ENHANCING POLICY MANAGEMENT CAPACITY IN AFRICA

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African Association for
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Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This volume is made up of selected papers presented at a series of seminars jointly organized by the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) between June 1988 and September 1989. The theme of the seminars was "Enhancing Public Policy Management Capacity in Africa: A Focus on Foreign Aid and Self-reliance."

The seminar series originated from an Experts' Group Meeting held in 1986 under the auspices of AAPAM at the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, Topo-Badagry. In identifying priority areas in public administration and management, the meeting singled out policy formulation and implementation capacity as an area requiring urgent and sustained attention in Africa. The socioeconomic crisis facing the continent was attributed partly to external influences and, to a significant extent, to the widening gap in policy formation and implementation. To bridge this gap, the meeting urged AAPAM to initiate without delay a series of workshops that would afford African policy workers an opportunity to focus on critical issues in public policy and to share experiences on how to upgrade the capacity of individuals and institutions engaged in the policy process. AAPAM subsequently teamed up with UNECA in implementing the program. In all, four seminars were organized at different venues between June 1988 and September 1989, viz: Banjul, the Gambia, June 1988; Mbabane, Swaziland, October 1988; Harare, Zimbabwe, June 1989; and Topo-Badagry, Nigeria, September 1989.

The discussions at the series of seminars acknowledged the debilitating impact of the ongoing socioeconomic crisis. However, the seminar participants were also required to discuss, in great detail, the question of how policy management capacity in Africa could be enhanced to ensure

that policy outputs were effective. In other words, the seminar participants were expected to address the question of how to enhance the policy management process, with a view toward consolidating the gains of self-reliance and/or maximizing the benefits of foreign aid.

In addition to the general objective described above, the seminar series was assigned the following specific objectives:

- Afford policymakers, advisers, and senior managers an opportunity to identify critical and contemporary issues in Africa's development and focus on the implications that these issues have for public-policy formulation and management.
- Enable workshop participants to recognize the strategic, interdependent, and complex nature of the policy process and discuss the innovative, analytical, and other skills considered essential in overcoming the constraints to a self-reliant development policy.
- Discuss the relationship between self-reliance and foreign aid and focus on skills that are required in resolving any perceived conflicts in favor of Africa's long-term development needs.
- Prepare broad outlines of an action program that would assist policymakers and senior administrators in reforming and revitalizing policy institutions and would provide a basis for the review of training and capacity-improvement programs administered by management development agencies/institutions.

As codirectors of the seminar series (and now joint editors of this volume), we wish to acknowledge the valuable contributions made to our effort by a number of individuals and organizations. In particular, we wish to record our appreciation of the role played by the Management of Change Program of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Ford Foundation, and the Commonwealth Secretariat in providing the necessary financial assistance. Our gratitude also extends to the four host governments and institutions that provided essential backup facilities and congenial environments for the implementation of the seminars' work program. While the names are too numerous to mention, we cannot fail to acknowledge the support we received from Dr. Ayo Langley, former Secretary-General and Head of the Gambian Civil Service; Mr. S. M. B. Fye, Director-General, Management Development Institute, Kanifing, the Gambia; the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Public Service, Mbabane, Swaziland; Mr. J. Ziyane, Director of the Swaziland Institute of Management and Public Administration; Mr. Malcolm Thompson, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Zimbabwe; Dr. Jonathan Gapara, Director-General, Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management; Mr. Ason Bur, former Director-General, Management Services and Training Department of the Federal Civil Service Commission, Lagos, Nigeria; and Professor Ali D. Yahaya, Direc-

tor-General, Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, Topo-Badagry. We also wish to thank the various governments in Africa for releasing their officials to participate in the seminars and for taking steps, however modest, to implement recommendations emanating from the seminars. We recognize the efforts made by the resource persons in working on papers for presentation at the seminars. The fact that only a few of the papers have been included in this book is not a reflection on the quality of the others not selected. Escalating printing and publication costs necessarily influenced the decision to keep the book within a reasonable size.

Finally, we thank Jatau Ndure and Maria Gomez, both of the Gambian Management Development Institute, Kanifing, Gambia, as well as Mulu Tessema of the Economic Commission for Africa, for providing valuable secretarial assistance.

Gelase Mutahaba
M. Jide Balogun

Introduction

M. JIDE BALOGUN
GELASE MUTAHABA

The early years of independence in Africa witnessed many African governments taking steps to reform and restructure their public administration systems, with a view toward making them effective instruments for managing development. It is now acknowledged that these steps fell far short of the required measures, having focused only on organizational designs, adoption of "modern" management techniques and technologies, and, on occasion, the training of personnel. Rarely did the efforts involve creating and developing organizations and institutions that would concern themselves with policy analysis, assembling data for policy formulation, and critical evaluation of policy successes and failures. As a result, many of the policies emanating from African governments have tended to fall short of expectations.

The socioeconomic crisis that engulfed the African continent during the 1980s prompted African governments and the international community to reexamine the policies that had been pursued during the previous two to three decades, with a view toward rectifying anomalies. It is worth noting that during the 1980s, many governments instituted substantial policy reforms in economic, monetary, and fiscal areas. Inasmuch as these policy reforms (which concentrated largely on policy content) are important and deserve to be encouraged, there is a feeling in some circles that many of the problems Africa faces pertaining to policy might have resulted from defective and ineffective mechanisms for analyzing, formulating, and implementing policies rather than the content of the policies themselves. Thus, policy outputs have tended to be poor because the tasks of identifying strategic choices; assembling, analyzing, and storing data; outlining implementable programs of action; and monitoring implementation are not carried out effectively. Policy should therefore

focus as much on the issues of creating the capacity and capability for effective policy management as it does on the substance of these policies.

Policy reforms should address the following issues: creating a conducive environment for policy management; designing, creating, and developing effective organizational and institutional frameworks for policy analysis and implementation in our respective countries; and locating and assembling the personnel necessary to carry out the tasks of policy management.

The chapters in this book have been assembled as a response to the issues delineated above. Their content addresses from different viewpoints the issue of enhancing the capacity and capability of African public service institutions to formulate, implement, and review socioeconomic policies.

The book is divided into three main parts. Part I (which comprises five chapters) provides a framework for analyzing public policy in its broad ramifications. The contributions in this early part of the book accordingly examine the content and process of public policy, options and strategies, approaches to policy and institutional reform, as well as constraints on, and possibilities in, policy management.

The first five chapters endeavor to answer a number of conceptual and empirical questions. First, what is the scope and character of Africa's development crisis, and how do we go about looking for its causes and cures? Second, what demands does the crisis make on policy management capacity? Third, to what extent can the domestic policy management capacity meet the demands? Fourth, if the existing capacity falls short of requirements, how far should we go in bridging any perceived gaps with foreign assistance? Fifth, does the appropriate institutional infrastructure exist to facilitate the achievement of basic policy objectives? Finally, what can management development/improvement agencies and institutions do to enhance domestic capacity for the formulation and management of macroeconomic policy?

The five chapters concur in their assessment of the scope and character of the ongoing socioeconomic crisis and unanimously conclude that resolving the crisis depends largely on how domestic policy management institutions perform their functions.

In the opening chapter, Jide Balogun examines two competing perspectives on Africa's development crisis: the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs (AAF-SAP). The former, SAP, as advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, requires that African governments institute a number of short-term measures aimed at rectifying external and internal imbalances. Such measures include spending cuts, privatization of state enterprises, devaluation, removal of subsidies, and price controls. However, not only do these palliatives fail to work in the short term, they also prove to be incapable of addressing

Africa's long-term development requirements. This explains why the Economic Commission for Africa stressed structural transformation rather than structural adjustment. The cornerstone of structural transformation is self-reliance; the building blocks are policy and institutional reforms, improved domestic resource mobilization, efficient resource allocation, exploration of domestic technology options, and human resources development. But laudable as the goals of structural transformation are, Balogun insists that until the threats to an inward-oriented development strategy are eliminated, the current external orientation of the African economy will persist. What are those threats? He specifically mentions four: the warped (and externally biased) notion of development; the mesmerizing effect of new technology; the crisis in sociocultural values and in administrative ethics; and the managerial credibility gap. Yet according to the author, the only way to proceed is through structural transformation and self-reliance. The alternative is the perpetuation of the dependent relationship with the industrialized societies—a relationship that has cost Africa dearly in terms of economic development, social welfare, and human dignity. Balogun concludes that if self-reliance is the only viable option, then this places extra burdens on Africa's already weak policy management capacity. In specific terms, self-reliance requires that the policy management cadres in Africa's public services apply and constantly perfect a whole range of skills in areas such as leadership and motivation, entrepreneurial ability, resource mobilization and optimization, aid negotiation and management, human resources utilization, and conflict resolution.

In contrast to the broad developmental issues raised in Balogun's chapter, the second chapter, by Apolo Nsibambi, focuses exclusively on aspects of public policy in Uganda. Starting with an overview of the policy and management process, Nsibambi proceeds to trace public policies to differing sources. He then singles out leadership in the executive branch of government as a critical factor in policy management. According to him, even when the civil service bureaucracy was reluctant to experiment with new ideas, it could still be prevailed upon to implement revolutionary, or at least unconventional, policies. However, the government that is prodding a slow bureaucracy into action must itself possess legitimacy, be clear about what it wants from a policy, and be determined in pursuing the policy objectives. Nsibambi cites as an example the barter trade policy, which was formulated with the aim of overcoming the constraints posed by a shortage of hard currency. President Museveni left no doubt as to whether this policy was central to his government's reconstruction program, and he lost no opportunity to rebuke public officials and/or agencies perceived to constitute a cog in the wheel of progress. It was thus not surprising that the policy enabled Uganda to import essential items and to execute otherwise expensive infrastructural development projects. This notwithstanding, and despite

high-level political sponsorship, the barter trade policy faced a number of problems, particularly at the implementation stage. Among the constraints Nsibambi identified are those relating to:

1. *Planning:* Some of the crops to be bartered for essential imports were not available in the right quantity and quality.
2. *Information and data:* Up-to-date data on the crops produced were not available; this hindered the decision-making process.
3. *Communication:* Where there were shortfalls in production, the agencies concerned failed to communicate the information to the right quarters for fear of being reprimanded. This weakened Uganda's bargaining position, as substitute crops had to be found at short notice to meet barter commitments.
4. *Institutional conflicts:* Individual actors/agencies sometimes bartered coffee (a ready source of hard currency) instead of other crops that were better suited for barter. Thus, the actions of various domestic agencies and individuals were incongruent before they were packaged as Uganda's positions in meetings with external parties.
5. *The ad-hoc nature of the policy:* The barter trade policy was initiated to tackle a specific foreign exchange problem. It was therefore not situated within the framework of a comprehensive food policy, and its long-term, strategic value was not fully analyzed.

All the same, Uganda's experience with a barter trade policy confirms the usefulness of the policy management skills referred to in the first chapter. Moreover, the policy buttresses the relevance of the issues William Shellukindo raises in chapter 3. In his review of the policy process in Africa, Shellukindo notes that because a significant number of policies were not properly analyzed, the initiators could never say precisely what the consequences would be or how effectively the policies would be implemented. Shellukindo further points that, on many occasions, "pertinent and serious questions are raised about certain policy objectives while the policy is well half way in its implementation. . . . It is not uncommon that consensus about the magnitude and nature of the problem [which a policy seeks to tackle] was simply taken for granted."

Obviously, the costs of hastily enacted policies far exceed the benefits. When not preceded by critical analysis, a policy is likely to omit vital considerations and lead to the allocation of scarce resources to wrong ends. Above all, such policies tend to compromise long-term, strategic interests in favor of short-term, immediate advantages.

To overcome the limitations perceived in the contemporary policy-making process, Shellukindo advocates the establishment of Public Analysis and Review Units (PARUs) as integral parts of government departments

Chapter 6 focuses on how Nigeria sought to balance the claims of self-reliance with those of foreign aid. Chapter 7, by contrast, looks at Zambia's recent moves toward self-reliance. In this brief chapter, G. J. Chivunga discusses the policy relating to mobilization and utilization of Zambia's domestic resources in the face of an increasingly hostile international economic environment. He notes that even though the procedure for aid assessment and negotiation was tightened under the new policy and the National Commission for Development Planning was designated the sole agency for external resource mobilization, there were still problems of aid coordination—problems that could be traced to the proliferation of institutions and the bewildering array of donor conditions.

In chapter 8 Gelase Mutahaba takes a serious look at the impact of foreign aid on local capacity building. Citing the Tanzania water supply project as a case study, he argues that while the motives of the donors were important, they were not the deciding factor in aid management. The outcome and impact of foreign-assisted projects, according to him, would tend to be determined largely by the institutional and managerial facility that the recipient provides to safeguard such projects. He notes that in the specific case of the Tanzania water project, the donor, Sweden, started out with pure, altruistic motives. The country also demonstrated its willingness to operate within the framework of the institutions already established in Tanzania for the purpose of administering and supervising water projects. However, because the institutional arrangements changed constantly and local managerial support proved inadequate, Sweden was compelled to bypass the local bureaucracy and to intervene directly in the design and construction of the water schemes. When the project was completed (with minimal domestic inputs), the operation and maintenance of the water schemes by local Tanzanian institutions became a problem. It was a vicious circle, which correct diagnosis of institutional and managerial weaknesses would probably have broken over time. In the interim, however, the inadequacies that prevented local institutions from playing an active role at the design and construction phase continued to frustrate their attempts to intervene at the operation and maintenance stage. It was not surprising, therefore, that foreign consultants had to be retained for essential services long after the project was supposed to have come onstream.

