of these difficulties, however, the Administrator has been too timid in the past in exercising his role as an instrument for dynamic progress. The potential for influencing policy decisions is very great and it has not been fully exploited. The Administrator, as a member of a public service system, has been backward in studying and understanding the nature of the change that is taking place in his society whether it be in the political economic, social or cultural areas, the ideologies which are being applied to bring about this change, the machinery and institutions through which change is being brought about and the role which the administrative system should, or is required to, play in bringing about desired change.

The first important task facing the Administrator, therefore, would appear to be to undertake, or promote, the study of the system of government within which he operates and the most appropriate machinery required to fulfil his role to ensure that it is consonant with the demands of the constitution, economic and social policies, manpower development, local institutions, local circumstances and social and psychological susceptibilities of the ordinary people. There is, of course, no guarantee that the results of such a study would be acceptable to his political authorities, but at least there would be the satisfaction that the appropriate "homework" would have been done to permit adaptations to the existing systems in the light of what might be immediately acceptable to the political authorities.

Secondly, the Administrator should attempt to identify the most urgent targets within the policies and activities of the government in the political, economic and social or cultural areas. While political and social problems

are of undoubted importance, it is a fact that the economic targets within the policies of governments are the ones which at present occupy pride of place in the considerations of all of them. They have the first call, generally speaking, on the resources available to governments for the development of their countries. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the Administrator should understand and accept the role he must fulfil in the field of economic development if he is to discharge responsibilities expected of him in the service of his country. But whatever ideological definition these economic policies are given the objective of governments in Africa is to build a welfare society which provides secured employment and a higher standard of living for every citizen. This implies to policies which will lead to steady economic expansion supported or stimulated by development plans in the agricultural, industrial and technological fields. And it is the role of the Administrator not only to help to formulate these policies but also to be effective in implementing them.

Social and cultural development, fortunately, have not been forgotten as factors for bringing about change. Education, health and social development have been aspirations in themselves for all peoples of Africa. Perhaps the most important role the Administrator can play in these fields is to help to bring about a re-orientation of effort to adapt the policies in the field of education, health and other social development to fit into the total climate of change which it is desired to bring about and, in particular, to match the requirements of economic development so as to avoid some of the distortions which have now become apparent in our society.

In most African countries, the organization and structure of the system within which the Administrator functions are outdated and incompatible with the dynamics of the new situation which faces us. Systems which applied to the colonial era have been adapted incongruously to the requirements of an age of modern economic and technological development. To continue with the old systems of administrative organization and structure would be like fitting old vintage motor-car engines into the latest design of modern vehicles. The situation, therefore, calls for a drastic re-appraisal of the organization and structure of the public services, of the institutions for training and orientation within them and for the application of research to policies of reform and modernization. The object of any reformation in this regard would be to ensure that a modern machinery for the exercise of public administrative functions is established which is capable of matching the requirements of modern government. It should also have within it the means by which developments can take place to match change in the political, economic and social situations of the country which the machinery serves.

POLICIES FOR REFORM

The actual lines along which reforms could take place would necessarily depend on the circumstances of each country and the results of whatever

study and research would have been carried out for the purpose. No attempt will be made here to propose detailed schemes for reform since others will be contributing their thoughts in this regard. Among the factors, however, which have a bearing on the nature of the reform which could take place, of each country, are included the following:

First, the environment, political and social, in which the Administrator operates is an important determinant of the direction which reform should take. What applies to a puritanical or a centralized socialist political situation would not necessarily apply to the situation within a more liberal political regime. In each situation, therefore, it is necessary to formulate policies for reform within the climate of the politics and social development of the country concerned.

Second, the attitudes of objectivity, impartiality and detachment from the policies of the government which characterized the old colonial Administrator are no longer applicable to the present situation in Africa. These attitudes are no doubt relevant when it comes to the appraisal of facts or to the relations between man and man. In modern Africa, however, there is a need for the Public Services to have a sense of involvement in the national endeavour. The Administrator must, therefore, learn to identify what the national objectives are within the context of the political, economic, social and cultural policies prevailing. He must organize the process of orientation within the Public Services so that the spirit, attitudes and institutions of these services are geared to the national objectives.

It is to be accepted, not only intellectually, but in the actual practice of the responsibility of the Administrator, that he cannot be detached from what goes on in the community. It has been demonstrated in a sufficient number of countries in Africa now for the lesson to be driven home that the Administrator is implicated in whatever revolutionary changes take place in his country. The experience of the Administrator in Ghana since 1960 is an object lesson which should not be forgotten or relegated to the archives. *A third factor*, therefore, in the reform which is necessary for the Public Services is to ensure that they are organized to provide one of the pressure groups in society for the promotion of a healthy climate for political, economic and social change necessary for development.

It is not suggested, of course, that the Administrator should be an active participant in the political institutions of his country, although there are differing opinions on this matter. What could be done—and this is a field which is woefully neglected—is to give priority to the establishment of Public Service Associations or Unions with the necessary finance and staff to act on behalf of the Public Services. Well organized Associations or Unions should be capable of pronouncing on policy matters affecting the responsibilities of Public Services within the Governments, of commenting on policies and changes in policies, of undertaking research relevant to the responsibilities

of the Public Services in Governments and of proposing lines of reform as well as mounting the necessary campaign and pressure to bring about necessary reforms. All these could be done through the full-time secretariats and officers of the Associations or Unions without directly implicating individual public servants.

Fourth, the economic and social objectives of government should evoke response from the Public Services in terms which would ensure the shaping of their organizational structure so that they are capable of planning and executing programmes and projects to achieve these objectives. This requires a new look at certain of the institutions which are now parts of the systems within which the Administrator operates. Some of the institutions which need to be looked at are the Ministries—their role, structure and functions; the Ministerial teams—their composition and responsibilities; the Regional and District teams, their role, functions and structures; the Administrative Service—its role as an elite system; and the Public and Statutory Corporations including their relations with the Central Government.

Furthermore and *fifth*, there is a need to consider, within the context of planned economic, social and technological development, whether professionalism—in background and approach—should characterize the role of team members at the Ministerial, Regional, District and Departmental levels. In particular, the role of the Administrator in the administrative service as a professional manager, needs to be studied and formulated. There are a number of people who hold the view that the idea of an administrative elite is not outmoded and that the administrative officer should be a professional officer exercising a management role alongside other professional persons in the economic, technological and scientific fields. Some would go further to say that this role should not necessarily accord to him the automatic role of leader. Leadership in these circumstances should be based entirely on competence and merit regardless of the discipline which a member brings to his team.

Another factor which has a bearing on the policies for reform is the nature of the institutions established to bring about orientation and training in the Public Services. The basic institution in this regard is, of course, the educational system. This, however, is too big a subject to be treated here. Within the limited field of training for the Public Services, however, it is important that government policies and development targets are adequately defined so that the training effort could be geared to their requirements and the objectives of reform which it is desired to introduce. Training without research could lead to sterile policies and this important field of activity in the process of orientation should be given greater impetus than is at present provided. Training and research have very often in the past been given lip-service support, have become stereotyped, have not always kept in touch with changes within the Government and the Public Services, and have lacked

purpose and direction. Whatever reforms are introduced in the organization, structure, functions and responsibilities of the Public Services could not really materialize unless they are backed by the application of adequate resources and the right policies in training and research. When a manufacturer decides to introduce a new model of his product, he not only mounts a programme of research for the purpose but also provides for the necessary re-tooling and personnel re-training to get the new model on the market at the right price. The same sense of purpose should apply to situations in which it is desired to introduce needed and urgent reforms into the Public Services.

CONCLUSION

Change in the political, economic, social and cultural patterns in Africa is the order of the day. Some of the changes are revolutionary in character. They may be brought about by the impact of external affairs factors, or by the stresses and strains produced by internal steady impulses, or sometimes by explosions. The machinery and instruments for action which applied in the colonial days are not able to function effectively in an age of rapid transformation for all aspects of life on our continent. The Administrator has to recognize the need to prepare himself for his role in this dynamic situation and to apply himself to the reform of the organization of the system within which he operates so that it becomes a potent factor in directing the course of change. The modern situation facing the Administrator requires values, qualities of dynamism, flexibility, adaptability and sensitiveness to the needs of the developing situation as well as the old qualities of integrity, objectivity, impartiality, discipline, loyalty, industry and devotion to duty which characterized the spirit of the old Public Service. The adopted mentality and attitudes derived from the past orientation obtained in or from Europe and America must give way to a willingness and preparedness to study what is suited to our conditions. Foreign ideologies which have made their impact on the minds of Africans, particularly in the intellectual and political leaderships, could be healthily applied to the African situation only if African leaders are willing and prepared to adapt these ideas to fit into the local situation and to create the opportunity for growth within the African context. Ideas, systems, principles, and institutions borrowed from outside Africa are useful only if they are properly grafted on to the local situation and if they are given a chance for achieving healthy growth. Finally, it must be the objective of the African Administrator to make his contribution to the body of world knowledge and achievement in the field of government by applying the unique qualities and gifts which Africans have to the development of the highest interests of the peoples whom he is appointed to serve.

Address by the then Prime Minister of Uganda, A.M. Obote, at the Opening Session, 2nd November 1964

Gentlemen,

I send you a message of welcome to Uganda.

May I also couple this very warm welcome with my appreciation of the idea of these seminars.

At this particular time when the idea of African unity has caught on, and when two Summit Conferences at the highest level have already been held and have done a great deal to consolidate the idea and bring it into being, it is very appropriate that the other part of Government, namely, the Civil Service, should also be fostering the same idea and strengthening it by seminars like this, where exchange of views, comparing of notes, and generally getting together and getting to know one another go yet a step further towards consolidation of this unity. It is to be hoped that at future conferences the organizers of these seminars will find it possible to invite our French-speaking brothers to participate in these deliberations.

I observe from your programme that you are all top civil servants with very heavy responsibilities of advising your Ministers and implementing government policy of your different governments. It is, therefore, important and desirable in the interests of coordination and cooperation between states that you should get together and discuss the problems involved and exchange views on such problems. Your objective should be to devise ways and means, employing your special knowledge and skill as top administrators, to advise on, interpret, and implement ideas and policies that arise out of the decisions of the Heads of States and Governments of the Organization for African Unity whose aim is maximum cooperation between states.

You will discuss at this particular seminar, the role of the civil servant in a developing country. This is a very fundamental subject. Uganda's experience on this subject dates from the inauguration of our Constitution on 9th October 1962, when we became independent with a Parliamentary form of Government based on universal adult franchise. Our switchover from a dependency to independence has, by all opinions, been smooth, and this has been due to the nature of our people and the high degree of cooperation between the Legislative and Executive organs of Government—particularly between the Ministers and the top civil servants. In this short time we have

learned that no institution of a government can work in isolation but through the administrative machinery of the country.

The administrative system in this country was designed by the British rulers to serve their own needs and its main task was to maintain law and order. The public administration was then neither responsible nor responsive to the will of the people. British administrators ruled—if I may use the term—from an ivory tower; their course being to satisfy their masters in England.

Our foremost task has been the shaping of our public service and gearing it to the needs of the altered conditions in the country. We are pledged to undertake planned development on a national scale. Our objective is to bring about equal opportunity for all and to secure the maximum development of the human and natural resources of the country as a whole. This social and economic freedom can only be secured by both servants and elected representatives believing in its urgency and being prepared and orientated to work for its achievement. We cannot yet claim to have completed the bringing about of a full re-orientation of our administrative system to assure flexibility and maximum efficiency which must go hand in hand. It will probably need the working out of a rational code of conduct for party men, on the one hand, and the public servants on the other.

The public servant here is required to be loyal to the party in power whatever its policies. This is the first principle in our public service. The second principle is a clear understanding between the Ministers and the Permanent Secretaries or Heads of Department of their respective roles in the implementation of government policies. The final decision in regard to policy or even administrative matters rests with the Minister. The Permanent Secretary's job is to tender advice to the Minister and help him in every way to formulate that policy. The Minister may or may not accept the advice as circumstances demand of him, but in no case is the Permanent Secretary to withhold any views or facts for fear that they may be unpalatable to the Minister, or recommend a course of action merely because the Minister would like it. The Permanent Secretary's job is, therefore, to give a free and frank appraisal of the situation, pointing out any administrative pitfalls that may be lurking in the course which the Minister proposes to follow. Once the decision has been taken by the Minister, the Permanent Secretary has to carry it out with thoroughness and in all its detail, even if it may be against his view. It also follows from this that the failure of a policy, after it has been fully implemented, will be the responsibility of the Minister which he should unhesitatingly accept.

Being top men in your public service, you do not need my stressing that the Minister, who may be a seasoned politician, cannot be expected to know the administrative technicalities and intricacies. By and large his view will be a commonsense view and may lack the expert's angle, but if on this account the public servant assumes a supercilious or non-chalant attitude,

thinking that his ministerial chief is only a dilettante, he would certainly be failing in his duty and role. Ministers are the spearhead of the popular will, and they are at their posts to see that the needs of the people are adequately served. It is the duty of the administrative personnel to guide them properly and implement their decisions with honesty and integrity of purpose. The success of a government depends very much on the close and cordial co-operation between the public men who are politicians and who are members of the government on the one hand, and public servants who act as their advisers and implementors of their policies on the other.

The Civil Service represents the expert element in the government and the whole service must be at the disposal of Ministers. The Ministers, as members of the government, are persons who have knowledge of the people and deep interest in their welfare. The Ministers, with their broad interests and with their fingers on the pulse of the nation, can do well as policy-makers. The civilians who are public servants absorbed in the task of administration can accumulate experience which must be placed at the disposal of Ministers.

Not infrequently we hear a cry raised against interference by party men in the administration, especially at the lower levels. I do not deny that there may be genuine cases of interference. We must, however, be careful in treating every complaint as interference. Most of the complaints are often the result of a lack of understanding of the role of party men. Party men are deeply interested in the steady implementation of the policy of their colleagues who are the Ministers. Party men have a duty to see that the difficulties and grievances of the people are redressed as expeditiously as possible. They must, therefore, keep in contact with administrative officers. It would be fallacious and misleading to call this interference with the administration. It is important to remember that the whole context of public administration in a developing country is changing. It has to be as broadly based as possible to fulfil the need for rapid progress. The enlisting of public cooperation in the implementation of development programmes and ascertaining of public opinion for the government must be encouraged. The party may introduce certain elements of pressure on the public servants and it must not be treated as interference. A public servant in a developing country must not be only responsible and responsive to his superiors but also to the people directly.

There are, however, some roles that the civil servant in developing countries must play. First, by virtue of the fact that the greatest percentage of the educated people in this country are in the Civil Service, they have the inescapable duty of being leaders of thought and bringing forward new ideas. Secondly, they also have the duty of educating and giving leadership and example to their less-educated compatriots. Thirdly, by their better education and training, and therefore because of their broader and enlightened outlook, they must take the lead in forging links of unity and in showing an example

of what a good citizen should be. They must, therefore, devote all their loyalty to the nation and not to any single component part of the nation. They are the light of the nation and must place themselves on the highest place where they can shine and illuminate all, and not put themselves under a bushel. This illumination should not stop at brilliance in performance of their duties, but must extend to their own personal character and conduct at all times and in all places. This is indeed a formidable challenge, but nevertheless a challenge that must be met adequately. Fourthly, they must be the foundation upon which that future service is built, and they must design what form and shape it will take.

It is, therefore, obvious that all civil servants in developing countries are of necessity pioneers—yet another inescapable role. As pioneers, therefore, they have the heavy responsibility and the most important duty of building for the future, of setting up new standards, of founding a heritage to pass on to the future generation, of forming traditions that those who come after them will be proud of. It would, therefore, be disastrous if they kept moving in the same old groove. It would be a pity if they proved to be old bottles that cannot carry the new wine. They, therefore, have got the double role of being custodians of what is best in the old traditions of the Civil Service and being innovators in building new traditions and a new heritage of the Civil Service. In this double role, therefore, they are a bridge between the past and the future, and they must use the present to ensure that the bridge is firm and sound, and that there is a good road leading from the other end of that bridge to a happy, prosperous and stable society.

In performing these roles, you are playing the role of innovators, and therefore you have to build the foundation of a future service suited to the status and nature of your new countries, a service that will not stand out in isolation as an anachronism of the past, but a service that will take into account the new changes, a service that will assimilate and absorb the new changes, the new atmosphere and the new ideas, and pass them on not only to the future generation, but also to the present generation that has not had the opportunities of education and experience that you have had.

In forming these new traditions you must learn to sympathize and co-operate with your political governments. You must understand and appreciate what their aims and aspirations are and assist them to solve their problems. You must be able to guide them on the straight road without being obstructive. You must learn to adjust yourselves to the new conditions and create an atmosphere of mature understanding and mutual cooperation, which you cannot do unless you make an effort to understand not only the political government that you serve under, but also the needs and aspirations of the general public you serve. You must teach those who come after you the sense of duty, dedication and service before and above self. You must inspire confidence in the general public, whose servants you are, and in the political government under whom you serve. In short, it is

your duty to create a harmonious atmosphere in the country, and to set the very highest standards possible of impartiality, integrity and courtesy to the general public and to everybody with whom you come into contact. You must ensure that the Civil Service and the political government are one and the same thing; that they are component parts of one entity and not conflicting forces within that entity. You must strive tirelessly and ceaselessly to ensure that there is a good government in a stable society, which depends not only as wise political guidance, but also on sound administration and efficient provision of services.

That, Gentlemen, I think is the target we must set ourselves; that is the formula that the new Africa is asking for, and that—I hope—is the answer you will find and the solution that will evolve from the present seminar.

Gentlemen, I wish you happy, constructive and successful deliberations.

Tenure of Office of Top Civil Servants

J. O. UDOJI

INTRODUCTION

One of the traditions left behind by the British, in their former African territories, is that of a closed career Civil Service. This is a system by which a young man is recruited at an early age into the service with an implied promise of a life career during which he works his way up the hierarchy of the service. The promise of a career means an assurance of life-long employment which can be terminated only by mental or physical incapacity or the commission of a criminal offence. The system is a closed one because it has no adequate provision for the admission of outsiders (older, qualified and experienced persons) into the higher grades of the hierarchy. When such persons are employed they are on contract and without the rights and privileges of the established and permanent staff.

An important feature of the career system is the pension scheme which entitles an officer to additional remuneration on his retirement on the grounds of age. Another feature is the existence of a series of protective regulations against dismissal or termination of appointment. The regulations are so stringent and rigorous that a doctor cannot dismiss an incompetent or dishonest wardservant nor can a head of department terminate the services of disobedient office messenger. In some countries there is a convention which has almost the force of regulations that at least two written warning notices should precede the termination of the appointment of an employee no matter how lowly graded. Even the conviction for a serious criminal offence does not automatically result in dismissal. Disciplinary proceedings have to be initiated and this would include a review of the court's judgment. In the end, the disciplinary authority may impose a lesser punishment than dismissal, such as reduction in rank or seniority, stoppage of increment, or ordinary reprimand. Sometimes dismissal for a criminal offence does not affect the pension rights of the officer.

The result of such a career system supported by protective regulations is that almost every civil servant remains in his job until retiring age which varies between 45 and 65. During the colonial era the retiring age was optional at 45 and compulsory at 55. This is one of the few pre-independence rules that have been amended in several African countries. Ghana, Western Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia have each raised the compulsory retiring age from 55 to 60. Three reasons have been given for the amendment. The first is that

the colonial administrators put the retiring age low to enable them to retire early enough to be able to take up other jobs in their own country. Second, the control of malaria and other communicable diseases and the rise in the general standard of living has resulted in a higher life expectancy. A more important reason is that in order to fill in the gap left by the retirement of expatriate officers the few experienced local officers should be allowed to remain in the service as long as they are able and willing to serve.

WHO ARE TOP CIVIL SERVANTS?

Before proceeding to consider the effect of the prevailing conditions on the tenure of top civil servants we should first define the term. For the purpose of this paper the term "top civil servants" will be used to describe the most senior officials in the civil service. They hold key positions which are normally graded super-scale. They work in close collaboration with ministers, advising on policy and implementing policy decisions. The group includes permanent secretaries, professional heads of departments and their deputies. It excludes local government employees and managers of public corporations and government companies, for we are here concerned with the traditional civil servants and not with the wider group of public servants. Numerically the group represents less than one per cent of the total number of the civil service. The educational background of the members of the group is a mixed one. The majority are graduates but there are still some who came up through the ranks with no more than secondary school education. This latter group may have considerable experience but lack the talent to deal with problems of development administration. In Ghana, at independence the average age of men serving as permanent secretaries and in equivalent posts was 38. About half had entered the administrative service directly and had about 10 years' service in government. The others had reached the top through the clerical service and had 15 to 20 years' service. In Kenya the British permanent secretaries were replaced by Africans who were all graduates. Their average age was only 33. Today Kenya has 20 permanent secretaries, 12 of whom are graduates. The average age today is 40. In Uganda 6 of 21 permanent secretaries have no academic qualifications and the average age is 41.

ECOLOGY OF TOP CIVIL SERVANTS

Several developments have, however, made it necessary to reappraise the suitability of the traditions of a career civil service particularly as they relate to the permanent and pensionable tenure of top civil servants. First among the developments is the shift in the political power structure. Political power no longer has the demagogic agitational mass movement base it had

in pre-independence days. It is acquiring a realistic and economic base. Political success and acceptability is no longer dependent on anti-imperialist slogans and promises of better days but on concrete achievements: the number of schools and hospitals built; the mileage of roads tarred; the improvement in the price of primary products and the general rise in the level of consumption. Political leaders are therefore realising that their continuance in power is dependent on their ability to bring about rapid social and economic changes in order to satisfy the aspirations and yearnings of their followers. This is the reason for the various development plans and programmes that have become a common feature of every African government. A natural concomitant of this desire for change and progress is the desire to ensure that the civil service bureaucracy is responsive to political leadership. This means the control of top civil servants whose jobs have considerable political content or extensive executive powers.

The argument of politicians is that they do not see how they can discharge their ministerial responsibilities without controlling civil servants who are responsible for the execution of their policies. How can they be held responsible for the official actions and conduct of civil servants if they have no part in their appointment, deployment and discipline? In support of this argument they cite the case in the United Kingdom where the whole department is under the minister's control including responsibility for every promotion within it. One must, however, draw a distinction between ministerial control of departmental civil servants in Britain and the control demanded by ministers in new African states. In Britain ministerial control is on the whole rather formal. Lesser appointments and promotions are conducted in the name of the minister by the senior officials of the ministry and he does not interfere. He may, however, take some interest in the appointment of senior officials of the ministry such as assistant secretaries. In these cases he will usually be content to accept the advice of his senior official advisers. Even in cases where his views are the deciding factor, such as the appointment of under-secretaries, he dare not depart from established conventions. If he were to do so, play favourites and make a prejudiced appointment, the staff would protest. In Africa where traditions and conventions are not yet well established "ministerial control" would be interpreted as "absolute discretion". Africa has the further weakness of having an unenlightened public opinion which enables people to get away with irregularities, improprieties and even crimes.

The more the people demanded progress and government development activities expanded the more the politicians wanted to tighten their hold and to control top civil servants. The exercise of improper control has made the position of top civil servants very sensitive and vulnerable. This has led to the great turnover of permanent secretaries and to some resignations movements away from the civil service.

Decline in Status and Prestige

A second development is the decline in the status and prestige of the top civil servant. Civil service jobs no longer have the status and prestige they had during the colonial era or in the early years of independence when politicians were settling down to their jobs, powers and responsibilities. A great deal of the status and prestige belonging to the service has been lost to the politicians and to the managers of the expanding and influential private sector. Early in the sixties a permanent secretary was among the top brass of society and his appointment usually appeared in the headlines of local newspapers. Today such appointments receive small mention if at all.

The politician is not prepared to share his status and prestige with anybody, much less the civil servant. In fact, he is jealous of whatever respect and confidence the public still has in the civil servant and he does not lose any opportunity of putting him in his place or of exposing his shortcomings and magnifying his mistakes, real and imaginary. The *Hansard* of some parliaments contain several unwarranted and/or exaggerated attacks on the integrity and efficiency of civil servants. This lack of respect and regard has hurt the pride of ambitious civil servants who do not hesitate to recall that some of the politicians were failures in private life. This unhealthy relationship has driven some top civil servants into politics and some into the private sector.

The attractions of the private sector has led, in some countries to a definite braindrain from the service. In Kenya not less than 16 permanent secretaries and heads of professional departments have left the service since September 1967. Of this number seven have gone to private enterprise, five to politics (three of them ministers), two to governmental boards or corporations and two international organizations. In the same period available records show that in Tanzania 17 permanent secretaries and heads of departments have left the traditional civil service. Two went into private business, three to the UN, three to departments of the East African Community and nine to corporations and state-owned companies. In Zambia the braindrain is also causing some concern. There 45 top officials have left since independence. Of the original 14 permanent secretaries appointed at independence only three are still in the service. Of the 45 officers who left since independence one is with the UN, 20 with government corporations and companies and 24 in private enterprise. Five out of the 24 are in politics, four of them ministers. The majority of the rest are either company directors or general managers with salaries, and service conditions much more favourable than those obtainable in the civil service.

Other contributory factors responsible for the movement away from the service are the following:

(1) Professional frustration. There are instances where professional officers have resigned because they were not allowed to practise

their profession in accordance with generally accepted traditions and standards.

(2) The danger of narrow prospects in certain government departments particularly in scientific and technical fields. In some departments there is only one post and this will hardly attract or retain some one wishing to make a career of the service. Even where there are several posts the pyramid of senior appointments may have such a very narrow apex that it is frustrating to many officers struggling to climb the promotion ladder.

(3) Tribalism. Many African countries have yet to succeed in becoming nation states. They are still a conglomeration of tribes. It will take time to forge a national identity and a sense of common belonging. Unfortunately many countries try to brush the matter aside as if it does not exist. It is no use doing so for the problem does exist and people should come to terms with reality. The solution requires a social revolution and constant and conscious effort. Some governments have attempted to solve the problem by a policy of balancing the tribes at the top. This is a process by which top jobs are distributed evenly among the different tribes in the interests of peace and tranquility. The result is that often junior and less competent officers are preferred to more senior and competent ones who may happen to belong to a tribe that is accused of having more than its "fair share of the national cake".

(4) Inefficiency. Some top civil servants are incapable of acquiring the skills currently demanded for the performance of development functions. They are, therefore, unable to play the role of entrepreneurs, catalysts and initiators of change and development.

(5) The frustrations of post-independence expectations are often blamed on civil servants by impatient politicians, aggressive trade unionists and an increasingly critical public.

Youthfulness of the Service

Another major phenomenon is the youthfulness of the service. Many African civil servants reach the top of their career at a very early age, sometimes in their early thirties. In East Africa the average age at which officers become permanent secretaries is between 33 and 35. With a retiring age of 60 an officer will be in the same job for over 25 years. It is well known that once a person is at the top there is only one way in which he can move, and that is downwards. Not only will efficiency deteriorate after about 5 to 7 years in a top job but very often the incumbent will be obstructing the advance of younger and more efficient officers. This will affect the morale and incentive of such officers and efficiency throughout the service will

suffer. All of the 45 officers that left the Zambia Civil Service did so after less than 5 years in their top posts.

With the present regulations regarding retirement, a pensionable officer wishing to leave the service before reaching the age of retirement must resign and forego any claim to a retirement benefit. The harshness of the regulations was represented to the 1967 Kenya Salaries Commission in these words:

(1) A number of officers have risen at a comparatively early age to posts from which they can expect no further promotion within the service. If they are required to serve for another 15 or 20 years before they can earn any retiring award they will inevitably become stale and their value as public servants will tend to diminish as the years go by.

(2) Because so many of the senior posts in the service are filled by comparatively young men, the promotion prospects of other officers are severely limited. Because of this they have insufficient incentive to give of their best, and the standard of work throughout the service is likely to fall.

(3) Kenyanization has proceeded more rapidly in the public sector than it has in the private sector. There is now pressure for more Kenyanization at the upper levels in the private sector, and indeed the more progressive companies are anxious to appoint more Kenyans to their senior posts. The difficulty is that so many of the best men are already employed in the public sector, and yet if we are to take a broad view and look at the needs of the nation as a whole it is clearly desirable that the best men should be more evenly spread between the two sectors. It is argued that it is in the best interests of the nation that there should be more flexibility in the system so that people may move freely from one sector to the other, as happens in other countries.[1]

The commission thought the arguments cogent and recommended (for an experimental period of 5 years) that officers may be allowed to retire any time after completing 10 years' service or attaining the age of 45, provided that the government and the officer mutually agree. The recommendation was accepted by the Kenya Government in 1968 and since then not less than 10 officers have retired under the rule.

THE POSITION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Before considering reforms in the tenure of top civil servants in emergent African countries it would be helpful to examine the position in the developed countries for any valuable lessons. We will refer only to the systems in the United States and Britain.

In the United States the civil service system is a mixture of the career

and patronage systems. The top two per cent of the federal service is politically appointed and removed whilst the remaining 98 per cent are under the merit systems managed and supervised by the Federal Public Service Commission or by the agencies for which they work. The political appointees are heads of agencies and occupants of policy-making or confidential positions. In recent years some of the political appointments were from career civil servants but the majority of them were persons who combined professional expertise with sympathy for the policies and programmes of the party in power. The argument has been that the career civil servant is, by training, neutral and anonymous, and cannot, therefore, be expected to advocate or implement government policies with the same dynamism, devotion and commitment as a political appointee. Another argument is that the patronage system is necessary for the survival of political parties.

The remainder of the civil service come under the open merit system. It is open because entry is possible at all levels. In fact some of the top posts are filled by in-and-outers, men who come into government service for a limited number of years (three to four) and then return to private life to be available at a future date for either further government or political appointment. This group of in-and-outers is quite distinct from the straightforward political appointments. They are in a grey area between the political appointee and the professional civil servant.

The career system proper applies to the middle and lower grade civil servants. It is based on merit and fitness for appointment after a competitive examination. Although called a career system it does not promise a life-long employment. A civil servant can, however, remain in office until the official retiring age of 70 provided his services are required and he continues to meet the standards of conduct and performance required for his position. The system is averse to any idea of permanency with rights and privileges outside the common law or which are not enjoyed by workers in other walks of life. The system developed out of the political philosophy of the country and reflects the American's love of freedom and his constant desires to control the executive. The civil service is looked upon as an extension of the executive and any idea of a permanent "administrative elite" is frowned upon as an extension of the power of the administration.

In the context of African administration the American system raises the following questions which we shall consider in later paragraphs: What posts should properly constitute the area for political appointments? Should they include heads of professional departments? Where should the line be drawn between career administrators and political administrators? If a permanent secretary is politically appointed should his deputy also be so appointed? How do you ensure that neither group transgresses into the field of competence of the other? How far can the system of in-and-outers succeed in a developing country with a limited private sector?

Top civil servants in Britain are covered by the career system under which they are recruited at an early age for life-long employment which ends with a pension calculated at about half the salary at retirement. Once recruited and confirmed, employees hardly leave the department and the service. They soldier on slowly from grade to grade until the retiring age of 60. The story of the rise from office boy to office manager is true of many British establishments. Incompetent officers and misfits are seldom dismissed; rather, they are found simpler jobs. The career system is so firmly established that it has not been easy to get rid of incompetent officers before their retiring age. It took an Act of Parliament[2] before the Foreign Office was able to retire members of its staff who, though good subordinates, were considered unfit for further promotion. Later, another Act of Parliament[3] made it possible for home civil servants to be retired after the age of 50 in the interests of efficacy. But these Acts are sparingly used. A minister once described his difficulty in pensioning off an inefficient officer in these words: "Theoretically it is now possible to retire an officer, with pension, at any time after the age of 50. On one occasion I tried to do this. I aroused against myself all the camaraderie of the civil service and every obstacle was put in my way."[4]

The higher civil servants in Britain belong mostly to the administrative class but in recent years a growing proportion is coming from the professions and the specialist groups. Unlike the United States where governmental employment has low prestige because of the traditional idealization of the businessman, the civil service in Britain is considered a worthy and honourable career and the higher civil servants have a high place and reputation among the professionals. There are several reasons for this. In the first place Britain is a class society where the government is in the hands of a ruling class. This class structure enables the top strata of society to obtain most of the best jobs and makes it difficult for those from the lower strata to rise to real eminence in any field. This is reinforced by the educational system which provides the best opportunity in public schools that are the preserves of the privileged classes. The best institutions of higher learning (Oxford and Cambridge) are also weighted in favour of the same group. Because of this, political leaders (particularly those from the Conservative Party) and leaders in the church, the army and the civil service come from the same social and educational background. This group in the civil service form themselves into an exclusive administrative elite, and consider themselves endowed with superior wisdom and experience. There is no doubt, however, that by their ability, discretion and undoubted integrity they have made themselves respected and indispensable to successive governments. Due to the expansion of governmental activities, the increasing technical and scientific nature of government duties and the growing complexity of modern life, the top civil servant is becoming a real expert in many fields. This adds to his influence and prestige so that politicians are beginning to consider ways and means

of keeping some expertise in their own hands as a means of guarding against undue bureaucratic power. This may be the reason why the Labour Government made several top specialist appointments from outside the civil service in the fields of economics, science and technology. The men came from industry and universities and were known to be sympathetic to Labour ideals and aspirations. There were complaints that Britain was tending towards the spoils system but the Labour Government was at pains to explain that it had received the fullest cooperation from the civil service in making the appointments. The cooperation was understandable. The appointments were not administrative and no civil servant lost his job or was demoted. Also the same civil servants as before remained at the head of the official hierarchy.

POSSIBLE REFORMS

It is argued in some quarters that the career system is unsuitable for the civil service of emergent African countries because ministers prefer and in fact want to work with people who share their dynamism and emotional commitment to the success of their policies and programmes; that the system operates best where civil servants have a tradition of competence, detached impartiality and dedicated service to the nation, qualities which at the moment are rare in African countries; that the system is expensive and should not, therefore, be introduced in to underdeveloped countries; that the system is bureaucratic, exclusive, stagnant and resistant to change whilst what African countries need is the constant introduction of new talent and men with ideas who will be agents and catalysts for change; and finally that the system creates an administrative elite which leads to the widening of the gap between the government and the governed.

What, in view of these criticisms, and the current braindrain, should be the conditions governing the employment of top civil servants in African countries? Before attempting an answer we must first draw a distinction between the merits of the career system *per se* and the wisdom of its application to the top layer of African civil services. We have no quarrel with its application to the great majority of civil servants but we question its suitability in top advisory posts in view of present evidence and experience.

The first suggestion is that the civil service should cease to be the "closed shop" of career civil servants. It should be opened up for mature recruits from outside—from the universities, industry and the professions. Government business is becoming very technical and specialized and there is need to bring in specialists who are experienced and able to deal with the various problems. It was considerations of this kind that prompted the Fulton Committee into the British Civil Service to say:

> We are convinced that, both in the public interest and also for the health of the service itself, effective steps must be taken to ensure

> a very much larger and freer flow of men and women between the service and outside employments than there has been in the past.
>
> At middle and higher levels, there should also be more short-term appointments for fixed periods; this would help to maintain regular movement in and out of the service. It would be particularly valuable in the case of those specialists, for example some engineers and scientists, whose special contribution would be up-to-date knowledge and practical experience of work outside government. It is also often the best way of using the talents of those, again mainly specialists, who are needed in an advisory capacity. For example, the present system by which professional economists come into the service from the universities for a few years and then return, perhaps to come back again for further spells later, has been of great value. We think that it should be adopted in other specialist fields. In the various administrative groups similar short-term appointments for those with relevant experience in industry, commerce or the universities could also bring advantages.[5]

Unfortunately career civil servants are not favourably disposed to such appointments. They argue that the recruits would block the promotion prospects of serving officers and that they are likely to be people who failed in private life; that they would be either too old to be able to adjust to civil service methods or too young for high responsibility. These criticisms are, however, not confirmed by the experience in developed countries where this lateral movement has been tried. A stronger argument, however, is that there is a real shortage of such talent and both government and industry are in competition for personnel possessing the required specialized skills.

One of the ways of meeting the present difficulties of the career system would be the use of contract appointments not only in cases of lateral movement but also for top civil servants whose jobs have a political content. It would not be a bad idea if the career service ended at the level of under-secretary or deputy permanent secretary. After that grade, officers could still continue to serve but the terms would be on a terminal basis to be mutually agreed between the government and the officer. This would enable either side to review further employment at regular intervals and thereby prevent possibly embarrassing situations. In recent years several African governments have been faced with the problem of what to do with the obsolescent civil servant. He is in general an older officer unable to keep up with the pace of change. He has either run out of steam or blunted his cutting edge. Terminal appointments would in such cases provide a convenient safety valve to either side.

The change over from career to terminal service need not affect the pension rights of the officer concerned. The period of contractual service could count for pension or the officer might elect to formally retire from the service, further employment being on normal contractual terms. What

the suggestion means is that the implied guarantee of a continuous employment until retiring age should no longer be applicable to certain specified top posts. An officer aspiring to such posts does so with the knowledge that from then onwards he serves on a basis of mutual agreement between himself and the government. This would result in increased efficiency for the officer would know that his further employment depended on his performance and ability to meet adequately the demands and challenge of his position. It would also facilitate the introduction of fresh blood and talent into the service.

This brings us to the question of the appropriate age for retirement. We have noted earlier that the retiring age has been revised upwards by some countries since independence. This upward review has not been altogether satisfactory as shown by the representation of Kenya civil servants to the 1967 Salaries Review Commission. It is, however, too early to assess the effects of the temporary modification of the retiring age rule under which Kenya civil servants could retire after 10 years' service or after attaining the age of 45. The general tendency so far has been to look at the matter only from the point of view of the officer. Two considerations, however, arise from the point of view of government. The first is that early retirements will put a heavy recurrent burden on government finances which will be saddled with the payment of pensions for upwards of 25 years or more. This will require a review of the soundness of the pension funds actuarially. It must be certain that monthly contributions to the fund plus interest on investments are mathematically calculated to produce the average monthly pension without further demands on the budget. The funds should also be carefully safeguarded. Unless this is done the government would default or be compelled to accumulate an unwieldly burden for future generations. The second consideration is that 45 is the age at which most officers reach the peak of their performance. A study carried out in the United States by the Brookings Institution showed that most officers reach their top careers in their mid-forties as illustrated by the following table:

AGE AT WHICH HIGHEST GRADE WAS REACHED[6]

Age group	*per cent*
Under 25	—
25-29	0.3
30.34	2.1
35-39	10.1
40-44	18.9
45-49	23.2
50-54	18.1
55-59	14.6
60-64	8.1
65-69	3.8
70 and over	0.9
	100.0

Retirement at 45 would, therefore, rob government of the dividends that should have accrued to it out of its investment in the education and training of the officer. The mid-forties is also the age at which most officers are anxious to leave for new opportunities as illustrated by the following table:

AGE AT THE TIME OF RESIGNATION OR RETIREMENT[7]

Age group	*per cent*
Under 25	—
25-29	—
30.34	3.1
35-39	10.8
40-44	8.2
45-49	16.0
50-54	9.8
55-59	12.9
*60-64	19.1
65-69	13.9
70 and over	6.2
	100.0

*Retirement was found to be the leading cause for departure in the sixties.

A compromise solution might be to suspend the payment of pensions until the officer reached the normal retiring age. On the other hand the pension could be put into a lump sum payment which the officer would take on leaving the service. This would be less burdensome on government finances. A system very much in use in developed countries is to make pension contributory and transferable so that officers on leaving could either take their contributions or transfer them to their next employer.

This will necessitate the abolition of the non-contributory Pension Scheme and the introduction of a National Contributory Scheme. Under such a scheme both the employer and the employee will contribute to the retiring benefits fund. There is a qualifying period of service, normally 5 years after which an employee is entitled to all the contributions plus interest on them. If, however, he leaves his employer before the qualifying period he takes only his contributions.

The Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of Ghana Public Services recommended such a change in these words:

> 429. We have recommended that the non-contributory Civil Service Pension Scheme and its equivalent in the teaching service should be discontinued and that in future all public servants should come under the National Social Security Act, 1965. This should take effect from the date on which the new salaries are introduced, viz.: 1st July 1969.

432. We recommend that benefits under the National Social Security Act should become payable at the age of 50 years.

434. The conversion from the Civil Service Pension Scheme to the National Security Scheme will facilitate increased mobility of skills throughout the economy. We consider this to be a desirable end, but the Government as an employer should take steps to safeguard its staffing position—more particularly because it is institutionally difficult for it to react quickly to changes in the supply and demand position. We recommend that under the new system, all public servants should be on five-year renewable contracts. Within the period of five years, an officer who voluntarily leaves the Public Service or who is dismissed for misconduct would forfeit the employers' contribution to the National Social Security Scheme. He would suffer no other penalty unless he was serving under a bond. At the end of the five-year contract, he would be free to leave the service without penalty and to enter into another five-year contract if this is offered following the assessment of his performance referred to above, and if his services continue to be required by his employer. In this way, we hope to provide misplaced civil servants with greater choice of occupation and employer while at the same time eliminating the time-serving attitude which is often—we hope wrongly—attributed to pensionable civil servants.

436. The greater mobility of public officers provided under this scheme would render more importance than hitherto, to good personnel management. If the various public employing agencies wish to retain their good staff in competition with other agencies—and with the private sector—they will no longer be able to rely on the pull of the non-contributory Pension Scheme. It will be necessary to pursue positive personnel policies designed to maintain a working environment which will induce good staff to stay. This we regard as a subsidiary but important benefit of the scheme we have proposed.[8]

Recommendations regarding the abolition of the non-contributory Pension Scheme were accepted by the Ghana Government. It did not, however, accept the recommendation that all public servants should be on five-year renewable contracts or that officers who resign or are dismissed should forfeit the employer's contribution to their Pension Scheme.

CONCLUSION

The solutions suggested in the foregoing paragraphs are not permanent but transitory solutions for meeting present difficulties and problems. Changes are taking place all over Africa at such a pace that it is no longer prudent

to look too far ahead into the future. There is always the danger of proposals and suggestions being overtaken by events. New ideas and social forces are bound to bring about new concepts. After 5 to 10 years there will be need for a review of the situation in the light of prevailing circumstances. In the United Kingdom civil service conditions are reviewed every 20 to 30 years. In Africa where both society and the civil service are yet to be stabilized there is a need to keep the conditions under constant review. As in other countries the solutions at every stage will reflect the economic, political and social conditions of the time.

FOOTNOTES

1 *Report of the Salaries Review Commission*, July 1967, p. 97.
2 The Foreign Office Act of 1943.
3 The Superannuation Act of 1949.
4 Article in the *New Statesman* of November 13, 1954, by Mr. G. R. Strauss, Minister for Supply in the Labour Goyernment.
5 *The Fulton Report*, Vol. I, CMND 3638, p. 44.
6 David T. Stanley, *The Higher Civil Service*, p. 36.
7 Ibid., p. 29.
8 *Report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana*, p. 62.

The Role of Public Service Commissions in New African States

W. N. WAMALWA

The need for an efficient and dynamic public service as an essential instrument for the implementation of government policies and programmes is widely accepted. The tool which some countries have adopted to assist in the achievement of this goal, is the Public Service Commission. As it exists in the former British dependencies in Africa, the commission exhibits quite significant features which show its heritage from the United Kingdom Civil Service Commission. Even where the system has been fairly fundamentally modified, this heritage is quite apparent. This is, of course, not to imply that the principles underlying the system originated in the United Kingdom for, we know that the merit system was actually borrowed from ancient China.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION SYSTEM

The circumstances which led to the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in the United Kingdom are familiar enough. In their report, the Northcote-Trevelyan Commission in 1853, while not overlooking the good points of the civil service, were nevertheless struck by the rather mediocre quality of civil servants in general. They noted that as selection depended on the whims of those entrusted with the distribution of patronage, only "the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable" sought admission. This method also operated for promotions. Consequently, the commission recommended the adoption of the merit principle in matters of selection and promotion in order to ensure that favouritism was excluded as a factor in the selection of civil servants and that only the best were selected. In order to implement this principle, they proposed the establishment of a Central Board for purposes of examining and selecting candidates for the civil service. However, it was not until 1870 that the Civil Service Commission was effectively established.

In the former British dependencies the history of Public Service Commissions is, in effect, the story of one repetitive process, with relatively minor local variations. Such commissions were initially established advisory to the Governor expressly for purposes of "regulating the selection and promotion

of candidates for posts, the filling of which is not subject to the approval of the Secretary of State".[1] Normally, the most dependencies, this step was taken in the early stages of the advance to self-government. The main objective was, initially, to remove the civil service from possible political intrigue and influence. It is significant that the establishment of a commission did, in most cases, coincide with efforts, however half-hearted, to admit qualified indigenous candidates into ranks of the service which had previously been preserved for the expatriate only. This fact has led critics of the system to assert that Public Service Commissions were originally established specifically for the protection of expatriate officers whose future prospects were likely to be affected adversely by the admission of local candidates, particularly as "localization" got underway. It is, therefore, wondered whether a system of that nature, with a negative objective, can still be useful in these dramatically changed circumstances. However, in spite of the Colonial Office's great concern for the members of the United Kingdom Overseas Civil Service, it would not be realistic to assign this as the sole, or indeed, the major motive behind establishment of Service Commissions. In any case, it cannot be denied that reasonable security of tenure of office for civil servants whether indigenous or expatriate, is an essential function of a commission.

The status of the Public Service Commission changed coincident with constitutional changes until, on internal self-government, the commission attained maturity and became executive and independent. Thus it became the sole recruiting and appointing authority in the land, with the exception of a few posts which were normally excluded from its purview, e.g. Permanent Secretaries, Chief of Police, etc. At this stage, as the *Gorsuch Report* on the Public Services of Nigeria of 1954-55 states "the commission must be set apart equally from the political and executive machinery of Government" and must have "as its sole purpose to ensure that appointments to the service, promotions and disciplinary control (are) dealt with on a continuing standard of detached impartiality and fairness, uninfluenced by political changes or pressure!"

During this phase, most of the Public Service Commissions are executive bodies. However, a further evolution takes place when the newly independent state becomes a sovereign Republic. The Republic status ushers in, among other things, an executive President and in many cases the President becomes, either by constitutional provision or Act of Parliament, the sole appointment authority. However, in practice, for the majority of posts, he delegates this authority to the Public Service Commission which consequently becomes advisory to him. In Uganda, for example, the advice of the commission in respect of posts below superscales, i.e. U£1,839, is rarely, if ever, scrutinized by the President. In Tanzania, the range of posts in which Presidential decisions are real is wider. In Nkrumah's Ghana, this range was even wider and Presidential authority in Public Service matters was all-embracing. This tendency for the Heads of State to become the statutory

appointing authority is normally explained as deriving from a fundamental factor of the African way of life. It is asserted that in traditional Africa, the leader's authority was all-embracing, and it is argued that this is the only meaningful form of leadership in Africa. However, most of the available evidence does not appear to support this view because in traditional Africa "government" was by discussion. The civil service is a powerful instrument of state, and control of government must naturally, in the view of the leaders, include control of the civil service. This means competence to decide on appointments and promotions, otherwise it would be meaningless to say that "civil servants hold office at the pleasure of the President!" In any case, it could rightly be said that, in normal circumstances, whoever controls the civil service controls the country.

At this point, it is relevant to make a few remarks about the relative merits of advisory and executive Public Service Commissions. Arguments for an executive commission are normally based on the need to insulate the public service from political and other sectional influences. It is argued, in particular, that in new states, be they African, Asian or Latin American, the temptation to reward party faithfuls and militants with posts in the public service is too real to ignore without reproducing a "spoils system" with all the consequences. In other words, it is only an executive commission that can apply the principles of merit, impartiality and justice in matters of appointments, promotion and disciplinary control. However, the advocates of an advisory commission argue that an executive and independent commission would be too remote from the theatre of actual operations to be able to dispense justice. In any case, Ministers are responsible for the operations of their portfolios, which includes actions of their civil servants and it would be illogical to deny them the right of influencing decisions regarding who should be appointed in their ministries.

ROLE OF A PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

This is perhaps a convenient place to discuss the role of a Public Service Commission is capable of playing in a new African State.

The primary function of a Public Service Commission is to provide the government of the day with an efficient public service as an instrument for the implementation of policies and programmes. In order for a public service to be efficient, contented and have high morale, it needs to be assured that its vital interests in matters of appointment, promotion and discipline are guarded jealously by a strong, independent and impartial body. For the efficiency of the public services is one of the major determinants of the rate of economic and social advancement. It could, therefore, rightly be said that protection of the service is another major function of the commission, although in essence the two functions are the opposite sides of the same coin. By ensuring that the selection of candidates for the public service, their promotion

once in the service, and disciplinary control are administered with complete and impeccable impartiality, the commission ensures that the very best available are attracted into the service. The commission serves in one action both the interests of the government and of the individual officers, are governed by official qualifications generally known to the service. Thus the Public Service Commission is in a way, the supreme authority to which public officers should look for justice.

But it is the contention here that there is a mere fundamental contribution which a Public Service Commission could make in the overall efforts of nation-building.

One of the most unfortunate characteristics of new African states is the inability of the pre-independence nationalism to provide the necessary driving force in the crucial task of nation-building. In the march to independence what provided the strength and unity of purpose was a sense of injustice generated by the discriminatory and degrading practices of the colonial rule. In the majority of cases, this urge to remove these practices from the motherland blended fairly diverse peoples into a solid front. At independence, however, sectional interests and aspirations began to threaten the edifice which had been built with so much sweat. The tribal, or other sectional entity, taxes preference over the state, and national unity is threatened. All these sectional interests demand what they call their fair share of the independence "cake". The civil service is naturally one of the most obvious parts of this "cake". The composition of Parliament and many other national institutions reflect these interests. We contend, therefore, that for national survival it is essential to have some national institutions which in their image, stand for integrity, justice and unity. There is, therefore, great need for creating and maintaining a sense of confidence in national institutions, and, thereby, in the nation. The commission, by exercising justice and impartiality in its functions, can assist in instilling this vital sense of confidence. All citizens should expect and actually get justice irrespective of who, or what, they are. The need for institutions with this "stabilizing influence" is not always fully appreciated. For the commission cannot only help establish a stable public service, but can also help in the general stability of the nation. For in the final analysis, stability of a nation could be said to be the sum total of the stability of national institutions.

Having made this point which implies that a new African state is normally a boiling cauldron of diverse and conflicting interests, it is perhaps fitting to consider what requisites must exist for the commission to be effective in the performance of its role.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

A primary requisite for the success of any Public Service Commission in the discharge of its functions is the need for a clear and unequivocal

instrument establishing its existence. In some countries the commission is established by provisions in the State Constitution, in others this is done by an Act of Parliament. The need for a statutory basis for the existence of a commission arises for two major reasons. In the first place, it removes the commission from the realm of capricious whims of persons whose interests might be threatened by its existence. The process of amending the Constitution, or an Act of Parliament, is not a thing that anybody, even government itself, can consider too lightly. Therefore, even those who would, for selfish reasons, wish to see the commission tampered with, are likely to accept it as a necessary evil to be tolerated. Secondly, such an instrument would clearly delineate the commission's area of competence which can only be modified by due process of law. This second point has a further significant aspect. The need for a clear and precise definition of the commission's area of operations is crucial because it helps avoid unnecessary conflict. In any such definition, policy matters, such as terms and conditions of service, job requirements, etc., should be removed from the commission's competence. The commission is a non-political organization and it cannot deal with policy issues without trespassing into the arena of politics. Government, as the employer, has the right to formulate policies regarding such matters as recruitment terms and conditions of service and job descriptions. These are matters which should be the responsibility of the Central Government agency or department concerned with establishment matters. This requirement, is in fact, a prerequisite for guaranteeing the commission's independence from the executive and politics.

It has been said that legal instruments, even international treaties, are in essence no more than pieces of paper. This perhaps, is even more so in the new states in Africa. For, one aspect of the history of independent Africa, is the story of a trail strewn with the debris of broken promises and constitutions trampled into the dust. Therefore, another requisite for the success of a commission is the total and unequivocal acceptance of, and support for, the principles of the commission by the government. The government must be committed to the essential need for the civil service to be free from political and other sectional influences. In particular, commitment to this principle by the Head of State is basic. The commitment must be both in words and deeds.

However, the commission itself, once established with a clearly defined area of responsibility, has a special obligation to win confidence. Sterile reliance on statutory instruments could prove disastrous. Each environment is likely to present a commission with its peculiar problems and opportunities, but winning confidence would appear to depend on a number of factors. In the first place and, perhaps, crucially important is the membership. Members of the commission must be carefully selected. They must be selected for their integrity, honesty and impartiality. They must be persons of some standing in the community, with some reputation of success in whatever field they

had been active in before appointment. All this is vital in order to give the commission the stature necessary for it to take the proper place in the government machinery. The members must be persons of courage so that they can resist pressures from whatever source.

It is normally not easy to get persons who fit this description. But every effort must be made to get persons of the right calibre. This is important because it very largely determines the quality of the commission's decisions and the manner in which the whole business of the commission is conducted. This, in turn, very largely determines the esteem which the system is accorded in society. But the members so selected must be buttressed by a competent team of civil servants of equally high integrity to ensure speedy and efficient despatch of the business of the commission.

Additionally, for a Public Service Commission to be effective in its work, the members must be fully conversant with the environment in which the commission operates. This calls for a full knowledge of the aspirations and sensitivities of politicians as well as the social fabric of the society. It is vital, therefore, for the chairman of the commission to have free access to the head of government in order that the commission may, on a continuous basis, be appraised of the "unspoken mind" of the government on important issues affecting the civil service. Such facility of communication would also afford the head of government an opportunity to know the problems faced by the commission in its operations.

SOME FACTORS MAKING FOR SUSPICION AND CONFLICT

However, in the environment prevailing in most new African states it is not always easy for the commission to command universal confidence. The suspicions, fears and tensions, to which reference has already been made, are largely responsible for this situation. While the commission may strive to serve the nation with utmost impartiality and justice, some political leaders and other influential persons, who see as their first duty the protection of the welfare of their sectional groups, do not readily believe that appointments, promotions, etc., can possibly be done on merit alone. In their frame of mind, it is easy for them to believe that other influences are at work. One of the most revealing statements on this issue was made in Kenya's National Assembly during a debate on allegations of favouritism in appointments in the civil service. A prominent member stated:

> Mr. Speaker, when we were devising the Kenya Constitution in London . . . I said that the question of the Public Service Commission in newly independent states was completely meaningless. It is meaningless, because, whoever comes into power would like to put his own good boys in responsible positions, even if they are not fit to carry out the responsibilities which are entrusted to them. So, today, anybody

> talking of an independent Public Service Commission in Kenya is fooling himself because the pressure of position bears very heavily. So, Mr. Speaker, if anybody tells me that there is no tribalism in public service appointments, I would say that is a big lie.[2]

It is the belief expressed in the quotation that presents to a commission challenge of vast proportions. There are, of course, some countries which are fairly free from these fears. This belief might also be used as a possible explanation, at least in part, for the desire of Heads of State in most new African nations to be constitutionally the appointing authority with a Public Service Commission of a purely advisory nature. It seems appropriate now to consider what other factors complicate the job of a commission and to consider whether the fears expressed in the quotation from the Kenya situation have any basis in fact and whether the objectives set for a Public Service Commission are, in fact, achievable.

Attempts to influence the commission in its work may come from political leaders or civil servants who assist in supplying information. The civil service is a powerful instrument and the temptation to appear as the authority that matters in those things that count most to civil servants could be quite great.

Differences Over Procedural Matters

Some of the conflicts over the civil service arise from the fact that the commission is an organ independent of political and executive control and yet at the same time, an instrument of public policy. This obviously means that authorized officials and other responsible officers, have a special interest in specific tasks of the commission. In ideal conditions, recommending officers should clearly distinguish their role in such matters as appointments and promotions, from that of the commission. They should know and accept the principles and criteria employed by the commission in those matters. Their role should be to make recommendations, supplying all relevant information to the commission. The commission, in turn, would carefully and meticulously weigh the information so supplied and arrive at a decision which should then be accepted and implemented by the ministry or department concerned. However, in actual practice, employing organs of government are seldom as passive as this; nor should this be surprising! In cases of recruitment from outside the service, the commission should have little difficulty in ensuring that the most suitable candidate is appointed. The joint objective of the employing department and the commission is to get the most qualified candidate appointed. But when it comes to promotion of serving officers, differences quite often arise. Sometimes these differences concern criteria for suitability. The essence of a merit system of personnel administration is fair competition. This, in effect, means that the merits of the candidates should be assessed as impartially and as objectively as is

humanly possible. While the commission will want to ensure justice in terms of competition, a department, perhaps because of its greater knowledge of one candidate, might be intent on that particular candidate. They may know the performance of their own officer and naturally this involvement does, to some extent, diminish the ability to see merit and suitability in comparative terms. Therefore, the commission, by applying standardized criteria and being detached from the theatre of operations, is in a much better position to ensure that justice is done.

What would normally concern a head of a department is that he should get an efficient officer. However, the process by which this result is most likely to be achieved is not always his concern. Thus, another likely source of difference of opinion between the commission and employing departments is the strict application of laid down procedures and rules. In a sense, the commission operates in a quasi-judicial manner and this means that rules and procedure are more important than outsiders are likely to appreciate. This also leads to accusations of inflexibility. While flexibility is certainly desirable, it should not mean inconsistency in decisions, as this would be one of the surest way of forfeiting the confidence of the service and the public at large. Flexibility can only be practised with advantage to the system if it is done within the established framework. For example, attempts at modifying job specifications to suit particular persons must be resisted with all possible energy because this would be discriminatory and partisan.

However, underlying the points made above, is the motive behind all this, that is the desire by heads of departments to feel that they are in control. This may be unconscious or deliberate. It is natural in some people to want to feel that they determine promotions, etc. They believe that to exercise influence they must be seen by the officers under them as the "kingmakers". This tendency to create "kingmaking" centres is one of the possible explanations of the struggle for the control of the civil service. Where a "Head of Civil Service" exists, this struggle could be quite real, particularly in the early stages of the commission's existence. This, however, is seeking power for influence within the service, and within limits it perhaps should not do too much harm.

Ethnic and Kinship Affiliations

A discussion of the role of a Public Service Commission is a new African state would not be completed without mention of the influence which are essentially tribal. It has already been stated that as the march to independence intensifies, sectional interests threaten the unity of purpose which had been the mainstay of the nationalist movement. These sectional interests are, in the majority of cases, tribal or ethnic.

Although the diversity of tribal groups has made some positive contribution to nation-building efforts, it is notoriously known for its disintegrative

effects. It is, therefore, understandable that most leaders do not always wish to acknowledge the existence of practices of discrimination based on tribal considerations. Those who point to these practices are normally labelled enemies of national unity. We suggest that the best way of dealing with this problem is first to acknowledge that it exists. It is a fact of life that a tribe is not just a territorial unit: it is a unit bound together by some extremely enduring human ties and values. These ties are cemented by a mesh of affectionate relationships. It is this group which provides a sense of security for the individual. This sense of security is intensified by fears of domination of the smaller, or less advanced groups, by the larger and more advanced tribes. These fears may be imaginary or real but the fact is that they do exist in people's minds.

This situation has a number of implications for the civil service. Those who allege the practice of tribal favouritism in appointments and promotions imply a deliberate attempt, by the appointing authority, to give jobs to persons of certain tribal groups irrespective of merit. This would, in fact, amount to a "spoils system" because in the case of a change of government, the new leaders would also be justified in wanting to "put their own good boys in responsible positions". But in the vast majority of cases, these allegations are based on false evidence. The fact is that owing to uneven educational development in many former colonial dependencies, there are more educated and trained people in some areas than in others. Unfortunately, these divisions happen to coincide with tribal units. The result is that the predominance in the civil service of persons from certain tribal units is usually taken as evidence of the fact that favouritism has been practised in appointments.

In its operations, the commission relies very heavily on information supplied by heads of departments. One of the most likely effects of tribal sentiments is that a recommending officer might be inclined to give an unrealistically favourable assessment of an officer of his own group. Thus kinship sentiments tend to diminish objectivity in assessment of officers. Where this happens, the commission would be operating on false or distorted information and it is likely to make decisions which are not based on merit. This fact should not be overemphasized but it should not be ignored either.

FUTURE OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS IN NEW AFRICAN STATES

Institutions are established to serve a purpose. It must be recognized, however, that the nature and magnitude of problems change with time. It is imperative, therefore, that institutions, their nature and objectives, should be kept under review, lest their existence becomes an objective in its own right. For organizations, like a living organism (man included) have an inherent capability to fossilize.

It has already been stated that when Civil Service Commissions were established in former British dependencies, the primary objective was to insulate the civil service from political influences. However, modifications of this system have occurred in some countries where after independence the President became the appointing authority. Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya are among the few countries where Public Service Commissions are still executive. But there are no strong grounds to support the view that either of the systems is the better means of ensuring an efficient civil service. What is important is to ensure that appointments, promotions, etc., are made on merit. In this regard it is important to emphasize the fact that the merit system does not merely mean the exclusion of favouritism; it means the securing of persons of superior calibre. Thus it is vital that the commission should see its role in more positive terms rather than being obsessed with the negative aspects of "protection". Protection of the civil service should mean no more than ensuring that appointments and promotions are made on merit and that civil servants are assured reasonable security of tenure of office consistent with efficiency. To this extent, it can be asserted that Public Service Commissions have largely achieved their objectives.

However, some critics have questioned the rather artificial separation of appointments and the general personnel management function which is normally the responsibility of the establishment or personnel departments of government. It is considered, in particular, that training, staff development and recruitment policy should be the responsibility of the appointing and promoting authority. This view was recently stated firmly by the Fulton Report on the United Kingdom Civil Service published in 1968. It stated, *inter alia:*

> We regard recruitment, training and subsequent career development as parts of a single process.... We believe accordingly that recruitment should be in the hands of those who share a direct responsibility for the individuals' training, deployment and development.[8]

The Fulton Report accordingly recommended that the United Kingdom Civil Service Commission should cease to be a separate and independent organization. In many other developed countries, too, the tendency today is to have what is popularly called a "Central Personnel Agency" combining the functions of recruitment, promotion, etc., and general personnel management. However, in our circumstances in Africa, it is perhaps beneficial for a commission to retain rather limited functions. It is doubtful whether public confidence could be secured by a system which does not appear to be operating uninfluenced by the executive. Additionally, with so many disintegrative forces at work, a commission in Africa cannot deal with policy matters without drawing itself into the political arena. In the final analysis, however, the control of the civil service is shared in varying proportions by the appointing authority, the politicians who determine recruitment and remuneration policies, and finally, the civil service personnel managers. An

articulate and informed public opinion could also play a very much needed function.

To sum up, the role of a Public Service Commission in a new African state is to provide the government of the day with an efficient and dynamic civil service which is capable of meeting the ever-changing conditions; and to contribute generally to the stability of the nation. It is not important whether the commission is executive or advisory; what is vital is that the system should be seen to operate on merit and impartiality.

FOOTNOTES

1 *The Holmes Commission Report, 1948, on the Kenya Civil Service.*
2 Quoted in *Government and Politics in Kenya,* edited by Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970.
3 *The Fulton Report on the United Kingdom Civil Service,* CMND 3638, 1968.

The Government and the Governed: I

S. NYAGAH

INTRODUCTION

This paper is going to deal with the government and the governed, and also discuss the effectiveness of the public services in ascertaining and satisfying the needs and aspirations of the people. Our first duty in this discussion is to attempt to define what these words the "government" and the "governed" mean to us. We should also define the context in which this subject is being discussed. Our assumption is that the subject refers to a situation where democratic institutions exist, where there is a framework of a political society, organized through and by law, that is to say a society in which the law, whether constitutional or statutory law, has established permanent institutions with recognized functions, definite rights, obligations and limitations.

If this assumption is accepted, how correct could we be by implying that all powers emanate from the people as the source of all the powers, and that the government is the agent and instrument of translating and implementing the peoples' wishes into positive realities to bring about the desired political, economic and social change in a given society? Furthermore, if we accept the argument that the people are the source of ultimate power, and that the government's basic function is to fulfil its purpose of contributing to the welfare of its people, then, how and to what extent should the people take an interest in and intelligently participate in what the government is doing and at the same time exercise its ultimate control over it? How should the government balance the peoples' felt needs and the administrative requirements for a well organized, disciplined and stable society, whose maintenance is a necessary prerequisite to all types of development for social change?

Under the colonial regimes executive action was insulated against public accountability and control. The status of the civil servants during the colonial area demanded for its preservation no identification with the masses. Furthermore, it was difficult for these members of the colonial service to teach and preach the essence of democratic participation, liberty, equality and social justice between all men; it was not possible for them to practise these principles in their policies without having to challenge the whole colonial system which rested on autocratic subjection and flagrant inequality. In addition, there was a deliberate lack of economic and positive social policy

designed to secure an improvement of the social conditions of the colonized people.

Today the nationalist governments of Africa like many other developing nations are facing such critical problems in their institutional arrangements and political, social and economic conditions that it would be wrong for us to ignore them when talking and writing of things like democratic principles, and liberty and the rule of the law. During the colonial era many of Africa's political systems were normally repressive and were used as instruments to favour one group against others. The economic systems were often geared to promote the interests of a very small group to the disadvantage of the majority; and the economic opportunities for this majority was severely limited. Social stratification was very rigid, access to education very limited and degrees of justice were meted out in direct proportion to the darkness of a man's skin.

On attainment of independence, many African governments inherited institutions and administrative structures which were not appropriate to Africa's own political and administrative philosophy. The new political and administrative ideologies had to be based on Africa's peculiar cultural and historical conditions which were consistent with their environments and beliefs. It is true to say that African nations have benefited greatly by drawing upon the experiences from industrialized countries of both West and East. But we should ask ourselves in this seminar whether ideologies developed by those nations to solve their political, economic and social problems could be adopted in Africa without changing political, cultural and social beliefs of the African people. Our contention is that the solutions developed by industrialized nations of the West and East to meet their social problems were as much products of their social order as the nature of their problems.

In Africa today it is considered a legitimate responsibility of the nationalist governments after independence to provide not only political leadership but economic and social services to meet the needs of the people. The participation of these new governments in the provision of these services has necessitated the creation of a new and complex administrative bureaucratic machinery unparalleled during the colonial administration. These new bureaucracies are supposed to implement political policies and to create both technical and legal procedures which ensure that the community is treated with fairness and justice. But it has not always been easy for the new bureaucracies to meet these objectives of fairness and justice. This subject will be discussed later in this paper, but it should be sufficient to say that this problem has been exacerbated in some states by the absence of a reorientation of mind culminating in a calculated departure from the old colonial attitudes inherited with independence. In other words, it means that the public servants have not been quick to respond to the fact that there is now more proximity between them and the public than existed between the former expatriates and the said public. The public servants have been

brought up among the people they administer, and they are like twin beans in a pod.

Furthermore, the charismatic nature of leadership in some of the African states has provided another source of strain and confusion in the line and staff authority. In some cases, civil servants have been unable to resist the expressed personal desires or commands of their ministers even where these directives have been outside the declared policies. In addition, a wide gap still exists between what is possible and what is practicable. This has constituted a serious source of strain, and frustration between the government and the governed and has led to serious explosions in some places. Granted that these problems do exist, then it is not hard to understand why demands for swift and sometimes harsh political solutions to these problems and the absence of the recognition of conditions which would uphold the dignity of a man as an individual become part of the creed of the new governments. It is against this background that this paper will be developed.

THE NATIONAL BUREAUCRACY

A General Outlook

The identity of every organization be it a giant industrial corporation, a community welfare agency or national government is lodged in its professional staff. Although the members, ministers or stockholders may control the organization, the staff is the organization. The staff, by virtue of their permanence, their technical knowledge, consistency and adaptability are in a position to provide continuous and exclusive exercise of functions entrusted to it by the government in the common interests of the nation. Furthermore, the existence of an efficient and trusted civil service is, in our view, the only agency that symbolizes the sole tangible evidence of the continuous existence of the government.

In our introduction, we mentioned briefly that on attainment of independence, many African states inherited governmental institutions which were not in tune with the political thinking of the time. We also mentioned that it has increasingly been accepted that it is the business of the new nationalist governments in Africa to ensure that every citizen can enjoy the primary necessities of life. It is now widely held that the state should ensure this minimum by itself buying, or producing and distributing the means of satisfying these primary wants. The participation of the public servants is vital for this. The representatives of the people through the executive and legislative process decide and indicate what the political, economic and social wants of the people are, and it then becomes the responsibility of the public servants to initiate and implement measures aimed at achieving those wants. In the process of implementing the policy objectives, the civil servants are constantly faced with alternative choices in decision-making as no policy

is laid out in such detail that it can cover every conceivable situation that may arise; hence, the civil servant is compelled to apply not only a general policy to specific situations, a condition which in itself permits greater discretion for interpretation, but he also frequently chooses among alternative policies which might apply to specific situations depending on the circumstances. In view of the increasing complexity of state activities, the relationships between the civil servants and their political representatives, and between the civil servants and the public, has become more complex. The main problem is the need to maintain an effective administration which is flexible, efficient, loyal and responsive to the political spirit of the time. The situation has been exacerbated by the slow and rigid response of the civil service to the need to transform itself into a service which is in resonance with a highly nationalistic political state.

Having said this, let us now examine the tasks of the public service in ascertaining and satisfying the needs of the people. The first requirements of a good administration in the development process is that it be suited to the needs of the time. The successful implementation of development programmes is largely dependent upon a well-organized, efficient and committed administration. Good organization and efficient management is essential if African nations are to meet the requirements of development goals. The creation and organization of units should be determined by the emphasis placed on the most urgent needs of the society. Scarce human resources have, therefore, to be carefully husbanded, wastes must be avoided; production and quality must be increased and this, no doubt, calls for better and more efficient administrative organization and operation. But have these objectives been met? This we will examine later.

It is the civil servants who, in most cases, have to formulate policies with due regard to the wellbeing of the nation as a whole. The politicians, on the other hand, in allocating scarce national resources, are often tempted to choose areas from which they derive political support. Their outlook is clothed with parochialism and many of them have failed to find an identity and loyalty beyond their constituencies. Their attitude makes the work of the civil servants much more difficult, and at the same time, it militates against the possibility of building up a national outlook coexistensive with the political community, and deepens the feelings of antagonism and interference with the orderly efficient operation of services by the civil servants. Hence, the question is: does the quality of politicians who have just emerged from pretechnological traditions, and whose attitudes to power were formed in agitational politics, offer hope for capable leadership in the work of the government? If the answer is in the affirmative, then how should the relationship between them and the civil servants be structured? On the other hand, if the answer is negative, what should be the alternative approach to this problem of relationship? Again how should political and administrative activities be harmonized, organized and co-ordinated for the optimum achieve-

ment of government development programmes? Furthermore, how should we define these political and administrative policies to determine the "public interest", and how should the administration be structured so that it effectively and responsibly represents and serves the "public interest"? Does the "public interest" exist in any tangible form? How can it be recognized in a country where the government exerts its own personality or existence independently of the governed? We do not profess to have any answers to these questions, but it is hoped that the participants in this seminar will emerge with some guidelines in the course of their deliberations.

Its Tasks and Problems in Ascertaining and Satisfying the Needs of the People

We have mentioned earlier in this paper that a substantial portion of governmental activity has been undertaken for the purpose of increasing the economic and social wellbeing of the society, particularly those with very low incomes and a very low standard of living. This action has been based, we think, on divergence between the actual pattern of income distribution and that regarded as most equitable by a consensus in the society. In addition, the tax structure has also to be utilized to lessen the overall degree of inequality. We have also said that the new African states have given increasing attention to the task of gaining greater economic stability and more rapid and stable economic growth.

The market economy, in most nations has demonstrated a failure to provide full employment of physical and human resources and to maintain a reasonably stable price level. This has resulted, where uncontrolled, in drastic fluctuations in prices and employment. The civil servants, by virtue of their technical know-how and professional skills should be able to develop policies that will maintain high employment and price-level stability when demand threatens to exceed available supplies. Economists have argued that most governmental activities, by their inherent nature, cannot be sold to the users, because the benefits accrue to the community as a whole, rather than separately to individuals. In other cases, sale is ruled out by society because of a conflict with desired principles of equity in the distribution of income. Granted that certain governmental services, for political, cultural or economic reasons, must be separated from the market mechanism and shifted to public administration then how does the public administration ascertain community preferences? It has been said in many quarters that this responsibility rests primarily with the legislators and the political executives. This is true to a certain extent, but our view is that the legislators and the political executives may have little understanding of many of the governmental activities and their benefits to society; and it is not easy for them to gain unbiased information. Hence, the basic responsibility for providing accurate and unbiased information must rest with the civil servants. Assuming this to be

the case, what criteria then do the economic planners, administrators and other professional officers use in ascertaining community preferences? How do they determine and separate individual freedom of choice from community interest? What criteria is used to determine the optimum levels of living and also the desired rate of economic growth? What considerations are taken into account in allocating the scarce and meagre resources to bring about the desired pattern of social services, employment and economic growth? How is the determination of the distribution of income in conformity with currently accepted notions of equity arrived at?

The above issues are not explicit in themselves, rather they are intended to provoke critical discussion about areas of concern which are common to all. These areas include education, health and welfare services, and urban and rural development. It is the task of the public administration to meet both economic and social objectives in these areas.

First, there has been much emphasis on education. The number of schools built in Kenya, for example, since independence is almost three times the number that existed before independence. Now *Harambee* schools are mushrooming everyday without consistent planning. The government has indicated that these schools will have to be brought under the plan, yet ministers and senior government officials are everyday initiating and ceremonially opening more and more self-help schools. The problem of school-leavers is already with us. The expansion of education in a country must bear some relationship with the economic expansion, otherwise the group of young unemployed school-leavers is going to grow to unmanageable proportions. The whole system of the new celebrated *Harambee* schools is likely to prove valueless to these young school-leavers and also to their parents if these youngsters cannot be absorbed into the wage earning population. The government should make its intentions about these *Harambee* schools quite clear without killing the self-help initiative. Bold plans for the absorption of the school-leavers should be made, and this information should be disseminated; otherwise, the good intentions of the government will be thrown into question when the output of these school-leavers join the already alarming pool of unemployed in the country.