The Tanzania water case study offers a number of lessons. Apart from the possibility of a low absorptive capacity perpetuating dependent relationships in general and their resulting in "leakages" in the benefits of foreign aid in specific cases, the operation of dual and parallel management structures may promote discord between the locally recruited civil servants and higher-paid project personnel.

In addition to the country case studies discussed in chapters 6 to 8, Oye Ogunbadejo, in chapter 9, raises a number of fundamental policy issues on regional economic integration. As a strategy in structural trans-

formation and self-reliance, regional economic integration has its advantages, although it is also fraught with a number of difficulties. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an example of the efforts that have been made to overcome the limitations of territory and size to achieve collective goals. The experiences of this subregional organization reveal a number of concrete achievements as well as some nagging problems. Ogunbadejo reports that on the positive side, ECOWAS could be credited with significant achievements—such as the design and construction of trans-African highways, the development of air links among member states, the encouragement of private initiatives in the areas of banking and interstate commerce, the sponsorship of subregional agricultural development projects, and the harmonization of agricultural policies.

Yet in Ogunbadejo's view, these laudable efforts in the economic integration of the West African subregion appeared to have been undermined by a number of factors. Among these are the pursuit of narrow, nationalistic policies at the expense of collective, subregional interests; the division of the subregion into rival linguistic blocs; and the proliferation of subregional groupings (intergovernmental organizations) whose functions frequently overlap. Thus it is not surprising that after many years and innumerable protocols and agreements, ECOWAS has yet to achieve substantial progress in intraregional trade. Cross-border movements of persons and commodities are still subject to the whims of policymakers and career officials—particularly, immigration personnel and customs inspectors. Although ECOWAS, in response to the deepening socioeconomic crisis, launched an ambitious economic recovery program in 1986 (costing US$ 920 million and embracing a total of 136 subregional and national projects), implementation of the program was thwarted by a lack of funds—a clear reflection on how promptly the member states paid their dues and fulfilled their obligations toward the economic community.

According to Ogunbadejo, in order to achieve economic integration, policymakers and senior managers must make clear choices on issues such as: allying with rival blocs and groupings; dealing with the numbers and roles of international governmental organizations (IGOs); establishing a single monetary zone; achieving trade liberalization within the subregion and dealing with cross-border movements; developing subregional infrastructures; and formulating an inward-propelled and self-reliant strategy for industrialization. He urges ECOWAS to reorient itself so that, as with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), it would be able to attract the type of foreign aid that reinforces rather than hinders self-reliant development.

While Part II builds on Part I by providing practical illustrations of the recurring issues in policy management and suggesting the types of capabilities that would need to be developed, Part III focuses on the role

of management training institutes in enhancing this capability. There are altogether six chapters in Part III.

In chapter 10 Jide Balogun raises the question of whether training institutes should enhance their own capacity before attempting to supplement other public institutions. He notes that Africa's socioeconomic crisis had raised the stakes in development administration and that conventional training techniques and methodologies are simply no longer effective. Of primary significance is his contention that ethics and values should be fully integrated into policy and managerial capacity-building programs. He bases his argument on the premise that "while matters of technical detail are important to the functioning of Africa's administrative systems, the ethical dimension can only be ignored at the peril of disconnecting the mind from the body of development administration. Ethics and values constitute the 'mind,' while systems and procedures [that is, for aid management] constitute the 'body' of administration."

Balogun is the first to admit that ethics and values are elusive (probably unteachable) topics. However, in publishing for the first time his theory of social action, Theory N and Theory P, he has suggested how management training institutes could handle the subject and moderate discussions on it.

Chapter 11, by Mulenga Bwalya, describes the experience of the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), Zambia, in designing and implementing programs in policy management training. To overcome the limitations in the structure and content of the ongoing programs, Bwalya suggests a three-pronged strategy that would assign general education in public policy to the University of Zambia, professional training in policy and strategic studies to NIPA, with practical, on-the-job training in policy formation and management being conducted on location in ministries and departments. Apparently, policy management training at NIPA does not yet include the critical areas of aid policy and management frequently referred to in Part II of this book.

S. M. B. Fye's contribution in chapter 12 focuses on the role of the Gambian Management Development Institute. In addition to its regular training activities (in the areas of general, project, and financial management), the MDI designed and organized a few policy-oriented training programs. Fye also reports that the Institute, in an effort to enhance policy management capacity within the public service, participated in a number of consultancy and organizational development assignments, leading to substantial changes in structure, staff complements, and management practices. His summary of the factors impeding the effectiveness of training institutes should be read in conjunction with chapter 10, as both raise important issues of priority and resource allocation.

In chapter 13 Thomas G. Koon examines the role of the Liberia Institute of Public Administration in meeting public-sector training needs. He

begins by tracing the history of the LIPA. He then proceeds to assess its contributions and to examine its relationship with other agencies.

Chapter 14, by Colin Banks, is a brief introduction to the Seychelles Institute of Management. After examining its current mandate, Banks goes on to outline the Institute's plan for the future. It is encouraging to note that in recognition of the need to develop aid negotiation skills, the Institute has indicated its willingness to design and organize courses in this area. Depending on how the courses are evaluated, SIM may yet turn out as a regional center of excellence in aid policy and management training.

It is in fact this regional orientation in policy management training that forms the subject of discussion in chapter 15. In this final chapter, Ali D. Yahaya examines the possibilities in, and problems of, networking and coordination of training in policy management. He surveys the progress made in establishing networks and networking arrangements not only in Africa but also in Asia. In discussing the role of, and the problems facing, networking institutions in Africa (particularly, AMTIESA, AIMAF, and WAMDEVIN), Yahaya is of the opinion that the support of the African governments and the international organizations is crucial. In specific terms, he suggests that local networking institutions be provided with adequate resources and be actively involved in projects that were designed to improve policy and institutional capacity in Africa.

In conclusion, this book may be regarded as a humble contribution to the ongoing debate on economic recovery and development strategies in Africa and on the role of institutions in the policy management process. The book does not claim a monopoly of wisdom on the issues raised; it simply provides another diagnostic tool for use by anyone interested in finding solutions to Africa's development problems.

Part I

Policy Management in Africa: Contemporary Issues

1

Structural Adjustment and Transformation

Policy Management Implications

M. JIDE BALOGUN

The ongoing debate over the effectiveness of structural adjustment reforms in coping with the current socioeconomic crisis in Africa has brought to the fore the hitherto latent questions about the role of external institutions in determining the shape and direction of public policy. The question frequently asked is whether African policymakers and their civil service advisers should assume greater responsibility for the destiny of their societies. Yet the stark realities of life in many of these societies tend to frustrate their attempts to be self-reliant. The next question then is if economic conditions dictate a recourse to external aid in the formation and execution of policy, what steps should African policymakers take to contain external interventions in the policy process and ensure that foreign aid does not constitute a permanent alternative to a strategy of self-reliance and economic transformation?

Unfortunately, the debate over how to replace dependence with self-reliance often takes an exclusively ideological form, even though technical and institutional issues are equally relevant. Indeed, while historical factors in Africa's development cannot be ignored in any discourse on future developmental strategies, it is also important that we address the issue of the preparedness and problem-solving capacity of domestic policy institutions as they interact with external bodies. In specific terms, the controversy over what constitutes the proper limits of external intervention in the policy process boils down essentially into the quantum and quality of skills that could be locally mobilized to tackle developmental problems.

This paper begins by discussing contemporary economic recovery and development strategies, with particular reference to the ongoing debate over the merits of structural adjustment policies. In the second

section the paper focuses on the imperatives of an indigenous development philosophy. The third section examines the obstacles to a self-reliant development philosophy and ways of overcoming them. The fourth section discusses the skills that the operators of the policy institutions require in formulating development-oriented policies and in optimizing the benefits of external economic relations.

Economic Recovery and Development in Africa: A Critical Assessment of Structural Adjustment Reforms

Africa's socioeconomic crisis is by now an old story. Structural adjustment as a recovery formula is itself an overflogged issue. However, the World Bank's recent attempt to shift the blame for Africa's economic woes entirely on the Africans has raised a set of questions that have until now received little attention. In the opinion of some observers, the World Bank's attempts to extol the virtues of structural adjustment reforms have begged the question on Africa's socioeconomic crisis. While the uproar that greeted the Bank's sales promotion effort must have been a shock, it could not have expected that a mere packaging of statistics would convince a suffering people that their lot had vastly improved. At the height of Africa's socioeconomic crisis, structural adjustment measures were credited with the ability to stabilize the region's tottering economies. The measures generally consisted of sharp reductions in both public expenditures and the size of government, a hefty devaluation of currency, privatization of public enterprises, elimination of price controls and subsidies, and rapid deregulation of the economy (through the dismantling of bureaucratic controls). The measures were regarded as the shock treatments that the lax economies specifically needed were fiscal loopholes to be closed up and resources mobilized and efficiently allocated. That was the theory. In practice, the measures made both money and goods unnecessarily dear, slowed down the pace of activity in the productive sectors, triggered inflationary spirals, and, by adversely affecting general standards of living, invited undesirable sociopolitical consequences. Although many countries at first hesitantly applied the measures, the threats that structural adjustment posed to peace and stability compelled some of them to look for alternative recovery formulas. But the argument against structural adjustment is not merely that it inflicts unbearable pain in the short term but that its impact in the long run might be to cripple public-management capacity without replacing it with viable alternatives.[1] In other words, while structural adjustment demands that each country prepare itself for a "temporary inconvenience," it sets no definite time limit within which the pains would disappear.

As a principal advocate of structural adjustment reforms, the World Bank is aware of the strong and negative reactions the reforms evoked

among the various African countries. In 1989 the Bank published a report that contradicted all its known positions on Africa's development prospects—adjustment or no adjustment. It is also significant that it persuaded the United Nations Development Program to coauthor what later turned out to be a highly controversial report. The World Bank began by reversing earlier assessments (including, no doubt, its own assessments) of Africa's recovery prospects:

> On closer examination . . . the statistics commonly reported mask a more complex, less dismal picture. When recent trends are put in the longer perspective of the past 15 to 20 years . . . or when sub-Saharan Africa is disaggregated into important country groups, including those that have, or have not, pursued significant policy reforms—the crisis seems less precipitous, and the road to recovery more obvious and more manageable.[2]

The report then proceeded to drop other bombshells. Firstly, it claimed that exogenous factors had not had too disastrous an impact on Africa's development as generally reported. After all, export earnings, which had quadrupled between 1973 and 1980, fell by less than half between 1980 and 1988. Secondly, the prices of Africa's export commodities did not decline as sharply as had been earlier believed. Yes, primary commodity prices did decline in recent years relative to the prices of imported manufactured goods, but the really sharp decline was in oil prices, with non-oil prices falling by "only half" between 1975 and 1988. Thirdly, the much-dreaded protectionist barriers were, for the majority of African countries, a figment of their imagination. According to the report, sub-Saharan exports to European countries faced virtually no tariff barriers. Fourthly, Africa, more than any other developing region, and despite its relatively low population, benefitted from generous foreign assistance and debt relief measures.

If the external environment was this favorable to Africa, where does the blame for the prolonged crisis lie? This is a rhetorical question, but the report volunteered an answer all the same:

> Africa's crisis cannot be satisfactorily explained as the result of an adverse international economic climate, low commodity prices, or dwindling foreign assistance.[3]

If Africa remained poor and backward, it had nobody but itself to blame. It should address, the Bank's report continues, the persisting institutional and policy constraints on growth, notably:

- the high rate of population growth
- structural rigidities
- institutional weaknesses
- defective policies

The report noted some encouraging signs, especially in countries that had embarked on structural adjustment reforms. For instance, it noted that between 1985 and 1987, the gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an annual average of more than 2.3 percent—an improvement over the poor performance of the early 1980s. Agriculture itself recorded a strong performance, with its growth rate exceeding the population growth rate between 1985 and 1988. The World Bank report supported its conclusions with statistical tables. Table 1.1 below compares the growth rate in different parts of Africa with the growth rate in developing countries generally.

Table 1.1 Average Annual Growth in Gross Domestic Product (%)

Country Group	*1980–84*	*1985*	*1986*	*1987*	*1988*
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.1	5.4	3.1	-1.5	3.4
Excluding oil exporters	1.1	2.9	3.8	2.1	2.2
Oil exporters	-2.8	7.6	2.4	-4.7	4.5
IDA recipients	0.9	1.8	3.6	2.8	2.2
All Africa	0.1	4.0	1.9	-0.4	3.0
All developing countries	3.1	4.9	4.7	4.3	5.2
Growth in sub-Saharan Africa using 1987 exchange rates	0.9	6.3	3.8	-0.9	2.1

Notes:

1. Figures for 1988 preliminary.
2. Average growth rates, weighted by GDP, based on conversion into U.S. dollars using 1980 exchange rates—unless the official exchange rate diverges by a large margin from the rate applied to foreign transactions.
3. Sub-Saharan Africa excludes Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea.
4. Africa excludes Libya.

Source: The World Bank, UNDP, *Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1990s*, 1989.

As one can observe, the report's aim was to prove the superiority of structural adjustment compared to any other policy instrument. Yet, in spite of its laborious efforts, the Bank has convinced nobody but the apologists of structural adjustment that this policy has changed the face of the African continent for the better. The cavalier handling of statistical data has left the Economic Commission for Africa a wide opportunity to dispel the myth of "adjustment and growth." In a quick response to the World Bank/UNDP's assessment of conditions in Africa, the ECA questioned the scientific basis of the methodology adopted in arriving at these conclusions.[4]

Secondly, the ECA drew attention to the arbitrary classification of countries and its effect on the inferences drawn from the data. According

to the ECA, the categorization into countries with "strong," "weak," and "no reform" programs:

> . . . appears arbitrary as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in their current form and with their current conditionality have been in place since 1980. Moreover, in several countries other programs with their strict conditionalities have been implemented since the late 1960s. It is, therefore, not clear why the World Bank Report drew the starting line in 1985, especially *as this has not been the practice in other World Bank Reports.*[5] [emphasis author's]

The ECA also cited instances of selective use of data, biased reading or interpretation of trends, inconsistent explanation of deviations from standard, and failure to define concepts in a way that would permit subsequent and independent verification of findings.

From the point of view of this paper, the World Bank's decision to include the table was a gross error of judgment. A careful review of the table would show how the Bank set out to vindicate structural adjustment but ended up testifying against it. Firstly, the table demonstrates unequivocally that overall, sub-Saharan Africa (however defined) is still a very backward region. Its growth rate still lags far behind that of other developing regions. This confirms the long-held view that Africa's development problems are deep-rooted and that a radical transformation is the only guarantee against total collapse. Secondly, the World Bank report insists that the real victims of the recent economic crisis are the oil exporters. However, apart from 1980–84 and 1987, they do not appear to have performed worse (or better) than the rest of Africa. The lesson is clear: oil or no oil, African countries share a common destiny, and their future lies in collective self-reliance. This again supports the position taken by the African governments in the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos, and the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER).

Structural Transformation: The African Alternative to Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment calls for change, but African leaders, as reflected in their efforts to restructure their economies, also are calling for change. Indeed, the difference between the externally imposed conditionalities and the African countries' response to the deepening socioeconomic crisis lies not in whether or not change should be encouraged, but in what emphasis to place on the time span and the overall impact of reform measures. Whereas structural adjustment programs often adopt a relatively short time perspective (focusing as they do on short-term inequalities such as balance of payments difficulties, budget deficits, and widen-

ing debt-service ratios), the advocates of structural transformation are concerned about the impact of short-term measures on Africa's long-term development prospects. In addition, rather than regard development policy as a value-neutral science, structural transformation assumes the need for policy reforms to take adequate cognizance of sociopolitical conditions prevailing at a given time and place, and to maximize the general welfare of the people. Above all, change—within the context of structural transformation—is neither complete nor meaningful until it creates an environment within which indigenous technology options could be developed and essential goods and services produced. Let us now examine the main thrusts of the structural transformation argument in greater detail.

Time Span and Velocity of Change

Critical to the implementation of structural adjustment reforms are measures such as balancing the budget, bridging trade gaps, and servicing external debt obligations. Policy formulation in normal times is a hazardous enterprise. In an era of structural adjustment, it is an impossible mission. Given the precipitous and sometimes menacing demands that external forces impose on him or her, the policymaker lives from one minute to the next believing that heaven is about to fall and that the ground on which she or he stands is about to give way. How to remain sane, let alone rational, in such circumstances is an unanswerable question. Orthodox structural adjustment compels the policymaker to tackle too many problems at the same time and to proceed with unseemly haste. The consequence of the high velocity of change is confusion at the policymaking and managerial levels. The costs include political instability and civil disturbances.

There is no doubt that a creditor determined to call in his IOUs is the best antidote to extravagant spending. But while a perpetual reminder of one's indebtedness might encourage prudent allocation of resources, the nervousness that characterizes a harassed debtor's state of mind might also lead to hasty and regrettable decisions on allocation. This in fact is the case with the increasing debt-servicing obligations that have retarded capital investment and have hindered the recovery effort in Africa.

Unless the loan repayment process leaves adequate room for the maintenance of recurring services and infrastructures as well as the long-term capital investment requirements of the various countries in Africa, the collapse of their economies is a matter of time. The history of the world's economic powers clearly shows that these countries did not develop with their creditors insisting on the immediate and full settlement of their bills. Certainly, Europe would probably be struggling with its postwar reconstruction programs today if it had not benefitted from the massive infusion of external resources. While it is highly unlikely

that Africa will benefit from anything similar to the Marshall Plan, Africa does need adequate breathing space to conquer its troubles and to participate as an equal partner in the global economic system.

The economic recovery and development priorities that have been identified so far would require huge sums of money to implement. The transformation of the food and agriculture sector, the development of the appropriate linkages between the sector and industry, the rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure, the control of drought and desertification, the development of human resources, and the promotion of full employment—all of these require urgent attention and adequate funding. Moreover, the projects are not the type that could be tied to the life span of orthodox structural adjustment programs, since their "gestation periods" vary in length from ten to twenty years.

The People Focus in Development Policy

Another fatal omission in structural adjustment programs that the advocates of structural transformation hope to rectify is what may be termed "the people focus" in development policy. While it is permissible to refer to an amorphous area called "policy science," it is sheer illusion to treat it as if it were mathematically precise and devoid of any link with human values. Unfortunately, intellectual arrogance and needless mental straining can lure a policy scientist into tackling a situationally specific problem with a universal formula. Yes, policy science has reached a stage today at which it is capable of furnishing analytic models for evaluating public allocative and investment decisions. When the issues are clear, such models can assist the policymaker in making a choice between "guns" and "butter." As a matter of fact, a model with high predictive power will immediately rule out huge allocations to defense and the military if an atmosphere of peace prevails and if there is little probability that a neighbor would become aggressive. Apply such a model to apartheid South Africa's neighbors or to a country that is threatened by secessionist forces, and you are likely to come up with different sets of answers. Moreover, a policy formula becomes ludicrous if, in the words of Comrade Mugabe, president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, it condemns Africa's children "to the life of ignorance and a life of darkness."

As with structural adjustment, structural transformation abhors prodigality, and encourages improved management of the economy through efficient mobilization and allocation of resources, and improved management of public services and enterprises. Unlike structural adjustment, however, it recognizes that certain policies and programs are crucial to the survival and development of each country. It proceeds on the assumption that there can be no policy without people and that there can be no people if policies are merely concerned with whether figures add up and not with where human beings fit in.

A Self-supporting Technological Environment

The short-term, structural adjustment reforms tend to address the issue of imbalances in an economy. Seldom do the reformers pay attention to the problems associated with Africa's continued dependence on the industrialized world for the basic necessities of life. The principle of free trade accords rather well with the conventional practice of international cooperation. Lately, however, both the principle and the practice have come under serious attack. The poor economies of the South resent the fact that they are at the mercy of the prosperous economies of the North. It is argued that although the South is bleeding profusely, the North appears to be interested only in collecting its debt. The South badly needs food, raw materials, spares, and medical supplies, but the eyes of the North are focused on trade figures and on interest payments due on loans.

A caveat is in order. The issue of how to offer debt relief to Africa has recently been receiving the attention of governments and donor agencies in the North. However, no concrete plan has yet emerged. The Brady initiative on Third World debt is targeted to Latin America, with a total debt of US$443 billion. The fate of Africa (with a debt of US$230 billion) is yet to be decided.[6]

Considering the fact that Africa's devastating economic crisis is attributable largely to the lack of structural transformation and to its excessive dependence on the technologically advanced societies, measures need to be taken to create an environment within which technological innovations could take place locally. This means that, among other things, linkages between agriculture and industry should be strengthened, research and development activities should be promoted, and huge sums should be earmarked for human resource development—particularly the development of technical and entrepreneurial labor resources. Efforts should also be geared toward the promotion of research activities involving the public and private sectors and the institutions of higher learning. Above all, collective self-reliance should become the cornerstone of public policy. Regional economic cooperation could be made meaningful if conscious efforts are taken to integrate the production process as a step toward market integration. Infrastructural facilities (regional transport and communications facilities, money and banking institutions) should also be developed. In effect, self-reliance should cease to be a conference resolution; it should now be synonymous with action. But then, there are constraints that must be removed first if structural transformation and self-reliance are to become an integral part of development policy.

Structural Transformation and Self-reliance: Threats and Prospects

Whether one accepts it or not, Africa's future lies in structural transformation and collective self-reliance. But then, the journey to this promised

land is long, tortuous, and hazardous. Structural transformation demands a fundamental shift in developmental policy. Self-reliance requires discipline and alertness. Between the two (structural transformation and self-reliance) is a vast and uncharted mine field of international economic or political blackmail and domestic intrigues and upheavals. Yet the course has to be traversed if Africa is to break the vicious circle of dependence and decay.

There are at least four obstacles in the way of structural transformation and collective self-reliance: misleading notions of development; the hypnotic effect of modern technology; an ethical vacuum at the leadership and followership levels; and a managerial credibility gap.[7]

Warped Notion of Development

As far back as April 1981 the author published an article in the *Quarterly Journal of Administration* under the title "Social Science and the Myth of Administrative Modernization." The aim then was to provoke African social scientists to start a dialogue on an Africa-centered social science. It was feared at that time that economic or political imperialism often started as a colonization of the mind. Unless African social scientists initiated an independent inquiry leading to a body of ideas on how our societies operated (or should operate), there was a danger that our lives would be regulated by a science of other people's societies. To quote from the article:

> To assume a value-free social science, as we have done all along, is to accept other societies' prescriptions for our ills.[8]

Unfortunately, African social scientists did not take up the challenge. In the meantime, the economy has deteriorated, and external influence on public policy has become more pervasive than at any other time.

As a social science discipline, economics was singled out for critical analysis in the 1981 article. Economists—particularly the mathematically oriented ones—have in recent years walked into the trap of numbers, and extricating themselves has proved very difficult. Instead of concentrating on measures to promote the maximum welfare of the people, they spend a disproportionate amount of their time on model construction and numerical balances. Human beings are more than numbers. As inhabitants of specific geographical locations confronted with different sets of problems, they are bound to react differently to a given policy stimulus.

With specific reference to the African region, the contemporary notions of development seem to be heavily biased in favor of the technologically advanced societies—particularly the early starters in Western Europe and North America. Until very recently, African economists have

accepted without question the hierarchical connotation of development and have fallen into the temptation of equating "Development" with "Modernization," "Westernization," or "Sovietization." It did not occur to us that Africa could develop along its own path or that the changes taking place in the *physical and mental* state of the African constitute the most reliable index of development. Thus, when a country, by whatever means, gained access to modern technology, it was considered "developed." When its constantly rising GNP or GDP enabled it to import machinery and spares, it was assumed to be developed. Seldom was any thought given to the possibility that imported technology could be out-of-date or that equipment and spares might become obsolete or unserviceable. The misplaced priorities that are the inevitable outcome of Africa's unquestioned acceptance of foreign developmental models have increased its technological dependence and external indebtedness.

The situation is gradually changing. Thanks to the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos, the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery, and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Economic Recovery and Transformation, Africans are being brought to the realization that development could not be "imported" but has to be promoted by the efforts of the people. Popular participation in the development process is therefore a notable feature of the shift in philosophy.

Mesmerizing Effect of Technology

Technological innovations in the industrialized countries have done incalculable damage to the creative and inventive spirit of African societies. The automobile, supersonic jets, the locomotive engine and modern electric trains, radio and wireless communications, videotape recorders, television sets, and the white man's journey to the moon—these and other technological "miracles" have mesmerized the African. As reports of further technological breakthroughs in the technologically advanced countries graphically contrast with human misery and abject poverty in the less-developed societies, the African is left with an overpowering feeling of hopelessness. In such a state of mind, he is prepared to experiment with any "modern" formula or to seek any panacea that would cure his society of the malady of socioeconomic backwardness. In the first and second development decades, foreign advisers encouraged Africa to try ambitious development plans and active state intervention. In the third development decade, Africa was placed on an austerity program to remove the "excess fat" endangering its economic health. Despite its stiff resistance, Africa is still being forced to swallow the bitter pill of structural adjustment. This is the price of excessive dependence on other societies for life-sustaining ideas and resources.

To argue that the technological changes taking place outside Africa

have jeopardized Africa's chances to develop is not to say that Africa's development hinges on other regions standing still. Obviously, the rest of the world will not wait for Africa to revise its priorities. In fact, in view of the threat that the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)—and, in particular, the Four Tigers—pose to early developers' a competitive edge, Africa should not expect the industrialized powers to ease its way along the path to technological growth. If anything, African policymakers should always be mindful of the possibility that their carefully constructed plans for structural transformation and self-reliant development could be destroyed by forces both within and outside of their societies. The enemy within the African society is the urbanized and "modernized" sectors' addiction to foreign manufactured goods. The external adversary of self-reliance feeds on this addiction, using techniques ranging from state-of-the-art packaging and advertising to diplomatic arm-twisting.

Planning, programming, and monitoring are crucial processes in self-reliance. A sudden embargo on foreign goods leaves adequate room for political "mischief," not to mention the emergence of underground economic activities such as smuggling, hoarding, and racketeering. To forestall the activities of those wishing to accumulate political and/or economic gains out of commodity shortages, it is essential that the commodities which a government wishes to ban would be those that the country could produce over a period of time. The production and marketing institutions must be identified, and the sectoral linkages must be fully developed. Speed is important to the success of decisions, but as we have noted earlier, a high velocity of change has its own risks—political turmoil and economic dislocations. This is why it is necessary to ensure that decisions on self-reliance are broken into elements and that the implementation is properly phased, sequenced, and coordinated.

Ethical Vacuum

Institutional rigidity is a major constraint on Africa's development. Whether we like it or not, African cultural values have contributed largely to this rigidity. The African traditional culture is rich, and its external manifestations are beautiful. But that is looking at the African culture in its exoteric form and as if it were a monolithic entity. In its esoteric form, and when its internal conflict is brought to light on the integration of diverse groups into "modern" nation-states, the African traditional culture emerges with serious weaknesses. As a result of its internal conflict, the African culture impedes cooperative action in political associations and in modern administrative agencies. Loyalty to primordial units breeds mutual suspicion and prevents a free flow of ideas and information. Blind acceptance of the ways of the ancestors stifles initiative. Traditional (largely authoritarian) patterns of child rearing suppress the

inventive genius in both children and adults. Superstitions stand in the way of analytical and creative thinking.