The second major area of concern is the health and welfare services. These services, too, have been expanded enormously without consistent planning and sufficient consideration of the effect on the economy. It is true to say that most of these services are community social wants and have a definite appeal to people, but is it not poor administration to allow them to expand without corresponding economic growth to support the recurrent financing? Has the government assessed the physical and financial capacity of the numerous institutions in which the responsibility for maintenance and efficient operation of the said services fall? In posing these questions we have at the back of our minds mainly the institutions of local government whose responsibility in Kenya is to provide and maintain primary

education, personal and environmental health services, housing and secondary roads. How are these institutions going to develop the infrastructure upon which economic development is dependent whilst the existing services provided and maintained by them are static and in disrepair due to lack of adequate finances and trained personnel? It is not unusual to hear certain ministers and senior government officials making public statements urging people to unite, work hard in nation-building, strive for education and expand self-help schemes. It is true that such statements are intended to mobilize the masses and create awareness in them of the need to unite and work hard. But how can the masses unite among themselves when the politicians are disunited and lack the self-respect, integrity, and personal dignity which is essential for good leadership? Some of the statements are not made in the interest of informing and educating the public but for personal selfish motives.

On the other hand some of the senior civil servants who are supposed to provide administrative leadership in their jurisdictions have, in fact, created more confusion and fallen short of the high standards required of them. In fact, instead of helping the society to elevate itself morally, we have examples of even conscientious officials who have become authoritarian in dealing with their colleagues, and have no regard for the need for circular consultation and communication which is essential for an understanding of the problems facing the community which it is their duty to serve. Their negative attitude towards their subordinates, perpetuation of class stratification and search for gain by use of their official positions, have all influenced the governed's view of them.

Third in our issues comes the problem of urban and rural development. It is almost commonplace, in Kenya particularly, to find that many government and quasi-government agencies have failed to communicate accurately and effectively with the vast bulk of the population in the rural areas to whose economic and social development government attaches great importance. The reason for this is that many departments and agencies are top-heavy structurally, both at the centre and the provincial capitals. Representation at the local level where actual development takes place is something of the past. More and more attention is paid to organizational commitments at the top. Policy formulation and plan review is too slow and takes much time. Effective machinery for the implementation of these plans does not exist on the ground. The district commissioners and their staff of generalists are often expected to be the jack of all trades. Lack of sufficient well-trained, informed and efficient staff at the local level where actual and practical development takes place has not helped departments achieve their basic plan objectives. The extension worker, in my view the most important individual in the development process, is the least informed on government policies or even for that matter his departmental plans. He is semi-educated, ill-trained, poorly paid, and above all, lacks the means of expressing his dissatisfaction with the treatment he receives from his superiors.

How well are the agricultural and veterinary extension officers informed to enable them to communicate with the villagers effectively? Are they consulted by their superiors on any matter that affects their work? How well-trained are they? Does their training take into account the human relations aspect? How well are they paid? Are they motivated? How effective are the present selfish inward looking recruitment policies?

Our contention is that none, if any, of these things have been done. There have been instances when veterinary assistants have not been able to explain the government policy on insemination schemes, have used wrong semen or have found it sterile, but their superiors have failed to listen to them. Take another example—agricultural extension workers. How capable are they of defining an area most suited for increased agricultural production? How well are they prepared to determine the nature and magnitude of the marketing of produce, the economics of road and rail transport, storage facilities, the marketability and financial returns to the farmers for crops they are encouraged to produce? Are they well-mobilized conscientious and informed of their responsibilities? Are the policies which they are supposed to implement or the information they are expected to disseminate to the public well-defined and understood? How effective is the coordination and integration of the efforts of various groups of extension workers in order that all work in harmony and that the whole organization of the governmental activities operates with efficiency and economy? What about departmental jealousies and selfish outlook? Is this an impediment to a concerted and integrated effort in the field? Has the centre succeeded in delegating sufficient authority and discretion to the field staff to permit flexibility and adaptation of programmes? Has the expansion of government activities resulted in increased control from the top and also a high degree of distrust and hence the centralization of initiative and decision-making process at the top? What measures are there to alleviate food shortages in some of the rural areas where this problem is almost permanent in view of the areas' low ecological and agricultural potential, and also due to the areas' general infertility?

The other issue to consider is the role of the public service in maintaining a balance in the allocation of resources between the urban and rural communities in order to attain and equality in the distribution of income and thus raise the general level of living standards. In every society, it is always appreciated that the opportunity to earn a higher income is a necessary condition for hard work. In order to accelerate economic growth and thus raise the material wellbeing of the society, all citizens must work hard and contribute productively to the extent they are able. A notable contribution, particularly in Kenya, has been made by the people since independence. In spite of the efforts these people have made, independence has not brought substantial betterment of the conditions of life to the bulk of the population. Poverty still persists, urban problems of housing and unemployment still

continue, and the low standards of living among the majority of the urban workers has not changed markedly.

In our view we do not think there can be any clear cut solutions to the numerous problems now facing the new African states engaged in the transformation process. However, it has been argued in certain quarters that the new states are too busy coping with the problems of development to pay much attention to the need for preserving the rights and freedoms of the individual. The new governments have tended to regard themselves as the guardians of the public and solely responsible for defining their destiny. The new governments may have done this and got away with it, particularly in the first few years after independence. But they cannot disregard the wishes of the people indefinitely and continue to hope that the masses can be contained for too long without danger of serious political explosions as the people seek new avenues for self-fulfilment and participation in determining their own future and the kind of government they wish to have. The recent coups in a number of African states have had something to do with this problem of denial of mass participation.

Our view is that any government that professes democratic principles should rest upon two broad propositions. The first is the dignity of the individual and the need for equality of opportunity and participation. The second is popular sovereignty, majority rule and tolerance to well-informed and constructive opposing views of the minorities. Decisions of the government can generally be put into effect only with the compliance of the people who have wills of their own, emotions as well as abilities and conscious prejudices and reactions that cannot be predicted with the aid of graphs. Men work and cooperate willingly when they take pleasure in doing so, when they gain satisfaction from what they do, when they feel confidence in the leadership and a sense of belonging as members of a team committed to the final objectives of the organization. Each individual, irrespective of his status in the community, is a separate personality, free to pursue his fulfilment, within the bounds of his responsibility and the law. He cannot be treated as an automatic machine. He is entitled to proper respect and a recognition of his abilities and aspirations.

Many of the newly independent African states have accepted the basic theory that final sovereignty and authority are vested in the people and are only delegated by them to representatives of their choice, and the success of the governmental transformational process will largely rest upon the evolution of a legitimate ideology capable of meeting the aspirations of the masses. It would be a serious miscalculation on the part of African states to expect the masses to support and adhere to their new ideologies of socialism unless the leaders also appreciate the importance of and the need for selfless and practical adherence to the new ideology. However, in contrast with what is preached in the new creed, we find that the inherited and outmoded bureaucratic and other political institutions are still being

interest group. Another solution, which I think is the solution to our problem is the Scandinavian Ombudsman or "People's Representative". In Sweden, the Ombudsman is elected by Parliament for a term of four years but formally and in reality he is independent of the Parliament. He chooses the cases he wishes to investigate and decides what measures ought to be taken.

His duty is to supervise the observance by officials of the laws and statutes. He is entitled to prosecute in court when errors have been committed in the exercise of official duties. He is also entitled to be present at deliberations and decisions of all courts and other agencies, and he has access to all their documents.

continued despite their frequent condemnation in public by the political leaders. The said institutions have been characterized by rigid communication channels, status, the class system, exploitation of the masses by the powerful groups, and indeed, corrupt and inconsistent practices of staff recruitment and promotional procedures. These practices have tended to frustrate any efforts to establish an egalitarian, participatory and nationally integrated policy. The leadership has failed in some countries, if not all, to adhere to the goals of the declared policies. They have failed to correct the economic

All officials are bound to afford him lawful assistance; among other things he can request a public prosecutor to bring actions against civil servants who have committed errors. The Ombudsman, however, cannot act as a judge and he is not an administrative authority.

The Ombudsman can intervene against all forms of illegal or improper conduct by an official, be he an executive officer or even a judge. However, because of his position as guardian of citizen's rights *vis-à-vis* the authorities, he gives most of his attention to measures affecting the freedom of the citizen and human rights.

The citizen does not need legal counsel or advice nor does he need approval of a superior authority to have recourse to the Ombudsman. And all complaints are promptly investigated.

I am convinced that some kind of people's representative is necessary. It would increase the confidence that is vitally needed in a democracy which aims at rapid development through the willing cooperation of all its citizens.

The Government and the Governed: The Tanzanian Model

F. J. MCHAURU

This paper seeks to describe the operation of that network of government, local government, party and voluntary agencies which has been set up in Tanzania to try to mobilize the people and to gear development to their needs and aspirations.

There are, in fact, two dimensions along which the people themselves and the official agencies interact. First of all there are the channels for popular participation, whereby the people make their demands known and their problems felt to those in a position to do something about those demands. The second set of processes we will be looking at are the various attempts made by the government, the party and other national institutions to reach down to the grass roots and to effect development at that level and provide services for the people.

In focussing on these relations between the government and the governed in Tanzania, we shall be touching on some of the other themes which are under discussion at this conference. institutional arrangements, problems of increasing productivity and questions of management and training. Before going on to discuss some of these themes, however, it may be useful to start with some assessment of the problems that have to be faced in providing effective machinery for popular participation and in bringing about a closer relationship between the public service and the people.

PROBLEMS OF PROVIDING GRASSROOTS CONTACT

Three sets of problems can be identified. First, there is the tremendous challenge set by the fact that population is mainly rural and scattered over vast areas—the geographical problem, as it were. Secondly, these vast areas have to be covered administratively with very limited resources in terms of manpower and finance. These kinds of problems beset all of the African countries of course; Tanzania perhaps is only different in the extent of these problems. The third problem area in providing services for the people is one which is not so often widely recognized, but is one to which Tanzania has recently turned its attention. This is the problem of the quality of the

performance of the official agencies and their leadership, the problem of ensuring that a particular agency or organization does, in fact, respond to the genuine needs of the people and not only its own or other, sectional interests.

First, then, let us try to sketch out the size and scale of the geographical problem of providing effective grassroots contact between government and people. Tanzania is divided for administrative purposes into 25 regions, five of them on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. The region is the highest of the various "local" levels, into which government and other services are broken down. The administration at that level is headed by a Regional Commissioner and most government departments will have representatives at the regional level.

The regions are in turn divided into administrative districts. The districts are, in fact, the key local administrative unit. There is at that level an Area Commissioner who heads the administration. The major spending ministries have some presence at that level, although some of the smaller governmental departments are not represented at the district level. In addition, the main organ of local government, the District Councils, are organized on the basis of these same administrative districts and provide several important services such as primary education, some aspects of health and transport in their districts. Altogether there are about 60 of these local district administrations operating in mainland Tanzania. But it must not be forgotten that this is hardly the "grassroots" level as yet; the district in some senses is a very large unit indeed. This is true both in terms of population and of area and creates problems of communication and of administration in providing services within the area. This size also poses a variety of development problems in many of the areas.

In some districts one finds mountainous highland areas capable of supporting a wide range of semi-tropical and temperate zone cash and food crops. At the same time, other parts of the district contain dry, barren areas suitable only for pastoralism.

To add to the problems of contact with the people and responsiveness to their needs, Tanzania faces grave problems of communication. There is now a basic national road network, but this still leaves many isolated villages and homesteads many miles away from any means of transport to or communication with an administrative centre.

The final set of geographical problems arises from the nature of the pattern of settlement found in Tanzania. In general the population of Tanzania is concentrated in the areas on the periphery of the country, so that the centre is more or less empty. This again poses a problem for effective communication from the capital to the grassroots level.

Furthermore, within the rural areas, the population is for the most part scattered, in the sense that people live in isolated family homesteads, often widely dispersed over sparsely populated areas, and only in a very few districts are people found clustered together in villages. The difficulties

arising from this latter problem are recognized by the government; major emphasis has been in the past, and is certainly now being given to the regrouping of people into *Ujamaa* villages so that more effective services can be provided for them.

The outlining of constraints deriving from the shortage of manpower and financial resources is by now, of course, hackneyed in any discussion of administration in Africa. It is important, however, to spell out the precise nature of these limitations in Tanzania. One has a situation in which some important government departments have almost no presence below the regional level. The Area Commissioners who play a key role in coordinating not only government but party functions within a district are themselves constrained because they have no personnel responsible to them operating below district headquarters. They have to rely for the most part on the executive officers of the district councils at divisional and village level and they combine tax collecting with a wide range of general administrative duties. (This has been changed in 1972 through a new decentralized system of administration.) The two government agencies with the most widespread presence at the local level are Agriculture and Rural Development. But even their field workers are still a long way from down to the village or grassroots level. Agricultural extension personnel are thickest on the ground, yet one agricultural field worker is often responsible for as many as a thousand farm families.

The financial constraints are best illustrated by the position of district councils, most of whom face such a severe shortage of funds that they scarcely have any resources available for development or capital expenditure. For the most part they are merely trying to keep their heads above water, providing the current expenditure for the primary schools and other essential services which they try to run.

These then are some of the difficulties which are inherent in the situation—spelling them out does not in itself help to improve the effectiveness of these public services in any sense, but perhaps the first step is to realize the limitations of what is possible in a country like Tanzania. One vital implication of this recognition is that effective services are likely to be provided only if the demands on the public services are within the limits of their capabilities. It is a temptation in a country where much needs to be done to overload the administrative machine. To do so perhaps reduces its effectiveness and further limits what is achieved.

The question we are now left with, having spelt out some of the limiting factors, is to what extent the effectiveness of the services can be improved within the bounds of the existing resources and the existing framework. Tanzania sees the answer to this problem as coming from much greater coordination not only between governmental agencies, but between public services, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), local authorities and such important local institutions as the cooperatives. Coordination

between these various development agencies on a broad front not only leads to the more efficient use of various resources but broadens the range of links between these agencies and the people and broadens the channels of communication from the authorities to the people, and from the people upwards.

The third problem we have posed, that of improving the quality of public agencies and of leadership within them, is not merely a matter of efficiency or of improving the training and capabilities of personnel. If various agencies are to provide more effective services to the people in meeting their needs and aspirations, they have not only to be efficient but to be genuinely geared to these interests. In fact, in the past, in Africa this was not the case when most of the agencies concerned with providing services, in fact, operated under the aegis of the colonial rulers. They were thus not in any sense responsible to the people themselves; their tone was very often authoritarian; the interests that they were essentially geared to serve were those of the metropolitan independence and the replacement of expatriate personnel by local officers in various institutions of government and other vital public bodies governing the economy does not automatically ensure that these agencies will always and in every sense have the interests of the people at heart.

Our President, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, long ago recognized that privileged expatriate classes can be "replaced by a permanently privileged class of educated Africans". It is further recognized that the danger becomes that much greater when what he calls the "would-be African exploiter" occupies a leadership position in the government, the party or some other vital institution. He may then use his position to further his own interests. The Arusha Declaration in 1967, in fact, stipulated that "leaders must be a good example to the rest of the people through their actions and in their own lives". The Declaration went on to require that "every TANU and government leader must be a farmer or a worker, and must in no way be associated with capitalism". It has meant in practice that no TANU or government leaders should "hold shares in any company or a remunerative directorship in any privately owned enterprise, receive two or more salaries. should own houses which he rents to others or employ labour". These leadership conditions were not only directed at senior members of the government, national leaders of the party and senior elements in the civil service but at a broad range of leaders right down to the party branch. It was recognized that even among the lower levels of the public service, and among leaders of village development committees or party organs, there were some who might be tempted by the possibility of allocating the various resources and services over which they had control to further their own special interests or that of their friends or relatives. In fact ,there was a tendency in certain areas for some of the local leadership elements to be representative of a class of better-off peasants, traders, or shopkeepers—

people who were progressive, worked hard, and who had hitherto been encouraged by government and party, but now might be tempted to widen the gap between themselves and the people. According to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the leadership qualifications were seen as having other very important ramifications. He argued that in a country like Tanzania, development cannot be merely dependent on what services can be provided by public agencies, but is a "result of people's enthusiasm and belief". In such a situation then, he asked, how could one "expect this enthusiasm and hard work to be forthcoming when the masses see that a few individuals in the society are very rich and live in great comfort while the majority continue apparently for ever in abject poverty? If the people do not have reason to believe that the object of their government is the wellbeing of the people as a whole, why should they be expected to cooperate with that government in its activities?"

THE AGENCIES FOR PARTICIPATION

Turning now from these underlying problems, we can look at the various measures that have been undertaken in Tanzania to bring the people and the authorities into more meaningful contact. The first set of institutional arrangements are those which provide a means whereby people can participate in the decision-making apparatus of the country—the channels whereby their needs and demands and their problems and ideas can be channelled up to central government and to the leadership. Of course today, most countries make a commonplace of claiming to be "democratic", but Tanzania has, in fact, taken several positive steps to ensure that there is more effective communication of people's aspirations upwards. The democratic one-party system that Tanzania has introduced does ensure opportunity for people to have an effective voice through Parliament, local government and the party. In 1965, the first parliamentary elections were held under this new arrangement and provided very lively, competitive campaigns between pairs of candidates in the 107 constituencies in the country. In 1970, many incumbent MPs were defeated, in many cases because they had not paid sufficient attention to their constituents. Parliament has since become a much more lively body; government policies are being questioned and local demands and problems being channelled up through this forum. It is particularly in point to note that in parliamentary questions and in other expressions within the national assembly there is far greater emphasis on the problems of the peasant population, on the problems of agriculture, and on the rural areas generally—the kinds of problems that do not always easily find expression.

At the local level, the MPs also play a significant role, providing an informal contact between the people and the authorities in the particular area. They are often able to mediate problems that arise in communication

between the authorities and the people. Elections based on the same competitive one-party principle, were held for the district and town councils at the end of 1966, and have gone a long way to ensure that these local authorities are more responsive to local, popular needs than perhaps was hitherto the case.

The same basic idea of providing for competition between party members has also been applied in elections for various party offices from the local cell leader right up to the National Executive Committee of TANU. In fact, the party as a whole provides as effective a means of popular involvement as any other of the institutions of state in Tanzania. In particular it is organized literally down to the grassroots level. The individual party cell is based on a group of members living within clusters or groups of ten houses, these members meeting together to elect their own cell leader. So at this very immediate local level the party offers an opportunity, a channel through which the people can be involved in wider affairs. The network extends up from the cell through party and local government channels. The lowest level of local government and development machinery is the Village Development Committee, of which there are over 3,000 in the country. (Since 1969 they are called Ward Development Committees and through amalgamation of VDCs they number approximately 1,000.) At the present time the membership of the Village Development Committees is made up entirely of the cell leaders within the area covered by the Village Development Committee. The Village Development Committee is a forum for discussing development priorities within a particular village, proposals for services and projects, and are a means of mobilizing people behind various self-help programmes within the area. It is through the party cell first of all that the ordinary people are involved in taking decisions about development in their own areas. The Village Development Committees are in turn linked with Development Committees which operate at both district and regional level. The District Development Committee is, in fact, a committee of the District Council, and thus there is a link between local party officials and local planning authorities. As in other East African countries, one of the problems that arises in coordinating the demands and aspirations expressed by the people through these channels with the aims and priorities of government is the fact that most of the demands coming up are for various social services such as education, health and other facilities.

And yet broader economic consideration usually suggest a need for a limitation on the proportion of resources spent on the social amenities in an effort to direct resources to more immediately productive purposes. Recent developments in Tanzania have suggested that the difference in emphasis is not fundamental, and that in the right circumstances people, through their Village Development Committees and other local institutions, can be made more conscious of the importance of increasing the productive capacity of their areas. The Development Committees have always provided a channel

through which application for support for projects can be channelled up from village to district and regional level. Now, a Regional Development Fund has been set up which is a pump priming device set up by Central Government to allocate funds to the regions which can use the funds as they wish with the one proviso that these funds should be made available only for productive projects as opposed to social services. Some scepticism was expressed about the ability of the regions to spend the kind of sums that were allocated. Thirty million shillings (4.2 million dollars) have been allocated for these kinds of small-scale local projects. The present evidence suggests that there is no shortage of really useful projects being brought forward by the Village District Development Committees for implementation.

A catalogue of the various agencies through which the people participate in making arrangements for their own development would not be complete without mention of the cooperatives which are given such priority in Tanzania. Almost all peasant cash crops are, in fact, now marketed through cooperatives, and the biggest of the cooperative unions in Tanzania, Nyanza Cooperative Union can lay claim to being the second biggest business enterprise in the whole of East Africa. (The NCU was split up into three separate unions in 1971-72 and is no longer as big as before.) The tremendous mushrooming of the cooperative movement in the years since independence has, however, presented problems. Many of the weaknesses of organization and efficiency found in the cooperatives were spotlighted by the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into the Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards which reported in 1966. Since that time the government has felt obliged to act and has stepped in to take over the running of several of the cooperative unions in different parts of the country, and is now reorganizing these unions starting with the individual primary societies and thus building a more efficient, and streamlined organization. The kinds of problems to which the cooperatives are prone, the high administrative costs, lack of efficiency in organization, a tendency for corruption, speculation, or ineffective handling of moneys are as much an effect of a crisis of participation as a crisis of management. A marketing cooperative seeks to provide a better price for the product of its farmer members by operating without profit and operating with lower costs than the private trader. But it is the essence of cooperative management and organization that there should be control of the organization by the members, not only to ensure that management does, in fact, respond to the needs and interests of the members but also through members' participation in the management to provide voluntary and thus cheaper management.

There exists then in Tanzania a range of institutions operating at the grassroots level through which the rural population in particular can participate in making decisions and planning development. The TANU cells, the Village Development Committees, the cooperatives, are all institutions which demand the active involvement of the people at grassroots level. The electoral

system, for local authorities and Parliament, give further opportunities for the voice of the people to be articulated. Machinery, therefore, exists which gives the people of Tanzania the opportunity to plan and to undertake on a self-reliant basis their own benefit and welfare. The experience of the co-operatives underlines the fact that the mere existence of such machinery does not automatically ensure that the agencies of development will, in fact, work effectively and respond to the felt needs of the people. The task of making participation in these institutions and in the development effort more effective is being tackled on two fronts. On the one hand party leaders and officials and the workers of the rural development division are trying to build up the consciousness of the people to promote effective organization and effective leadership to mobilize the people in order to make this programme of self-reliant development a reality. The second avenue of attack is through various programmes of education. District Training Centres have been set up in several parts of the country and have as their main purpose the training of local leadership, giving them an understanding of the process of development, the priority needs in their area and the problems involved in running various organizations. Following the Arusha Declaration TANU itself has set up broad programmes for political education which in part are directed towards the cell, village and branch leaders of the party, in an effort at one level to make them more clearly understand the new socialist self-reliant aims, and in order to provide them with the understanding and skills necessary to be effective in running the various grassroots organizations. The cooperative movement has also realized that it is not enough merely to train managers and secretaries but that cooperative education in the principles and in the details of the running of cooperatives has to be provided for a cooperative society, committee members, chairmen and other leaders.

GOVERNMENT TRIES TO REACH THE VILLAGE

Of the various agencies concerned with getting government policies across to the people, the Regional Administration plays a key role. The Regional and Area Commissioners, as we have noted, are not only the senior government officers in their regions and districts but they also play a coordinating role in government planning, and act as secretaries of the local TANU machine. It is in this latter role that the difference between their style of work and that of their colonial predecessors, the PCs and DCs, comes out most clearly. Unlike many African countries, Tanzania did not merely replace the colonial field administrators with similarly qualified African officers who were expected to undertake the same kind of duties. Political appointments to the new posts of Regional and Area Commissioners emphasized that the new government was seeking a nationalist presence and not merely a governmental presence at the local level. This difference in

approach comes out in the activities and orientation of the political Commissioners who tend to gauge their own success by the number of new projects and the overall rate of development in their own areas.

Below the district level the form of the administration was also changed. To replace government appointed chiefs—who may or may not have had some traditional legitimacy—executive officers who are employees of the district councils were appointed. In order to create further, close links between governmental agencies and the popular institutions, it is, in fact, now proposed that new officials be appointed at the divisional level, who, like the Commissioners, would combine administrative and party functions.

At the grassroots level, government presence more often than not means the *Bwana Shamba* or *Bwana Maendeleo*—the agricultural extension worker or the rural development (formerly community development) assistant. The efforts of these "contact" men, who are in daily touch with the peasant is often taken for granted and is seldom the subject of any thorough evaluation. Yet, as we have seen, to many thousands of farmers in the rural areas, these grassroot workers are the "government". Recently, as part of the overall effort to improve contact with the rural population, some attempt has been made to evaluate these services. A study of agricultural extension work has revealed that as often as not, the shortcomings in the performance of field workers is due to weaknesses in the overall structure of the service. It has been noted in many areas as well as Tanzania that the field worker is not always equipped to deal with all the farming and other problems which confront the farmer. The solution which is often then proposed is that the extension worker must have much longer training to ensure his greater technical proficiency. Yet even with a fairly high level of technical training, it is doubtful whether the field worker can cope unaided with all the problems which he is likely to meet. In these circumstances it may be more profitable to seek a solution in much closer field supervision of extension workers by more qualified and experienced personnel. It is, in fact, clear from an examination of the various extension services that the man at the end of the line is left very much to his own devices. The reason for the lack of effective supervision and communication is often due to such simple, but fundamental factors as a very limited petrol vote which leaves the qualified technical officer little choice but to spend his time behind his desk. It is clear, too, that generally the performance of technical services could be greatly improved if those in charge of them had more administrative training to complement their technical capabilities, and if more executive personnel were employed to bear much of the load of routine administrative work.

We noted at the beginning of the paper the severe limitations on providing effective local services in a situation where the limited personnel that can be financed is spread very thinly. Tanzania obviously cannot conjure additional people and additional funds out of thin air. But the fact

that there are effective grassroots agencies such as the party and cooperatives means that the arm of the various technical and administrative services can be extended. Instead of the agricultural field worker being restricted by the number of farmers he can see, he can and frequently does work through the TANU cell leaders or cooperative committee men. Rural development workers can also gear their activities to informing and mobilizing community leaders who are being educated to see their role as one of promoting development in their villages. Indeed, the party has to be included in any list of the development agencies operating in the field in Tanzania, for this is how TANU sees its role.

This cooperation between technical public services and the popular agencies existing at the local level has, in fact, been given broader institutional form. There exist at regional, district and village level, development committees whose task is to draw together the government, local government, party, cooperatives and other bodies concerned with development and the overall welfare of the people. In theory this "Development Front" is given direction by the party. However, in practice the actual processes do not always work out as neatly as this. Central government departments are used to thinking of their own activities as separate programmes and have tended to be more concerned with the vertical chain of command back to their Ministry's headquarters in Dar es Salaam than with cooperating in broad integrated local programmes. This, despite the very marked success of those campaigns and programmes which have commanded the support of several agencies. Recognizing some of these problems, the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development have recently made it clear to their field staff that one of their first priorities should be to involve themselves in the broad community based programmes of development that are sponsored by the local development committees.

Effective coordination on field programmes depends on more than the existence of a efficient coordinating machinery. Common programmes which link agricultural, nutritional, community development and party activities, for instance, presuppose a common set of objectives and a common set of programmes worked out on the basis of these aims. The working out of a suitable set of development priorities for an area would also help to give coherence to the work of various government services operating there. One necessary element in the working out of this kind of common approach is a set of basic aims which point in the general direction along which change is to take place. With the setting out of the ideology of socialism and self-reliance in the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania now has defined the kinds of development it wants to see take place. The various services provided in the various districts should not contribute to growing disparities and should be ultimately geared to the development of self-reliant and self-governing farming communities. The form a programme based on these goals should take will obviously yary with the developmental possibilities to be found in

a particular area. Recent efforts to build up machinery for planning development at the regional level and below, with the appointment of regional economic secretaries, are thus timely. There now exists the possibility of mounting local development programmes based on a thorough survey of local needs. This local planning will avoid a situation where public services are run on a more or less *ad hoc* basis. In addition it will help to tailor these services not just to the expressed needs of the people, but to the removal of the key constraints and an emphasis on the essential priorities for overall development of the rural areas of the country.

Part Two

From Africanization to Professionalization

G. HYDEN

In this section we shall be concerned primarily with the discussion of ways and means to establish an African civil service suitable to local development needs. The Seminar Reports suggest a shift in emphasis away from Africanization, which was the immediate need at independence, to professionalization of the civil service. The original concern was to ensure that senior posts in the government were held by local staff as they could more effectively understand the political aspirations of the new states. Training in those early days, therefore, was primarily a tool to accelerate this process. "Crash programmes" were the order of the day. Gradually, however, training has increasingly been concerned with strengthening the professional attributes of the civil service. Rather than going for the minimum qualifications needed for specific posts—as was the case when the Africanization need was predominant—trainers now prepare their students for maximum performance. There is definitely a causal link between Africanization and professionalization. The latter concern is to a large extent the result of problems arising from premature promotions made during the initial phase of Africanization. Below we shall first trace the evolution of Africanization and the related training issues. The discussion of professionalization will be treated thereafter.

THE PROCESS OF AFRICANIZATION

Professor Ali Shaath, in his paper reprinted below, quotes sources that estimated the number of European civil servants in Africa at about 100,000 in 1958 (1966, p. 110). This gives an idea of the magnitude of the need for Africanization on the continent. It should further be remembered that Africanization mostly affected the top and middle echelons of the government hierarchy. Hence, it has affected the most strategic positions in each government organization. Africanization has usually started with the senior generalist positions in the ministries and has gradually spread to specialist positions and key positions in other public institutions, notably the public corporations. These characteristics seem to be more or less universal in all African countries. Yet, the scope and the timing of the process differs from one country to another.

The European, and to some extent Asian, dominance of the civil service

before independence was much heavier in East and Central Africa than it ever was in West Africa. The senior ranks of most ministries in the Federal Government of Nigeria were staffed 100 per cent by Nigerians as long ago as 1962. Africanization in East Africa, as measured statistically by nationals holding senior positions, is about a decade behind West Africa. In Central and Southern Africa, like Francophone Africa with the exception of Guinea, the presence of expatriates in senior position is still visible. Yet as one observer has noted in general Africanization of the civil service is increasingly assuming the status of *fait accompli*.[1]

It would be wrong, however, to look at Africanization purely in quantitative terms. This point was stressed by the 1962 seminar which added that "Africanization is not the simple exchange of Africans for non-Africans" (1962, p. 1). Africanization is the process of transforming a colonial type of public service into a national public service. It implies the gradual elimination of expatriate predominance at all levels in the public service and a reassessment of the machinery and the procedures to meet new functions and circumstances. The reasons for Africanization are, according to the 1962 report at least five (1) There is a need to show the man-in-the-street that the direction of the country's affairs is in their own hands. (2) As an instrument of change it is necessary that key civil servants are in harmony with the needs, wishes, and customs of the people. (3) Mutual confidence between a minister and a civil servant is easier when both have the same racial and cultural background. (4) It is necessary to overcome the uncertainty created by dependence on expatriate staff. (5) It costs less to employ an African and moreover the money spent as pay and allowances is kept in the country (1962, p. 2).

While criticizing the creation of supernumary posts for expatriates in the civil service and training grade posts for local staff it was widely recognized in 1962 that hired foreign technical and professional expertise was needed to complete the Africanization programmes. The latter could be divided into two main phases:

(1) A short-term programme to bring the public service effectively under national control. During this phase African officers should be pre-selected for promotion and given such formal training and directed experience as is necessary to enable them to take over top-level positions within a pre-determined time. Where necessary expatriate "advisers" should be retained to supplement lack of technical knowledge or experience but this device should be used with caution. It should not be used to retain Africanized expatriates in an executive capacity. During the short-term programme the normal appointment and promotion procedure should be relaxed to enable the public service to recruit at all appropriate levels.

(2) A longer term training programme based on a scientific survey

> of human resources and requirements for the entire economy. This programme would aim to reorient and expand the educational and training facilities of the country so as to meet the urgent manpower needs (1962, p. 5).

One of the sources of tension in the Africanization process was, and still is, the fact that the terms of employment of expatriate personnel are substantially better than what governments can offer their own staff. At the 1966 seminar it was noted that some of the experts get higher salaries than the African Presidents. Salary differentials between two people of approximately equal qualification were bound to create inter-personal problems. Some participants, defending the need for such differentials, argued that without high remuneration to expatriates it will be difficult to get highly qualified people. Their high salary could also be justified as they do not visualize a career in their jobs. Yet, other participants meant that non-monetary privileges for the attraction of foreign experts were equally important. Good housing, facilities to do research and a chance to travel and explore were suggested among others (1966, p. 27).

Patriotic incentives, i.e. a "burning desire" to serve one's own country, should be developed to retain African high-level manpower and eventually have it replace foreign talents. This has been emphasized at several seminars also in view of the tendency among some Africans, on studies overseas, to remain abroad for a long time or even flatly refuse to go back to serve their home country. To avoid this braindrain it was suggested in 1962 that bonding of scholarship holders was necessary in the early years of Africanization (1962, p. 13).

On the question of staff training, seminar participants emphasized that "crash programmes" must not be seen as alternatives to longer term balanced programmes for development of staff potential. The tendency to view training only as an interim measure was particularly great as many senior civil servants regarded training with scepticism. Thus, the first step to take is to induce a change of attitude towards training. A strong central training authority should be set up for this purpose (1962, p. 11).

At the same seminar all agreed that a newly qualified graduate requires some instruction and "lead-time" before he becomes operationally effective, but there was wide divergence of opinion on the nature and duration of induction training. On the one hand it was argued that in older and well-established civil services such as the British, there would be no harm in throwing a young graduate into the machine without pre-entry training. The tempo and staffing there are geared to training by slow absorption of experience from grade to grade. In new states in Africa the situation is different. For one thing the time factor is much more important. Also the civil service may lack the stability and continuity which would facilitate guided experience as a means to staff development. Desk training without

experienced supervision is often no training at all. In such circumstances pre-entry courses are essential both to give the officer some idea of the machinery with which he is to work and some understanding of the general principles of administration. Such pre-entry training would serve as a framework which could be filled in by experience.

Those who argued the opposite view maintained that formal pre-entry training should be confined to a brief introduction to the job and its context. Pre-entry training could never be a substitute for experience. Moreover it was difficult to ensure that pre-entry training was keeping pace with developments in governmental organization, procedures and philosophy. An officer who has imbibed irrelevant or erroneous ideas of administration in a pre-entry course is a liability. Staffing programmes, therefore, should respect the need to retain sufficient experienced officers to provide the guided experience during the first years on the job of each new graduate. The young officer straight from the university was usually full of enthusiasm and should not be discouraged by long formal induction courses. This view was particularly common among participants from East and Central Africa, who also maintained that whatever the merit of the first approach the realities of the situation in their countries would not allow any but the briefest induction courses for graduates (1962, pp. 14-15).

In 1963, the prevailing opinion seemed to favour induction training aimed at offering better knowledge of government objectives and organization as well as techniques and procedures. Assuming that to some extent a good administrator is born not made, the seminar agreed that:

> The object of all administrative training should be to develop and sharpen the officer's inborn qualities and to enable him to learn more quickly from experience. The training experience is continuous whether it is formal or on-the-job. Senior officers have a responsibility to ensure that junior officers understand not only "how" but also "why" of what they are doing (1963, p. 21).

In 1967, the prevailing opinion of the seminar participants had shifted in favour of specialized training. They argued that it is time to stop regarding the administrator as a Jack-of-all-trades. There is need for a systematic study of the kind of training required by administrators in Africa:

> It seems we have been looking at this problem through the eyes of the colonial administrator and the expert and not through the eyes of the African administrator. In such a study every attempt should be made to define the type of leadership we expect of the new administrator and the duties we require him to perform (1967, p. 24).

In order to help institutionalize the civil service, generalist administrators ought to specialize in economics, development planning or some other resources

area of government responsibility. The professional civil service associations should not merely be pressure groups but should also have training resources.

One can see, then, how there is a gradual shift away from the concept of the "amateur generalist" towards establishing a professional identity among the African generalists. There are several reasons for this. Many generalist administrators at the time of independence had been promoted to senior positions without possessing the necessary intellectual and academic qualifications. They had been unable to meet the demands of dynamic leadership in the civil service at this transitional stage. Another reason was that many of the younger administrators saw professionalization as a lever to reach more influential positions in the service. Perhaps most important of all, however, was the need to mark the border between the politicians and administrators. The optimistic assumption made at independence that relations between politicians and civil servants would be more harmonious if top posts were held by African officers had not come true. If anything tensions had increased. Thus, it was imperative to establish a professional identity that could help bring about a more constructive relationship between politicians and administrators.

TOWARDS PROFESSIONALIZATION

Professor Adedeji, in his background paper reprinted below, argues that the preoccupation with Africanization prevented most African governments from paying sufficient attention to the issue of professionalizing public administration in their respective countries. Even if it would be wrong to see Africanization and professionalization as incompatible processes, it is clear that to better equip administrators to cope with the development task, professionalization is becoming increasingly urgent.

But what does professionalization in the African context imply? Dr. Carney, in his paper below, maintains that the content of the concept of professionalization is changing in the newly independent African countries. This is primarily due to the fact that the conditions of public administration in Africa are different from other countries. The author stresses that the developmental activities of government in African countries extend to areas which in many other countries are controlled by the private sector. The administrator's relationship to the public as well as to the politicians is expected to be different from that practised elsewhere. All these factors, in Dr. Carney's view, point at both the urgency and the new meaning of the professional approach to public administration.

The discussions of the background papers on professionalization centred on two principal questions: (a) Is public administration already a professional activity? (b) What are the criteria of professionalism?

As to the first question, one participant was emphatic that public administration is already a professionalized activity in that it has a service

structure based on objectives and functions, a service based on special training and competence; a code of ethics in the form of political neutrality and a highly developed sense of mission in "serving the government of the day". He said that African administrators should devote more attention to strengthening these basic characteristics in the face of developmental needs. Discussions should focus on organizational structures, career development, pay scales, establishment of research groups for specific purposes and the formation of professional associations.

While most members did not reject the specific proposals made, they did not support the view that public administration could claim to be a profession like law and medicine. Yet, this did not exclude the possibility to make the field of public administration more professional (1971, p. 20).

The discussion of the professional qualifications required of an administrator was dependent on the definition of his role. Participants differed in their conception of this role. Some argued he should be viewed as a "social science engineer" while others emphasized that he is primarily "someone who gets things done by organizing men, money and materials". While a minority suggested that the basic education of the administrator should depend on the needs of individual countries, the majority was of the view that it should be in the social science disciplines. With regard to training it was felt that the four to five years of post-graduate training suggested in Professor Adedeji's paper was too long. Yet, there was no consensus as to the content and period of training required. This matter needs to be further examined. In view of the multi-disciplinary nature of public administration, the participants stressed the need for some proof of competence. This proof could be by examination, but the majority view was that most important should be competence rather than paper qualifications. While an association like AAPAM should resist the trade union habit of limiting the members of their profession, it was agreed that a profession cannot be recognized unless it has a body of knowledge and expertise over which it claims exclusive jurisdiction:

> The old idea that administrators are born, not made, no longer holds true. So also is the old-fashioned notion that administration is an art which is learnt on the job. It is becoming a science which can be learnt in a classroom and administrators and managers can be trained to use tools of their trade in much the same way as a craftsman can be trained to use tools of his craft (1971, p. 21).

The members of a profession must also have a common concern for advancement of the relevant body of knowledge and the techniques of its application. There should be a close link between the practitioners and the "contemplative" members of the profession.

To be recognized as a discipline it is also important that members are willing to exercise self-discipline. The Code of Ethics in Professor Adedeji's

paper was considered, but participants felt that it should be redrafted in more positive terms.

Although administrators operate in a socio-political context they must always bear in mind that the public and not the ministers are the clientele and that its interest must always be paramount. Cases are bound to occur when the private interests of the minister clash with those of the public. In such cases the job of the administrator will be to put the case of the public as strongly and clearly as possible whilst allowing the minister to pass political judgment on his views and recommendations.

On the question of professional independence it was agreed that it should not be exaggerated. It was noted that no profession enjoys complete autonomy. Operating in close proximity to politicians, administrators will probably find that they cannot expect the same degree of independence that other professions have:

> Their degree of independence is, however, bound to depend on their degree of competence for in the final analysis politicians are likely not to interfere with the administrator whom they know to be competent and able to deliver their promises (1971, p. 22).

While strongly advocating increased professionalization seminar participants recognized that there are several obstacles. It would not be easy to institutionalize professional values and norms in the quasi-political atmosphere that surrounds the top posts in the civil service. Very often political interference cuts across professional competence and ethics. But perhaps even stronger opposition to professionalism comes from the present generation of amateur generalist administrators; they may regard professionalization as a threat to their position. The hierarchical nature of administration in African countries was also mentioned as a constraint. "At present the initiative for change almost always comes from top management where power is concentrated autocratically in a few hands" (1971, p. 23). Such a style of management does not encourage professionalism and inventiveness, the participants asserted. One cannot avoid the impression that in the name of professionalization they are advocating a transfer of managerial qualities to the administrators. The Jack-of-all-trades type of administrator is out:

> Prefessional competence will make the public believe in the science of government, that as a science it can be learnt and that public officials have mastered it. Only efficiency can earn the profession the trust, respect and admiration of the public (1971, p. 24).

In 1972, it was noted that many administrative training institutes had actually moved away from training for "promotion/localization" towards producing more professional officers. But the question is: how successfully? It may be too early to answer this question in this volume, yet, the 1972 report makes it clear that training alone will not bring about change. Too

much training may actually have been channelled into perpetuating outmoded structures and attitudes. It was necessary to Africanize not only the individual roles but also the whole institutions they perpetuate. In the words of Robert Gardiner: "Today the substance of the colonial tradition has disappeared but the form lingers on in many administrative practices". Structures and decision-making processes have to be improved, too.

FOOTNOTE

1 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The New African Administrator", *Journal of Modern African Studies* (Vol. 10, No. 1, 1972), p. 94.

African Manpower Needs and the Role of Technical Assistance

N. A. SHAATH

INTRODUCTION

The process of nations is ultimately the result of human efforts. The rate of social and economic growth depends—to a great extent—on the quality of a country's manpower. It is no wonder, thus, that increasing attention has been given lately to manpower development as a priority of all forms of progress: social, political and economic.

Manpower development has been defined as the process of increasing the knowledge, the skills and the capabilities of all the people in a society and the accumulation of human capital and its effective investment in the development of an economy.[1] This definition would include formal education (schooling), as well as on-the-job training, adult education and self-development as well as improvements in health, nutrition and labour mobility. However, the emphasis will here be on formal education as the most important tool of manpower development.

African needs for high quality manpower of all categories and specilizations are immense. Long decades of colonial administration have failed to produce the requisite African manpower urgently needed to maintain a progressive system of government, to provide adequate social services and to man the productive institutions which sustain and develop the African economy.

Consequently, the newly independent countries of Africa, in particular, need education to improve the quality of the labour forces, to create an adequate number of leaders, scientists, technicians and administrators and to foster a favourable change in attitude, motives and outlook of the African population.[2]

Education, however, is a very expensive process. It requires the commitment of a large amount of scarce resources, for a long period of time, with the hope of an uncertain reward in the future. Moreover, education is quite variable in context and philosophy. It is conceivable that certain educational messages and systems may be inimical to development and social progress. The experiences of several developing countries that gained their independence in the late 1940s, and thus started their educational upsurge in the last twenty-five years, show very little positive and at times negative effects of

education on economic development. India, Burma, Thailand and the UAR before 1960-61 are outstanding examples.[3]

Education, generally inflates the expectations of the educated. Unless these expectations are partially met by expanding job opportunities via rapid capital formation in agriculture and industry, great dissatisfaction and frustration may ensue. Formation of an army of intellectual proletariat, unemployment of the educated, the flight of high-level manpower to the more affluent countries and acute urban-rural dualism are some of the symptoms of uncontrolled expansion of low-quality formal education in a poor country without the requisite comparable expansion of employment opportunities.

Manpower development requires the allocation of resources beyond the means of the developing countries. Such development cannot be sustained without substantial aid from the advanced nations. To channel such aid effectively to their manpower development programme, the recipient countries need comprehensive development plans, with manpower goals as an integral and vital part. Careful study of the experiences of the older developing countries may be of great value to avoid the pitfalls and handicaps faced by these nations.

External technical aid to education creates new problems of its own. These must be considered seriously by aid administrators in the developing countries to optimize the utilization of this important form of assistance.

The present study will consider first the nature and magnitude of Africa's manpower needs. Subsequently it will turn to a critical examination of the role of technical assistance in catering to African needs with special reference to the newly independent countries of Africa.

No attempt is made to make the study exhaustive or definite. More questions are asked than could be answered in such limited space. It is hoped the paper will stimulate discussion and interest in this most vital and timely topic.

AFRICAN MANPOWER NEEDS

Africa's manpower needs today are immense by any measure or standard of comparison. Most of these needs are not related to any prospect for rapid, large-scale economic development. Rather, they arise from the fact that in the long years under colonial administrations, Africans were excluded from every important post in the government or the institutions running the economy. Africans were denied access to the advanced institutions of learning, and only a few were given the opportunity to get any amount of education.

The situation was a little better in certain countries, even before independence was won. Egypt—of course—is an exceptional case, but even in Ghana and Nigeria, Africanization gained momentum right after the Second World War. No such deliberate measures took place in the former French, Belgian, Spanish or Portuguese colonies. In such countries, the colonial rulers could not see that independence was imminent, and that

Africans would be required on a massive scale to perform a variety of jobs traditionally done by the colonial expatriates in Africa.[4]

This policy retarded the education of Africans. In Senegal, Dahomey and Togo, the most advanced former French colonies, less than five children in a hundred were touched by education before the Second World War. There were less than a dozen university graduates in the Ivory Coast in 1945 and only one in Guinea as of 1948.[5]

The situation in other colonies was even worse. Despite the progress made in the post-war period, the situation was not much improved. There still exists a shortage of all categories of high level manpower in the independent African states. Shortages are most acute in the critical professions of engineering and medicine. Uganda had one African dentist in 1960, and four electrical engineers.[6] Malawi had two physicians, one of whom was the Prime Minister out of a total of 50 university graduates, when independence was achieved.[7]

In 1958, the number of European civil servants, in Africa was estimated at 100,000; this does not include university personnel, missionaries and Europeans hired by local authorities. It also excludes Americans and United Nations personnel.[8] Admittedly a very rough and conservative estimate, it gives an idea of the magnitude of the Africanization problem.

A large number of these foreigners decided to leave their jobs at the time of independence or shortly thereafter. Some ex-colonial civil servants were asked to leave. New foreigners had to be recruited to fill their places, since qualified Africans were not available.[9] Recruiting new foreigners has become more difficult and costly as opportunities in Europe and America have become quite attractive compared to those in Africa. The glamour has worn off for most Europeans and since the essence of the job of a new foreign adviser is to work himself out of a job, there is no more career. This makes manpower problems for the newly independent countries quite difficult to solve and makes resort to international technical assistance to build up their own educational institutions to generate qualified African manpower imperative. This, however, requires a long lead time that must be bridged in the interim by more foreigners.

TYPE OF MANPOWER NEEDS

The needs of manpower development can be divided into two categories: actual and potential.

Actual Needs

The first and most obvious manpower need Africa faces today is that of maintaining the services and productive establishments existing at present growth.

To this must be added the number of new positions that will be derived from the country's social and economic development plan reflecting expected manpower needs. As it takes from ten to fifteen years to develop high level manpower, the planning perspective must be long enough.

Several studies have been made to assess such manpower demands. The most famous of such studies is probably the Ashby Commission's Report on Nigeria. The United Nations, the Ford Foundation and several other institutions helped several African countries conduct their own studies.[10]

The present educational system's capacity to generate the needed manpower is quite limited. The future plans of several countries do not cope with the magnitude needed either.

Furthermore, it was estimated that—according to the targets of the plan—the manpower gap in 1980 may be even greater than at present.[11] As a way out it was suggested that secondary enrolment "ought to be doubled over the next six years, doubled over the following six years and then doubled again over the next twelve, in order to finally catch up with the manpower shortage in 1986". Such a plan could have been carried out only if the number of highly qualified expatriates (especially in teaching) had been increased to twice their number in 1966. If this had been done, they would have ceased to be needed in 1980.[12]

Potential Needs

Potential needs for education include the vast demand to eradicate illiteracy among the masses, to change society's values and foster a sense of nationhood, to provide a leadership elite, to provide skilled workers and sub-professionals if large-scale industrialization is envisioned in the future, and to improve quality throughout the educational system, especially at the primary and secondary levels.

All such needs were left out of the previous estimate of "actual or measurable needs". It is here that the most difficult decisions must be made. It is here that the experiences of older developing countries must be reviewed and learnt from. Besides, it is such types of educational input that potentially contribute most to economic development. However, education for such potential needs is quite a costly and slow process. It yields uncertain returns after a long period of waiting. Professor Vaizey estimates the opportunity cost of waiting from the returns in the developing countries in Africa to be as high as 10 to 20 per cent per annum.[13] This is because of the keen competition for scarce resources for alternate uses in agriculture, industry and other services. Since at least one-third of the output of higher education is used by the educational system itself (as teachers of administrators), this makes the net contribution of education to the stock of skilled people the more expensive.

It is in this area that controversies are rampant, and questions of policy

are most debated: Education for the masses or for elite formation? General or technical education? Schooling or on-the-job training? Quantity or quality? These are only a few of the questions asked.

Satisfying Africa's educational needs requires allocating a minimum of 3 to 6 per cent of the African countries' national income for a long time to come. Financial or physical resources are not the only or even the most relevant constraints. Africa needs human agents to develop its human resources. Africa's needs in terms of financial, physical or human requirements are beyond its present resources.

Given such constraints, one can only recommend caution. This does not imply relegating potential manpower needs to a secondary role. For, it is just such demand for education that may have the greatest impact on economic development and social progress. However, careful planning is a prerequisite in this area.

Primary school-leavers are a problem in most African countries. Their schooling is quite inferior and remote from African realities. They learn no useful skills. Nevertheless, such graduates consider their school certificate as a ticket of white-collardom that should secure for them a desk job in the cities. They crowd the cities. As the civil service or the secondary schools are unable to absorb them, they become restless and frustrated. This and other manpower problems must be faced and solved as early as possible before they reach the "classic" developing countries, such as India or the UAR.

THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Survey of African manpower needs and available resources to satisfy them leaves the newly independent countries of Africa no alternative but to resort to external technical assistance. Without substantial aid from the advanced countries and the international organizations in the form of men, money, overseas training places, education materials and expert advice, Africa's manpower shortages will not be relieved in the foreseeable future. The most important contributions of technical assistance to Africa's manpower needs are the following:

(1) Provision of operatives to replace departing expatriates until qualified Africans are developed.
(2) Development of African high level manpower to eventually replace most expatriates and to meet the additional needs created by economic, social and political development. The most important forms of aid in this area, to be discussed below, are:
    (a) Provision of expatriate teachers.
    (b) Provision of scholarships for study abroad.
    (c) Provision of equipment and advice.

In the following sections, these forms of technical assistance will be discussed briefly but critically, with the hope that greater awareness of problems and prospects may lead to a more efficient utilization of technical assistance and thus may accelerate the process of manpower development.

Provision of Operatives

After independence, ex-colonial officers and other expatriates departed. Qualified Africans were not available, nor could they be developed rapidly in adequate numbers to replace all the departing expatriates. Therefore, new foreigners had to be recruited to fill acute manpower shortages. The new African governments are not able to attract high quality foreign operatives at reasonable costs, and the manpower gap continues to exist and widen.

Consequently, aid from advanced countries and international organizations in the area of recruitment of foreign officers and in financing part of their cost is urgently needed. The United Nations' Prrogramme is still a mere drop in the bucket. Its enlargement to something like an International Civil Service has been suggested, and deserves further attention.

Besides, in the instances where vacancies have been filled by unqualified Africans, advisers are needed to help such appointees perform their duties and to accelerate their on-the-job training to improve their efficiency. It should be borne in mind that all foreign operatives are also expected to be trainers for their potential African replacement. In certain cases this has been difficult to achieve. Certain expatriates have no time to advise and train their subordinates. Others understandably spend more time making themselves indispensable than replaceable.

On the other hand, rigid insistence by certain aid agencies, and especially the UN, on nominating local counterparts for every position filled by a foreigner creates a different kind of problem. As counterparts are unavailable in certain areas, a whole project is jeopardized or a critical post left vacant. In other cases a very unfit "counterpart" is nominated to meet the requirement even though he cannot possibly replace the foreign expert in a relatively short time and by training-on-the-job.[14] It is important to provide incentives to expatriates to train their subordinates. It was suggested that they be given a small part of their salary for their job performance and a large part considered explicitly as a compensation for training. A time schedule should also be set for their training duties.

Development of African Manpower

This need is partially met by on-the-job training of subordinates and counterparts. The major source of African high level manpower, however, will be the educational system.

If rapid economic development through industrialization and agricultural

development is desired, then a much faster rate of human resource development and high level manpower formation is needed.[15]

Provision of Expatriate Teachers

The most urgent need of the African educational system is that for teachers.

Foreign teachers are especially needed in university and teacher-training. This is a most important area for technical assistance, although several problems are encountered in the employment of foreign teachers:

(1) Salaries of qualified teachers are very high. Even if external technical aid pays for their services, their local pay is usually provided by the recipient country. The almost inevitable consequence of this is the raising of the whole salary structure in the country concerned. Otherwise, dissatisfaction of the native teachers will result, creating a source of constant trouble.[16]

(2) The quality of volunteer teachers varies considerably. Their local maintenance costs occasionally run high and exceed total actual cost of local teachers.[17] They also serve for a very short period, too short to equip them with enough knowledge of the local culture and conditions to increase their usefulness.

(3) Political problems affect teachers most, since they come in close touch with the country's youth; voicing their ideas may sound to some like indoctrination. On the other hand, they cannot escape affecting the minds of their students directly or indirectly. This is most delicate ground and must be recognized as one of the serious problems of employing foreign teachers.

(4) The use of expatriate teachers, mostly in the cities may accentuate social dualism in a developing country. The urban students coming in contact with expatriate teachers acquire values and standards quite different from those acquired by their rural counterparts taught by native teachers.

Given the difficulties of employing foreign teachers, it is most important that qualified African teachers be developed rapidly. Technical aid can accelerate the process of teacher development. Moreover, providing financial and human resources to areas other than teaching, may release local resources that can be allocated to the educational system. This, however, assumes that incentives will be provided to attract Africans to the teaching profession. Higher salaries and fringe benefits may be one incentive, but it raises the cost of high level manpower development. Raising the status and prestige of teachers may be the real long-term incentive to attract teachers and retain at reasonable costs. Special attention should be given to the rural areas and incentives to attract high quality teachers to such areas.

Technical assistance can be most useful as an aid to teachers, by providing teaching materials, e.g. audio-visual aids, programmed instruction and correspondence courses to enable local teachers to reach a large number of students more effectively.

Foreign aid may help transport students to larger schools allowing high student-teacher ratios, thus making for more economic use of local teachers' time.

Problems of cultural adjustment and the relevance of teachers' experience to developing country's needs may be reduced if teachers from other Afro-Asian countries are hired to teach in the newly independent countries of Africa. These teachers may cost the recipient countries less than their European or American counterparts. Thousands of teachers from the UAR, Jordan, India among others are already teaching and providing other services in the developing countries. Some of these teachers are being financed by their own countries. However these countries are already in great need of aid themselves. Third Party Programmes, programmes whereby a third "rich" country finances the transfer of such teachers, may prove of great value to the "surplus" as well as the manpower-short developing countries.

Aid for Study Abroad

The second important method of high-level manpower development is that of sending developing countries' students to the universities and institutes of learning in the advanced countries. Leaving one's country in search of knowledge in far away lands is as old as recorded history.

It is, however, an expensive method of manpower development. Part of the cost is inevitably provided by the host country through its subsidy to education, i.e. providing it to everybody (including the foreigners) below full costs.

Large amounts of technical assistance have been offered to the African countries in the form of scholarships for study overseas. Thousands of other Africans have been invited by national or international agencies to visit institutions in the advanced countries and spend shorter periods pursuing various forms of training.

Sending students to the advanced institutions of learning abroad may be more economic than building local institutions to handle their demand for higher education. Moreover, travel abroad has its advantages. The student from a developing country is given the opportunity to acquire the best training, latest advances in knowledge and come in contact with people of different cultures. The student may acquire from his contacts and experience new habits of industry, self-discipline, original thinking of a broad background.

However, this method of manpower development has its difficulties and limitations. It requires the most careful planning. Wastage rates among

foreign students are sometimes double those of average university students in Britain or the US.[18] There is a great need for initiation and orientation courses, careful student guidance and changes in curricula to offer courses to meet the special needs of these students. Efforts by the Ford Foundation and AID among others are directed to institution building in the developing countries, linking American universities in an organic way with universities in the developing countries. This gives confidence and proper care to overseas students.

The foreign student faces many other difficulties in a foreign land: language, discrimination and difficulties of adjustment to name a few. Such difficulties are in the most part surmountable if the student spends a long enough time abroad, which adds to the costs borne by the host country by student.

The returning student, however, faces the greatest difficulties in his homeland. He has acquired a new outlook and different attitudes, and his readjustment to local conditions may prove to be quite painful. In fact, the problems of the returning student have been strong enough to lead the Tananarive Conference to recommend the discontinuance of sending African students to complete their undergraduate education abroad, limiting study abroad to post-graduate studies and special short visits.[19] The conference recommendation provided the following explanation: "It is essential for young Africans to acquire deep enough roots in their own cultural and social environment during their formative years before coming into contact with strong outside influence."[20]

Technical assistance in the form of scholarships for study abroad may eventually lead to the total loss of such students as they decide to stay in the host countries in which they have acquired their education. What makes the problem even more serious is that most of those who never go back are scientists, engineers and physicians: the most critical high-level manpower.

In certain countries graduates of foreign universities are distrusted because of the suspected foreign influence on their thinking. They are also distrusted by the ruling elite as all educated groups are.[21] This problem must be faced seriously, so that Africa's young intellectuals may be well allocated and motivated.

In conclusion, technical assistance in the form of scholars for study abroad may be a most important form of help if properly handled and planned for. Nonetheless it is costly, especially in terms of the long waiting time it involves. Moreover it entails the risk of the total loss of the graduate to his needy country.

Other Forms of Technical Assistance to Education

Technical assistance may contribute significantly to the process of manpower development by providing advisers in manpower planning, researchers on

educational needs, curricula and methods of cutting the costs of education in a developing country. It may render great help in institution building; a very important requisite for economic and political development and social progress.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Reviews of African needs for manpower show great shortages of high level manpower in almost every area. The systematic exclusion of Africans from senior posts under the ex-colonial administration and the very slow process of education in those pre-independence days have left Africa with severe shortages that will not be eliminated for a long time. Under such conditions manpower development is not apt to create an intellectual surplus in the tradition of the older developing countries in the immediate foreseeable future. However, such a danger will remain in the background and may become a reality in 20 to 25 years if the pace of economic development does not accelerate. The contribution of manpower development to such growth will be minimal unless the "right" kind of education is provided and unless heavy doses of physical capital are provided in industry, agriculture and social overhead capital. Surpluses of a sort are already developing among primary school-leavers in several African countries despite great shortages elsewhere. Such a condition is caused by inappropriate primary education, the inability of secondary schools to absorb such graduates and the inability to gear education to economic demands.

Some of the perverse effects of education widely prevailing in the older developing countries are also creeping into the African scene, e.g. the effect on the level of aspirations and the "explosion of expectations", the concentration of the educated in the urban centres and the ensuing cultural and economic dualism of urban vs. rural sectors, and the consideration of "educational certificates" as important passes to white-collardom and government employment. Consequently, integrated manpower development planning is a most important requirement at this stage.

The large amount of resources, both physical and human, needed to achieve the required rate of manpower development is not available to the newly independent developing countries of Africa. Substantial technical assistance is most urgently needed. Technical assistance is needed to provide operatives to fill the manpower gap created by departing expatriates and growth needs that cannot be met at present by qualified Africans. Aid is also needed to help African countries build their own high level manpower for immediate needs, i.e. replacement of expatriates, and for potential requirements, that is manpower development needed to accelerate economic growth.

Such technical assistance should be carefully planned in an integrated manpower plan in each recipient country. Special care should be given to the use of expatriate teachers in secondary education and to scholarships for study abroad.

Teachers from other manpower-surplus developing countries, e.g. UAR, India, Jordan may contribute to the process of African manpower development. So might the universities and institutes of learning of such countries. Costs may be lower and inter-cultural problems less acute in such circumstances. The use of third party aid programmes to finance such exchanges of manpower resources among developing countries may prove to be of great value.

Other areas of technical assistance to education should include advice on manpower planning, development of curricula and provision of educational equipment to cut costs and improve teacher efficiency.

Finally, unless aid to education is accompanied by substantial assistance to physical capital formation in agriculture and industry, manpower will have a minimal effect on African economic development. Equal attention should be paid to institution building as an important requisite for social and political progress.

FOOTNOTES

1 Harbison, F., and Myers, C.A., *Education, Manpower and Economic Growth*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1964, p. 2.
2 The literature on the subject of education and economic development has grown to voluminous proportions lately. See Alexander-Frutshi, M. C. (ed.), *Human Resources and Economic Growth*, Menlo Park, California: Stanford University Press, 1963, for a very useful annotated bibliography on the subject. See also the works of Harbison, Myers, Schultz, Correa and Vaizey.
3 See Shaath, N. A., "Education, High-Level Manpower and the Economic Development of the UAR", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1965.
4 In fact, Frenchmen poured into French West Africa after the war. Their number increased from 30,000 to 80,000 in the 1954-56 period. Their pressure blocked accession by Africans to a variety of jobs thus severely limiting Africanization. See Berg, Elliot, "Education and Manpower in Senegal, Guinea and the Ivory Coast", in *Manpower and Education*, pp. 232-267.
5 Hodgkin, T., and Schachter, R., "French-Speaking West Africa in Transition", in *International Conciliation*, No. 525, May 1960.
6 Thomas, R. L., "High-Level Manpower in the Economic Development of Uganda".
7 Saltzer, G., "High-Level Manpower in Nyasaland's Development", in *Manpower and Education*, op.cit.
8 Benveniste, G., and Morand, W., *Handbook of African Economic Development*, New York: Praegar, 1963, p. 61.
9 The sudden and rapid withdrawal of French civil servants and technicians from Guinea when it chose independence in 1958 could have led to a disaster had it not been for technical assistance from the Soviet Bloc and other African countries. Similar disasters were faced in the Congo after independence. Ibid., p. 66.
10 See Thomas, R. L., *Survey of Manpower and Training in the Uganda Protectorate*, op. cit.
11 Jolly, R., and Rado, Emil, "Education in Uganda—Reflection on the Report of the Uganda Education Commission", *East African Economic Review*, Vol. I, New Issue, 1964, pp. 76-77.
12 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the Ashby Commission's targets for Nigeria, considered ambitious at the time of the Reports' publication, have been raised substantially.
13 Vaizey, J., "Education in African Economic Growth", in *Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara*, edited by E. E. G. Robinson, London: Macmillan, 1964.
14 The UN has initiated a programme to train people who will act as counterparts in several UN-assisted programmes.

15 See Harbison, F., "High-Level Manpower Development and Economic Growth", in US papers presented to the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Vol XI, p. 1.
16 See *Volunteers in Aid*, London, ODI.
17 Ibid., p. 347.
18 Vaizey, J., "Education in African Economic Growth", op. cit.
19 Carr-Saunders, A. M., *Staffing African Universities*, London: ODI, 1964.
20 Ibid.
21 The alienation of the intellectuals or "technicians" as they are commonly called is a practically universal phenomenon in Africa. See Berg, Elliot, "Education and Manpower in Senegal, Guinea and the Ivory Coast", op. cit., p. 266.

Improving Effectiveness Through Training

J. E. KARIUKI

Training is an integral part of the overall personnel philosophy of an organization, an agency or a government. Training is relevant and useful only if this overall philosophy is soundly conceived and implemented towards the achievement of set objectives. In the context of a state, such objectives will be related to the achievement of the public good through a number of agencies specially set up to deal with the large variety of activities which are part and parcel of the needs of modern life. The management of those activities entails the effective utilization of the material and human resources available. It is generally accepted that most developing countries suffer far more from the human than from the material or even the technological problems; the first aspect of the human problem is the lack of human resources to meet the manpower requirements of the state, and the second problem the acquiring, maintaining, motivating, developing and utilizing of persons in implementing plans towards the achievement of national objectives.

Personnel policies are mainly concerned with the second aspect of the human problem, but their formation is made more complicated by the first aspect, namely, the acute shortage of trained manpower. There are also a number of other limiting factors which add to the difficulties of framing progressive personnel policies. These factors vary in nature and degree from state to state, but are, nevertheless, always present in some measure. Examples are the political situation in a country, the level of economic development, public opinion towards government agencies, traditional attitudes and practices, vested interests in high places and many more. Whoever has to implement the personnel function has to take into account all these different factors, and more often than not the personnel officials contend with, rather than enhance, the development of progressive personnel practices.

Another limiting factor, particularly in the area of training, is the fact that the interpretation and implementation of training policies is not limited to those who exercise the personnel function alone, for much responsibility is in the hands of the "managers" in all the other functional areas of an organization. The effectiveness of personnel policies is so dependent on the most senior officers of an organization that it may be useful to spend a little more of the seminar's time discussing this point.

MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES REGARDING MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

One of the problems of rapid Africanization has been that officers have had to assume management roles without having had the opportunity to understand what management was about. It is not necessary to go into details of the role of management here. This is the subject of another paper in this volume. It is enough to emphasize that a manager spends little of his time doing functional things, e.g. operating machines, designing products, treating patients, teaching classes, meeting tourists, selling products, etc. He is more concerned with the creation of an atmosphere wherein the declared objectives of his organization can be achieved through the activities of other people. True enough, there are certain "functions" of management he must perform, e.g. planning, coordinating, directing, motivating and controlling. These, however, have to do with his role as a "leader" of other people. And since most of a manager's activities are centered around people—his most useful resource—it follows that he must constantly concern himself with the development of their talents, and his teams' and individuals' motivation, for only through these means can he hope to achieve the objectives of his organization.

The colonial situation did not give much, if any, opportunity to Africans to learn to exercise management functions at any senior level. Africans were not given the responsibility of coordinating and directing the activities of others. On the whole they were made to do "things" the objectives of which were not always clear to them and the responsibility for which was not theirs. They were hardly ever called upon to make any decisions that would affect the running of the organizations in which they found themselves. It is not surprising, then, that when many of them found themselves suddenly having to make important decisions, having to supervise the activities of others and generally to practice leadership qualities, they were on the whole unprepared and consequently hesitant in the use of their newly acquired authorities. When authority and responsibility were given to them the tendency was for them to try to do the work themselves rather than through other people. The result was that they were so busy doing things which other people could do for them and their organizations that they had no time to give to the consideration of development and motivation of their teams. And the less opportunity the staff had for the development of their talents and their aspirations, the less useful they continued to be and the more the making of decisions continued to devolve on the persons at the top.

The problems I have described above continue to bedevil the performance of African "managers" and hence the effectiveness of their institutions. It, therefore, seems that the first step towards breaking the vicious circle is to "train" the managers in the better understanding of their role. They must

be made to realize that only by working through and with others in their team can they hope to achieve the best results within their organization, and therefore, to get these "others" so developed and motivated that they can give their best. This should be the manager's prime concern and responsibility. Only then will the top officers give the right emphasis and encouragement to training, and support personnel policies concerning training.

Without this support, national training efforts will tend to be regarded as something separate rather than an integral part of the whole service; an activity that takes away people from their jobs rather than an essential process in the development of greater efficiency in the service. To develop this attitude further, senior officers must themselves have the opportunities to develop their understanding of their role in the development of personnel and, through discussions such as the kind afforded by this seminar, explore ways by which such personnel development can be improved and accelerated, not only through better organization of the personnel functions, but also through the willingness of managers to accept the responsibility of training and developing their teams.

TRAINING: PART OF THE PERSONNEL FUNCTION

It has already been indicated that training has to be seen in the light of the overall personnel policies. There is no way by which it can be isolated from other activities, such as establishing the personnel requirements for the various agencies, identifying sources of suitable labour for selection and recruitment, job analysis, methods of personnel development, promotion, schemes of service, administering programmes for developing managers, etc.

Definition: Although there is no single standard definition of training, it might be described as the organized process by which people learn knowledge and skills required to fill the gap between their initial knowledge and skills and those required for the effective performance of the job they are expected to do after training.

Training can bring tangible benefits to an organization: people are able to learn to do jobs quicker and thus production increases; the level of present performance can also be improved even for those with experience; training can inculcate certain desirable attitudes within the organization; certain operational problems, e.g. accidents, poor public services, etc., can be reduced; training can be used to fill manpower needs, e.g. in the Africanization process.

It is necessary to differentiate training from education, the latter being much wider and more general in scope, while the former is more particular and limited. In this connexion, the United Nations Handbook of Training in the Public Service states:

With particular reference to the Public Service, education is under-

> stood to be general cultural preparation which a young person received before entering public employment, while training is understood to be the specific preparation received just before entering public employment or at a later point in the career and directed towards the performance of the duties assigned to the individual.

Training and education often overlap. When education, especially at advanced levels, becomes so specialized that its objective is to enable the learner to do a specific job for which he will earn a living, then it can be referred to as training. On the other hand, many training programmes contain an important educational element, usually intended to give the trainee a broader understanding of the wider issues related to the specific job he is being trained to do.

Three important issues arise out of the observations made above. The first one is the specific nature of the job for which a training programme is conducted. Before dealing with this point in greater detail, it will suffice to state right away that many training programmes fail to achieve the desired results because no attempt has been made to analyse precisely the exact nature and content of the job.

The second consideration is the implication in a training programme that the trainee has certain gaps in his knowledge and skills which the training programme must attempt to fill if he is to perform the job efficiently. As there are exceptionally few situations where the absolute requirements of a job will be found in the individual either when initially employed or after promotion, it will be necessary to consider also the question of the means of obtaining the best candidate for a job—one whose deficiencies can, to the highest degree possible, be corrected by training. We shall, therefore, have to briefly discuss recruitment policies in this session; for training can be a total failure if the trainees are from the start completely unsuited to the kind of job for which a training programme is set up.

Thirdly, there is the question of the training programme itself: the determination and definition of the nature of the gap, i.e. the training need, the planning of the training programme to meet the need, the content of a training programme, implementation of the training programme, and the evaluation to test its effectiveness.

Job Analysis

The United States Department of Labour has described job analysis as follows:

> Job analysis is defined as the process of determining, by observation and study, and reporting pertinent information relating to the nature of a specific job. It is the determination of the tasks which comprise

the job and of the skills, knowledge, abilities, and responsibilities required of the worker for successful performance and which differentiate the job from others.

Thus job analysis is a progress by which all the pertinent facts relating to a job are obtained. It includes a job description: a statement relating to the nature of the job with such items as job title, summary, duties, location, machines used, materials used, supervision given and/or received, working conditions, etc., and a job specification: a statement of the human requirements and qualifications necessary for the performance of a job, including such items as education, experience, prior training, judgement, initiative, physical skills needed, responsibilities involved, emotional characteristics, etc.

It is the experience of the writer of this paper that job analysis is not much used in the training programmes he has encountered so far. And most writing referring to job analysis mentions it in connexion with selection and recruitment methods. Yet it seems obvious that, if a training programme mounted for a specific job is to be successful, there is need for a clear definition of what the job entails and of the qualities needed for its performance. Most training programmes seem to be designed by trainers who have had experience in the job. To the extent that their experience is up-to-date from the job, their training programmes will have validity. After some time away from the job, however, and with the ever-changing circumstances that development entails, the trainer is bound to get out of date and to continue teaching practices which no longer relate to the needs of the job. Hence it would seem that a regular review of the nature of the job by prefessionally trained job analysts would yield information of vital use to those involved in designing training programmes. The role of a district officer in this country is one which is said to have been changing, particularly with the emphasis on the development aspects of the job. Yet no analysis of the changing role has been made, nor have the additional aspects been defined so that they might be reflected in the course organized for them.

It would seem that if job analysis were done prior to the organization of all training programmes, then the programmes would have much greater relevance to the needs of the jobs and would produce officers who were much better prepared for their responsibilities.

Recruitment

If training is not to be unduly expensive by nature of its scope and its length, then those to be trained should have qualifications as similar as possible to those required by the job. It is possible that if the gap is too wide in certain respects, the gap may never be filled by any form of training. On the other hand, if the candidates recruited for a job are too

well qualified for it, this may lead to boredom and the loss of workers to other jobs after a short period of service. Here again, it would seem that careful selection and recruitment policy is required if training programmes are to be effective.

A sound recruitment and selection policy, based on well established needs, offering attractive terms of service, and a useful career development programme using the best selection methods—including job analysis—will result in the proper placement of candidates in jobs suited to them, and the training programme following such a selection process will contribute effectively to the development of the talents of the trainees for the effective performance of their jobs.

The emphasis here is that training must be related to a sound overall personnel policy. There is no merit in training, even well, the right people for the wrong jobs or *vice versa*. Training will not serve an organization usefully if, after training, the placements are wrong. There is no point in developing talents which, when fully developed, cannot be utilized in the interests of the organization.

TRAINING PROGRAMMES

It is not necessary in this seminar to discuss in great detail the organization and the implementation of training programmes. This is best left to the trainers themselves. It is, however, important that the basic issues involved should be mentioned, and some of the problems be exposed.

Establishing Training Needs

Training programmes are costly, and should not be set up simply because it is fashionable to do so. When it is clear that a training programme would help improve performance, however, then the nature and size of the training need should be defined, and a programme set up to meet that specific need.

In the case of new entrants the training need is established from the very beginning. Their qualifications and experience are known, and so are the requirements of the job—assuming that the recruitment has been based on sound principles. The same can be said of promotional situations.