While it is not in any way being suggested that African societies are lacking in moral values, somehow these values have been trampled upon in the quest for "modern" material possessions. A well-timed lie can divert large sums of public money into private treasuries. When the truth overtakes the lie, the miscreant generally starts by evading responsibility. He blames everyone except himself. If there is no human scape goat in sight, he pins the responsibility on the invisible but ubiquitous Devil.

Taking into account the impact of the African culture on modern management, the author has developed a theory summarizing the negative features of the culture.[9] In chapter 10 he discusses how Theories N and P could assist management training institutions to start a debate on administrative ethics.

Managerial Credibility Gap

The theory of social action referred to earlier offers a possible explanation for the sometimes negative conception of political leadership and managerial roles. The suboptimal performance of basic managerial functions has, in any case, cost Africa dearly. It has forced policymakers to turn to external advisers and management agents for assistance in reviving dormant organizations. Examples include Nigerian Airways, which was once handed over to KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and the Nigerian Railway Corporation, which was farmed out to Rail India Technical and Economic Services. Weak managerial and institutional capacity has also encouraged direct donor intervention in aid programs, thus undermining the prospects for self-reliance. The Tanzania rural water supply case study discussed in chapter 8 provides adequate illustration.

The irony is that when a public organization is managed by an African, he or she is denied the institutional support and other facilities that are needed to succeed. The African would also be confronted with demands that threaten the profitability of his agency. As soon as a non-African steps in, the organization begins to operate efficiently. As chapter 10 indicates, Theory N provides a partial explanation of this irony. The African managers' overall conception of their role and the kind of preparation they had before assuming office are equally important factors.

Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa: A Review of Critical Skills in the Policy Process

In facing the challenge of economic transformation and self-reliance, the African public services have to enhance their capacity for the formulation and implementation of policy. While it is difficult to provide an ex-

haustive list of skills that are essential in accomplishing the objective of economic recovery and long-term, self-sustained growth, it would be advisable to pay adequate attention to the following:

- leadership and motivation
- entrepreneurial skills and innovation
- planning and forecasting
- programming, sequencing, and precision-management/coordination
- resource mobilization and optimization
- information storage, retrieval/scanning, and utilization
- aid negotiation, coordination and management
- human resource management (and cultural reconstruction)
- conflict resolution and crisis control

Leadership/Motivational Skills

Africa now needs leadership of the highest caliber. Leadership does not necessarily mean the class of people at the top of the government hierarchy. Leadership in contemporary African society would need to be broadly defined to include senior personnel in the armed services and security agencies, members of the higher civil service, senior executives of parastatals, captains of industry, and molders of opinion in the institutions of higher learning and in the community at large.

Each African country needs these leaders to assist in resolving the conceptual crisis in development, evolving an African philosophy of development, and by example, showing the rest of the society that this new African path is to be preferred to any other. The role of leadership is amply illustrated in chapter 2, which focuses on the origin of the barter trade policy in Uganda.

Historically, great leaders and prophets have a lot in common. They tend to see that which others cannot see. They have a vision of society that is quite different from that of their followers. Since their language is incomprehensible to persons of lesser calling, great leaders and prophets stand the risk of being stigmatized as imbeciles or as tricksters. But this is where the analogy ends. Prophets are the anointed of God. While also relying on divine inspiration, leaders may acquire their attributes after careful reflection on the problems of their societies and by gathering together associates who accept their philosophy. The prophet's mission is accomplished as soon as he transmits the gospel to the designated community. A leader most frequently wishes to go a step further: he mobilizes human and material resources to transform his dream into reality. This is significant from the aspect of skills development. The leader is at once a visionary, a communicator of ideas/instructions, an organizer of troops and supply lines, a decision maker and crisis manager, a source of inspiration, and a fair-minded disciplinarian. Install such a

person in a position of authority, and his primary motive would be service to his community, and his overriding concern—achievement of tangible results in all areas of activity. He does not look for shortcuts to attain material possessions nor use his power to avenge his enemies. His intelligence and dedication almost invariably propel him toward actions that would improve the living standards and enhance the dignity of his people. Above all, his constituency is the entire nation rather than a coterie of friends, a council of tribal elders, or a particular socioeconomic class.

Entrepreneurial and Innovative Skills

It is essential that steps be taken to develop a viable and self-supporting technological environment in order for Africa to overcome the multitude of obstacles to its economic transformation. Accordingly, not only must the leaders become increasingly entrepreneurial, but they must also foster risk taking and an innovative spirit in the general population itself. Instead of assuming that the industrialized societies have a monopoly on technology, these leaders should emulate their counterparts in the NICs by forging a tripartite alliance consisting of the governmental policymaking sector, the industrial sector, and academic/research institutions. The major aim of this alliance should be the development of new technological options in every aspect of life and the improvement of Africa's competitive edge in global economic interactions. The prevailing atmosphere of discord and suspicion among these three sectors should be replaced with one that facilitates a free flow and continuing exchange of creative ideas.

To ensure that their entrepreneurial dreams are not frustrated by bureaucratic inertia, policymakers must also acquire new skills that would enable them to revitalize administrative institutions and convert these institutions into "results-oriented" (or at least, responsive) agents of change. They must take every precaution to counter what President Robert Mugabe aptly summed up as:

> . . . the bureaucratic nature of the public service system (and) its inability to yield decisions as quickly as we want it.

Planning and Forecasting Skills

The high velocity of change that innovative and entrepreneurial measures sometimes trigger off could spell disaster for a polity unless each system is equipped with the appropriate monitoring instruments. To this extent, policymakers and their advisers must develop a strategic orientation. Strategic thinking should become an integral part of the process of policy formulation at both the national and sectoral levels. To equip the actors with the necessary skills, it might be necessary not only to

strengthen or establish policy analysis units in government departments, but also to expose the personnel of the units to training in policy and strategic studies.

Programming/Sequencing and Coordinating Skills

It is not enough to look into the future. Steps should be taken to anticipate crises and to map out appropriate corrective or responsive measures. The tasks of programming and sequencing actions and reactions should be closely linked with that of coordination. As much as possible, sectoral disparities or conflicts should be minimized. Overlapping and duplication of effort should be avoided. Resources should be allocated to achieve maximum benefits and minimum costs. Precision management should be the new orientation at all levels of decision making.

Resource Mobilization and Optimization

In view of the resource constraints on Africa's recovery and development efforts, it is vital that policymakers constantly apply their resource mobilization and optimization skills. They need to distinguish between investments in social welfare services and purely economic investments. With regard to the former, policymakers would be well-advised to tap the resources made available by nongovernmental and local-level institutions. They should also avoid the temptation to squander capital receipts on recurring activities. As for economic investments—particularly, investments in the parastatal sector—nothing should be done that would hinder efficiency and productivity, whether in recruitment of personnel, fixing of tariffs, or allocation of financial and material resources.

Information Storage and Utilization Skills

Obtaining information on socioeconomic conditions in each African country is not always a simple task. Yet it is imperative that policymakers have access to information that is relevant to decisions on choosing projects and/or whether indigenous capacity should be relied upon to implement the projects or if foreign assistance should be sought. Information storage is the primary function of career officials. However, policymakers must now insist on the development of a systematic framework for the collection and processing of data. In addition to acquainting themselves with the operational methods (and deficiencies) of conventional filing and registry systems, policymakers need to show more than casual interest in the use of desktop computers. They now need to be able to monitor the use of these resources and the impact of the reform measures that they periodically undertake.

Aid Negotiation, Coordination, and Administration

Foreign aid comes in various forms and from diverse sources. African policymakers and managers need to develop the skills of appraising the costs and benefits of the different types of aid—such as loans, grants, and technical assistance; bilateral and multilateral assistance; and intergovernmental and money-market transactions. Not only must foreign aid be balanced with local capacity-building requirements, but the immediate and long-term impact of foreign aid (on balance of payments, debt-servicing obligations, annual recurring and personnel budgets) should constantly be monitored.

Above all, the administrators of the aid-coordination agencies must possess the skills to negotiate the most favorable aid packages and repayment terms with their foreign counterparts.

Human Resources and Cultural Reconstruction Skills

In order to plug the leaks resulting from gross misallocation of resources, African policymakers must acquire the skills for handling Africa's most precious resource—its human resources. The influence of traditional African culture on the behavior of this resource has been clearly established. To this extent, the human resource management skills referred to will encompass, at least in an African environment, the skills of reforming the culture's negative and counterproductive aspects and maximizing the impact of its positive aspects. In each country, leaders need to evolve a new national work ethic that will ensure the triumph of excellence over mediocrity.

Conflict Resolution and Crisis Containment Skills

The formation of public policy by its very nature generates conflict—between the advocates of change and the defenders of the status quo; between the new beneficiaries and the losers; between government and the "opposition." Ensuring that the conflicts do not get out of control calls for new skills—notably, those of interest articulation, bargaining, communication, and arbitration.

Conclusion

Exogenous and endogenous factors certainly play an important role in exacerbating Africa's socioeconomic crisis. However, the bulk of the efforts required to stem the crisis and to place the region on the path of self-sustained growth will have to be made by Africans themselves. Apart from striving to eliminate the main obstacles to self-reliance,

African policymakers and senior administrators will need to apply a whole range of skills designed to enhance Africa's recovery prospects within the region and to improve Africa's competitive edge in the global economic arena.

Endnotes

* The views expressed in this paper are the author's and are not necessarily shared by either the United Nations or United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

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7. Balogun, M. J. "Social Science and the Myth of Administrative Modernization," *Quarterly Journal of Administration* Ile-Ife (April 1981): 145–61.

8. Balogun, M. J. "Social Science and the Myth of Administrative Modernization," p. 160.

9. Balogun, M. J. "Human Resources Development and Utilization in Nigeria: Options and Strategies in a Changing Environment." Presented at the National Conference on Human Resource Development and Utilization Policy for Nigeria (organized by the Management Services Department of the Federal Civil Service Commission at ASCON), Topo-Badagry, March 13–17, 1989. The model presented at ASCON has since been slightly reworked and is further discussed in chapter 10.

2

The Public-Policy Management Process in Africa

APOLO R. NSIBAMBI

Overview of Public Policy

Public policy is concerned with courses of action selected from alternatives in order to realize certain objectives.[1] At times, governments fail to deal with particular problems either because they are not aware that they exist or because they lack the resources needed to act accordingly. In any case, failure to take action cannot be regarded as policy because the failure is not purposeful but is due to either a lack of data, lack of resources, or lack of both. For example, a government may fail to evolve a policy on seasonal hunger because the people affected are not only poor, but they also lack the necessary visibility and political clout to dramatize their plight. Thus the government fails to take action on seasonal hunger because the issue that affects poor people lacks the necessary weight to influence the already crowded national agenda.

There are policies that are virtually impossible to manage because they were not properly analyzed in terms of their implications and the strategies for implementing them. Public-policy management must therefore entail a discussion of the public policymaking processes. Public policy is administered by the civil service on behalf of the people. It is different from private policies, which are pursued by individuals and companies for their private ends. Services such as health, welfare and education, roads and defense require public intervention because of their strategic importance. Other services are usually more efficiently managed by private individuals who have a personal stake in them and are motivated by economic gain.

Policymaking Process

A public policy passes through at least eight stages: problem identification, drafting of a policy manifesto, setting of a policy agenda, moderation of policy debate, actual policy formation, policy implementation, policy outcomes, and policy evaluation. Most of these stages are self-explanatory and need no elaboration.[2] Therefore we shall clarify only the aspects relating to policy manifesto, agenda, and evaluation.

Before a government can adopt a policy, many problems requiring action need to be identified. However, because of resource limitations, some are deferred, while others are aggregated and adopted for action. Evaluation is concerned with providing information and assessing the achievement of the adopted objectives. It is at this stage that bottlenecks in the implementation of the policy are identified and analyzed.

Once a policy has been formulated, it needs to be implemented. At this point, management becomes critical. It entails controlling and directing activities in pursuance of the policy's objectives. The next section examines the concept of management as it relates to policy.

Management Process

L. Gulick defines management as POSDCORB. The acronym stands for the following activities:

1. *Planning:* working out the tasks that need to be carried out and to accomplish the goals set for the enterprise
2. *Organizing:* the establishment of the formal structure of authority through which jobs are arranged and relationships defined and coordinated
3. *Staffing:* the whole personnel function of hiring and training the staff and maintaining favorable conditions of work
4. *Directing:* the continuous task of making decisions and embodying them in specific and general orders and instructions
5. *Coordinating:* the important duty of interrelating the various parts of the work
6. *Reporting:* keeping supervisors/superiors and colleagues informed as to what is going on through records, research, and inspection
7. *Budgeting:* fiscal planning, accounting, and control[3]

Gulick misses the important step of evaluation, which we discussed earlier on. It should be clear that policy and management are interwoven. Unfortunately, in Africa these two processes have been either largely ignored or weakly handled by the institutions responsible for them. Indeed, in some cases there is an absence of policy in the sense in

which we have defined it. However, before we identify the skills that are critical to both policy and management, let us examine the sources of public policy.

Sources of Public Policy

Public policy in Africa emanates from four major sources: government, the career bureaucracy, external bodies (such as the International Monetary Fund), and professional and academic institutions. As we discuss these sources, we shall also highlight some of the management problems and critical skills necessary to implement policies.

Government As a Source

Government is an important source of public policy, especially in Africa, where pressure groups, political parties, and professional organizations are either weak or nonexistent. Leaders play a vital role because they tend to monopolize the powers of coercion and patronage. It goes without saying that imaginative political leaders—who simultaneously enjoy popular support and political legitimacy—are likely to initiate relatively durable public policies.