There are other situations, however, which may call for training programmes, especially when things are not going as well as expected. Examples of problems which may suggest training are: poor productivity, high costs, wastage of resources, poor quality, low morale, excessive grievances and complaints, poor discipline, excessive violation of rules and regulations, bad public relations, resistance to change and bribery and corruption. Many of these problems suggest that supervision may be weak, that communications may be breaking down and so on. And so there is need to analyse the

situation and see what the exact nature of the problem is. Only then can the relevant training programme be mounted, and only for the areas where training seems to be the solution. These problems can usually be most easily identified by the supervisor who holds a line responsibility, and although he may wish to use the services of such staff members of the organization as he may consider best fit, the responsibility for the good performance of his people is his own. This he cannot delegate. On the other hand, training staff, being in the habit of looking at problems from the training angle, may sometimes identify training needs which are not apparent to the supervisors and managers. In this case there would seem to be no objection to their suggesting possible training solutions for the consideration of their colleagues holding line responsibilities.

Type of Training Programme, Materials and Methods Used

When the training need has been established then the training staff are able to determine the kind of training required. The need may be for a general course; it may be to impart new skills and knowledge of the job; it may be to set up an apprenticeship programme; or it may be for safety training and so on.

The material to be used in training programmes is normally to be found within the organization itself. The usual problem is once again that proper job descriptions may not have been written. Research into the nature of the substance to be taught is necessary before a training programme is mounted. In Africa there is a great shortage of manuals and handbooks which can be used in training. There is also a serious lack of materials relating to local practices and conditions. It should be part of the duties of all trainers to do research in these areas so that more training material is made available.

The needs and numbers of trainees, the kind of training programme required, and the facilities available will determine the methods of the training programmes and location. Training can be done on-the-job or in formal classroom situations, where it can be either short-term, long-term, or on a day-release basis. The methods used include the lecture, the conference, the seminar, case studies, demonstration, role-playing, etc. The methods should be determined by their effectiveness for the specific purposes they are intended to serve.

A common point of conflict between trainers and line managers is the duration of a training programme. So often training people are requested to give lectures or mount training programmes of "so many hours" without prior consultation as to the requirements to be met by such a programme. Whereas no manager wants men to be away from their normal duties for longer than absolutely necessary, no trainer wants to waste his time trying to do the impossible. There is a minimum period during which certain skills and knowledge can be taught and this should be discussed and agreed upon.

Who are the Trainers?

The ideal trainer should be, in the first place, a person who has a thorough knowledge of the job from the experience of having done it himself. Secondly, he must be able to communicate effectively his knowledge and skills to other people. These two qualities are not always present in the same person. In Africa the usual problem is how to find an experienced person who can also instruct who is not already too senior in status to accept a training post. When younger people are available they usually lack experience and their training is neither practical nor acceptable to others who are either the same age as themselves or who may have more practical experience of actual problems. The problem then is how to attract, particularly to training institutions, officers who are senior, and to offer them terms of service attractive enough to make them leave the normal line of promotion in their agencies for a period of time. The problem is one which is discussed often enough without much action being taken. The fact is that no training programme will be successful if conducted either by experienced but illiterate officers or by academically qualified novices. Unless African governments are prepared to have their officers permanently being trained by expatriates then they must accept that the trainer must be as good as, and even better, than his trainee and be prepared to pay him accordingly.

Even when the system of recruiting trainers improves, trainers will have to have other qualities, e.g. the ability to do research, creativeness, etc., which are needed to maintain dynamic and growing programmes which teach not just what is, but also prepare for tomorrow.

It hardly needs to be stated that, as most training staff are recruited on the basis of their knowledge of the job, a training programme for training the trainers should be mounted wherever possible so that they improve their techniques. This is something often ignored, much to the detriment of the training programmes.

I have already pointed out that the responsibility for the development of their staff rests on the shoulders of the managers. One of the ways in which they can illustrate their interest is in their participation in the training programmes. They can open and close courses, and they can give lectures on matters of policy and insist that other senior officers also make their contribution. Such a contribution will not only help to make the training based on a practical approach, it will help to boost the morale of the participants by making them feel that the organization as a whole is interested in their development.

One other way in which managers can show their faith in training is by the way in which they make nominations to training programmes. In many cases candidates nominated for training are those who are normally ineffective in their duties, who therefore can be "spared". Training should be for those whose needs require it and who can be expected to benefit from it. Senior

officers should also ensure that training is not a wasted effort by seeing that those who receive training are used in areas where they fully utilize what they have learnt. It is not only bad for the morale of the ex-trainee not to be able to use his newly acquired skills, it is morally wrong that skills learnt at a high cost should not be properly used in a situation where there is a general shortage of skilled personnel.

Evaluation

This final test as to whether a training programme has been successful or not is whether the trainees can thereafter do the jobs for which they have been trained. Only their supervisors can tell this, and they should communicate back to the trainers their observations of performance so that training programmes can be progressively improved. Trainers can, by tests and questionnaires before and after training programmes, measure to a certain degree how well the trainees have done within the training situation. Good performance there does not guarantee good performance in the working situation, where other factors such as working conditions, motivation, relations with colleagues and so on may influence performance. Other methods of evaluating training, such as having control groups, are being developed, but the more complicated the method the more unlikely is it to be put into practice.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, it is necessary to emphasize once again that training must be in the context of a progressive manpower development policy. It must be supported from the top, otherwise trainers and personnel establishments will labour in vain. It must be based on recognized needs and implemented rationally by trainers who have the skills and motivation to do so. It must be comprehensive and should cover all fields of service. Finally, it must be recognized as an essential element in the development of a competent service without which national objectives cannot be attained.

The Case for Professionalization of Public Administration*

D. CARNEY

This paper is written in the context of contemporary independent African countries which have inherited a public service structured in the Western European tradition and involving, among other things, the separation of public from business administration, and the general insulation of the greater part of the public service from political life. These countries now find themselves in a process in which inherited Western traditions and practices are being increasingly called into question, while there has been little thinking or rethinking of the inherited concepts and manner of operation of the public service. In fact, there has been very little time and energy for anything beyond taking over and operating the public service on an ongoing basis.

Consequently, the issue of professionalization of the public service is but one of the aspects and problems facing African public administration—although a very important one. It is very important because of the wide-ranging issues which it raises.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALIZATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The term "professionalization" applied to public administration conjures up a series of connotations among which the following are outstanding:

(1) a service structure established in the best traditions of analysis and systematic study of objectives and functions, and devising of the machinery that should accomplish the desired objectives and functions;

(2) service based on special training and competence which are harnessed through highly selective methods;

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*A word of explanation is due on the presentation adopted in this paper. The interpretation of the topic by the writer is probably somewhat different from what may have been intended by the organizers of the seminar. The writer came to the conclusion that an attempt to argue for professionalization of public administration would have been superfluous since public administration is, and has always been, a professionalized activity. Consequently, he has preferred to present his paper in the form of raising issues intended to provoke discussion of the traditional concept of professionalization as applied to the public service, in the context of changing circumstances, with a view to showing the need for re-thinking and working out new concepts of interpretations of the various aspects of professionalization of public administration.

(3) development and adherence to an "administrative ethic" commonly referred to as "political neutrality" which enjoins the public servant to give even-handed treatment to all client-Governments over time, and is enshrined or elaborated in a public service code regulating behaviour, contacts with the public, etc.[1]

(4) a highly developed sense of mission in "serving the state through the Government of the day", which implies as well as results in, unquestioned loyalty to the "operation" of the administrative and executive machinery and its various forms of action and procedures—what may, not improperly, be called the "six hundred mentality" made famous in Tennyson's poem about the British involvement in the Crimean War, *The Charge of the Light Brigade.*[2]

(5) existence of opportunities for normal advancement through the ranks of the public service.

These connotations are not new to public administration, certainly not even in African countries. What may be new is that they are only now beginning to be examined seriously in many African countries which had generally taken them for granted without much thought about their implications and requirements.

A thorough-going analysis would reveal that the further implications and requirements would include the following:

(6) specific organizational arrangements for career development and advancement;

(7) determination of specific pay scales, conditions of increment and promotion, and establishment of special machinery for negotiation of pay and terms of service;

(8) establishment of professional (occupational) associations of public administrators;

(9) establishment of a research arm for study and analysis of organization, operations and problems of public administration with a view to proposing solutions; and as a result

(10) preparation and issue of manuals about organization and operation of the public administration as a whole, its ministries, departments, boards and parastatals.

What emerges out of all this is the basic conception of the public administration as something set apart in a class of its own, not necessarily in the sense of a social class (although this very often becomes a natural extension of the idea) but in the sense of a specialized group of workers based on the principle of division of labour as in the case of doctors, firemen, policemen, engineers, or accountants, to name a few.

The question, which then arises is whether, in the light of the various problems which beset African public administrations today, the public

administration should continue to be treated as a professional activity. There does not seem to be much argument about this. Many governments would agree that the public administration is a professional organization and should be allowed to remain so. The questions which are often raised concern how many of the traditional attributes of professionalism should be retained in the varying circumstances in which the public administration is called to perform. These are the questions on which this paper will now focus. The aim in each will be to examine how well the case for professionalization holds up under each changing circumstance.

DIVISION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SPHERES

One of the first traditional attributes to be challenged in recent times in some African countries[3] is the separation between private and public in the economic sphere, with the result that in the sphere of administration a similar challenge has arisen. The elimination of the demarcation between public and private in these countries, through the extension of the development activities of government, has resulted in a broadening of the concept of public administration to cover what was formerly public as well as what was private. In such circumstances it becomes possible for staff to move between the formerly public and private sectors. In ideal conditions this should enrich both sectors through interchange of experiences and staff and comparison of methods of operation. It should also promote efforts towards a unified science of administration comprising what were formerly public and private sectors.

From the viewpoint of administrative theory and practice the extension of the public sector to include the formerly private sector thus has two outstanding advantages. First, it confirms that the "tradition" of regulation of the economy is contingent on whether or not the State accepts the responsibility of economic development; it is, therefore, not an "independent" truth. Second, it provides an opportunity for the growth of administrative science and practice.

It is quite another matter whether the State can adequately shoulder the full responsibilities of pace-making and overall development of the economy. That it may not be able to do so is an argument against over-extension and straining of the administrative capabilities of the State, rather than a negation of the advantages to administrative theory and practice of the merging of formerly private and public sectors.

Where the sectors remain separate it is, admittedly, difficult to practice an interchange of staff because the responsibility of the individual is different in the different sectors. Obligations relating to secrecy and confidentiality enforced by the weight of the authority of the State are much stricter in the public sector than in the private sector where sanctions have less weight.

This factor, however, should not prevent an effort being made to assimilate administrative theory and practice in the two sectors.

It is only in recent years that the development of a unified theory of administration has been seriously undertaken in academic circles. It is slowly getting around to civil service training centres and institutes of administration in Africa. Even more important are the implications for professional training and recruitment of administrators, a point which will be taken up later. One thing is clear, however; the growth of State activities in the economic sphere has increased the need for professionalization of public administration rather than reduced it.

POLITICAL NEUTRALITY VERSUS LOYALTY

The tradition of loyalty to the organization (public administration) and political neutrality *vis-à-vis* the government of the day has, until now, been regarded almost as a cardinal principle or truth of administrative theory and practice. The novel conditions in which governments in Africa, and the developing world in general, find themselves today have tended to underline the relative nature of this tradition as well as raised questions about its validity. It is all a function of the degree of change. In this respect there are two dangers which beset the civil servant, and particularly the higher civil servant, in his career: (a) under-reacting to significant change and (b) the assault on the tradition of political neutrality to which he may have been accustomed. The first danger, under-reacting to change, is the normal consequence of "occupational inertia", that is, a negative reaction or resistance to "perceptible" change.[4] This is true of all bureaucratic organizations (i.e. organizations structured according to hierarchy and established rules, regulations and procedures) not just the public administration. Indeed, it is a fundamental fact of bureaucratic life that any organization tends to seek its own internal (as well as external or environmental) equilibrium: when the dust has settled—once, that is, the initial momentum has been given in the form of policy measures clearly spelled out, and routine has been adjusted to the new policy measures—the organization, through its functionaries tends to run on its own and adjusts easily to small imperceptible changes. This is desirable for continuity as well as internal stability; there is nothing inherently bad about this. Difficulties arise, however, when the change intended cannot be localized but must affect the entire bureaucratic machinery at levels from the top downwards.

Such perceptible change was experienced when, for example, the Labour Party acceded to power in Great Britain in 1945. Its policy of socialization represented such a drastic departure from previous policies, and notably those of its Conservative predecessors, that it required a shakeup of the entire civil service. Quite inevitably, built-in resistances appeared, which

became the signal for changes in the high-level personnel of the permanent civil service.

The problem here is how to accommodate large changes within the framework of political neutrality when bureaucracy tends to resist change through "occupational inertia". The civil servant then runs the danger of being accused of "taking sides" with the policies of the previous administration and sabotaging the policies of the new. He is regarded as violating the canon of political neutrality.

The second danger facing the civil servant is of the opposite kind: the assault on organizational loyalty in an attempt by the Government of the day to convert it into party loyalty. This danger is apt to arise when change is imperceptible, and is often the case when political parties or alternatives do not differ significantly from each other. Pressures then build up to convert the State into a one-party state, effectively or formally, and to require that civil servants show open loyalty to, and identification with, the ruling party.

This phenomenon by which loyalty to the administrative machinery becomes transformed into party loyalty can be observed in several contemporary African States and is one that needs close study. It is closely related to another phenomenon which is treated in the next section.

POLITICIZING OF ORGANIZATIONS—ORGANIZATIONAL ARTERIOSCLEROSIS

From demanding or expecting an open show of loyalty by the public servant it is but a short step to actively politicizing administrative posts—not the posts which are normally regarded as highly politically sensitive and therefore accepted as political appointments, but the technical posts which are normally regarded as beyond politics and requiring expertise and competence.

This is an entirely modern phenomenon[5] the explanation for which is somewhat complex. It is to some extent, but not entirely, compounded of (1) pressures in developing countries for employment opportunities which cannot be provided in the economic sector and, therefore, have to be provided by expansion of government employment chiefly in the civil service, the armed forces and police, and in politics; (2) the emergence of international technical assistance as a permanent rather than, as originally intended, temporary phenomenon and source of supply of technical expertise.

What tends to happen is that:

(1) technical posts are filled with non-technical political appointees;
(2) these appointees are then supported by technical consultants who do the work that belongs to the technical posts, so that
(3) two people are employed instead of one to do a given job which therefore, costs twice as much to perform, one of the job holders fulfilling the function of merely keeping the political bosses happy.

There thus emerge in reality two parallel organizations: the primary organization which has become arteriosclerotic through politics and cannot function in the technical sense originally intended; the secondary corps of short-term technical consultants and workers who soon assume a permanent role but with changing personnel.

What this means, in fact, is that the level of political posts is increasingly extending from the top jobs, to which it has traditionally been confined, and reaching down into the lower levels of the organization. This is the process referred to here as organizational arteriosclerosis.

The class of problems treated in this and the preceding section are cited because they give new meaning and urgency to the case for a professional approach to public administration in general. They are problems which are confined to administrative bodies—or organizations—in general and, therefore deserve systematic observation and study. A stronger case could hardly be made for the establishment and financing of research into such organizational problems within the framework of modern organization theory. They are problems which cannot be handled by classical organization theory or within the framework of inherited administrative theory and practice.

THE (NON) POLITICAL AND (NON) BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

In the Western concept of public administration the public servant (or administrator) is an animal that eschews direct involvement in politics—he is faceless and anonymous and cannot engage in political campaigns or stand for election. This is another element of theory which has not stood up well under assault by the new conditions and problems faced by African countries.

It is often pointed out that in such countries, the best talents are limited and found only in the public service; hence other sectors would be deprived of their services unless the rules were changed to permit public servants to engage in business or in political activity. Until recently this argument has been resisted.

In some countries, even before political independence, the rule that public servants should not engage in business was winked at in the face of devices whereby the public servant could do so by putting the business in the name of wife, children or other relatives. This was certainly the case in Anglophone West African countries, but particularly in Nigeria, the largest and most booming of all. Consequently there were many wealthy civil servants whose wealth could not be explained by their civil service salaries.

During the first flush of the independence era the traditional rules that Ministers of Government also should not engage in business activities were openly flouted, and it was generally the case that Ministers of Finance and of Commerce and Industry, in particular, openly used their positions to amass wealth and more wealth.

As already indicated, the non-political bias of public servants has also been openly flouted through pressures from ruling parties, especially in one-party States. But this has always stopped short of encouraging civil servants to stand for national (as opposed to local) elections without resigning. Thus top civil servants would not lightly resign their jobs to contest national elections unless they were assured in advance of ruling party support. There are indications that all this is now about to change. Recently in mainland Tanzania, the Central Committee of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) has resolved to dispense with the law which forbids civil servants to contest national elections without first resigning their civil service posts. The resolution seeks to allow civil servants to contest parliamentary elections while holding on to their posts.[6]

The East African Community at the meeting of the Finance Council held at the beginning of 1971 at Mombasa, Kenya, has now adopted the practice of voluntary retirement its civil servants at age 45, in order to allow those so inclined to offer their talents to the business world while there is still life and energy to their credit. This was regarded, among other things, as a special measure of assistance to the business world and particularly to African enterprise.

Thus, in the field of business and politics the traditional canons are changing and new rules are being established. These new developments deserve close study and attention and are bound to influence the future development of administrative theory and practice in Africa.

ADMINISTRATOR AND CLIENTELE-PUBLIC RELATIONS

The traditional code of behaviour of the civil servant specifies certain ground rules to be observed in his contact with the public—e.g. fair and firm dealings with members of the public, integrity, loyalty and support of the government's policy, etc. Thus the public relations aspect of his contact with the public is paramount—it is an antiseptic relationship in which he projects the view of his client, the Government as represented by the Ministers. Since the role of the civil servant is always to present the best face on every government matter of policy, regardless of its content, his faceless anonymity becomes an asset here.

This is all according to tradition. The political nature of government dictates a given pattern of roles. Government, like politics, is the art of the possible, or the art of compromise. The possible is invariably arrived at through compromise—the compromise or reconciliation of many variables. In this task the statesman leads the government and his people. The politician keeps his ear to the ground and follows the people, trying to harmonize what the people want with what the statesman leader, through the government, wants. The politician is thus the political broker.

The civil servant, principally the administrative, technical and scientific

personnel are allocated the role of advising the Ministers on policy—stating the clear, objective facts and leaving the decision to the political head of his ministry who will have to reconcile the various aspects and claims. The decision will then be sold to the people through their political representatives and in turn be carried out and defended by the civil servant.

This client relationship between civil servant and government may actually be changing in countries where the role of the party and the party executive is increasingly concerned, not merely with broad issues of policy, but in actually defining policy details. The civil servant may then lose his role to the Party Executive (which, in such cases, is fact becoming an integral part of the government) and fulfilling increasingly the role of justifying, presenting, executing and defending the policy already determined by Party Executive and Government.

There thus arises a curious situation: in terms of decision-making the civil servant becomes increasingly ineffective or passive, but increasingly actively involved in justifying and presenting—he is coming more and more to behave like a politician. This is not surprising in view of the other related developments mentioned above, chiefly the inclination towards permitting civil servants to keep their jobs while contesting parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, it is a new development deserving careful study and analysis.

THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL SERVICE REWARDS

In the inherited tradition the civil administrator is the mover of the entire machinery and thus has a highly respected place. The technical and scientific personnel are parts of the machinery, although very special parts whose remuneration is equal, sometimes superior, to that of the administrators. The parliament, or law-making body, does not rate as high as the senior civil servants in remuneration and the topmost class of civil servants occasionally enjoys a remuneration far superior to that of their political heads or Ministers. This, at least, is the British tradition.

In Anglophone Africa, this tradition was not adopted entirely, at least so far as technical skills went. Scientists and technicians have been consistently downgraded in pay everywhere in African civil services *vis-à-vis* the administrators, a factor which carries adverse consequences for the development efforts being mounted. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that this factor may be at the bottom of the slow development of the African continent. Science and technology are at a discount.

Nor is this all. Almost everywhere in Africa, the political heads, the Ministers, are the highest paid in the governmental structure—exception being made in the case of outside contractual services which are not rendered within the regular civil service structure. This also is a new phenomenon in Africa which constitutes a departure from the known tradition.

THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONALIZATION

The objective of the discussion in the preceding sections is not so much to argue the case for professionalization, pure and simple,[7] but to show that the very content of the concept of professionalization is changing in the newly independent countries of Africa and should be re-examined. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place to make a serious continent-wide effort to establish professional organization(s) devoted to scientific examination of developments in African administration (including public administration) as these are bound to affect, eventually, the theory and practice of administration in Africa.

Existing African bodies concerned with administration are, regrettably, pre-occupied with perpetuating the old traditional concepts of administration rather than examining closely and interpreting what is actually happening in civil services and other types of administration in Africa. This is particularly true of training in administration to which attention will now be given.

Training

In the light of the various issues which have been raised in the body of this paper it seems desirable that training programmes in administration should be reviewed, in order to give candidates the type of preparation which will fit them professionally for their jobs as well as reflect the realities around them.

Training handbooks and manuals describing the tasks of public administration, including the objectives and functions of each ministry or department are sadly lacking in existing training programmes. Consequently, less is achieved than would be desirable from the probationary period of officers. They are usually left to fend for themselves with little guidance and specific orientation from senior officers.

As to the substantive parts of administration, more attention ought to be given to organization theory and practice, especially to such topics as: the nature of organizations, their goals, structure and operations; the intended and unintended consequences of organizations; internal and external equilibrium of organizations; the role of the administrator and of the technical and scientific expert; the process and technology of decision-making; the system of rewards within the organization; and the role of formal and informal groups.

This short list of contents of a desirable administrative training course is not intended to be exhaustive but indicative. Even so, it is a far cry from what normally passes for administrative training at the present time in civil service training colleagues or institutes of administration in African countries. The emphasis in most such courses turns on legal and constitutional matters

which, for all practical purposes, are irrelevant to the type and functioning of organizations as distinct from the legal sources of their origin, functions and powers.

Research and Experimentation in Organization Planning

Given a modern orientation to the content of training as indicated in the preceding sub-section on training, it should become possible for useful research and experimentation to be conducted into the structure and establishment of organizations or administrative bodies within the public service.

It is a generally known fact that in most countries, African and other, institutions within the public service are blue-printed by constitutional lawyers and legal officers of the Attorney-General's office and established accordingly. Lawyers are, by their training, less suited to the tasks of organization planning and building since nothing in their training gives them any insight into the nature, functioning and consequences of institutional organisms. Consequently, it is usually very hard to predict how any given organism established by the lawyers would turn out, unless one has had some training in modern organization theory and practice.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the history of institution building in the public domain, in most African countries, has been fraught with disastrous consequences. An excellent example is the prescription for, and establishment of, ministries and departments in African countries at independence. The pattern of allocation of functions among ministries, not infrequently, is self-frustrating and in some cases inhibits effective action. This is because the constitutional lawyers ignored, or were unaware of, the organic relationships within and between organizations, since by training they are only concerned with purely legalistic relationships.

It should be a part of the functions of administrative training institutes to provide for, and carry out, research and experimentation into organization building and provide advice to government on the setting up of institutions such as marketing boards, construction firms and other parastatal organizations. This work should not be left to the law officers. Such research could be a useful sequel to the training of cadets as well as a part of the in-service training of more senior officers.

Seminars and Symposia

There is a clear need for some of the problems and issues arising from changing conditions—problems such as those that have been raised in this paper—to be discussed at seminars and symposia organized at various levels: for Ministers, senior officials and for middle level and junior officials. The value of such seminars consists in clarifying issues and problems as an aid to devising suitable measures to deal with them.

Whether such seminars and symposia should be organized by administrative training and research institutes or by more general professional bodies of civil servants or by the universities is a matter of detail which need not detain us here. The important thing is that it should be possible to discuss such difficult issues as the role of the civil servant in regard to political parties and political campaigns, business and commercial interests and activities of civil servants, the role of the Party in the decision-making process of government, and so on. Certainly such issues, as events have shown, are far from being settled, and outside opinions and expertise (i.e. of people not in the civil service) should be sought in organizing and conducting the seminars and symposia.

Streamlining of Civil Service Structure, Recruitment Policies and Systems of Remuneration

At the present time, in most countries, a permanent civil service commission exists for the purposes of recruitment into and advancement within the service with a view to preserving the best traditions of competitiveness, impartiality and isolation from political influences in the recruitment process. The question of pay, however, is often tacked on an *ad hoc* basis by appointment of commissions from time to time, with mixed results more often than not. Very few, if any, countries in Africa have got to the point of examining, much less restructuring, their civil services and revising, in consequence, their general orders and instructions.

It hardly needs to be stressed that a professional approach to such matters requires that they be kept under continuous review. It should be the function of the Personnel Department of the public service to formulate and implement the guidelines relating to the structure of salaries between types of employment within the service and to continually review and relate these to the structure of salaries in the rest of the economy. This is as important a task as that of supervising career development and promotion of officers. In fact, both types of tasks go together. The *ad hoc* approach is hardly satisfactory, achieving little more than stirring up periodic controversies within the service and much dissatisfaction over the relationships between different pay scales.

Similarly, a permanent body should be set up to keep under review the organization and structure of the civil service and parastatal organs. Such a body should serve in a consultative capacity on questions such as the justification and need for new organisms to carry out new or existing functions or, alternatively, for new functions to be allocated to existing organs. It should also be a part of its function to advise whether or not some existing organs should be continued or discontinued, and their functions terminated or distributed among other existing organs. Implicity this same body would advise on the coordination of government activities.

In bringing this brief paper to a close its basic purpose should be recalled. This has been not so much to state the case for professionalization of public administration (this has been assumed for the reasons given) as to show the need for (a) a re-examination of the traditional concept of professionalization, as applied to public administration, by raising issues which challenge that concept, and (b) resolving the issue of professionalization along fresh lines in the light of new developments.

FOOTNOTES

1 Associated with the tradition of political neutrality is that of non-intervention in economic life owing to the rigid separation of public from private (business) sector. The State thus fulfills a purely regulatory role.
2 This poem celebrates bureaucratic obedience in its purest form, and it does not matter that the case in question is one of warfare since the army and the public (civil) service are generally organized and run on the same lines.
3 E.g., U.A.R., Guinea, Tanzania.
4 "Perceptible" change may be defined here as change which does not spend itself until every part of the entire bureaucratic machinery of a Ministry has been affected by it; as distinct from "imperceptible" change which is limited to minor adjustments in the machinery which spend themselves after affecting only a few parts of the machinery, leaving the greater part of it unaffected.
5 The phenomenon is not limited to national civil administrations but is found also in international civil services.
6 *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam), 5 June 1971, p. 5; "Nuta (National Union of Tanganyika Workers) hails TANU ruling on civil servants". Although it is the case that most civil servants are members of TANU, the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, in the same month made it clear that membership of the ruling party should not be regarded as a condition for Government employment.
7 It seems to the writer superfluous to plead for professionalization in view of the existing facts and particularly because professionalization is an inevitable concomitant of specialization of division of labour.

The Professionalization of Public Administration in Africa

A. ADEDEJI

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN BUREAUCRACIES IN AFRICA

Excluding the pre-colonial days, the evolution of modern bureaucracies in Africa has undergone three phases. During the pre-colonial era, there was hardly any bureaucracy in the modern sense of the word although there was a semblance of what would be regarded as the beginning of a modern civil service consisting of career men. Personal rule by the kings or the traditional rulers was the order of the day. These rulers performed not only political functions but also administrative duties. By and large they were their own mandarins. Indeed, they also performed spiritual functions. Although they did have a few paid officials who assisted them with the nitty gritty of administration and management, the establishment of regular civil services is a colonial development. There are, however, a few exceptions. Some of the more powerful kingdoms like that of Buganda in Uganda and the Emirates in Northern Nigeria did manage to establish the nucleus of a civil service but like the British Civil service in pre-Trevelyan and Northcote days, nepotism and corruption were the order of the day.

Modern bureaucracies in Africa could be said to have begun with colonialism. The colonial powers established central civil services in the various African countries which came under their control. They also established local administrations. These were, it is true, the caricature of central and local administrations in the metropolitan countries. Nevertheless they were the beginnings of modern bureaucracies in Africa. The first of the three phases in the development of modern bureaucracies in Africa was the establishment of the major departments, the field administration and the local administration. The well-known system of indirect rule, under which the colonial powers governed through the chiefs and traditional rulers, and the basic administrative infrastructure was established during this phase which lasted from the beginning of colonial rule to the 1940s in West Africa and the 1960s in East Africa.

The second phase was the period of Africanization or localization which began in earnest in the forties in West Africa. Indeed, this period can be described, as far as West Africa is concerned, as one of re-Africanization. For the Africanization process has in itself passed through three phases. In

the first, from about 1830 to 1898, Africans and men of African descent were frequently employed in responsible positions. In 1865, a Select Committee of the British Parliament had recommended that the object of British colonial policy "should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and more to transfer to them the administration of all the governments with a view of our ultimate withdrawal from all".[1] This policy was implemented through the appointment of Africans and/or West Indians of African descent as senior government officials. For example, a Trinidadian, John Carr, became the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone in 1841 and subsequently acted as Governor. Henry Carr of Nigeria became Inspector of Schools in 1892 and later the Resident of the Colony of Lagos.

However, from 1898 onwards, there was a sharp change of policy. Africans seldom held senior posts. These posts were placed in European hands. Henceforth, no matter how qualified, experienced and competent an African was, he came under the most junior and not-so-well qualified European. This policy continued until the 1940s when a policy of progressive Africanization was introduced.

From the beginning of modern bureaucracy to the 1940s, the civil services in Africa were primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order. Although social and economic development did take place, this was merely secondary. Government was primarily concerned with law and order and the collection of tax revenue. The third phase which began just before independence in West Africa and immediately after independence in East, Central and Southern Africa was one of development administration. Government began to play an increasing and more pervasive role in the development process. During this period, various ministries were established and the departments were integrated with them not only to ensure that responsible and responsive ministerial government consistent with constitutional development did evolve but also to facilitate the emergence of development administration.

During the first phase, the recruitment of the administrators who manned the civil services was hardly based on a merit system nor on the possession of any specialized qualification and/or skill. The colonial administrators who came to Africa were amateurs, pure and simple. In the case of the British officers, they were appointed by the patronage of the Secretary of State for the Colonies rather than by competitive written examinations. They were not necessarily well-educated. If they were, they would certainly have preferred to go to India rather than to Africa. Thus the administrators in British colonial Africa were mostly men of mediocre ability who were generalists and were accordingly quite favourably disposed to "muddling through". As Chamberlain himself confessed when he was the Colonial Secretary, "we take inferior men for West Africa and they are not good enough for other Colonies".[2] And in 1903, Casely Hayford, contrasting the quality of the

British officers in West Africa unfavourably with those who entered the Indian Civil Service (ICS) by competition, wrote "Patronage ruled the day in Downing Street".[3]

As the countries entered the second and third phases of the development of their civil services, recruitment was increasingly based on merit, culminating in Ghana and Nigeria in competitive examinations for entry into the administrative class. However, the approach is still generalist in nature. The qualifications required of recruits are simply a good honours university degree in any discipline. In fact, a high proportion of senior administrators in African countries do not have any university education. This lack of basic professional qualifications for administrators has had serious consequences for the quality of the performance of the officers. In most cases they have continued with the British tradition of "muddling through".

Another colonial legacy inherited by African civil service is the excessive dependence on seniority rather than on merit for promotion. Whatever may be the latent professional qualities of the administrators the fact that seniority has precedence over meritocracy is enough to nip it in the bud. As I once wrote elsewhere, the practice of basing promotion on seniority "has had a devastating effect on morale and efficiency. It has placed a premium on mediocrity and conformity rather than on intellectual brilliance, initiative and resourcefulness. Once an officer has been confirmed in his appointment, no one even bothers to find out how knowledgeable he is . . . before promoting him from one grade to another".[4] Because of lack of professionalism there is nothing in our civil service system which makes it imperative for a higher civil servant to keep abreast of intellectual and professional development in his field.

Another legacy of colonialism is the class structure of the civil services, particularly in Commonwealth Africa with the pre-eminence of the generalist administrators. Such a structure prevents the best deployment and use of individual talent and reduces considerably the ability of the civil services to adapt to the new tasks. The hierarchical nature of the civil service also tends to inhibit the development of professionalism by reducing administration to a routine process where papers are passed from the subordinate officers to their superiors who are in turn content to pass orders thereon or forward them to their own superiors. There is thus a dearth of programme and policy initiative at the top levels.

Unfortunately, the African governments have, during the first decade of independence, been so preoccupied with the challenge posted by Africanization in the face of rapid expansion of the civil services that they have not been able to give much attention to the issue of professionalizing public administration in their respective countries. Yet if their administrations are to be able to deliver the goods in terms of their ability to cope with the developmental task, such professionalization is not only essential but becomes daily increasingly urgent. Before arguing specifically the case for professional-

izing public administration in Africa, let us first ask ourselves what we understand by professionalization and the main characteristics of a profession. And, secondly, let us discuss very briefly whether or not public administration is a profession.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF A PROFESSION

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a profession is defined as "a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some departments of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others, or in the practice of an art founded upon it". The Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines it as an "occupation, especially one requiring advanced education and special training (e.g. the law, architecture, medicine, the church)". Both of these definitions accordingly combine four major attributes of a profession. These are vocation, specialized knowledge, application or "art", and advanced education or special training.

In their article, "The Higher Civil Service as a Profession",[5] R. N. Spann and G. R. Curnow identified seven main features of a profession. These are specificity of expertise, higher qualification, self-education, ethical self-sustenance, fiduciary relation, colleague control and recognition.

The first characteristic of a profession is that it has a *specific expertise*, including a specialized body of knowledge over which it claims exclusive jurisdiction. A professional is, therefore, one who possesses fundamental knowledge of and deep familiarity with the specific expertise that enables him to move with ease among its concepts.

The second characteristic of a profession is *higher qualification.* A lawyer, after graduating in law goes to the Law School for further professional education. An accountant-to-be is articled with a firm of accountants for some years for his apprenticeship. A doctor in training goes through his housemanship. In other words, a profession requires a long period of training to enable the would-be entrant to master the specialized body of knowledge over which it claims exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, entry into professions tends nowadays to be preceded by university or equivalent study, invariably supplemented by a period of apprenticeship or journeyman experience.

The third charactristic, *self-education,* is closely related to the second. This has been defined as "a corporate concern on the part of its members for advancing both the relevant body of knowledge and the techniques of its application".[6] The status of a profession depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of this process of self-education. There must be

> a close link between practitioners and those involved in the more theoretical or research aspects of the discipline . . . feedback between action and contemplation, between existing practice and new thought, between new practice and old thought. . . . The true professional must

> continually update his knowledge and re-educate himself by reading professional journals, by attendance at conferences and refresher courses, and by intellectual contact with his colleagues.[7]

Fourth, a profession must be *normatively or ethically self-sustaining.* "Its members have tended to develop and establish norms or ethical codes applicable to professional practice. These are taught to new entrants, and hopefully internalized by the latter, so as to become a matter of habit and self-discipline, with external sanctions rarely needed to enforce them."[8]

The fifth characteristic of a profession is a *fiduciary relation*, i.e. a relation of trust with one's client. The client must have complete confidence in the professional as to his professional integrity and his ability to keep secrets and personal confidences. Thus a patient must trust that his doctor will not betray his confidence as well as that the medicine he prescribes will cure his ailment.

A high degree of self-government or *colleague control* is the sixth characteristic of a profession. Every profession sets its entry standards, disciplinary rules and code of behaviour which it enforces. A doctor's name is, after due investigation, struck off the medical practitioners' register if he behaves unprofessionally. Admission to the profession is strictly controlled to ensure that only those who qualify are admitted.

Finally, a profession must be so *recognized* by all and one. First, its members must recognize themselves as belonging to a profession. Second, its identity must be recognized by others. Self-recognition and public recognition are two prerequisites of a profession.

These then are the major characteristics of a profession. Any vocation or occupation which does not possess them cannot rightly be called a profession. In other words, a profession pre-supposes the existence of a professional community, a body of knowledge, an ethos, values and standards, an ethical code of conduct and the ability and willingness to uphold standards and discipline recalcitrant or erring members.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PROFESSIONALISM

Given these features is public administration a profession? It is not here intended to enter into the debate among the academics as to whether or not public administration is a discipline. In a volume published in 1968, both Dwight Waldo and F. W. Riggs waded into this debate.[9]

There is no doubt that because of its historical development, it has not been easy for public administration to emerge as a universally recognized academic discipline. It was too closely tied to the apron strings of political science and law for this to happen. Even now there are not many academic departments of public administration in universities.

The concept of public administration as an academic non-juridical

discipline originated in the universities of the United States during the twenties and the thirties. It was hived off from the mother discipline of political science. By the beginning of the Second World War public administration had emerged as a respectable academic discipline. However, by the end of the war, doubts had begun to set in. There was what Dwight Waldo has described as a crisis of identity and the threat of possible collapse and disintegration. Critics held the view that the claim of public administration to science "was, with respect to substance, premature, and with respect to method, immature or erroneous; that the 'principles' which were the issue of the science were at best summary statements of commonsense; that economy and efficiency was goals or criteria were either too narrowly conceived or were misconceived; that the separation between politics and administration is arbitrary or false and must be abandoned or thought through on new terms".[10]

The effect of this critical attack was to create a crisis of identity for public administration. Both the nature and boundaries of the subject matter and the methods of studying and teaching it became problematical. Although it is now over two decades since the attack was made, the crisis of identity is still not completely resolved. However, it has now been recognized that rather than being a discipline, public administration is a multi-disciplinary study. As Lewis A. Gunn has recently put it, public administration is better pictured as a

> roughly defined inner circle where the tips of several disciplinary vectors converge. One vector is the study of Law, narrowing through Constitutional Law to Administrative Law. Another is Government, through Political Institutions to Administrative Institutions. The study of Politics leads to the Policy Process and to Administrators in the Policy Process. Sociology includes the study of Bureaucracy as a system of authority and contributes to modern Organization Theory as do certain aspects of Social Psychology. Macro-economics contributes Public Finance and studies of Government in the Economy; while Micro-economics includes Managerial Economics and much of Decision Theory. In a rather different sense one might add other vectors such as Medicine, Education and Physical Planning, since many of the professions are showing greater interest in their own administration and relation to government, and a few university departments concerned with professional education are beginning to develop specialized courses in these areas.[11]

Thus a curriculum in public administration is primarily a curriculum in applied social sciences and a synthesis of the various approaches.

There is no doubt that the debate as to whether or not public administration is an academic discipline will continue for some time to come even though the approach of many universities which provide education and

training in this field is multi-disciplinary. In the meantime, a great deal of professionalization of public administration has taken place, particularly in the United States. What then are the merits of professionalization with particular reference to Africa? Are there any demerits or danger signs?

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST PROFESSIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

To answer these two questions adequately we have to begin by reiterating two sets of characteristics of the African nations which are particularly relevant to our analysis. The economies of African countries are underdeveloped. *Per capita* incomes are very low both in absolute terms and relative to the *per capita* incomes of the more developed countries of North America and Europe; the resources—natural and human—are relatively underdeveloped; the rates of growth of the GNP are not particularly impressive, especially when account is taken of the comparatively high rate of population growth. Yet there is a revolution of rising expectations in these countries with resultant political and social unrest. The need for rapid economic and social development at a rate at least as high if not higher than the expectations of the people cannot, therefore, be overemphasised.

The second set of characteristics which is relevant to our analysis relates to the political fragmentation of Africa imposed by the imperial powers during the nineteenth century. One of the consequences of the balkanization of the continent is that the present national boundaries are artificial. Many pre-colonial warring ethnic groups have been forcibly grouped together in one country.

The sizes of the countries in terms of areas and population vary considerably. The average population of the African countries is 6.0 million while the average area is 271,000 square miles. The corresponding figures for South American and Asian countries are 11.0 million and 528,000 square miles and 43.0 million and 448,000 square miles respectively. Africa is, therefore, faced with the acute problems of small size, multi-culturalism and multi-lingualism. All these tend to heighten and reinforce the centrifugal forces.

What are the implications of these two sets of characteristics to the issue of professionalizing public administration in Africa? Because of the first set of characteristics, those which concern rising expectations and economic factors there is a growing desire on the part of governments to play an all-pervasive role in the development process to be the prime movers and the catalytic agents for bringing about rapid social and economic modernization and transformation. Through their development plans, the annual budgets and fiscal and monetary policies, many African governments have assumed responsibility for stepping up the rate of capital formation and the magnitude, direction and control of both public and private investments. They participate openly and actively in the directly productive activities.

All these responsibilities, of course, devolve on the civil servants, particularly on the administrators who advise on policies as well as see to their implementation. The African administrators of today do not merely have to ensure that law and order and good government are maintained. They have to assume full and rapidly growing responsibility for socio-economic development. This calls for new skills, new approaches and new attitudes. In other words, there is need for professionalism in public administration in Africa if these attempts by governments are not to be frustrated. The generalist administrator must give way to the highly specialized and skilled administrator. The administrators who know a little of everything and can only muddle through most public policies will have to be replaced by those who know a great deal about one aspect of administration and management. Breadth must be replaced by depth. The generalist has to give way to the functional specialist.

Yet within the context of the new nation-states of Africa with their centrifugal tendencies—our second set of characteristics—there is danger in the functional expert taking over from the generalist. The danger arises from the fact that the functional expert in the civil services can seriously weaken the integrative function of the generalist. Specialists are by their very nature insular and narrow in their vision as well as their desires. This in turn tends to promote internal strife within the bureaucracy. This insularity and concern with limited interests can blur the specialist's vision of the broader national problems and issues and thereby enables him to play a creative and stabilizing role in the socio-economic development of his country. Thus "when a society is rent by all sorts of social and political forces pulling in conflicting disintegrative directions, the administrative generalist may be a vital cement, holding the system together".[12] Professionals are problem oriented rather than policy oriented and in so far as professionalism requires many years of training and exercise in specialized subjects it has an inhibiting effect upon mobility from one occupation to another.

We are, therefore, faced with a dilemma. Professionalism in public administration is required if African governments are to be able to cope with the problems of rapid socio-economic transformation. This calls for specialization, for depth rather than breadth but this in turn can lead to narrowness of outlook and professional parochialism which can exacerbate the socio-political disintegrative tendencies. But our dilemma, given a long-term time perspective, is more apparent than real. In the short run the generalist administrator may successfully be a stabilizing factor but he is, over time, likely to become an impediment to progress through his lack of appropriate skills for his job and the conservatism and caution which inevitably creep in. Thus he may, in fact, through his actions and/or inactions, destroy the very nation he is trying to preserve, or unless the governments are able to satisfy the expectations of the people, there will be social disorders and constant revolutions.

Moreover, it is not true that all professions breed insularity and narrowness of mind. There are quite a number which have very strong intellectual education as a base on which they are built. In any case, once a professional administrator becomes a top level executive (e.g. Permanent/Principal Secretary) he will cease to be merely a specialist and become instead a policy-maker pure and simple. There is nothing peculiar or unique about this. A doctor who assumes administrative or managerial responsibility ceases to practise his medicine.

Moreover, there is no conclusive empirical evidence to show that African generalist administrators are above the disintegrative tendencies which abound in most African countries. Although there are many individual exceptions, they appear just as ethnic-centred as most other groups. In fact, in a number of cases they have been known to have exploited the centrifugal forces for their personal aggrandizement. On the other hand professionalism, by encouraging specialization, rationality and objectivity, by being project and problem oriented and by setting professional behaviour can, among other things, strengthen in no small way the centripetal forces which make for national cohesion. But there are at least three basic prerequisites which must be satisfied if the professionalization of public administration is to be achieved in Africa.

PREREQUISITES FOR THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA

In my view, the three basic prerequisites for the effective professionalization of public administration in Africa are (i) the institution of administrative reform; (ii) the provision of professional education and training in administration (including a period of internship of apprenticeship) for all administrators; and, (iii) the legislation of a code of conduct for professional administrators.

The institution of administrative reform is most vital. We had earlier noted some of the major weaknesses in the administrative systems inherited at independence by the African governments. The challenge of independence and the problems it has brought made it virtually impossible for any administrative reform to be instituted during the sixties. The implementation of the Africanization policy absorbed the energy of many African governments during this period which was also one of rapid expansion of the public services of these countries. Some of the governments have now begun to initiate action for administrative reform. The fear that administration may grind to a halt, and the growing feeling in some of the countries that a mood of routine performance and a loss of sense of direction may be gaining ground, has forced some governments to begin to think of instituting major administrative reform. And in one or two countries, reforms have actually been instituted. However, such reform measures as have been

introduced have not grappled adequately with the major problems confronting African nations in terms of setting up a dynamic, development- and achievement-oriented bureaucracy. This implies that the administrative system, structure and practices must be completely revamped. Entry to the civil services, particularly to administrative positions, must be based on the possession of specific skills, and advancement in the services must be on achievement and merit rather than on seniority and mediocrity. Practices which tend to inhibit initiative, rationality, and objectivity in the decision-making process must be done away with. Responsibility must be firmly fixed and the tendency to pass the buck should be discouraged. It is within the framework of such a reformed administrative system that professionalism can be meaningful, can take root and indeed prosper.

Given the administrative system that we have outlined above, the next stage is to provide professional education and training in administration that will develop the kind of people that can man the system effectively and efficiently. The designing of a proper professional education and training programme for administrators poses perhaps the greatest challenge facing professionalism in administration. Such a programme must avoid the one-shot-in-the-arm approach that has dominated administrative training in Africa since the sixties. Professional education is a continuous process. In this connection, the first question which comes to mind is what sort of undergraduate educational programme a would-be professional administrator should have? Should it continue to be in any discipline or should there be some attempt at identifying the relevant ones?

My own strong view on this is that only rarely should one who is not a graduate in one of the disciplines in the social sciences be admitted to the profession. Given a broad-based undergraduate educational programme, the danger of the professional administrator becoming insular in outlook will be considerably minimized.

Given this basic educational background, the professionalization of an administrator should take between four and five years. Immediately after completing his undergraduate studies, he should be given two years of intensive post-graduate professional education and training. This should be followed by a period of internship or apprenticeship lasting one or two years. Thereafter, he should go for another intensive course lasting from twelve to fifteen months, specializing in one aspect of administration or the other. This brings the period of his post-graduate professional training to between four and five years.

The content of the syllabuses for both courses is another critical issue. On the assumption that all would-be professional administrators will be graduates with broad-based social sciences degrees or degrees in one of its disciplines (i.e. Economics, Political Science or Sociology), curriculum development will be relatively easy. The pre-service two-year professional post-graduate programme should build on the undergraduate work. It should

consist primarily of in-depth education in various areas of public administration and management. It should be a combination of both theory and practice. Indeed, a proper marriage between theory and practice is a *sine qua non* of professional education. It is most essential if a fruitful tension is to be created which will elevate the practical and chasten the theoretical mind.

The first course (i.e. the two years' post-graduate course) should be followed by a period of internship which should last at least eighteen months and preferably two years. The internee should spend the first half of his attachment in a government ministry or department and the second half in a private firm or parastatal body. It is most essential that he should be exposed to at least two of the three sectors—governments, parastatal bodies and private firms.

This should be followed by an advanced and specialized professional education which, as already suggested, should last for at least one calendar year. During this period each trainee will specialize in one or the other of the areas of public administration and management, e.g. personnel management, planning, financial management and budgeting.

On the successful completion of this course, a degree of Master of Public Administration (MPA) should be awarded. The individual should also be registered as a professional administrator/manager by a legally recognized Society for Public Administration (SPA) which should make him a Fellow of the Society (FSPA). His MPA degree and his fellowship will be his passport to professionalism.

In a previous paper,[13] I had suggested a time period of six to eight years for a trainee to become a full-fledged professional. The difference arises principally from the duration of the internship. I had earlier suggested that the trainee should put in three to five years' service after his two-year post-graduate course before the one-year specialized course. In the light of the criticism that it will take a man too long a time before he becomes a professional—much longer than it takes in other professions, I am suggesting a reduction in the internship period provided that the internship will be as intensive as possible.

Given the type of professional education that I have just described, public administration will satisfy the first two of the characteristics of a profession discussed earlier in this paper—the possession of specific expertise and higher qualification. There is no doubt that the third characteristic—self-education—will in the circumstances be easily acquired by the members, and given the administrative reform that we have advocated, the administrative system will also compel members of the profession to ensure their continuing education. It will also be the responsibility of the respective SPAs to ensure the continued and continuing education of their fellows.

It is with the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh characteristics that I now wish to deal. I have suggested that upon the successful completion of his

course the administrator should be awarded his MPA degree by his university and that he should also be enrolled as a fellow (FSPA) by his country's Society for Public Administration. These qualifications must be recognized by the laws of the country. The society, like other professional organizations, should be given the power to register its members and to discipline them. The law should lay down a code of conduct which the society must maintain. It will further be the responsibility of the society to ensure that these norms are taught to new entrants and internalized by them so as to become a matter of habit and self-discipline, with external sanctions rarely needed to enforce them.

In the maiden issue[14] of the *Quarterly Journal of Administration* formerly *Administration*) published by the Ife Institute of Administration, we suggested a Code of Ethics for the alumni of the Institute and other public servants. This is given in the Appendix. In an editorial comment recommending the Code we argued that

> it has long been a mark of the true professional that he dedicates himself to uphold a high standard of ethics. The lawyer, the doctor and other professionals subscribe to a code of ethics in their respective professions. Their public expects they will choose to observe without coercion or legal imposition a code of behaviour that puts the need of their fellow man paramount. It is our firm belief that the professional public administrator must accept standards which are no less stringent than those of other respectable professions—impartiality, dedication to service and probity. A code of ethics for administrators, voluntarily accepted and adhered to, is therefore most essential.[15]

CONCLUSION

We have argued for the professionalization of public administration in Africa. We have also identified what needs to be done before this objective can be achieved. It will be wrong and misleading to suggest or give the impression that this can happen easily, painlessly and quickly.

The road to professionalism is paved with all sorts of difficulties. There are many vested interests whose short-term interest it is to maintain the *status quo*. The older generation of civil servants, a great number of whom are poorly educated, belong to this group. They resist and resent any suggestion for fundamental changes in the administrative system which is likely to threaten their leadership position or expose their professional weaknesses. And yet this group of people are holding some of the highest offices in the public service of their countries.

There is also the problem of inertia. Many senior civil servants whom one would have expected to support the professionalization of public administration are unwilling to be disturbed by what to them are no more than new

fangled ideas. Through a mixture of conservatism and cynicism, they have turned deaf ears to any suggestion for change. This is where professional associations in public administration have initially a most important promotional role to play in educating the upper echelons of the civil services in Africa about the need to professionalize. The proposed African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) has a unique if herculean task to perform. Most African countries do not have national associations for public administration or management. Where they do exist they are hardly more than paper organizations. It is to be hoped that AAPAM will give this task its first and most immediate attention.

APPENDIX

CODE OF ETHICS

I hereby solemnly and voluntarily undertake to uphold the following code of ethics:

In the service of my government or my corporation I will:

Put loyalty to the highest moral principles above loyalty to persons, party or government department.

Give a full day's labour for a full day s pay, giving to the performance of my duties my most earnest effort and best thought.

Ever seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.

Never discriminate by the dispensing of special favours or privileges to anyone, whether for remuneration or not, and never accept, for myself or my family, favours or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of my official duties.

Make no private promises of any kind binding upon duties of office, since an employee or official of the government or its agencies has no private word which can be binding on public duty.

Engage in no business with the government, either directly or indirectly, which is prohibited by law or which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of my official duties.

Never use for private gain, or disclose to unauthorized persons any information coming to me confidentially in the performance of my official duties.

Expose corruption wherever discovered.

Uphold these principles, ever conscious that a public office is a public trust, service to my fellow man is a profession of the highest order and, therefore, I must render it impartially to all.

FOOTNOTES

1 Parliamentary Papers, Vol. V, 1865, p. 412.
2 Colonial Office 885/7, Misc. 123, 28 August 1899.
3 Casely Hayford, *Gold Coast Native Institutions*, London, 1903, p. 218.
4 Adebayo Adedeji, "Nigerian Administration a Decade After Independence: Problems, Progress and Prospects: The Federal and State Civil Services", *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 20.
5 R. N. Spann and G. R. Curnow, "The Higher Civil Service as a Profession", *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. IV, No. 3, April 1970, pp. 183-191.
6 L. F. Crisp, "Public Administration as a Profession: Some Australian Reflections on Fulton", *Public Administration* (Sydney), XXVIII, 2/3, June-September 1969.
7 Spann and Curnow, op. cit., p. 185.
8 Ibid.
9 Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration" and F. W. Riggs, "Professionalism, Political Science and the Scope of Public Administration", in James, C. Charlesworth (ed.), *Theory and Practice of Public Administration*, Philadelphia, 1968.
10 Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration", op. cit.
11 Lewis A. Gunn, "Public Administration Teaching in British Universities", *PAC Bulletin*, No. 6, May 1969, pp. 29-43.
12 Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 21.
13 Adebayo Adedeji, "The Rationale and Scope of Graduate Programmes in Public Administration in Africa", paper presented at the International Conference on Trends in University Teaching and Research in Public Administration in Africa, Institute of Administration, Ife, Nigeria.
14 *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1966.
15 Ibid., p. 5.

Part Three

Reforming the Structures in the Public Service

G. HYDEN

We noted in the previous section that as early as 1962 seminar participants expressed the view that Africanization is not only a question of changing white faces for black. Africanization should also include a critical review of all existing civil service structures and standards. Each country must determine its own structures and standards and must try to relate its operations to the resources at hand. This commitment to a more thoroughgoing reform, however, naturally remained in the background during the first years of independence. The most important task was to install African officers who subsequently could take the responsibility for adequate reforms of the administrative structures. The African officers had to feel the "squeeze" or the inadequacy of the inherited administrative structures before they could be expected to take initiatives for an overhaul of the system. Thus, it is not surprising that only more recent seminars have devoted themselves extensively to the issue of structural reform. Chronologically it comes after the issue of Africanization and training of individual officers.

The subsequent presentation is divided into four sections: (1) What are the reasons for structural reform? (2) What do the reform proposals entail? (3) What are the problems encountered in carrying out structural reforms? (4) What are the methods of reform?

REASONS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM

Administrative reform was defined by the 1965 seminar as "a continuous process of evaluation of change (or improvement) and adaptation of the existing machinery thereby broadening its base to accommodate new development needs" (1965, p. 7). This definition in itself contains one of the reasons for structural reform: the increasing need for structures that can promote development. It was a general feeling among Africans, both inside and outside the administration, that the colonial service was primarily structured to serve the purpose of law-and order maintenance. The aspirations of the governments of newly independent Africa were qualitatively different in that they at least in words were more directly committed to the objective of development through the use of government structures. In 1962, the call for reform was general and primarily aimed at demarcating a new era: "A

realistic Africanization programme should not attempt to produce an African replica of the colonial civil service" (1962, p. 5). In 1963, the discussion focused on the problems of rapid economic development. The key role traditionally played by the Treasury was questioned by many participants who believed that in a development-oriented government machinery, co-ordination has to be done by a special planning organization. Participants had divergent views whether this organization should be a separate ministry, a planning commission or a unit attached to the Office of the Chief Executive. Whatever the views, participants agreed that planned targets could only be achieved through a system of more effective coordination (1963, pp. 4-12). The same view was echoed in 1964 when participants reiterated the call for African countries to create their own civil service structure.

Without questioning the genuineness of the sentiments expressed in the first three seminar reports it is difficult to avoid the impression that the calls for structural reform in those years rested on little sensitivity to the real problems of restructuring the civil service. Development was the new catch phrase and re-organizing the government to incorporate planning for development, it was believed, would give it a fresh outlook. The civil bureaucracy was no longer primarily a guardian of law and order but the leader in development.

While these views occurred again in 1965, another major reason for administrative reform was stressed at that seminar:

> ...the need for administrative reform springs not only from the newness of the functions and change of objectives but also from the greater scale and volume of governmental activity. With the introduction of fully representational government, the whole population enters into the body politic. Government by elite for the elite gives way to popular government from which all seek some benefit. Just as development from a small family retail business to a large national industry buying material, manufacturing and selling, necessitates major organizational changes, so does the explosion in volume of governmental activity which seems an inevitable concomitant of the introduction of popular government (1965, p. 9).

The complexity and increasing scale of governmental activity create their own problem and this was increasingly being felt in the administration. Coordination became more difficult and the problem-solving capacity similarly reduced. The 1968 seminar committed itself to the view that governmental functions must be so allocated that they facilitate the exchange of ideas and information and make control more effective (1968, p. 15).

A third reason for structural reform has been the effects of excessive centralization and bureaucratization under the new African governments. In 1970, it was recognized that the abnormal civil service structures of African countries were at least in part due to the Africanization programme, which

used good intermediate officers for replacing the expatriates. The resulting vacuum at the intermediate level was a reason for both centralization and bureaucratization in the system of administration in many countries. In some countries, e.g. Ghana, political factors had also contributed to these trends. The fall of Nkrumah and the economizing policies imposed on the new military regime created the opportunity for the first systematic review of the civil service in an English-speaking African country after independence. The Review Commission, known as the Mills-Odoi Commission, was the first in a series of such commissions that have been set up in more recent years (e.g. the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya and the Udoji Commission in Nigeria).

The three reasons for restructuring the administration—the inadequacy of the British model, the increasing scale and complexity as well as the experience of post-independence rule—were all mentioned at the 1972 seminar where administrative reform was the main theme. The case for administrative reform remained undisputed at this meeting. Participants did not advocate any particular approach, as the need would differ from one country to another. Whether a gradual or a frontal approach was adopted, it was agreed that "mounting dissatisfaction" must exist as a prerequisite to any successful reform measures. But how serious the deterioration of a system had to be before remedial action should be taken must remain a matter for the leadership of each system to determine. It is not possible to say that at a particular stage in the evolution of a system reform is necessary (1972, p. 13). In short, participants identified two factors that usually would spark a demand for reform: (a) a general feeling that there was something wrong with the existing machinery; (b) a strong sense that there was an intolerable gap between plan and performance. But what should be done?

CONTENTS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS

The proposals for structural reform have focused on the need for greater flexibility: a change in the rigid class structure of the civil service; greater interchange of senior staff between the civil service and other occupations; and, new structures to support a decentralized system of administration. We shall discuss them here one by one.

It was generally agreed in 1964 that a conscious effort must be made to get away from the class rigidity of the colonial-style civil service. It was further stressed that the new service must be less bureaucratic. In 1965, the seminar noted that one of the early administrative reforms which new countries had to consider was in salary structures and conditions of service:

> A salary structure is an incentive scheme and as such is part of the whole process by which a government channels manpower into the most productive uses. The salary patterns inherited from the colonial regimes had reflected the preoccupations and priorities of these regimes.

> There was a need to review the salary structure in the light of the new government's requirements so as to ensure that wages and salaries are correctly used as incentives for the working population to qualify themselves and seek occupation in the fields where they are most required (1965, p. 15).

The call for a change in the class structure of the civil service and its outdated salary scales gained more support after 1968 when the Fulton Commission in Britain—the origin of the system expressed its criticism of the system of classes in the civil service. Such a system prevents the most efficient matching of men to jobs. It is too crude an instrument for such a purpose. The system of classes is based on two assumptions: that any job can be categorized as appropriate to one or the other of the classes and that it will be most appropriately filled by selection from the members of the class, all of whom are in principle more likely to be good candidates for it than any member of another class. This criticism of the class-structured civil service has been echoed in recent seminars.

The importance of the call for a change in the inherited structure of the civil service lies also in that it has usually served as a justification for a more thorough review of the whole system of administration. This was certainly the case in Kenya in 1970 when the Ndegwa Commission was set up. Other review commissions have gained support to a large extent because their terms of reference have included a review of the inherited class and salary structure.

Another weakness of the inherited civil service has been its inability to absorb new knowledge and to be innovative. Many calls have been made for a development-oriented administration, but in actual fact very little has been achieved in terms of substantive innovations. It is against this background that the notion of a career service has been discussed and calls have been made for greater interchange of senior staff between the civil service and other occupations. The civil service career has in many African countries lost much of the prestige it enjoyed at independence. Other careers, notably in the private or the parastatal sector, have become more attractive. To take advantage of the skill and experience accumulated in these two sectors the proposal has been made that senior staff should be more interchangeable.

The 1964 seminar made the specific recommendation that better use could be made of expertise in the universities. University lecturers and professors might benefit from a period of practical experience and responsibility at appropriate levels within the civil service structure. Greater flexibility in the structures along these lines, however, would both have costs and benefits. On the one hand they could bring valuable expertise to the civil service and they could eventually return to their university posts people better able to relate their teaching to the needs of the country. On the other hand, it was realized that a teacher is not necessarily a good executive.

Secondly, this horizontal mobility between different professions could not be extended to all disciplines.

The most serious reservations about this type of mobility, however, have been of a practical nature:

> ...it was clear that conditions in most developing countries were very different from those in countries like France and the United States where such interchange had been operating successfully for a number of years. The number of openings outside the government service for top-level personnel in some countries was still comparatively small. Further, as long as high-level manpower was scarce, salaries paid by the private sector would always tend to be higher than those paid by the government; for whatever the government paid the private sector would offer a little more in order to attract the best candidates. These differentiations in salary would complicate any arrangements for interchange of personnel (1964, p. 11).

With the advantage of hindsight one can say that the relevance of this argument has decreased in those countries, e.g. Tanzania, where the private sector now plays a relatively more limited role than before. The argument in favour of greater interchangeability has also been raised at other seminars. (In Section I we referred to Chief Udoji's proposal to cancel the career service in favour of a contract service.) Yet, it must be noted that very little has been done in practice to facilitate this interchangeability. While it is possible to get an expatriate from a university in Europe or America to work on the contract basis in the civil service of an African country, it is still virtually impossible for a local man to do the same!

Greater mobility, then, has been advocated as a means to improve the innovativeness and problem-solving capacity of the public service. It is along similar lines that seminar participants have argued for more decentralization in the government administration. A highly bureaucratic and centralized machinery is unable to make effective decisions for development. It must be noted that this concern for decentralization has been raised only after 1967. It was never really an issue in previous seminars where the concern was more with institutionalizing the existing structures that had been Africanized. Furthermore, the support for decentralization has usually been coupled with some reservations.

While decentralization has many advantages, e.g. increasing accountability, participation and problem-solving capacity, it creates other problems. This was the view expressed by seminar participants in 1967, who continued:

> In fact there are dangers in over-decentralization—for instance, increase in the problems of coordination when the system and the machinery for doing so effectively do not exist. While a minimum amount of efficiency could be guaranteed under a centralized system, with a decen-

> tralized system, one requires competence at both ends; in other words, one's requirements multiply under a decentralized system (1967, p. 21).

Central government encroachment on the autonomy of local governments was discussed in 1968. It was noted that the result is lack of interest, frustration and inefficiency in local authorities and the concentration of powers in the central government which is able to assemble both the resources and the men who understand and can solve the problems of development. The general opinion seemed to be that the degree of decentralization should depend on the particular circumstances of each country: its degree of stability and ethnic heterogeneity, availability of qualified and experienced staff and the degree of sophistication and ability of the people to take charge of their own local affairs effectively. One participant expressed the view on this occasion that African governments should take a critical look at their systems of inherited local governments to see if they were wanted, and if so, how they could be adapted to present circumstances and better used as instruments of economic and social development. A study of the French system of local administration by deconcentration was suggested (1968, p. 14).

It is clear that the general trend in most English-speaking African countries has been towards a system of deconcentration of administrative authority within a strengthened central government and away from the system of devolution of power to autonomous local authorities as inherited from the British. In Zambia, the system is referred to as "decentralization in centralism"; via centrally controlled avenues and centrally appointed personnel the presence of government might be felt more closely in the localities while at the same time decision-making has been brought closer to the people (1972, p. 25). Proposals in other countries, e.g. Kenya and Tanzania, have also laid more emphasis on deconcentration than devolution, i.e. of decentralization within a centrally controlled system of government.

PROBLEMS OF STRUCTURAL REFORM

We have already noted that structural reforms in African countries are recent phenomena. The problems experienced, therefore, have only been critically examined in the last years. The 1972 seminar devoted special attention to the experience of three countries: Kenya, Zambia and Ghana. There seems to be general agreement that in terms of increasing government capacity to develop society the problems of structural reform lie primarily in the field of decentralization. More specifically it is the issue of combining decentralization with increasing popular influence over decisions made by regional or district administrative bodies.

In Zambia, and indeed in Tanzania, this problem has been tackled by allowing stronger party control over the administration at the regional, district or local levels. By encouraging at the same time greater inter-

changeability between party and civil service personnel, attempts have been made to cut across the vertical hierarchies established on functional grounds and to generate an integrated provincially-oriented "development front". It was realized by the seminar participants in 1972 that too short a time had elapsed since the reforms were made to allow for a more critical examination. Yet, it was noted that many obstacles remain. To be sure, some of these were highlighted and remedies proposed in 1972 by the Working Party that was appointed by the Cabinet Office in Lusaka to review the system of decentralized administration in Zambia.[1]

The Kenyan experience is not unlike the Zambian one, although Kenya has been less inclined to "politicize" its provincial administration. Yet, as President Kenyatta said in 1968: "I am convinced that no ruling party can effectively exist without the provincial administration".[2] The situation in Kenya is that a number of reforms, most of them incremental, have continuously been carried out since independence, but with the Ndegwa Commission Report in 1971 a package proposal for structural reform was offered for the first time. The Government of Kenya has produced a White Paper on the Report subsequently in which some of the proposed reforms have been accepted and implementation of these reforms has gradually begun. Again it is too early to make any critical examination of the most recent reforms in Kenya, but on the question of decentralization seminar participants in 1972 agreed that:

> The most contentious area was clearly the apparent lack of institutional machinery for popular participation at grassroot level. Although decentralization, *within the bureaucracy*, has occurred it was considered that this was not devolution but a device to encourage bureaucratic initiative and innovativeness rather than to involve popular participation (1972, p. 21).

Local authorities in Kenya had increasingly become emasculated and discussion at the seminar turned on the problems of local participation. The chronic shortage of funds was mentioned as one factor which has had the most debilitating effect on the capacity of local authorities to manage their own affairs. Lack of trained manpower and their role as protagonists of tribal and other local interest were also noted as factors limiting the positive effects of local participation.

Some participants defended the local authority system and argued that low revenues could be due to poor collection arrangements and that given the ingredients of viability and capability, a local authority could receive subventions and manage them without compromising its powers. They also advocated that the poor personnel situations in local authorities could be improved by seconding or even integrating (as in Ghana) trained and experienced manpower from the central government:

> If it is held that local institutions had a vital part to play in any reform as the natural vehicle for popular participation in the locality, then the vicious circle of debilitating features could well be breached in the most effective and contagious fashion by some such device to improve their manning situation. Likewise, if the present impotence of the local authorities has stemmed in part from the erosion of their powers and the subsequent takeover by central authority of these powers, then it is within the political and administrative competence of that authority to remedy the situation. No facet of the relationship (and some would say interdependence) has been irretrievably lost (1972, p. 23).

Problems similar to those of Kenya have also been experienced in Ghana which, it seems, has seen more major attempts to reform the administration than any other English-speaking African country. The principal interest of the 1972 seminar focused on the experience of implementing the recommendations of the Mills-Odoi Commission to counter the overwhelming centralization experienced during the reign of Nkrumah. As the two background papers on Ghana, reprinted below, show, proposals for decentralization have been made but only a few have been implemented. The National Liberation Council government accepted the recommendations of the Mills-Odoi Commission; the Progress Party government, which followed, expressed itself in favour of decentralization two years later but moved manifestly in the opposite direction.

The main problem in Ghana turns out to have been that the decentralization proposals of the Mills-Odoi Commission were too far-reaching for the political leadership to accept. These proposals were a threat to its position, power and influence. The seminar, in its analysis of the Ghanaian experience, emphasized that reform measures cannot succeed with only lukewarm support, the temperature of the opposition to decentralization being always much higher. Political support of administrative reform is a precondition for success, for as one participant put it: "... all reform is political to meet political ends" (1972, p. 27). In the light of these points, it is interesting that several participants maintained that administrative reform in the Ghanaian context, involving some form of decentralization, stands a greater chance of success under a military regime. In this they received support from Nigerians who said that some decentralization measures taken successfully under a military regime would have not otherwise been possible.

METHODS OF STRUCTURAL REFORM

Administrative reforms, involving structural reorganizations, are not easily implemented. The Ghanaian experience highlights this. In spite of government's stated policy, an accepted set of recommendations, a carefully

selected and dedicated cadre of reform agents and sophisticated implementational machinery, only limited success was achieved in Ghana. The entrenched centralized structures were virtually impregnable. Yet, as one Ghana participant told the 1972 seminar: "... the Mills-Odoi Commission set things moving, at least, in the right direction and this was a very positive achievement" (1972, p. 28).

What did contribute to at least a limited success was the special administrative machinery set up to implement the Mills-Odoi recommendations. This apparatus, known as the Office of Government Machinery (OGM), worked directly under the head of government and was staffed by carefully selected and very senior officers who were dedicated to the concept of reform. After some time the OGM was turned into a Management Services Division and responsible for management, finance, personnel, organization and methods as well as staff inspection in the civil service. It was advised by a group of eminent specialists.

The methodology of implementation incorporated all the ingredients of planning, identification of problem areas, delegation and supervision, evaluation and follow-up. The recommendations for implementation were listed: short-term and long-term; those which could readily be delegated to the operating constituent part of the government machinery and those which required specialist assistance. Action steps were tabulated and target dates were determined. At the same time informal discussions were started with ministries and departments. As a result, first draft implementation guides were produced for scrutiny by the ministries before being submitted to government for approval and issue. Follow-up action was initiated by the OGM which had authority to install any procedural alterations designed to achieve the detailed goals (1972, pp. 28-29).

This description of the methodology of implementation resembles very much the system developed for implementation of the decentralization recommendations in Tanzania. The Implementation Committee works directly under State House and the McKinsey Consultants, who have worked out the details of the proposed reforms, have remained in Tanzania to supervise the implementation of the reforms. It is too early to say anything about the Tanzanian experience of implementing major administrative reforms. It may be that political conditions in Tanzania are more congenial to reform than they have been in Ghana, but even so everyone concerned with structural reform must take into account the existence of the vested interests against reform. As the Swaziland paper, reprinted below, emphasizes, perhaps the most useful approach to overcome these obstacles is to bring about a climate for change *for the better* and to stimulate motivation for change. This in turn can best be served by institutionalizing the reform programme into a government standing policy, where responsibilities, contributions, participation and involvement of all concerned are brought to bear on the endeavour.

This, in view of the 1972 seminar, is the only way by which structural reforms can be rooted in the minds of those officers who are expected to perform in the proposed new structures.

FOOTNOTES

1 Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Working Party Appointed to Review the System of Decentralized Administration* (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, May 1972).
2 *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 1968; see also Cherry Gertzel's background paper on Kenya and Zambia, reprinted below.

Institutional Means of Improving the Public Services

J. O. UDOJI

FRAMEWORK OF AUTHORITY WITHIN WHICH THE CIVIL SERVICE OPERATES

Position in Developed Countries

The civil servant, in origin, was a servant of the Crown or Emperor. This was the position in Rome and later in England. As a servant and member of the royal household he derived his authority not from any imperial statute but from the discretionary prerogative of the sovereign. To question his actions would, therefore, be tantamount to questioning the authority of his master and sovereign. It was not until the development of parliament that the actions of the servants of the Crown (ministers and civil servants) began to be questioned, first by parliament and later by the public. And with the development of ministerial government and the expansion of governmental activities some of the duties imposed on ministers and civil servants began to appear on statutes.

Even in a relatively new country like the United States of America the Constitution does not directly provide for the civil service. It does so indirectly where it gives the President the power of appointing and the Senate the power of confirming "officers" of the United States. Another reference in the American Constitution is found where it refers to "all other officers of the United States, which shall be established by law". It follows that in the United States as in England, the civil servant derives his authority either from the Head of State or from the Legislature.

Such statutory provisions as there are in Britain and the United States are isolated cases where specific duties are imposed on civil servants. In other words there is no comprehensive civil service law under which the structure and conditions of employment are legally defined and made subject to the interpretation of the courts of law. An attempt was made in England after the Trevelyan and Northcote Report of 1854 to embody the Civil Service Reform proposals in an Act of Parliament, but the government of the day opposed it and decided to legislate for the Civil Service by Order-in-Council under the Royal Prerogative. In 1920, an Order-in-Council gave the Treasury the power to make regulations for the Civil Service.

The absence of a civil service law in both the United Kingdom and the United States resulted in the late introduction in both countries of a civil service career system based on merit. In the United Kingdom the patronage system (by which offices were openly for sale or were granted as rewards for service to the Crown) operated until the Trevelyan and Northcote Reform of 1854. This reform introduced merit as the criterion for appointment. In America the spoils system by which civil servants were regarded as political agents of the political faction in power continued until the Pendleton Act of 1883. This Act brought into operation a career system based on merit and fitness for appointment after a competitive examination.

Corruption, inefficiency and other abuses of the patronage and spoils system must have been some of the reasons that forced upon France and other European countries the concept of a non-political civil service. To ensure such a politically neutral public service the conditions of service of public officers are contained in a statute and subject to interpretation by the courts. In France it is the *Statut General de la Fonction Publique* of 1946; in Germany it is the *Bundesbeamtengesetz* of 1953; in Switzerland the federal officials come under the Federal Statute of Public Officials of 1927 amended in 1949. In Sweden the Civil Service is covered by constitutional provisions. In countries like Spain the provisions of the civil service law are so detailed that they contain such details as hours of work and procedures for dealing with correspondence. Although the legal provisions may vary from constitutional clauses to legislative enactments the problem which these countries are trying to solve is similar: to have a self-governing self-administering service insulated from outside interference, whether social, political or judicial. The most striking point is the extent to which political and legislative influence has been eliminated. In the fields of recruitment, discipline and promotion a group of officials is generally responsible, not an outside body. This is particularly true of France, Germany and Italy.

New African States

In the new African countries the idea of a Civil Service Act is a recent innovation. The Independence Constitutions of the early African countries (Ghana and Nigeria) were silent on the civil service. The only civil service posts mentioned in such constitutions were those of Attorney-General, Permanent Secretary, Director of Public Prosecutions and Director of Audit. There were, however, provisions for the establishment of a Public Service Commission, the purpose of which was the insulation of the civil service from political control. It is, however, arguable whether such purposes were achieved or were capable of achievement. It may be the arguments about the desirability of the independence of the civil service that made countries like Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda introduce Civil Service Acts.

The arguments in favour of a Civil Service Act are that such an act

embodying the duties, responsibilities and functioning of the civil service will give the civil service a legal identity and also enhance the status and prestige of the civil servant. This view is not generally accepted. Some people are sceptical of the merits of a Civil Service Act *vis-a-vis* the public of a developing country. They argue that an Act will produce the opposite effect in many African countries; that given the present level of understanding and relationships the introduction of such Act will be drawing attention to what may be considered in certain quarters as excessive and bureaucratic powers of the public servant and the legislature might end up curtailing instead of enhancing the status and prestige of the public servant. In the circumstances it might be wiser to rely on the provisions of the constitution and the guarantees contained therein as these override legislative enactments. Present experience is that Public Service Act could be used as levers for removing the independence guaranteed the public service in the constitution.

Before introducing a Public Service Act the wisdom of emphasizing the special features of the public service should be considered. The concept of an official who is subject to special regulations and privileges might give rise to a tendency for the administration to turn itself into a special class. This attitude can be dangerous for relations between the public servant and the community. At present the developed countries are busy trying to avoid creating a gap between the government and the people. In a developing country the danger of such a gap is even greater. To enhance the prestige and status of the civil servant will result in turning the service into a privileged caste of bureaucrats and technocrats with undesirable social, economic and even political consequences.

The requirements of a developing country demand that the conditions of service of civil servants, including their autonomy, should be flexible and constantly under review. This will not be the case if the conditions are enshrined in a statute. Most African countries are made up of tribal groups at varying levels of economic and educational development and to enshrine in a statute a merit system based on fitness for appointment after a competitive examination would be socially unfair and politically disruptive. In such cases there will be need to vary the qualifications (in conjunction with upgrading courses) in the case of educationally backward groups. A quota system may even be tried in certain classes of appointments.

The concept of a civil service law was a concept born out of the philosophies of nineteenth century Europe—a period of rapid all round development. Many African countries have yet to reach that stage. To get there they may have to sacrifice or modify some of the cherished traditions of developed countries. One of the traditions which is bound to be tampered with in the process is that of an independent civil service. Without an enlightened and articulate public opinion and the correct political, social and economic environment the chances of a civil service law guaranteeing an independent career merit system will be very slender indeed.

As far as the service itself is concerned there is no doubt that a body of laws which defines the functioning, duties, responsibilities, as well as the rights of a public servant will make for certainty and good working morale. But it does not require an Act to achieve this. By tradition General Orders and Financial Instructions are regarded as authoritative and of compelling if not legal validity.

Before leaving the subject of the source of authority within which civil servants function, a distinction may be drawn between civil service law and administrative law. A civil service law we have seen is a law dealing with the structure, organization, powers, duties and procedure of civil servants. Administrative law on the other hand, deals with the exercise of the powers of civil servants and the methods of controlling such powers. Such a law deals with *delegated legislation*, administrative tribunals and the exercise of powers by central, local and statutory bodies. In France, unlike England, administrative law is administered in separate administrative courts. These courts ensure that civil servants and public authorities observe the law. In this way these courts, originally designed to protect public officers, have come to assume the role of the protector of the citizen against the "tyranny" of the administration. There is no need, particularly in a developing country, for the law to give more protection to a civil servant than it gives to ordinary citizens. Such a protection will tend to divorce him from the people. With regard to the protection that administrative courts offer to the citizen it is submitted that greater and more flexible protection is offered him by other forms of control of the public servant, namely: ministerial, treasury, parliamentary, professional and work controls.

LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND STATUTORY BODIES: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATIONS

Local Government

Local government is the creation of central government. It is created by statute which give it its powers and functions. The functions are generally considered to relate to matters of local interest, such as:

(i) the maintenance of law and order;
(ii) the maintenance of local roads;
(iii) the running of local primary schools; and
(iv) the collection of rates and taxes.

Usually the statute that grants these powers to a local government body also provides safeguards for their proper exercise. This is done by giving the central government powers of direction and control. The most important of these is the power of suspension or dissolution by the appropriate Central

Minister if he thinks that the local government body is not performing its functions satisfactorily. Next in importance is the financial control which is exercised through the approval of annual estimates, the making of grants and loans and audit of accounts.

In recent years the governments of developing African countries have embarked on economic policies and programmes. Confronted with the totality and enormity of development they find that matters such as roads and education which were formerly considered of local interest have acquired national importance in the context of economic development and planning. They find that in order to succeed they have to encroach on the independence and autonomy of local governments as well as on the liberty and property of individuals. They find also that local governments do not have the resources, the men or the organization to cope with development demands. The result is lack of interest, frustration and inefficiency in local government and the concentration of powers in the central government which is able to assemble both the resources and the men who understand and can solve the problems of development.

In defence of such centralization it is argued that decentralization is a concept of a developed economy with a strong nationally conscious central government anxious to hive off matters of local interest to capable and locally elected citizens, and that to advocate decentralization for emergent African countries would be to ignore the twin problems facing African governments: fostering national unity and rapid economic growth, neither of which can be solved quickly in a decentralized or plural structure. In addition it is argued that centralization will ensure easy mobilization and mobility of scarce resources in funds and trained personnel.

Against centralization it is argued that the politicians and civil servants who run central governments are increasingly out of touch with the wishes and aspirations of the people, that the party system and the use of party whips make governments ineffective in representing the wishes of the people and that a gap is developing between the government and the governed. It is further argued that there is a growing desire for participation at all levels and that local government has an important role in fostering rapid economic growth, that it will decongest government at the centre and thereby free national leaders from onerous details as well as bring management close to the site of operation and that it will increase the peoples' understanding and support of social and economic development activities and thereby facilitate personal and group adjustments to needed changes.

The problem is how to reconcile central government responsibility for policy direction and assessment of performance with the desirability of efficient popular participation. Two courses are open. The first is to leave local government structure as it is but to drastically reduce the functions of local governments to such matters as they are capable of discharging. Such functions would probably be limited to such matters as:

Liquor licensing,
Recreational facilities,
Animal pounds,
Minor health matters, and
collection of rates and taxes.

This course of action has the advantage of being more acceptable to the people in that it leaves room for some participation. The second course would be to abolish the present fragmented and incompetent local governments and replace them with new authorities, big and capable of fulfilling the tasks of management and development. This course of action was recommended by a recent commission which considered organizational and structural reforms in the machinery of the Government of Ghana. The commission condemned centralization as slow and inefficient and recommended the creation of plural authorities in the form of District Regional Authorities comprising representative council with clearly defined responsibilities. The District Authorities would elect self-accounting and rating authorities with responsibility for the comprehensive development of their areas. In particular they would be responsible for:

Roads and buildings,
Health (other than large hospitals),
Land administration,
Social services and community development,
Agricultural extension services,
Primary or middle schools,
Fire fighting, and
General amenities.

Regional Authorities on the other hand, would be composed of representatives of District Councils and Senior Officials of Regional Authorities. Regional Authorities would have direct responsibility in the management of large regional hospitals, secondary schools, teacher-training colleges, nurses' training schools and major workshops. They would approve District Authority estimates and would negotiate on their behalf with the Treasury for annual subventions.

These recommendations go beyond delegation of authority to Regional and District Authorities. They are creations of separate and independent legal institutions outside the ministries and vested with responsibility for defined functions. The recommendations look more like the creation of regional governments instead of regional policies. Regional policy means regional plans, regional development, and/or strong regional arms of the central government but not necessarily regional governments in the sense of regional representative councils. Representative councils will not be satisfied with being consultative and deliberative but would want to be

executive. Experience in Nigeria with deliberative Provincial Councils was that they constantly demanded executive powers, a desire not altogether unconnected with separatist movements.

On balance the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the circumstances of a country, particularly its level of political and economic development. For an undeveloped country centralization and a rise sary if initial progress is to be made in economic development and a rise in general social and economic efficiency is to be gained. But as effective development proceeds and the general level of technical efficiency rises, new problems begin to emerge. The number of units begins to increase not only in the economic system but also in public administration. The central authority becomes inefficient because its control becomes increasingly difficult. Then is the time for powers of decision in economic and social matters to be decentralized. In other words the need for decentralization does not suddenly arise; it is a gradual process.

Public Corporations

One of the results of the expansion of governmental activities is the growth of public corporations. Like local governments, corporations are creations of central statutes and instruments of decentralization, but unlike them they are created to perform specific functions of a commercial or industrial nature. Unlike local governments they are better equipped technologically and financially for performing their functions and are not hampered by the effects of elected membership. In a way the growth of public corporations in recent years is a reflection of the weakness of local government and their inability to cope with the increasing demands of development. It may be that in future and unless success is made of the local government system more and more of the functions of local governments will be taken over by regulatory corporations.

In view of the differences between local governments and corporations the problem of their relationship with the central government is also different. Here the main argument is how to reconcile the need for operational efficiency and financial flexibility with the necessity to conform with the overall policy of the central government. Corporations are constituted by law to achieve a public purpose and as such it is incumbent on government to ensure that they accomplish the purpose for which they are created. What corporations should, therefore, seek is not freedom from government control but freedom from those restrictions which are unsuited to a business operation. Corporations should also not insist on organizational autonomy for that will exclude them from participating in the formation of public policies affecting their sphere of activity. The theory of autonomous corporations has not been justified by practice in some African countries. In West Africa their record is such that governments are bringing them under stricter government control

by the appointment of full-time civil servants as chairmen or directors of corporations. Furthermore steps are also taken to bring the wage structure of corporations into line with that of government. The present trend is towards integration with government in everything except what is unsuited to a business operation. One advantage of this tendency is that it will facilitate the interchange of staff between the various agencies of government and might eventually lead to a unified public service for all persons engaged in public duties.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

The internal organization of the government of all ex-British territories is the ministerial type at the head of which is the Prime Minister or President. He is the chief executive and presides over the cabinet. Immediately under him are the ministers who are charged with responsibility for matters either on a functional or group basis. The size of ministries varies with countries.

As portfolio ministers are automatically members of cabinet the size of the cabinet may be material from the point of view of easy dispatch of government business. Experts suggest that cabinets should be small in number—preferably 10 or at most 12—as this is the number at which organized oral discussion is most efficient.

The chief executive and his cabinet form the administrative apex and centre of government. They are the centre of authority, policy-making, coordination and surveillance. Much of the coordination and surveillance relate to departmental matters which are too detailed for the attention of cabinet and are performed by coordinating ministries, namely, Finance, Economic Planning and Establishment.

The requirements of rapid economic growth have made coordination and the assessment of performances of great importance. The traditional practice is to use the Ministry of Finance for the control of personnel, the surveillance of common practices and procedures and the coordination of economic policies. This is still the practice in Western Nigeria.

Since economic development is now the basic platform of all African governments there is a great awareness of the need for coordinated efforts in the sphere of economic planning. Most African countries have, therefore, introduced planning ministries. Ministries of Finance are considered too negative, cautious and unimaginative for bold positive planning. The new ministries, have, in several cases, started with the usual difficulties of shortage of staff, absence of statistical data, uncertain status in the government and resentment from the strongly entrenched Ministry of Finance which regards the new ministry as a rival institution. This makes institutional liaison between the planning ministry and the other ministries weak. The result is that programmes are honoured more in breach than in their observance. Priorities are ignored and there has been a case where later budget decisions distorted

the planning decisions. To remedy this some countries have strengthened the planning ministry with an economic committee at which the head of government presides. Such committee is made up of the economic ministries—Finance, Commerce, Agriculture and Economic Planning. In former Eastern Nigeria the Economic Committee included the Chairman of the Development Corporation and the Governor of the Government Bank. The function of the committee is to approve the recommendations of the planning ministry before it goes to the cabinet.

Where there is a Ministry of Planning the Ministry of Finance is restricted to:

(1) securing funds necessary for government current expenditure;
(2) securing enough additional funds for government investment outlays; and
(3) pursuing a functional tax policy in place of the traditional policy of taxing for a balanced budget. Such a policy will stimulate private savings and encourage their flow to productive fields.

Ministries of Finance, however, resist such limitations of their functions and argue that there is an element of planning in all their activities.

The other ministry which has invaded the controlling influence of the Ministry of Finance is the Ministry of Establishments sometimes known as the Ministry of Public Service matters. This ministry arose out of the need for an organization or authority to supervise the Africanization of the service and to bring pre-independence practices and procedures in line with the status and aspirations of the new governments. In recent years the ministry has been concerned more with personnel administration and the general management of the service. This includes identifying and developing management talent, career planning and training in management techniques. In some countries these functions are performed not by a ministry but by a department in the office of the President or Prime Minister. This is because at independence the management and control of the service became a matter of public and political interest.

In the last few years there have been a lot of structural and organizational reforms aimed at improving the effectiveness of the public service in many African countries. In spite of these reforms there is still a clamour for more and more reforms. Critics of the public service draw attention to the structure and procedures of private industrial and commercial firms and urge government to adopt such practices and procedures. It is considered that there is a limit to management practices which government can adopt. For example, management wants to discipline and dismiss employees without having to defend its action before an appeal body. It wants to promote workers on the basis of its own standards of merit. Management wants a flexible working load with layoff based on merit. It wants to pay individuals on the basis of

its own assessment of their merit and not according to a uniform scale which regards everyone alike.

The objectives of government are different from those of private enterprise; so also is the extent and level of accountability. In the nature of things and in view of their different roles government methods are bound to be different from those of private enterprise.

Ghana's Experience in Administrative Reform of the Central Bureaucracy

J. NTI

The movement of colonial peoples for independence had as its motivating force the notion that locally based government responsible to the local people, would not only be more responsive to the aspirations of the public but would also achieve more in terms of material development.

The achievement, in some cases the approach of independence, has, therefore, invariably been characterized by energetic and phenomenal expansion in the scope and functions of government—with a corresponding increase in the weight and complexity of tasks thereby imposed upon the existing administrative machinery of the state.

It is a matter of common observation, however, that the administrative systems inherited from colonial rule have, in practice, generally been found after independence to be structurally, orientationally, sometimes attitudinally and often procedurally inadequate if not unsuitable for the urgent and dynamic tasks of new nationhood.

Under the circumstances, for pragmatic as well as symbolic reasons, administrative reform has come to be regarded as *sine qua non* for development. The usually proclaimed objectives of such reforms are to improve efficiency (or is it, in fact, effectiveness?), probity, openness and political responsiveness of public servants.

An attempt is made in this paper to analyse the various experiments in administrative organization and procedures that have been tried in Ghana from the time the country became internally self-governing to the present day, to assess the impact of reform on the operation of the civil service and to explore the social and political constraints to future change.

Administrative reform in the Ghanaian context should be looked at as retooling the administrative machine in response to political demands as distinct from administrative demands. Always implicit in structural reforms which were undertaken was the political motive (used here not in a pejorative sense) that the ruling elite wanted some structural changes.

ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

Ghana like all the ex-British colonies inherited an administrative structure which had two main divisions:

(a) a central secretariat handling policy issues, personnel matters, and financial problems as well as exercising overall supervisory powers over technical departments; and
(b) a field organization consisting of administrative and technical officers implementing government policies on the ground.

With the granting of internal self-government to the Gold Coast, this administrative structure had to be changed as the Governor now shared his responsibility for policy-making with an Executive Council of eleven members, called ministers. To enable them to discharge their responsibilities, each of the ministers with portfolio required a secretary and a secretariat. To meet this political demand, a major reorganization of the administrative structure was undertaken in 1950. The Colonial Secretary's Office was divided into nine embryo ministries—Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, Justice, Finance, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Commerce, Industry and Mines, Communications and Works, Education and Social Welfare, Health and Labour, and Local Government—each in the charge of a senior civil servant designated Permanent Secretary. These structural changes in the administrative machine were thus in response to constitutional changes. Consequently, with the appointment of ministers after the 1951 elections, each Permanent Secretary had to exercise supervision over his departments subject to the general direction and control of his minister. What was left of the central secretariat became the Office of the Leader of Government Business, later Prime Minister.

What is significant is that the ministries were created as separate entities from the functional departments whose policy they controlled, i.e. the small secretariat under each minister, designated a ministry, was geographically separate from its constituent functional departments.

The evidence available indicates that physically integrating functional departments with ministries was avoided as a means of giving technical heads of departments some amount of discretionary power as well as protection from political interference. But the separation of ministries and functional departments created resentment as it divested heads of departments of some power and helped to exacerbate the conflicts and cleavages between the technical officers and generalist administrators. On the other hand integration of ministries with departments create a number of administrative difficulties which tend to increase as one moves from a uni-departmental ministry to a ministry with conglomerate departments. It also tends to confuse determination of nation-wide objectives, priorities and strategies with the day-to-day management of programmes, and to diffuse responsibility and accountability.

THE LIDBURY COMMISSION

The commission on the civil service of the Gold Coast, 1950-51,

popularly known in Ghana as the "Lidbury Commission" rather significantly had as part of its terms of reference "to investigate and report on changes which, in order to improve efficiency and economy in administration and to secure elimination of waste, are necessary in relation to organization, staff cadre . . . and to make recommendations".[1] The commission felt that there was a need for some fundamental re-designing of the civil service machine to adapt it from the service of "a highly centralized bureaucratic administration to that of a constitution involving the dispersion of administrative and executive responsibility to a number of ministries and regional bodies".[2] It emphasized that for speedy decision-making, there was a need for "the greatest measure of devolution compatible with efficiency" and that even though for several years past the Gold Coast had been attempting to achieve a measure of decentralization by posting Assistant Directors to regions the organization of government business was still defective.[3]

The commission, therefore, recommended not only devolution from ministries to departments so that heads of departments could accept full responsibility for the daily direction of the business of their departments, but also as much decentralization as possible from headquarters to regions, both to the Chief Commissioner as Regional Administrator, and to Chief Regional representatives of departments. It further urged that the devolution of authority should not stop at the regional level but should reach down to the field unit.[4]

Despite the recommendations of the Lidbury Commission and the disadvantages of the integration of ministerial and departmental functions such integration came into vogue after 1957 under the policy of "democratic centralism"[5]—and resulted in the creation of the integrated Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, Trade and Industries. After two years' trial, however, the cabinet decided in December, 1959, that integration of ministries and departments should cease except in Ministries of Health, Education and Information to enable heads of departments to attend to their executive functions. In supporting this view the Smith Committee stated that "the full integration of departments with ministries was wasteful of time, effort, manpower and good tempers".[6]

CENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION

Despite these decisions, the centralization trend continued, mainly because the First Republican Constitution of 1960 gave Ghana an Executive President with enormous powers which he decided to exercise with the minimum of delegation. Consequently the distinctive features of the period 1960-66 were the assumption of a great deal of ministerial powers by the President, the proliferation of ministries, the creation of presidential secretariats and the very frequent reshuffling of ministerial portfolios. Thus during this period,

the President assumed ministerial responsibility for the Armed Forces, the Police and the Budget Bureau. To feel in absolute control, he needed to put his hands on the key spots in the country's administration. As part of this exercise it was necessary to weaken the influence of the "original old" ministers by breaking up their ministries into smaller units and upgrading young dynamic, junior ministers, to ministerial rank. Thus in June 1965, the President announced the creation of 15 ministries of cabinet rank, and 16 ministries of non-cabinet rank and nine appointments of Regional Commissioners, First and Second Parliamentary Secretaries and Chief of State Protocol with ranks equivalent to non-cabinet ministers and a Deputy Attorney-General with cabinet rank.[7] This was at the time when there were 23 presidential secretariats which were in effect parallel organizations to these ministries. These changes closely followed the official declaration of Ghana as a one-party state supposedly in consonance with the popular will demonstrated by a referendum.

These secretariats and small ministries may have performed their given functions well and expeditiously and may have provided a way out for Nkrumah in his disillusionment by weakening traditional ministries (e.g. Ministry of Finance versus Budget Bureau). But this creation of small units and parallel organizations performing similar functions, was costly and administratively unwise.

A remarkable feature of this period is that while ministries and departments were being dismembered, e.g. organization and methods division was moved from the establishments secretariat and made a separate secretariat, bodies which were considered to be stumbling blocks to the implementation of the President's personal will were being abolished or merged with bodies which were directly under political control. A case in point was the Public Service Commission. Its jurisdictional scope was curtailed in 1960 to exclude all organizations other than the civil service and its powers as regards the appointments of heads and deputy of departments were also curtailed. By the Civil Service (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 303), the Civil Service Commission was dissolved and its functions, members and staff were taken over by the establishments secretariat ostensibly to make for expedition in implementation of policies. What is significant is that the new enlarged establishments secretariat was to work under the supervision of a committee which was directly under the President and which included two party activists. The Civil Service Commission was now to be directly under political control. This was at the time when various steps such as the creation of party branches in the ministries, the injection of specially oriented graduates from the "Ideological Institute" into the civil service machine and the organization of political party rallies specifically for civil servants, were being taken to ensure the political responsiveness of civil servants.

It is worth mentioning at this point that the fragmentation of organiza-

tions and the attempt to politicize the civil service did not end with the headquarters. The field organization also had its share.[8]

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES UNDER THE NLC

Nkrumah's government was toppled in February 1966. The National Liberation Council (NLC) was dissatisfied with the administrative structure it inherited. Consequently, one of its early tasks on taking over the reins of government was to review the structure.[9] The number of ministries was reduced from 31 to 17 and of secretariats from 23 to 8,[10] the prevailing guiding policy being that of ensuring effectiveness and economy. Slight expansions such as the creation of a separate Ministry of Rural Development to emphasize the government's priorities, were made during the NLC regime, but on the whole, this structure of limited number of ministries and secretariats was maintained throughout the regime.

THE MILLS-ODOI COMMISSION

The NLC appointed a commission[11] in 1967 to investigate the organization and structure of the public services and to recommend reforms with special regard to the need to "establish a civil service structure which matches the requirements of a machinery of government geared to rapid social and economic development" and "improve the efficiency and economy in administration and secure the elimination of waste".[12]

Among the findings of the commission were that:

(1) There was an excessive centralization of authority and responsibility with a corresponding heavy concentration of senior civil servants in Accra, while the field work was consequently left in the hands of relatively junior and inexperienced personnel.

(2) Ministries in Accra had become directly involved in the day-to-day management of field programmes with the result that control over current operations in the field had become remote and ineffective, while accountability had become anonymous and far removed from the scene of operations.

(3) Attention paid to the determination of objectives, priorities and strategies and the allocation of resources at the national level which should properly be the role of ministries had been grossly inadequate and often neglected.

(4) Excessive fragmentation of government functions had made co-ordination cumbersome and ineffective.

(5) The result of all these had been that the machinery of government had become an unwieldy instrument capable of responding to the demands for a balanced economic development of the country.[13]

To improve efficiency and provide a machinery of government suitable for the accomplishment of programmes for rapid social and economic development, the commission recommended a radical and substantial decentralization of the executive work of the government, by creating district authorities and regional authorities with legal powers to perform specific functions. The district authorities were to be the basic administrative and executive institutions for the provision of government services at the local level with power to create local and village committees. Professionally staffed regional authorities were to be the intermediary planning and coordinating bodies between the district authorities and the central government.[14] On the assumption that "the government of any country, in its widest sense, is a single operation even though it may be carried out by a number of different kinds of administrative and other agencies",[15] it recommended the unification of all the functional arms of the government, the teaching service, and the local government service into a single unified service. In addition to geographical decentralization through regional and district authorities, the commission, following the principle that ministries should be relieved of the management of programmes and that management should be located as near as possible to the site of operations, recommended the establishment of functional agencies in place of a number of departments. For instance, it recommended the conversion of the Departments of Railways and Harbours and of Posts and Telegraphs into public corporations and the Department of Forestry and Wildlife into trusts. It also suggested the establishment of Hospital Management Boards to take over the management of the large hospitals in the country.[16]

The commission envisaged that there should be fewer ministries than previously and that these ministries would be smaller, more professional bodies, "concerned with determining objectives, priorities and strategies for the nation as a whole and for assessing, marshalling and allocating resources".[17] The functions of reorganizing the structure of the public service and of carrying out the decentralization programme recommended in the report, with its attendant unification of the various arms of the service and the retraining and re-orientation of civil servants, was to be entrusted to a new office to be known as "Office of Government Machinery".[18]

The commission's recommendations were, in general, accepted by the NLC government.[19]

The Office of Government Machinery (now called Management Services Division) was established in December 1967 and it took the first interim steps towards decentralization. In primary education, parks and gardens, social services and community development, fire-fighting and roads construction, programme management was decentralized to the regions with funds placed under the control of regional heads of departments (since the 1968-69

budget), though regional administrative officers exercise the function of controlling officer.[20]

THE PROGRESS PARTY GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION

Attempts to decentralize personnel management did not meet with the same amount of success. The Progressive Party government which took over from the NLC and expressed itself in favour of decentralization as a principle, appeared to move in the opposite direction with its assignment of personnel control to ministers and its rejection of the Campbell Commission's recommendation to consider delegating some appointment powers to heads of departments. On the other hand the decision of the Progressive Party government that appointments to posts of Regional Chief Executive and Chairman of District Councils should be made by the Prime Minister (i.e. its attempts to control the institutions) might be regarded as indication that it was not thinking of whittling down arbitrarily the substantial powers given to these institutions by the constitution, as the fear of strengthening the civil service *vis-à-vis* the political power centre would have been eliminated. For whereas the Mills-Odoi Commission's intention was to improve operational effectiveness over a wide range of governmental activities, the government saw in it the strengthening of the civil service. This step, therefore, clearly illustrates the dilemma faced by governments. The need for an effective civil service for the implementation of governmental policies is widely accepted. Yet some administrative reforms may result in having a technocratically competent but politically uncontrollable civil service. This usually results in ambiguity on the part of the government. Thus an Evaluation Committee stated in May 1971 that they had a feeling that there had been much more decentralization in practice than the records show, but that in so far as the status of decentralization was to be judged by progress in establishing the institutions envisaged by the Mills-Odoi Commission Report, the position was disappointing.

The question then is why had the recommendations of the Mills-Odoi Commission not been substantially implemented, four years after their submission?

At this point, it may be of interest to draw attention to some of the similarities between the Mills-Odoi Commission and some earlier ones, particularly the Lidbury Commission, as regards the terms of reference, the recommendations, and the treatment given to those recommendations.

Like the Lidbury Commission the Mills-Odoi Commission was to recommend changes that would lead to improvement in "efficiency and economy in administration and secure the elimination of waste". Like the Lidbury Commission, the Mills-Odoi Commission recommended decentralization.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Thus decentralization has been the running theme of a number of commissions[22] and yet, consistently, there has been failure to implement these recommendations. The main factor which accounts for this is in the top leadership—politicians and civil servants, since if the recommended structural changes should take place the thrust for the implementation of the recommendations of the various commissions must come from these people. And yet these are the people who would have most to lose in the short run if the changes occur. They are, therefore, not unnaturally reluctant (to say the least) to press forward.

The Lidbury Commission found that in their discussions with secretaries to ministries on the question of further devolution in personnel matters there were expressions of doubt as to its propriety and the commission set it down as "an example of the misgiving with which decentralization and devolution of responsibility is regarded".[23] These misgivings have certainly plagued administrative reform efforts in Ghana. Some heads of departments find it difficult to accept partial loss of power and direct influence in the day-to-day implementation of policies. This fear of loss of power and influence kept coming up day after day at seminars held jointly by the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration and the Office of Government Machinery to discuss the Mills-Odoi Commission Report, and its implementation.[24]

The Administrative Committee of the NLC—a body made up of top civil servants—in their review of the Mills-Odoi Commission Report was, in short, advocating the *status quo* and pleading for the rejection of the commission's recommendations. Instead of decentralization, the committee suggested delegation of powers to regional and district authorities.[25] And yet because decentralization was fundamental to the whole proposed new structure, the commission had dwelt at some length on the question of decentralization versus delegation.[26]

This bears out Caiden's conclusion that "the haves" resist changes that will deprive them of their advantages, seeking to block or divert reforms with compromises, etc.,[27] and Eisenstadt's analysis which indicates that elite classes support reforms that leave essentials unaltered and their positions intact.[28] Cohen argues that "social relationships are the essential determinants of responses to change".[29]

To politicians, decentralization would imply loss of power and influence whether they are Ministers or ordinary Members of Parliament (MP). Ministerial control and close supervision and involvement in the management of programmes would be whittled down with decentralization. The fear of this happening was clearly voiced by a number of ministers at a seminar organized by the Office of Government Machinery at the State House in 1970 to

acquaint ministers and ministerial secretaries with the proposed decentralization and its implications. The ordinary MP would lose some influence, as people in the locality would now tend to look to district authorities for developments rather than to the central government. Consequently, he could no longer exclusively claim the honour of bringing development projects into particular localities.

FOOTNOTES

1 *Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of the Gold Coast, 1950-51* (Chairman: Sir David Lidbury), Hodgson and Son Ltd.
2 Ibid., paragraphs 18 and 38.
3 Ibid., paragraphs 34-36.
4 Ibid., paragraphs 38-43.
5 Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, p. 209.
6 Report of the Smith Committee on "Relations between Heads of Departments and Ministries".
7 Press Release No. 58/65 of 12 June 1965, from Office of the President.
8 There are powerful advocates for the conflict theory. Lucian Pye advocates building bureaucracy around conflict and competition, while Braibanti talks of creating "countervailing loci of power". See Yehesekiel Dror "Strategies for Administrative Reform", in *Development and Change*, Vol. II, and *Political and Administrative Development*, edited by R. Braibanti, Durham University Press, 1969.
9 Instead of three regions in the colonial days, Ghana was divided administratively into nine regions, and instead of 42 districts in the fifties, by early 1966 and there were 161 districts, headed by "politician" District Commissioners.
10 Secretary to the NLC's Circular No. SCR 0061/TJ, dated 10 March 1966.
11 *The Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana* (Chairman: Mr. Justice Mills-Odoi), Accra-Tema: 1967, State Publishing Corporation, Printing Division.
12 Executive Instrument No. 31 of 1967, dated 22 April 1967.
13 *The Report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana*, op. cit., paragraphs 23-28.
14 Ibid., paragraph 29.
15 Ibid., paragraph 30.
16 Ibid., paragraph 30.
17 Ibid., paragraph 54.
18 See OGM Circulars 1/68, dated 1 July 1968, and 3/69, dated 15 May 1969.
19 Ibid., paragraphs 52 and 139-163.
20 See the Government White Paper No. 6/68 published in May 1968.
21 Commission of Enquiry (Salary Structure), 1971.
22 See also the *Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform*, Colonial 248, 1949, and *Regional Administrations, Report by the Commissioner* (Sir Sydney Phillipson), Accra: Government Printing Department, 1951, Part III.
23 *Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of the Gold Coast, 1950-51*, op. cit., paragraph 37.
24 Orientation seminars were held on the campus of GIMPA, at the State House and at Regional Headquarters for Principal Secretaries and Heads of Departments and Ministries, e.g., see OGM Circulars Nos. OGM 0928, dated 19 May 1969, and OGM 0929, dated 24 May 1969.
25 Review by the Administrative Committee of the NLC of the *Report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana* (mimeo), paragraph 27.
26 Ibid., paragraph 29.
27 G. E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, London: The Penguin Press, 1970, p. 140. See also H. Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform", in *Development and Change*, op. cit., p. 57.
28 S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires*, New York: Free Press, 1963, cited by Caiden. "Administrative Reform", loc. cit. See also V. V. Moharir, "Administrative Reforms in India", in *Development and Change*, op. cit., p. 84.

29 A. R. Cohen, "The Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform: Towards More Differentiated Strategies for Change", *Development and Change*, op. cit., p. 72.

Administrative Reform at the Grass Roots: The Ghanaian Experience

K. A. OWUSU-ANSAH

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to complement James Nti's article on *Ghana's Experience of Administrative Reform*[1] by focusing attention on administrative reform at the grassroots and on the relations between the centre of political power and the periphery during the period under review (i.e. 1950-1971).

Administrative reform, in this context, is taken to mean the deliberate inducement, against resistance, of change in structure, process, capacity and output of an organization with a view to improving on the *status quo* in the eyes of its initiators. The term is here considered in relation to a particular period of time and in the context of changes that have taken place since the period of internal self-government for the country. The issue, therefore, has political, social and economic dimensions, however these are defined. It is my task, however, to seek to endorse the observation,[2] that the effectiveness or otherwise of decentralization[3] is a function of the orientations, attitudes and behaviour of the ruling elite, that leadership orientation and practice are salient in the institutionalization of administrative reforms.

EMERGENCE FROM THE NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM

Evidence of increased political consciousness in the late forties culminated ultimately in the appointment, in 1948, of an all-African committee—known for short as the Coussey Committee[4]—to examine details for a constitutional reform for the country. Although the recommendations of this committee covered government at all vital levels, it is those aspects of its report concerned with local government and decentralization of powers to regional organizations that will specifically be the focus of this analysis.

The committee confirmed that the central government was remote from the people and that the native authorities were inefficient. The remoteness was due to the absence of participation by indigenous people in the making of public policy decisions and to the inadequacy of decentralization of the central machinery to the regions. The inefficiency of native authorities had

come about because their membership was restricted to predominantly illiterate traditional office-holders and their kinsmen, because they lacked a sufficient number of suitably trained and qualified staff, and because their funds were inadequate for their needs. Also the size of their membership was unwieldy and their procedure irregular.

Far from imposing a rigid pattern on all localities, the committee, in its report submitted in 1949, recommended the establishment of a new local government system based on the existence of a community interest and the stage of political consciousness of the localities. The indigenous culture was recognized to embrace the principles of representativeness and government by discussion. Efficiency was to be achieved through training of staff of councils, the secondment to local authorities of willing civil servants as council clerks and treasurers, the modelling of the structure of local government after the fashion of England and Wales, and the streamlining of the rather cumbrous and leisurely procedure of the native authorities. As regards responsibility, the franchise was to be widened to embrace many more people and provision was made for persons selected to represent the localities to be public spirited or of acceptable socio-economic background. Organizationally, the executive staff of the local authorities would be separated from and made subordinate to the council whilst the central government's control of local finances was to change from a direct method through district commissioners to an indirect one through the agency of Regional Councils (deliberative councils to be set up in the regions). Additionally, the powers of the central government in the fields of health, education, public works and social services were to be decentralized.

THE CPP AND DECENTRALIZATION

As if these departures from the native authority system were not a sufficient threat to the power of the chief, the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1951,[5] introduced a few subtle modifications of the Coussey proposals which had the effect of making it even easier for the chiefs and other opponents of the government party to lose influence at the grassroots. These included a rejection of a deliberative council at the regional level, the removal of precautions aimed at securing men of considerable social experience as councillors, the dropping of the suggestion for seconding some civil servants to the local government system, and the establishment of councils by means of statutory instruments issued by the government rather than by the national legislative assembly.

The results of the local government elections held in 1952 to fill vacancies of the new councils were a foregone conclusion. The government party was voted into power in a considerable number of councils. Training of local government staff had been established a year before and the Local Government School had, in fact, started turning out sufficiently efficient clerks and

treasurers in reasonable numbers. And yet barely four years afterwards, the local government system was in ruins.

A number of factors account for the situation. In their anxiety to show the people visible results of their effectiveness, the government had rushed through the programme of reform so fast that its intricacies had not been understood by the broad masses. For a similar reason the councillors had put up many unproductive projects without sufficient thought for their maintenance. Also the councils were too small in taxable capacity to be economically and technically viable. Another reason is that the administrative and moral calibre of the councillors was poor. But perhaps the most important single reason for this failure might be the intense partisan politics in councils resulting partly from the absence of basic trust and consensus at the national level and partly from the councillors' mediocre talents.

Although all these factors were recognized to be at the bottom of the failure of local government in Ghana, it was with the structure and finance of local authorities that the central government expressed concern. The Greenwood Commission[6] was appointed in 1956 to examine the structure and finance of local authorities with a view to reducing the number of units and streamlining the financial administration.

Faced with these problems, the commissioner, Mr. A. F. Greenwood, proposed two alternative structures, both aimed at a reduction in the number of local authorities and the acquisition of adequate population and resources for the execution of all local government services in their areas. The advantages derivable from larger local government units were to include reduction in administrative cost, resilience in temporary financial difficulties, increased scope for better supervision and for more comprehensive planning.

The commission made two alternative proposals, labelled Plan A and Plan B, in its report. Under Plan A, large units, to be known as Divisional Councils, based upon District Councils where they existed, and on similar groupings of local authorities where they did not exist, would be created. District Councils would be abolished. The Regional Authority (that is, the executive organization of the Regional Assembly) would be responsible for major constructional works, maintenance of roads, maintenance of traditional authorities, and the management of stool lands.

The divisional councils would be responsible for all other local govèrnment services within their areas. Urban and local councils as they existed then would be replaced by town, village, or area committees.

The divisional council would be the rating authority but would be required by law to consult the local committees before finalizing estimates or imposing rates. The local committee whose scanty staff should be on the payroll of the divisional council, would act as a financial watchdog, provide a forum for the expression of local feeling, stimulate interest in local government, explain the divisional council's policy locally and encourage the payment of rates.[7]

Plan B envisaged that the main local government services such as public works, roads, education, police, water supplies, clinics and dispensaries would be the primary responsibility of the regional authority which could delegate some of the functions to certain categories of local authority. The existing local and urban councils would take care of the remaining services, including markets, lorry parks and sanitation. District councils would be abolished. The local and urban councils would remain the rating authorities whilst the regional authority levied a "precept" on them. The exact division of responsibility, under both plans, between the regional authority and local and urban councils was left to be worked by a Regional Constitutional Commission, already set up.[8]

The proposals (Plans A and B) had the merit of attempting to define the functions and responsibilities of central and local government, of discarding what was assumed to be too complex and unintelligible to the inhabitants and of streamlining the financial administration in and control over councils. Both plans abolished existing district councils, but while Plan A shared major local government functions between the regional authority and the divisional council, Plan B almost wholly assigned these crucial functions to the regional authority.

The government, in theory, accepted Plan A but legislated to implement the divisional (rechristened district) councils alone without considering the village committees proposed with them, and in spite of overwhelming popular evidence recorded by the Commissioner against amalgamation of councils. It did this without first publishing a White Paper on the report and without waiting, as required by an entrenched clause in the national constitution, for the report of the Regional Constitutional Commission. The reasons were highly political: The government was anxious to quickly disentrench local loyalties which it considered too narrow and intransigent and also to prevent the setting up of regional authorities which might develop a too powerful position *vis-à-vis* the centre.

As expected, the report of the Regional Constitutional Commission, when it was published, was rejected by the central government. The wide executive powers proposed for Regional Assemblies were whittled down to advisory functions and central government control over regional finance was extended.

The Regional Assemblies were reluctantly established in November 1958, roughly a month after the elections. But assured of firm political control of both the centre and the regions, the government party in March the following year, passed the Constitution (Amendment Act) which dissolved all the Regional Assemblies.[9]

In the regions, therefore, there remained the colonial structure of a regional organization made up entirely of civil servants and headed by expatriate Chief Regional Officers. This was anathema to the nationalists.

So during 1958-60, as part of the constitutional changes after political independence, Chief Regional Officers were replaced by Party Regional Commissioners. Government agents[10] were withdrawn from the field to regional headquarters and to the central ministries in the national capital. In their places in the field was appointed a body of politicians of both sexes outside the civil service for whom the title "District Commissioner" was revived.

The problem here was shortage of administrative talent in the governing party's hierarchy from which District Commissioners (and Regional Commissioners) were appointed on a patronage basis. One result was that, although socio-economic change was at least initially stepped up through the enthusiasms of the politicians, the direction of development was neither generally in consonance with the proclaimed objectives of the National Development Plan nor productive in the economic sense. Another significant effect was the shift in emphasis in field administrative duties from guidance of local authorities to regulatory functions often involving security.

No wonder the amalgamation of councils proposed by Greenwood failed to be institutionalized. Nor was administrative ineffectiveness of District Commissioners the only cause. The structure was also defective. Because village, town or area committees had not been established, the district councils found it extremely difficult to be influential at the grassroots. Also, staff of the superceded local authorities had, generally, in the interest of party solidarity, been absorbed wholesale, thus denying the new enlarged councils the intended savings in cost of administration. Furthermore in wooing the political support of chiefs, the CPP government had responded to demands for re-fragmentation of enlarged councils to agree, in most cases, with traditional chiefly jurisdictions. By the time of the first coup in 1966, the number of local authorities had been increased from 70 large units to 165 units generally incapable of large-scale socio-economic development.

DECENTRALIZATION UNDER NLC

Soon after the coup two commissions[11] were appointed by the government to examine the politico-administrative relations between the centre and the periphery. The major changes proposed by these bodies are summarized below.

The most significant features of the external structure were:

(1) Instead of a one-tier but fragmented structure, a two-tier structure consisting of district (enlarged district units) and regional councils is proposed.

(2) Regional councils are to be created to serve as a planning link between the centre and periphery and to assist an effective sounding of regional opinion and demands in the process of nation-building.

(3) The district councils are to be large economically viable local authorities capable of providing almost all government services carried out at the local level. Additionally, the basic local government unit, the district council, is to have a number of village/town committees which are to operate mainly as local self-help development units and the council's direct link with communities at the grassroots.

(4) Chiefs—no longer considered to be necessarily divisive forces—are to be included in the membership of local authorities because of the influence they wield among their people at the grassroots.

None of these proposals, it is realized, was new; all of them had been made by commissions in the years past at several stages of the development of local government in the country. The only novelty appears to be the proposal to merge the local government service with the civil service in order to strengthen the local bureaucracy and to bring into the local authority a central agency (in the shape of the District Administrative Officer) which might otherwise offer in competition in prestige.

The changes proposed in the internal structure of councils, on the other hand, were substantial. These included the establishment of a policy co-ordinating committee in place of all existing policy-making committees of the councils which would then be abolished, the strengthening of the administrative machinery of the council by the transfer of substantive civil servants to it and the assignment of its internal management to a high powered central government administrative officer.

The functions of the district council would, of course, be enlarged to take account of its increased capabilities. Other recommendations concerned possibilities of additional sources of income for local authorities as well as financial and personnel administration in the councils.

The Mills-Odoi Report in addition suggested the division of responsibilities for programmes between departmental/ministerial headquarters and the regional branches in the fields of Public Works, Education, Community Development, Health, Agriculture and Fire Services. The Regional Administrative Officers were charged with the responsibility for management of programmes and personnel in their regions through the establishment and use of Regional Management Committees consisting of the regional heads of the decentralized departments. Personnel matters in the decentralized departments relating to transfers, discipline and appointment were dealt with at the Regional Management Committee level. Regional Administrative Officers were to be designated as "Controlling Officers" for all votes in the regional sections of the estimates.

A central government machinery[12] was set up in the Office of the Head of Government to see to the smooth implementation of these and other reform proposals affecting the public services of Ghana.

DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER

The Local Administration Act, 1971, passed by the Progress Party (which came to power in October 1969 soon after the ban on party politics had been lifted) in the main followed the lines prescribed by the Siriboe Commission on local government. However, provision in the Act which sought to give power to the Prime Minister to appoint chairmen of councils was, in the context of Ghanaian policies and the absence of intra-elite trust and consensus, naturally resisted on the grounds that such an action would unduly put the Prime Minister at an advantage in the control of local political structures.

Concerning "deconcentration", the government altered the position of the relations between ministries and regional headquarters in the following significant ways:

(a) *Personnel:* Responsibility for personnel administration in the regions was transferred back to the national level. All appointments, promotions and discipline of staff in the public services were made by the political heads of the ministries. It may, however, be pointed out that all regional heads of organizations or heads of classes were at liberty to make, through the appropriate Regional Administrative Officer, representations on any reservations they might have regarding a proposal to post senior officers from the region.

(b) *Finance:* As the controlling officer of funds allocated to all decentralized ministries and departments, the Regional Administrative Officer released funds to the organization concerned in the form of financial encumbrances and adjustments. The department in turn submitted expenditure returns to the Regional Administrative Officers at the end of every month. In addition, it was also the responsibility of the Regional Administrative Officer, instead of the various heads of departments as was originally the case, to apply to the Ministry of Finance for the release of development funds, applications for supplementary allocation and provisions and also to grant authority for the ministries and departments to spend the subsequent quarter's allocation in advance when that of the current quarter fell short. Besides, the Regional Administrative Officer in his capacity as the controlling officer of the regional volume of estimates, exercised the powers of re-allocation of funds, exercised the power of re-allocation of funds, a task hitherto exercised by the parent ministry. Finally, all boards of survey and write-offs of unserviceable stores, where necessary, were undertaken by the Regional Administrative Officer.[13]

Although scarcity of highly skilled technical personnel for posting to the regions to assume control of regional affairs may have contributed some-

what to the slowing down of the momentum for decentralization in personnel matters, a crucial factor, judging from the reception given by the top civil servants to the Mills-Odoi proposals,[14] ministerial reactions to the Campbell Commission's Report[15] and press statements in defence of the government's position on local administration,[16] would appear to be leadership orientation of the ruling elite. This is, however, not denying that sociological, cultural and organizational variables are also relevant.

FOOTNOTES

1 Originally published in *Administrative Reform in the Public Services,* Proceedings of the Eleventh Inter-African Public Administration Seminar, organized by the African Association of Public Administration and Management, Mbabane, Swaziland, 1972.
2 Ibid.
3 For lack of a better term, "decentralization" is used here to embrace both devolution and deconcentration.
4 *Gold Coast: Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional Reform,* Colonial No. 248, 1949 (Chairman: Sir Henry Coussey).
5 The Local Government Act, 1951, was one of the first major acts introduced by the CPP Government.
6 *Report of the Commissioner for Local Government Enquiries, June 1957,* Accra: Government Printer, 1960, pp. 6-8.
7 Ibid., 1960, pp. 6-8.
8 *The Regional Constitutional Commission,* Accra: Government Printer, 1958 (Chairman: Justice Van Lare).
9 To obtain a more balanced explanation of the government's actions, regard must, however, be had to the intensely dangerous political climate that prevailed in the country at the time.
10 The post of District Commissioner had been rechristened Government Agent to emphasize the fact that the holders were representatives of the Central Government.
11 *The Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana* (Chairman: Mr. Justice Mills-Odoi), 1967; *Commission of Enquiry into Elected and Local Government Reform,* Part III (Chairman: Mr. Justice J. B. Siriboe), 1968.
12 The Office of Government Machinery, now called Management Services Division.
13 OGM Circulars 1/68 and 3/69; also Government White Paper No. 6/68.
14 Review by the Administrative Committee of the NLC.
15 *Commission of Enquiry (Salary Structure)* 1971.
16 *Daily Graphic,* 20 February 1971, pp. 3 and 7.

Administrative Reform in Kenya and Zambia

C. GERTZEL

This paper attempts an overview of the major administrative changes made in Kenya and Zambia since each became independent. It suggests some of the major influences that have to be taken into account in order to understand the direction of administrative change in those two countries, and which may indeed be relevant to the problems of administration generally in developing countries. Finally, it isolates some of the more important issues that these changes raise.

Although both Kenya and Zambia emphasize the need to adapt their administrative structures to the needs of development, they have in their adaptations adopted somewhat diverging lines of approach.[1] Kenya, on the one hand, has maintained a highly centralized administrative system modelled closely on the former colonial pattern, particularly in so far as the provincial or field administration is concerned Zambia, on the other hand, abolished its Provincial Administration on the eve of independence in 1964; and, after a period of trial and error without any clear administrative style, at the end of 1968 announced major administrative reforms designed to create a decentralized administration combining political leadership with civil service functionaries. These contrasts of policy reflect in part the contrasting colonial political legacy: Kenya inherited a powerful, centralized bureaucracy and a weak, decentralized, internally divided party; Zambia had in 1964 a powerful party but a much weaker civil service machine. Administrative developments reflect also differing attitudes held by the leadership about the kind of government appropriate for the developing state. Underneath these different approaches, however, one can discern a common concern over what is crucial issue not only for them, but also for all such states: the need to ensure that whatever administrative structure is evolved provides the necessary balance between functions of control and development. Moreover the attempt to achieve that balance has been made against a very similar background, characterized politically by a growing factionalism within the dominant ruling party.

Before looking at each country in turn a word should be said, however, about the functions of "control" and "development". The two are not necessarily in conflict if the "control" is more than a mere concern for the maintenance of law and order. Control of the periphery by the centre is an

essential prerequisite for the national planning on which overall development must be based and for the maintenance of a united development front. The potential for conflict arises once it is conceded that development demands the participation of the people as a whole, particularly at the grassroots level. Such participation involves greater demands upon the system, which must be controlled to prevent parochialism and any weakening of a united development front. Whether the control then required is exerted in the interests of a class or of the national interest, is a separate issue; whichever is the case there is, however, a potential difficulty in sustaining the popular participation required for development while at the same time ensuring national/central control. It is this kind of balance with which we are concerned.

The Kenyan Experience

Turning first to the Kenyan experience, the most important aspect of administrative developments is that there has been very little structural change since independence. There was a short-lived and unenthusiastic move to the decentralized administration required by the *majimbo* constitution that introduced regionalism in 1963; but in December 1964, the Kenyan Government was able constitutionally to abandon that posture and returned to a centralized, unitary state in which they restored the field administration to the same position as the former colonial Provincial Administration with exactly the same title and structure. They also progressively restored to it all the functions that had been transferred to other governmental bodies during the period of reform in 1963. By the middle of 1965, the presence of government was once again symbolized throughout the countryside by a uniformed assertive Provincial Administration whose officers were the personal representatives of the President. The maintenance of the old colonial structure meant, however, much more than the mere presence of uniformed personnel. It meant that the central government had at its disposal throughout the country a hierarchically organized administrative machine that provided a chain of communication from the locality to the centre: from the Chief and Headman at location level to the District and then to the Provincial Commissioner and finally to the Office of the President and the Executive in Nairobi. This was a ready-made instrument of control as well as communication which had proved its efficiency in the past.

Those changes made to this service did not affect its structure. First the service was rapidly Africanized (localized). Within a year of independence all eight Provincial Commissioners were Kenyans; by the middle of 1965 virtually the whole of the service at all levels had been localized. This transformation was achieved at a time of acute shortages of trained manpower, and the price paid was a combination of rapid transfer, numerous vacancies and in some cases inadequate personnel; nevertheless the achieve-

ment was significant. Second, a new emphasis was laid upon the roles of the Provincial Administration as the major agents of development, roles made explicit by President Kenyatta in 1965 when he told officers:

> From now on civil servants will be judged by their contribution to the development plan. They will be called upon to explain any failure to achieve their targets. The best district is no longer the quietest one, but the one which makes most progress towards its development targets. The civil service is under my control and I can reward work and punish bad work in this field.[3]

This role of the administration has also since been defined in the Development Plans of 1966-1970 and 1970-1974.

The original decision to emphasize the role of the bureaucracy, as opposed to the political party, in the development process was undoubtedly influenced, as I have suggested elsewhere, by the legacy of a powerful administration and a poorly-organized faction-ridden ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). It also suggests, however, some of the prevailing Kenyan ideas and attitudes about the problems of administration reform. The late Tom Mboya, once he became Minister for Economic Planning and Development, quickly saw the potential of this centralized bureaucratic machine, with its direct chain of command from the location to the capital for control and implementation of development programmes. He did not, it seems to me, wish to do away with the party; on the contrary he consistently sought to obtain agreement among party colleagues to proposals for party reforms designed to make it a more effective machine. At the same time, however, he (and the government) made a clear distinction between the roles of party and government in the development process: where the implementation of planned projects was concerned, it was the government agency that was to have the primary responsibility; and he sought to exploit the hierarchical bureaucracy to that end. This has remained the major trend in administrative thinking, demonstrated most recently by the setting up in 1970 of the Ndegwa Commission to inquire into the "structure and remuneration of the public service".[3] While that commission's terms of reference were largely related to problems of salary scales and terms of service for all grades of personnel in the public service, they also emphasized the need to review and recommend reforms in the structure and organization of the public service itself, to make it a more effective agent of development.

Given the emphasis in Kenyan civil thinking upon the Provincial Administration it is significant that so many observers have, in fact, been critical of what they regard as the failure of that body as a development agency. Attention has been drawn, for example, to the failure of the Development Committees set up in 1965 at provincial and district level to become effective coordinating bodies.[4] Those committees still, in fact, exist more on paper than in practice. Certainly they played a minor role in the preparation of the Second

Development Plan, notwithstanding the detailed procedure laid down for them by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. Equally important is Nellis' conclusion that administrative officers have, in fact, been largely preoccupied with non-developmental functions, especially, for example, the collection of Graduated Personal Tax.[5] As a result of this preoccupation, as well as other factors, few administrative officers, it has been suggested, and certainly at the level of the location, are particularly dynamic generators of economic and social development. Most recently the Ndegwa Report drew attention to a range of problems that face the administration and what it considered the resulting weakness of coordination of government activity for which in the field that administration is responsible. Provincial Administration is not in fact, it concluded, closely enough linked to the development process.[6]

Many of the routine functions of this generalist administration are, in fact, related to the implementation of development programmes. Their responsibilities for a wide variety of land matters, performed on behalf of the Minister for Lands, are, for example, a necessary preliminary to many areas of rural development including settlement programmes. The development function must, however, go beyond such routine administrative responsibilities; it requires a good deal of coordination and the generation of change; and it is in these areas that the administration has, it seems, been weakest, as was demonstrated on a variety of occasions during the sixties.

The import of proposals for improvement, made both in the *Development Plan for 1970-1974* and the *Ndegwa Report* is that there is no inherent weakness in the existing structure. Since this structure follows so closely upon the colonial mode, which critics of Kenya's administrative bias have argued is inappropriate for the needs of the independent state, and for development, one might first consider this problem. Can a colonial administration be adapted to the independent situation?

The burden of the critics' case is that the colonial administration was a law and order, not a development agent; this argument rejects the claim of the colonial governments, particularly after the Second World War, that their object was development. Any assessment of either claim is complicated by the difficulties of measuring development, and by the need to differentiate between social and economic rather than political development. Development in colonial terms certainly emphasized increased production of cash crops resulting from improved agricultural methods. It meant improved water supplies, bore-holes, better roads, houses, social and educational amenities. It did not necessarily imply political change, except in a very gradual sense. One might quarrel with the paternalist interpretation of what was meant, especially in the political field; and one must recognize that the rate of such development varied considerably from one territory to another (the contrast between Kenya and Northern Rhodesia is an obvious example). Nevertheless if one recognizes development as including the kind of economic and social

progress described above then one must recognize the expansion of the development role of the colonial administration in the latter days of colonial rule. The Provincial Administration certainly assumed a responsibility for the promotion of development in this sense. The extension of this role in turn generated a certain amount of innovation within the administrative system, such as the establishment in the early fifties of provincial and district teams designed to improve coordination of departmental activities.[7]

Recognition of this development role should not, however, obscure the obstacles that the colonial bureaucracy encountered in seeking to fulfil it. A comparison of their experience in the Central and Nyanza Provinces of Kenya during the period of the "Emergency" suggests that where the administration was politically unacceptable, it could only generate development when it was prepared to use force. Reaction against enforced agricultural reforms was thus an important element in the growth of the nationalist movement there and elsewhere. The more the administration became involved in the control of nationalist politics the more difficult it was for them to gain support for proposals such as agricultural improvement. Moreover, experience in Kenya during the 1950s indicated the difficulties of associating within the one governmental system a strong Provincial Administration evolved during the period of secretariat control and ministerial system that developed after 1950. The Pritchard Report of 1958 on the organization of government considered the position of the Provincial Administration in relation to the ministerial system as one of the organizational weaknesses which "result from centralization". On the one hand the report considered that the Provincial Administration as such would for a long time continue to provide essential machinery for coordination and implementation of government policy in the field, and that without it the task of departmental officers would be virtually impossible. On the other hand, however, it saw considerable dangers in the independent position of the Provincial Administration, situated as it was outside the ministerial system, with its own minister, responsible only, in real terms, to the Governor. This separate existence encouraged administration staff to interfere in departmental affairs, secure in the belief that their own position was superior, and unassailable. At the level of the province and district this tendency often led to serious conflict between administrative and departmental staff and consequently difficulties of coordination, for which the former held overall responsibility.[8] Thus while the colonial administration was instrumental in initiating a good deal of rural agricultural and community development, its success was inhibited by its ultimate emphasis upon control and by its relationship with other departments which frequently led to inter-departmental friction.

Post-independence experience suggests that these weaknesses still affect the performance of the Provincial Administration. Since independence there has been a steady accretion of political power in the hands of the Kenya Administration as the agent of central government and the personal repre-

sentatives of the President so that it has become again as the *Ndegwa Report* noted "a major organ of political authority in the countryside".[9] This responsibility is symbolized by its responsibility for law and order, including control of public meetings. The return of responsibility for law and order to the administration from the police in 1965 was related to the internal factional conflict then dominant within the ruling (and at the time the only) party, KANU. In this situation the executive used the administration as a mediating and then as a controlling agent. This role increased after the formation of a new Opposition Party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1966; and by July 1968, was made explicit by President Kenyatta's joint meeting between Provincial and District Commissioners and his KANU officials when he reportedly remarked: "I am convinced that no ruling party can effectively exist without the administration".[10] It is thus a body of very great power. Its officers complained to the Ndegwa Commission that they had "responsibility without power". But in many respects their position is the reverse. This powerful field administration has played a crucial part in the maintenance of control, especially since 1968.

Members of Parliament in Kenya have objected strongly to this role of the administration on the grounds that power has passed out of the hands of the elected representatives. What is more relevant here is the extent to which their responsibility for political control has inhibited administrative officers in their development task. There are several reasons for concern. First responsibility for law and order and political control involves a good deal of time. Young officers may carry their responsibility to a ludicrous extent. (I recall a District Officer, for example, who spent three days chasing and immobilizing a KPU vehicle). Under these circumstances the development task suffers. Second, officers may find themselves involved in a factional conflict, at any level, that may weaken support for their development activities from a section of the community, because it brings their legitimacy into question. There may, therefore, arise a conflict of functions. Whether or not this problem was in their minds, it is interesting that the Ndegwa Commission proposed a division of labour within the Provincial Administration between officers concerned with general administration including law and order and tax collection, and officers responsible for development.[11]

The *Ndegwa Report* was also concerned with what it considered the basic problems of building "horizontal working relationships within a vertically structured organization" to provide "the maximum coordination of governmental organizations towards meeting the nation's development goals".[12] As Robert Chambers has observed there are dangers in emphasizing maximum coordination simply for its own sake.[13] Nevertheless there is ample evidence to suggest that the Provincial Administration has continued to suffer from the kind of inter-departmental frictions that existed in the past, and which have not been overcome by the creation of new coordinating bodies

such as the Development Committees. There have been complaints from both sides at the difficulties of inter-departmental coordination.

The sources of friction are numerous. One serious weakness has resulted on the one hand from the fact that although the Provincial Administration is assumed to be responsible for coordinating all government departments in their work, it continues to lack (as did its predecessor) any legal authority to impose its orders. Thus in this respect the DC may well have had responsibility without power. On the other hand inter-departmental friction has often been aggravated by the temptation to assert the role of the administration: as for example was seen in the progressive assumption of control over self-help projects from about 1966. But probably the major source of weakness has ben two-fold: on the one hand many administration staff lacked the training and experience necessary to undertake development. They fell back on the idea of the "jack of all trades" role, and were constrained by their dependence upon narrow, traditional interpretation of development. Through no fault of their own, a significant number of the Administrative Officers, prompted rapidly in the mid-sixties, were not equipped to meet the demands of development administration. Thus it is important that the Ndegwa Commission, again, recommended, not a change in structures but the injection of new specialist professional staff into the Provincial Administration. They have proposed the appointment of District Development and District Planning Officers who would be immediately responsible for the coordination of the development functions of government.[14]

Another problem, however, remains. The colonial administration was a highly centralized organization. While there was room for independent initiative by the resourceful District Officer the basic characteristic of the machine was centralized control. In independent Kenya this centralized control has remained, and Divisional District Officers in particular have often been left with little responsibility for decision-making. The *Ndegwa Report* recognized this as a basic constraint on rural development, and recommended "some devolution of power from the provincial to the district levels within the administration".

> If the district is to be the effective focus of development, and we believe that it should be, it is essential to give a good deal of independent authority to the administration at the level, i.e. to the District Commissioner and his staff.[15]

Thus the advantages for rural development of at least a measure of decentralized authority from the centre to the locality appear to be recognized.

The decentralization envisaged is, however, to the bureaucracy not to representative local government institutions. This reflects a major characteristic of administrative practice in Kenya since independence: administrative (and political) changes have reversed the decentralization of 1963 when a

good deal of authority was devolved upon regional authorities and local government bodies in both rural and urban areas.

Kenya has a long history of African local government beginning with the Native Councils set up in 1924. At independence the former African and European institutions were replaced by an integrated structure of elected local authorities which assumed responsibility for a range of major services including primary education, local health services and secondary roads. In 1965, the County Councils (the rural as opposed to urban authorities) were collectively responsible for recurrent and capital outlays of approximately £18,000,000 although there was a good deal of variation in individual councils' capacity and resources.[16]

Since 1965 there has been a progressive erosion of the authority and powers of these County Councils, which today are a shadow of their former selves. In 1965, responsibility for the assessment and collection of Graduated Personal Tax was returned to the administration. In 1968, the District Commissioner was given veto powers over County Councils' finances. But the major change was made in 1969 when the Transfer of Functions Act enabled the central government to resume responsibility for the three major services of primary education, local health services and roads. At the same time Graduated Personal Tax, which had been perhaps their major source of revenue, was transferred from local to central government. Whereas in 1969, therefore, County Councils' expenditure had been in the nature of £15,000,000 in 1970 it was £2,300,000.[17] The *Ndegwa Report* did not contemplate any immediate restoration of their responsibilities. They envisaged decentralization to the district level of the administration, not to the County Councils. They were talking about *deconcentration,* not *devolution.*

There is a conflict here between the need to stimulate participation in development, which the *Ndegwa Report* recognized, and the desire to control demands. The latter has been uppermost in the minds of the administrators, who have tended to emphasize the conflict that characterized relations between themselves and local authorities, as well as the administrative and financial weaknesses which have not been entirely of the County Councils' making. In the mid-sixties, for example, those councils were given increased responsibility, with the introduction of free outpatient services, without any comparable increase in their grants. Moreover the demands generated by the County Councils are a necessary reflection of the involvement of the local community in development. The limitations imposed upon the local authorities have, therefore, to be considered in relation to the responsibility for mobilization and development that they still retain. Thus it remains to be seen whether the bureaucracy can provide a sufficient link between the rural population and the centre to counteract the weakened position of the County Councils, which must be interpreted as an indication of the emphasis placed upon control.

Administrative change in Kenya since independence has not, therefore,

meant radical change or innovation, nor any significant move, up to the end of 1971, towards the decentralization of government. The trend has been to maintain and expand the power of the bureaucracy which, through the field administration, enhance the role of the centre in the locality. This has been largely at the expense of local representative institutions, which have been progressively restricted in their responsibility for important services whose maintenance and expansion is part of the development process. The local authorities and the political party (which was in 1963 institutionally weak, although it had created an effective electoral organization) have both been emasculated, and administrative policy has emphasized the importance of the generalist Provincial Administration.

There has been little to suggest that Kenya will abandon this emphasis upon the bureaucracy as the major agent of development. But no administrative machine can meet changing needs without some adaptation. In the 1950s the colonial administration was itself adapted to meet the new emphasis on development that emerged, for example, with the Swynnerton Plan. The greater emphasis today in Kenya on much more rapid rural development now requires further adaptations to meet the dangers that have been discussed here. This is the main thrust of the Ndegwa recommendations whose report seems to herald a new period of growth. Thus it is significant that the report has urged an important degree of decentralization to the district level and the infusion of specialized staff into a traditionally generalist service. These changes, if introduced, might go some distance to countering the dangers of too great a concentration of authority in a service that has overemphasized the tradition inherited from the colonial system. There appear to be no administrative reasons why such an emphasis on the district should inhibit overall central political control which is essential for planning and development. What is more problematical is whether the nature of their political role will not continue to inhibit the Provincial Administration from providing the leadership that would otherwise come from the political representatives.

The Zambian Way

Zambia has approached the task of building an administrative structure from a very different perspective. Since independence she has been seeking not to exploit old structures but to create new ones. This has been necessitated by the decision made in 1964 to abolish the old Provincial Administration in what President Kaunda later described as a "deliberate act of policy", taken because of the belief that that administration was unsuitable for the independent state. Thus in August 1964, the Provincial Administration as such ceased to exist. In its place a new, reduced provincial and district government service was created to coordinate and implement government policies and to provide cooperation between government and political parties. A number of functions formerly performed by the administration were

transferred to other ministries, the most important being law and order which went to the police, judicial functions which were taken over by the Ministry of Justice and the collection of local tax.

The provincial and district government was partially politicized by the introduction of a political appointee, the Resident Minister, at the head of each province. He was supported by a Resident Secretary (the former Provincial Commissioner) at provincial level and a District Secretary (the former District Commissioner) at district level as his civil service advisers. This minister assumed overall charge of the province, responsible for the coordination of government policies through the Provincial Development Committee (set up earlier in 1964), of which he now became chairman. (At district level the District Secretary became the chairman of the parallel District Development Committee.)[18]

If we are fully to appreciate subsequent administrative developments in Zambia it is essential to clarify what the abolition of the old Provincial Administration structure implied. In contrast to the Kenya situation, it meant that there was no longer a single, dominant hierarchical government organization linking the centre to the locality. The major instrument of control was emasculated; this was symbolized by the removal of responsibility for law and order from the provincial and district government. The new administration was intended as a coordinating agency rather than an agency of control. But it was a much weaker organization than its predecessor so far as manpower was concerned. Whereas at the beginning of 1964 the Provincial Administration had had 227 administrative officers (of whom eight were Zambians) at the end of 1966 the total strength was 75 (of whom 15 were expatriates).[19] The new administration was thus much more thinly spread over the country. Moreover its channels of communication and coordination did not spread effectively below the district level. The old Native Authority structure that had provided links below the district level between District Commissioners and the people through the Chiefs and Headmen was abandoned. The Chiefs themselves remained, but under the Chiefs Act of 1965 they were responsible only for traditional functions. Although they continued to receive allowances from the central government they were no longer in any sense paid government agents. In the place of the former Native Authorities structure a new system of representative rural local government, based upon elected Rural Councils, was introduced. This council system, however, came under the surveillance of the Ministry of Local Government, and there was no easy chain of communication or formal link between them and the District Secretary. Supervision of the Rural Councils was the responsibility of field officers of the Ministry of Local Government, not the District Secretary. The presence of the Rural Council in the countryside was moreover limited. It was responsible for only a limited range of functions for the district, the most important being the maintenance of local roads and waterways, water supply, mail delivery and collection and environmental health services.

Neither its resources (the greater part of their revenue derived from central government grants) nor its staff were extensive. The council did not, therefore, provide an extensive institutional network through the district. Councillors in many cases faced considerable practical difficulties in maintaining communication with their constituents in wards that were large and sparsely populated.

Thus the abolition of the former Provincial Administration and Native Authority structures left Zambia, in essence, without the lynchpin of the local administration that the District Commissioner formerly provided and without an administration linking district to grassroots village level such as the Native Authority had provided. The contrast with Kenya is marked, especially at the local level where the Kenya Government continued to rely on the civil service chief as the focus of administration.

Zambia, on the other hand, had one institution below the district level that Kenya lacked: the political party. The United National Independence Party's (UNIP) organization had by independence built up a sophisticated machine that was very effective for electoral and communication purposes, and which did provide significant links between the district and the lower levels of the country at large. The political party to a considerable extent thus filled the institutional gap created by the withdrawal of Chiefs and District Administration. The degree of central control over the local level institutions of the party was, however, problematical in many places. Moreover, since 1967 in particular, the party had suffered seriously from internal conflict leading to the split of 1971 and the formation of a new Opposition Party, the United Progressive Party under the leadership of former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe.[20]

The assumption that the new Provincial and District Administration would settle down quickly proved incorrect, and the period up to 1966 proved a difficult one. First, the transfer of functions proceeded more slowly than expected, so that the burden on the reduced administration did not decrease. In fact, it was increased, since a number of departments, lacking sufficient local staff, relied upon the administration for assistance in the field so that: "in short the Provincial and District Government has become the leaning post to some and the maid of all work to others, while the Resident Minister remains the kingpin responsible for the coordination of development in the province. . . ."[21] Second, the new administration lacked the authority of its predecessor, especially at the district level. At the provincial level the Resident Minister's political position gave him a certain power and authority; but the District Secretary's position lacking any such political connection, did not. Essentially the office lost the political power enjoyed by the DC. The District Secretary also found himself on many occasions in conflict with the political leadership at district level, which further weakened his position. He had no obvious authority with which to assert himself *vis-à-vis* departmental officers. One District Secretary complained that the Provincial and District Govern-

ment did not receive the same loyalty from other government departments accorded the former Provincial Administration. But the question was less one of loyalty than of authority. The District Secretary was no longer the authoritative focal point of the district administration, although he was expected to coordinate government at district level. Not surprisingly he complained of having "responsibility without power".[22]

These difficulties might have been less serious had there not been an acute staff problem over this period. In the first place, as we saw above, the overall strength of the administration was drastically reduced by 1966. In the second place, the new men who assumed office were a good deal less experienced and equipped for the office than their predecessors. The retirement of many experienced expatriate staff and the transfer of others, both expatriate and Zambian, to central government ministries, stripped the administration of its most experienced men. The large number of those who replaced them were promoted up from the clerical ranks. Many of them, through no fault of their own, lacked the training and experience required for the job. A number of former teachers were also drawn into the administration in 1965-66, but they also in many cases lacked appropriate training and experience.

Zambia's acute manpower problems, the direct result of her colonial legacy of a neglected educational system, with which she began her independent administration, go a considerable way to explain the weaknesses of the Provincial and District Administration. There was available in the sixties a small group of able men, but Zambia generally lacked the resources required for a sophisticated generalist administration. Whether the problems would have been eased had the structure itself been stronger is difficult to assess. The Kenyan Government also faced staff problems, although not of the same magnitude as those of Zambia; but in her case the administrative machine was sufficiently powerful in itself to endure.

It is possible to discern since 1966 two main lines of thought on the part of the Zambian leadership concerning the administration. In the first place efforts were made to strengthen and improve the system as set up in 1964; and then in 1969 two radical steps were taken, with its further politicization and a new emphasis upon decentralization.

From 1966 there was a distinct attempt to improve the existing machine. First, in the middle of 1966 a presidential circular emphasized overall responsibility of the Provincial and District Government for governmental affairs at district and provincial level, and especially for direct communication between those levels and the people at large, which it was felt had largely been lost. The onus for firm control was placed clearly upon the civil service. Thus the circular stated:

> From now on I want it to be known and realized that Resident Secretaries and District Secretaries are, in their provinces and districts

respectively, my personal civil service representatives; and that I am charging them with the following specific responsibilities:

(i) to be the chief government coordinating officer in their provinces and districts, with particular reference to the work of economic development;
(i)) to maintain the morale and wellbeing of the civil service;
(iii) to ensure that government policies and procedures are understood by the people;
(iv) to ensure that the presence of government is felt throughout the provinces and districts;
(v) to supervise generally the functioning of the other government departments within their provinces or districts.[23]

But the emphasis was upon a new style of administration, whose officers would win support for government programmes not by coercion but by willing consent. The staffing problem was acknowledged by the decision to recruit from a wider area in the civil service generally, as well as the decision to establish a Resident Secretary in the President's Office to coordinate the service and report directly to the Secretary to the Cabinet. The latter post was established; but there is little evidence that the wider recruiting policy was put into effect. Second, continued concern to improve is implicit in the greater emphasis laid upon the Provincial and District Development Committees and their responsibility for the coordination of development; and explicit in the President's statement on *Humanism in Zambia* in 1967 when he emphasized the importance of a two-day traffic between government and the people below.[24] Third, the creation of a Provincial Block Vote in 1967 to overcome local hold-ups in the implementation of development projects, and the introduction (in the same year) of the Regional Secretary (of UNIP) as the Chairman of the District Development Committee, in place of the District Secretary, suggests divergent ideas about further improvement to the existing structure. Fourth, an internal government working party was set up at the beginning of 1968 to make further recommendations for the improvement of the system. Its report was never published but its existence indicated a continuing concern about the situation. It is not difficult to understand why this should be so: the weaknesses of the administration had in no way disappeared, and there was an increasing concern at the slowness of the implementation of First National Development Plan projects for rural development, which it appeared the administrative structure could not sustain.

For four years, therefore, it appears that Zambian thinking on administrative change was basically directed at improving the changed field administration introduced in 1964, which was essentially a semi-politicized generalist administration responsible for overall coordination and for the communication to the rural as well as urban population of government policies, but not for political control. The main difference between that administration and its

predecessor was its lack of responsibility for law and order, its lack of coercive power. At the end of 1968, however, a more radical approach towards the field administration was announced: it was to be more completely politicized, and government was to be more decentralized to the provincial and district level.