Furthermore, the energy of the leaders with political legitimacy is not likely to be dissipated on measures for the preservation of power. For example, former President Nyerere of Tanzania, who held periodic elections, enjoyed significant political legitimacy. This enabled him to launch the socialist experiment, which was taken seriously for more than a decade until the policy failed to bring quick economic returns to the country. He also built strong political institutions, such as the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, to legitimize his power.[4] He was able to increase the adult literacy rate significantly in Tanzania. In contrast, former President Obote lacked political legitimacy, and he spent most of his time fighting for political survival.[5] He faced popular guerrilla movements (led by the National Resistance Movement), which subsequently overthrew him. Under these circumstances, it was very difficult to initiate viable and durable public policies.

It may be further argued that a government whose peoples are united behind a common goal is likely to pursue consistent and viable public policies. Thus Botswana, which enjoys a significant degree of national integration, has been able to pursue its economic policies with an important measure of success and consistency. On the other hand, Chad, which was torn by dissension, was unable to pursue any major socioeconomic policy for many years.

Another major hypothesis worth considering is that since the majority of the population of most African countries consists of farmers, obtain-

ing their support for, and commitment to, public policies is likely to enhance public-policy implementation. It is our contention that Nyerere's failure to secure the commitment of the farmers was largely responsible for the failure of the villagization experiment. Here was a public policy that was intended to benefit isolated farmers by bringing them into well-organized villages which would be supplied with the necessary infrastructure to meet their basic economic requirements. However, the use of force in the villagization scheme was undemocratic, and it alienated the farmers. The evidence of the alienation was provided by the fact that on 21 December 1971, Wilbert Kleru, the Tanganyika African National Union Regional Secretary for Iringa and Regional Commissioner, was assassinated by a farmer opposed to the Ujamaa Villages.[6]

The design of the villagization scheme also ignored the fact that withdrawing farmers from places where cashew nuts had been planted would deprive this cash crop of the vital labor that had sustained it. Furthermore, the villagization scheme should have been supplemented with agroindustrial and urban-based schemes, as well as planned industrialization. This package would have ensured that what was grown by the farmers had a ready market. Worse still, the state, which had promised that it would reward positive contributions by the farmers in the villages, was largely unable to honor its pledge. For example, farmers built houses expecting to be assisted with roofing sheets, which they failed to get.

Uganda's barter-trade policy is another illustration of a policy that could be traced to government—indeed, the highest level of government as personified by the President, Yoweri Museveni. The policy is also an example of the type that circumvented the conventional stages or process.

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) acquired political power in January 1986 under President Museveni, the leadership faced an acute shortage of foreign exchange, a devastated economy, fragile public institutions, and a host of other problems. President Museveni decided to grapple with the problem of foreign exchange by personally spearheading barter trade. He faced the problem of how to carry along the routine-minded civil servants and politicians who were either opposed to the declared policy or were too slow to respond to its dynamic requirements.[7] In declaring the barter policy, President Museveni did not go through the eight traditional processes of formulating public policy mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Perhaps he realized that if he did so, the civil servants would have created so many obstacles that the policy would not have reached even the policy agenda stage. After launching the policy, he openly rebuked civil servants and managers of parastatal bodies who failed to respond to the demands of the new policy. For example, he criticized the officials of the Produce Marketing Board (the body that markets produce), which had given incorrect quotations regarding the price of beans, which were to be bartered.

Between 1986–88, a substantial portion of trade was undertaken by barter, mostly to facilitate the importation of finished goods and to undertake construction projects. During the same period, the government's commitment was about US$240.1 million worth of barter trade. Of this commitment, US$82.072 million worth of commodities was supplied. Through the barter system, tractors were imported into Uganda, and the Mityana-Fortportal road was repaired by a Yugoslavian company. The Sheraton Hotel was also renovated under the barter arrangement.[8] The Ministry of Commerce was given the authority to coordinate the activities of the affected ministries, which included the following: Finance, Co-operatives and Marketing, Planning and Economic Development, Agriculture, and the Prime Minister's Office. A Deputy Minister for Commerce in charge of barter trade was also appointed. Any request for an import item (either by a government department or an individual) was analyzed and decided upon depending on whether or not it fell under the following categories: agricultural rehabilitation, transport, road construction and earth-moving equipment, industrial development, essential pharmaceutical and veterinary products, and essential commodities such as sugar and soap. These priorities were intended to enhance Uganda's capacity to produce and market goods and services. If the commodity to be bartered was accepted, it would be ascertained through the relevant ministry whether or not the right amount of the items to be bartered existed. Delivery schedules would then be worked out and a barter trade protocol would be signed by the Minister of Commerce after consulting the Ministry of Justice.

The problems encountered in implementing the barter trade policy are illustrative of the critical skills needed in policy management for economic recovery and development. Firstly, barter trade agreements occasionally failed to materialize because crops offered for barter (such as beans) were not available. Some officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, who lacked hard data, committed further errors by failing to inform the government on time that they were unable to supply the agricultural commodities for a barter agreement that the government wished to conclude. The failure to supply information was probably due to fear of government reaction. The quality of the crops produced was also poor in some cases.

Secondly, coordination was sometimes undermined by enthusiastic politicians who committed Uganda's coffee quota or pledged the supply of crops whose quantities were not carefully ascertained. It must be stressed that coffee is easily convertible into hard currency. Thus, it is illogical to use that dependable source of foreign exchange for barter purposes, since the barter system is supposed to enable Uganda to overcome obstacles posed by shortage of foreign exchange. Thirdly, the system of bartering in some ways undermines the supremacy of the convertible currencies such as the American dollar and the British pound

and so, barter trade is open to sabotage by Western finance capital—which would like to use hard currency as a weapon to "tame" radical African leaders. As an example of how the barter policy could be undermined, it should be recalled that when one neighboring country in East Africa was short of food, one Western country rushed surplus maize to it. And yet Uganda had surplus maize that could have been bartered with that country's commodities, thus promoting intra-African economic cooperation.[9]

Another problem with the barter trade policy is that as in most other African countries, Uganda lacks an effective information system for improved management, monitoring, and evaluation of existing trade.

Lastly, in order for Uganda to barter its food, it must first adopt a comprehensive food policy. As we write, the Ministry of Agriculture has not yet indicated Uganda's annual food requirements compared with the quantity of food that is produced. Before this information is available, it is risky to export food.[10] What we have observed applies to most African countries in which food production has declined while the population has increased. President Museveni's barter policy compelled the civil servants, especially those in the Ministry of Agriculture, to take steps that would enable Uganda to adopt a food policy. His style of publicly castigating the routine-minded civil servants may have the effect of tempting some civil servants to quietly sabotage his policy by withdrawing critical information. Alternatively, his policy may encourage the civil servants to acquire innovative managerial skills. These include the capacity to rapidly assess what is required and to install the needed infrastructural and support services. For example, in the case of the Produce Marketing Board, it must acquire modern marketing devices such as telex machines, telefaxes, computers, and a Reuters machine. The barter system also requires opening up feeder roads, many of which are in disrepair.

The state may have to persuade banks to lend money to a group of capable entrepreneurs so that they could buy tractors, acquire underdeveloped land, and grow the food required for barter. This experiment will affect the whole system of land ownership and distribution.[11]

The capacity of Uganda's negotiators must also be greatly improved. For example, some countries have demanded beans, although they were aware that Uganda was not likely to produce the required quantity of the commodity. They then demand coffee, which is easily convertible into hard currency. The barter trade negotiators on Uganda's side should learn how to forestall such tactics.

The Ministry of Commerce, which enjoys the same status as other ministries, does not have the clout to enforce sanctions against ministries that undermine the barter trade. The Prime Minister's Office should therefore coordinate the trade.

The barter trade case study has demonstrated the complexity of implementing a government policy that bypasses the essential bureaucratic

steps. The lesson is clear: if a government is transforming society and restoring economic and political order, it must sometimes bypass a routine-minded bureaucracy. The bureaucracy will then be forced to acquire a new managerial capacity in order to cope with the new demands that have been imposed on it.

Bureaucracy As a Source

The Weberian classical view that bureaucrats are neutral implementors of public policy has been proved to be false. It is well known that civil servants have interests which they try to pursue.[12] They thus initiate policy. For example the Arable Development Policy (ARIDEP) of Botswana originated from the civil servants. It went through the traditional processes and was passed by Parliament. It has been implemented successfully because it was properly assessed. This example should not, however, lead us to conclude that policies that emanate from the civil service are always without problems.

The External Sources

Many African countries have faced grave financial difficulties for a variety of reasons. The reasons include mismanagement of their resources and exploitation by the industrialized countries. Consequently, many African countries have sought financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These bodies have in turn imposed conditions that have to be fulfilled by the borrowers. The scope of the domestic institutions in policy formulation has inevitably been reduced by these conditions, which sometimes include devaluation, reduction of public expenditures, removal of subsidies, and privatization of ailing parastatals. These are the major components of structural adjustment programs discussed in chapter 1. In any case, if Africa's domestic policies are not to remain subject to externally defined conditionalities, African policymakers and their career advisers must now approach their responsibilities in a highly professional manner. Firstly, studies must be carried out to show the impact of IMF policies on the vulnerable groups. These empirical studies must be prepared along with well-reasoned policy options. Secondly, public officials must be trained in the art of negotiation. In many cases, African countries tend to send to IMF or Paris Club meetings inexperienced people who cannot make any impact. Thirdly, Africa must improve its public accountability record in order to confirm its credibility with external bodies and leave no one in doubt as to the legitimacy of African governments. Above all, administrative reform measures should be pursued with vigor to ensure that non-productive workers are quickly separated before they constitute a bad influence on the hard-working elements in the public service.

Productivity must be duly rewarded, and the entire public service should be made accountable and responsive.

Conclusion

The public-policy management process in Africa takes place in an intricate socioeconomic environment, which is in many ways characterized by inferior technology, lack of basic decision-making data, and problems of national integration. The environment is also afflicted with adverse terms of trade and weak political, professional, and administrative institutions. At times also, the bureaucracy, because of its preoccupation with rules and administrative routine, fails in its role as a major source of policy and as the principal agent for the implementation of policy. It is thus frequently challenged by imaginative and action-oriented political leaders who do not hesitate to bypass the traditional public policymaking processes. In order to be part of the movement for socioeconomic transformation, the bureaucrats must be innovative in managing resources and responsive to the yearnings for change. In order for the declared policies to be successfully implemented, it is essential for the leaders to elicit the commitment of the bulk of the population. Public accountability and democratization should also be promoted in order to check mediocrity in policy formation and implementation.

Endnotes

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3

A Strategic and Analytical Approach to Policy Management

WILLIAM H. SHELLUKINDO

For over a decade now, the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) has been urging African states to take some measures to undertake a study of capabilities for policy formulation, implementation, and review. AAPAM specifically advised African governments to establish a policy analysis capability at the macro policy level as well as at the sectoral level.[1]

As a concrete step, AAPAM has organized a series of workshops on this subject. The most recent one, which was held in October 1988 in Mbabane, Swaziland, came up with some interesting recommendations. A few of these recommendations are as follows:

1. In view of the fact that most of the public policies formulated are rarely subjected to rigorous analysis at the conception and planning stages, it is recommended that national policy analysis and review units be established to focus on the long-term perspective of policy analysis at the macro level.
2. Having observed the dominance of elite preferences in policymaking, it is recommended that each country should find ways of institutionalizing effective grassroots participation in the process.
3. Due to the weakness of public-policy analysis in existing training programs, training institutions and universities are urged to initiate programs on public-policy analysis and review.

Probably the time span is too short to evaluate the outcome of the last workshop, which produced the above recommendations. Nevertheless, we can gain an overview of the public-policy improvement measures taken in the countries that participated in this workshop. The fol-

lowing countries were represented: Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Botswana, Zambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania.

In the case of Tanzania, the issue was placed on the agenda of an Ordinary Meeting of Principal Secretaries held on 21 December 1988, whereby it was agreed that:

1. There is need for establishing a special unit in each ministry for enhancing the capability for policy analysis and review.
2. Chief executives in the ministries and parastatal enterprises should be sensitized through seminars so that they understand the importance of policy analysis and review. Also, the training program for top executives currently in progress should incorporate policy analysis and review topics.
3. The treasury has so far established a small unit for policy analysis and review on their own initiative and it has proved to be very useful. It is therefore necessary for each ministry to attempt to establish Public Policy Analysis and Review Units (PARUs) so that ministers and principal secretaries can be assisted effectively in their policy management activities.
4. The Principal Secretary, Manpower Development, in liaison with the State House, should prepare modalities for establishing PARUs in all ministries and submit proposals for further discussion during the next Ordinary Meeting.[2]

The next meeting was scheduled for the end of June 1989, when substantive action was to be taken. In any case, we should not expect much to happen. As Adair has clearly pointed out, formal organizations are notorious for resisting change through procrastination.[3] The public bureaucracy in particular routinely stonewalls decision making by employing tactics such as forming committees, commissioning studies and surveys, and promising to act on a subject without committing itself to an exact date.

Thus, no substantive action has been taken in Tanzania, apart from the principal secretaries deciding to appoint a team to look into the issue and to submit proposals for further discussion on establishing PARUs.

It may help to heed Adair's[4] advice that the argument in favor of procrastination is valid only when no action is really the best option.

In a similar paper that I presented to the workshop held in Mbabane, Swaziland, I stated:

> All in all, the impression one gets is that a lot of energy has been expended on restating what is already known . . . I personally doubt if AAPAM's cherished goal of ridding the African policy processes of the ever-persistent anomalies will be realized before the closure of the decade.[5]

Participants may wish to find out the extent to which AAPAM member states have heeded AAPAM's vehement appeals to rectify the chaotic situation.

My assessment, which is not based on empirical research but on practical experience, is that no substantial changes have occurred in Africa, specifically in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Ghana and most probably in many other African states.

Overall, there is ample awareness and understanding amongst policy initiators and policymakers in all eleven countries that sent participants to the second workshop on the same theme held in Mbabane, Swaziland in October 1988, that a real policy crisis exists. What is needed is a little action—deciding to do something and proceeding to implement our decisions.

State of Public-Policy Management in Africa

In Africa, public policies are initiated and formulated by various institutions within the government. The head of state is one of the sources of many public policies, which are normally contained in presidential orders, directives, and decrees.

The government (local government inclusive) on the whole formulates many public policies that appear in the form of legislative acts or laws and bylaws. At this level, various organs of the government are involved—the Parliament, local (district) councils, ministers at the cabinet level, and the civil service through permanent/principal secretaries/chief executives of the ministries. In all these activities, civil servants, through their departments, contribute considerably to policy proposals until they take the form outlined above.

At the purely civil-service level, a number of functions or tasks are performed. Specific sectoral regulations, directives, and orders are often initiated by civil servants below. On the other hand, civil servants in central ministries initiate many policy decisions, and ministers and permanent/principal secretaries issue circular letters, orders, and so forth to effect them for and on behalf of the government. Local government personnel also initiate a lot of policy decisions, which are later formulated into bylaws in their respective areas.

The President's Office, Prime Minister's Office, and ministries responsible for finance, economic planning, public service/manpower development/establishments, labor, and so forth may be categorized as central offices and ministries.

Public-Policy Process

The policymaking process normally starts as a response to a particular situation. When a problem has been identified in a certain ministry or

field of work, the ministry responsible usually initiates the policy process by preparing policy proposals in the form of a "Draft Cabinet Paper." The draft policy proposals are then circulated to other ministries and independent departments for comments. The next stage is a final draft for discussion by permanent/principal secretaries. In Tanzania, the government has established an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC), comprising all the principal secretaries. This is the intermediate stage, where policy recommendations are solidified. Depending on the opinion of the IMTC, a go-ahead may be given for the ministry concerned to prepare a cabinet paper requesting a policy decision at the cabinet level, which may lead to the enactment of a law. On several occasions, policy proposals are referred to the initiators for recasting, and some are turned down completely at the IMTC level. In the case of a returned draft cabinet paper, the ministry responsible is normally advised to solve the real or assumed problem using existing mechanisms.

In contrast to this, the party in power usually directs the government to take necessary action on certain issues in which the party has some interest. Sometimes, the party directives are not subjected to discussion through the normal policy channels. It is generally assumed that the people in the party know what they want, that their commitment is absolute and that, after all, the party is supreme.

Public-Policy Formulation

There is a growing obsession with policies to the extent that sometimes action on a very practical problem is delayed on the pretext of lack of a policy for dealing with it. In my experience, most of the policies formulated are hardly subjected to rigorous analysis. Therefore, it is not easy to forecast with certainty the real outcome of a policy announcement. The trial-and-error syndrome has gripped many policy initiators and policymakers. It is always advisable to wait and see.

This absence of serious analysis when formulating policies is clearly demonstrated by Hogwood and Gunn when they say:

> In the real world, politicians and administrators often do little more than attempt to improve existing policies incrementally, without asking more fundamental questions about underlying objectives.[6]

On several occasions, pertinent and serious questions are raised about certain policy objectives while the policy is more than halfway into its implementation. It is often discovered that the problem or issue which the policy seeks to tackle has never been studied and sufficiently analyzed. It is not uncommon that a consensus about the magnitude and nature of the problem was simply taken for granted.

I have personally attended some policy decision sessions where

viable options were discarded on the pretext that they involved discussing some aspects of the political setting. Civil servants deliberately avoid discussing political issues, and yet these very issues are entrenched in most of the viable public-policy alternatives. It is therefore useful to remember that the purpose of analyzing policies sufficiently before decisions are taken, by and large, is to provoke high-level inquiry and debate, the result of which is certainly high-quality rational choice amongst better-known options.

Public-Policy Implementation

Experience has shown that many public policies fail at the outset partly because they have not been sufficiently analyzed; hence, their implications—political as well as resource-oriented—are not clearly understood from the outset.

Policy implementation is an expensive undertaking. It requires commitment on the part of the initiators, and it also needs financial and human resources, which are in short supply.

Many policies, however attractive they may appear to be, are sometimes not fully implemented due to the lack of capable management teams to implement them. At the same time, a poor choice of options can cause a lot of implementation problems. It frequently occurs that once a policy has been declared, its life span is shortened as enthusiasm for the policy diminishes. Implementation may start with songs composed by local choirs and jazz bands and with public rallies and speeches, but after a few months, interest wanes and eventually, all activities come to a halt. This is inevitable because a new and more popular policy is being initiated, and new songs and rallies have to be arranged.

Generally, African policymakers show a keen interest during policymaking or formulation, but their interest wanes in the implementation stage. Having promulgated the policies, policymakers turn over responsibility to the lower level officials to implement them. Supervision is lacking, and when the policy fails to be properly enacted, policymakers respond by firing or replacing the managers tasked with implementing the policy. They do not take the time to analyze the true causes of its failure.

In Tanzania for example (and perhaps in many other African states), there are as many old policies buried in closed files as there are new ones being initiated. In some instances, it is very difficult to differentiate the old policies from new ones, for the differences may be only in the captions and wording, while the substance, thrust, and methodology for implementation are the same. In this regard Gorbachev said:

> . . . we seem . . . to take innovative decisions, but when it comes to choosing methods for implementing them, we end up trying to use old methods to accomplish new tasks.[7]

This style of policy management is observable in the case where a new minister is appointed who wants to prove himself to be superior to his predecessor.

The problem I perceive is that of a lack of dynamic systems for monitoring and coordinating policy implementation. There are cases where resources continue to be allocated for the implementation of policies that have failed simply because no particular institution is responsible for reviewing their progress on a permanent basis and announcing (publicly) that a certain policy has failed and should therefore be discarded.

This lack of a proper and continuous policy review or evaluation accounts for the existence of many irrelevant policies in our countries.

Overall, some progress has been made despite numerous contradictions, dramatic mistakes, and tragic policy commitments. There is room for improvement; it is crucial that policy initiators and policymakers resolve to take concrete action. It is easy to cultivate the will to take positive action, but no significant change will occur unless policy initiators, policymakers, and implementors have acquired the necessary skills/tools for the trade, meaning, public-policy analysis and review skills, which are not found in the general or standing orders governing the civil service.

Critical Issues

From the foregoing explanation, we can infer that some aspects of public-policy management, which are critical to effective policymaking, are not sufficiently considered and, in some cases, are totally ignored. As a consequence of this omission, financial as well as human resources have been invested where they should not have been allocated at all had the important parameters been properly addressed.

Viable policy decisions can be achieved through rigorous analysis and review of issues, problems, imaginations, sentiments, and other factors, whereby all the implications are uncovered, weighed, and categorized; linkages explored; and options proposed.

Thus, policy analysis and policy review appear to be the critical issues involved in the public-policy process. Yet, this aspect is regarded as marginal by most policy initiators and policymakers. Moreover, in the isolated cases where policy analysis and policy reviews are undertaken, the methodology has tended to be ad hoc in nature. Generally, no specific machinery has been established on a permanent basis to perform this function.

Conceptually, this omission is not only observable in Tanzania in particular and Africa in general, but even in long-established governmental systems such as that of Great Britain. As Hogwood and Gunn have stated: "Policy analysts are not a recognized category in the civil service in Britain."[8]

Where attempts have at least been made to allocate the function to staff who have other responsibilities, the situation is no better, as the following statement indicates:

> At present policymaking, especially long-term policy *thinking* and *planning*, is the responsibility of officers overburdened with more immediate demands arising from the parliamentary and public responsibilities of ministers. The operation of existing policies, and the detailed preparation of legislation with the associated negotiations and discussions frequently crowd out demand that appear less immediate. Civil servants, particularly members of the administrative class, have to spend a great deal of their time preparing explanatory briefs, answers to parliamentary questions, and ministers cases . . . Almost invariably, there are urgent deadlines to be met in this kind of work. In this press of daily business, long-term policy-planning and research tend to take second place.[9]

The foregoing observations provide indisputable evidence of the lack of appreciation of the important role that policy analysis and policy review play in the public policymaking process. At this juncture, it may be useful to define some terminologies such as public policy, policy analysis, and policy review, which are frequently referred to in this chapter.

Public Policy

A policy is typically generated by interactions among many, more or less consciously related decisions. Policy is larger than decision making. A decision, according to Drucker (1967), is a judgment, a choice between alternatives. It is, at best, a choice between almost right and probably wrong.[10]

The term "policy" is commonly used, therefore, to denote broad statements about a government's or organization's intentions or objectives. Within the government, these broad intentions may be observed in the form of economic policies, social policies, and so forth. And within these broad statements, there may be specific policies concerning sectors such as agriculture, industry, education, and health.

Briefly, a policy is an expression of a general purpose or of a desired state of affairs. It contains specific proposals, decisions, authority, programs and, above all, it delineates accountability and responsibility.

Public policy normally develops and is processed within the framework of governmental or public agencies, but its implementation may involve many other agencies outside the government, such as parastatals and even private organizations. For example, the policy regarding delivery of health services is implemented by the central government, local government, parastatal organizations, private enterprises, and voluntary and religious organizations.

Public-Policy Analysis

Public-policy analysis is the activity involving studying, gathering, processing, ordering, and presenting specific information for policymaking. Policy analysis contributes to reaching policy decisions or advises on the implications of alternative policies or actions. Analysis is an important phase in policymaking. It is essential for decision making, problem solving, idea development, communication, and time management. It assists in providing information or data about a specific issue. In stressing the necessity for public-policy analysis, the philosopher Bertrand Russell urged one to think as deeply about the decision as he knew how, to obtain all the relevant information, to concentrate on the pros and cons, and then to decide. In the light of new and more relevant information, one should reconsider the matter, revise the decision, if necessary, and then stick by it.[11]

Public-Policy Review/Evaluation

Public-policy review or evaluation seeks to assess specific policies in terms of the extent to which their outcomes have achieved the stated objectives. Policy review helps to improve an understanding of the factors that shape policy and provides reliable information that can be used in future policymaking functions.

Emphasizing the importance of reliable data in evaluating the performance of policies undertaken, the editor of the Dar-es-Salaam *Daily News* made the following comment:

> Accurate, basic information is even more crucial now when we are in the last stage of implementing our Economic Recovery Programme. The allocation and monitoring of resources under this programme is critical and only reliable performance data will enable us to know whether we are recovering.[12]

Policy analysis and policy review stand out clearly as the most critical issues or activities in the policy management agenda. If adequately undertaken, policy analysis helps to inform policymakers on the implications of the options presented and enables them to know whether the intended policy is in harmony with the desired objectives. Similarly, policy review helps policy initiators and policymakers know to what extent intended goals and objectives have been achieved. It considers whether the policy still merits priority attention or whether it should be downgraded or even terminated.

Improving Public-Policy Management Capacity

Any attempt at rectifying the existing anomalies should aim at imparting the critical policy analysis and review skills. The purpose of this section,

therefore, is to shed some light on the establishment of a viable machinery that would be responsible for analyzing and reviewing public policies on a continuous basis.

Establishing a Viable Public-Policy Analysis and Review System

African states, which are faced with the critical problem of a lack of resources to run even long-established services such as health and education, could benefit considerably by establishing strong policy analysis and review systems, at both the macropolicy level and the sectoral level.

It is absurd to think that mere appeals for foreign aid will bring any immediate changes. What we must now do is to start thinking and acting responsibly, as there is a critical need for continuous and constructive programs of action.

There is a lot of potential for constructive development in Africa. But there is a dearth of the critical skills necessary for viable policy formulation. Therefore, we should not be too proud to ask for assistance or advice from those who have the necessary skills and experience. Although initially asking advice from others can be a humbling experience, in the long term the quality of our decisions regarding policy will be enhanced. Thus, asking for help from others would be to our benefit. Nevertheless, we should exercise caution to ensure that the assistance and advice we receive do not lead to a relationship of dependency. The skills and experience we need to acquire from others within or outside Africa should always aim at developing our own capacity for self-reliance in public-policy management.

We can benefit from the experiences of developed countries such as Great Britain, where the government established a high-level Central Policy Review Staff (a type of "think tank") in 1971 in response to a genuine demand for policy analysis and review at that level. Unfortunately, the CPRS was abolished in 1983. Among the reasons that led to its dissolution was its association with political figures. Having become very competent and powerful, and because of its nonsectoral nature, the CPRS was viewed as a threat by some Cabinet members. This was because they could not easily impose their sectoral policies, as the CPRS subjected them to rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher established a new policy unit in the Cabinet Office to cater for her policy analysis needs.

It is advisable to create relatively small but competent units whose size may be expanded in accordance with the demands of the work. Units that we can refer to as Public Policy Analysis and Review Units (PARUs) should not be detached from the mainstream of ministerial or organizational work. They should be part of the civil service or public enterprises, performing this special function on a permanent basis. For PARUs to survive, they should not be associated with political func-

tionaries; otherwise, they will cease to exist when these particular personalities are no longer in office.

Civil services and public institutions everywhere are very conservative and inflexible entities. Therefore, we should expect some resistance to the introduction of this new system. Any attempts to assign the units other duties should immediately be discouraged, however well intentioned they may appear.