The decentralization measures introduced in January 1969 implied a very much stronger Provincial and (as it now became) Local Government. They hinged on the creation of two much stronger political posts at provincial and district level. A Cabinet Minister was now posted to head each province and the new political post of District Governor was created to head the district. Each of these officers had civil service supporting staff, the Provincial Permanent Secretary for the Province and District Secretary for the District, each in the same kind of relationship to his political superior as a Permanent Secretary is to his Minister at the centre. Through this strengthened administration it was intended to decentralize a good deal of government activity from Lusaka to the province and district and thereby to speed up the process of government. The Provincial and District Development Committees under the chairmanship of the Provincial Cabinet Minister and District Governor respectively were to play an enhanced role as co-ordinating bodies (although it should be noted that the Provincial Block Vote had, in fact, been withdrawn as a result of difficulties encountered in ensuring its proper use). President Kaunda defined his new

> . . . decentralization (in centralism) as a measure whereby through the party and the government machinery we will decentralize most of your party and government activities while retaining effective control of the party and government machinery at the centre in the interest of unity. In short we will decentralize but avoid regionalism.[25]

He described the role of the District Governor in terms very similar to those used by Kenyatta of the District Commissioner: ". . . in all these postings merit and merit alone will count. The acid test of this merit is the success that he makes in his area as District Governor of development plans at the district level or of his province or ministry at cabinet level. . . ."[26]

Two significant decisions were thus involved: first the further transfer of the leadership to political appointees, away from the civil service; second the transfer of increased responsibility for decision-making from the centre to the region. These changes were designed to strengthen the structure of the Provincial and Local Government, but not to restore it to the role of a "law and order" agency which its colonial predecessor had enjoyed. It was viewed as first and foremost an agency of economic and social development which would rely upon persuasion and conversion and not on the powers of arrest and imprisonment. "There is", the President told his first meeting of District Governors and Cabinet Ministers in December 1968, "an enormous distinction between the colonial administration and our new system of

Provincial and District Government. The differences lie in objectives, methods, spirit, problems and prospects".[27]

And yet a strong provision for control was now built into the structure, in relationship to the local authorities and the party. The decentralization measures emphasized the role of government agents rather than elected Rural Councils, in that they merged the officers of Provincial and District Government and the Ministry of Local Government. The new Provincial and Local Government Administration fell under the Office of the President and administrative officers responsible for the supervision of the Local Authorities came within the Office of the Cabinet Minister and the District Governor.[28] So far as the party was concerned, although the Cabinet Minister assumed no formal party office at provincial level he emerged implicitly as the senior party figure at that level. At district level the District Governor became Chairman of the District Political Committee. It is certainly possible to interpret these developments as an attempt to establish an increased central control over the party at the local level.

Thus while the centralization measures emphasized the role of Provincial and Local Government in development they also provided for greater central control by strengthening the direct links of command and communication between centre, province and district. Both Cabinet Minister and District Governor became the personal representatives of the President. The District Governor was the crucial addition in 1969 as the direct agent of the executive at district level.

It would, nevertheless, be short-sighted to emphasize the potential for control in the new administrative arrangements at the expense of underestimating the importance attached to them as a means of facilitating the implementation of development in the rural areas. The objects enumerated in the cabinet circular on the new decentralized administration stressed the aim of accelerating development in the rural areas: by ensuring more direct contact between the people and government; by reviving the district as the basic unit of administration; by mobilizing popular support for development at the local level.[29] The object was to accelerate the implementation of rural development by transferring much decision-making to the region. Thus it was suggested that the number of ministries in Lusaka would decrease. Since 1969 there has also been an increased expression of concern for local participation in such decision-making through a new committee structure at village and ward level that would help fill the gap between Village and Rural Council.[30]

The evidence of government activity suggests, however, that up to the end of 1971 no such radical decentralization had been implemented. The number of ministries in Lusaka, for example, had increased, not decreased, from 16 to 21 (although this need not in itself prevent the decentralization of decision-making in a wide variety of departmental matters). There have been regular complaints from men in the field about their continued position

of "responsibility without power". In the middle of 1971 one observer commented:

> In spite of the structural reforms announced by His Excellency, the overall impression one gets from visiting provincial and district offices is that there is very limited decentralization in the actual day-to-day operations of government. Provincial heads of departments complain that Lusaka appears not to trust their judgement and gives them little room for decision-making ... officers at district level have even less feeling of government authority having been devolved to their level. ...[31]

This concern at the apparent failure of decentralization was linked with an equal concern at the manner in which performance in rural development had lagged behind targets set in the First National Development Plan. Thus one of the sub-committees set up by the Ministry of Development and National Guidance during the period of the formulation of the Second National Development Plan was requested to consider related administrative problems.

In view of these and other expressions of concern at the apparent delays in the introduction of a more decentralized administrative structure it is relevant to consider the circumstances against which the Zambian Government proposed these changes and the possible reasons for delays in their implementation. The commitment to a more decentralized administrative structure needs to be considered in terms of the difficulties that may be encountered in its implementation.[32]

The first question to consider concerns the central government machine itself. The ministerial system which Zambia inherited was less developed and powerful than, for example, that of Kenya at the same point in time. Apart from any other considerations, the ten years of the Central African Federation had inhibited the expansion of the Northern Rhodesian Central Government in many respects. Nevertheless, there was in 1964 a considerable central government structure, which had of necessity to expand rapidly at and after independence. The exigencies of Southern Rhodesia and her Unilateral Declaration of Independence put a strain upon that government machine. The need to build up rapidly a viable infrastructure, for example, in internal communications and services such as education, further necessitated the expansion of government. By 1969 the central ministries had grown considerably. They could not be dismantled overnight, even were this considered necessary. The evidence suggests that there had been very little forward planning before the decentralization measures were announced in November 1968. There was, perhaps as a consequence, a marked lack of clarity in the definition of functions and the relationship between central (called Lusaka-based) ministries and those in the provinces in the original circular .which set out details of the decentralized administration.[33] The Provincial Cabinet Minister was designated the "personal political representa-

tive of the Head of State within the province" and "the government's co-ordinating Minister for the Province and Chairman of the Provincial Development Committee, supervising generally the activities of all government departments within the geographical area of the province". He was made responsible within his province "for coordinating the functions of all government departments through the Provincial and Local Government Division of the Office of the Vice-President". But he had no final responsibility for the development and operation within his province of Lusaka ministry staff and no financial control except (after 1970) for development projects for which his Permanent Secretary was made controlling officer. He was given no real disciplinary powers over staff. Moreover, as the circular put it, he had "little responsibility to parliament and the cabinet for departmental activities" within his province. The weakness of the Minister's position was reflected in the limitations imposed upon his Permanent Secretary, both in staff and financial matters. Provincial departmental officers remained finally responsible both administratively and financially to Lusaka not to a Provincial Permanent Secretary. Thus both Cabinet Minister and Permanent Secretary could argue with some justification that they had "responsibility without power". Decentralization could lead only to restricted decision-making. The Cabinet Minister could certainly put his province's viewpoint within the cabinet but he had no final responsibility for any particular policies and little for the actual implementation of projects within his province.

A similar lack of clear-cut definition of functions applied to the District Governor. The latter was designated the political head of his district, appointed personally by the President. He became His Excellency's personal representative at district level. He was also designated the chief coordinating officer in his district, with particular reference to the task of economic and political development, and required to supervise the activities of all government departments. But neither the District Governor nor his District Secretary was given any disciplinary control of civil servants except through normal administrative channels.

District Governors have also, therefore, claimed that they have "responsibility without power". In their case, however, experience suggests they rather have "power without responsibility". The lack of clear definition of their functions, combined with their political role and their position as personal representatives of the President, has made it difficult in practice to establish their accountability. A number of District Governors have ignored the stipulation that they are immediately responsible to their Provincial Ministers, going instead direct to State House. Some have certainly also been prepared to use their status as personal representatives of the President to ignore instructions from other sources. On more than one occasion there has as a result been open conflict between a District Governor and a Minister, either Provincial or Lusaka. The District Governor undoubtedly enjoys a good deal

of power as a result of his special position as the President's personal representative. This involves a real measure of political power, the use of which cannot always be controlled. Sometimes it has been difficult as a result to call a District Governor to account and to establish his accountability. In this respect the parallel with the Kenyan District Commissioner is close. Thus while in many instances the presence of the District Governor has provided a valuable intermediary between the civil service, District Secretary and the political party official that has overcome earlier clashes between those two, in other instances it has been a potential for conflict between that officer and the Governor himself. The District Governor has been alleged to intervene in civil service matters over which he has no authority. The District Secretary has been alleged not to provide the District Governor with the assistance and support that are his due. Tension and sometimes open clashes have been the result.

These tensions have also arisen partly because of personality and partly as a result of the political associations of the District Governors. Although the President made it clear from the outset that he proposed to bring party and government office closer together by making party and civil service posts interchangeable, a majority of the appointments to the office of District Governor have, in fact, been from the party. Of 53 District Governors appointed in December 1968, 28 had organizational links with the party at the local level and two had been national organizers. Only eight were former civil servants. The office of District Governor is, in fact, regarded by many in UNIP as a step in the promotion ladder from regional party office. Consequently the men holding these posts have had a very different background and experience from that of their civil servants and this contrasting experience has sometimes led to clashes between the two.

The District Governor has probably been the most maligned officer in the Provincial and Local Government system. He has been accused of trying to "run the show" and of interfering where he has no authority. His public image varies considerably. More than one witness giving evidence to the current One-Party Commission of Inquiry urged the government to abolish the office. But the problem has lain more in the experience of the men who have filled the office rather than the office itself. As they grow more experienced there is no inherent reason why they should not fulfil the role envisaged for them, which is to provide a central focus for district administration and key link in the chain of command and communication between the centre and the locality: the "lynchpin" of the district administration. Nevertheless clear definition of the functions of the office and the relationship between Governor and civil service, and Governor and Party seems to be required.[34] Until this particular office is recognized and worked out, it is difficult to envisage any considerable decentralization of administrative control to his level.

A second constraint upon the rapid reorganization of government must also have been that of manpower. The limitation upon the government's

resources of skilled, experienced manpower, remains considerable. The broadening of the area of recruitment to the Provincial and Local Government service originally proposed in 1966 has not been effective, so that the majority of personnel in that service have continued to be drawn from a narrow source of men who have come up through the clerical ranks. Thus there is as yet no one with the professional development training desirable in the ranks of that service. Under these circumstances the Zambian administration is in a very similar position to that of the Kenyan administration which the *Ndegwa Report* seeks to overcome. Thirdly, it must be remembered that in the two years following the decision to introduce a more decentralized administration Zambia has experienced acute political tensions arising out of the factional struggle within UNIP which led finally in the middle of 1971 to the creation of a new Opposition Party, the United Progressive Party led by the former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe. The comparisons with the Kenya situation are here close. In this situation the essential requirement became first and foremost political control, a function the District Governor was called upon to fulfil. There may well, therefore, have emerged a conflict of priorities that would delay the full implementation of administrative reorganization. Moreover the factional conflict weakened the office of District Governor as an office of control, and potentially development. A District Governor who was a politician in his own right, with his own power base (even if not in the district in which he was serving) was more able and perhaps more willing to assume an independent stand contrary to government policy. The factional disputes within UNIP could make him a less reliable agent. This may all have contributed to the apparent difficulties in enunciating a clear picture of his role.

Another of the objectives of the administrative reforms of 1969 to which we must now turn is "to revive the village as a basic unit of administration in the rural areas and to make it an effective unit for development". This suggests a concern to fill the vacuum left by the abolition of the former Native Authorities system, and to create a new structure linking the village level with the district. This concern for a viable structure reaching down to the village has been evident in Kaunda's statements since 1966 when he expressed concern at the loss of contact between the officers of Provincial and District Government and the people, and instructed that touring should be revived to re-establish those contacts. In his *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation* (1967) he emphasized the importance of the village as the basic unit for administration and development; suggested that the logical corollary was that villages should be registered; and proposed to set up a committee structure of Village Productivity Committee, Ward Cooperative Coordinating Committee and District Committee, all with responsibilities for development. At that point, however, the system seems scarcely to have been thought out, and not surprisingly he announced, a year later, at the UNIP National Council Meeting in November 1968, that

he "had not as yet heard any encouraging news about the work of village and section committees".

The decentralization instructions that followed soon after instructed District Governors to set up Village and Section Productivity Committees, and Ward Development Committees, the success of which would, it was insisted, depend upon their "creative initiative and powers". There was still, however, no clear explanation of the actual structure and organization, and it was indicated that "the organization and procedures of the Ward Development Committees may be determined by the District Governor himself at district level". There was considerable vagueness about the role of chief and headman, both of whom were, however, said to have responsibility for providing leadership and direction for the people. It appears to be the intention to draw them more closely into a committee structure that would provide links between the district and the locality and draw the villagers of the rural areas more closely into touch with government, and with development.

In August 1970, a presidential circular put the responsibility for the formation of the new committees directly on the District Governor. As a result, committees began to spring up with varying degrees of success from one district to another. Then in September 1971, the new Registration and Development of Village Act laid down the procedure for the registration of the population at village level and provided for the organization and functions of Village Productivity Committees, Ward Councils and Ward Development Committees. The latter, which is intended as the Executive Committee of the Ward Council, shall be "responsible for the administration and development of the ward as a whole".

In seeking to provide an administrative structure below the district, Zambia appears, however, to place a greater emphasis upon party and politician rather than civil servant, and thereby to have created potential confusion and crossing of lines. In the first place the village committees are related to the Rural Council, to whom they report, through their councillors, as well as to the District Governor. In the second place all committees below the district level, although they have been accorded administrative as well as development responsibilities, are purely elective bodies. Thus at present the line of communication is by no means direct, except through political party lines. The position of chief and headman also remains unclear. The requirements of registration of villages give them a good deal more power than they have hitherto officially enjoyed. They are also made responsible for the effective functioning of the productivity committees. They have, therefore, been brought more closely into the government administrative structure than has previously been the case since independence. Nevertheless, they still have no official government position and headmen still are not paid. (Chiefs receive allowances but no salaries.) Consequently although it appears that a definite attempt is now being made to utilize the informal power and

influence that the majority of chiefs still enjoy by virtue of their traditional office, they have not been brought openly into the governmental machine.

The Registration and Development of Villages Act suggests a concern for control as well as development. The first objective is to register the total rural population by village of residence. There seems no necessary connection between development and the registration of the rural population, although the information is clearly relevant for many development issues. Such information might, however, presumably be obtained from the recent census. There is, however, a closer connection between registration and control; and it is relevant for an understanding of the kind of structure Zambia is now seeking to build that the control of registration is put, in the first place, in the hands of headmen and chief. This perhaps more than responsibility for development restores them to a place in the old hierarchical administrative structure, stretching from the village to the District Governor and so to the province and the centre.

This suggests recognition of the fact that a government cannot decentralize administration unless political control from the centre is clear and strong. This is essential if decentralization is not to become the regionalism that Kaunda rejected in 1969. Thus while seeking to decentralize administrative actions, the 1969 measures have also been directed at establishing a new hierarchical, centrally controlled administrative machine whose responsibility is to control on behalf of the centre the country as a whole. The need for this strong central political control is dictated by the political fragmentation that is as characteristic of Zambia as of Kenya.

There has not, I am afraid, been as much about decentralization in this paper as I had hoped. This is not, however, surprising: for notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, decentralization has not been a dominant factor in the attitudes towards administrative reform in either of the two countries I have discussed. Both Kenya and Zambia have a common problem: how to maintain control by the centre over the locality. This is a greater problem than it is for Tanzania because the party situation is more fluid and less secure. Thus while the necessity/desirability to decentralize in some way may be recognized this is countered by an equal awareness of the need to maintain and improve central control. Kenya has resolved the problem to date by sustaining a colonial-style centralized field administration that is an excellent machine for control. There is now, however, an awareness that this machine has not been fully appropriate for development. Zambia laying greater emphasis on the party, nevertheless, equally concerned to create the central control that can permit local participation to proceed.

FOOTNOTES

1 For details of the Kenya administration, see my article "The Provincial Administration in Kenya", in *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3, November 1966; and "The Provincial Administration and Development in Kenya,

1965-68", paper read at the 1970 Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 1970 (mimeo). On Kenya administration generally, see G. Hyden, Robert Jackson and Okumu, *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970. For details of the Zambian developments since 1964, see W. Tordoff, "Provincial and District Government in Zambia", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. VII, No. 3, July 1968, Vol. VIII, No. 4, October 1968, and "Provincial and Local Government in Zambia", ibid, Vol. X, 1970.

2 Kenya News Agency Handout No. 768, 15 December 1965, speech made at the Kenya Institute of Administration.

3 *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission) 1970-71, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1971, hereafter the *Ndegwa Report*. The Commission, with Mr. Duncan Ndegwa as Chairman, was set up in January 1970, and presented its report in May 1971.

4 See my "The Provincial Administration and Development in Kenya 1965-68", op. cit., and John Nellis, "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental? Political Considerations in Development Administration", Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Staff Paper No. 103, June 1971.

5 Ibid.

6 *Ndegwa Report*, e.g. Ch. XII.

7 See J. M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government*, Oxford, 1967.

8 *Organization of Government's Internal Administration Report*, November 1968 *(Pritchard Report)*, mimeo., Kenya Archives Library.

9 *Ndegwa Report*, op. cit., p. 112.

10 See *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 29 July 1968.

11 *Ndegwa Report*, p. 117-118.

12 Ibid., p. 110.

13 Robert Chambers, "Planning for Rural Areas in East Africa: Experience and Prescriptions". Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Discussion Paper No. 119, November 1971.

14 *Ndegwa Report*, op. cit., p. 117. I have discussed the staff problems encountered by the administration in some detail in my article on "Provincial Administration and Development in Kenya" cited above.

15 *Ndegwa Report*, op. cit., p. 118.

16 *Report of the Local Government Commission of Inquiry, 1966*, Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966.

17 *Ndegwa Report*, Ch. XX.

18 Tordoff, "Provincial and District Government in Zambia", op. cit.

19 *Annual Report, Provincial and District Government, 1966.*

20 For UNIP before Independence see David Mulford, *Zambia: the Policies of Independence, 1957-64*, Oxford, 1967. For UNIP since Independence, see William Tordoff and Ian Scott, *Political Parties in Zambia, Structures and Policies*, Lusaka (mimeo).

21 *Annual Report, Provincial and District Government, 1966.*

22 See T. Rasmussen, *The District Secretary and the District Governor as Co-ordinators of Development*, Lusaka (mimeo.).

23 Quoted in *Annual Report, 1966.*

24 *Humanism in Zambia and Guide to its Implementation*, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967.

25 *Zambia's Guideline for the Next Decade*, His Excellency the President Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, addressing the National Council of UNIP at Mulungushi, 9 November 1968, Zambia Information Services, 1968, p. 19.

26 Zambia Information Services Press Release No. 2223/1968.

27 Ibid.

28 Cabinet Circulars 13 of 1969 and 24 of 1970, *Government Organization: Working Instructions for the New Administration.* Provincial and Local Government has since 1969 successively fallen within the Office of the President; a separate Ministry of Provincial and Local Government (September 1969); the Office of the Vice-President (February 1970); and a separate Ministry again (November 1970). In February 1972, Provincial Administration was returned to the Office of the President, and a separate Ministry of Local Government and Housing became responsible for local government.

29 Ibid., quoted in full in Tordoff "Provincial and District Government in Zambia", op. cit., 1970.

30 The Registration and Development of Villages Act, No. 31 of 1971.

31 Lawrence Taylor "Decentralization for Rural Development", National Institute of Public Administration, Lusaka, March 1971, mimeo.

32 The government's own concern was indicated by the setting up in January 1972 of a Working Party to review the Decentralized Administration under the chairmanship of Mr. Alan Simmance, Staff Adviser in the Cabinet Office, of which I was myself a member. In view of the confidential nature of that Inquiry, I have not felt able to draw upon it at all in this paper. The views expressed below were arrived at as a result of research I had myself undertaken before that inquiry began. I am grateful to those officers who in 1971 gave time to discuss the question with me. The opinions given here are entirely my own. The views are tentative, because of the restricted nature of my inquiry. If in due course the Report of the Working Party *(the Simmance Report)* becomes more widely available it will be possible to discuss these issues more fully.

33 Cabinet Circular No. 13 of *1969 Government Organization: Working Instructions for the New Administration.*

34 An attempt was made in the middle of 1971 to provide such a definition. See Cabinet Office Circular, 7 June 1971, *Functions and Duties of District Governors,* and 27 August 1971, Cabinet Circular No. 46 of 1971, *Functions and Duties of District Secretaries.* Neither, however, satisfactorily overcome the vagueness referred to above.

Strategy and Tactics for Administrative Reform

THE SWAZILAND PAPER

SIGNIFICANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Fundamental changes in the environment and functions of State Administration impose extraordinary strains on its competence and efficiency. Achievement of independence, adoption of a new constitution, introduction of national planning, changes in the availability of resources and advances in scientific and technological processes may involve far-reaching changes in an administrative system to meet the concomitant new tasks and new challenges. Even in the absence of such dramatic changes, there may be a need to revitalize the existing system through elimination of obsolete structures and practices as well as the introduction of different and more suitable arrangements and processes. Moreover, as has been aptly observed, problems of administration are common to every field of development, and efforts to bring about progress in specific areas such as education, health, agriculture and industry, can be hampered or defeated by shortcomings in general administration. Similarly, administrative changes have little significance unless their impact is felt in the various nation-building activities.

Practically every country is committed to accelerated national growth. The challenge this presents to state administration derives from three widely recognized related factors, namely:

(1) national governments have a central role in promoting, administering and sustaining socio-economic development;
(2) the extent to which governments fulfil this role depends largely on the degree and speed of expansion of administrative capability at all levels of government and in major fields of development;
(3) the administration itself must be adaptable to changing circumstances if it is to be an effective instrument for the desired social and economic changes.

The role of government, therefore, includes not only direct action of public bodies at all levels but also the facilitative, allocative and regulatory functions needed to accelerate development, as well as the encouragement of participation by the people, voluntary bodies and the private sector in national development. In short, it devolves upon it to mobilize all the human

energies and other resources of the state in the overall national effort for development and progress.

The experience of the last decade underlines the crucial role of administration in national development and overall nation-building. Deficiencies in organization and management have frequently been noted as among the causes of the slow rate of economic and social progress. Administrative capability is a scarce resource and is particularly inadequate in countries that became independent during the last two to three decades and had to develop their own administrative systems while trying to increase administrative capabilities required for socio-economic development.

An African country has admitted categorically through its third Five Year Development Plan that "the success or failure of the national plan depend more upon the country's administrative capability than upon any other single factor". On the other hand, the observation has been made that "it has been demonstrated with reasonably adequate statistical evidence over a period of seventy years that, of each year's increase in *per capita* product in the United States, about *one-tenth* could be attributed *to more capital input*, and *nine-tenth to improvement in the way the inputs were put together*"[1] (italics supplied). Indeed, it can be reaffirmed here that the ability of governmental organizations to define problems, determine policies and programmes of development, assign priorities among competing demands, allocate resources including capital, skilled manpower and foreign exchange, use science and technology for development, mobilize talent for development and carry out programmes of action, will be a decisive factor in the outcome of national efforts for development.

Whilst the administrative gap is almost universally accepted as the principal constraint to national development, the measures taken and resources made available to effect improvements have seldom been commensurate with what was needed and possible. In some cases, action has stopped after the diagnosis of administrative problems or if action has been taken, it was only an infinitesimal portion of what needed to be done, and hence was at best only symbolic of what was needed to achieve worthwhile results. The value of investments to overcome administrative deficiencies is seldom appreciated and the erroneous notion still persists that the cost of administration, and even administrative improvements, is intrinsically unproductive and often wasteful. Consequently, there has been a reluctance to invest in administration which has adversely affected the performance of other sectors.

The emergence of a central role for government in the development process calls for investments in administration and the improvement of administrative capability if that new role is to produce effective results. The view has been expressed that a successful response to its challenge calls for bold commitments and initiatives or even an "administrative revolution" to realize the sought for changes in the economic and social fields. Administration must be re-adjusted, re-adapted and re-vitalized to bring

forth the changes and achievements required in the transformation of societies which national development entails. Administrative systems that can actually accelerate development and enable better and more effective use of resources must be devised and installed as a matter of priority and urgency. In other words, administrative reform must be carried out to attain the administrative capability required for national development and overall nation-building.

APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Administrative reform is meant, for purposes of this paper, to apply to the specially designed adjustments, adaptations and improvements in the structure, processes and practices of the administrative machinery of government that increase its capabilities and effectiveness in carrying out national objectives. In terms of scope, it includes reorganization of the machinery of government and of individual ministries/departments/agencies; rationalization of administrative regulations and procedures; decentralization for regional and local development; re-organization or re-orientation of the civil service, staff training and development, planning, budgeting and financial management; management of government properties and stores; and other measures for the expeditious dispatch of public business. Its overriding objective is to put into effect whatever changes or improvements are required to enable administrative organs of government to plan and execute public policies, plans, programmes and projects in an effective and responsible manner.

Administrative reform is a long-range and difficult process and requires careful planning and sustained action. It is a continuing task and implies a need for periodic review and improvement of the administrative system. Since problems of administration are common to every field of activity, administrative planning should be an integral part of national planning to avoid or at least minimize failures of implementation and to ensure concerted action for improvements in all elements and parts of the administration. In this connection, the considered opinion of a meeting of experts on Public Administration and Development in the Second Development Decade may be mentioned, thus:

> . . . new managerial concepts and systems must be developed to organize and administer multifunctional development programmes which transcend departmental and ministerial jurisdiction. New types of general and sectoral administrators, programme and project managers, enterprise organizers, development planners, organization and systems analysts, budget and resources programmers, urban and environmental developers, and many other categories of personnel as well as scientific, technical and professional manpower must be educated, developed and motivated to contribute effectively to economic and social development. They are needed at all levels of administration. Each country

> should select the strategic fields to which priority is to be given. To make development plans operational, it is essential to incorporate into them the administrative measures and commitments needed to ensure that the required organizations, management systems, personnel, material and equipment will be available at the appropriate times and places for effective implementation. The plan for each programme and project must be evaluated as to its administrative feasibility and must incorporate operational specifications, including provision for the personnel and pertinent research essential for execution.[2]

It is equally vital that administrative surveys or studies in aid of or as part of administrative reform should be followed by timely approval and prompt implementation of specific measures proposed.

But, above all, is the requirement for carefully selected staff who are able to absorb training and put it into practice. There has been, and in many cases, still is a false idea that any man or woman can be trained to be an administrator. This is simply not true. For a person to become an efficient and successful administrator he or she must possess a natural bent for that type of work. If we reflect for a moment we will all be able to think of men and women who are brilliant in their own professional, academic, technical or scientific fields, as the case may be, but who will never become either efficient or successful administrators. The natural inclination for the work is just not there and no amount of training will ever induce it.

This is a basic fact which we must recognize for, unless we do, our selection and training of administrative personnel will almost inevitably fail. The proper selection and training of staff is an essential fundamental to any scheme of administrative reform or improvement for no system will be successful unless adequate qualified and efficient personnel are available to operate it. No matter how good a head of department may be personally he cannot operate or maintain an efficient department unless his supporting staff measure up to requirements. That latter situation is not uncommon and one that many of you will no doubt have experienced yourselves. It is at the Under-Secretary, Senior Administrative Officer, Principal, or equivalent grades that the weakness chiefly exists. It can only be cured by a ruthless elimination of unsatisfactory staff, the careful selection of replacements and well thought out and meticulously organized training of all descriptions, in-service, programmed courses at home and abroad, seminars and refresher courses. Throughout there must be sound supervision and a determination at the top level to dispense with unsatisfactory staff members who are clearly incapable of or unwilling to improve themselves. These officers must be removed to other jobs of a non-administrative nature where they cannot frustrate the administrative efficiency of some other department. Failing all else they must be removed from the service. In the interests of administrative reform and improvement sentiment must not be allowed to play the upper hand.

SOME STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

For practical purposes, strategy and tactics for administrative reform simply mean "how we go about adjusting, adapting and improving the government administrative machinery and its operations to bring about the administrative capability required for national development and overall nation-building". We can only discuss here the framework, the general outline of the ways of achieving defined goals, the skeleton if you will. The flesh and substance will have to be supplied by what will actually be done to yield the performance and output desired.

There is a variety of strategies and tactics or procedures through which a government may identify, prepare, support and carry out administrative reform. They include the following:

1. *Procedures used primarily by and within departments, ministries, agencies*
   - (i) Development of management services.
   - (ii) Surveys or studies and methods, personnel management or other staff services.
   - (iii) Management conferences of key departmental officials.
   - (iv) Surveys or studies by departmental committees.
   - (v) Recruitment, training and development of a competent body of personnel.
   - (vi) Systematic encouragement of supervisors and staff in administrative improvement.
   - (vii) Drawing upon outside assistance.

2. *Procedures used by central management services units*
   - (i) Preparation and distribution of guides and standards.
   - (ii) Conduct of and encouragement of training in administrative improvement.
   - (iii) Conducting surveys or studies.
   - (iv) Carrying out planned administrative reviews.
   - (v) Providing assistance to budget reviews.
   - (vi) Provision of advice and recommendations to the Cabinet or Head of Government.
   - (vii) Reviewing pending legislation, including provision of advice and recommendations to legislative committees.

3. *Procedures used by Presidents, Prime Ministers and Cabinets*
   - (i) Establishing, strengthening and utilizing central management services units.

(ii) Establishing special committees of high government officials.
(iii) Use of special administrative improvement funds.
(iv) Exercise of power to order administrative reform.

4. *Procedures employed by or dependent upon legislatures*

(i) Scrutiny of administration during enactment of appropriations.
(ii) Scrutiny of administrative implications of proposed legislation.
(iii) Enactment of legislation making changes in organization or methods of administration.
(iv) Legislative veto procedures.
(v) Special committees of inquiry.
(vi) Standing committees on government operations.
(vii) Parliamentary questioning.
(viii) Interpellations and motions of censure.
(ix) State controller.[3]

5. *Procedures dependent upon talent from outside government*

(i) Employment of consultants or management consulting firms.
(ii) Use of universities and non-profit organizations.
(iii) Establishment of commissions drawn partly or entirely from outside government.
(iv) Visits of officials to other nations.
(v) Technical assistance in public administration.

PLANNING AND EXECUTING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Some of the considerations in planning and executing administrative reform may be briefly summarized as recognition and exposure of the need for administrative reform and the planning, implementing and evaluating of it.

Recognition and exposure of the need for administrative reform

Periodic meetings or conferences among senior officials to appraise administrative performance and to study the problems and obstacles limiting effective implementation of policies and programmes could project the need for administrative reform. Parliamentary questioning; reports of parliamentary committees, particularly by those on government operations; motions of censure; and review of administration during enactment of appropriations are other avenues for exposing the need for improvement. Shortfalls in implementation of development plans and projects, public criticisms of the civil service and the administration, dramatic increases in prices and the

cost of living and programme-oriented training and development, may also indicate and could be used to expose the need for improvement.

Planning Administrative reform

A programme for administrative reform should ideally involve four related but distinct phases, namely:

(1) preliminary or reconnaisance survey;
(2) collection and analysis of information on pertinent problems and formulation of remedial action;
(3) approval of the reform measures by appropriate authorities, and the setting up of the time-table for their implementation; and
(4) actual implementation of accepted recommendations, including removal of difficulties which may emerge in the process of modifying the existing system, and evaluation for further and continuing improvement.

The last three phases frequently overlap so that in a specified case they do not always appear to be distinct from each other.

The preliminary survey is expected to identify the critical problems, to select the procedures for designing necessary improvements, and to formulate the terms of reference of the proposed programme. It should also give indications on the amount of resources likely to be required, including technical assistant, so that government may realistically budget the necessary internal and external resources, and accordingly proceed in negotiating and receiving technical and other external assistance. Clear definition of the problems and objectives and sound selection of strategies and procedures will greatly influence the outcome of the improvement programme.

Comprehensive and piecemeal approach

Casual treatment of individual administrative obstacles will not produce the desired administrative capability. Only a comprehensive approach and an integrated system of analysis and improvement may create the necessary impact.

Administrative reform must be considered as an organization-wide, continuous function, involving a spectrum of different types and levels of activity in a systematically planned programme. Exigencies in some countries may sometimes require immediate improvements in particular fields even before a comprehensive plan or programme can be elaborated. There should be no inhibitions in the minds of administrators and managers against adopting such piece-meal measures as long as they are conceived in consistency with the vision of overall reform and at some stage incorporated in a comprehensive plan. It is not infrequent the improvements begun in a

small way and perhaps in only a part of the administration, have stimulated, or passed dramatically into, general administrative improvement where the latter has been envisaged and pursued all along.

Institutionalization of administrative reform

One of the most important thoughts expressed and shared by the participants of the Seminar on Urgent Administrative Problems of African Governments held at Addis Ababa in October 1963, was that the institutional approach was recommendable in searching for solutions to administrative problems. They felt that it was made abundantly clear that the strengthening of institutions of a government would provide more lasting and sound reforms or improvements than makeshift or sporadic programmes, however, important or useful they may appear to be for the immediate requirements. They thought, for instance, that the establishment of sound administrative structures, an efficient personnel administration, a widespread network of training facilities, organization and methods units, performance budgeting, central agencies and institutions of various types for improvement of local government administration and other institutions, would serve countries better in achieving a permanent degree of development. Whilst the second follow-up seminar on the same subject held at Addis Ababa in November 1968 did not affirm the above views in so many words, it nonetheless made recommendations along the same lines. To mention a few, it proposed the establishment of a coordination unit in the Cabinet Office, if such a unit does not already exist, to give permanent administrative support to the Chief Executive and the Council of Ministers and ensure continuity in the implementation of government policies. It also suggested that the organization unit coherent plan (master plan for administrative reform for instance), drawn up by an inter-ministerial body should determine the order of priorities and provide strict operational procedures for the organizational services (study groups, study procedure, approval and implementation of re-organized systems, etc.).

Considering that changing conditions and circumstances bring in their wake new or modified policies, programmes, organizations, processes, staff with different qualifications and competence, corresponding adjustments, adaptations and improvements would be required for sustained and healthy growth and progress. To that end, continuing improvement through administrative reform, institutionalized as a standing government policy, is an imperative.

Instruments to use

Special commissions commend their use if administrative reform is programmed in one go. However, their usefulness will depend largely on a clear definition of their missions and very careful selection of their

members. Steps must be taken to ensure that they do not arouse the distrust or enmity of ministries/departments/agencies affected, and the heads and officials of these units, but that on the contrary, they win over their efficacious support and assistance.

The services of consultants are utilized in both partial and overall administrative reform. In addition to the fact that they have special skills and experience that can provide appropriate and useful contributions to the solution of problems, it is felt that their recommendations might be more disinterested or carry more weight than proposals originating from a government management services unit. Sometimes the latter does not yet have adequate expertise to furnish the technical services for such a programme or does not even exist. However, consultants can be used effectively only when the regular officials or government takes advantage of the advice given, implementing proposals they have accepted, and when there is an organization capable of taking over in due course.

Central management services units with sufficiently competent staff may very well be entrusted with the responsibility of planning and implementing a comprehensive programme of administrative reform. In view of the usual inadequacy of funds and trained staff, a comprehensive programme may have to be carried out on a piecemeal priority basis. The central unit can perhaps begin with a planned administrative review of individual ministry/department/agency structure, procedures and practices to launch the comprehensive programme, increasing its skills and building up its experience in the process. As has been mentioned earlier, modest beginnings can very likely end up in overall improvement.

Implementing administrative reform

Some critical factors and obstacles to the implementation of a programme of administrative reform deserve consideration.

One must take into account the existence of vested interests against reform/improvement, compounding the normal human resistance to change. Perhaps a useful approach to overcome these obstacles is to bring about a climate for change for the better and otherwise stimulate motivation which must permeate the whole process of reform. This in turn can best be served by institutionalizing the programme, as earlier suggested, into a standing government policy, where responsibilities, contributions, participation and involvement of all concerned are brought to bear upon the endeavour.

Specifically, administrative reform requires not only the initial consent of government but also continuing and purposeful attention at the highest political levels. There must be a high standard of leadership, sustained encouragement and support, and a sizable commitment in terms of men, money, materials and machines. The ministers and heads of departments/agencies should take an understanding interest and give vigorous backing

to the programme. On the other hand, the senior levels of the career service should stimulate the formulation and implementation of measures for improvement and train their subordinates in the value and proper use of modern procedures, techniques and practices. They should be more receptive to new ideas and take every opportunity to promote and foster the desired climate for change for the better. Leadership is thus demanded of the political leaders and chief officials of the career service. However, the will for improvement needs to be encouraged and nurtured among officers and staff at every level if improvement is to actually happen.

Good human relations and public relations must be observed at all times. An effective two-way communication between the rank and file and the management team must be maintained. This should be supplemented by such measures as incentive awards and programme-oriented staff training and development schemes to encourage and obtain the participation and involvement in the programme for improvement by all concerned. This will include the creation and maintenance of a sense of service and dedication, an obligation if you will. All of these can engender or pave the way to a realization of the necessary coordination and cooperation without which improvement may take too long or may never take place.

Evaluation of administrative reform

Effective reporting systems should be designed to enable proper and timely evaluation. Periodic evaluation is necessary in order to correct flaws and discrepancies not foreseen, to institute measures that would further improve the prospects of attaining the objectives of the programme and to otherwise adjust and adapt it to changing requirements. The vigilance of the body responsible for the programme, leadership from the top, support and cooperation of the management team and the rank and file, all of these can make meaningful and fruitful an action-oriented evaluation as an essential to continuing administrative improvement.

At this stage it is important to re-emphasize that no plan for administrative improvement will succeed unless two basic conditions apply. Firstly, there must be not only an acceptance of the need for this improvement at the topmost level, i.e. ministerial and senior official management, but a determination on their part that improvement is to be effected no matter at what cost in personnel or material. In other words those who do not measure up to the required standards or who will not or cannot appreciate the need for improvement must be ruthlessly discarded. Secondly, it is essential that the top level of official management is itself efficient and capable of both identifying the weaknesses and knowing how to correct them. The existence of these two basic conditions is of paramount importance for without them any reform plan is doomed to failure before it commences.

OUTLINE OF A PROPOSED APPROACH

At this juncture, the following strategy and tactics are offered for objective consideration and approval. It is believed that they may be applied by any country, after appropriate adaptation to its culture and social systems, stage of development, requirements, resources and other circumstances peculiar to it.

The strategy

Declare it as standing government policy that equal priority shall be given to investments in administration and socio-economic programmes and projects and that administrative improvement to produce the administrative capability with which to effectively carry out national development and overall nation-building shall be a continuing endeavour.

The tactics

(1) Set up a special administrative improvement fund for government's administrative reform.

(2) Constitute an Administrative Improvement Council (Committee) to be responsible for establishing, carrying out, evaluation, adjusting and adapting a comprehensive administrative reform programme as well as ensuring continuing administrative improvement to bring about the required administrative capability.

A suggested membership for such a Council is:

Chairman: Secretary to the Cabinet and/or Head of the Civil Service.

Members: Permanent Secretaries of those Ministries or Departments concerned with finance, establishments, training and economic development.
Head of the Central Management Services.
A senior member of the Central Management Services.

Secretary: A senior member of the Central Management Services.

The Council's general responsibility as stated above should include planning, a comprehensive administrative reform programme and determining priorities therefore; establishing policy and priorities and approving general programmes of activities of the Central Management Services as well as ensuring prompt action to its recommendations and implementation of those that have been approved without undue delay. The Council shall report directly to the Head of Government who has ultimate responsibility for

ensuring that the administration is at all times capable of implementing national policies and objectives.

(3) Organize a Central Management Services if it does not already exist or strengthen one in operation to enable to render technical services required for administrative improvement and to act as Secretariat of the Council as well.

(4) The Council should commission a preliminary survey of problems of administration or constraints which limit administrative capability for national development and overall nation-building. Separate conferences or meetings of (i) Permanent Secretaries and officers of equivalent rank, and (ii) officers at the Under-Secretary level, may be held as part of and in aid of the survey.

(5) The Council should make arrangements for obtaining the services of a team of one to three United Nations or other suitable Public Administration Advisers to conduct or advise and assist in undertaking the aforesaid preliminary survey. The team shall also advise the Council on administrative improvement, including the development of a comprehensive administrative reform programme. It may additionally advise and assist in organizing or strengthening a Central Management Services.

(6) The Council should establish a comprehensive administrative reform programme on the basis of the findings and recommendations in the preliminary survey conducted under its aegis, establish priorities, direct and coordinate its implementation, causing all necessary arrangements to be made therefore.

The programme may include the development, re-adjustment, or improvement of the following:

(i) Machinery of Government.

(ii) The Organization, Procedures and Practices of Ministries/Departments/Agencies.[4]

(iii) Local Administration.

(v) The Management of Public and Quasi-Public Enterprises.

(vi) The Civil Service and overall Personnel Administration.

(vii) Education and Training Institutions and their Programmes (including content and methodology).

(viii) Budgeting, Accounting and Auditing Systems, and overall Financial Administration.

(ix) Government Property and Stores Management.

(7) The Council, should, before the formal launching of the programme, conduct conferences or meetings of top level officials and seminars for other supervisors to orient them on the objectives of the comprehensive programme; delineate their roles and expected contributions towards its success, stressing the need for developing and improving the administration to meet the requirements of

national development and overall nation-building and otherwise motivating them to give it their full support and cooperation. The Head of Government should open the conferences of upper level officials and the Chairman of the Council, the seminars for other supervisors. Attendance of these officials and supervisors to the above-mentioned appreciation conferences and seminars should be made compulsory.

(8) The Head of Government should issue a statement on the establishment and implementation of the programme, its objectives and the expected results, and this should be widely publicized. He should personally launch the programme whence the presence of Ministers and top level officials will be required. An appropriate brochure should also be prepared and distributed within the public services, free of charge, before the formal launching ceremony.

(9) Constitute administrative planning and improvement as one of the sectors of the development plan with the Council taking responsibility for it. To that end, administrative policies, measures, and processes to carry out programmes and projects envisaged in the plan should be essential parts of the basic planning documents. Organizational responsibilities, administrative arrangements, operating procedures, and resources utilization should be defined for each sector.

The necessity to maintain proper motivation of both the management team and the rank and file in the administrative improvement and healthy socio-economic growth cannot be overemphasized. Since the attitude, behaviour, and actions of the leader permeate and influence his whole organization, enlightened and forward-looking leadership by the Head of Government in getting the programme off the ground and giving it sustained attention and support can be the golden key to continuing improvement and to the successful realization of the essential administrative capability which is indispensable for national development and overall nation-building.

This is the challenge that we must face, that the rich resources and potential of the African continent are awaiting the purposeful and dedicated touch of the genius, ingenuity, skills and sweat of her sons and daughters to transform them to greater usefulness for their prosperity and wellbeing. In taking up this challenge, administrative reform in the public services is the appropriate and timely tool that can be employed, and the fruits shall not be long in coming.

FOOTNOTES

1 "Economics as Part of Development Administration", *Development Administration—Concepts and Problems*, I. Swerdlow (ed.), Syracuse University Press, 1963.
2 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Fiftieth Session of the UN Economic and Social Council, E/4950, 2 March 1971.

3 **A State Controller is not only an Auditor but includes in his terms of reference, scrutiny and control of administrative effectiveness and behaviour and reports periodically to Parliament.**

4 **Priority may be given to doing work in this field under what may be called a subsidiary scheme of planned administrative review, where each ministry/department/agency is subjected to a study for improvement every three to five years to start implementation of the comprehensive programme.**

Strategy and Tactics for Administrative Reform in Africa

A. ADEDEJI

WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM?

One has used the term "administrative reform" so often during the past few years that one is apt to take its meaning for granted. And yet it could convey quite different meanings to different people. This fact was recently brought home to me by Professor V. Subramaniam in his article on "The Zambian Administrative Experiment and Experience", recently published in the *Quarterly Journal of Administration*.[1] In that article, the author gave the impression that unless an administrative system has existed for "a long while" and has led to "mounting dissatisfaction" and a "deliberate investigation thereof" has been undertaken, any changes in the system cannot be properly labelled "administrative reform".

Professor Subramaniam was accordingly unable to categorize the administrative changes that have taken place in Zambia since the country became independent in 1964 as constituting a reform. On the other hand, he had no difficulty in so labelling the changes which have recently taken place in India on the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission and in Great Britain on the findings of the Fulton Committee. It is not clear which label he would put to the changes in Ghana (after the Mills-Odoi Report) and Kenya (after the Ndegwa Report). Although there was a "deliberate investigation" in each case, neither administrative system has lasted "for a long while" in the sense that the British and India systems have.

Followed to its logical conclusion Subramaniam's definition means that we have to exclude virtually all African countries south of the Sahara from any talk about administrative reform. I am sure he did not intend this to result from his analysis. Be that as it may, the term administrative reform as used in this paper can be applied to any systematic changes in the administrative system (no matter how old) designed to lead to a more efficient, effective and responsive administration. Such reforms can be general or specific, across the board or partial. We will, however, distinguish large-scale administrative changes from specific or limited ones by referring to the one as major administrative reforms and to the latter as minor administrative reforms.

In most African countries there are problems facing the administrative systems which call for reform. The first and second quinquennial Seminars

on Urgent Administrative Problems in Africa held in 1963 and 1968 under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa have identified most of these administrative deficiencies. Twelve of these will be listed here. Unfortunately there is not space here to permit their discussion.[2] These are the problems of rigid structure and hierarchical organization; recruitment of generalists into the administrative service and a system of promotion based on seniority rather than merit; remuneration not in line with prevailing levels in the private sector and lack of job evaluation; poor intra- and inter-sectoral mobility; corruption and tribalism; inter-class conflict; strained relationships between politicians and the higher civil servants; weak administrative leadership; over-centralization; poor staff development and training arrangements; anachronistic administrative management practices; and lack of effective coordination.

The public corporations have, in addition to these problems, their own peculiar problems. Being a hybrid, neither civil service departments nor private enterprises, they have the worst of all possible worlds. There is lack of clarity in their objectives and they suffer from duplication of functions and from political interference.

Finally, there is the problem of local administration. The grafting which took place at the central level before independence also took place at the local level. On to the traditional local administrative system were grafted the British model of local government (with elected councillors and local government service) and the colonial system of field administration. It was, therefore, not surprising that local government has been a failure since independence in many African countries and that development from below is still an unattainable goal. The local authorities are short of fiscal resources and trained manpower, and their personnel practices are, to put it mildly, very backward—patronage, nepotism and jobbery, low salaries, inadequate security of tenure and limited promotion prospects.

The case for administrative reform, therefore, rests on the need to solve these enormous problems which pervade the civil service, public enterprise and local government. It is these problems which make the public sector in most developing countries ineffective, inefficient, and unresponsive to the changing needs of the society. The question is, therefore, not whether administrative reform is necessary but how best to undertake it to ensure positive results. It is a question of strategy and tactics and it is to this that we shall devote the rest of this paper.

PREREQUISITES AND STRATEGY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Given the enormity of the problems, what should be the strategy for administrative reform? What approaches should be adopted? And what are the prerequisites for a successful administrative reform?

Let us start with prerequisites. If an administrative reform is to be effectively instituted there must, first and foremost, be a general awareness of the need for change at administrative and political levels. What Subramaniam has described as "mounting dissatisfaction" must exist. But it is not enough simply to be dissatisfied. There must be a willingness to do something positive to improve the performance of the administrative system. In other words, the political and administrative elite must be receptive to a radical overhaul of the administrative system.

The second prerequisite follows from the first. Having accepted the need for overhauling the administrative system, the political leadership must possess the wherewithal particularly in terms of the will and courage to see the reform through. Unless reform measures receive the wholehearted support of the political leadership they will not be effective.

Finally, the leadership within the administration must be prepared to push the reform measures virtually down the throats of their colleagues. Civil servants invariably prefer the *status quo*. So it requires a persistent and sustained effort to make them accept the unknown. If those who occupy leadership positions in the civil service (the Head of Service, Permanent Secretaries, Heads of Departments, etc.) accept the need for change, it will be easier for them to sell it to their colleagues. Otherwise, the reform measures may be sabotaged.

Once the right type of environment exists for reform the next question is what the most appropriate strategy to be pursued—should it be an all-or-nothing strategy or a micro one? Here we might borrow some ideas from the theory of economic development. Economists have for years been arguing as to the best strategy of economic development. One of the most contested issues is whether the rate of economic development would be best advanced by pursuing an unbalanced growth strategy or a balanced growth one. The most well-known proponents of the unbalanced growth strategy are Albert Hirschman[3] and Hans Singer.[4]

The balanced growth theorists, of whom Ragnar Nurkse was the most well-known, had advocated that the way out of underdevelopment was for developing countries to launch a frontal attack on their poverty through "a more or less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of different industries". The case for balanced growth rests on the need for a balanced diet. The balanced growth theorists accordingly recommend that developing countries should embark on several big industrial projects simultaneously.

But as the critics of the balanced growth strategy of development point out, the resources required for carrying out the policy of balanced growth are of such an order of magnitude that a country disposing of such resources would, in fact, not be underdeveloped. However, the doctrine is not wrong but premature. It is applicable to a later stage of sustained economic growth—the post-take-off stage—rather than the breaking of the vicious

circle of poverty. For launching economic development, Singer suggests, "it may well be better development strategy to concentrate available resources on types of investment which help to make the economic system more elastic, more capable of expansion under the stimulus of expanded markets and expanding demand". Investment in social overhead capital and the removal of specific bottlenecks are examples of such "strategic" investments. In conclusion, Singer argues that the fundamental trouble with the balanced growth strategy is "its failure to come to grips with the true problem of underdeveloped countries, the shortage of resources. "Think Big" is sound advice but "Act Big" is unwise counsel if it spurs underdeveloped countries to an effort to do more than their resources permit".

Hirschman carries the Singer argument further. He contends the deliberate unbalancing of an economy, in accordance with a pre-designed strategy, is the best way to achieve economic growth. The real scarcity, in Hirschman's view, is not the resources themselves but the organizational ability to bring them into play. This ability "is acquired and increased primarily by practice; and the amount of practice depends, in fact, on the size of the modern sector of the economy. In other words, an economy secretes abilities, skills, and attitudes needed for further development roughly in proportion to the size of the sector where these attitudes are being inculcated".[5] Thus the planning problem is to determine the sequence of expansion that will maximize induced easy-to-take or compelled decisions resulting in additional investment and output.

What is the relevance of all this to the strategy of administrative reform, it may be asked? Put simply, it is that the wholistic, all-or-nothing strategy of administrative reform under which a number of reform measures will be introduced simultaneously is like the balanced growth doctrine in development theory. If an underdeveloped country can manage simultaneously a balanced administrative reform package, then that country will cease to be underdeveloped—for undertaking effectively and efficiently administrative reform calls for certain administrative skills, abilities and attitudes which an underdeveloped country lacks but which can be secreted over the years as reform measures, introduced one by one, become effective and eventually internalized. This development is greatly facilitated when administrative reform is planned in such a way that one reform or one set of reforms induces or compels decisions which result in additional reform. To maximize induced decision-making the sequence of reform is most critical.

However, the kind of sequence is also important. And here again we turn to Hirschman's strategy of economic development. Hirschman distinguished between two types of development: development via surplus and development via shortage. The former facilitates but does not compel further development. It is largely a matter of faith in the development potential of a country. Development via surplus is caused by permissive sequences and results in excess capacity with the possibility of wasteful mistakes. On

the other hand, development via shortage brings forth compulsive sequences, maximizes induced decision-making. Thus to accelerate the rate of administrative efficiency of a country, it is not sufficient to follow the unbalanced growth strategy in administrative changes and maximizes induced decision-taking.

APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Given the strategy, what approaches to administrative reform should be adopted? Three approaches are discernible—the special commission approach, the management services approach and the development planning approach. These three approaches are not mutually exclusive although some governments tend to behave as if they are.

The first approach—the setting up of a special commission—is perhaps the most popular. A government that is desirous of instituting administrative reforms sets up a high powered commission with specific terms of reference. The Mills-Odoi Commission and the Ndegwa Commission are two recent examples in Africa. The terms of reference of the former include:

(1) investigating the organization and structure of the Public Service in Ghana;
(2) investigating the remuneration and conditions of service of all grades of the Public Service and proposing what changes are considered desirable.

The Ndegwa Commission's terms of reference were:

(1) to investigate the organization and structure of the Kenya Public Service and recommend reforms wherever desirable;
(2) to investigate the remuneration and conditions of service of all grades of the Public Services and to recommend what changes may be necessary;
(3) to examine methods of recruitment and conditions of employment and provide for retention in the services of properly qualified personnel with adequate superannuation arrangements between public and private sectors.

It will be seen from these terms of reference that the special commission approach is a one-shot affair. It takes reform as a static rather than a dynamic process. The emphasis is on structures and organizations. It has little institutional support. Little wonder that such reforms have merely led to increased formalism, ritualism and overcentralization in administrative processes and practices.

The management services approach has been adopted by many African countries. It is micro rather than macro and is usually haphazard rather than part of a systematic and planned reform measure. Besides, the personnel

of the management services unit are invariably of such a low calibre that they are hardly ever in a position to bring about fundamental changes in the administrative system.

The third approach—the development planning approach—is the least common. Hardly, if ever, do administrative reforms feature in the development plans of developing countries. In the preparation of a development plan the administrative system is taken for granted. The chapters on "Administration" in the Development Plans are more concerned with spatial problems (office space) and projected capital expenditure in the administrative sector rather than with the fundamental issues of reform. There is, therefore, no administrative development plan comparable and complementary to the socio-economic development plan.

Our advocacy of the strategy of unbalanced administrative reform based on compulsive sequences makes it imperative that there must be at least a medium term administrative development plan. Ideally, this should form part of an administrative plan. Administrative plans, of whatever duration, should be integrated with the socio-economic plans. As I stated in an article which I wrote recently,

> . . . the administrative reform programme must be consistent with a country's overall development programme. Just as a country's administrative system must not lag behind its socio-economic development so also it is important that it must not be too sophisticated for the economy. African governments must beware of reformists who are so obsessed with some of the modern management technologies that they are determined to push them down the throat of the poor countries.[6]

IMPLEMENTING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Whatever strategy of administrative reform is adopted, whatever approaches are preferred, unless the reform measures are implemented effectively and efficiently all efforts would have been in vain. Like socio-economic development plans, reform measures are not worth the papers on which they are written unless the government possesses the capability to see them through.

If, as we have advocated, an unbalanced strategy of administrative reform is adopted, and a medium term administrative reform plan is integrated with the country's socio-economic plan, the problem of implementation will be considerably facilitated. However, the government would still have to take concrete steps to ensure full and effective implementation.

First, the reform measures must be given an institutional base. A dynamic and flexible machinery for reform implementation is most vital. A special ministry for administrative reform may be established to oversee

implementation. Or a special department may be established in the office of the head of government to perform the same function. The third alternative is to make the minister responsible for ensuring the implementation of the socio-economic plan also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the administrative plan. This last alternative becomes the logical institutional support if, as suggested in the preceding section, the administrative plan is integrated with the socio-economic plan.

But institutional support is not enough. The government must be able to create an innovative atmosphere and both the political and administrative leadership must associate itself publicly and privately with the reform measures. Finally, the reform must be subjected to constant appraisal so that necessary modifications may be made as experience is gained in implementation.

If administrative reforms are not to lead to increased formalism they must be oriented towards programme achievement. If ritualism is to be avoided, they must be discriminatory in the adoption of the modern techniques imported from industralized countries. Only those techniques that can be fully understood and internalized should be adopted; otherwise reforms will become an end in themselves rather than a means to an end.

Administrative reforms that are preoccupied with only structures and ignore cultural and human factors are also doomed to fail. Although scholars, particularly Western scholars, have been concerned during the past decade or two with the effects of these factors, particularly the cultural factors, on the efficiency and effectiveness of administration in developing countries, reformers, particularly the various administrative reform commissions which have been set up, do not appear to have given much attention to the problems posed by these factors. For example, if as Milne suggests, most administrators in developing countries have a perception of limited good and their loyalties are limited primarily to family, clan or clique; if they show little identification with formal organizations and are reluctant to make sacrifices for the sake of such organizations; and, finally, if a lack of trust in persons not belonging to the same primary groups make it difficult to encourage the development of impersonal and functional relations in organizations",[7] what are the implications of all this for administrative reform? One can only ignore such factors both at planning and implementation stages if one were to assume that they either do not exist or that their importance is exaggerated. But such an assumption will not only be heroic but will also imperil whatever reform measures are introduced.

FOOTNOTES

1 *Quarterly Journal of Administration (QJA)*, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 287-299.
2 For detailed discussion, please refer to the author's articles, "Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies in Africa", *QJA*, Vol. VI, No. 3, April 1972,

pp. 223-244; and "Federal State Civil Services (in Nigeria", *QJA*, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 7-32.

3 Albert Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.

4 Hans Singer, "The Concept of Balanced Growth and Economic Development: Theory and Facts", University of Texas Conference on Economic Development, April 1958.

5 Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, op. cit., p. 36.

6 Adebayo Adedeji, "Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies in Africa", *QJA*, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 242.

7 R. S. Milne, "Mechanistic and Organic Models of Public Administration in Developing Countries", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. XV, 1970, pp. 57-67.

Part Four

Delegation to Public Enterprises

A. H. RWEYEMAMU

Public enterprises are an accepted feature of the political economy of the African states as indeed they are throughout most of the world. Reasons and objectives for their formation apart, public enterprises are found in socialist, capitalist and mixed economy states throughout the world. In Nigeria alone, as reported by Chief J. O. Udoji, there were in 1973 over 250 public enterprises consisting of statutory corporations both federal and state, state-owned companies and their subsidiaries, state-controlled companies and their specialized organizations. In Tanzania, on the other side of the continent an equally impressive number of public enterprises has been established especially since 1967 when the country moved toward socialist construction. Throughout independent Africa public enterprises of all types have been created to spearhead economic and social transformation of the societies. More appropriately, it may be said that the responsibility of transforming and managing the public economic sector has to a large extent been delegated to the public enterprises in most of the African states.

Why public enterprises?

The Twelfth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar which was held in Ibadan, Nigeria, focused entirely on the role of public enterprises in the development process. The seminar discussions revealed that public enterprises irrespective of their legal status, fall into three categories based on their functions and objectives:

(1) Business-type organizations that we expect to compete and show a profit either to re-invest into furthering the enterprise itself, or as a source of revenue for public sector as a whole, e.g. commerce, industry, mining and related mineral extraction and manufacturing.
(2) Infrastructure organizations that undertake to provide the basic services needed by the nation to develop, e.g. transportation, communications, public utilities, commodities marketing, banking, insurance, etc.; these may or may not be expected to make a profit depending on their assigned functions and objectives.
(3) Service organizations that are created to deliver services to the public, e.g. health, libraries, sports, training, where profits are not expected to be made (1973, p. 14).

It is easy to appreciate the crucial role of public enterprise in Africa, given the colonial background of most of the African states. The colonial administration left the economies of the new African states totally underdeveloped. In many cases, the little business activities which was inherited by the new states were essentially in the hands of foreigners. The private enterprises is most English- and French-speaking Africa, especially at independence were in the hands of British and French nationals. Throughout the colonial period few Africans were given the opportunity to accumulate private capital and to acquire large-scale business management skills, which could be relied upon by the new nations to build their economies. As President Julius Nyerere pointed out, Third World countries do not have the kind of wealth and indigenous skills to establish large-scale modern industrial units sufficient to meet the expanding needs of the people.

> As a general rule no individual, or group of individuals from within any of our nations has capacity to establish even a large modern textile mill, much less operate a diamond mine, put up a steel mill, or run a large-scale commercial enterprise. That amount of money, and that kind of expertise, just do not exist.

The new African governments committed as they are to rapid economic and social development of their societies had no choice but to resort to the creation of public enterprises. Throughout independent Africa, public enterprises have been as (1) instruments for increasing indigenous participation in commerce and industry thereby enhancing political stability. (2) Public enterprises also serve as stabilizers of the economy. This is so especially with reference to Public Produce Marketing Boards and Consumer Co-operatives which seek to provide stable prices for major primary products and also to provide facilities for transportation and marketing of these products. (3) Another reason justifying the creation of public enterprise is the need to provide essential public services, including water, electricity, roads, railways and airways. (4) The need to create public enterprises may also arise from the government desire to build an integrated national economy, and to stimulate balanced regional development throughout the country. It is recognized that private enterprise is normally unwilling or slow to respond to the needs of a government committed to rapid economic development. (5) Government intervention in the economic sector is also necessary when there is need to obtain international finance on a scale large enough to develop a large-scale industry. It is the government which can give assurances required to attract outside capital. (6) Government intervention is also necessary where a single industry or service under a single private enterprise reaches a monopoly or dominant position in the country. (7) Government participation or intervention in profitable enterprises like mining is also considered necessary in order to acquire a large share of the profit accruing from the enterprise for wider national development.

In short, the justifications for direct government intervention in the economy include the need to provide essential public services at reasonable cost. It is also motivated by the government desire to get a larger share of profitable enterprises in order to facilitate rapid economic and social development of the country as a whole. In this case one may view the government move as a stop-gap measure until indigenous capital and entrepreneurial skills emerge. In some cases state intervention in the economy is justified on ideological socialist ground. In these countries which are committed to socialist construction, nationalization of large-scale private enterprises, financial institutions and other "commanding heights" of the economy is viewed to be consistent with socialist goals of the leadership. It should be noted, however, that nationalization involves quite a number of complications and problems. Experience suggest that nationalization should be preceded by careful planning and appraisal of all relevant elements and effects of nationalization lest it leads the country into national economic disaster.

In general, participants in various Inter-African Public Administration seminars have looked at public enterprise more as a form of public capitalism whereby opportunities for development should be sought, risks taken, investments made and profits accrued for the benefit of society. This process is often done along with private enterprise, either in the same function or business or as a joint venture. In fact, a prime reason for establishing public enterprises in most African countries has been the lack of private enterprise to undertake such major functions as transportation, communication, manufacturing and the like. Thus the need for public enterprise in Africa to fulfil the role historically played elsewhere by private enterprise (1973, pp. 14-15). It is, therefore, clear that public enterprises in their various forms have a vital role to play in African development. In addition to serving as instruments for economic and social development they also serve to transmit modern management and technological skills to the African managers and administrators.

Management of public enterprises

While the vital role of public enterprises in African development is acknowledged by governments there seems to be no agreement among the African states regarding the structural and personnel requirements of public enterprises. The Twelfth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar devoted considerable time discussing these issues which affect the management of public enterprises. It was noted that there is confusion between the acknowledged need for government to control its public enterprises in order to ensure that they are functioning according to national priorities, and the equally acknowledged need for the management of the public enterprises to have the freedom and flexibility necessary to fulfil their functions and meet their objectives. Seminar participants agreed that these two requirements in the

management of public enterprises can best be achieved if the public enterprises operate within the context of clearly set and mutually understood aims and objectives.

Managing and controlling public enterprises by objectives was considered vital for effective operation of these institutions. The participants also queried the prevailing pattern of control by functional or parent ministry. It was agreed that the typical public enterprise suffers because in its objectives, financial controls, staffing, methods of work and means of appraisal, it is too much influenced by existing civil service patterns, which, however, worthy in themselves may not always suit the demands of modern business. Public enterprises are business enterprises and their structures of management and control should reflect this objective. Several proposals to improve ways and means of managing public enterprises were put forward (1973, pp. 16-17). These include:

(i) A single board of directors for several public enterprises, having similar functional objectives, e.g. transportation, communication, energy.

(ii) A Cabinet Committee that, in conjunction with the public enterprises, sets objectives, monitors progress toward meeting these objectives and evaluates results.

(iii) More careful selection of board members, especially those from the private sector, to get a competent group of men who can ensure that government policy is understood and implemented by the management of the enterprise, using the most appropriate practices available.

(iv) A gradual reduction of the number of civil servants serving as board members, with an early end to the practice of naming permanent secretaries as chairmen of boards of directors.

(v) A regular reporting system whereby the enterprises keep the government informed as to progress and problems in meeting their objectives.

(vi) A special management control unit or steering committee within each ministry to ensure competence and continuity in the ministry for setting objectives, monitoring progress and achieving results by the enterprises.

These issues relating to the management structure of public enterprises in Africa and proposals for improving their performance are discussed fully in the papers which follow. The authors of the papers emphasize the crucial role of public enterprise in the development process. They point out the need for flexibility in government control over the operation of public enterprises provided these enterprises are staffed with men of the highest professional integrity. It is important to point out that the staff of public enterprises should not be seen so much as government employees but as businessmen, and that public enterprises should not be controlled by regulations but by results.

Some Measures for Improving Performance and Management of the Public Enterprises*

J. O. UDOJI

INTRODUCTION

There is a continuing concern in African states over the management, effectiveness and usefulness of public enterprises as instruments of development and change. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the public enterprises in these states, in particular in East and West Africa. In Africa, public enterprises take the form of corporations and state companies. The corporations are established by statute and are owned entirely by the state. The common types are development corporations, state trading corporations, utility corporations, regulatory commissions and marketing boards. The state companies, unlike statutory corporations, are established under the ordinary company law of the country concerned and some of their shares may be in private hands. It is the form used when governments want to enter into partnership with foreign private investors.

Besides their variety, an inquirer is struck by the number of these public bodies, the rate at which they are being created and the large amounts of money being channelled into them. The Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya has over 100 public enterprises. Uganda has fourteen major corporations; and the Development Corporation has 53 subsidiaries. In Tanzania; there are 10 government companies and 35 boards and corporations with several subsidiaries. The National Development Corporation alone has 66 subsidiaries in fields covering agriculture, manufacturing, construction, commerce and services. This corporation invested £4.4 million in 31 projects in 1967. By the end of the same year its commitments to further investments amounted to nearly six million pounds. In the same year the Uganda Development Corporation had a gross turnover of £22,866,824 and an investment of £5,562,820 in seven projects. In 1966, the East African Railways and Harbours Corporation had a capital account of £127,000,000 and in recent years it has invested about £15,000,000 in capital works annually.

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In Nigeria, there are today over 250 public enterprises, consisting of statutory corporations, both federal and state, state-owned companies and their subsidiaries, state-controlled companies and other specialized organizations. These range from the more traditional forms of public enterprises such as railways, harbours, electricity, and marketing boards, to such industrial and commercial activities as cement, soft drinks, hotels and newspapers, as well as social services like school boards, teaching hospitals and sporting and cultural organizations. They now constitute a large, and growing aspect of the public sector, with an impressive financial investment.[1]

If the rate at which these bodies are being created and financed were indicative of the economic growth of the countries or the success of the bodies themselves, at least some of the countries would be near the stage of economic take-off. The experience, however, has been in the opposite direction. In Nigeria and Ghana, the corporations have done so badly that many public inquiries have been conducted into their affairs.

THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATIONS

On the achievement of independence, politicians in East and West Africa discovered to their dismay that the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy were largely in the control of foreigners. A survey in Uganda, made shortly before the mass exodus of expatriate businesses, revealed that 4,000 non-Africans controlled 70% of the distributive trade whilst 16,000 Africans were responsible for only 30% of the trade. This was in spite of the fact that as far back as 1938 the then colonial government restricted non-Africans from expanding their activities into new areas of the hinterland. This restriction turned out to have done more harm than good. It forced the non-Africans to entrench themselves in the main business centres of the country where there were the greatest opportunities. In Kenya, it was revealed that in 1955, 246 new companies owned by Europeans with a nominal capital of £8,875,892 and 99 companies owned by Asians with a nominal capital of £3,559,400 were registered while only one company owned by an African with a nominal capital of £250 was registered.

Such a situation is unhealthy both economically and politically. It does not take the politicians long to sense that the tide of rising expectations among their followers will change to a tide of rising frustrations. They realize that they can retain power only as long as they continue to increase the standard of living of their people. To them, therefore, it is politically impossible to leave the control of the economy in the hands of foreign entrepreneurs. Without this control they cannot plan economic growth, nor bring about African participation in business, nor solve the problem of unemployment.

Also, the governments of these countries have come to the conclusion that the enormous and urgent problems of development cannot be solved

by private enterprise, and that governments must get away from their traditional caretaker and regulatory functions and move into an era of active participation in the productive sector. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture should no longer be satisfied with being a research department but should go into agricultural production. In the same manner the Mines Department should not only produce maps of mineral resources but should go into mineral exploitation. These are some of the reasons for the establishment of development and state trading corporations that have become a common feature in East and West Africa.

Unlike the development and state trading corporations, all the public utility corporations were established by the colonial governments.[2] Although the main interest of the colonial government was the maintenance of law and order and playing the role of a silent umpire for the private entrepreneurs in the exploitation of the resources of dependent territories, there were areas where the entrepreneurs were hesitant to venture either because of the attendant risks or because they involved huge capital investments with low rates of return. (In the colonial territories entrepreneurs were normally interested only in net returns of 15-20% on capital, usually on the basis of an investment maturing in about five years.) Utilities were also fields which the colonial governments considered essential for the maintenance of minimum civilized standards for the civil and military administrators as well as for facilitating the maintenance of law and order in the territories. This was how water, electricity, railways and airways came into being. All were government departments until pressure for more business-like operations resulted in converting some of them into corporations of state-owned companies.

The Nigerian coal industry, electricity, and railways started as government departments and remained so until after the Second World War. During the enactment of the Nigerian Railways Corporation Act in 1955 the then Minister of Transport and Works gave the reasons for the conversion in these words:

> It is government's view that a public utility of this kind is better operated on quasi-commercial lines by a statutory corporation than a government department. The rigidity of control and the established formalism which are proper and necessary in the operation of a government department are not suited to a public utility which should not only provide the service required by the public but should do so on sound financial lines.

Public utility corporations were, therefore, established in order to fill in the gaps left by private enterprise. Their expansion in the post-independence period has been dictated by demands for the infrastructure of development.

The third group of corporations are the marketing boards. These boards are usually for the inspection, purchase, storage and export of primary

products that have fluctuating prices, such as sugar, coffee, cocoa, groundnuts, palm-oil and palm kernels. In Nigeria and Ghana, the marketing boards were established after the Second World War primarily for the stabilization of producer prices. After independence the boards were found to be substantial sources of capital for development. By maintaining a price policy by which the producer was paid less than the world market value of his produce, the board accumulated large surpluses which amounted to several million pounds.

In Nigeria, the boards were not only the source of capital for the development corporations but they also contributed to the financing of regional capital budgets. The University of Nigeria at Nsukka was built with £N5.00 million provided by the then Eastern Nigeria Marketing Board. In East Africa, the marketing boards, particularly those established after independence, were mainly to eliminate the expatriate middleman and to ensure that the producer got the best price for his produce. Unlike West Africa, some East African boards also have responsibility for the distribution of food crops. One of the functions of the Kenya Maize and Produce Marketing Board is:

> to buy, store, sell, import, export and otherwise acquire and dispose of maize and maize products in such a manner, in such quantities and such terms as it may from time to time deem necessary in order, so far as possible, *to fulfil the requirements both of consumers and producers in Kenya.*

The Uganda Lint Marketing Board also has power to "sell within Uganda or sell and export the lint, cotton and cotton seed it has purchased". The board is also responsible for the transportation and treatment of cotton seed from ginners to growers.

ARE THE OBJECTIVES BEING ACHIEVED?

In West Africa, the failure or inability of most of the public corporations to achieve the objectives for which they were created is no longer in doubt. In an address to the Working Party appointed in 1966 on Nigerian statutory corporations and state-owned companies the then Head of the Federal Military Government said:

> The present state of the statutory corporations, state-owned companies and allied organizations has given the Federal Military Government same cause for anxiety. Sufficient time has elapsed to enable an objective judgement to be passed on whether or not these various organizations have creditably satisfied their objectives. The spate of public opinion in the last five years and more provides available evidence that these organizations have failed to fulfil their expectations.

The series of public inquiries into the operations of the corporations is a reflection on the standard of their performance. At least 50% of the corporations in Nigeria and Ghana have had public inquiries conducted into their operations. Between 1960 and 1966 the Nigerian Railways alone had 13 inquiries into its activities.[3] In 1965, it had a deficit of £3.5 million and the World Bank described its finances as "disastrous". The inquiry into the affairs of the Ghana Timber Marketing Board found that the board failed to render adequate services to the timber industry and that it was "a mere collecting agency and dispenser of funds". Again the report on the Ghana State Distillery Corporation concluded by saying that the expectations in establishing the industry had not been realized. Even now, one of the major areas of interest of the Public Service Review Commission of Nigeria is discovering ways and means by which the public enterprises can be made more effective for development.

There have been very few inquiries into the East African corporations.[4] They have so far avoided the scandalous performance of their West African counterparts, but not their inefficient behaviour. Critics usually point to the East African Railways and the Kenya Meat Commission and Maize Board which have been losing money in recent years. Some of the accusations of inefficiency against these corporations, however, are not justified. In the case of the East African Railways, for instance, although it had a deficit of £1.25 million in 1969,[5] its critics lose sight of the fact that it has a differential tariff imposed on it by the governments of the three partner states. Again, although the Kenya Maize and Produce Board may have had a bad record in recent years its present losses are due to uneconomic prices fixed by government.

There are several reasons for the failure of some of the corporations to achieve their objectives. The first in order of time is that the objectives of the corporations are never clearly defined. Other reasons are the fundamental non-viability of many projects, political patronage in appointment to the board and staff and lack of suitably qualified and experienced Africans to run commercial and industrial projects. A few examples will suffice in each case.

Definition of objectives

When we talk of a corporation achieving its objectives we must be clear what the objectives are. Achievement of objectives may not always be synonymous with profitability. In a socialist-oriented economy a corporation may be achieving its objectives by not making a profit. If such is the objective, it should be clearly stated but this is seldom the case. For example, the law establishing the development corporation in Tanzania says that "the business of the corporation shall be to facilitate and promote the economic development of Tanzania". Similarly the law establishing the Uganda Development

(1) The civil service members may not be strong enough to influence policy and may be consistently outvoted;
(2) Civil servants are by training service-oriented rather than profit-oriented. They are cautious and averse to taking the kind of risks necessary for the success of commercial enterprises;
(3) Civil servants are normally appointed by virtue of their office, and because of the great turnover in staff they are never on the board long enough to develop a sense of identification with a corporation. By the time they get acquainted with the problems of a particular corporation they are moved to other jobs;
(4) There is also a tendency on the part of civil servants to act as watch-dogs rather than as planners. They also tend to apply to corporations civil service forms and procedures which have the effect of emasculating initiative; and
(5) Civil servants also are inclined to equate their remuneration and conditions of service with those of private corporations with the result that corporations are often unable to attract or to compete with private enterprise in the recruitment of scarce manpower.

Lack of suitably qualified and experienced staff

Incompetent staff is as important a cause of failure of public corporations as political patronage. Many argue that given a competent, dedicated and public-spirited management, at least some of the effects of political patronage could be rendered ineffective.