Tasks of PARUs

Policymakers need the assistance of specialized personnel who can analyze and review policies on a continuous basis. Therefore, the PARUs should be manned by professionals in the ministries and other public institutions who possess the requisite skills in their fields although they may, at first, lack skills in policy analysis and review. For example, an industrial economist may evolve into an effective public-policy analyst in the industrial sector if given the appropriate training in policy analysis and review. I should emphasize here that we will not find trained public-policy analysts in most of the public institutions. Training should therefore be a priority activity in establishing PARUs. PARUs will normally perform these tasks among others:

1. Analyze problems, issues, and directives related to policy and advise on rational policy choices.
2. Analyze policy proposals within ministries or organizations and advise on their rationality and viability.
3. Keep all policies under review on a continuing basis and work with policy initiators and policymakers on issues requiring their attention or intervention.
4. Analyze policy proposals submitted by other ministries or organizations, identify linkages with existing policies, and advise the policy initiators and policymakers concerned accordingly.
5. Monitor all ministerial or organizational policies being implemented and apprise policy initiators and policymakers on their current progress in achieving the policy's objectives.
6. Review old policies to determine if they have relevance to present-day situations, trends, and thinking.
7. Advise policy initiators and policymakers about the success or failure of ministerial or organizational policies that are being implemented and present views about their being maintained, their being successful and/or their being terminated.
8. Assemble and maintain basic data on all ministerial or organizational policies (both old and new) and assure that the data is accessible to policy initiators and policymakers when they need it.

9. Serve as a "think-tank" in assisting policy initiators and policymakers to resolve urgent policy-related crises.
10. Write periodic and annual reports on overall ministerial or organizational policy performance and highlight areas needing special attention or improvement.

The overall aim should be to create responsive and supportive systems for those involved in policy initiation and policymaking. Establishing such special units will motivate policy managers to alter their policy approaches. The United Nations recommends the following:

> . . . less emphasis on maintenance and control . . . on rules and regulations and more pragmatism, originality, inventiveness, innovation, . . . flexible attitudes and greater expertise in . . . policy preparation, decision making. . . .[13]

Creating an Effective Policy Analysis and Review System

In order for any new system to function effectively, it should have a clear mandate. In the case of a system that is supposed to question the viability of certain policy proposals, the mandate should be clearly established in the overall national policy framework.

It is generally assumed that the planning departments which are already established in ministries and organizations have the capacity for policy analysis and review. However, my experience has been that most of the planning departments with which I am familiar in Tanzania and probably elsewhere in Africa do not have the capability to effectively undertake the policy analysis and review functions enumerated in the preceding section.

Regarding this misconception, Adair (1985) says that:

> . . . establishing the truth or the reality of a situation seems to be the essential preliminary to knowing what is feasible. Decisions based on wishful thinking, false assumptions, undetected errors, careless calculations, or vain assurances are hardly likely to succeed, except by luck.[14]

It is this misguided thinking that leads to the omission of creating special units for rigorous analysis and review of policies before and after they have been formulated. Thus, the first step should be to establish PARUs in all ministries and other strategic institutions. They should be introduced as part of existing managerial structures and positioned in such a way that they have easy access to policymakers. Normally, they should report directly to the chief executives wherever they are established. Each organization should establish an effective system so that

there is a continuous flow of information between the PARU and policy initiators and policymakers.

Apart from establishing fully operational units at the macropolicy level, departments, local governmental systems, and other concerned units can also establish their own policy analysis and review arrangements. These are internal arrangements to serve the departmental and local governmental executives, while those at the ministerial level are external to the departments and local governmental organs and serve policymakers at their level. Nevertheless, a system of free and informal interaction should be established so that the units at the macropolicy level can meet with those at the sectoral level and exchange views on issues of common interest.

It is also advisable to establish informal interaction/relationships amongst PARUs, particularly in the ministries, to enable the units to exchange views on policy proposals well before they are formalized.

In the organizational charts of the institutions where PARUs have been established, they should appear as appendages of the offices of the chief executives. And when communicating formally and officially with other ministries or organizations, they should do so on behalf of the chief executives whom they are serving.

The main responsibility of a PARU in any organization should be to advise policy initiators and policymakers. They should not be given any special authority, such as the power to veto policy proposals from departments. Where such action is necessary, they should advise the policymaker concerned and exercise authority only upon the instructions of the policy maker accountable for that policy action.

Staffing

The core of the PARU staff should be drawn from existing professional personnel in the ministries or organizations. Those to be assigned this responsibility should be graduates in their professional fields and should have a minimum of five years' experience. However, only those who are keen to learn new operational skills in the area of policy should be assigned to PARUs. The core of the PARU staff, who are professionals in their respective work areas, can be complemented by specialists in other fields such as economics, statistics and/or demography, public administration, finance, and human resource development, depending upon the policy requirements of each institution. For instance, a PARU in the Ministry of Health may need the expertise of an economist. All in all, even the staff who are to be transferred to PARUs in other organizations should be those who have distinguished themselves in their professional fields.

There should be a great measure of flexibility in staffing PARUs so that the size is basically determined by the work demands in each orga-

nization. However, for purposes of continuity and effective performance, the smallest unit should have at least two analysts.

The PARU staff should be developed in the same way as other professional staff are, but with some added incentives. Also, their work environment should be improved so as to be conducive to strenuous analytical activities. Facilities such as a reliable means of transport are a necessity, since data collection may involve visits to distant offices and areas. I would even insist that they be provided with personal computers, particularly for use in the central organizations to begin with and later in other institutions that have established PARUs.

Financial Provision

Since the PARU staff would be recruited from the existing establishments, no new recurring expenditure is envisaged for payment of salaries, leave allowances, travel allowances, and so forth. However, some financial provision is necessary for payment of added incentives such as transport, where none exists, desktop computers for improving information management—processing, storage, and retrieval—and for initial training.

Strategy for Imparting Critical Skills for Policy Management

We have clearly seen that there is a dearth of skills in policy analysis and review, and that in order for this function to be performed effectively and efficiently, training is imperative. Due to the newness of this area in most African states, suitable training facilities and trainers are not readily available.

However, training opportunities abound in overseas training institutions, although relying wholly on these will not solve the problem completely. The rational approach would be to organize special training programs within Africa and especially within subregions, with the assistance of AAPAM/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and other friendly organizations outside Africa. Existing subregional institutions such as the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) and national institutions responsible for management and public administration training—ASCON (Nigeria), SIMPA (Swaziland), IDM (Tanzania), GIMPA (Ghana), ZIPAM (Zimbabwe)—may be called upon to collaborate with overseas institutions that have the training capability in policy analysis and review and to initiate intensive training programs for the staff recruited to start PARU. A two-month program may help to impart the initial skills needed to undertake PARU functions.

Since experience for training in policy analysis and review does not

exist within our countries, it is imperative for a few selected trainers to be exposed to training skills in this field for a period of not less than two weeks. There are two approaches to this type of training. The first is to send the trainers to overseas institutions, and the second is to recruit specialists from overseas institutions to train the trainers in the national or subregional institutions. I would recommend the latter approach because it facilitates the training of many trainers at once and is less expensive.

For future training the existing institutions, such as those already mentioned above, should be encouraged and helped to develop public-policy analysis and review as an optional subject in the normal courses in management and public administration, economic planning, financial management, and so forth. Students in institutions that offer professional courses such as medicine, engineering, agriculture, or veterinary science may be exposed to a series of lectures on public-policy analysis and review.

The initial exposure on skills-sharing sessions in public-policy analysis and review should also involve the policymakers themselves. It is beneficial to start by sensitizing the top echelon to the need to cultivate the necessary positive attitudes. Success at this level normally influences successes at lower levels. AAPAM and UNECA are now following this strategy. Experience-sharing through attendance at such workshops may appeal more to busy top-level policy initiators and policymakers than would the teaching approach, which may be more suitable for training the policy analysts.

Enhancing Capacity for Self-reliance in Public-Policy Management

African policy initiators and policymakers can learn and acquire the critical skills needed for effective policy management from developed countries. Nevertheless, great caution should be exercised in order to avoid creating a situation whereby policies are dictated from outside our systems. Deliberate action ought to be taken to ensure that each country creates its own capacity for self-reliance in policy management.

External assistance will necessarily be needed, but it should not be used to suppress the national policy initiative. Therefore, aid or donations of any kind—be it material, human, or technological—should be selected with discretion.

Emphasizing the importance of self-reliance in the management of Tanzania's economy, Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere (Chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi and also Chairman of the South Commission) said the following while opening a seminar for major producers in Tanzania.

> . . . the country presently has numerous trained people who could do wonders if properly utilized . . . why outside consultation was sought

> even for most elementary things. . . . This is certainly a continuation of the colonial mentality . . . it was imperative for poor countries to develop their national as well as collective capacities for self-reliance to overcome (policy) backwardness. . . . Self-reliance was crucial if we had to reduce dependency on the Northerners.[15]

Conclusion

In general, the public-policy process in Africa is defective. The most critical defects are related to the omission of policy analysis and review as important parameters in the policymaking process.

Therefore, in order to overcome those inherent weaknesses, African states should establish units for policy analysis and review in their public institutions.

It is necessary to remember that reforms of this kind are not easily accepted and that they normally encounter many problems. That notwithstanding, I am convinced that the educational influence of workshops such as this will help change the prevailing negative attitude among policy initiators and policymakers.

African governments need to be reminded that some of their ill-conceived public policies have had very high socioeconomic, political, and moral costs. They should heed AAPAM's advice to establish viable policy analysis and review systems as a matter of priority. The decade is coming to an end and nothing has happened.[16]

Endnotes

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13. United Nations. *Enhancing Capabilities for Administrative Reform in Developing Countries*, New York: UN Publication No. ST/ESA/SER.E/31, 1983.

14. United Nations. *Enhancing Capabilities for Administrative Reform in Developing Countries.*

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16. It is understood that PARUs have since been established as integral parts of government departments in Tanzania.

4

Institutional Dimensions in the Policy Process[1]

ADEBAYO ADEDEJI

When I was approached by the codirectors of this seminar to prepare a keynote address with a slant on policy and institutional dimensions in developmental management, I did not hesitate to accept their invitation. In fact, for at least three reasons, I welcomed the opportunity to express my thoughts on the topic that was suggested to me. Firstly, it is my belief that the institutional perspective in development policy management has yet to receive the attention it deserves. Secondly, I wish to associate myself with the efforts and aspirations of regional bodies such as the African Association for Public Administration and Management, which are becoming increasingly active in the area of development management and have demonstrated their willingness to team up with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in its crusade for the economic advancement of Africa. Thirdly, I am always delighted to exchange ideas and share experiences with policymakers and senior administrators on the subject of Africa's economic recovery and development.

I do not have to provide the sordid details of Africa's development crisis. The crisis has had so devastating and pervasive an effect that no one here present can feign ignorance of its nature and repercussions. It has manifested itself in so many negative forms—deteriorating terms of trade, widening current-account and budget deficits, increasing balance of payments difficulties, rising external indebtedness, and increasing debt-servicing obligations. It (the crisis) has also reduced the tempo of activities in Africa's public sector, caused factory closures and production declines in the private sector, swollen the ranks of the unemployed,

[1]Keynote address presented at the second in the series of seminars on Critical Skills in Policy Management Process, Mbabane, Swaziland, 17 October 1988.

and denied large sections of the African society access to food and essential social services.

The current situation has been interpreted in many different ways. The radical school of political economy sees the predicament of Africa as a continuation of the age-old conspiracy of the developed world to keep Africa perpetually underdeveloped. The international financial institutions counter by saying that Africa had nobody but itself to blame for its economic woes. It is argued that for long—perhaps, for too long—Africa had lived beyond its means, and that the time had finally arrived for the people of the continent to pay the price of prodigality, lack of vision, and bureaucratic waste.

Both arguments make sense—up to a point. There is no doubt that Africa's persistent economic backwardness is a function of different but interrelated factors. In view of the continent's traditional links with the rest of the world—especially, the technologically advanced areas—external influence is certainly a potent factor in development. Africa has indeed been exposed to pressures of the external environment in recent years. The economic recession of the early 1980s reduced the capacity of the industrialized countries to import commodities produced in the region (Africa). Before the recession and, to a large extent, up to now, protectionist policies and tariff barriers in the industrialized countries have curtailed their imports from the underdeveloped countries, particularly, Africa. In contrast, the policies embarked upon by many African countries have tended to increase their dependence on the industrialized countries for technological know-how, capital goods, raw materials and spares, and, to a large degree, consumer products. In the circumstances in which the demand for Africa's commodities does not rise as fast as Africa's appetite for foreign goods, the terms of trade would, over time, tend to deteriorate. Indeed, taking into account the excessive reliance of many African countries on a narrow range of export commodities, it would take a miracle to shield their economies from external shocks—notably, the increasing wave of protectionism referred to earlier, the international financial institutions' tough lending policies, rising interest rates, and fluctuations in exchange rates.

If an increasingly hostile international economic environment is responsible for Africa's perpetual underdevelopment, so are the domestic institutions whose tasks include policy formulation and execution. To the extent that these institutions failed to anticipate problems or to respond adequately to environmental changes, they are as much to blame for Africa's economic crisis as the external causes of stagnation.

In any case, the two preceding viewpoints on the causes of Africa's economic crisis do not provide a complete picture of the situation. The policy option suggested by the radical school (severing trade relations with the technologically advanced countries) may run into practical obstacles in view of Africa's full integration into the international eco-

nomic system. Besides, the economic principle of the interdependence of nations does not support an "isolationist" development policy. An alternative option is structural adjustment as proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although structural adjustment has influenced development policy and management in recent years, it does not provide an adequate response to Africa's deepening crisis. Its diagnosis of Africa's problem is partial, and its prescription is not oriented toward the long-term health of the beleaguered economy of the continent.