The main factor which affects the staffing of public enterprises is the basic shortage of men with the requisite experience. This shortage is due to the absence of any indigenous commercial and industrial community. The best brains are attracted to the civil service, while, until recently, the expatriate private sector was not interested in recruiting Africans into its middle or top management cadres. Furthermore, there is some difficulty in prescribing precisely the qualifications and experience required by public enterprises. This is because what many enterprises require is not so much academic or professional qualifications, but effective management skill. They require men with practical knowledge of the trade or industry.

For example, many of the expatriate managers of the various commercial houses in East and West Africa have no academic qualifications, but they have acquired expertise, that is considerable practical experience in dealing with a particular trade in a particular country. They have a grasp of the local market, when to buy, where to sell, and when to sell. This experience is often supplemented by some training. For example, if it is a firm that sells refrigerators the manager is given some training in engineering so that he knows how a refrigerator works and how to distinguish a good from a bad one. What this means is that there are no ready-made recruits for the

public enterprises. The enterprises have to produce the men they want. To do that they have to spread their net wide and attract men from the civil service, the armed forces, the universities, the professions and industrial and commercial concerns.

The decision to establish a public corporation often arises out of dissatisfaction with the performance of an over-burdened government department. But it is false to assume that the basic manpower shortage could be solved by the mere act of removing the function from the civil service. All that the removal may achieve is to shelter recruitment from the scrutiny of the Civil Service Commission by bringing it within the area of hidden patronage. Furthermore, what is wrong with the civil service is not with the quality of its members but with its bureaucratic procedures. In the countries concerned and, in fact, in every underdeveloped country the civil service contains those with the most administrative talent who could without much difficulty, learn the various facets of management in the public sector. The main problem is that civil servants, because of their other duties, are never able to give the public corporations full attention. It would be a different matter if they were appointed to manage enterprises full time. This has been done in India with considerable success.

Another factor which affects the quality of the staff of corporations is their rapid and haphazard Africanization programmes. The World Bank Report that criticized the finances of the Nigerian Railways gave "too rapid a pace of Nigerianization" as one of the reasons for the disastrous situation. The Africanization figure in the East African Railways was recently reported to be 97.3%. This was considered in some quarters to be too fast.[7]

In the civil service, Africanization was carefully planned in conjunction with expanded training programmes. This was hardly the case with the corporations. They had no phased programmes and no analysis of training needs was undertaken. In short the corporations had not learnt to invest in training as was the case in the civil service. Yet this is even more important in corporations where most of the middle management posts are highly technical and require a longer lead time. It may be possible to fill the top purely managerial and administrative posts from the civil service, but such top managers will need the support of cost accountants, production engineers and project appraisal economists who at the moment can only be produced by the enterprises by intensive training.

To employ foreign personnel raises a number of problems. The best available in developed countries are not easy to attract. Their employers would not release them. There is also a great deal of unwillingness on the part of the employee to undertake assignments in unfamiliar countries. In both cases there is the fear of losing a chance of further promotion by being out of sight. The result is that the foreigners the corporations are able to recruit are often second rate people who have failed to establish themselves elsewhere. When well-qualified foreigners are found, they are usually beyond

retirement age. Such men may bring considerable experience to their new jobs, but lack the flexibility and adaptability very necessary to enable them to do the jobs as well as pass on their skills and expertise.

Other defects

An attempt has so far been made to discuss some of the defects which impair the performance of public corporations in East and West Africa. It is not possible, in an article of this nature, to deal with all the defects. Those dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs are some of the basic ones. Others, some of which are also basic, are:

(1) *Environmental inadequacies and lack of infrastructure in developed countries.* Many times an enterprise has to provide itself with all facilities that are normally taken for granted in a developed country. These facilities range from power, housing and medical facilities, to training simple operators and setting up repair shops. This complicates problems of management and increases production costs;

(2) *Organizational structures which are not conducive to efficient performance.* The imprecise relationships between the ministry, the board of directors and management (top officials) produce obstacles no matter how hardworking and qualified the management may be; sometimes the term of office of the chairman and directors may be so short that continuity, which is one of the secrets of success in private enterprise, is often disturbed;

(3) *Interference with management* by ministers, directors, and civil servants;

(4) *Low morale of staff* due to an unsatisfactory system of recruitment, promotion, discipline and general staff development;

(5) *Lack of proper and adequate financing.* Because of the greater expansion of the public sector there is considerable pressure on the corporations, particularly the big ones, to invest more than their finances will permit. Sometimes development corporations have been urged to get loan finance for use as equity;

(6) *Financial irresponsibility* on the part of the directors due in part to their not having a financial stake in the project. Cases have been known where the first act of a board of directors was to vote themselves handsome allowances even before the corporation went into business; and

(7) *Lack of proper coordination between corporations themselves and between them and government departments.* The Working Party on Nigerian Statutory Corporations and State-owned Companies noted the absence of proper and adequate coordination between the Nigerian Railways Corporation and the Nigerian Ports Authority.

SUGGESTED REFORMS

If the corporations are performing so badly, what do we do about them? Some have suggested scrapping them and handing back some of their functions to government departments. Others have suggested that some of the objectives of public corporations could be achieved by controlling private enterprise through a combination of the following measures:

(1) Fiscal and monetary policies—taxation and control of credits;
(2) Physical controls—inspection, licensing and price fixing;
(3) Subsidies to certain industries for capital development in order to encourage them; and
(4) More mixed enterprises.

These suggestions were considered by the Nigerian government, which came to the conclusion that "Corporations and State-owned Companies should neither be scrapped nor translated into government departments but that means should be found . . . to remove the defects which impair their efficiency." I am sure that other governments would have come to a similar conclusion. The main reason for this conclusion is that the measures suggested above are too slow, bureaucratic and complicated. Some of them are also unpopular and could be avoided. The more acceptable measure is (4), but it is not always possible. In any case, it requires the consent of the other party.

I am also sure that the Nigerian conclusion is a correct one. There is nothing wrong with the institution of corporations as such. If the corporations are doing badly it is not because the institutional machinery is bad but because its operators are bad. It follows that any reforms must be directed towards its operators, namely, government (ministers), board members, managers and consumers. This is a much more difficult reform. Change is not easily effected with people, for human nature is resistant to change. This is because not one but several factors cooperate and interact to bring about change in human behaviour and attitudes. All we can do is to try to create the environment that will hasten the desired change. The reforms suggested in the following paragraphs refer to both operators and the environment under which corporations function, namely:

The ministerial level.
The board level.
The management level.
The consumer level.

The ministerial level

Here the most urgent reform is that of definition, control and coordination. The objectives of every public corporation should be clearly defined. Having defined the objectives, the responsible ministry should proceed to

set targets in quantitative terms for each corporation. These targets may be in the form of investment decisions. What is suggested is that the ministry and not the corporation should initiate programmes of investment. Once this programme is agreed upon the corporation should be allowed to get on with the job without interference. From that moment the ministry should be interested in results. Hitherto it has been the corporation that takes the initiative and then goes to the controlling ministry to defend its schemes. Very often the ministry is not in a position to criticize and the corporation gets away with its projects—particularly if it is not asking government for any funds. If there are any criticisms they are with regard to whether or not the project comes within the plan. They are not in respect of its efficiency because of the lack of alternative choices. In some cases the project was not even initiated by the corporation but by a foreign entrepreneur who was interested in selling machinery. This system of development is not much different from uncontrolled private enterprise. It converts corporations from instruments for carrying out government policies into instruments of private enterprise.

The planning ministry should ensure that the objectives of the corporation as defined by government and its activities as outlined in the investment programme of the controlling ministry are properly coordinated with the objectives and activities of other government functionaries in order to ensure overall plan consistency. Tanzania did this by breaking up its giant multilateral development corporation into sector bodies such as an agricultural development corporation, tourist corporation and industrial corporation, each under the relevant ministry. In addition the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning has a unit in each ministry whose job is to assist the ministry and ensure not only consistency of projects but also their efficiency.

In Ghana the State Enterprise Secretariat has been converted into the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. Its main responsibility is coordination. Developed countries have Select Committees of Parliament. What is important is not the type of organization, but that the work of overall coordination should be institutionalized to ensure that the total economy is moving in the direction that the government and the people want it to go.

The board level

The main reform at this level is with regard to the calibre of the board members. The problem of government appears to be how to reconcile the pressure for popular participation with the requirements of efficient management. The pressure is mostly politically motivated and difficult to resist, even though the corporations are so important that government cannot afford to play politics with them. A possible solution lies in the creation of a few sinecure posts which politicians can fill at their pleasure. What is being suggested is something like the post of the keeper of the Tower of London

or that of honorary chairman of French parastatal bodies. The posts carry good salaries but hardly any responsibilities. The corporations have such an important role that they must be protected even at a price.

The desirable goals of participation and involvement could be achieved by getting organized and interested bodies to nominate members for appointment. The board of our Electricity Corporation, for instance, should contain representatives of industrial and domestic users; that of an Agricultural Corporation, representatives of agricultural cooperatives and other organized farmers. There would be no objection, in the short term, to continuing to give representation on boards to ministries until more qualified and suitable members can be appointed from the community. Once the appointment of board members is insulated from politics it will be possible to appoint them on the grounds of their special knowledge and experience and to give them longer tenure of office.

There is also a need to ensure that boards concern themselves only with policy matters. They should translate the ministerial investment programme into specific projects. They should insist on a proper pre-investment survey of every project and satisfy themselves in respect of its economic and commercial viability. They should also see to it that proper financial arrangements and adequate staff and materials are assembled for the successful execution of the project. Once these are assured they must leave the management free to manage the project. It should, however, be the boards' responsibility to appoint and dismiss general managers and to receive periodic reports from them on the state of the corporations.

The management level

The most urgent reform at the managerial level is that of manpower surveys. The corporations must know what managers, supervisors and operators they require, both in the long run and in the short term. The survey should indicate types of staff, their numbers, in what sectors and when they are required. This will depend on the objectives and programmes of investment of each particular corporation.

With the staff requirements known a progressive personnel policy must be developed for recruitment, training, discipline and general staff development. At present such policies, where they exist, are fragmentary and negative. They are fragmentary because they deal with appointment, salaries, allowances and leave but do not cover such areas as schemes of service, promotion prospects, insurance and pensions. They are negative in that they show more concern over rights and perquisites than over obligations; more concern for job protection than creativeness and production. Management, in the sense of staff development and getting the work done with minimum application of manpower and other resources, is ignored. No rules exist for developing leadership and motivation to ensure that people perform up to their capabili-

ties. The fragmentary and negative policies have a demoralizing effect on the staff resulting in general frustration and dissatisfaction.

Any reform should aim at improving individual and group productivity. To achieve this, personnel policies must aim at continuous training and development of every worker from his recruitment to his retirement. The policies must be such as will liberate the will to work and cultivate that state of mind which expresses itself in loyalty, enthusiasm, cooperation, pride in one's organization and devotion to duty.

The reform should start with recruitment, the purpose of which should be to get the best man for the job. The criterion should be competence and ability to perform a particular job based on its description and requirements. Some countries have common recruitment for its corporations. In India, there is an organization called Industrial Management Services whose members serve in enterprises. In Ghana, the Industrial Holding Corporation has to approve the establishment of, and appointment to, certain categories of corporation staff. Nigeria has a Statutory Corporations Service Commission responsible for personnel matters (appointment, promotion and discipline) in the same way as the Public Service Commissions do for the civil services. It has also brought the salary structures of corporations in line with those prevailing in the civil service.

These actions knock at the bottom of what makes for success in business; that is, flexibility. For example, business wants to promote workers on the basis of its own standards of merit; it wants a flexible work load with layoff based on merit; it wants to pay individuals on the basis of its own assessment of their merit and not according to a uniform scale that treats everyone alike.

Since the ultimate aim of reforms in personnel policies is improvement of individual and group productivity, the quickest way to achieve this is through training motivation and effective communication. The need for training cannot be overemphasized. The technological age is with us and the activities of corporations are more and more likely to be ruled by science. Scientific and technological developments take place at such a rate that even recruits with scientific education become out of date after a short time. The only way to keep up to date is for everyone to undergo training and re-training as the need arises.

Experts in behavioural sciences have discovered that the best method of increasing productivity is by developing the right motivators in workers. Two of these motivators are:

(1) A sense of security. This is not necessarily economic security, but security in knowing what is going on, security in knowing that one's work is wanted, that one is part of a group, and that one's boss and colleagues are not going to be capricious; and

(2) A sense of success, achievement and recognition. This is a feeling that one is making progress, that there is a general acceptance of

one's work, that one is achieving what one sets out to achieve and that advancement will depend on merit.

An effective communication system is indispensable to greater group productivity. People will work better if they know what is required of them, how their work ties in with the objectives of the organization, and when changes are to take place. They will work better if they feel free to discuss problems with their supervisors and to contribute to decisions that affect their work.

The consumer level

It would be a mistake to think that the expansion of the public sector is welcomed by all sections of the community in the countries concerned. The wealthier and growing entrepreneurial class are apprehensive. They resent the increasing tax burden which goes to finance the growing public sector; the real estate speculators are opposed to housing corporations competing with them in the provision of residential accommodation; and the transporters are opposed to measures which tend to favour the railways in their competition with road haulage.

What corporations should do is not to woo this influential minority but to ensure that they do not alienate the support of the majority by inefficient service and poor public relations. Very often the quality of the service of corporations is the subject of adverse comments both in Parliament and in the Press. Since the public is the consumer it is only fair that both the legislature and the Press should be concerned about the standard of services supplied. Sometimes, however, the adverse comments are based on ignorance of the facts and the circumstances of the particular case. Some channel should be provided for keeping the public informed about what is happening in the corporations and for bringing to the notice of appropriate authorities public reaction to corporation activities. Corporations should improve their public relations not merely by the appointment of professional public relations officers, but more particularly by ensuring that every worker inspires confidence in the public.

One method of keeping the public well-informed and of having the benefit of their reaction is by the appointment of Users' Consultative Committees. Public corporations like Railways, Ports and Harbours, and Electricity should benefit from such committees.

CONCLUSION

It will be observed that in this article little attention has been given to the organization and structure of public enterprises. This is deliberate because I believe that the performance of public enterprises is closely tied not so

much to the structure of the enterprise, but to the quality and calibre of the people in the enterprise. If we are to reform the enterprises we must first reform the people in them for the enterprises do no function in a vacuum. To reform the people we must take into account the social, economic and political environment that conditions their behaviour. It means that until there is an enlightened and articulate community coupled with the correct political, social and economic environment the chances of an efficient public enterprise responsive to the demands of development are very slender indeed.

The African states are passing through a period of transition and experimentation and there are bound to be defects as well as mistakes. To ignore these and other factors will be to expect too much. All we can expect and hope for is that they do not make costly mistakes and the future generations will learn from present mistakes.

FOOTNOTES

1 Specific current financial data on the public enterprises in Nigeria is difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that the 10 Federal Statutory Corporations alone have an employed capital of over N390,000,000. Because of the nature and size of the state-owned companies, the capital employed, again, is difficult to specify, since they range from a low of N250,000 to a high of some N25,000,000. It is safe to say, however, that the parastatals represent an important and influential role in the Nigerian scene.

2 The only exception being Kenya, where power was owned by private enterprise—The Power and Lighting Company Ltd. This, too, has now become a public enterprise, with the Kenya Government the majority shareholder.

3 *Report of the Nigerian Railway Corporation*, p. 13.

4 The only public inquiry I know of is the Maize Commission of Inquiry in Kenya.

5 Speech by the Minister of Communications, Research and Social Services on Revenue and Expenditure during the May Session of the East African Legislative Assembly in Dar es Salaam.

6 An effort to change this situation was made by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. This is set forth in its Statutory Corporations, Etc. (Special Provisions) Decree, 1966. This states clearly in section 2 (5) that

> Appointments of members of the board of a corporation affected shall be made by the appropriate Commissioner only after first satisfying the Federal Executive Council in respect thereof that the persons concerned are persons of integrity, and of good standing in the community from which they are to be drawn. In addition, the Federal Executive Council must be satisfied that such persons have the necessary ability, experience or specialized knowledge of the working of the particular corporation in respect of which appointments as aforesaid are contemplated, so as to discharge their functions of office in a manner satisfactory to the appropriate Commissioner.

7 *The Standard* (Tanzania), Tuesday 27 May 1968.

Developing New Managers for the Socialist Enterprise Sector in the UAR

A. F. SHERIF

This paper is concerned with developing managers for modern economic enterprises in a newly industrializing economy which has decided upon a socialist path to development, namely, the UAR.

Socialist managers, or rather managers of public enterprises, are viewed primarily, as professional managers. Just as engineers, doctors or lawyers are defined by a set of techniques that they, and normally only they, are trained and even licensed to use, so are professional managers. Management as yet even in industralized countries is not a fully developed profession by the accepted standards. But the fact remains that it is increasingly developing as a profession; and it is my belief that a socialist organization of the economy provides conditions which are most conducive to its increased professionalization.

My conception, however, of the socialist manager entails more than a mere professional similar to his counterpart in capitalist enterprises where separation of management from ownership obtains. Management development under socialism is different from its orientation in capitalist countries in so far as it envisages the socialization of management behaviour and practices. Indeed, the UAR experience in this respect can be fairly characterized as a systematic attempt at accelerating the growth of professional managers who are also inclined to behave as socialist managers should.

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It might be fitting, before we proceed, to describe how the UAR has gone about this task of relating the problem of management development to the overall problem of economic and social development. It is imperative under socialism to stress this relation, perhaps more than it is usually stressed in mature private enterprise economies.

To begin with, one must realize the enormity of Egypt's economic development problem. For more than two decades prior to the July 1952 Revolution, a period for which estimates have been made, *per capita* real income remained almost stationary. The rate of growth in net national product (in constant prices) only barely coped with a rate of growth of an exploding

population. The rate of gross capital formation did not exceed 10% on the average throughout this period. The Egyptian economy was virtually locked in a vicious circle, or inter-locking vicious circles, of secular stagnation.

This state of secular stagnation was increasingly associated with growing income inequalization, increasing misery of the working classes and a growing reserve army of underemployed workers. Indeed, these tendencies seem to hold beyond dispute under conditions of stagnation of a primitive capitalism.

The vicious circle of domestic politics was also a reflection of such a stagnant, lop-sided exploitative economic system. In essence, it was a game of conflict between an unholy alliance involving the colonial power and the privileged classes on one hand, and the suppressed working classes on the other. The armed forces, the civil bureaucracy, political parties and labour unions acted as docile and readily complying instruments of oppressive power in the hands of the ruling class and willing hirelings of its exploitative interests.

THE AGENTS OF CHANGE

The stagnant society did not operate, however, as a totally closed self-perpetuating system in one respect. It generated finally its antithesis, namely, a growing middle-class of army officers, educated civil servants and professionals. A revolutionary cadre then emerged in a powerfully potent change agent, namely, the armed forces. They were bent on the successful capture of the instruments of power and suppression from the ruling class, thus, making possible their control of the country.

Coming from peasant origin and gaining vertical mobility through education, the new cadre, though of a middle-class level of living, had the inclination to seek a new identity with the long-suffering working classes. This process of identification contributed to the successes of the revolutionary government. And success, in turn, has facilitated an increasing shift of political power to the working classes. A virtually one-man revolutionary organization, steeped in militarism, has smoothly yielded to increasing social democratization. Such a shift from military to civilian control not only helped Egypt to avert the well-known pattern in some countries of a continuous series of military coups, but it also paved the way for a smoothly increasing shift from a nationalist to a socialist revolution.

A strategy of development by a socialist revolution has been deemed inevitable as a way out of the interlocking vicious circles which contained the growth of Egypt. Only a major breakthrough under a socialist pattern of organization, would push the established Egyptian society to take-off into sustained growth of not less than 8% cumulative rate. By and large, one can safely characterize the ideological inspiration of change, as spelled out in the National Charter,[1] in terms of a form of "democratic socialism" true to the Egyptian culture.

NEW FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

Socialist organization began with a land reform programme which explicitly rejected the notion of land nationalization, forced collectivization and related Soviet practices. A regulated system of individual ownership under an announced ceiling intended to prevent the re-emergence of feudalistic exploitation has been adopted. Coupled with it is a state-initiated and guided, but voluntary, producers' co-operative movement designed to offset the limitations of peasant farming. More than 90% of the land is privately owned and the share of the socialist sector in agriculture is not projected to expand except through new land to be reclaimed from the High Dam.

Nationalization has proceeded in the non-farm sectors of the Egyptian economy, however, and progressively throughout the post-Suez nationalization decade. Large industrial, financial and trade enterprises employing 500 workers or more have been more amenable to compensated nationalization than small size enterprises. Handicrafts, retail trade, personal services and independent professions are completely in the private sector.

The Egyptian pattern of nationalization departs from some other experience where enterprises ranging from steel mills to barber shops are in the socialist sector. In addition to the explicit endorsement of private ownership of land and real estate and a limited margin of stock and bond ownership, no outright ban on the hiring of labour power or the selling of individual production has been decreed. However, clear-cut and announced ratios for the relative shares of the socialist and private sectors by activity branches have been specified. The ideological rationale behind this demarcation is more on the side of controlling the commanding heights of the economy, and building-up a strong lead-sector, than on the side of all-encompassing, Soviet-type practice.

Although the socialist sector accounts for 80% of net national product originating outside agriculture, or more accurately of the organized enterprise sector, the Egyptian economy is as yet more on the side of mixed than fully socialized economies in the overall patterns of ownership.

Obviously, this does not preclude a degree of centralized control which might be greater than the overall degree of socialization suggests. In principle, the private sector comes under indirect public management and still is assigned a role in the national development plan. Any further expansion in the size of the socialist sector is more likely to stem from its successful growth relative to the private sector, than from a new wave of nationalization. The size of central bureaucracy has overgrown to the extent that further socialization of the economy will have to wait upon the adoption of a greater measure of enterprise self-management, local self-government and decentralized decision-making.

The emerging form of democratic socialism in UAR is generally characterized as a blend, of "administrative socialism" and of self-management

in the Yugoslav sense. Definitely, it is not a full-fledged model of administrative socialism of the traditional Soviet-type. The fact that socialist practice in Egypt has not drifted into an excessive form of bureaucratic centralism is no meagre achievement considering the established bureaucratic tradition,[2] the over-committed resources and a variety of mounting pressures.

Nevertheless, the existing form of organization of the Egyptian economy does contain some features of administrative socialism. For one thing, the plan is compulsory rather than indicative, but it does not amount to a system of detailed instructions. The plan does not spell out more than aggregative sectoral targets and does not specify more than a list of investment projects to be implemented by assigned enterprises.

The administrative organization of the executive branch is hierarchical, running down from ministerial committees to ministries and central agencies to public organizations to public enterprises. In content, it is a ministerial system which brings under its wing new bureaucratic agencies, in the Weberian sense, to be welded with the traditional government bureaucracy. This process of fusion is still under way.

Public enterprises still retain the traditional, non-socialistic corporate form as promulgated by a Western-oriented company law. In this respect, the situation approximates the Indian pattern more than the Yugoslav Basic Law on Economic Enterprises. This lag in effecting change in the form of enterprise organization is intended, among other things, to assure public enterprises a greater measure of autonomy than might otherwise obtain. Although the present form of organization provides for a good measure of enterprise autonomy, there has been a built-in tendency toward proliferation of central controls. A more stable balance remains to be struck between enterprise autonomy and central control. Unlike other models of administrative socialism, the pendulum is bound to swing toward greater centralization, under the stresses and strains of development, unless a conscious, deliberate and more positive effort is made to counter the tendency of an established strong central bureaucracy for self-perpetuation and self-aggrandisement.

Such a trend must be countered or reversed by setting in motion the forces working for a greater measure of self-management. Although the July 1961 socialist measures have introduced workers' participation in management and profit-sharing, the present form cannot be accurately characterized as a self-management system of the Yugoslav-type.

In principle, the Egyptian socialist practice is committed to increasing democratization of the present form of organization: especially, in the directions of greater local self-government, popular participation and control, greater enterprise autonomy and more effective workers' participation. The present formula for workers' participation through equal representation on enterprise boards[3] has not been adequately tested to be evaluated correctly. It remains to be seen to what extent this form of workers' participation has strengthened the democratization of the management process.

Further measures for self-management would allow enterprise management greater freedom in wage administration, installation of incentive schemes, employment policy, profit distribution and pricing decisions. It would also call for more freedom for local authorities in the field of regional development. The Yugoslav model, though not fully understood and appreciated, has reinforced advocates of reform along the pattern of democratic socialism. Lately, the "Liberman Effect" seems to have added more reinforcement to this reform movement. By default more than by design, the planning system, established in 1957, has not developed into an all-powerful, detailed instructions mechanism as might be expected under bureaucratic forms of socialism. This unintended result might facilitate the move toward more democratic forms of market socialism, in so far as a shortage economy could prove conducive to further democratization—for as Leon Trotsky once noted, bureaucratism tends to thrive on situations of shortage.

EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

In the final analysis, the effective level of democratization that a socialist economy attains depends upon the development of adequate effective/managerial resources. Expertise autonomy and local self-government are to be won by enterprise managers and local administrators through effective performance backed by visible success with results delivered to society at large. Rarely is autonomy bestowed upon them by central agencies bent on bureaucratic centralism.

Thus, management development lies at the heart of the problem of evolving more democratic forms of socialism. Management development is viewed as a process of planned change in which the instrument of training, research and consulting are brought to bear upon the skills managers and administrators need for more successful performance and upon the environment in which they perform. In principle, a socialist economy rejects the doctrine of nineteenth century capitalism, or spontaneous "natural" growth of managerial skills. In principle also, autonomy conduces to the growth of enterprise management and the latter, through successful performance, reinforces further enterprise autonomy. This is what one might call the virtuous circle of democratic socialism, which feeds the forces of self-development all over the socialist enterprise sector.

In contrast with the experience of some other developing countries, the enterprise sector in UAR seems to have averted the situation where the frequent failures of new public enterprises justify more bureaucratic centralism, which in turn inhibits the further growth of socialist enterprises. Endowed with more abundant and better qualified professional manpower resources, Egypt has managed to embark upon the successful development of its socialist enterprise sector. In fact, Egypt seems to have captured the comparative advantage of a successful start since the nationalization of the Suez

Company. And Suez operation seems to have bolstered the self-confidence of the rising cadre of professional managers and to have built a modicum of achievement motivation in the Egyptian enterprise sector. The more challenging case of the High Dam administration has reinforced this trend. Such successful examples of autonomous lead organizations have made a decisive case for enterprise autonomy.

The diffusion of this experience into the whole socialist enterprise sector can be accelerated through management development services. Scientific management, like any new idea, product or process, finds its entry into practice via the pioneering efforts of a few innovators who display enough creativity and non-conformity to initiate the process of change. Then it spreads to a group of early adopters, an early majority, a late majority and at last to a group of laggards. The latter are usually the small enterprises maintained in the private sector under forms of primitive capitalism. In a real sense, socialist transformation should favour this diffusion. Hence, the socialist sector performs a lead-role in modernizing and upgrading management practices in the whole economy.

Management development is a cumulative process that has a momentum and a pattern of diffusion of its own. Once initiated on a sound basis it tends to accelerate until it permeates the whole economy. The real problem is to make an effective start or to engineer the process of initiation. Accordingly, management development efforts and programmes should shoot at developing the highest calibre of new managers who are expected to behave as innovators or early adopters. How to go about gearing management development programmes to this end is the case history of the National Institute of Management Development (NIMD).

SEARCH FOR NEW TYPE OF MANAGERS

According to NIMD's conception, the job to be done is no less than developing, quantitatively and qualitatively, a totally new cadre of socialist managers. Contrary to a currently held contention, there is such a thing as the "socialist manager" which is an ideal type.[4] True, in terms of professional make-up, the professional manager is one and the same in both capitalist and socialist enterprises. A good socialist manager is a sound professional with all skills of trade needed for successful economic performance.

Apparently, there is a tendency among Western management professionals to underestimate the differences between socialist and capitalist managers and a corresponding tendency toward their overestimation among socialist-oriented professionals. Without losing sight of, or glossing over the area of similarities, it has proved useful for management developers to place due emphasis upon the shaded area of differences.

These differences, it has been found, pertain more to behavioural characteristics than to technical skills. For one thing, the motivation of the

so-called socialist manager is different in so far as he is required to work harder at ambitious targets; to learn faster; to do his best work when it counts for the record, and not when special money incentives are introduced. In other words, the social system in which he operates, assumes that he has a higher need for achievement.[5] Indeed, it is hard to perceive the effective working of a socialist economy according to plan in the absence of a strong achievement-oriented nationalist ideology. There is some evidence already to the effect that certain types of ideological reform or conversion can apparently markedly increase this need for achievement at least for a time.[6] This is an area to be further explored by management development professionals if they are to influence motivation or change value attitudes in the desired direction.

In addition to differences of motivational orientation, there are still some differences in degree which might seem nebulous and difficult to concretize. To begin with, the socialist manager ought to have a greater awareness of his social responsibility and of his commitment to societal objectives than is usually required of his counterpart in private enterprise economies. He is also called upon to develop a greater understanding of the macro-economic science and of the process of bureaucracy. His effectiveness is at one time more related to his ability to cope with bureaucratic pressures from above and to display effective leadership under democratic pressures from below.

To be sure, both "types" of professional managers need thorough training and solid grounding in the newly developing science of management, including decision theory, systems analysis, information technology, simulation, programming and operations research techniques, heuristic methods, organization theory and the managerial economics. The professional manager of today, and definitely of the future, increasingly needs to be more of a management scientist or a technologist than is generally recognized. It is even clear that a large segment of this training would include the basic allied disciplines, mathematical as well as behavioural. Our attitude toward management is coming closer to our attitude toward modern technology, implying a greater recognition of the growing risk of managerial obsolescence, which might prove more detrimental to newly industrializing countries than technological obsolescence. However, any attempt at the identification of training needs of our ideal type of socialist manager is apt to remain incomplete without due reference to the new needs of behavioural training.

Recognition of the need for socialization of management behaviour in the direction of helping the transformation of authoritarian work relations into socialist relations has led to experimentation with newer training techniques designed to increase the participants' understanding of the dynamics of group relationships. Presumably, the need is greater on the part of the socialist manager than the capitalist manager for understanding group dynamics and inter-group conflicts. In principle, a socialist enterprise is,

by definition, an organization where conflicts, to use Mary Parker Follett's terminology, are resolved through integration rather than through domination or negotiation.

Indeed, the "announcement" or socialist transformation arouses expectations of and stimulates the need for newer socialist relations to evolve and replace a pattern of established work relations associated with exploitation, injustice and discretionary managerial authority. However, an accumulating backlog of past conflicts and lagging adjustments in socialist attitudes and values, while management clings to the logics of discipline and efficiency, are among the factors that combine to bring out the contrasts between what the socialist enterprise would like to think of itself and what it really is. The process of socialist transformation of work relations is the very process of change which begins with the awareness of this contradiction on the part of the enterprise's work force.

The enterprise manager is caught in the middle of this process of social change while still charged with maintaining discipline and morale as well as coping with larger production and investment targets. In effect, the authoritarian, discretionary managerial authority system comes under new pressure. The very concept of managerial authority is pressed to undergo a fundamental, qualitative change. It verges toward the concept of "influence" as experienced in highly democratic organizations.

DEMOCRATIZATION VERSUS PROFESSIONALIZATION

Now, induced professionalization of management might run counter to the mounting pressures for its increasing democratization, i.e. the opportunity for all workers, or producers in Yugoslav terminology, to participate in decision-making. In effect, the process of democratization in this context is a deliberate transition from a system of unilateral authority within the enterprise to a system of diffused or collective authority in response to a growing need for participation.

Over a wide range of enterprise operations, there is a contradiction between democratization and professionalization of the management process. Democratization might dilute the professional level of management, inject institutional politics into decision-making, loosen discipline, magnify the difficulties of leading the work force, relax efficiency standards, create conflicts, etc. By the same token, professionalism under the unit of command principle as Fayol has called it, or unity of management leadership in Soviet terminology, might produce its unanticipated results in negative morale, work relations and motivation. Professionalism orients the sociology of enterprise in such a way as to bolster lack of identification, low satisfaction, disciplined lethargy, a tendency to exchange revolutionary zeal for bureaucratic careerism, and growing tendency toward bureaucratization. The problem before socialist organizers, management developers and enterprise managers is to attempt to

solve that contradiction, or at least effect the best possible synthesis of the two desires.

Now to cope with mounting pressures for the speedy democratization of the management process, while maintaining discipline and clinging to the logic of efficiency is one of the ' toughest equations" which the new managers are struggling to solve. Sensitivity to the need to develop new socialist relations, insight into how these socialist relations develop within the enterprise and knowledge of how conflicts are resolved through integration are new "social" skills which rarely come naturally.

Greater effort has to be made to ascertain the differential changes in the process of management under conditions of socialist transformation. Managements of modern enterprises in industrial countries, capitalistic or otherwise, have experienced a growing professionalization. Like production processes, the process of management has undergone deepening and elongation. The growing degree of professionalization of the management process in industrial countries is evident, among other things, from the rising proportion of professional manpower, the virtual disappearance of unskilled workers and the rising standards of professionalization in appraising management performance.[7] In short, growing professionalization can be perceived as an iron law of modern management development in industrial countries, capitalistic or otherwise. In essence, therefore, management development in newly industrializing countries is viewed as a case of belated professionalization of a field which is known as the oldest of the arts and the newest of the professions.

In estimating the scope of planned change, it is imperative to perceive the management process in macro-terms, more than "Western" experts were once inclined to do. To relate micro-management at the level of enterprise to the total process, it might be useful to speak of vertical (or external) diffusion of management authority.

In a UAR socialist enterprise, management authority—formal and informal—tends to be shared within the enterprise with elected workers' representatives, the socialist union basic unit and the trade union committee. It also tends to be shared externally with the supervising public organization, the ministry concerned, the planning commission and a host of central agencies.

In a highly bureaucratic form of socialist organization, vertical upwards and external diffusion tends to be great to the extent that enterprise management is carried out according to a set of detailed instructions with minimum freedom for decision-making. In contrast, horizontal diffusion is greater under democratic forms of socialism.

One might easily make a strong case for democratic socialism on the strength of its favourable effect on management development. There is enough evidence to indicate that bureaucratic socialism inhibits initiative, stifles creativity, generates pressures for uniformity, reduces incentives for

innovative change and in many ways leads to the departure of informal organization from the formal norms.

I feel that the sociology and psychology of enterprise behaviour under bureaucratic forms of socialism still provide a fertile field for management research. State-appointed enterprise managers tend, under the principle of unity of command, to operate on the false assumption that no one at the work level has any ideas that could be useful to management.[8] By and large bureaucratic socialism tends to focus more upon the direction of things than upon the development of people. Management by detailed instructions is a poor system from a management development point of view. It might help develop an effective technocrat, but it does fail to produce the rounded effective generalist who will be increasingly needed as the enterprise economy grows in size and complexity.

STOCKTAKING DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

The UAR system of economic management with its unique features, can be said to stand midway between the bureaucratic form of the Soviet variety and the Yugoslav system of self management. As the economy moves away from situations of shortages to greater abundance, further decentralization will be undertaken.

As things stand, there are already, in addition to professional managers, newer participants in the overall management process. One group is a new cadre of economic administrators placed in public organizations, central agencies, new ministries, and in local administration as well. In a real, though indirect way, they do participate in managing the enterprise sector.

More directly involved in management at the enterprise level is the growing group of workers' representatives. These are placed in a host of newly created units which are coming to be an integral part of the formal organization of the socialist enterprise. They participate in the management process in their capacity as workers' representatives *vis-à-vis* the state-appointed professional managers.

Broadly conceived, the problem of management development should encompass all three groups, namely, the economic administrators or government bureaucrats, state-appointed professional managers, and workers' representatives. The total size of the universe, covering the three types, would probably run to more than 100,000, depending on our definitions; this is a challenging development job.

It is easy, however, to gloss over the qualitative differences in developmental needs for the three types of managers. Available evidence, pieced together, might produce a useful actual portrait to be contrasted with any ideal types or normative standards at which we might be shooting. It could be supplemented by further field data designed to portray the learning

needs of existing cadres. Some significant research along these lines is already under way at NIMD.

By and large, the typical professional manager is a university graduate in engineering, commerce, science, law or liberal arts. The ratio of university education is almost 100%; this is even higher than the corresponding ratio in advanced industrial countries. His record of at least fifteen years' experience has developed him into a qualified specialist in his field. He needs to grow into a generalist with an all-round understanding of the enterprise growth problem as a whole and the interaction of different enterprise functions upon its economic expansion. In so doing he needs to understand the administrative process and to appreciate the potential of newer high-powered management techniques.

The knowledge, technical skills and functional competence are easily knowable and relatively easy to develop through well-known and tested training techniques and management development services. More difficult are the behavioural and adaptability-to-environment segments of his make-up. The same is equally true of the other two types of managers. At the technical-professional training level, we might safely speak of three types of managers, different in kind. On the behavioural and environmental plane, the differences are more in degree than in kind. In fact, joint or group training might prove instrumental in effecting the required change in attitudes and in developing better inter-group relations. There is already some evidence to this effect.

In a period of relatively swift, government-initiated, forced draft socialist transformation, the manager's adjustability to a new environment in a major and urgent development need. In partial recognition of this fact, the trend has been in other socialist experiences to select top managers in terms of criteria of political conformity rather than in terms of merit. Such a policy might dilute managerial professionalism, politicize the management process, down-grade management competence, demoralize merit candidates and other "unanticipated" or unintended results to which it might lead and are not favourable to sustained professional management development. Nor would the policy of political appointment, once established, prove conducive to a subsequent shift to professional recruitment.

Due to some fortunate circumstances, such as the relative abundance of professional manpower, the ready popular acceptance of the revolutionary government and its record of success, it has been possible to avoid pressures that might have discounted the merit factor in top-management selection in Egypt. In spite of some faint advocacy in some political quarters of a shift to the contrary, this seems by now a firmly established policy. Aside from some transitional or delaying circumstances, the merit factor is likely to loom larger in future selection decisions.

With further democratization, the machinery and procedures of top-management selection might still undergo fundamental change. Here lie

possibilities for more rationalization of the selection system. As might be expected of a bureaucratic-ministerial administration, selection decisions are still highly centralized: they allow for no public competition, no voice for workers' representatives or local authorities, no explicit specifications of periods of tenure, procedures for reappointment or rotation or periodical appraisals of performance. These are areas where rational changes are to be considered.

PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION

The UAR approach to developing managers adjustable to the new environment is more geared to "training" than to political appointment. The understanding is that the socialist manager needs the ability to adapt to a changing environment as well as the ability to "lead" social change in his organization and to exert some positive influence on his environment as well. But the assumption is that such ability, though difficult to define and develop, is definitely developable and ought to be looked upon from a developmental rather than from a liquidationalist point of view. The resources of professional managers are always too scarce and too precious to be scrapped, liquidated or pushed aside. They ought to have their full role to play, including the right to make mistakes; their environment ought to be made more conducive to their freedom of action and their self-development in turn. And the society at large ought to guard against any overt or latent hostility it may develop toward them, and to educate itself concerning the strategic roles and social functions of managers. A hostile environment might erode the incentives of managers, sap their creative energy, divert their interest, distort their rational behaviour, suppress their propensity to take risk and stultify their growth.

Many pressures of transitions are not without some inhibiting effects on managers' development. It is no excuse to state that most of these inhibitions are unanticipated and unintended results of certain measures and situations.

Further situational thinking ought to go into understanding the ordeal of the Egyptian manager in a period of transition and transformation. He is required to cope with a host of conflicting targets with limited means and resources. Operating under the continuous pressure of an imposed imbalance between targets and means, he has frequently experienced some adverse effect on his motivation.

In the face of the mounting pressures, inevitable inherent in the process of a shortage economy attempting an ambitious leap forward, the average manager has frequently perceived, rightly or not, that his authority is withering away while his responsibilities are multiplying. Undeniably, the transition from a unilateral authority system to a system of participation has always had its pains. However, the fact remains that such mounting

pressures might weaken or do away altogether with the achievement motivation which would kill off any management development effort at the very source.

ROLE OF NIMD

Hence, the ordeal of Egypt's present manager is also an ordeal for us the management development practitioners. For one thing, a system of management by discretionary pressures and detailed instructions might evolve and gather strength enough to nip our management development effort right in the bud. For another, the average manager himself, and we need to feel we are in his shoes, might react to the situation in a defeatist way.

In a popular magazine article, I characterized his crisis as heroism or suicide. For the new Egyptian enterprise manager, suicide is, I judge, to develop the way traditional old-time bureaucrats have always developed generation after generation—inclined to play it safe and to put security before success. As President Nasser in his *Philosophy of Revolution* has put it, the role is searching for a hero. And it is my job as Chairman of NIMD to advocate the road to heroism and to make it possible for heroes to develop through whatever learning and training they can acquire. And they can acquire a lot.

NIMD is the very institutionalization of a well-conceived national development programme striving to fight the problems of transition via two avenues that are open to us: First, to help enterprise managers develop a creative response to these problems and to equip them with new tools; second, to advocate consistently changes in the overall system of organization and management of the enterprise sector which we deem supportive to the above-mentioned creative response and application of new techniques.

This is, indeed, a revolutionary task that requires NIMD to master a new social technology of decisive importance, namely, the new technology of management development. New vistas are opening up in the techniques of training which ought to lift our confidence. Programmed instruction, for example, promises to make possible faster acquisition of many technical skills with less teaching resources. Sensitivity training promises the effective acquisition of behavioural skills. It is even conceivable for training, using some newer techniques, to attempt to develop far-fetched dimensions like creativity and better motivation of managers.

Some new developments in learning theory and the techniques of adult education justify our firm belief that attitudes, motives, values and personality traits can be developed as knowledge and skills have proved to be developable. The problem is to know how to effect this type of planned change, to increase the effectiveness for management development services, to test out and master new training, research and consulting techniques. Above all, it requires a real sense of mission.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, some lessons of experience stand out as worthy of note. Many developing countries, as is the case with the UAR, are experimenting with newer forms of economic organization. We still lack a theory of management development to guide us, among other things, in ascertaining the areas of comparative advantage to relevant alternative institutional frameworks, including public operation under bureaucratic and democratic forms. Such alternative forms of economic organization are not without their serious ramifications for management development.[9] However, management development professionals have left this area of investigation to the economist, whose theory has not been an adequate platform and whose standard equipment is not clearly appropriate.[10] Non-economic influences on economic development in general and managers' development in particular, with respect to which the economist claimed no competence, have been left to other social scientists. A few of the latter have only recently recognized their concern for management development. Management specialists, on the other hand, have enthusiastically advocated professional management training of the type perfected and popularized by Americans.[11] This is becoming generally accepted among management development practitioners as a means of professionalizing management and generating high level managerial resources. Such training programmes are generally oriented toward the case method or similar training techniques.

As they stand, such programmes tend to make the implicit assumption that the major barrier to management development is lack of effective knowledge of advanced management techniques. Or, it might be at times supposed that since they are definitely oriented toward improving conceptual and technical skills needed for successful problem-solving, they would change value attitudes in the direction of those held by managers in the most advanced countries. Unfortunately, no comprehensive investigation has yet been made to evaluate their effects.[12] There is some evidence, though not very conclusive, that management training for practising executives of the traditional type, fails to produce significant changes in attitudes in the desired directions. Again, the results are not conclusive, but they are not encouraging either.

Indeed, it is likely that if a rigorous evaluation were made of the degree to which these programmes have made a dent in diffusing modern management practices, the results would be, in most cases, startingly dismal. Somehow, such offering are not well taken. Protective shells seem to prevent this exposure from penetrating or unexpected results arise which nullify it. Sometimes, it is received and seems promising for a time, but there is then a gradual reversion to old methods. The lack of supportive environment might account for this frequently encountered washout effect.

Some of these programmes have, of course, been highly effective. But, if the informed guesses of the directors of such programmes concerning the

fraction of success results in terms of attitude changes were pooled, the median fraction would probably not be very high.

So far, my conclusion might meet with the approval of a number of behavioural scientists who are growing rightly critical and fairly skeptical of accepted approaches to management development.[13] But, I definitely refuse to go along with the thesis of "natural growth", i.e. that change can only occur through a slow historical process; allowing little room for deliberate measures to produce change. Indeed, some current theorizing about the process of change in this field seems to suggested change is apt to occur only over a series of generations under historical pressures that alter childhood environment and earlier personality formation. By implication, they pessimistically suggest that formal education and training in adulthood does not have much power to accelerate the process of desired change.

Without meaning to conclude on an optimistic note, I am inclined to put greater faith in the significance of the on-going social change in many developing countries, in the results of experimentation with forms of economic organization and the potential of newer management development techniques.

FOOTNOTES

1 The National Charter as spelled out by President Nasser has been adopted by an elected national assembly as an official ideology.

2 Egypt as a "hydraulic as well as an established society"—using the technology of Carl Wittfogel in his book *Oriental Despotism*—has always needed a strong central government to administer irrigation and social changes. However, a workable organization formula needs to be designed to maintain such a strong central government while allowing a greater measure of economic decentralization.

3 The presidential degree on Workers' Participation specifies that not more than four state-appointed members from the ranks of professional staff of the enterprise and four openly elected workers' representatives sit on the board for a two-year tenure. The board is to be chaired by a state-appointed top manager who bears the real burden of executive responsibility *vis-à-vis* the government.

4 Bertrand Russell, once asked about the similarities between communism and capitalism, instantly retorted:

> "There are to quote a lot of similarities which can result almost inevitably, I think, from modern technique. Modern technique requires very large organizations, centrally directed, and produces a certain executive type to run them. And that is equally true in communist and in capitalist countries, if they are industrially developed."

Upon further questioning he goes on to say that these large organizations tend to produce a similar attitude of mind among their executives in, say Russia and America, "though not completely. I mean, there are differences in degree but not in kind... I think there is a very great similarity between a really powerful American executive and a Soviet administrator. There are more limitations upon what the American executive can do, but in kind they are the same sort of thing". (See his book *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind*, Ohio: The World Publishing Company, 1960, p. 49.)

Although Russell's theme has been largely confirmed by more detailed descriptive findings compiled by economists and management professionals (see, for example, David Granick, *The Red Executive*, MacMillan, 1960, and Josteph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, it is still operationally useful for a management development institution operating in socialist economy to retain the concept of the "ideal type" of socialist manager.

5 This is by definition the so-called "Achievement Motive in Economic Growth". See a paper bearing this very little by David C. McClelland in *Industrialization*

and Society, Bert F. Hozelitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Paris and The Hague: UNESCO—Mouton, 1963, pp. 74-95.

6 See David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society,* Princeton, 1961.

7 For a more detailed and rigorous formulation of this thesis, see my dissertation "The Role of Capital Formation in the Industrialization of Underdeveloped Countries", Chicago, 1953, pp. 90-96.

8 For some indicative research along these lines, see A. Zalemik, C. Christensen and F. Roethlisberger, "The Motivation, Productivity and Satisfaction of Workers: A Prediction Study", Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1958, especially pp. 415-417 and 421-423.

9 Note, for example, a remark made by a distinguished British Sovietologist, namely, Alec Nove, commenting on Stalin's form of economic organization: "Throughout Russia, officials at all levels modelled themselves on Stalin, and each succeeded in imposing more unnecessary misery, on more subordinates, stultifying initiative, penalizing intelligence, discouraging originality. The price of all this is still being paid." See his book *Was Stalin Really Necessary?* Allen and Unwin, 1964, p. 31.

10 This remark was aptly made by a distinguished economist, George Stigler of the University of Chicago in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, "The Economist and the State", *The American Economic Review,* Vol. LV, No. 1, March, 1965, pp. 1-18.

11 F. A. Harbison and C. A. Meyer, *Management in the Industrial World,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

12 I don't know of any available on a comparative basis except one sponsored by the Ford Foundation, conducted by a group of Northwestern Professors, which is more focused upon the comparative growth and institutional models of a number of institutions engaged in these programmes.

13 I would include among them, David McClelland, see his book, *The Achieving Society,* op. cit., p. 415, and Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change,* Homewood, Illinois: The Dorney Press, 1962.

Factors Affecting the Performance of Public Corporations in Nigeria

M. S. OLISA

The history of public corporations in Nigeria is fairly recent, dating back to the five years following the end of the Second World War. "Public corporations" mean corporate bodies created by the federal or state governments to operate certain businesses in agriculture, commerce and industry, often with a view to operating these lines more efficiently than could be done by governments and on a profitable basis. Beginning as a trickle in the period between the end of the Second World War and Nigeria's attainment of independence, the creation of public corporations rose to flood level at independence and has maintained that pace since. The Nigerian Railway Corporation, the Nigerian Produce Marketing Boards, the Regional Development Boards (later Regional Development Corporations and now State Development Corporations) and Nigerian Airways were among the first public corporations created in this country.

The rationale of public corporations is partly intellectual and partly economic. The intellectual argument lies in the view of these corporation as answers to the accusations levelled against the capitalist system that it encourages monopolistic ownership especially of vital public utilities, and exploitation of a large section of the population who are collectively the rightful owners of all resources of their land; and that it permits a few persons or groups to enjoy this monopoly. Perhaps this view was responsible for the earlier public corporations being vital areas: ports, railways, airways, electricity and the marketing of the export produce which is one of the country's key foreign exchange earners. Because they were in vital areas the accountability of these corporations to the government and through that to the people was important. Hence in the days of civilian rule in the country each of the public corporations was under the portfolio of a minister who presented its annual reports to Parliament, took the praise for the achievement of the corporation or the blame for its failures. Under the present military government public corporations are still assigned to "controlling" ministries, with the relevant Commissioners taking responsibility for the affairs of the corporation in the government, whether State or Federal.

The economic rationale for the creation of public corporations is rooted in the assumption or expectation that:

(1) efficiency can be achieved to a higher degree than is possible if the enterprise is run by a government department or ministry;
(2) there will be freedom of initiative, the possibility of quick decisions and more flexible policies and methods, all of which are impaired by direct governmental management;
(3) as a result of (1) and (2) above, the corporation will be in a position to run the enterprise at a profit;
(4) as government, and therefore the people, are the ultimate owners of the enterprises managed by public corporations, the profits accruing from their operations are public money and can be fully utilized in the public interest e.g. by reducing consumer prices for the products;
(5) although public corporations are expected to operate as businesses and make profits, they are also expected to provide more employment opportunities for citizens. It is generally believed that the big expatriate owned commercial and industrial enterprises in the country could employ more people and offer more generous service conditions than they presently do if they were less profit-oriented. In other words, public corporations should be motivated by social welfare and profits at the same time;
(6) profits made by state-owned corporations, unlike those of private enterprise, could be ploughed back into the domestic economy while most of the profit made by foreign-owned enterprises—on the average the most prosperous in the country today—are expatriated; in other words the income of public corporations can produce multiplier effects within the country and these help its general economic development.

These arguments cannot be seriously challenged for they constitute what should be the proper expectations from the public corporations. But the experience of the country since the inception of public corporations is that very few of the economic expectations have been met; not a few corporations in Nigeria have remained sick while quite a number of actual deaths have been recorded. The reason that liquidations are not more frequent is that several of the corporations are annually propped up by the governments which own them, either by repeated subsidies or by writing off the debts or losses incurred by the corporations concerned.

Because of the one-sided nature of this balance sheet, this discussion of the factors affecting the performance of state-owned corporations will emphasize the negative more than the positive. In other words the discussion will dwell more on the ways in which the factors discussed hinder efficient performance than enhance it.

Public corporations, within this paper, should be differentiated from other state-owned statutory bodies which render services which are not commercial.[1] The Nigerian Railway Corporation, the Nigerian Coal Corpor-

ation, the Marketing Boards of the federal and state governments, the state-owned hotels, state-owned breweries, state-owned cement factories and banks are some of the corporations discussed. The other category includes such bodies as the Scholarship Boards, the Public Service Commissions, the Library Boards, the School Boards, councils of universities and teaching hospitals. This latter group does not fall within the context of our present discussion even though some of the factors discussed can be applied to them.

Generally a state-owned corporation has a board of directors appointed by the government which owns the enterprise with which the corporation is charged. The board controls the corporation especially on policy matters and is itself responsible to a "controlling" government ministry and through that to the government. During the period of civilian rule in the country the chairmen of the boards of management of the public corporations were generally political appointees, picked from the membership of the political party in power, or prominent and responsible individuals not antagonistic to the government party. Under the present military rule it became common, for understandable reasons, to appoint very senior civil servants as chairmen of these corporations, mostly on a part-time basis. Day-to-day operation of the businesses has, as before, been in the hands of the management and professional staff, operating under the general policies laid down by the government through the board.

The factors which affect the performance of these corporations are in this paper, for convenience and clarity, grouped into four: economic, socio-political, administrative and operational-technical. Although efforts have been made to categorize factors which operate generally among the corporations, the categories cannot be rigidly separated from one another because many factors are interrelated. It is also important to note that the same factor does not apply with the same intensity in all corporations because of individual peculiarities arising from the personalities which make up the board, the type of business which the corporation operates and the nature of the human and material resources needed for its operation.

THE FACTORS

The factors affecting public corporations may appear differently to different people and this leads to difficulty in analysis. In addition the number of these factors is surprisingly great. Since I contributed a short article to the *Bureaucrat*[2] on this subject early in 1973, further research has revealed that the problems facing public corporations are far greater in number and scope than those discussed in that article. For this paper I have distributed a questionnaire to a number of responsible persons in various decision-making capacities. The responses have been quite revealing, highlighting new factors. I will list all the factors so far identified and comment briefly on each. In other words what is presented here is mostly a shopping list.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Staffing and Staff Establishment

Over-staffing occurs when the staff strength of a corporation exceeds the volume of work which it is intended to cope with and under-staffing occurs when the reverse is the case. The results of both phenomena are very much the same in that the corporation loses money through heavy labour costs or through under-utilization of capacity. The Nigerian experience over the past fifteen years is dotted with perennial troubles arising from threats of or actual mass retrenchment and from anxieties over delays in paying staff its regular wages.

Another aspect of the problem of economic staff strength is what some analysts of the problem have called "too much stable employment".[3] This means that far too many workers who should be hired on a day-to-day or piecework basis are given tenure and are thus converted into a perpetual burden on the funds of the corporation concerned. One of the results of this is that tenure tends to reduce alertness, dedication and diligence and therefore to aggravate the human obstacles which will be discussed later. Over-staffing not only reduces the profit margin of the enterprise concerned but can also in fact reduce the total output per man. Following the civil service tradition to which most people in this country are accustomed, almost every department is loaded with an array of chief, deputy chief, senior, deputy senior, assistant, deputy assistant, and junior, etc., at all levels, with the result that many functionaries tread on one another's toes where one or two persons could do the job more effectively.

The problem of determining an optimum, or the most economical staff strength is tricky because over-establishment may occur in sections of the enterprise; the clerical staff may be too many and the technical staff too few.

Closely related to this problem is that of high labour costs which could take the form of high wage rates or low output per unit of labour. It is often argued that public corporations must offer attractive rates of pay in order to obtain high-quality staff at all levels. But this argument and the attendant expectations have not been proven right in practice mostly owing to the intervention of other factors such as employment practices affected by ethnic and sectional considerations. The controversies and the consequent pamphleteering which bedevilled such corporations as the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the then Electricity Corporation of Nigeria between 1962 and 1964 suggested that staff recruitment might be affected by tribal considerations. More will be said about this when we consider socio-political factors. Many corporations today retain a good number of employees who were hired before the civil war because of political and other non-economic considerations and it is often among such employees that one finds limited expertise and little dedication to duty.

In general the wage-rates of public corporations in Nigeria are higher than those of the government although total benefits, including job security, may compare unfavourably with those of the latter. Fringe benefits and conditions of service differ from corporation to corporation. The problem here is that in almost all cases the wage-rates and fringe benefits of corporation are not determined by economic realities, such as the size of profits and output per worker. This is because the wage-rates are sometimes fixed even before the corporation begins to operate its business.

High Cost of Equipment

Because many public corporations in Nigeria have to import most if not all their capital equipment, costs are naturally high, thus reducing the profit margin in the initial years of operation. Corporations are frequently not exempted from import duties which are often quite large. Initial profits are further decreased by such fringe benefits as subsidized housing, medical services, provident funds or superannuation schemes, and staff training schemes which, though expected to yield profits in the long run, reduce profit margins in the short run. Another aspect of this problem is the wasteful purchase of unsuitable or uneconomic types of equipment. An example is the purchase of Scania buses for the Lagos Municipal Transport Service. It was discovered that the buses, bought at very high prices, were in fact old, reconditioned buses whose functioning lives were almost finished and for which spare parts were not easily available. In about two years all the buses were off the road with millions of pounds more or less poured down the drain. For enterprises which are yet to establish themselves economically, these financial commitments can be heavy burdens. This does not overlook the fact that for some corporations, like the Railway Corporation, Ports Authority and the Airways, heavy overheads and capitalization are inevitable, so expectations of profit must take into account heavy maintenance costs as well as the considerable time lag needed to offset the heavy sums invested initially.

Uncompetitive or Low Quality Products and Services

Most of the public corporations in Nigeria produce services rather than goods. Federal and state governments have only recently become part owners of enterprises which produce goods, including beer brewing, distilleries, textile manufacturing and cement production to name a few. In recent years there have been constant public complaints about the quality of service given by the established corporations, e.g. erratic supplies of electricity, congested ports, undependable flight schedules and manifest inability to cope with occasional abnormal demands. As far as goods are concerned there has been the persistent impression that locally manufactured goods are inferior in quality and much higher in price than imported goods. The results of this include

continued importation of foreign brands and the smuggling of such goods where they are not officially allowed. The relevance of this situation to productivity can be clearly illustrated by the sample of textiles, where imported varieties led to low sales of locally made ones, with all the attendant unpleasant economy measures such as lay-off of staff and reduction of production.

The low quality of local products and services largely account for widespread smuggling which federal and state governments have been battling for years because of the attendant loss of public revenue.

Uncompetitive Prices of Products and Services

Closely related to the problem of low-quality products and services is that of the high prices of goods and services. Most of the goods made in Nigeria have not proved cheaper than their substitutes made overseas under more advanced technology. Air fares for domestic flights in this country are believed to be comparatively high and to have discouraged numerous persons from travelling by air. Contrasted to this the luxury bus lines established in recent years by several state governments have become popular mainly because the fares compare very favourably to those in the open market and the services are efficient and dependable.

By limiting present consumers and keeping away potential consumers overpricing reduces current revenue and denies the business larger potential revenue. Cheaper domestic air travel, for example, is an experiment worth trying in this country.

Markets and Market Potential

Markets for the goods and services produced by the public corporations differ in size and potential. Some corporations like the Coal Corporation and Nigeria Airways face the problem of domestic markets which are either too small or not fully developed. If domestic air travel had become a mass consumption service in the country it would provide most of the corporation's fortune; in the world market the Airways had to contend with highly developed competition. The Coal Corporation on the other hand often faces a dwindling market.

An interesting illustration of an undeveloped market is provided by the glut which bedevilled the soft drinks industry in the middle 1960s. During that period the soft drink factories were operating under capacity—some as few as three days a week—in order to avoid enormous unsold stock. This particular problem is tied up with the need for intensive market research, the development of which is low in most if not all the corporations. As many of the corporations are monopolies the markets for their products can be

easily expanded by judicious use of research, modern marketing methods and lower prices in return for increased consumption and larger turnover.

Financial Management

Sound financial management or administration is an important factor in the operation of a public corporation. Financial administration involves the investment policies of the corporation, as well as controls over money in the day-to-day business of the company. Purchases of inferior or outdated equipment do occur in many public corporations examples being the transmitter purchased by the former Eastern Nigeria Government for its radio service and the much-criticized Scania buses of the Lagos Municipal Transport Service. Poor financial controls usually leave room for fraudulent practices on the part of corporation staff, often in collusion with outsiders who do business with the corporation. News items reporting cases of large-scale fraud involving public officials are quite frequent in the Nigerian press.

Another serious aspect of financial mismanagement is the over-pricing of contracts and the attendant kick-backs for top-level personnel of public corporations. One result of this practice is that large amounts of money earmarked for investment do not take the corporations as far as they were expected to do because only part of this money is really invested.

The Problem of Capital

One hundred per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire used for this paper listed insufficient capital as one of the major problems facing state-owned public corporations. While this problem constitutes a major handicap for most public corporations it must also be noted, before further discussion, that too much capital—what one may call over-endowment—could itself encourage tendencies towards faulty and extravagant financial management. The mere fact that public corporations can always be rescued from financial misfortunes by owner-governments is itself accountable for the lack of entrepreneurial ability so common amongst these corporations.

But these observations apart, there is a strong case for the corporations to be allowed more investment and working capital, more borrowing powers and wider discretion in investing capital than they presently possess. Quite often well-worked out programmes of expansion remain on paper permanently because the needed capital cannot be provided or borrowed, as long-term loans must be approved or underwritten by government.

Lack of willingness to undertake risks is thus heightened by political and bureaucratic constrictions. Not infrequently commissions of enquiry and dissolution of the supervising boards follow any major financial crisis in the corporations even in cases where further financial assistance could enable the corporations to contain the crisis and ensure future buoyancy.

Public corporations owned by state governments suffer more from insufficient capital funds than those owned by the federal government. The latter is richer and this underscores the adviseability of state governments allowing the Federal government to participate in business enterprises initiated by then. Active and substantial participation by the federal government will most certainly not be very welcome by the states but it could in the long run benefit them when the enterprise succeeds and yields profits. Here, of course, one has to take into account the complications that will arise in such matters as staffing, control, board membership and accountability.

Competition

Not all public corporations operate as monopolies, and some therefore have to contend with competition in their lines of business. Even those, like the railways and the airways, which are deliberately established as monopolies have nevertheless encountered indirect competition. The railways have since the 1960s been facing serious competition from road transport, especially heavy road haulage by fleets of long-distance trailers which came into prominence on the eve of independence; this situation and the consequent reduction of revenue strengthened the case for more use of diesels.

The airways have to meet effectively the challenge of mass ownership of fast cars especially as the country's road system becomes modernized. Outside the country, as has been noted earlier, it has to equip itself for competition with other airlines.

Smuggling, unfair and illegal as it is as a weapon of competition, creates serious problems for some government corporations. In spite of the limitation on the importation of foreign substitutes, the government-owned textile industry in this country continues to be seriously affected by large scale smuggling of textile materials into Nigeria. The production marketing boards face problem of produce being smuggled out of the country.

World Economic Forces

Not all public corporations are insulated from economic forces prevailing outside Nigeria. Inflation, monetary fluctuations and national economic policies in other states do, directly or indirectly, affect the fortunes of public corporations. Prices of raw materials required for operation fluctuate, more sophisticated equipment and methods emerge, and changes in foreign exchange rates affect prices of capital equipment and raw materials. For corporations which have heavy financial dealings with the outside world, these uncertain economic forces could be a help or hindrance. Increase in world demand for primary products like cocoa, palm produce and groundnuts could make fortunes for the marketing boards as happened soon after World

War II, whereas a sharp fall in demand could create heavy financial burdens for them as has been happening during the past ten years or so.

Infant Industry Benefits

The general view of public corporations is that they are over-subsidized and over-sheltered by government. Still, many who are involved in the management of corporations are prepared to argue that infant industry benefits accorded to corporations are not sufficient. Some state governments regard the initial capital invested in corporations as a loan and demand repayment over periods which vary from state to state. Corporations which need many years to show profits are expected to yield them within a few years and failure to do so is regarded as an indication of inefficiency or mismanagement. Circumstances differ from corporation to corporation and these should be carefully analysed before the nature and extent of infant status are determined. In general, however, one could argue that the longer these benefits—exemption from company tax, postponement of loan repayment, excise duties, low interest rates, etc.,—are stretched the better, especially as profits are not the prime expectations for the corporations.

SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

The category of factors which is here labelled socio-political refers to those factors which arise from or can be explained in the context of the prevailing political power structure and of social values within the country.

Political Intervention and Control

The intervention of politics into the affairs of public corporations has been a major problem both before and since the emergence of military rule. The nature and extent of political intervention differ from corporation to corporation. One of the most common forms is the determination of the economic activities of public corporation by political considerations. Cases like the siting of Nigeria's iron and steel complex and of the soft drink industries illustrate a situation where the corporation could be compelled to locate itself in an environment not best suited to optimum productivity or to duplicate itself in such a way that optimum productivity is not achievable. It was the opinion of many economists that one big soft drink factory operating at full capacity could adequately supply the whole of Nigeria and West Africa; yet every regional government went ahead to establish its own soft drink factory.

Optimum performance and profitability of public corporations are also disturbed or distorted when staff recruitment is heavily influenced by politics. This was more pronounced during civilian rule when employment in public

corporations provided the political parties in power with jobs for persons and groups loyal to or active in the parties.

At the end of the civil war several corporations in East and Central State, for example, had to work out the best ways to strike a balance between removing and retaining their pre-war employees many of whom were recruited on political grounds. Even if a new board of directors takes over and retains former politically recruited employees the loyalties and work attitudes of such employees often tend to be uncertain, and this is not in the best interests of the corporation.

Quite apart from the negative effects of politically influenced appointments of corporation workers, a more destructive situation arises when chairmen, board members and top management staff are appointed on political grounds. Patronage often results in extreme freedom or extreme caution none of which is best for the corporation.

Other areas in which political intervention is manifested include the award of major contracts, the determination of further investment, for example, through expansion. In spite of all this it must be realised that some degree of political intervention is unavoidable in public corporations because of the fact that they are state owned. Sometimes purely economic advantages have to be set aside in favour of what is considered to be the public interest. The extent to which these observations could be considered detrimental to the success of public corporations depends on the degree to which particular situations deserve or do not deserve the intervention of political authorities. A balance is necessary between making a board a rubber stamp by indiscriminate dictation from above and ensuring that the corporation achieves the objectives for which it is created.

Tribalism and Ethnicity

Tribalism has remained one of the most serious unsolved problems of Nigeria in her effort to achieve national unity and integration. Tribalism has been described by students of African societies as a phenomenon which makes people more loyal and more attached to the tribal group than to the nation,[4] and it manifests itself in practice where political decisions and the exercise of government authority deliberately favour members of some tribal groups at the expense of other groups. Ethnicity, the younger brother of tribalism, is the same phenomenon applied to large recognizable groups within one tribe. Thus while tribalism will apply to dealings among Ibos, Yorubas, Hausas, Tiws and so on, ethnicity would apply to dealings among Owerri, Ibos, Onitsha Ibos, Ngwa Ibos, Egba Yorubas, Ijebu Yorubas, Oyo Yorubas and so on.

The period from roughly 1956 to 1966 can in retrospect be regarded as the country's worst period in terms of tribal politics, bitterness, rivalries and suspicion. Natural issues were blurred by these negative social forces and

appointments in public corporations were judged in terms of tribal labels rather than the qualifications and abilities of the appointed. At the peak of the mutual accrimonies which followed the confusion over the 1964 and 1965 federal and western elections respectively, myriad inter-tribal utterances, memoranda and pamphlets were fed to the Nigerian public.[5] Within the major tribes too, inter-ethnic jealousies flourished, so that at the same time that accusations circulated about which tribes dominated the federal-owned corporations others circulated as to which ethnic group dominated regionally-owned corporations.

The destructive effects of tribalism and ethnicity on the efforts of public corporation to achieve their declared objectives included weakening of discipline, protection of incompetent and unqualified employees, inability to agree on operational methods and policies, mutual suspicion, decline of morale, feelings of insecurity, inability to undertake long-term plans and the undermining of good labour relations and industrial peace.

Bribery and Corruption

Some people would rate bribery and corruption equal to tribalism as a social force destructive of national development in general and of the success of the public corporations in particular. A host of the other negative factors discussed in this paper could be said to hang or converge on bribery and corruption. Bribery features in employment and staff management when initial employment and future promotions have to be bought; it features in the award of contracts, in the administration of funds, in investment decisions. The 1962 Report of the Coker Commission into the affairs of the Western Nigerian Development Corporation and of the Western Nigerian Finance Corporation will always stand as an illustration of the magnitude of bribery and corruption in the public affairs of this country. The extent to which the situation persists is demonstrated by the fact that today, ten years after the Coker Commission Report, no week passes without several news items in the national press reporting cases of employees at all levels of public corporations facing trial or investigation for bribery and corruption, theft or fraudulent misappropriation of huge public funds.

As long as public corporations are governed or managed by board members and personnel who are prone to bribery and corruption, it will be difficult to attain optimum results financially and operationally.

Negative Work Attitudes

The idea inherited from Nigeria's colonial past that employment in government or public corporations is "white man's work" is still held by a large number of Nigerians. Often this is accentuated by political patronage and tribalism and the results are quite detrimental to the best performance

of our corporations. "White man's work" makes it possible for one to be indolent without immediate retribution, for discipline to be remote and circuitous, for tenure and promotion to be unaffected by efficiency and productivity. The observation that an operative in the expatriate-owned enterprises puts much more effort and devotion into his work than his counterpart in the corporations indicates that "white man's work" really means government work; the lower pay rate is not the reason for indolence in corporations because quite often corporations pay more. The right of petition which one colonial district officer described as one of the regrettable things the African learned from his white masters and which the privately owned firms hardly countenance, is a treasured weapon of government and corporation employees, easily used by junior and senior alike, even when the petitioner does not deserve what he petitions for.

Work attitudes cover not only personal operational efficiency but general business ethics such as attitudes towards members of the public, sense of personal responsibility about equipment, sense of attachment to the business itself and willingness to make sacrifices in order to promote its interests. Employees of public corporations, when compared with their counterparts in the private sector, especially in foreign-owned enterprises, make poor grades and this often accounts for the clear preference by many Nigerians for expatriate banks, shops, hotels, factories and so on.

Industrial Relations and Trade Unionism

Like the corporations themselves labour unions are new institutions in the country and while the organizational structures of trade unions are in general identical with their counterparts in the advanced nations, many of the established traditions that govern practice are far from being fully assimilated. Far too many labour leaders have received little or no training in this field and too many workers are still without clear ideas of the privileges and obligations of organized labour.

The general pattern of trade union behaviour among corporation employees is a pronounced emphasis on what employees can get from the corporations and little on what they can give to the corporations.

Very few unions, if any, take the trouble to assess the efficiency and productivity of workers as a basis for demands for higher pay and better working conditions. In one of the corporations in which the writer is directly involved cases have arisen where unions pressured the board of directors to recall workers dismissed for theft and those retired after reaching retirement age. Such frivolous demands are common and one result is to make employees feel that they can do no wrong or that redress is possible in all cases and under all circumstances.

One-sided trade unionism also encourages indolence, indiscipline and lack of personal satisfaction in giving service; and all these deficiencies are

not unconnected with the notion of "white man's work" which has been discussed earlier. Often such attitudes make it difficult for workers to draw proper lines as to the limits of trade union demands. One union known to the writer demanded to sit with the board of directors in drawing up the conditions of service of the corporation's employees. Sometimes union excesses are politically inspired or manipulated. It is nevertheless important to state that labour organizations have helped considerably in the development of public corporations generally. Unions often provide checks on boards and management prone to tribalism or applying partisan political considerations in running the corporations. Cases also exist where unions have spotted and publicized incompetent top management personnel. The extent to which they can continue to be constructive or destructive will depend on the opportunities provided at private, state and national levels for general education in trade union leadership and practice.

Boards and Board Members

Success or failure in a corporation is to a very serious extent determined by the nature and ability of its policy-making board of directors. As has been pointed out earlier politically appointed boards could feel too free or too constrained to take bold decisions on matters of major importance. Political appointments to the board may mean that there is little integrity or knowledge and experience in the business among the members.

The Adebo Commission Report stresses the need for board appointments to be based on these criteria but in practice this is often not workable.[6] Apart from the difficulty of measuring the individual's integrity before appointing him, there is a lot to be said in favour of striking a mean between extreme professionalism and extreme amateurism. Politics, if properly used, could provide checks on boards as the members must all confirm to the general policies of the party and no party in a real working democracy could risk antagonizing the public on a wide scale.

Perhaps a more complicated aspect of the role of boards is their proper relationship with management (general managers, accountants, engineers, who control day-to-day operations). Where boards are weak or have very limited knowledge of the corporation's type of business, the tendency is to rely too heavily on management guidance and this could be exploited by management. On the other hand management could be antagonized or frustrated by a board which tends to be too meddlesome. This is most likely to happen where the Chairman is full-time and is tempted to enter into areas properly belonging to management, or feels that he is isolated by the management and is, therefore, more or less redundant. In one such case the Chairman of a Public Corporation presented to the board a memorandum making unspecified and unsubstantiated accusations of ethnicism against the General Manager of the company. Further inquiries showed that the

Chairman's attempts to deal directly with staff matters were resisted by the General Manager. A situation of this nature could be doubly difficult to solve where the appointments of top management staff is by authorities higher than the board as is the case of boards under the present Federal Statutory Corporations Service Commission. A board of directors which cannot exercise some form of discipline over top management will find decisions quite difficult especially if such decisions do not please the management. One solution to this problem is a recommendation of the World Bank Mission of 1952[7] that the General Managers or Secretaries of Public Corporations be made members of the boards of directors, especially where the Chairman of such boards are not full-time.

ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Management occupies a crucial position in the fortunes of any corporation and its composition and performance should be of the highest grade. High-grade management personnel is generally in short supply, taking the country as a whole, but it is believed that though many corporations have some such personnel, their talents are hindered or diluted by a combination of other related forces, the most important of which are the limited education, and lack of experience, diligence and loyalty of auxiliary and junior staff. It is only recently that business administration has been introduced as a course of study in Nigerian universities and other higher institutions of learning and the graduates of such training are not only few at present but will for several years remain in junior positions wherever they are employed. This means that until they gain enough experience to rise to positions as Secretaries or Personnel Managers of public corporations, these positions will be occupied by persons not specifically trained for them.

Healthy Human Relationships

The study by Warmington and Wells[8] provides some interesting illustrations of the importance to a corporation of healthy human relationships. One is a situation where the zeal and ability of a foreman could be thwarted if his artisans are hostile and conspire against him, thus causing him either to compromise or to be removed if their conspiracy is pushed forward to management. Another illustration is a situation where a foreman or manager has to connive at the misdeeds of his kinsman in order to escape being indicted at home by his kith and kin. Both types of situations are capable of frustrating managerial ability if the collusion is not completely uprooted.

Another situation arises from the lack of sufficiently defined and generally accepted business ethics which makes it possible for top management staff or even board members to have improper relationships with female employees of the corporation. These practices could intrude into promotion, discipline

and deployment of personnel and could to that extent affect general efficiency and productivity.

Management Efficiency

An efficient management is indispensable to the success of a public corporation, especially if it is expected to operate like a competitive business and make profits. Corporation management in this country is handicapped by the lack of sufficient managerial experience shared by most developing countries and is worse when the drive for indigenization makes it necessary for most, if not all, of the management staff to be indigenes of the country. This general deficiency grows more serious the bigger and more complex the corporations, a situation which creates the impression that the developing countries find it difficult to cope with large-scale organizations.

But quite apart from difficulties arising from the large-scale nature of many corporations, there are some defects that cannot be attributed to size and one of them is slow decision-making arising from cumbersome procedures or sheer lack of proper response to exigencies. The report of the World Bank Mission to Nigeria, discussing this particular point, referred to a case where, in their own words "a loan for oil machinery was granted after three years of negotiations but funds were not made available for another two years".[9] This was much slower than even the government bureaucracy so often critized as being slow in decision-making. It also represents a situation where caution and thoroughness, if they were excuses, could be detrimental rather than helpful to the interests of the enterprise.

On a more routine level efficient management should handle the corporation's labour force in such ways as to extract optimum services from it. Balance in overall and sectional staff force, proper structuring of work schedules and loads, a prompt and effective system of discipline, regularity of wage payments, regularity and fairness in staff assessments and promotions, are but a few examples of labour management techniques still not attained in many corporations and in such cases attitudes to work and overall productivity are adversely affected. It has been argued that practical incentives in the form of bonuses, special promotions, prices and so on, should be freely applied to corporation workers so as to create the desire for excellence and better services. But one could argue that the same objective could be attained by a judicious combination of effective discipline and better education and training for workers.

Training schemes hold a very important place in countering poor efficiency and productivity. In terms of what is here being discussed, employees with management status and managerial potential should be encouraged to acquire formal training in business administration and related areas in both local and overseas institutions. In this regard new institutions like the Administrative

Staff College could broaden their bases to cater for the needs of both governmental and non-governmental sectors.

Intrusion of Government Bureaucracy

Although it has been pointed out earlier that some measure of political control is unavoidable in the public corporations, owing to the need for proper accountability, some people do not find it easy to justify the intrusion of bureaucratic governmental methods and personnel into the administration of these corporations. Many public corporations have top civil servants as either Secretaries or Chairmen. Seconded civil servants also serve at lower managerial and professional levels but their positions at those levels are perhaps less significant than those serving in key policy and management areas. One of the problems raised by their presence at top levels is that of dual loyalty and inability to identify fully with the aspirations and problems of the corporation concerned. Operationally, entrepreneurial drive is often thwarted as more stress tends to be put on the well-reasoned memoranda of civil servants than on the flair and imagination of entrepreneurial talents.

In spite of these dangers, however, it must be recognized that top civil servants serving in corporations provide valuable liaison between the government and the corporation and they do, in fact, facilitate such things as government backing for loans obtained by corporations. Civil servants at senior levels may not on account of their positions be easily amenable to such malpractices as bribery, corruption and political partisanship.

A recent trend in the intrusion of government bureaucracy is the creation of the Statutory Corporations Service Commission (SCSC) to assume among other things, the responsibility for recruiting top-level management and professional personnel for the corporations, supervising the conditions of service of such personnel and exercising discipline over them. Some of the responses to the questionnaire used for this paper describe the SCSC as an undesirable and unnecessary restriction. It is also noteworthy that recently the Western State government substituted for it a new arrangement in respect of its public corporations. The Adebo Commission, while strongly advocating the need for the SCSC stated that it received representations on the SCSC and, therefore, recommended a revision of its terms of reference so that its activities would not prevent corporation managements from having the authority needed for effective performance.[10] The extent to which one can argue for or against the SCSC depends on the extent to which its functions help to remove or reduce certain of the problems of the relationship between top management personnel and the boards of corporations as discussed earlier.

OPERATIONAL-TECHNICAL FACTORS

The group of factors here discussed for convenience as operational-techni-

cal refers to those making or not making for the maximum utilization of existing equipment, methods and expertise in the business of the corporations. In this connection the quality and availability of such equipment and expertise are relevant, for one without the other (available but poor, high quality but unavailable) still leaves an undesirable gap.

Quality of Equipment and Method

The type of equipment which a public corporation uses in its operations has an important influence on its fortunes. Inferior and obsolete equipment is often found in businesses operated by the government for a number of reasons, among them the slow processes of decision-making which prolong unduly the scrapping of obsolete equipment and the installation of up-to-date ones. This happened in the Nigerian Railway Corporation where dieselization was introduced in the fifties many years after heavy road haulage took away enormous business from the Corporation; and in the Nigerian Ports Authority where purchases of modern equipment waited for years until port congestion became a national crisis in 1971. Sometimes the delay in modernization of equipment is due to lack of capital and easy loan facilities (discussed earlier) which would enable the corporation to modernize. Again delay in technical innovation may be due to bad financial administration which makes it possible for inferior or obsolete equipment to be bought with funds provided for the best models. The case of the Lagos City Council buses can be cited here. Again ignorance of existing alternatives could be a cause, especially if the top professional levels are not experienced or very knowledgeable in the business.

Just as equipment could be inferior or obsolete, business methods could also be obsolete or unproductive. This recalls that some public corporations adopt the practices and procedures of the civil service rather than those of private business organizations.

It makes all the difference in business whether, for example, the accounting system adopted is the most efficient or not, whether procedures for policy discussion and decisions are quick or slow, whether hand brushes or vacuum cleaners are used for carpets, whether adding machines are used or not, whether the communications network in the office is efficient or not and whether staff deployment and work distribution are versatile or not.

The postal and telegraphic services in this country are constantly under sharp criticism because of factors of this type. In the telephone services particularly technical deficiency adds to the deficiency in methods and the result is not only that existing services are insufficient and unreliable, but also that telephone installation which is advertised and pushed in the more advanced countries is here treated as a luxury and privilege. Inadequate equipment also accounts for the general slowness of the postal and telegraphic services as seen in frequent letters to editors about telegrams and letters

which were received abnormally late. While conceding that serious efforts at modernization and improvement of equipment may be going on in these areas, the effects are yet to get to the remotest areas.

Professional Expertise and Experience

The most sophisticated equipment and the most up-to-date methods cannot function profitably if they are not backed by sufficient know-how and experience. Just as plants which are not well-handled or maintained could quickly become liabilities instead of assets, personnel with the best expertise could fossilize and waste away if not provided with the wherewithal to apply their knowledge. The actual situation differs from corporation to corporation but in general most Nigeria Corporations have not been able to get an adequate supply of professional expertise and experience.

One important but controversial solution has been the importation of foreign technical or professional experts. Experience has shown that many times these foreign experts are gods of clay and their contributions do more harm than good. In one case known to the writer the foreign expert proved to be irresponsible in financial administration and unable to appreciate the social and political realities which surround and affect his business organization. Quite often, too, indigenous colleagues are outraged to discover that the imported experts are less experienced or knowledgeable than them and interpret their presence as deliberate steps to frustrate local talents.

Even in those cases where the foreign experts are good, the World Bank Mission noted that "such outside assistance can be fully effective only if local staff is able to act on the advice and suggestions offered and to conduct the necessary continuing investigations". Still all these qualifications do not remove the fact that in the long run a satisfactory solution to the general shortage of professional expertise will be foreign participation either by intensive overseas training of indigenous staff or by increased local training facilities given by both local and foreign qualified staff.

The Problem of Infrastructure

The general business environment of Nigeria still remains comparatively underdeveloped in spite of tremendous advances which have been made in the last fifteen years. The national road system is ultra-modern in parts but badly needs coordination and standardization if it is to serve the economy profitably. Mention has been made of the present inability of the postal, telephone and telegraphic services to meet the challenge of large-scale demand. Supplies of electricity, water and gas are still erratic and undependable creating serious problems for modern business in the country.

All these affect the general performance of the public corporations and must be taken into account in judging their successes or failures so far. The

World Bank Mission noted in their report that in an effort to overcome this handicap, some public corporations spend heavily in providing this infrastructure themselves,[11] and funds spent on such projects cannot be invested in the actual business for which the corporation was created. Other infrastructural expenses arising from the deficiency of general national infrastructure include those made on staff medical schools for staff children.

CONCLUSION

Looking at these factors together it can be seen that some of them are self-generated (that is arise from the very nature of the corporations concerned) while others could be termed extraneous in the sense that they arise from the general social, economic and political circumstances prevailing in and outside the country. Therefore, while it is possible that solutions to the problems arising from the self-generated factors could be found through internal measures by the corporations themselves, solutions to problems posed by the extraneous factors will come through improvements in the general environment within which the corporations function.

FOOTNOTES

1 Federal Ministry of Information: *Second and Final Report of the Wages and Salaries Review Commission 1971.* The Wages and Salaries Review Commission (Adebo Commission for short) classified public corporations into four, namely
(i) public corporations which are regulatory agencies
(ii) public corporations which are welfare or service agencies
(iii) commercial and industrial public corporations
(iv) State-owned (limited liability) companies. If the Commission's classification is applied to our present context, the last two categories would be included in the corporations discussed in this paper.

2 The Bureaucrat No. 2, (April-June 1973) pp. 5-9.

3 F. A. Wells and W. A. Warmington, *Studies in Industrialization*: *Nigeria and Cameroons,* (OUP 1962).

4 P. C. Lloyd *Africa in Social Change* (Penguin 1967), pp. 288-295; also W. Schwarz: *Nigeria* (Pall Mall, 1968) "Its (Nigeria's) Federal institutions—the corporations, the foreign services, the armed forces provided a melting pot of nationalism . . . as easily as Jekyll could become Hyde, the Nigerian could become the Yoruba, the Hausa or the Ibo." p. 14.

5 A few such pamphlets are: *Ikejiani and the Railway Corporation—Tribalism in Electricity Corporation of Nigeria—The Case of the Senior Staff* (Published by a group of the Senior Staff); *The Guilty ones* (published by the UPGA Office); *Intelligent Person's Guide to UPGAism* (published anonymously).

6 Federal Ministry of Information, *Second and Final Report of the Wages and Salaries Review Commission 1971* (Federal Government Printer, Lagos), p. 34.

7 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Economic Development of Nigeria.* p.100.

8 F. A. Wells and W. A. Warmington, *Studies in Industrialization*: *Nigeria and Cameroons* op. cit.

9 I.B.R.D., *Economic Development of Nigeria,* op. cit., p. 110.

10 Federal Ministry of Information, *Second and Final Report of the Wages and Salaries Review Commission, 1971,* op. cit., p. 35.

11 I.B.R.D., *Economic Development of Nigeria,* op. cit., p. 110.

The Management of Public Enterprises Control and Autonomy—External and Internal Problems

A. C. I. MBANEFO,

INTRODUCTION

Almost everywhere in the world today, governments have created institutions and service organizations which provide much needed investment in infrastructure which usually is non-profitable from the entrepreneurial investor's point of view. The provision of this infrastructure includes the financing, constructing and operating of bridges and tunnels; the management of major port facilities, airports and other transportation facilities; the construction of public buildings and roads on behalf of state or local governments; providing public finance for both private and private bodies requiring long-term and medium-term finance for development; generation and distribution of electric power and the development and redevelopment of local housing schemes for governments and other public organizations. Other miscellaneous facilities can be provided such as parks and other recreational facilities, hospitals, regional and local markets, schools, and for activities such as industrial promotion. The institutions and service organizations usually are referred to as public enterprises because of the public nature of the services they offer.

In the developing countries, governments have gone far beyond providing the traditional public utilities and have ventured into commercial and industrial businesses because of the scarcity of private entrepreneurial skill and domestic capital. Where the urge is to accelerate the pace of economic development by industrialization and commercial activities, providing the infrastructure alone is not enough as many of these governments did not even inherit basic infrastructure from their colonial masters.

In nearly all cases, the required capital and entrepreneurship in the private sector, which are the twin pillars on which selected areas of any economy can be activated at a desirable pace, are usually grossly lacking. Governments, therefore, have no choice but to go into the areas they consider most desirable for their development programmes.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

A public enterprise usually deals with a single specific function. Because

of this, the following criteria have been assumed for identifying a public enterprise:

(1) existence as an organized entity with some evidence of corporate powers designated by law;
(2) governmental character including election of officers or appointment by public officials;
(3) substantial autonomy, i.e. considerable fiscal and administrative independence.

Most public corporations, authorities or boards are created by acts of Parliament or in the case of military governments by decrees or edicts, and legislation is usually required for their abolition. Although public enterprises are created for the benefit of the public at large, they do not necessarily require public approval for their creation.

The control and management of a public enterprise are usually entrusted to a board of directors or other governing body which is not publicly elected. The boards are appointed by the chief executive of the government and their composition is usually specified in the legislation creating the enterprise. These enterprises possess no inherent sovereign authority, their powers being derived completely from their enabling laws (c.f. Companies Law or Decree which spells out the authority and responsibilities of limited liability companies and their officers, etc.).

In general, public enterprises are wholly owned by government and they do not issue shares or stock certificates to their parent governments as evidence of ownership as in the case of private enterprises or companies. This notwithstanding, they possess corporate identity. They therefore have the power to sue and be sued and to adopt a seal and execute contracts in their own names. They appoint their principal officers and employees, issue obligations and collect fees and rental for the sale or use of their services. In most cases their profits are not subject to government taxes.

Traditionally, public enterprises are expected to be entirely self-supporting being revenue producing. These days, it is becoming increasingly recognized that this is no longer a crucial characteristic. It is becoming more important to see that they do not rely on general purpose government grants to guarantee their obligations. (In the developing countries today, they do).

An important feature is the use of accepted business standards and procedures, including budgeting arrangements, in their operations. They are free to decide how best to utilize financial resources available to them. In developed countries with good money and securities markets, they issue bonds and dated debentures in order to raise required finance. These are usually highly attractive investments offering very significant tax saving.

Although public enterprises operate along business-type lines with substantial autonomy, they are often subject to the unlimited control of their governments. Their popularity is in their autonomy which is supposed to

avoid financial limits, red tape, civil service bureaucracy and the jurisdictional restrictions of governments.

Apart from the traditional public enterprises, the governments of developing countries now establish limited liability companies under their local companies laws or decrees. This form is usually used in instances of foreign investors going into partnership with the governments. The shares of such a company would be in the hands of private individuals. The government's share would be held in trust for it by its nominees or by "Ministry of Finance Incorporated", a corporate body created by the government for this purpose.

The policy which these governments have followed is that they held such investments in commercial or industrial enterprises in trust for their public. This is based on the assumption that indigenous investors would be available subsequently to take over the investments in due course. There is only one example of this so far in Nigeria; the government of the then Eastern Nigeria relinquished a substantial part of its holdings in the Nigerian Cement Company Limited, to the indigenes of that region.

While I acknowledge the existence of this type of public enterprise, whose problems are no different from the others, my comments in this paper will generally refer to the traditional types of public enterprises known as statutory corporations.

THE PROBLEMS—INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

The success of the management and control of any business rests on the efficient management and control of its finances and personnel.

In the developing countries more than the developed countries, the management of public enterprises has failed in many cases because there is little appreciation of the management requirements of the enterprises. Ideally, this would be left to the board of the enterprise which determines its internal policies.

In developing countries, most of these businesses were managed by representatives of the colonial masters or other foreigners. The indigenes were only employed in inferior positions with little or no responsibility for decisions even at the lowest levels. The result is an acute shortage of experienced personnel with the required managerial skills to take over from the foreign staff as they leave the business or the country.

This apart, political considerations would appear to have motivated the establishment and location of most public enterprises in the developing countries, the social and economic influences on development usually being ignored.

More often than not, the boards of directors of these organizations are selected on considerations other than the benefit of the organizations. In the political days, as even today, membership of boards was the key source of compensation for party men who for one reason or another could not be

accepted into responsible government positions. It must be concluded from such ineffective board membership that the overall control of these organizations is never entrusted to these boards and those appointing them do not realise the fiduciary and executive nature of the office to which they are nominating.

At the other extreme, civil service red tape and bureaucracy have been introduced into the management of many public enterprises. In all but a few cases, civil servants are at the highest levels of management and often they lack a proper concept of modern management requirements. Their training usually is not designed for directing or managing businesses and their experience of such activities is in most cases small and fortuitously acquired. Their only qualification perhaps is that usually there are not many men of suitable experience and calibre in the private sector. They usually insist on rigidly applying conditions which present considerable handicaps to the working of the enterprise. They reflect an attitude of suspicion and mistrust which, to a degree, still dominates the relationship between government and private enterprise in these countries.

Financial management in public enterprise is usually comparable with the highest skills practised in the top private corporations. This is mainly because managers are free to decide how best to utilize the financial resources available to them. As in private industry, they are engaged with the complete cycle of financial operations namely, planning, budgeting, accounting, reporting and auditing. In addition, their operations are expected to meet the following objectives of proper financial management:

(1) adequate control over the acts of public officials, and
(2) wide dissemination of financial data.

The basic responsibility for the exercise of the finance functions should rest with the board of directors. These functions may be delegated by the board in whole or in part, but in any event it is responsible. This delegation may extend in some cases to policy decisions of a basic nature with the board merely ratifying what is subsequently brought before it.

There is little uniformity amongst enterprises as to the organization for financial management. Much depends on the historical development of the organization and the relative strengths of the personalities involved. The more authority the chief financial officer is given and the higher he is in the organization hierarchy, the more effective will be financial management and planning, and the more useful the contribution of the finance function in overall management.

In the Nigerian case, financial management in the public enterprises has suffered from a lack of adequate control over the acts of public officials and apparent lack of modern accounting knowledge among the persons charged with the responsibility for these functions.

The effect of this lack of supervision and control over the acts of

officials in these organizations in Nigeria can be seen from the following examples of the writer's observations obtained from working for most of the public enterprises in Nigeria.

Internally, one finds that

(1) the strong grip of favouritism and "old-boys club" ties allows practically all the staff of these enterprises, who have control over the revenue generating sources of these enterprises, to grossly undercharge their friends and relations who use the services of these organizations. One would be shocked to know that several million *naira* are lost daily from this one act alone in many of these organizations in Nigeria, notably the Airways, Ports Authority, Railways, National Shipping Line, National Electricity Power Authority and Telecommunications, to name only a few. What is painful is that very good accounting systems and procedures would seem available to these organizations but they are just not being utilized in the manner expected for the efficient running of these organizations. Furthermore, management does not seem able to apply simple accounting techniques which would show these terrific losses, and which should, therefore, raise heart-searching questions as to their origins and, hopefully, attempt to correct the sources of abuse.

(2) Because of the case with which these bodies obtain grants and subsidies from governments, their credit management is usually very poor or non-existent. Several of them would have uncollected debts amounting to millions of *naira* on their books while asking for government grants or loans to meet such recurrent expenses as salaries and wages. Good housekeeping requires that one collects one's debts to pay one's creditors. In the Nigerian public enterprises, even when the debts are not collected the boards and the governments approve and guarantee bank overdrafts and loans with very high interest rates, to enable these bodies to pay their creditors and meet their day-to-day expenses.

(3) The greatest part of the finances of any business is tied up in its fixed assets, except in the case of simple service companies like travel agents, professional firms, etc. The control and management of these assets are usually very weak and in most cases absent. Simple records of assets are seldom kept. Because of this lack of control and accountability, unscrupulous staff members have diverted assets of these bodies to their private use without being found out. Some of these assets are openly abused. Many assets which are purported to be on the books of these organizations are in reality not there and their locations are often not known. The same can also be said of their stores and stocks.

(4) There are cases of the same expenses being paid several times over because of the inadequate working of the control mechanisms in the accounting systems of these bodies.

(5) The major accounts of many of these bodies are never reconciled. The writer knows of several cases where the bank and cash accounts of some of the leading public enterprises in Nigeria are not written up nor reconciled for over a year at a time.

One could go on and build up a catalogue of the gross lack of financial management and control in our public enterprises but this is hardly the right forum.

The following statement in a recent Nigerian newspaper is worthy of note as it characterizes some of the problems of many of these enterprises:

> Unscrupulous electrical contractors who supply consumers with electricity without necessary approval will be severely dealt with. . . . He said that they could not have succeeded in installing meters without the collusion of some members of staff of the Authority. . . . He attributed frequent blackouts in some areas in Lagos to other malpractices prominent among which is over loading of lines by using heavy equipment of high voltage.[1]

Usually the power supplied to houses and factories from this source is not paid for and the Authority does nothing about it.

Externally, the forms of interference in the financial management of these organizations include abuse of office by top government officials and other respected public figures who are connected with these organizations, who use their positions to order the staff of these bodies to perform acts for friends and sometimes for themselves; this invariably causes severe financial losses to the organizations.

Examples include preferring to pay certain creditors who are connected with these individuals at a time when the finances of these organizations cannot bear such loads; and causing debts owed to the organization to be suppressed or even cancelled and obliterated from the records of the organizations, to name only two.

Apart from the management of public enterprises by the "remote control" of top government officials who issue management "directives" to the boards and executive management of these bodies, another serious external interference introduced in the Nigerian case is the creation of the Statutory Corporations Service Commission by the Ani Working Party on Statutory Corporations and State-owned Companies. This body is charged with the responsibility for recruitment of the higher levels of staff in these organizations.

The composition of this Commission does not guarantee that its members give adequate attention to the following personnel management functional areas:

(1) management development which should evaluate the parties, and design appropriate programmes aimed at updating existing skills;
(2) manpower planning which should ensure that the right talents are available to match the long-range and short-range objectives and needs of an organization;
(3) organization planning which should ensure the effective use of available manpower by putting the right people in the right posts.

The boards of directors of public enterprises, like their counterparts in the private sector, have fiduciary responsibility to the owners of the businesses they manage. They should, therefore, be allowed wide powers on all issues affecting the business including recruitment at all levels. The methods of selection and recruitment of the members of top management should be the same as for top executives in private enterprises.

These would include selection of the General Manager who is usually charged with the overall day-to-day management of the enterprise, the Chief Financial Executive, the Personnel Manager, the Public Relations Manager and the heads of the operating divisions of the organization.

Ideally, these enterprises are run on lines similar to the best managed private enterprises. In many cases, they have developed their own merit systems for recruiting and promoting personnel, consequently many of them have succeeded in recruiting and retaining first-class top personnel. They boast high salary scales, attractive pensions and considerable opportunity for advancement. Obviously, this method of selection must have more merits than selection by the Statutory Corporations Service Commission, the appointment of which body is no different from those of the board members which I have referred to above.

Internally, the general staff of these enterprises would appear to be recruited not by relation to what the individual employee can do but to the need of the people who are responsible for finding him a suitable job.

By the same token, the salaries and wages paid to these individuals are seldom related to the job content of their positions, their qualifications or experience. Invariably, these organizations are found to be over-staffed with redundant personnel who have no other reasons for being there than that they must be maintained by someone at the expense of one of these public enterprises. The impression one often gets, particularly in Nigeria, is that the public enterprises have limitless sources of income which must be used for the maintenance of non-productive members of the public. Employment in these enterprises must not be at the expense of efficiency and output.

Another internal problem facing these organizations is the over-centralization of their management resulting in the inability of senior and executive officers to take decisions in matter affecting the organizations to whom they are responsible.

In many cases the chief executives have no power to hire and fire their

labour as circumstances demand nor are they permitted to incur certain expenditure without the approval of someone higher, sometimes even higher than the board.

There is also the absence of incentives in the control and management of members of these organizations owing to their continuous reliance on subsidies from the governments. Even today in Nigeria, one finds that some of the public enterprises still depend on government grants to pay salaries and wages. It must be difficult to see how the control of these organizations can be independent of external influences when the top executives and the boards will have to beg Permanent Secretaries to help them obtain approval for the subsidies out of which their salaries and allowances must be met.

Joint-public ventures with foreign partners have also failed because of external interference from the representatives of governments. Usually, the foreign partners have contracts for the management of these ventures because of their technical knowledge and past experience. There are often complaints that these foreign partners do not make substantial enough financial contributions to the ventures to make them reasonably loyal and committed to their success. The first conflict usually arises as soon as the government representatives' influences on management are resisted by the foreign partners. With the minimum provocation, government functionaries can find reasons to abrogate the management contracts, remove the managers and replace them with local individuals whose only qualifications are the fact that they are easily managed by these authorities. This is sometimes at heavy costs to the governments and in some cases, produces strains on international relations. In the main, these new employees have no stake in the business beyond the fact that they need a job.

Examples abound in Nigeria, where some formerly profitable and self-supporting organizations have been run into the ground simply because of the absence of good managers and people at the top who truly appreciate their responsibilities.

The innumerable Commissions of Enquiry and Tribunals into our Public Enterprises show clearly the mass of vested interests in which control and management of these enterprises in Nigeria are submerged. The findings are usually the same—lack of adequate management knowledge and skills, nepotism, ethnic-grouping and "old-boy" relationships in recruitment, and so on. The shame is that there are no examples of adequate disciplinary measures being taken against those found guilty.

SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS

In even the best managed corporations in the world, we would expect that loose operation would constantly appear without explanation and internal conflicts and duplications would continue to occur. But generally, substantial coordination is achieved, and this is partially attributable to the introduction

of formalised budgeting procedures, which are a major aid in controlling the operations of both large and small business organizations.

In order to solve the problems of financial management and control in these public enterprises, proper budgeting and accounting must be introduced and used. These enterprises must be able to

(1) determine the financial resources required to meet their operating programmes;
(2) forecast how much of these requirements will be met by internal generation of funds and how much will have to be obtained outside the business;
(3) develop plans to obtain the external funds needed;
(4) establish and maintain a system of financial controls governing the allocation and the use of funds;
(5) formulate programmes to provide the most effective profit-volume-cost relationship;
(6) analyse the financial results of all operations, report the facts to top management and make recommendations concerning future operations.

To do these things properly, the chief financial officer must be familiar not only with the financial matters affecting the enterprise but also the company activities and policies in such areas as production, marketing, purchasing, labour, personnel relations, taxes, and general management problems. He must be able to pull together, review, analyse, interpret and plan the financial requirements and consequences of total operations.

In 1950 the government of the United States of America passed the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act which introduced the first comprehensive law covering budgeting, accounting, auditing, and reporting since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Following the second Hoover Commission Budget and Accounting Report issued in June 1955, Public Law 863, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, was passed in 1956. This law specifically provided for the use of accrual accounting, cost-based budgeting for internal operations and appropriation request, and consistent classifications. It provided major legislation in the field of improving government accounting and financial management procedures for the government agencies. The result is a gradual evolution in agency practices towards systems that resemble more closely those employed in private practice.[2] The government of the United States found very early that the management of public enterprises must be closely related to those of the best managed private companies. It works for its public agencies and should work for those of other countries.

It must be realized that it is not enough to install systems; the staff to work them must be trained and this is a steady and continuous process. They must also be supervised and directed. Finally, their remuneration must be

maintained in line with what the markets can offer so as to ensure that good and efficient staff are retained and their loyalty to the organizations assured.

The management of these enterprises must be able to "hire and fire" its staff without fear of opposition and the enterprises must only have just the economic staff they require to work their projects and must not be used as a dumping ground for national misfits. Governments should desist from supporting financially, those enterprises whose management and operations may be aptly described as "useless".

As much as possible the management of these enterprises must be decentralized and where appropriate suitable accounting and management systems like responsibility accounting and management by objectives (MBO) should be used.

The press release sent to the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Mines by the Federal Commissioner for Mines and Power which was published in the Nigerian *Daily Times* of 16 October, 1973 is worthy of note. On the subject of representation on the Boards of Public Bodies, it stated:

> The Commissioner accepted the submissions of the Association that the designation of public officers as chairmen and members of the boards of public corporations, especially the new Public Commercial undertakings, tends to give the wrong impression that capable people cannot be found outside the public service for those positions; and that the systems is detrimental to personal and corporate efficiency.

This is a welcome statement as a recent study which was carried out on the composition of the boards of a number of corporations and their chairmen in a number of African countries showed that the corporations which have made the most substantial impact on the development of their countries were under the chairmanship of private citizens and the composition of their boards revealed a predominance of private citizens over Ministers, Members of Parliament and civil servants. This emphasizes the importance of avoiding the domination of statutory corporations by Ministers or Members of Parliament who, due to their appointment or geographical interest, may find it difficult to bring impartial judgment to the corporations' affairs. Civil servants for that matter are apt to pursue government's policies which may not be most beneficial to the control and management of these corporations. It is obvious that it is best to draw the membership of such boards exclusively from properly qualified individuals in the private sector. For such men their appointments are a great challenge. Where there do not appear to be enough men of suitable experience and capacity in the private sector, the mix must be to benefit the organization and ensure its survival.

CONCLUSION

Provided these enterprises are not unduly hampered by lack of funds, their success or failure will depend upon the energy, imagination, enterprise and determination of those directing and running them. Appointments to the post of General Managers and to the boards are of vital consequence to their prospects. Experience has shown that in setting up organizations of all kinds, there is often a tendency to give too little attention to determining the right structure and staffing at the top, and too much to far less important details.

FOOTNOTES

1 Address by Mr. Laditan, NEPA Area Manager for Lagos, *Daily Sketch* (Lagos) 14 November 1973, p. 2.

2 See Secretary of the Treasury, Director, Bureau of the Budget, and Comptroller General of the United States, *Annual Report of the Joint Programme for Improving Accounting in the Federal Government* (Washington, D.C., 1958) and *Fifteen Years of Progress under the Joint Financial Management Improvement Programme* (Washington, D.C., 1963).

Management of Public Enterprises:

The Sierra Leone Experience

S. H. O. T. MACAULEY

DEFINITION

Public enterprises in this context refers to those institutions created by government for implementing development programmes or for supplying essential services which by the nature and magnitude of capital involved cannot be left to free enterprise. They are set up by Acts of Parliament and are an arm of Government. The Acts of Parliament set out their objectives, duties and powers while policy matters and the day-to-day running of the enterprises is the concern of the Board of Directors and management. Public enterprises are not supposed to be bound by civil service red tape and should be in a position to take major decisions by themselves, within the scope of their powers but subject to certain safeguards in the national interest. In short, the term "public enterprises" refers to marketing boards and government corporations.

CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS

In Sierra Leone two classes of corporations can be distinguished by the history of their formation. They are:

(1) The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board which was part of the West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB).
(2) Those that started as civil service departments but later converted to corporations.

The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board is the offspring of the West African Produce Control Board, an organization which was formed in 1942 to handle and control the export produce trade of the former British West African dependencies of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. Later it was decided to wind up the West African Produce Control Board and form separate marketing organizations for the respective countries; with the sharing of surplus funds accumulated by WAPCB among the participating countries, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board was established in July 1949.

The other corporations started off as civil service departments and perform services of a commercial nature. These are:

Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation established in 1964.
Road Transport Corporation established in 1964.
Sierra Leone Ports Authority estabished in 1964.
Forest Industries Corporation established in 1965.
Rice Corporation established in 1965.
Hotels and Tourist Board established in 1966.

THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICS AND STATUTORY CORPORATIONS

Although statutory corporations are intended to be insulated from politics (no statutory corporation is expected to take part in politics just as the civil service is not) they are, in practice, linked with politics through the powers usually vested in the responsible Minister. The enabling legislation usually empowers the Ministers:

(1) to appoint the Chairman and members of the corporation;
(2) to issue directives to the corporations, where it is considered in the public interest to do so; and
(3) to ask for and be furnished with any information which they consider necessary concerning the affairs of the corporation.

There is also the obligation on the corporations to furnish the responsible Minister with their annual reports and accounts. In short, the main link between the administration of public corporations and politics is through the responsible Minister, although this link may not always be a formal one. Experience has shown that in addition to the issuing of directives to a corporation, the responsible Minister may also offer advice or make requests or suggestions. Even though these do not have the status of formal directives and, therefore, are not binding on the corporations, they are usually not ignored. This influence exercised by Ministers could be and usually is quite a vital link between the corporations and politics.

Other links with politics exist in the fact that questions can be asked about statutory corporations in Parliament and debates held on the subject. Furthermore, the audited annual accounts of each corporation are usually tabled before the House and critically examined.

Because of the nature of public corporations these political controls are to be expected, but experience has revealed that in some cases politics has interfered so much with the operations of corporations that initiative has been stifled and performance reduced. It is intended when statutory corporations are created that they should be viable commercial institutions and to this end it is intended that they have that degree of autonomy and flexibility that

would ensure their success. This awareness of the need for autonomy arose mainly out of the experience of private commercial concerns and from the history of public enterprises in Sierra Leone. Apart from the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, all other corporations in Sierra Leone started off as government civil service departments. Later it was diagnosed, and rightly, that services of a commercial nature cannot be successfully run within the civil service bureaucracy with its attendant red tape and inflexibility. The Cole Commission of Inquiry[1] whose recommendations led to the conversion of the Rice Department into the Rice Corporation recognized the inability of the civil service to run services of a commercial nature and in their report recommended the following:

> As a long term view, we strongly recommend the creation of a statutory corporation to take over the Rice Department and its operations. We consider this proposition to be the ideal for the following reasons:
> (a) The Rice Department as a Government Department is unable to work with the same flexibility as a commercial firm. Rules and regulations not akin to commercial undertakings are applicable. The General Manager of the Rice Department cannot engage suitable staff at short notice nor can he by himself take disciplinary action on major issues. The machinery of the Public Service Commission has to be set in motion, which is rather unsatisfactory when it comes to a matter of quick decisions. In a fully commercial undertaking, regular Board meetings are all that is necessary.
> (b) Under a corporate body the rice set-up would become a more self-contained organization and for this reason alone it would be able to function more efficiently.

The predictions of the Cole Commission have not come true. Political and bureaucratic interference have in some cases hampered the operations of corporations to the extent that the process of decision making has become slow and unwiedly. A good many decisions have to be sent to government for concurrence or approval. These decisions do not go directly to government but have to be channelled through the appropriate ministry.

The process is as follows:



The Ministry has other responsibilities and may not consider the problems of the corporation with the urgency they deserve. The same attitude might be taken by government. Thus one usually finds a situation where a decision

which could have been implemented within a matter of days has to wait for several weeks if not months.

This state of affairs has the following effects on the Corporations:

(1) Their commercial effectiveness is reduced because they are unable to employ one of the cardinal factors in commerce—speed in implementing decisions. As a result, in areas where statutory corporations have to compete with private enterprise, the former are usually out-manoeuvred and out-classed.
(2) The Board of Directors are denied the performance of their rightful duties. If government has to approve all decisions or most of them, then there is no need to have boards.
(3) The purpose of creating these statutory corporations is defeated and their role is reduced to that of a civil service department.

Politics also manifests itself in other areas of corporation administration. As already stated, statutory corporations are set up to achieve specific objectives and to achieve these objectives certain essential conditions must exist. These conditions are:

(1) A competent and knowledgeable Board of Directors;
(2) An effective organizational structure;
(3) Qualified and experienced management personnel.

Let us now examine how politics has influenced these areas of corporation administration.

Two types of boards are known: the policy board and the functional board. The former consists mainly or entirely of members without executive powers. The task of such a board is collectively to take decisions on the highest policy level and generally to supervise the work of the professional and administrative managers. A functional board consists mainly or entirely of members, who have charge of departments or other aspects of the corporation's business.

The "policy" type of board is prevalent in Sierra Leone and for that matter whatever type exists, competence depends on the quality of the members of the board. That is desirable in the case of a policy board is that the members should be men of unimpeachable honesty, of high intelligence and good general education with a real devotion to the public service and to the cause of economic development, a marked capacity for committee work and some experience in the field of business management or public administration. The laws setting up the various corporations vest the responsible Minister with the power to appoint members of the board. In theory, he should be free to appoint qualified men, including men who are neutral politically. In theory also, it is better not to appoint politicians to boards, because apart from the difficulty of resisting the temptation to regard themselves as their constituency representatives, they are particularly subject to pressures which may lead

them to advocate policies or induce decisions which may not be in the best interests of the corporation. In practice, however, the Minister does not possess the freedom of selection which the low confers upon him and in appointing members he has to keep in mind the party's thinking. It must, however, be pointed out that though the Minister's selection of directors is greatly influenced by the dictates of his party, nevertheless, genuine efforts have been made to appoint good men who, to the best of their ability have worked unstintingly for the progress of the corporations.

The appointment of boards may be influenced by political considerations but factors other than politics affect their outlook. The following civil servants are members of statutory corporations:

The Financial Secretary[2]
The Establishment Secretary[3]
The Permanent Secretary of the responsible Ministry.

The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Chief Agriculturist are members of the boards of corporations like the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) and the Rice Corporation which handle and market agricultural products.

The presence of civil servants on boards of statutory corporations has both advantages and disadvantages. They are government watchdogs and are on the boards to see that whatever the corporations do is done in accordance with government policy and in the national interest. Some of these officers are capable civil servants who over the years have acquired considerable skill and experience. Many corporations have benefited from their experience and competence. Nevertheless, there is the problem that these people are by their training and outlook civil servants and there is, therefore, a tendency for civil service practices to creep into the running of the corporations. As already pointed out, corporations performing services of a commercial nature need flexibility and a certain degree of freedom in making decisions. The importance of these factors is appreciated by business men but not by all civil servants.

The second condition for effective performance is an effective organizational structure. The activities to be performed in keeping with the objectives, the persons to perform them, the physical factors of environment to be provided and the relationship among the persons in terms of authority result in an organizational structure which can be thought of as a framework which holds the various functions together.

From this definition, it is clear that organizational structure will vary from corporation to corporation depending on the aims and objectives of the individual bodies. It has, however, been observed that a pattern is common to all corporations in Sierra Leone. This is a structure in which the Board of Directors is at the top, followed by the General Manager or Chief Executive, then by department managers and lastly by their deputies and supporting staff. All board members including the Chairman are part-time directors with

no executive functions. Experience in corporation management in this country has revealed very little or no interference in the organizational structure of public enterprises.

The third condition for effective performance is the employment of qualified and experienced management staff. The responsibilities of the organization having been defined and allocated, care should be taken to ensure that suitably qualified and experienced people are appointed to carry out these responsibilities as the success of any corporation depends on the quality of its personnel. Corporations must, therefore, have sound personnel policies, particularly in recruitment, promotion and dismissal. The ideal precedure for the appointment or promotion of staff is for written applications to be invited and eligible candidates interviewed by independent panels of top executives or the Staff Committee of the corporation. Selection should be final in the case of junior staff and subject to formal approval of the Board of Directors in the case of senior officers. There must be no room for nepotism or tribalism if such a system is to be effective.

It is true that there have been instances when politics has interfered with the selection and promotion of staff in statutory corporations, but the problem is not so much that of politics as the lack of suitable people. Management is a comparatively new art in developing countries and, therefore, there is not that cadre of qualified and experienced managers as is the case in the civil service. The belief in certain quarters that anybody can be a manager has resulted in the failure of many businesses. The question now is who is a manager? A manager is the dynamic, life-giving element in every business. He must, therefore, be someone who is skilled in the execution of the management process which entails four fundamental functions. The first essential function to be performed by a manager is to determine what must be done to accomplish the work. The board aspect of the work load must be determined in addition to how and when the work will be done. Specific component contributions must also be determined and the manner of accomplishing them made known to each member. In other words, a plan or a predetermined integrated programme must be drawn up. This requires the ability to foresee, to look ahead purposefully. In short, a manager should be a planner.

The course of action having been determined, the next step is to distribute or allocate the necessary component activities among the members of the work force. This distribution is guided by such considerations as the nature of the component activities, the members of the team and the physical facilities available. Normally, these component activities are grouped and assigned so that accomplishment with minimum effort, time and cost will be realized. In other words, the manager has created an organizational structure to suit the enterprise. A manager should, therefore, possess the ability to organize.

To physically carry out the activities of the corporation, it is necessary for the manager to take measures that will start and continue actions as long

as they are needed in order for the task to be accomplished. The measures selected will depend on the members of the work team, the task to be accomplished and the manager's judgement. Among the more common measures utilized to initiate action are communication, leadership, counselling, instructing and disciplining.

Managers have always found it desirable to follow what is being done in order to make sure that the work of others is progressing satisfactorily toward the predetermined objective. The establishment of a sound plan, the allocation of component activities required by this plan and the successful actuating of each member do not assure that the undertaking will be a success. Discrepancies, misunderstandings and unexpected hindrances may arise. Such contingencies must be made known quickly to the manager so that corrective action could be taken. This function constitutes controlling.

These four fundamental functions of management—planning, organizing, actuating and controlling—are the means by which a manager manages. They are the distinguishing marks between a manager and a non-manager. Managers are in short supply and so are other professionals and supporting staff—engineers, accountants, storekeepers. The few good managers available tend to go to private enterprise because they offer better pay and conditions of service than public corporations. The shortage of qualified and experienced managers and the inability of statutory corporations to attract good people is a limiting factor on the performance of corporations. It is also a limiting factor on development and expansion.

OTHER PROBLEMS

Finance

There are many other problems connected with the management of public corporations besides politics. It was pointed out earlier that one of the factors limiting growth and development in public corporations is the lack of qualified personnel. Another limiting factor is finance. All corporations except the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board started off as revenue earning civil service departments and at vesting date their working capital consisted of the physical assets taken over from the departments for which stocks and a certain amount of liquid cash were issued to the government. In certain instances, as in the case of the Forest Industries Corporation, the cash was obtained as a grant from the central government and in other instances, as in the case of the Rice Corporation, government permitted the retention of the profits from trading activities.

For most corporations the working capital provided at vesting date was not sufficient for take-off. Loans from commercial banks were not forthcoming because these institutions with their tradition of caution would not support new and untried organizations. After almost ten years the situation has

improved. Most corporations have been able to increase their working capital, mainly through profits. The attitude of the banks has also changed. They are in some cases willing to grant short term loans or overdraft facilities.

Despite the improvement in the situation, the corporations are still short of working capital. Expansion and development require large amounts of working capital and because of the general world shortage of capital the corporations are finding it extremely difficult to find money. The enabling Acts do not make matters any better for the corporations. The legislation setting up the various corporations give them power to borrow money by loans and overdrafts, but tie their hands by requiring them to obtain the prior approval of the Minister of Finance. This provision is an unnecessary shackle on the initiative and managerial autonomy of a corporation's administration.

There is, however, the argument that because statutory corporations are government organs it is obligatory on government to meet the liabilities of these bodies in case of default. There have also been instances when government has guaranteed loans to corporations. It is agreed that because of the financial responsibility of government to the corporations, government must exercise control, but it must not be forgotten that the Financial Secretary or his representative is a member of the board of all corporations and he is there specifically to see that the corporation's financial policy is in accordance with government's policy.

Pricing Policy

A common problem arising from the management of public corporations is price policy. Price policy differs from corporation to corporation depending on whether it is a monopoly like the Electricity Corporation, is in competition with private enterprise like the Road Transport Corporation or handles a strategic commodity like the Rice Corporation. A monopolist organization can in theory raise its prices at will but in practice such organizations must keep their prices in line with general economic developments in the country and the ability of the consumer to pay. Corporations in competition with private enterprise have to keep prices in line with competitors or provide service of superior quality if their charges are higher.

The price policy of the Rice Corporation with which the writer is familiar is rather peculiar. Normally the price of a commodity is determined by the supply and demand position, but rice is the staple food of Sierra Leone and this makes it a strategic commodity. The importance of rice, therefore, creates not only economic and social problems but also political ones. The national staple food is the concern of every government and needs special treatment. This was the thinking that led to the establishment of the Rice Corporation whose main objectives include the maintenance of stable prices, the ensuring of fair and equitable distribution of rice and availability of rice at all times.

The corporation is essentially a marketing organization, but also manifests considerable interest in rice production.

The present position in Sierra Leone is that production falls short of consumption; the aim is to produce rice to feed the whole nation at a price everyone can afford. Under the circumstances, the price policy for producers is such that it should provide incentives for higher production. In other words, prices are such that the marginal producer is encouraged to produce. To this end, the minimum guaranteed producer price of paddy has been increased by 43.75 per cent between 1965/66 and 1970/71. During this period of short supply of local rice there was a tendency for consumer prices to rise, but cheaper alternatives in the form of imported rice have been provided.

When self-sufficiency is reached, there will be a tendency for the supply of rice to exceed demand. This will result in a fall in producer prices. Falling producer prices may act as a brake on production as farmers turn to more lucrative enterprises. This state of affairs, if not checked, will result in the loss of self-sufficiency and the country will once more become deficient in rice. The price policy at this stage should be such that production is maintained at the level of self-sufficiency.

There are a few weaknesses in this policy. The idea of having a floor price for producers has its advantages. Farmers have a guaranteed income and are, therefore, able to plan better than if exposed to the uncertainties of demand and supply. The danger, however, is that in giving price incentives there has been little consideration of world market prices. As a result rice grown in this country is more expensive than that entering the international market. This means that it may be difficult to dispose of any future surplus.

It is also doubtful if price incentives alone will stimulate rice production to the point of self-sufficiency. The bulk of rice produced in this country is grown under conditions of peasant agriculture and it is not certain if farming under these conditions responds appreciably to price incentives. What is important is that price incentives should be applied in conjuction with improved technology such as the use of better seeds and the increasing use of fertilizers.

Attitude of Employees

Another common problem is the non-commercial orientation of employees of statutory corporations. Productivity of corporation employees is low and the attitude to consumers in some cases is that of "take it or leave it". The history of the corporations has to a very large extent been responsible for this situation. Most of the people now working for the corporations were civil servants taken over on vesting day and are, therefore, not conversant with commercial practices. They fail to realise that while the civil service is run by the taxpayers' money the survival of corporations depends to a very large

extent on the profits they make and that profits can only be obtained through efficiency and hard work.

The only way to remedy this situation is by means of an effective system of employee training. Such a system should not only aim at imparting basic management and commercial skills but should also aim at changing employees' attitudes towards their jobs. As explained earlier, the efficiency of statutory corporations to a large extent depends on the competence of the people they employ and, moreover, since people with managerial and technical training are at the moment in short supply, the institution of an effective training scheme is a *sine qua non.*

EXPERIENCE IN PROBLEM SOLVING

A number of problems experienced in the management of public corporations have been highlighted. In a very real sense, a manager's job can be viewed as one of everlastingly facing and solving problems. The winning of a stated objective can be fraught with many difficulties. Hurdles must be overcome, scarce resources assembled, progress maintained and employees motivated. In surmounting these difficulties, problems arise. By successfully resolving problems, the manager not only serves his enterprise, but also achieves personal growth and advancement. It appears that one of the greatest contributions of executive leaders is to provide fresh thinking on problems.

There are certain problems about which managers in developing countries can do very little at the moment. As long as corporations are part of government machinery there will always be the likelihood of politicians interfering with them. The objection here is not to the statutory obligations of Parliament and the Minister but to interference in the day-to-day operations of corporations. The only hope is that with time politicians may come to understand fully the purpose of the corporations and also realise that these bodies would operate more efficiently with less interference.

The manager's role under the circumstances is not easy. He is in a dilemma. He is criticized if he resists the demands and requests of politicians and he is also criticized if things go wrong as a result of the fulfilment of these demands and requests. Experience, however, has shown that it is far better for managers to give honest and genuine advice and to resist politely but firmly undue interference in the operations of their corporations than to acquiesce or go along with popular opinion. It is true that to maintain such a stand can be difficult. At times, it will be necessary to be cautious or a compromise might be necessary. Nevertheless, it is better to take a stand which although unpopular in certain quarters might be proved right in the long run.

The principle of problem solving may be universal but the method of application varies from country to country. The problem of rising operation costs is common to all commercial institutions but solutions vary. The developed

nations' answer to cost problems lies in the use of automation and sophisticated, capital intensive technology. A developing country like Sierra Leone cannot afford such sophisticated techonology, in terms of either money or technical skill. Experience has shown that in developing countries costs can be brought down by the efficient use of the available manpower (motivation and training) and also the use of uncomplicated labour saving machines. The machines should not only suit the climatic conditions of the areas where they will be operated but should also be compatible with the development of local technical skill. In other words, the machines should be such that local engineers and mechanics can operate and service them.

The points raised above will be made more meaningful by the following example. In Sierra Leone people prefer parboiled rice ((i.e. rice steamed and dried before milling). The Rice Corporation's method of parboiling involve the use of imported capital intensive equipment which can only be profitable if operated on a large scale. Large scale operation is limited by several factors which include the pattern of rice production in the country and the lack of technically qualified staff to run the equipment. Improvements in this field aim at the introduction of simple not too capital intensive procedures which suit the pattern of rice production and technical competence. It will also be an added advantage if the requirements of such can be made locally with local materials.

It is true that not all operations can be simplified as in the parboiling of rice. Some enterprises by their very nature require capital intensive equipment; in that case, the answer is to import expatriate technicians until local people are trained. The point being made, however, is that the simpler the operations, the better.

HOW A MANAGER IMPROVES SKILL AND PERFORMANCE

It has already been indicated that the manager is the kingpin of a business and progress depends on the ability of the manager to improve his skill and performance. How then does a manager improve his skill and performance?

One way is through information. The manager has to motivate, guide and organize people to do their work and his tool in doing this is the spoken or written word. No matter whether the manager's job is engineering, accounting or selling, his effectiveness depends on his ability to listen and to read, on his ability to speak and to write. He needs skill in getting his thinking across to other people as well as skill in finding out what other people are after. Managers have to know the language, to understand what words are and what they mean. Perhaps most important, they have to acquire respect for language as man's most precious gift and heritage. Without the ability to motivate by means of the the written or spoken word, a manager cannot be successful.

Another way, is the judicious use of time. Everybody has the problem

of time, for all resources it is the scarcest, the most perishable and the most elusive. The manager must, however, solve what is a common problem in very specific ways. Managers who know how to use time will achieve results by planning. They are willing to think before they act. They spend a great deal of time thinking through areas where objectives are set and a great deal more on systematically thinking through what to do with recurrent problems.

For example, a lot of time will be saved and better results achieved if development plans in marketing and purchasing arrangements are systematically appraised once a year instead of half-hearted and inconclusive attempts being made. Again, a manager who spends time in thinking systematically about his problems will reap rich dividends and be in a better position to find lasting solutions than managers who do not; for a systematic approach to problem solving logically involves the definition and analysing of the problem, the development of alternate solutions, deciding on the best solutions and estimating the decision into effective action.

One of the functions of a manager is to work with people. A manager's role in working with human beings is to develop them and the direction this development takes decides whether the human being—both as a man and as a resource—will be more productive or cease ultimately to be productive at all. This applies not only to the man who is being managed, but also to the manager. Whether he develops his subordinates in the right direction, helps them to grow and become better and richer persons, will directly determine whether he himself will develop, will grow or wither, become richer or impoverished, improve or deteriorate.

One can learn certain skills in managing people—for instance, the skill to lead a conference or to conduct an interview. One can set down practices that are conducive to development, in the structure of the relationship between manager and subordinate, in the promotion system, in the rewards and incentives of an organization. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, developing man still requires a basic quality in the manager which cannot be created by supplying skills or by emphasising the importance of the task. It requires integrity of character.

There is a lot of stress these days on liking people, helping people and getting along with people as qualifications for a manager. These alone are never enough. In every successful organization there is one boss who does not like people, does not help them, does not get along with them. Cold, unpleasant, demanding, he often teaches and develops more men than anyone else. He commands more respect than the most likeable man ever could. He demands exacting workmanship of himself as well as of his men. He sets high standards and expects that they will be lived up to. The Manager who lacks these qualities of character—no matter how likeable, helpful, or amiable, no matter how competent or brilliant—is not fit to manager.

It may be argued that every occupation requires integrity. There is a difference. The manager lives with the people he manages, he decides what

their work is to be, he directs it, he trains them for it, he appraises it, and often he decides their future. The relationship of a professional man and client requires honourable dealings. Being a manager, though, is more like a teacher and in such a relationship honourable dealings are not enough, personal integrity is the essence.

CONCLUSION

Public corporations are comparatively new in Sierra Leone and are at present going through problems. In a country that has long been accustomed to civil service tradition and practice and has at the same time paid less and less attention to commerce, the presence of public corporations does not fit the normal run of things. Like all new ideas they are readily accepted and in some cases are even viewed with open hostility.

The future of public corporations in this country depends on how successfully the public can be convinced to accept these bodies as useful and necessary organs of government. This in turn depends on how efficient these corporations are, how successful they are, in achieving their objectives and most importantly how successful the Board and management are as leaders and educators. This is the challenge of the future.

FOOTNOTES

1 A Commission appointed by the government to enquire into the report on the matters contained in the Director of Audit's Report on the Accounts of Sierra Leone for the year 1960/61.
2 The Financial Secretary is a member of the board of all statutory corporations.
3 The Establishment Secretary is a member of the board of the following statutory corporations:
Forest Industries Corporation,
Rice Corporation,
Road Transport Corporation,
Sierra Leone Ports Authority,
Hotels and Tourist Board.
He was a member of the Board of the Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation up to 1969. He is not a member of the Board of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board.

Part Five

Improving the Process of Decision-Making for Development

A. H. RWEYEMAMU

Throughout the world public administration is rapidly taking on the features of business administration. Operational concepts like planning, programming system and budgeting (PPBS), and management by objectives (MBO), which are associated with business management, are already widely used in public administration, particularly in industrial societies. As the Seventh Inter-African Public Administration Seminar observed, both public administration and business management are concerned with "getting things done" and "although public administration deals more with people and business administration deals more with things, the differences are getting narrower as government enters more and more into the fields that were formerly thought to be the sphere of private enterprise" (1968, p. 24).

The central purpose of public administration and indeed government as a whole in Africa, is to mobilize and deploy resources for economic and social development of the societies concerned, that is why there is a growing involvement of African governments in economic enterprises and economic management tasks. It is in this context that participants in various inter-African public administration seminars have emphasized the need for public administrators to learn the management techniques that have been developed in business management. The Seventh Seminar agreed that

> the old idea that administrators are born, not made no longer holds true. So also is the old-fashioned notion that administration is an art which is learnt on the job. Administration is fast becoming a science and administrators and managers can be trained to use the tools of trade in much the same way as craftsmen can be trained to use the tools of craft. But all that the techniques or tools of management do, is to help administrators and managers do their work better and more efficiently. They are not substitutes for good administrators and managers. In the final analysis efficiency depends on whether managers use the correct tools and take and implement the right decisions. Normally the techniques chosen are those that are relevant to the particular purpose and objectives of the organization. (1968, p. 24).

A strategy for improving the process of decision-making for development must, therefore, focus on three basic problems, namely: (1) getting the *right*

personnel in the various positions of executive responsibility; (2) having the *proper* management tools to assist the executives in their effort to achieve the desired goals and, maintaining a *suitable* communication pattern and atmosphere conducive to development decisions and their implementation.

The problem of getting the right personnel in the various positions of executive responsibilities is perhaps the most difficult to achieve. "Right" in this context means people with a keen sense of duty and responsibility, people who are also equipped with the necessary knowledge and management skills to enable them to handle high responsibilities efficiently. Issues of recruitment, training, delegation and motivation fall under this category of the problems of administrative effectiveness. Throughout independent Africa, the administrative structures which were inherited at independence comprised essentially generalist administrators who were also concentrated at the capital city in vertically structured ministries.

Since independence government activities have increased tremendously both in function as well as in complexity. The men at the top have to devise new ways to keep up with normal routine duties but since these top administrators have to make decisions, ways and means must be found to decentralize or delegate some of their functions. There is need to re-examinie the whole system of management in the public service in Africa in the light of expanding needs of the African societies. Management, as one author put it "is an authority or personal ability used to get things done" (1968, p. 91). He suggested that the word is used with three different connotations:

(a) As a process concerned with organizing, arranging, administering and all the various jobs which constitute a manager's or an administrator's task.
(b) As a group of persons gathered together for a specific managerial purpose and the structure within which they work.
(c) As an art, meaning the skills—natural or acquired—used in decision-making; the exercise of judgment and handling of human beings within an enterprise or establishment.

The importance of having well-trained staff at all levels of the public service including permanent secretaries was particularly stressed by the participants in the Seventh Seminar. It was pointed out that some Permanent Secretaries "fail to realize that the changing functions of African governments and the continuous advance in technology make it necessary that officers of all levels should be constantly trained in new functions and new techniques. For them to admit the need for training, is like admitting their own inadequacy" (1968, p. 28). The seminar appealed to African governments to follow the example of business management where directors and top officials are constantly sent to various study seminars, conferences and training courses to expose them to new ideas and techniques. In addition it was pointed out that through training, managers and top administrators "must be made to realize

that only by working through and with others, in their teams can they hope to achieve the best results within their organization and, therefore, to get these "others" so developed and motivated that they can give the best of their ability, should be the manager's prime concern and responsibility" (1968, p 28).

An essential aspect of good management in public affairs is the need for delegation. The Ninth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar discussed this issue and how it affects management performance. The seminar considered the distinction between responsibility, authority and accountability in public administration and whether any of them could be delegated. The seminar agreed that

> responsibility (that is duty) can be delegated in the sense that when work is assigned to a subordinate, he is made responsible for its performance. The senior officer, however, retains a different kind of responsibility, that of delegator. That is, responsibility to see that a proper delegation has been made. He has also the responsibility of training, motivating and evaluating the subordinate. Authority on the other hand, is full power to perform the delegated functions. This is also delegated except that by delegation the senior officer does not give up his authority completely, because he can always retract his delegation. The delegator must, however, possess the authority that he delegates. A Permanent Secretary for example cannot delegate a policy decision to his Under Secretary. Accountability is having to answer to the delegator for the results of his action. The delegator on the other hand remains accountable to his own superior officer for any mistakes of his delegatee. Accountability is, therefore, shared both by the delegator and the delegatee. These concepts illustrate that delegation establishes a close relationship between officers and their subordinates, one of sharing duty, power and accountability (1970, p. 31).

Participants in the seminar noted that productive delegation starts with a clear and detailed definition of duties, within a well-planned system of administrative decentralization. Secondly there must be a clear understanding of the policies and objectives of the ministry concerned and, thirdly there must be an effective system of communication to facilitate leadership functions of coordination and evaluation in the performance of delegated functions. The seminar noted farther, that the worst offenders as far as delegation is concerned are Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. It concluded with the view that the benefits of delegation and control were great but that far too little attention had been paid to them in many African states. "The efficiency and morale of public servants could be improved by an all out effort to ensure good delegation and control at all levels" (1970, p. 86).

The second important and fundamental problem in improving the process of decision-making for development is making selective use of management tools and techniques. The modern management techniques including work-

study techniques, operational research, network analysis, organization and management. Preventive maintenance, job evaluation, and the use of computers were discussed at the Seventh Seminar. It was agreed however, that some of the techniques are not applicable to the civil service and that the first step would be for government to set up management service units, staffed by specialists who would study and analyze the new techniques and recommend those which seem applicable to the public service (1968, p. 26).

The 1971 Seminar focussed on the Professionalization of Public Administration and Management, paid particular attention to management by objectives, the budget as a tool of management and the use of computers in government. In the discussion which followed participants described management in the civil service as "either management by crisis, management by rules or management by detailed instructions. Management by crisis is the system of muddling through. It is the opposite of the idea of management by objectives which is management by future planning for expected results. The other styles of management tend to deflect people from thinking of results and to think rather of other performance criteria. In one case rules/instructions loom larger in the minds of workers than results". (1971, p. 27).

Doubts were expressed however, as to whether African governments could afford the cost of consultants required when introducing MBO. Other problems which were pointed out include the difficulties of measuring performance in the public service, the political nature of public administration as well as the principal of anonymity usually associated with the civil service. The seminar agreed however, that MBO would be of great potential value to the public service and recommended it to African governments for further consideration.

The budget as a tool of management is another concept which has received considerable attention at the seminars. The traditional budget has been criticized on the ground that it

> does not give decision-makers sufficient information about the objective and purpose of the expenditure, the results expected and the relationship between various expenditures which cut across ministerial or organizational boundaries. In other words the budget is not structured to present expenditures in terms of programmes, sub-programmes and activities, nor does it present the full cost of progrrammes, the alternative courses of implementing them with analysis of costs and benefits (1971, p. 31).

In short, it was pointed out that the traditional budget is not an effective instrument of plan implementation and secondly, it is not an effective instrument of management. The proposals for reforming the budgeting system include the introduction of management approach known as Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). This system has been explained by Mr. T. A. Akinyele in a paper which is reprinted in this volume. The essence of PPBS is

that it seeks to help management make better decisions in the allocation of resources to achieve government objectives.

> Its essence is the development and presentation of relevant information as to the full implications—costs and benefits—of the major alternative courses of action. It enables the budget to be used effectively in planning and management, particularly programme evaluation (1971, p. 33).

The seminar agreed that PPBS is a useful device in management but noted that there were difficulties, including the political aspects of the budgeting process, inadequacies of data on costs, planning factors and especially on evaluation of benefits; there were also difficulties of obtaining experienced personnel to operate the new system. The seminar concluded that the introduction of PPBS should be accompanied by a comprehensive training programme and that too much should not be expected from the system in the early stages (1971, p. 37).

The use of computers in government operations is discussed in the paper by Dr. Sherif which is also reprinted in this volume. As seminar participants observed, a number of African countries have already entered the computer age—many of them without making adequate preparations. The 1971 seminar which discussed the use of computers in African government did not reach a consensus on the matter. African administrators were urged to be cautious on the matter and consider what exactly they want computers to do for them in the light of other economic and social priorities facing their governments.

The third problem in improving the process of decision-making for development concerns the social, political and economic context within which administrators operate. Administrators including expert advise from functional specialists are some times inhibited in taking and implementing functional decisions because of the political environment in which they operate. Things like corruption, patronage and undue political interference by politicians do occur among the African states with negative consequences for rationality in decision-making and management of public affairs. The relationship of ministers or generals and civil servants is a relevant area of investigation in the search for administrative efficiency. Where the public service finds itself with an incompetent and corrupt political leadership, obviously a problem arises as to what the public service is expected to do. Thus the whole issue of improving the process of decision-making for development including the nature of the political context in which the public service must operate requires more study and analysis. It is hoped that in the coming years the inter-African Public Administration seminars will take up this issue again in order to suggest some guidelines for public administrators and managers of public affairs.

Delegation

A. ABDEL-HAMID

INTRODUCTION

This short paper is intended to shed some light on the importance of delegation in modern management.[1] However, more emphasis will be put on the experience of developing countries, particularly Sudan, in order to find out what has prevented such countries from making the necessary success and utilization of delegation in their management practice. Limitations and shortcomings will be spelled out. It is of vital importance to seek proper remedies to overcome such difficulties.

As a matter of convenience, the paper will be divided into two main parts: First, the definition and significance of delegation in modern management will be clearly pointed out. Second, limitations and shortcomings will be enumerated as depicted from the daily practice of government officers, both delegators and delegatees, in their attempt to solve their problems through delegation. In other words, this chapter will focus on all sorts of problems cropping up in circumstances where the people concerned do not know how to delegate properly.

DEFINITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DELEGATION

Delegation should simply mean an act or procedure of investing another person or persons with authority and/or permission to act freely on one's behalf. Usually one delegates part or all of his responsibilities to his subordinates together with the necessary authority.

It should be understood, at this juncture, that the person who delegates authority should have acquired it by law, regulation, contract or other official means. This is because no person has the power to delegate any authority or part of it unless it has been invested in him to begin with.

That delegation should not necessarily be in full, i.e. one may delegate part of his responsibility and authority. It is to be emphasized here that this practice should not be confined to a certain group, e.g. top executives.

> Delegating is not limited to the few top executives. It spreads to the grassroots of the organization. The major aspect is developing people who can be trusted to make many work decisions for themselves, so they don't interrupt or overload their chief for his advice on or permission for every move they make.[2]

The act of delegation does not, in any sense, free the delegator from his responsibilities should any irregularities arise in the course of executing that particular job.

More important, delegation should not be for the sake of parting with part or the whole of one's responsibilities, but a predetermined act of inviting others to share, help and contribute more to the well-being of the organization: "Delegating has been dealt with in the past as if it were as mechanical or logical a process as routing the flow of work."[3]

The objective of delegation has, therefore, been changed to reflect an intentionally devised procedure, dominating more of a significant application in management. It has become a useful tool to train subordinates and prepare them for further responsibilities. This helps in distributing knowledge and administrative know-how to a broader base. It will necessarily lead to the creation of a standby cadre that will be ready to take over senior jobs whenever time permits. Mobility and flexibility should be more evident in the service. The myth dominating the public service that certain posts can only be run by those who have held them for a long time will be buried for good.

Should delegation be just a means for training subordinates, or has it more significance? Surely it has more to accomplish for sound administration. Delegation gives bosses more time to devote to other tasks. They will be free to practise policy-making and planning and deal with critical decisions instead of being burdened with the meticulous day-to-day administration of the organization. They need more time for such activities as organizations grow and work becomes more complex. Top management alone may find it technically and practically difficult to handle the more advanced processes and specializations which have appeared. Physical distance and size may also produce the need to delegate more. Those to whom work is delegated should have the authority and power to act on behalf of those at the top. This will help in developing the faculties and enthusiasm of subordinates in their work.

The significance of delegation seems to be clear and tangible. Delegation, as simple as it looks, entails difficult as well as important steps and principles which should not, under any circumstances, be overlooked. Delegation should not be an act of calling upon subordinates and giving them orders to perform one's duties. It is not just a matter of deciding upon what somebody else could do to make the job easier for you and you give him orders to do it. The delegated task must be defined, if possible in writing. All the essential activities should be covered. This should not be confined to how to do the job, but the results expected have also to be pointed out. It is, however, important to note here that the availability of job descriptions and classifications in all parts of the organization will ease delegation.

Moreover, the delegatee should be accountable directly and only to the delegator. No one should be answerable to more than one master in a sound management system. By so doing, dual and multiple subordination is completely avoided. But this procedure does not, in any way, forbid sub-

ordinates from or cancel attempts by them to delegate, in their turn, part of such responsibility to further subordinates, as long as the usual principles of delegation are followed. This means that delegation could be transmitted downwards in the pyramidal shape of the organization.

Furthermore, when delegating one should provide coaching and understudies in order that depth and flexibility are given to the organization. Controls to check effectiveness of the delegated task have to be set up. Personal contacts, occasional visits, statistical reports, etc. are of vital importance to prevent misuse of authority and power by subordinates, especially those who are away from the headquarters of the organization. This follow-up device is essential.

However, delegation should not be expected to fulfil its objectives just by defining the task, showing the accountability of the persons concerned and providing controls. It should seek, as well, the conducive climate necessary for delegation: "The records indicate that delegating works most successfully, in general, when the human climate is democratic, permissive, egalitarian, not secretive, not smothering".[4]

A climate of this nature gives delegatees a feeling that they are more than subordinates working for their chief. They feel like associates doing their work with him rather than doing it for him. It is more than just a matter of adhering to orders and accomplishing prescriptions. It is important to have confidence in your subordinates and trust them. It is said that if we do not entrust, we are assigning not delegating.

Finally, one should, when delegating, seek the right person for the right job. It is in human nature that not all people have the same degree of knowledge nor have they the same tendency and readiness to accept certain missions. Effective training may bridge this gap between individuals, nevertheless, one should be selective in delegating in pursuance of the general good of the organization and without being biased. Personal relations and likeness of X to Y must not be the criteria in choosing people.

Finally, it is to be emphasized that the above-mentioned steps and principles should not be overlooked or underestimated under any circumstances if delegation is to be a success. Also the human climate referred to above requires the same emphasis. Last, but not least, the follow-up system suggested requires due attention and careful consideration.

THE SUDAN EXPERIENCE

This section attempts to discover the real problems facing full utilization of delegation in the Sudan which may have some degree of pertinence for other developing countries.

My own research, though not fully informative, has brought forward remarkable information about how senior government officers misunderstood the meaning of delegation. Some of the answers show that there is no

differentiation between delegating and assigning. This is the first problem and the most serious one facing the application of delegation in the public service. The only way to solve such a problem is through training.

Apart from this, one gets the feeling that a small number of people do understand what delegation means, but they do not believe that it solves their problems. The reasons given may be summarized in the following points:

(1) Since delegation does not free one from his responsibilities, one thinks that it is better to do one's duties by oneself and play it safe!
(2) When one gets too many questions about the details of work from his subordinates, it becomes a real source of nuisance.
(3) If a subordinate is shy of making mistakes, there is no need to invite him to help where he is hesitant to accept such a task.
(4) The rush of work does not permit trial and error. Hence one has too little time to practise delegating his responsibilities.
(5) Some responsibilities bear political implications. If one delegates such responsibilities, it becomes embarrassing when subordinates make mistakes.
(6) If subordinates are not trained, delegation is almost valueless.

These are the most typical answers that one is likely to hear from top executives. They always complain of the rush of work, of the incompetence of their subordinates, of certain responsibilies that could not be delegated due to their being beyond their subordinates' capabilities . . . etc. and all these excuses lead to the result that such people do everything, all the time, by themselves. They have no time for rest and have not enjoyed their annual leaves for years.

In order to bring to light the other part of the picture, questions have been asked of a group of subordinates about problems of delegation. Thus the two points of view can be compared. Their answers focused on the following points:

(1) That top posts are powerful, therefore, their occupants prefer to keep more of their details to themselves so as to look more knowledgeable and more powerful. They think that the more one grasps the details of his job, the more he looks important and indispensable.
(2) That some of the top men are incompetent and so they do not like to come into close contact with their subordinates, by delegating, because they are afraid of any disclosure of their stupidity or shortsightedness which is likely to lose them respect.
(3) That bosses, generally, do not like their young subordinates who are more qualified and more intelligent. And since there are still a few key posts held by people of lower qualification, this sort of attitude will continue to hamper delegation and reduce efficiency.
(4) That some of the key men are reluctant to change. New devices and techniques will not be admitted while they are in leadership positions.

productivity of subordinates. If leave is made a right and compulsory, this will most probably serve the two purposes of delegation and productivity. People at the top will be forced to go on leave or at least take part of it every year; their assistants will find time to know what these people have been doing and how it should best be done. Favourable opportunities will be available for assistants to be trained properly to create the necessary cadre to take over the responsibilities of their seniors whenever they are transferred, pensioned, or have died. Also the change of leave from a grant to a right will stop subordinates being at the mercy of their seniors. On the other hand, if seniors are forced to go on leave, they will be more concerned about their assistants and the amount of work to be done by them. Mistakes due to incompetence or negligence will be reduced or avoided.

In the final analysis there will be a more equitable distribution of responsibility and authority in favour of productivity and a healthy organizational set-up.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, there are many reasons, put forward by both bosses and subordinates, why there is little delegation in the public service. In this paper, certain suggestions have been made to remedy this situation. These are:

(1) Governments in developing countries should make clear policies regarding the training of their top administrators.
(2) Classification and description of jobs have to be given more attention and consideration to help delegation.
(3) The merit system should be the only criterion for promotion to enable delegation and help train subordinates.
(4) And, finally, annual leave entitlement should be reviewed to ensure that it in fact does increase productivity and efficiency. Leave duration will have to be shortened in the Sudan and some people will have to forced to go on leave, when they are due for it.

The above-mentioned points should be considered as concluding remarks on the subject of delegation. They will not, however, be expected to hold good for all developing countries since these countries differ from each other organizationally, politically, socially and culturally.

FOOTNOTES

1 Perhaps it is important to note here that the two words: "management" and "administration" will be used in this paper interchangeably to mean the same thing *only* for convenience sake.
2 *The Techniques of Delegating* by Donald A. Laird and Eleanor C. Laird, McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1957, p. 19.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 20, italics mine.

The Budget as an Instrument of Management

T. A. AKINYELE

INTRODUCTION

Budgeting is as old as the story of man and its use is as varied as the purposes of men. Since this paper is one of a series in the discussion of the main theme of the Conference on the "Professionalization of Public Administration", the purview of the paper will be limited to the financial management of public affairs while deriving benefit from the methods and techniques used in the private sector in solving management problems. Illustrations and examples highlighted in the paper will be drawn from the Nigerian experience of the writer but they would be seen to be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to other African countries. A critical appraisal of the relevance of modern budgetary and management techniques is of vital concern to developing countries, for a host of reasons. In most developing economies, especially of Africa, issues relating to the time dimension and the rising expectations of the people stare Governments in the face everyday. The scale and costliness of goods and services now provided by these Governments in response to the demands of their peoples, as seen against the background of a gradual but persistent erosion of the avenues for additional domestic finance, throw Government leadership into a series of dilemmas. The inequality in the terms of international trade between consuming and producing countries and the diminution in foreign aid as a result of the internal financial problems of traditionally-recognized donor countries jointly pose a further threat to the amount of resources available to governments of developing countries for economic development. Consequently, the need for a critical evaluation of the allocative methods as well as the price levels of the various cost elements of government's goods and services becomes highlighted.

TERMS AND TRENDS

It is commonly recognized that the main objective of the management of any organization or society is the judicious administration of its men, money and materials. This management by objectives involves planning, organization and execution or direction. Execution or direction may further involve three other elements, namely, command, coordination and control. This paper

discusses how the budget can play an effective role within the context of management by objectives, especially in Government affairs. A budget may be defined as a comprehensive plan, expressed in financial terms, by which an operating programme is effective for a given period of time for the purpose of attaining a given objective. Public budgeting is a reflection of what the Government is doing or intends to do and since it is difficult to conceive of any public policy that can be carried out without money, most of the early literature on budgeting treated the budget basically as a financial plan and emphasised its mechanisms of expenditure control. Subsequent writing recognized the economic implications of the budget and emphasized its role as an instrument of economic planning, an occasion for assessing probable developments in the national economy and for regulating the volume of governmental taxation and expenditure to offset threats of inflation or economic recession. Most recently, however, there has been a wave of interest in the budget as a work programme with emphasis on relating costs to performance. The gradual progress in budgetary thought and techniques culminating in the tripartite mix of the objectives of economy, efficiency and effectiveness may be broadly summarized (see table below).

Period	*Type of Budgeting*	*Emphasis*
1. Pre 1940—	Traditional	Cost
2. 1940s	Programme	Cost-Objective
3. 1950s	Performance	Cost-Benefit
4. 1960s	PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting System)	Cost-Benefit-Effectiveness

The landmarks seem to underscore the changing emphasis of consideration of the budget as a socio-political document or financial plan to a work plan or programme for the management of the national economy. Which ever way it is viewed, the budget represents the evaluation of the intentions of the management and usually it reveals a cycle of events:

(1) the formulation of a policy;
(2) the preparation of a plan based on that policy;
(3) the control of the execution of the plan;
(4) the measurement of the results of the plan; and
(5) necessary modifications to the plan in the light of experience, new developments and changed or alternative policies.

THE BUDGET FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY

The Budget and Fiscal Policy

In aggregative terms, the production, utilization and output of men, money and materials represent the economy of any nation and since the main

objective of management is to influence these factors of increased output, it follows that the budget should be so fashioned as to become a tool for the management of a nation's economy. The modern trend of thought regarding the role of the budget is focused on this aspect. In the words of the 1969 Annual Report of the US Joint Financial Management Improvement Programme, "the budget represents the proposed allocation of available resources to national goals and objectives, and the distribution of the Nation's output. It reflects a considered fiscal policy and is an instrument of economic and programme planning".[1]

The budget can be used to influence the economy, either to stimulate or to control it, in two broad ways:

(a) as a tool of fiscal policy, and
(b) as a mechanism for Development Plan implementation.

Fiscal policy concerns itself with the aggregative effects of government expenditure and taxation on income, production, and employment. In its relation to economic development, fiscal policy has come to mean the utilization by Government of coordinated revenue, expenditure and debt programmes to stimulate or control that development. The budget should help to make fluctuations in total demand less severe, and thus aid in stabilizing employment and prices. When total demand exceeds total supply and inflationary conditions prevail, the effect of budgetary policy should be to restrain demand. When total demand is low, when unemployment is high and prices falling, the effect of taxation and expenditure should be to stimulate demand.

Most countries of the developing world are faced with the problems of inflation and unemployment. It is hardly appreciated how important a role the budget could play in ameliorating these problems. Taxes affect the level of private income, the distribution of that income and the volume of private expenditures. Government's taxation policies as enunciated through the budget should be coordinated with the other facets of the economy because a disorganized package of policies could have disastrous effects. Unnecessary tax burdens could impair the basic incentives of individuals to work, and their willingness and capacity to save and invest; or taxation may make impossible the expansion of existing enterprises, and it may cause some independent businesses to be sold out or merged with larger companies. Taxation could, therefore, be used as an instrument to affect the level of prices, as well as selectively to affect relative prices and the kinds and varieties of economic activity.

Budgetary policy should also serve to restrain unnecessary government expenditure and stimulate efficiency in Government. Traditionally, public expenditure is seen as a subtraction from and a substitute for private expenditures. Government outlay is considered desirable only in those circumstances where the private sector could not conduct the activity. It is now generally agreed that the character and volume of government expenditure

will affect levels of private income and its distribution and the prices and allocation of resources. Budgetary policy can be an effective force for economy if Government harnesses the legitimate and specific interest in lower taxes to the general interest in economy. Every proposal that would expand government's functions should pass the test of society's willingness to pay for it in taxes.

Budgetary policy should provide for the reduction of the public debt under conditions of reasonably high employment and production. The conversion of private assets from money to bonds in the selling of debt obligations by a government may, in some circumstances, alter the volume of private expenditure. Since the main concern of public borrowing is to minimize the inflationary effect of government expenditure and to discourage private expenditure on goods and services in short supply, it is not considered appropriate in a situation of high employment and production suggestive of an economic boom. In this tailoring of public finance to economic purposes, budgetary policy becomes one of the principal agents for influencing a nation's general level of economic activity.

By way of example, the budgets of the Federal Government of Nigeria during 1966-1970, the period of the country's civil war, could be seen as an epitome of the role which the budget can play in the management of an economy. By a deliberate and conscious use of budgetary measures, taxes on personal and corporate income and on imports and exports were increased while at the same time expenditure rationalization measures restrict non-military expenditures and reduced financial assistance to non-profit yielding corporations, standardizing earnings so as to restrain expenditure on administration. Voluntary and compulsory savings schemes were also introduced to mop up floating liquid assets and to assist in the financing of the war. The measure of success achieved in financing the war under the country's own steam is evidence of the need to appreciate the role of the budget as an instrument of economic stimulation and control.

Budgeting for Development

No matter what system is adopted, a budget cannot be constructed in a vacuum. It is generally said that it is both backward-living and forward-looking in the sense that a budget is one of a series of budgets which in a comprehensive and coordinated manner make up what are commonly referred to as Development Plans. It must be appreciated that the intention here is not to say that a Development Plan is a series of budgets put together but on the contrary that a budget should be seen as part and parcel of a Plan. The question of how long is long is more a matter of taste than of prescription. Generally speaking, anything going beyond one fiscal year is long-range and from that point one may wish to follow Peter Drucker's statement that "anything beyond 20 years equals infinity".[2] The first role of the budget for the purpose of economic development planning is that it should be established

as an annual phase of the Development Plan. There are, however, real problems of integrating one with the other. These essentially methodological problems may include:

(i) forecasting;
(ii) time span and spill-overs;
(iii) classificatory dichotomy; and
(iv) funding and cash management.

Since a Development Plan is long-range in view, there is bound to be a gap between plan formulation and plan implementation for which the budget is expected to serve as a channel. All the basic assumptions underlying a Plan are subject to changes when more data and better knowledge of the economy become available. A Development Plan forecast of revenue cannot, with any degree of certainty, take into account factors such as adverse weather conditions and other "acts of God" which may affect revenue prospects in an agricultural economy, anti-tax agitations which may affect the personal tax contribution effort and tax yield and the occurrence of smuggling and other social evils which may affect proceeds from customs. Basic differences in attitude and outlook towards forecasting techniques and scope may cause a wide gap between plan implementation as seen by the dreamland optimism of planners and the over-cautious realism of estimators. Similar difficulties in forecasting may also occur in respect of expenditure policies as enunciated in the Development Plan in the case where the planners are expansionary in outlook as opposed to the budget officers who may be conservative and contractionary in approach to financial matters. An inherent conflict may exist between the application of fiscal and monetary tools aimed at solving balance of payments and foreign exchange problems and budget expectations of a large revenue yield from customs. The need to narrow down these areas of conflicts is one of the compelling reasons for urging the adoption of a comprehensive approach to budgeting which will embrace the techniques of planning, programming and budgeting in one package deal.

The next problem in relating the budget to the Development Plan is the question of the time span and consequential spill-overs. A plan may be envisaged to last six years. There is always the problem of estimating the amount of work actually done on the project so as to be able to assess how much should be voted in the succeeding Plan since a number of projects are not susceptible to *pro rata* estimation. Apart from inflationary changes in prices, a situation such as that may be further bedevilled by overlapping of projects similar in scope and objectives which may be introduced at the beginning of the new Plan period.

Another serious obstacle to a good relationship between a Development Plan and an Annual Budget is the usual lack of integration in the classificatory systems adopted in the two processes. It is not unusual as in the case in

Nigeria, to find the Development Plan with an economic/functional classification whereas the annual budgets are structured on organizational lines.

Very often because of this classificatory dichotomy, it is difficult to use the budget to obtain the kind of information on annual government transactions which would be required for determining aggregates of national income and expenditure and for tracing the inter-relationships between major sectors of the economy. This leads to further difficulty in relating the government sector of national accounts to government's annual accounts.

One other major cause of divergencies between the Plan and the annual budget, especially in developing economies, is the difficulty of matching the actual funding and cash flow management with the projections of the funding of capital formation envisaged in the Plan. With the unsophisticated money markets of the developing world, the financing of development projects is strictly on a cash basis and very rarely is recourse made to the use of development bonds, tax anticipation notes and other monetary tools. The cost of money in a dynamic economy keeps changing and it is not unusual to find that the inputs required for development projects are often costed on a factor-price basis in the Development Plan instead of at market prices which is the level at which the annual budgets will have to operate. In serious inflationary situations, not uncommon in developing economies, such differences in costing techniques may lead to apparently serious budgetary indiscipline owing to wide budget variances.

THE BUDGET IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 3 Ms

It is generally accepted that the main concern of economic policy is the production, allocation and utilization of resources but since money is the common denominator, the consequential measurements of these resources are expressed in financial terms. To the extent that the budget serves as an expression of economic policy, it is also to be regarded as a tool of financial management. In what ways can the budget be used to affect the interaction of men, money and materials to improve the productive capacity of the economy?

Broadly speaking, the three stages in the budgetary process, namely, formulation, execution and review, should have an impact on two levels of people—the "governing" and the "governed". Given the truism that whatever the "governing" is doing is for the common good of both the "governing" and the "governed", there should ideally be no credibility gap between the intentions of both sides. In other words, the first prerequisite of a budget is that it should form an information medium between the two groups. If the government is to collect taxes from the people for their common good, the budget through which the intention is to be announced should be explicit and unambiguous as to the effect of the revenue measures on the people's fortunes. Conversely, the people should also be told in clear terms what the revenue collected is going to be spent on and what difference it will make to their lives

and living. The central question here is "Who pays what and who gains what?" Since the needs and purposes of people are as diverse as their numbers, the major task of budgetary policy is to be able as much as possible to reconcile the conflicts of interests through realistic applications of various allocative principles including marginalism and social cost and benefit analysis. As Aaron Wildavsky puts it, "Budgeting deals with the purposes of men. How can they be moved to cooperate? How can their conflicts be resolved? How can they find ways of dealing effectively with recalcitrant problems?"[3]

If the budget is to inform, the question of what information and how much of it should be made available to the people is never a settled one. Should the government inform the people through the legislative consideration of the budget of the underlying substantive legislations of the budget or should it suffice to discuss just the financial implications? Must the people know the salaries, allowances and other prerequisites of office, which the government pays to its servants and must they be told the detailed cost of each item and object of expenditure? In traditional budgets, the emphasis has been on details of inputs for the purpose of control but the experiences of modern governments with their paraphernalia of complex structures and functions have shown that it is more meaningful and useful to emphasize the aggregates of activities to be performed. In this age, when the work and accomplishments of public agencies are viewed from the point of view of benefits, the task of budgeting has to be redefined as the effective marshalling of fiscal and organizational resources for the attainment of benefits. The emphasis should, therefore, shift from consideration of inputs to the end-product of output. It is not how much is paid to a typist that matters but how much value government can get out of that typist's emolument, that is, how much typing work he can accomplish in a day. A ton of cement, no matter the cost, is more importantly seen as potentially a section of a road after it has been used in combination with other materials, some equipment and the physical activity of men. In serving the purposes of men, the budget should be used to inform and benefit men and consequently motivate them for further productive activity.

FORECASTING FINANCIAL NEEDS AND RESOURCES

In an earlier part of this paper, some attention has been given to problems that may often arise between long-range forecasting of needs and resources as practised in the drawing up of Development Plans and short-term forecasting epitomized by annual budgets. The emphasis here is to make an over-view of the problem of forecasting needs and resources. There is always some academic argument as to whether you should start with your needs and latter consider your resources to meet those needs or vice versa. Whichever way the issue is viewed, two facts are incontrovertible:

(1) needs are always in excess of resources, and

(2) taxation resists an upward change and expenditures abhor a downward movement.

From these facts, it seems clear that resource allocation is the key problem. In this connection, even for one of the most affluent of nations, Edward A. Lehan has this to say: "Clearly the rise in real wealth in the United States has increased rather than abated the pain of choice".[4] Given a good tone and style of government, the tax tolerance of the people will be high enough to enable further productive activity to be generated which will reduce the constraints against an equitable sharing of the "national cake". The most rational approach to the problem of forecasting needs and resources would be a technique that weighs performance with objectives. If a country, for example Nigeria,[5] states that its national objectives are to establish

(1) a united, strong and self-reliant nation;
(2) a great and dynamic economy;
(3) a just and egalitarian society;
(4) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and
(5) a free and democratic society;

then it becomes obligatory on the part of the executors of the country's Plan to ensure that the forecasting of the people's needs and resources are made on the basis of such objectives. Such a country will have to ensure, among other things, that it establishes an equitable and progressive system of taxation that does not rob Peter to pay Paul, that each citizen is given an opportunity to use and improve his productive capacity through rational educational and employment policies. In its allocative principles, an effort should be made to work out a rational relationship between the level of expenditure on consumption, investment and transfers, on social overheads as against expenditure on directly productive activities, on expensive as against inexpensive development projects and on dispersed rather than concentrated development.

HARMONIZING DEVELOPMENT AND RECURRENT BUDGETS

Partly due to the historical development of budgeting in most developing countries of Africa, where the execution of development projects depended on the whims and caprices of colonial governments, it is not unusual to find recurrent budgets treated in isolation of capital development projects. It is hardly understood that the success of a government, in an economic sense, is not to be measured by the number of persons it can offer employment in its service and the amount of salaries and allowances it can pay to them but by its ability to muster and marshal the resources available in all sectors of the economy for increased productivity. Since the attainment of Independence most developing countries of Africa have come to realize that they have to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and consequently they have

become keenly aware of the need for harmonization of the recurrent budget policies with the aims and aspirations of Development Plans. The attainment and transfer of surpluses from recurrent accounts to funds for capital development are now seen not only as prerequisites but are often prescribed. For similar reasons revenues and expenditures are also assessed as ratios of Gross Domestic Product.

In order to harmonize the recurrent budgets with development budgets a number of steps would have to be taken which will involve the following:

(1) structure
(2) classification
(3) financing methods
(4) consistency with development objects.

To achieve the desirable change in the structure of budgets would require an appreciation of the need for a change by all concerned. The inherent possibility of the comprehensive planning/programming/budgeting system to liberate policy and procedure from existing political and bureaucratic perspectives is most certainly the main source of its appeal and equally so of its criticism. All expenditures whether for personal services or commodity expenses can be seen in the light of their relationship to a programme of work to be accomplished. In the case of common and unassignable expenses, the usual cost accounting principle of operation might be adopted.

The important point about classification is that it must be consistent with the purpose of the classificatory method adopted and be readily adaptable for reclassification for other purposes.

There are many classificatory systems that could be adopted in budgeting, depending on the purpose it is intended to serve, but there are four main methods of classification generally adopted: economic classification, functional classification, classification by organizational units, and classification by objects of expenditure. The first two methods are adopted in programme formats which will be discussed later and the last two, which though obsolete are still fashionable, can be broadly termed a commodity format since the stress is on objects of expenditure incurred by organizational units. A combination of the last two methods in the list above is still being used in Nigeria. For the purpose of harmonization, it should be possible to use the device of cross-classification. The budget of a Building Inspection Agency should be capable of being cross-classified as in Exhibits 1 and 2 below:

Exhibit 1 (Commodity Format)

Personal Services	£60,000
Contractual Services	7,800
Supplies	1,300
Outlay	400
	£69,500

Exhibit 2 (Programme format)

General Administration	£15,800
Plan Examination	12,300
Inspection	40,800
Innovation	600
	£69,500

The financing method of the recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure could be a means of harmonizing the two segments of government expenditure. In an attempt to provide evidence of development effort, some Governments are known to have set up different funds for the financing of recurrent expenditure as distinct from capital expenditure. Such is the case with Nigeria. The futility of the practice is proved by the treatment usually given to the servicing obligations in respect of the public debt or transfer payments such as pensions and gratuities which are made a charge to the revenue funds. Very often the financing of enterprise activities in which many governments are increasingly engaged raises serious financial management problems. Questions which immediately arise include:

(1) Are such enterprises to be self-balancing?
(2) Are their financial transactions to be recorded on a cash or accrual basis?
(3) Are their costs to be recorded on a gross or net basis?
(4) How do you determine their net costs?

These problems arising from an attempt at the functionalization of enterprise activity can only be resolved through a system of programme budgeting which gives an opportunity for the evaluation of the revenue possibilities of each programme.

The level of consistency which exists between a Development Plan and the annual budget could be a useful measure of the harmonization between the two. If, for example, a Development Plan declares that one of the objectives for the Health Programme is emphasis on preventive medicine as a matter of priority, but it is found that in the next annual budget 80 per cent of the personal emoluments bill of the Health Department is paid in respect of officers dealing with curative services, then such a recurrent budget is inconsistent with the spirit of the Development Plan. The Development Plan could also serve as a yardstick for the measurement of the level of productivity of the Civil Service as a whole. The growth rates in absolute numbers and in cost of the staff where personal emoluments are paid from the recurrent budget could be related to the growth rate in the level of capital development expenditure so as to determine whether productivity in general has been rising or declining. For example, if in a previous Development Plan period, an average establishment strength of 12,000 was able to execute capital projects of approximately £15 million per annum on the average as against staff numbering 20,000 with higher rates of pay during a later plan period being able to execute only £10 million worth of development projects, then there is an obvious cause for alarm with regard to the level of productivity in the latter years. To achieve harmonization, the programmes and their financing as enunciated in the Development Plan have to be phased out annually through the budget. If there is need, as often is the case, to revise a Plan as it progresses, then the budgetary control mechanisms have to be used not only

to ensure compliance with Plan objectives and targets but also to inculcate a rational approach to any variations.

THE DISADVANTAGES OF ANNUAL BUDGETING

The trend of thought so far in this paper has been to show the weaknesses of budgeting in isolation, that is, without reference to or relationship with a Development Plan. Yet most countries of the Western world have practised such a budgetary system for centuries. It will be shown in the discussion of the development and application of PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System) which countries are currently championing that the shift towards the system is nothing more than a rationalization of the shortcomings of the past.

The first issue to resolve in considering the success or failure of the budgeting system adopted is the question of the time span of the budget as well as the timing of the financial year. Should budgets be presented each year such that they cover only one fiscal year? Although a number of local and state governments in the United States of America have biennial budgets (e.g. Hartford City Council, State of Connecticut or State of Wisconsin), it is generally agreed by most writers on budgeting that an annual base is ideal for budgeting. Jesse Burkhead[6] made "annuality" one of the prerequisites of a budget. However, modern thinking on the subject stresses the fact that annual budgeting would be ideal in situations where a Development Plan exists, otherwise there would be something to be said in favour of biennial budgets.

No matter what academic position is taken in this matter, the vexed question still remains, whether one is to discard the annual budget system or to de-emphasize the role of the Development Plan and re-emphasize the possibilities offered by budgets of longer duration, especially biennial budgets. It is my view that in cases where no coordinated system of formal planning exists, as in most states of U.S.A. where biennial budgets are in vogue, there may be a strong argument in favour of biennial budgets. Also where planning exists but its range is not long enough, e.g. less than 10 years, the argument in favour of biennial budgeting becomes weakened by the shortness of the Plan period. However, the comprehensive system of the PPBS offers a good compromise scheme whereby planning/budgeting is viewed as a continuing process with the first identifiable landmark of the continuum staying in the range of 12-20 years. In such a situation the budget (annual or preferably biennial) is prepared as a continuous budget, like those used on a monthly basis by most commercial organizations, such that a twelve-month forecast is always available by adding another year immediately one year is dropped. One should not lose sight of practical problems that exist. One should readily admit that long-range planning such as is envisaged here requires a great measure of sophistication in the tools of forecasting which are often not within

financial and manpower capabilities of developing countries. It should also be appreciated that the fluctuating fortunes of agrarian economies with their great dependence on weather and world market conditions are not conducive to realistic and reliable forecasting.

With regard to the issue of timing of the financial year, there also seems to be no consensus of opinion. The operative determinants should be the circumstances of history, geography and the prime movers of the economy. It seems, however, that without rhyme or reason, other than the accident of history, most Anglophone countries (formerly British colonies) have adopted and stuck to the financial year lasting from 1st April to 31st March. Even for the British from whom the tradition has been handed down, it is a matter of expendiency.

As shown by Lord Bridges, the last full Permanent Secretary to the British Treasury, in his book *The Treasury*,[1] the dates for the financial year changed more than half a dozen times between 1752 and 1833 when the matter was finally settled by law.

In a country like Nigeria for example, where most festivals are based on calendar years, where climatic conditions dictate an almost uniform time for the planting season, where the school period is reckoned from January to December, there seems to be no valid reason for the retention of 1st April to 31st March as the financial year. The writer's experience of the situation in the Western State of Nigeria shows that the arrangement causes hardship to a number of Government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture which provides agricultural extension services and credit supervision for farmers is never happy with the timing; the Ministry of Education which provides grants-in-aid for primary and secondary education also complains, whilst the Ministry of Works does not see the rationale behind a system that makes money available during the rainy season when the smallest number of civil and highway engineering works can be carried out. It is necessary before embarking on any budgetary reforms to ensure that these fundamental issues are resolved in a way that will not impede the success of the reforms.

PPBS-A MANAGEMENT TOOL

The traditional system of budgeting has been criticized on the grounds that it is short-range in view and that, because of its structural design, it emphasizes the principle of control which is related to only one of the three objectives of management, namely economy. Traditional budgeting offers little help in establishing the remaining two objectives of efficiency and effectiveness. It encourages strong central control over departmental expenditures and since the objects of outlay have to be specified in detail, the administrative discretion of departmental heads is greatly reduced. The amount of detail contained in a traditional budget is neither useful nor meaningful either to legislators

or to the citizenry at large. Of what use are the several pages of an Estimates Book containing details of personal emoluments and commodity expenses if it is not easy to relate or identify these expenses with a productive activity? Over 75 per cent of the paper space totalling 478 pages which the 1971/72 recurrent Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria covers contains details of Personal Emoluments. This is also true of the Estimates of the State Governments of the country.

Over-attention to detail inherent in the object classification in traditional budgets causes inattention to larger issues which ought to be presented in the budget but which are buried in the object details. These criticisms point to the fact that, for a modern government that is daily grappling with the painful duty of satisfying needs which compete for insufficient resources, for a government which serves a citizenry that wants to be adequately informed the traditional system of budgeting is an anachronism. Management has often been defined as an art of marshalling resources for productive activity or the science of converting information into action. I regard these two points of view as the ends of a continuum, with the real definition lying somewhere between. It is this real definition of management that PPBS (Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System) is designed to serve—a tool to assist in the decision-making process. A planning-programming-budgeting-system can be defined as a mechanism for systematically gathering and analysing relevant information and presenting choices to the decision-makers. The system must include the basic processes of planning budgeting and evaluation in an integrated fashion.

RELEVANCE OF PPBS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Ironical as it may sound, there is nothing basically new in the concept of PPBS for a developing country. Most developing countries, starting with India's earliest experience with Development Planning have accepted Development Planning as a *sine qua non*, almost as an article of faith. Yet one of the cornerstones of PPBS is long-range planning. The complexities associated with the concept, language and gadgets of PPBS as championed first in the USA and later in the United Kingdom, stem from the fact that both countries only came to realise the need for comprehensive planning when they found that affluence without planning could lead to poverty in the quality of life. Unfortunately, these apparent complexities scare developing countries away from the idea of introducing PPBS without realising that its very foundation has already been laid. In fact, it did not take much effort for the Federal Government of Nigeria to convert its 1971/72 Capital Budget into a programme-type budget based on the classification adopted in the Second National Development Plan, 1970/74. The programme structure of that budget is patterned as follows:

Code	*Programme*
621	Primary Production
622	Trade and Industry
623	Electricity
624	Land Transport System
625	Water Transport System
626	Air Transport System
627	Communications
629	Education
630	Health
631	Town Planning
633	Labour and Social Welfare
634	Information
636	Police
637	General Administration
638	Defence
639	Financial Obligations
640	Loans On-Lent and External Grants
	Grand Total

Even though the above programme pattern deserves further refinement, it is to be seen as a step in the right direction.

BACKGROUND TO PPBS

Shortly after the Second World War, the need for overhauling the system of allocation of resources became a pre-eminent issue in the United States. With the background of the profit-oriented practices in industry and business which have made significant achievements, it was not considered difficult to evolve budgetary processes in public financial management where expenditures are planned on a programme basis considering priority, revenue available, available ways of providing services and other factors. It was with this background that the Hoover Commission, set up in 1945, produced reports in two stages recommending the adoption of performance budgeting. The first practical success of PPBS was that made of it by Mr. Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defence from 1961-64. This success story led President Johnson in August 1965 to adopt PPBS as a Federal Government budget policy and to direct that all Federal agencies should adopt the system.

WHAT IS INVOLVED IN PPBS

The underlying principles of PPBS are readily understood by answering the following fundamental issues about any activity: What? For whom? How? How well?

Answers to these questions also provide the background to the three distinct stages of PPBS which may be adopted in a phased approach to the introduction of PPBS. By the time answers have been found for the questions "What?" and "For Whom?" a programme would have been established and where programme budgeting ends, performance budgeting takes over by asking the question "How?" which has the undertone of querying the efficiency and cost. A more specific "How well?" raises the issue of effectiveness which intuitively suggests the need to consider alternatives (How else?). The matrix of the system is as follows:

Question	*System*	*Emphasis*
What? For whom?	Programme	Benefit
How? How well?	Performance PPBS	Efficiency (Cost) Effectiveness (Impact)

PPBS is a system which aims at helping an organization make better decisions on the allocation of resources among alternative ways to attain government objectives. Its essence is the development and presentation of relevant information as to the full implications—the costs and benefits of the major alternative courses of action. It also aims at minimizing the amount of piecemeal, fragmented, and last-minute, programme evaluation which tends to occur under present planning and budgeting practices. The main distinctive characteristics of the system are:

(1) it focuses on identifying the fundamental objectives of the government and the relating of all activities, regardless of organizational placement, to these;
(2) future year implications are explicitly considered;
(3) all pertinent costs are considered—including capital costs as well as non-capital costs and associated support costs (e.g. employee benefits) as well as direct costs; and,
(4) systematic analysis of alternatives is undertaken.

This last characteristic is the crux of PPBS. It involves:

(a) identification of the governmental objectives;
(b) explicit, systematic identification of alternative ways of carrying out the objectives;
(c) estimation of the total cost implications of each alternative;
(d) presentation of the resulting major cost and benefit trade-offs among the alternatives along with the identification of major assumptions and uncertainties.

The major components of a PPBS are the following:

1. *An across the board governmental programme structure*

One of the first steps performed in instituting PPBS is the identification of fundamental governmental objectives. Based upon these, the government's activities are grouped into categories, which aim at grouping together activities (regardless of organizational placement) which contribute towards the same objectives. As experience is gained in the system and as programme emphasis changes, it should be expected that the programme structure will also undergo some changes periodically.

2. *A multi-year programme and financial plan*

At any given point in time there should exist an approved multi-year plan which uses the programme structure categories discussed above. This approved plan will be based upon decisions previously made. Major change proposals would be presented in a similar format. The plan is in two major parts. The first part is the "financial plan" which displays the pertinent costs, both capital and non-capital. Major associated external revenue should be identified where appropriate and the expected net cost to the jurisdiction indicated. The programme, or output part of the plan, should contain the major measures which indicate to the users of the plan the scope and magnitude of the approved programmes. Five years in addition to the current fiscal year has typically been selected for presentation in these multi-year plans.

3. *Programme analyses*

The systematic identification and analysis of alternative ways to achieve government objectives is the cornerstone of PPBS. The analysis of a programme issue should result in the identification and documentation of:

(a) the fundamental governmental objectives involved;
(b) a description of the criteria for showing success including the fundamental objectives i.e. indications of "effectiveness" not merely of output.
(c) the major feasible alternative;
(d) for each alternative the best available estimates of the total programme costs for each year considered;
(e) for each alternative the best available estimates of the benefits (and/or "penalties") relevant to the objectives for each year considered;
(f) the major assumptions and uncertainties associated with the alternatives, and
(g) the impact of proposed programmes on other programmes, other agencies, levels of government, and on private organizations.

4. *Programme updating procedure*

PPBS requires explicit provision for the revision and updating of resource decisions. The system must be responsive to changing needs and changing information.

THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PROCESS IN PPBS

Since PPBS is a marriage of planning and budgeting, the system must essentially combine the methods and tools of the two systems coupled with realistic ways and means of measuring output and performance. As an attempt to furnish useful and meaningful information to decision-makers, PPBS should be able to build a structure couched in clear, easily understandable and test-oriented language which will provide the necessary information not only for internal administration but also for the legislature, the press and the general public to understand the budget and the services provided. One of the basic questions in a political economy which a budget is expected to attempt to answer is "Who gets what and how much?" In order to be able to satisfy all these multifarious requirements, it has been established that PPBS necessitates the use of an inter-disciplinary crossbreeding in the tools which it has to use to meet these objectives. PPBS draws heavily on the knowledge of the inter-relationship between the Keynesian aggregatives of consumption, investment and income as well as the micro-economic principles of costs and prices. The role of the profit motive in a free market interplay, the validity or otherwise of theories based on equimarginalism in determining the criteria for the allocation of scarce government resources and for measuring the impact of government investment policies, the finesse of costing principles used in Cost Accounting, must all be regarded as useful tools for reaching the goals of PPBS. In other words, PPBS must lean heavily on the disciplines of economics, accounting, mathematical and physical sciences (for the systems analysis element) statistics, operational research, simulation and computers, sociology and the behavioural sciences. The PPBS analyst should be acquainted with the major characteristics of these tools but need not, of course, be expert in all of them. Above all, it has to be realized that there is a lot between the lip and the cup and that "budgets", in the words of Professor Aaron Wildavsky,[8] "are political documents, and budgetary decisions are answers to central political questions—who gets what and how". The analysis process should not ignore the political and legislative constraints that are pertinent. The system should, therefore, seek to optimize resource allocation within these contraints. However, analysis should also indicate the potential penalties arising from them. This will provide information to government decision-making, suggesting how worthwhile it might be to try to overcome these constraints. Although emphasis has to be placed on quantitative information, when this information is not available qualitative materials should

be included to place the issues in proper perspective. In other words, it is not the quantity of the data that matters but the quality.

CHANGE-OVER: PROCEDURE AND TECHNIQUES

For any innovating system to succeed, its introduction has to be based on a philosophy of "adapt" and not "adopt". What this connotes is that the system will have to be introduced within the context of prevailing political, economic, social and other relevant circumstances of the country concerned. As a first step, a country desirous of introducing PPBS as a management tool will need to set up a Task Force to examine the relevant circumstances under which the system will operate, its practicability and the stages by which it ought to be introduced. Such a Task Force would have to advise on the type and scope of training required for staff who will be directly concerned, on the gaps in informational data which need filling and on the timing of the introduction of the system. It should be possible for the Task Force to draw up concrete proposals regarding methodology in respect of the following essential steps which need to be taken prior to the introduction of PPBS:

1. *Establishment of a programme structure*

   This will depend on the constitutional functions allocated to the component parts of the country. In a Federal set-up like Nigeria, the programme structure at Federal, State and Local Government levels must essentially be different. The important point, however, is for each item of expenditure to be seen clearly as a programme that is capable of answering the questions "what?" and "for whom?" It will be desirable to settle the inter-relationship in the role to be played between the central budget office (say Ministry of Finance) and the departments or ministries. Should the programme structure be worked out by the ministries/departments or by the central office? For the purpose of involvement and cooperation, it is advisable to design the structure from below, that is to involve the departments in the decision-making process.

2. *Development of performance evaluation criteria*

   From the initial stage of designing programme structure, it is necessary for clear indications to be given as to the yardsticks to be used at a later stage for the measurement of the performance of each programme. These performance indicators will be useful when performance budgeting procedures are subsequently introduced. Every programme, including those least quantifiable, would be seen to be capable of being measured no matter how objective the method of evaluation.

3. *Injection of planning methods*

   The entire decision-making process has to be backed by considerable planning effort including long-range financial plans. Here the statistical gadgets have to be modernized.

4. *Examination of alternatives*

   Before a final decision is taken on any programme, it is essential for opportunity to have been given to the decision-maker to be aware of other alternatives which can be weighed and judged along with one another.

PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS

Much of the current literature in the United States on the subject of PPBS is replete with criticism of PPBS, highlighting its problems, limitations and, surprisingly enough, dangers. On the one hand, it is argued by some writers that it might lead to over-concentration of the powers of Congress or that it might confer too much power on the technocrats of the system who as bureaucrats are despised if not entirely hated in the American society. Others suggest that it might present an opportunity for Congress on the basis of an analysis of alternatives, to put the President "on the carpet" with regard to his pet programmes, thus drawing him away from autocratic tendencies. Some feel that since welfare programmes are the least quantifiable, programmes with hard-goods elements might prosper at the expense of programmes like health, education and social welfare which are considered to be in the best interest of the public. This is also seen as an opportunity for bureaucrats to favour vested interests in the society—interests closely associated with the production of hard goods. Programme analysis is not easy. There are many quantitative tools from such fields as economics, operations research, mathematics, the computer sciences and so forth, that can and should be brought to bear on problems. The terms "cost-benefit analysis" and "cost-effectiveness analysis" are frequently used to describe these studies, particularly those which utilize the more sophisticated quantitative procedures. However, it is still true that programme analysis (or whatever it may be called) is still as much an art as a science. Probably the most important limitation on the undertaking of meaningful analyses are:

(1) problems in defining the real objective;
(2) the presence of multiple, incommensurable benefits;
(3) inadequacies of data relevant to the analysis; including information as to what effect each alternative course of action will have on the objectives as well as information, describing where we are today;
(4) difficulties in considering a time stream of costs and benefits and not simply the evaluation of costs and benefits and not simply the evaluation of costs and benefits for a single point in time.

Despite these real difficulties, competent and thoughtful programme analysis should be able to provide considerably improved information on the important issues facing government decision-makers. Much of the relevant analytical work done thus far in government PPBS systems in the USA has not resulted directly from very sophisticated, technical analyses, but from penetrating questioning, and the improved perspective obtained from attempts to identify the true costs and benefits of alternatives that are relevant to the fundamental objectives. Ideally, there should be continuing analyses of all major programme problems and issues facing the jurisdiction. In practice, and certainly during the initial institution of a PPBS systems, a jurisdiction will need to be quite selective in its choice of issues for analyses. The greatest appeal of PPBS is that it removes the budgetary process from the arena of *laissez faire* and that it aims at evolving a common language between professionals and administrators. It is, therefore, a step in the direction of professionalism to which public administration should move in the seventies if it is to adequately serve governments in this space age.

CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of any management depends on the information it is given, and any information system is only as good as its ability to motivate management to take the right actions. A dynamic economy, to which all developing countries are aspiring, demands dynamic management—management founded on optimism and capable of making decisions necessary not merely to keep pace with competition but to keep ahead of it. Such an economy is obviously one of change. The will to change is the catalyst to progress.

FOOTNOTES

1 *Report of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Programme for Fiscal Year 1969*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 14.
2 Peter F. Drucker, *The Practice of Management*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.
3 Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1958.
4 Edward A. Lehan, *Public Budgeting*, Institute of Public Service, University of Connecticut, p. 6.
5 Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Second National Development Plan, 1970-74*, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, p. 32.
6 Jesse Burkhard, *Government Budgeting*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., p. 107.
7 Lord Bridges, *The Treasury*, London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, p. 189.
8 Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, op. cit.

Electronic Data Processing Systems:

Their Potential for Modernization of Public Administration in Africa

A. F. SHERIF

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP) AND COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEM

While the electronic digital computer has already made its entry into some sectors of the public administration of several African countries, the capacity of utilizing effectively the computer, or simply the "computer capability", has yet to be developed. Underlying this detectable pattern of imbalance, as will be taken up further, is the fundamental fact that it actually takes longer, much longer, to develop that capability than it takes to produce and install the facility. The record of experience to date holds some meaningful lessons for African Governments contemplating new computer installations, or concerned about improving the utilization of already installed capacity. This paper will attempt to underline some such lessons of experience.

PRE-COMPUTER SYSTEMS

The traditional system of administration prevailing in most African departments and agencies was historically designed around the capabilities of a clerical work force supervised by a hierarchy of generalists. It was structured for an army of clerks, recording transactions, performing manual office operations and operating with an eye on rules rather than oriented to measurable performance results. The system was paced to these clerical and general administrative skills with their attendant limitations. At that pace, the system was more geared to minimize procedural errors than maximize "results" to be delivered. Errors were detected by clerks inspecting and auditing the paper work of other clerks, by the most labour-intensive methods of checking and overchecking. Information was handled sequentially, with all inputs recorded before any processing was initiated. The system was wholly dedicated to after-the-fact recording of historical information.

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*The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Increasingly, however, the traditional system is becoming inadequate to the new tasks to be performed, the new problems to be solved and the new targets to be achieved. Its survival in its present shape may be a manifestation of goal-displacement, of the capacity of bureaucratic organization to perpetuate themselves well after they become obsolete, and of a system whose survival is only tangentially contingent upon its demonstrated performance. In many situations, the rising "cost of government" has been associated with unmistakable signs of deteriorating performance and growing ineffectiveness. Only a few policy-makers and senior administrators now fail to recognize the problem of the traditional system in these terms. Fewer still are those unaware of its having become a brake on, instead of a generator of development. Yet the problem of effecting the required change in the system remains more baffling than ever.

One certain, or almost certain, lesson of experience to date is that the conventional reform measures of the last decade or so have made little impact on the capability of the system to cope with complex problems and with the growing demands for better results. Such measures dwell exclusively on small changes in work methods, organization structure, and so on. Either these reform inputs were too small or the throughput was fraught with too many impediments to make for any marked improvements in performance results. Indeed, the promise of these conventional reform or management improvement techniques, even when expertly applied, has proved rather limited, and at times dubious. And they have been overshadowed by the promise of the computer and the new computer-based management technology.

COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS: SOME COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The electronic digital computer, being basically a high-speed adding machine, finds its most practical applications in situations calling for massive memory, repetitive calculations, and quick feedback of information. The major initial application seems to be the mechanization of information systems, particularly accounting information in large complex organizations. In principle, the use of machines in office work is no different from the use of machines in a factory. The objects are to reduce the man-power required and the time taken for a given process and to reduce the possibility of error; in other words to increase efficiency. Several modern corporations have subjected the introduction of an EDP system to the same rate of return criterion as governs their overall operations.

In Government, the decision to computerize the information system should flow from an adequate analysis of attendant costs and benefits. Unlike the situation of the modern corporation operating in a developed economy, there is often little pressure from the point of view of wage costs for computerizing accounting operations and information systems. The low level of wage costs compared with capital costs or foreign exchange costs, in conjunc-

tion with the pressures for employment-creation or the institutional limitations on staff reduction, often permits or induces the utilization of an apparently unlimited supply of clerical man-power to cope with larger masses of accounting data or information requirements. Cases have occurred of government departments and departmental enterprises having to maintain an inflated clerical work-force, part of which would have been made redundant by the mechanization of their information systems. Thus, there is often little wage cost benefit from the installation of an EDP system.

However, wage costs are not the only consideration, nor the most important one in the situation of developing countries. At some point, even an army of clerks cannot cope with the volume of information that needs to be processed rapidly enough to satisfy administrative requirements. Processing time becomes a major benefit where rapid decisions have to be made on the strength of processed information. A delayed decision may turn out to be more costly than an erroneous one. The reaction time required for decision may be a decisive factor in a competitive situation or for administrative action to be effective. Even in those cases where processing time may not be a major consideration, and reaction time may not be that decisive, the use of an increasing amount of manual labour may result in a fractionalization of the work or may become on unwieldy that it may give rise to certain cost diseconomies.

Some examples may clarify this point. A state economic enterprise engaged in the manufacture and distribution of appliances experienced a rapid increase in sales and the number of customers paying by instalments. Initially, the number of clerks handling instalment accounts receivable was simply increased, with each clerk gradually maintaining a smaller and smaller portion of the customers' ledger. The increase in clerical staff was made at a relatively low cost. However, a point was eventually reached when the instalment accounting clerks were occupying a significant part of the floor space allotted to administration. With the mounting pressure for limited space, the confusion resulting from a large number of clerks, the sagging morale of an overcrowded organization, the need to break down sales and remittance devices between an increasingly greater number of office workers and the difficulties in controlling the operation, a point was reached where it was deemed imperative that some degree of mechanization be introduced. As a result the number of operators was reduced by about 75 per cent. With the low wages of the clerks versus the high purchase price of the machine, there is no certainty that there was a cost saving commensurate with the high rate of return on invested capital the enterprise was already making. The major benefit, however, was that the instalment accounting operation was finally brought under control.

The benefits of an EDP system tend to become more evident and measurable when an increase in the size of operations is accompanied by growing complexity and an increase in the number of operating units to be

controlled from one centre. A modern branch banking system, for example, cannot operate efficiently without EDP installations. Branch banking in several developing countries has now grown to the point that may justify a shift from the archaic manual method of handling inter-branch transactions to an EDP system, and the large banks have become the largest users of EDP equipment. In the same vein, the production or operations system of an organization may require a system of production or operational control that could not be feasibly sustained by a manual arrangement. The system may require reaction to feedback received as to changes in the production process, many of which are expected to show up as variances in cost systems or similar control mechanisms. The design of the system of operations often pre-supposes that certain control mechanisms will be installed. The paper work involved could be handled by manual operations, but not possibly within the reaction time required for corrective action to be effective.

In most instances, information systems of departmental enterprises or agencies have been geared to the historical information necessary for the annual reports to superior authorities and for the satisfaction of the external control agencies. Consequently, information is often lacking that may permit operating management to know where it stands at any given moment and to determine whether or not its operational plans are being carried out as expected. Nor is this information available soon enough so that a performance shortfall may be anticipated and so that management can take corrective steps to counteract unfavourable performance outcomes as soon as they appear. In one way or another the information system is designed to satisfy hierarchic and external demands rather than meet management needs. An adequate awareness on the part of the operating management of the need for more information that it could use to control organizational performance and for new information different from that which it is now getting is the key to rethinking the present information system. More often than not, that is likely to be contingent upon certain systematic changes.

Nowhere does the need for information make itself felt more than in the domain of internally derived cost information for operational planning and control. Yet a lack of computerization may affect the efficiency and utility of cost accounting systems in several aspects. In the first place, it is fundamental to the utility of cost accounting information for operational control purposes that data be timely. Relative to the demands of the particular process, the information has to be made available to operating management soon enough to take effective action to alter the process under control. To the extent that cost accounting control information arrives later than that time, it is of value only as a history of past errors. A second aspect of the utility of cost accounting information is the need for sufficient detail. Cost information has to be broken down into small enough divisions to enable responsibility to be determined, if effective corrective action is to be forthcoming. To the extent that cost accounting information is so aggregated that it merely indicates

that elements of an operation are changing, without clearly suggesting the area of change, it does not provide aid to corrective action. To be useful, effective cost accounting must result in sufficient disaggregation of information. In a large complex organization such disaggregation is rarely possible without an EDP system.

There is no doubt today that computers could do for the general administration function what automation had done for the production function. The majority of demonstrated achievements have been in this area of computer application. By substitution for and/or supplementing man's clerical and computational capacity it could markedly enhance the administrative capability of an agency in maintaining accounting records, performing routine iterative calculations, processing payroll operations, preparing checks, integrating financial and cost accounting and production controls. The direct benefits of mechanizing these administrative operations, as discussed above, may well outweigh the costs of installation and operation. By it may be rather myopic to consider the economics of computerization in reference to a narrow calculation of direct benefits and to that immediate area of computer application. Certain indirect benefits would have to be accounted for, and also certain added areas of computer application would have to be envisioned.

Most EDP installations, for one thing, are deliberately designed to include an element of excess capacity. That is, the volume of repetitive transactions which can be processed with a given installation is quite elastic, and considerable expansion can be undertaken without disruption of normal routine and without more work on the part of most administrative personnel. In the meantime, the cost of computer time is going down drastically. A few years ago, one hour of computer time cost several thousand dollars. It now costs perhaps one hundred to two hundred dollars. Ten years hence it may cost as little as a dollar or two. Eventually running costs should be no more than an hour of lighting, that is a penny or less. This ease of expansion on account of an enhanced administrative capability at a decreasing cost is one of the most potent selling points for EDP systems in developing countries, where for many enterprises and agencies continuous expansion is a way of life. The existence of excess capacity at the administrative end of operations may in itself be a powerful spur toward expansion of productive operations. Where paper work is entirely dependent on manual operations, an expansion of production volume either requires a corresponding increase in office staff which may result in a top-heavy organization or awakens resistance to the increasing volume of work from within the organization, if such an increase means more work for the existing staff.

The installation of an EDP system may induce movement into more sophisticated areas of computer applications. In more than one way, installation could act as a modernization mechanism; as a means of changing the thinking of the men who manage, of improving the organizational climate and effecting change in organizational and management practices. An EDP system appears

to be a pervasive device, whose very existence acts to cause significant organizational change. A major reason for this effect may be the capacity of the computer to absorb large quantities of data which have not previously been analyzed. The availability of new analyses often seem to demand action. The speed of the machines in making this information available produce a dynamic organizational climate which was not produced by bookkeepers, clerks and manual systems of information. Such a dynamic climate places certain disciplinary demands on management which would not have existed under a manual system. The scheduling of work may provide a simple illustration of the disciplinary demands generated by an EDP system. A battery of clerks can usually be kept busy, or will look so, regardless of the order in which tasks are given to them. The same does not hold for an EDP installation. Work must be fed to the EDP equipment in a predetermined sequence, which if altered will result in waste of costly machine time.

The unutilized capacity of the equipment, usually representing a substantial investment to the organization, appears to generate pressure within the organization to insure that the investment is not wasted. This pressure tends to generate a process of search for additional areas of computer applications. From the mechanization of accounting and administrative operations the computer is extended into more analytical work. The EDP system is progressively used for control and analytical tasks as performed by middle-management and various staff groups. Some of the work includes: sales forecasting, budget control, optimizing plant operations, determining the reorder quantity for inventory, scheduling routes for vehicles, evaluating acquisition possibilities, etc. Increasingly, the installation of an EDP system works to enhance the staff-management capability in helping line-management assimilate more sophisticated management concepts and tools.

Success in extending computer application, at this stage, would still reinforce the search for more creative computer applications. The next significant stage of computer use will be in the area of sharpening the senior executives' role as planners and central decision-makers. This will include such things as: appraisal of key operating conditions, competitive comparisons and correlating the organization's plans with forecasted economic conditions. Eventually, the computer will act as an adjunct of top-management creativity. In all its capabilities, the computer becomes an extension of management—either enhancing its control over day-to-day transactions, keeping management adequately informed, helping to solve complicated problems, or supplementing management's anticipative and imaginative qualities. So marked, indeed, is the enhancement of the control and directive capability that the usual tendency of an EDP system is to accentuate centralization which might in some ways be detrimental to organizational development. To the extent that the shift to an EDP system abets centralization and standardization there is need for continuous organizational audit to assure that installation does not function against the best interest of organizational development and that major

compromises to the machines' demands are not made in terms of organizational development demands.

To decapitulate, the cost-benefit analysis of an EDP system in developing countries, tentative as it is, points to specific conclusions. It appears that the major force impeding the introduction of EDP systems in developing countries is the relative labour cost, precisely the reason that often makes it attractive in developed countries. It is not equally attractive as an investment in machines to replace manual labour or to save labour costs. In one developed country, for example it has been calculated that a basic minimum installation would be profitable if it resulted in a net reduction in staff equivalent to more than two clerks. In a developing country it might require the net replacement of from 10 to 25 clerks to be economically justifiable. The unfavourable economies of EDP in these terms, are made even worse by the reluctance or incapacity of employers, particularly in the public sector, to reduce the number of office workers. In low-labour-high-capital cost countries, there is usually no economic justification for EDP equipment on the basis of out-of-pocket cost savings.

Cost reduction may not, therefore, provide incentives to management to opt for an EDP system. Even in developed countries, it is questionable whether many of the EDP installations produce any measurable out-of-pocket cost savings after allowing for the cost of machine rental or acquisition, programmers, operators and related expenses. In the case of large highly repetitive operations, such as public utility customer billings, cost savings are probably clearly present. In the typical production operations the benefits would tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative. Even the equipment companies salesmen refrain from placing any great emphasis on cost savings as a selling point. This is more so in developing countries. As noted, the benefits of introducing EDP equipment for handling repetitive administrative operations may be clearly present where operations are becoming complex and requirements for rapid reporting cannot be met through the utilization of manual methods. The fact remains, however that the capital and foreign exchange cost of EDP equipment is so high, relative to any labour cost saved or any qualitative benefits attained, that the mere computerization of manual operations is rarely enough to justify the existence of the equipment.

The paradox, then is that an EDP system, particularly in a developing country, justifies itself by its capacity to provide management services, to enhance management capabilities and as a managerial tool. Otherwise, it is a misplaced investment at worst or an investment in a vacuum at best. This places a premium on extending the areas of computer applications from the start. However, it appears far easier to introduce the "hardware" than to develop the capability associated with its effective utilization. This has often been one of the fundamental problems in attempting to modernize the traditional departmental system. In spite of the foreign exchange shortage, the high capital cost and, the frequently unfavourable economies of EDP systems,

the fear of labour displacement and a host of other difficulties, which will be taken up later, the tangible hardware element of an EDP system is easier to install than the intangible elements of the system. Not infrequently the intangible elements are overshadowed by the glamour of and the bias for the tangible hardware.

A CAPABILITY IMBALANCE

The resultant "capability imbalance" is a tendency that has been frequently observed even in developed countries. A committee commentary on a departmental enterprise in a developed country noted:

> A strong tendency has existed throughout the growth of electronic data processing to concentrate on the development of equipment to a far greater extent than on the development of the man in the system. As a consequence, EDP machines are capable of performing many more tasks than people are requesting of them or capable of instructing them to perform. This imbalance of capability has been referred to . . . as a man-machine ratio problem, also as a technological gap. It is important to note that only recently has electronic data processing been referred to as a "system" which includes people and their functions along with the equipment. In the case of EDP, the imbalance results in higher costs than necessary, wasteful consumption of time, undue hardship on people, and impediment in general of full realization of EDP capabilities. (The Committee went on to note:) Further evidence of the existence of this imbalance is to be found in the one-sided emphasis which has been placed on the cost of EDP equipment. Efforts to control equipment costs are absolutely essential . . . but this is only half of the job. There are indications that personnel costs now run to 50 per cent of all EDP expenditures, and therefore they are the other half and may be expected to increase percentagewise.

There is evidence to suggest that the probability of imbalance is even higher in developing countries where equipment costs loom larger in the thinking of the user.

To reduce the probability of a capability imbalance, a view of EDP as a system with interrelated elements is crucial. The regular feasibility study, made upon installation, would have to probe the capability profile, actual and potential of the client organization. In situations where an imbalance is highly credible, as is more likely to be the case in developing countries, probing the capability profile, as illustrated in Exhibit 1, might elicit corrective action. With the availability of a third-generation computer capability, a balance could be achieved where commensurate capabilities are developed on the dimensions of software, staff, environmental support and areas of applications. Simultaneously, techniques and management orientation would preferably have to be one generation ahead of the hardware capability. A serious problem

of imbalance is likely to obtain where management orientation, staff capability and perceived areas of application belong to a pre-computer stage of development. More important than the installation of hardware is parallel development on these related dimensions.

Certain conditions peculiar to developing countries may impede or delay this balanced development of a computer capability, rendering the process of its introduction more of a symbolic or ritualistic change than a genuine growth experience. The traditional outlooks of administrative personnel associated with and affected by the system may well get in the way of its

EXHIBIT 1

Computer Capability Profile



introduction or its developing to a higher stage of utilization. A "critical mass" of personnel of "transitional" or "innovative" personality types is necessary within a departmental agency for the "hyper-dynamic" change to take place. Most crucial is the orientation of top management whose thinking has to be one step ahead of the hardware potentialities for a balanced computer capability to be developed. Irrespective of demonstrated or demonstrable results,

an EDP system encounters certain resistances from different segments of personnel on account of the inertia of tradition, fear of being displaced, the demands the system makes for different kinds of skills and the sheer lack of familiarity with EDP equipment. With no pool of trained operating personnel available outside the boundaries of the organization, the new personnel to be developed have to be selected from within the organization and to be trained inservice and on the job. One crucial aspect of this within-organization manpower development is the selection of the personality type that can identify with the new system and that comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside his habitual experience.

An EDP system directly enhances the control capability of central management. For a higher control capability in the face of a variety of possible situations requires the support of extensive memory facilities in the organization. In particular it requires the development of efficient memory functions for the selection storage, retrieval, recombination and use of operating data, symbols, analytic procedures, and reserve plans for action. It also enhances the control capability of central management to the extent that it renders feasible a high degree of centralized decision-making in large complex organizations. The advent of electronic computation, more than 10 million times faster than the mechanical calculator, the techniques of automating problem solution and data processing, the computer's ability to control operations on a microsecond basis, have tremendously extended top management's potential for centralized direction and control. Using these techniques, top management can predict and test a new system or system change, assessing the long-term array of consequences and outcomes, before the new system is actually constructed or the change actually implemented. The new system can be specified, designed, tested, and evaluated, by computer simulation or mathematical computation prior to its being placed into operation. The effects of a newly proposed change can be checked for possible side effects in other operational areas of the total system. Furthermore, an EDP system makes possible the integration of financial cost accounting and production control in a manner which could not be duplicated without the high-speed electronic equipment.

The quest for stronger central control, which is a frequent occurrence in many developing countries may, therefore, enhance the appeal of EDP systems. In situations where central authorities, as is frequently the case, experience a strong need for control, the introduction of the computer can be made to ride on the coat-tail of that quest for centralization. The benefits and disbenefits, however, of accentuating this trend would have to be adequately assessed. Recent research findings on the impact of computerization on the degree of centralized control seem, on the whole, to suggest a strong positive correlation between the two trends, insofar as the experience of early starters go. In some developed countries the movement to decentralize into autonomous

profit centres has already taken hold in many large complex enterprises. Nevertheless, organizational change in the direction of centralization is observable in most cases. The trend, indeed, is more pronounced in functional areas of operations such as accounting, production and supply management, where so-called closed-routine tasks are performed under great time pressure. In open-routine or executive tasks and organizational activities the trend is understandably less visible.

In situations where powerful forces are already working for centralization, the advent of the high-powered electronic computer may be decisive in tilting the balance in favour of central authorities against the autonomy of the operating manager. The benefits and disbenefits of such a trend are too mixed to yield any conclusive outcomes. On the one hand, the installation of an EDP system immediately, and possibly traumatically, exposes central management to new concepts of and approaches to organization, planning, decision-making, sequencing of operations, scheduling of activities and exercising control over performance. To the extent that central authorities could assimilate the change and cope with the demands for effective utilization of the new system, they could be in a position to overpower operating level managers. To the extent that this situation may cut down on the initiative, creativity and operating autonomy of lower-level managers, it may not conduce to long-term management development.

SOME CORRECTIVE MEASURES

The present pattern of computer utilization can stand considerable improvement as described above. Such corrective attempts are evidently forthcoming as public managers are starting to pose for themselves such questions as, "what do we want the computers to do for us?" rather than "What can the computers do for us?". Certain fears of the computer taking away the manager's role or displacing his decision-making power are already giving way to a greater sense of familiarity and a more assured outlook. Enthusiasm flowing out of ignorance and infatuation with the computer as a symbol is increasingly turning into a more productive enthusiasm based upon realistic understanding as to what management can do with the computer, and what doing it really takes. More feasible planning for harnessing the EDP facilities and turning them into an economic proposition are coming to be real concerns of public managers in many situations.

Most probably this changing orientation of public managers is furnishing the key to effective dealing with the multiplicity of restraining forces that got in the way of utilizing the computer potential from the early start. A greater effort is going into accelerating training in the new technical skills that have proved critical, skills needed by operators, programmers, analysts, or specialists, training technicians, and all the rest. Related to this are certain adjustments in the public personnel systems that are coming to be recognized as essential

in order to enhance the capability of the public service to attract, retain and adequately motivate the new breed of professionals and technicians. As a traditional bureaucracy moves into the "computer age", it will eventually undergo certain fundamental changes in its structure, in its manpower make-up, and in its ways of operating. More so as the EDP installation gets to be assimilated, digested and "internalized" by the evolving system of administration. With the realization of the computer's potential for storing vast information and for quick retrieval of desired information when needed, one visible and immediate consequence is the change that the traditional record-keeping and filing systems will undergo. The requirements for low-paid clerical jobs will be reduced in favour of the growing requirements of technical and high-paid jobs.

The creeping transformation of the job structure, the mounting needs for retraining and redeployment, the fears of negative transitional effects on the part of older employees and organized groups, the growing power and importance of new groups of technicians, and attendant tensions are but signs of the structural change in the public service that is getting underway in many situations. As the "old" problems of accelerating the training of the new technicians, of pushing computer technology into new uses, of going beyond the areas of proven application, of coping with the competition of the private sector of scarce skills, and the like are adequately dealt with, "new" problems will emerge calling for an even higher order of capability. And certain indications of them are already here.

One such problem that is already causing concern is the tendency towards centralization as a consequence of computerization, and of the economies of installing central data banks, as described above. The increased power at the top, and the possibility for the few at the top level to pre-empt the power of decision may run counter to the growing demands for participation. No less disturbing is the possible effect on management development, at the middle level, as the top management directly inquires into the computer-based information system. Backed up with such a system, top management can bypass, short-circuit and, in turn, undermine the potential development or even initiate the atrophy of the very top managers of years to come. Indeed, in many conceivable, and at times evident ways, a computerized public service can prove vulnerable to its own pathology as the traditional bureaucracy proved vulnerable to its own.

While it is recognized that there are no ready recipes for such organization ills, old and new, the latter should not detract from the strategic long-range potential of the computer, as the former should not detract from the contribution of conventional bureaucracy in its days. Indeed, many of the new management techniques, whose possibilities commanded the concern of this Seminar, are already riding on the coat-tail of the computer. Their feasibility and practicality have been largely enhanced by the computational power of the computer. Certain techniques are only usable with the harnessing of that

computational power. In fact, the recent history of inducing the introduction of these techniques in several advanced countries is closely interwoven with the history of developing computer capability.

The promise for developing countries, despite the inevitable difficulties and conceivable negative consequences, is all the more significant. The development of a computer capability will not only induce and facilitate the entry of a related cluster of techniques, a kind of a computer multiplier, but also it could directly feed into the capability of a government to tackle certain stubborn development problems. For example, as a computer capability develops in close conjuction with improvements of telecommunication network facilities, new possibilities arise in connection with reduction of imports and promoting of exports. Similarly, new possibilities arise for managing more effectively crucial programmes such as food production and supply, irrigation, power, transportation. Indeed, with the advent of on-line terminal facilities, a network of computers could furnish new possibilities in the management of the economy as a total system. A national information system becomes as feasible as a management information system, at the level of individual agencies and enterprises. Through model-building and simulation, as well as the evolving computer technology, policy-makers as managers of the economy can operate on real time basis, posing any number of "what if" questions. Costly errors may be avoided and better insights into the consequences of alternative courses of action gained.

SOME POLICY ISSUES

Undoubtedly, the possibilities are here and are growing. The question now on the agenda of many governments of developing countries is how to formulate a "national policy" for tapping any number of meaningful opportunities in terms of the needs of the situation. In a real sense, the question is new, or rather newly posed. In a way, public policy has often lagged behind the problems posed by the rapidly evolving computer technology. As several developing countries are moving away from the stage of *ad hoc* procurement of computers, certain inter-related policy issues are coming to be recognized clearly enough to suggest certain lines of policy action. Most prominent among these is the need for regulating, guiding and informing the decisions on computer procurement. An adequate measure of compatibility between the computer facilities to be installed and their future uses must be ensured. Workable arrangements for sharing and joint use of installed computer facilities must be invented, analogous, in demonstrated usefulness, to the time sharing practices of advanced countries which are not directly transferable in the absence of better telecommunication systems. Such arrangements would hopefully bring under control the intertwined tendencies towards computer proliferation and underutilization.

The decision to procure and install and EDP facility by an individual

organization—public or private—is often of enough consequence to call for some national policy intervention. An adequate computer capability is not likely to develop at the national level under a kind of *laissez-faire* system whereby the decision is to be validated or invalidated in reference to the organization's own goals and interests. The cost-benefit ramifications of these micro-decisions with macro-consequences should not escape public scrutiny. The principle involved borders on the more familiar concept of public utilities. Computer services, it may be argued, could be usefully regarded in the same light as public utilities. The validity of this conceptualization of the problem, however, can be tested only when the operational workings of the concept are explicitly spelled out, and their implications in terms of some clearly stated national goals are adequately explored. In fact, several interpretations can be simultaneously placed upon the concept. Public utilities, being "national monopolies", could associate in some minds with computer services organized in the form of a "nationalized service", or a centralized computer service, under national control serving both public and private users. To what extent, then, computer services are or are not to be regarded as public utilities remains an unresolved issue?

Similarly, the relative desirability of centralizing as opposed to decentralizing computer services remains, at the present level of knowledge and experience, another debatable and unresolved issue. For one thing, the centralization-decentralization issue in this respect carries a number of operational connotations, partially related and partially unrelated. It could refer to centralization of information, or of storage functions; to centralization of management or the use of information; or the centralization of equipment in terms of physical location and control; or to any meaningful combination thereof. For another, centralization of information and equipment may not necessarily call for centralization of management. A number of remote users or departments could be provided with access to a central file through input and output devices, while leaving to the individual departments the information of unique interest to them. While such a system is technologically workable, and is actually in use, files of data sorted centrally could unleash forces in the organization's dynamics that make for a centralizing tendency.

Closely related to the issue of centralization is that of integration—the handling of all related data together. The trend of centralization and integration is likely to gain momentum as it tends to develop better information, reduce the cost of information, and cuts down on duplication. Although certain forms of centralization may be economically desirable on a number of counts, it could so bureaucratize the endeavour as to stifle the initiative and creativity of its staff and the users' alike. It could possibly give rise to a new technocracy based upon the power of information. The use of that power may, again, raise a host of issues related to the confidentiality and privacy of individual citizens which call for adequate mechanical and institutional safeguards.

Nowhere in the national administrations of most developing countries

is the institutional machinery that is grappling with these policy issues—the almost resolved and the as-yet-to-be resolved. Nowhere has the policy analysis capability called for been developed. Yet the need for such an institutional machinery is paramount if developing countries want to make the best use of opportunities opened up by computer technologies. While no standard institutional format could ever provide an adequate answer, what is needed is a central unit with the capability of guiding policy on computer development. Such a central unit could provide the staff support for an interdepartmental policy committee empowered with certain authorization and regulatory authorities and endowed with the resources needed to further computer applications in new and relevant fields.

Apart from providing the anaytical capability for dealing with the unresolved policy issues discussed above, that central unit could provide support to the policy committee in carrying out certain immediate functions, or laying the groundwork for them to be carried out. These include:

(1) devising a regulatory system for procurement of computer equipment that would reconcile the need for national control with the desirable amount of users' autonomy;
(2) providing back-up services geared to inject more vigour and better information into the potential users' decisions concerning the technical, economic and administrative feasibility of computer installation;
(3) clarifying through meaningful research the criteria that could guide users as to which type of equipment would be appropriate;
(4) setting standards that would ensure compatibility and equivalencies;
(5) fostering the acceleration of training in critical skills;
(6) providing for the conduct of periodic "systems audits" of EDP facilities with a view to improving their utilization;
(7) facilitating the structural adjustments, and the manpower redeployment and retraining attendant upon the growing use of EDP in the public service.

Appendix

Constitution of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)

PREAMBLE

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Inter-African Public Administration Seminar held in Botswana from the 3rd to the 9th of October, 1970:

And recognizing the need for the development of competent administrators and managers for rapid economic and social development of the African continent;

And in order to promote the study, practice and status of the profession of Public Administration and Management and the adoption of adequate administrative and management practices;

And recognizing the importance of cooperation among African states and institutions in the mobilization of resources for the achievement of these objectives;

This representative meeting of Public Administrators, Managers, Institutes of Public Administration and University Schools of Administration and Management assembled in Freetown, Sierra Leone hereby formally resolve to found The African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and adopt this Constitution.

1. NAME

The Association shall be called "The African Association for Public Administration and Management" hereafter referred to as "The Association".

2. OBJECTIVES

The general objectives of the Association shall be:

(i) To maintain the tradition of providing senior administrators and managers with an opportunity of exchanging ideas and experience in public administration and management.

(ii) To foster the professionalization of public administration and management in Africa and particularly to develop an increasing appreciation of the value and importance of public administration and management.

(iii) To advance the study of the techniques and problems of public administration and management.

(iv) To undertake comparative studies in the field of public administration and management.

(v) To promote research in African administrative problems.

(vi) To promote the adoption of more effective and adequate administrative and management systems and practices.

(vii) To foster affiliation and maintain liaison with international bodies and organizations interested in the progress of public administration and management.

METHODS OF PURSUING THE OBJECTIVES

The objectives stated in Article 2 may be pursued by the following means among others, operating where appropriate through or in collaboration with institutions with similar objectives:

(i) Organization of the Inter-African Public Administration Seminars.

(ii) Establishment of standing committees for research and documentation on special problems related to administrative and management practices.

(iii) Organization of training seminars, short courses and conferences on special issues.

(iv) Publication of research and occasional papers and a journal promoting the development of administrative and management science.

(v) Distribution and exchange of documents.

(vi) Providing consultancy services to professional training centres, governments and bodies interested in the progress of African administration and management.

(vii) Promotion of an inter country scheme of exchange of public servants and managers.

4. MEMBERSHIP

(i) There shall be the following classes of membership:
Corporate Members.
Individual Members.

(ii) An Institution, Organization, Association or Group in a country whose purposes and activities are in consonance with the objectives of the Association shall be eligible to join as a Corporate Member.

(iii) Any individual of good standing in his community whose profession and activities would serve to promote the interests of the Association shall be eligible to join as an Individual Member.

(iv) The Association may however confer honorary membership upon any individual who has made distinguished contribution to public administration in Africa.

5. OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION

The Association shall have the following officers:

(i) The President
(ii) Three Vice-Presidents
(iii) Secretary-General

6. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASSOCIATION

(i) The administration of the Association shall be entrusted to an Executive Committee consisting of the President and three Vice-Presidents. There shall be a Secretary-General who shall be an ex-officio member of the Executive Committee and head of the permanent secretariat.

Other members of the Executive Committee shall be elected as under:

Five representatives of Corporate members.
Five representatives of Individual members.

(ii) The President shall be Chairman of the Executive Committee.

(iii) The Executive Committee shall be responsible for:

(a) The general direction of the activities of the Association.
(b) Determining the working procedures of the various services of the Association.
(c) Preparing the budget of the Association for the approval of the General Meeting.
(d) Administering the finances of the Association in accordance with the approved budget.
(e) Determining the agenda, date and place of meeting of the Association.
(f) Taking such measures and actions deemed appropriate in the interests of the Association.

(iv) General Meeting: The General Meeting of the Association shall be constituted by the gathering of the representatives of the Corporate and Individual members convened by the President of the Association or as provided for in the Rules.

(v) The General Meeting shall formulate the policies to be implemented by the Executive Committee and give overall financial direction to it.

(vi) The General Meeting shall be held at least once every 3 years.

(vii) There may be national chapters with responsibility for promoting the objects of the Association.

7. RESOURCES

The resources of the Association shall consist of:

(i) Entrance Fees
(ii) Members' subscription
(iii) Payments for services rendered
(vi) Proceeds from the sale of publications
(v) Donations and legacies
(vi) Subventions from Corporate members
(vii) Grants from organizations or individuals.

8. ENTRANCE FEES AND ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS

Entrance Fees and Annual Subscriptions by members shall be determined by the General Meeting of the Association.

9. ACCOUNTS

The accounts of the Association shall be audited annually by an Auditor appointed by the Executive Committee.

10. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

The present Constitution may be amended by the General Meeting upon the proposal of the Executive Committee or upon the request of a simple majority of members. Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Meeting. Voting by proxy shall be permitted.

11. RESIGNATION

(i) Any member may withdraw from membership of the Association by notifying the Secretary-General in writing, upon the settlement of all outstanding financial obligations.
(ii) Any member whose conduct proves incompatible with the objectives of the Association may have his or its membership suspended or revoked. Each suspension or revocation shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds majority of members present and voting in regular General Meeting.

12. DISSOLUTION

(i) The dissolution of the Association may be proclaimed by the General Meeting convened for this purpose, through a vote of three fourths of the total number of Corporate and Individual members.

(ii) In case of dissolution the assets and liabilities of the Association shall be distributed to charitable causes in accordance with the specific wishes of the General Meeting. In the case of assets from donor agencies the wishes of the particular donor shall be respected.

(iii) Voting by proxy shall be allowed.

13. RULES

The Executive Committee shall lay down the rules for implementation of the Constitution.

Rules of the African Association for Public Administration and Management

DEFINITION

1. In these Rules unless the context indicates otherwise,
   (a) 'The Association' means the African Association for Public Administration and Management.
   (b) The "Committee' means the Executive Committee constituted under Article 5 of the Constitution.
   (c) 'The Public Service' includes the civil services and the services of Local Government and Statutory Bodies and Corporations.
   (d) 'Membership Committee' means the Committee constituted in accordance with Rule 4.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Association shall consist of Corporate Members and Individual Members whose names stand on its register at the date of the coming into operation of these Rules and such other Members as may hereafter be admitted. Individual members shall consist of Full Members and Associate Members.
3. (a) The following shall be eligible to join as Associate Member:
      (i) Any person who is employed or was formerly employed in the Public Services;
      (ii) any person who is employed in the teaching or study of public administration or related subjects;
      (iii) any other person who in the opinion of the Membership Committee is actively interested in or concerned with the practice or study of public administration.
   (b) The following shall be eligible to join as Full members subject to the approval of the membership Committee:
      (i) Any person who has made some significant contribution (literary or practical) to the progress of administration and management;
   (c) The following shall be eligible to join as Corporate Member:
      (i) Any country that is a member of the Organization for African Unity.
      (ii) Any Institute of Public Administration in a country eligible for membership.

(iii) Any Department of Government of a University in a country eligible for membership.

(iv) Any organization, association or group whose objects and activities would serve to promote the interests of the Association.

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE

4. The Membership Committee shall consist of not less than four and not more than six members of the Executive Committee and the Secretary-General.
5. The Membership Committee shall lay down specific conditions for the admission of members, and admit applicants considered qualified in terms of those conditions.
6. The quorum of the Membership Committee shall be three and its decisions shall be by the majority vote of those attending and voting.
7. The decisions of the Membership Committee shall be reported to the Executive Committee.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

8. The quorum of the Executive Committee shall be five.
9. The President and the Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the General Meeting in 1971 and thereafter in every third year.
10. Each candidate for election to the Executive Committee except the office bearers must be nominated by at least two other members, such nominations to be received by the Secretary-General four weeks before the date of the election.
11. All elections of the Association shall be by secret ballot. No member shall be qualified to vote or to be voted for unless he is a fully paid up member.
12. Membership of the Executive Committee shall be for three years and such members shall be eligible for re-election.
13. The Executive Committee shall meet at least once a year at the Permanent Secretariat of the Association or at any other convenient place as the President may decide.
14. Decisions of the Executive Committee shall be taken by a majority of the members present and voting.

THE PERMANENT SECRETARIAT

15. The General Meeting shall appoint a Secretary-General who shall be head of the Permanent Secretariat.
16. The Secretary-General shall be responsible to the Executive Committee for:

(a) the administration of the affairs of the Secretariat;
(b) the execution of the decisions and instructions of the Executive Committee;
(c) the coordination of the activities of the Association;
(d) preparation for the meetings of the Association;
(e) communications and correspondence of the Association;
(f) the preparation and submission of a detailed annual report on the activities of the Association;
(g) submitting to the Executive Committee a draft work plan for the coming year;
(h) maintaining the Register of the Association; and
(i) any other matters considered by the Executive Committee or the Secretary-General to be in furtherance of the objectives of the Association.

17. The Secretary-General shall also act as Treasurer of the Association. In this capacity he shall be responsible to the Executive Committee for:
(a) the safe custody of the funds and other assets of the Association;
(b) submitting to the Executive Committee for its approval in advance the draft estimates for the coming financial year; and
(c) submitting to the Executive Committee at the annual meeting a statement of the audited accounts for the past financial year.

18. (a) All moneys of the Association shall be banked with a Bank approved by the Executive Committee and withdrawals from such account or accounts shall be authorized by the Secretary-General. The signatories to the cheque shall be the Secretary-General and one other member designated by the Executive Committee.
(b) An Auditor shall be appointed by the Annual General Meeting. He shall audit the Association's accounts, records and documents and his report shall be presented to the Annual General Meeting. The Auditor may be paid such honorarium as the General Meeting may determine.

THE GENERAL MEETING

19. A General Meeting shall be convened by the President at least once every three years.

SPECIAL GENERAL MEETING

20. The President shall convene a Special General Meeting at the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Committee.
21. A Special General Meeting shall also be called at any time by the President within 60 days of the receipt of a written request submitted by at least one-third of the fully paid up members.

22. At least 28 days' notice of a General Meeting or Special General Meeting shall be sent to all Members.
23. All decisions of the General Meeting or Special General Meeting shall be by a majority of the members present and voting.

QUORUM

24. The quorum of the General Meeting or Special General Meeting shall be 25 per cent of all the fully paid up members.

MEMBERSHIP FEE AND ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

25. Membership Fees shall be as follows:

Corporate Members	$500
Full Members	$ 15
Associate Members	$ 5

26. Annual Subscriptions shall be as follows:

Corporate Members	$200
Full Members	$ 10
Associate Members	$ 3

27. The subscription fees shall be payable in U.S. dollars unless the Executive Committee decides otherwise in respect of any particular member or members. All cheques shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General who shall issue an official receipt for every payment received by him.
28. The annual subscription shall be due on the 1st January of each year.
29. The Membership Committee shall take action deemed appropriate on the status of any member in respect of the Association upon failure by such member to pay the annual subscription due for three consecutive years.

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES

30. Amendment to the Rules shall be made by a two-thirds majority of members on the recommendation of the Executive Committee.
31. At least 60 days' notice shall be given to the Secretary-General of any proposed amendment of the Rules and the proposed alteration shall be sent to every member at least 20 days prior to the Meeting.

INSPECTION OF ACCOUNTS AND LIST OF MEMBERS

32. The books and all documents relating thereto and a list of members of the Association shall be available for inspection at the registered office of the Association by any officer or member of the Association on giving not less than seven days notice in writing to the Secretary-General.

Contributors

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