The position taken by the African leaders (in Africa's Submission to the United Nations General Assembly) accurately sums up the contemporary situation. According to the leaders, the root cause of Africa's recurring socioeconomic crisis is the lack of structural transformation and the pervasive low level of productivity, aggravated by exogenous and endogenous factors. In order to illustrate this viewpoint, it is necessary to examine critically what has been happening in one major sector of the economy—the food and agriculture sector.

As is now generally accepted, Africa's food crisis did not start overnight. The Sahelian drought of 1973 was an ominous sign full of great foreboding for the future, but as it turned out, very few lessons were learned from it. In retrospect, it sounds incredible that a disaster of such magnitude would have made little difference to the combat-readiness of the policymaking and implementation agencies of government. The drought swept the entire Sahel region from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and in the process, caused large-scale destruction of human and animal life and inflicted untold damage on the ecology of the region. In 1974 a World Food Conference was held in Rome, and it was here that a formal attempt was made to recognize food security as a major international problem. The then American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, made an impassioned plea:

> We must proclaim a bold objective . . . that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry . . . no family will fear for its next day's bread and no human being's future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition.

In 1983–84 (that is, ten years later) practically everything that was enshrined in Kissinger's "bold objective" had failed to materialize. In fact, the 1983–84 drought caused greater havoc than its 1973 precursor. Whereas in 1983 Africans outside the Sahelian belt wondered how such a calamity could befall a subregion, by 1984 the rest of the world was asking "how could this happen to Africa?"

However, disaster was boldly written on the wall for years, but only a few people cared to read it. A significant feature of Africa's food and agriculture situation is declining productivity. In the early 1960s, India and sub-Saharan Africa produced about the same quantities of food.

Today, India produces three times as much food, while production has, at worst, regressed, and at best, stagnated, in Africa. It is also instructive that in the early 1980s, India achieved food security and that by 1985, it had stored twenty-six million tons of food cereals and extended emergency food aid to Africa. If any further evidence of declining productivity in Africa's food and agriculture is required, let us examine another comparative figure: the average African farmer produces 600 kg of grain a year, while his American or Canadian counterpart produces 80,000 kg!

The imbalance between population growth and food production has confounded Africa's food supply situation. In contrast to an average annual growth rate of 1.5 percent per-capita food production in the 1970s, the population has increased at the rate of 3 percent within the same period. The per-capita production index for wheat fell from 210 kg in 1979 to 179 kg in 1980. From figures supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank drew a trend line covering the period of 1970–84 reflecting the annual grain production per capita for twenty-four countries most adversely affected by the drought. This trend line shows a fall of approximately 2 percent a year.

As domestic food production failed to keep pace with population growth, Africa became a net importer of food. In specific terms, food self-sufficiency ratios dropped from 98 percent in the 1960s, to 86 percent in 1980. In 1980–81, food imports grew at the rate of 12 percent per year. The food import bill rose from US$598 million in 1961–63 to US$4,095 million in 1980–82. Between 1983 and 1984, the deteriorating balance-of-payments position (itself a reflection of the worsening economic crisis) forced Africa to cut back on food imports, but even then—and particularly between 1980 and 1985—agricultural imports grew at an annual rate of 6.2 percent. The emerging picture is alarming. From declining food self-sufficiency ratios, Africa moved to a situation of food insecurity, as reflected in the increasing difficulty in obtaining the resources to finance food deficits. The rapid decline in personal incomes has also limited the access of a large number of people to food. It is a fact of life today that in Africa many people go to bed hungry, and many more wake up without food. The world is aware of the plight of those affected by the 1984 drought because the scale of destruction and destitution is not one that could be easily ignored. But out of the focus of television cameras are countless numbers of people who have no access to minimum food requirements. The future outlook does not appear encouraging. According to an FAO projection, if the present trend continues, low-income Africa would, by the year 2000, experience unprecedented and severe food shortages that would be difficult to plug with a combination of commercial food imports and food aid.

How did Africa get into this muddle? I have alluded to one significant factor—rapid population growth relative to stagnant or declining agricultural productivity. On the assumption that we are unable or

unwilling to interfere with the forces of nature by controlling the growth of population, there is still a lot that we could do to raise agricultural productivity to a respectable level. Unfortunately, it does not appear that contemporary policies on food and agriculture have taken advantages of viable options. Granted that droughts, locust invasions, and desert encroachments are acts of God, certainly the installation of early-warning systems as well as the investment of resources in rural infrastructures are within man's own control. Almost invariably, government policies view agriculture as a secondary, low-priority sector. Farmers and the rural populace hardly receive a fair deal in the allocation of resources. It is true that agricultural parastatals have been established but many of them have not been really successful. Besides, the bulk of the food consumed in rural households (about 75 percent) is self-produced. Operating in scattered settlements, the peasant producers have very little incentive to apply new techniques or experiment with high-yielding crop varieties. Government assistance comes in trickles and in the form of ill-trained extension services agents. In a few cases, the peasant farmers benefit from integrated rural development schemes. In the majority of cases, however, the "field units" of central government departments seldom coordinate their activities with one another to ensure maximum overall impact on the peasant communities. There is also the question of incentive. Existing pricing and tax policies seek to supply cheap food to urban dwellers and cheap raw materials to manufacturing establishments. Governments could not have sent a clearer message to the rural folks that their future is in urban centers and in factories.

Finally, the peasant producers rarely obtain the necessary institutional supports—agricultural credit facilities, information/advisory services on storage and marketing of products, and backup technical services on matters relating to irrigation, planting, and harvesting.

The neglect of the food and agriculture sector has, in any case, cost Africa dearly. Unless far-reaching measures are undertaken to revive the sector, it will be difficult to turn the African economy around. This is the position taken in the African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), formulated in 1985, and the United Nations Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), adopted by the 13th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1986. The logic of the agriculture-based recovery strategy is simple: if we shift resources to the agricultural sector, this would have the multiplier effect of increasing rural incomes, and by so doing, would induce all-around growth.

Current policy reforms (particularly, structural adjustment reforms) have attempted to address the problems confronting the food and agriculture sector and other sectors of the economy. In popular usage, structural adjustment is a reaction to the postindependence development philosophy, which placed too high a bet on the efficiency of government

intervention in the productive process. The argument in favor of structural reforms is based on the poor performance of government agencies—notably, the parastatals. While bureaucratic layers escalated and offices have multiplied, the performance of organizational units has gone into decline. This is what led to a critical reexamination of the role of the state in development. We should not press the argument too far that the awakened interest in "market forces" has to do with the resurgence of neoclassical economic thinking. After all, neoclassical economics was alive and well in the 1960s, when policymakers and their advisers (local and foreign) promoted the cause for a government-engineered development strategy. It is on record that private cooperatives were disbanded and then replaced with public enterprises on the recommendation of external funding agencies, which believed that loan recovery would be a less problematic exercise were formal public organizations held responsible for projects. But that was in the 1960s and early 1970s, when development finance was not a serious constraint. By the early 1980s conditions within the international economic environment had led to a general credit squeeze. It was then and only then that questions were being asked about the role of government in national development. Unfortunately, they were the wrong types of questions. For instance, rather than focus attention on the range of institutions that were created between the 1960s and 1970s and the pattern of interactions among these institutions, a new school of thought that is known as "supply side" economics turned the debate upside down. Adherents of this school brushed the institutional issues aside and concentrated their attacks on economic indicators—the imbalance between public expenditure and the (declining) rate of economic growth, the widening deficits (attributable to government agencies, notably, the parastatal sector), and the unsalutary effects of the "visible hand" of government on productive activity in general. Indeed, Africa's socioeconomic crisis, which came to a head in the early 1980s, was blamed largely on excessive government control of, or interference with, economic activities. This is probably where the early efforts to stem Africa's economic crisis went off the mark. Instead of recognizing the negative trends in the economy for what they were (as symptoms of a deeper malaise), the new orthodoxy interpreted the signs as a justification for clipping the wings of the public bureaucracy. Accordingly, and to correct the short-term imbalances in the economy, many African countries had to institute varieties of structural adjustment measures, the main features of which are a reduction in public expenditures, reduction of budget deficits, removal of subsidies and price controls, devaluation of currency, privatization of public enterprises, and liberalization or deregulation of the economy.

In essence, the measures were to provide shock treatment for the ailing economies. In practice, they have failed to provide short-term relief, and their impact in the long run might be to cripple public management

capacity without replacing it with viable alternatives. Moreover, the adjustment programs have been implemented at tremendous social and political cost.

This is not to say that structural adjustment had no impact whatsoever on economic performance. To start with, the new policy reforms have compelled government agencies to be more prudent than before in the handling of funds. Secondly, where parastatals had been created for political or bureaucratic empire-building reasons, the "privatization" or abolition of such parastatals tends to make economic sense by ensuring that scarce resources are earmarked for productive projects. Thirdly, the removal of food subsidies, the decontrol of prices, and the devaluation of currency may be justified in cases where food prices are too low to motivate increased production. Finally, deregulation helps to liberate the productive forces in an economy that is already fettered by bureaucratic rules and regulations.

Where a different set of circumstances prevails, the implementation of structural adjustment packages tends to produce unanticipated results. The privatization option, for instance, may stumble in many African countries largely because of the incipient nature of equity trading, the underdevelopment of the stock-and-bonds marketing institutions, and the shortage of persons skilled in the valuation of enterprise assets. The need to develop local institutions in the area of credit and savings mobilization is further demonstrated by the risks of insider-trading and other unethical practices—now receiving much media attention in the United States and Western Europe. The risks are particularly great in Africa where, depending on a combination of circumstances, the new owners of a "privatized" enterprise may reap a windfall at the expense of the taxpayers. Added to this is the problem of valuation—a problem that is confounded by the nonquantifiable payoffs that the government took into account at the inception of an enterprise but which, in the rush to privatize, tend to be completely ignored.

Even more significant than the issue of privatization is the need for increased and sustained government assistance to the hitherto-neglected sectors of the economy—particularly, the food and agriculture sector. If the objective of transforming this sector is to be met, government institutions have to support the efforts of the large commercial farmers and the small-scale, peasant producers by establishing or strengthening the institutions responsible for savings/credit mobilization, liberalizing credit facilities, providing technical advisory services, reforming land tenure systems, resuscitating producers and marketing cooperatives, improving road networks and other rural infrastructures, and eliminating production and marketing bottlenecks. In the area of food security, there is a need to formulate realistic policies on food storage and grain reserves as well as policies related to the exchange of perishable surpluses with food-strapped neighbors.

It is fair to ask where the institutional dimension fits into all these factors. Institutional issues become relevant precisely at the point where they are currently overlooked—at the point of policy formulation and implementation. It is at this point that we should be able to locate institutions capable of performing the following tasks:

1. Analyzing changes in the environment, proposing long-term strategies, and outlining scenarios taking into account short-term problems and emergencies.
2. Setting performance targets as dictated by long-term plans and short-term needs and assigning responsibility for the accomplishment of targets to appropriate agencies.
3. Correcting imbalances between plans and implementation capacity and reconciling conflicts in sectoral objectives.
4. Ensuring rapid shifts of resources and adjustment of plans in order to weather temporary storms.
5. Mobilizing savings and increasing the stock of resources.
6. Promoting internal stimuli for change.
7. Evaluating and monitoring progress and problems on a regular basis.

For the institutions to operate at an optimum level, at least two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, there is a need for cohesion at the highest level of government. That means the long-drawn battles between political functionaries and career officials should cease, and the attention of both groups should focus on solutions to ongoing problems. Secondly, in proposing new policy measures or assessing the impact of the existing ones, we should ensure that a holistic approach is substituted for the current preoccupation with partial, hit-or-miss solutions. Policy reforms can achieve their intended objectives only when they take into account the *interactions* among the component institutions of an economy. We are not likely to get very far in our efforts to monitor (and therefore improve) the performance of an economy unless we are in a position to say whether macro and micro economic decisions are mutually reinforcing or internally inconsistent. If the center sends conflicting signals to the periphery, the economic system as a whole is not likely to operate at an optimum level. If strategic plans could be altered by powerful enclaves or individuals operating in remote corners of the public service, movement toward economic recovery or growth will tend to be impaired.

5

Policy Management

An Institutional Focus

E. A. SAI

If Africa's commitment to collective self-reliance is to bear fruit, it is imperative, first of all, for a common understanding to emerge as to what is involved in, or implied by, the philosophy. To view self-reliance as an attempt to escape from or overcome the crippling effects of external aid is to view it in a narrow sense. In the broader sense, one must regard self-reliance as the total mobilization and optimization of our natural resources (human and material) at the national level, and the establishment of collaborative mechanisms amongst the various African nations to make it possible for them to pool their resources and achieve solid economic strength throughout the continent. If this can be achieved, then Africa will have found true negotiative power and a voice of its own. In that event, given the world structure of global interdependence, external aid may nonetheless persist in all its known forms—but only as a calculated and complementary input to Africa's own efforts at economic and social advancement, rather than as the dominant factor in developmental planning.

Policy will be the fundamental instrument on the path toward socio-economic development by which we can achieve the goals discussed above. It therefore follows that the primary task that African governments have to face is how to develop the creative and absorptive capacity for appropriate policy conception, formulation, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, implementation, and review. In short, Africa must develop the capacity for effectivly managing policies that are best suited for the economic growth of the continent.

This is by no means an easy task. There are several dimensions to it. There is the human dimension: recruiting, developing, and optimally

deploying experts in various fields to manage policy. There is the skills dimension: identifying and inculcating the critical skills needed for Africans to develop as policymakers and policy managers. There is also the systems dimension: the organizational framework within which policy can be efficiently and effectively managed. Above all, there is the institutional dimension: the necessary institutions or hierarchy of institutions vested with specific authority or power to formulate or execute certain policies and charged with the responsibility for ensuring that the policies are clearly articulated, faithfully implemented, and constantly reviewed in the face of environmental and other changes.

Hierarchy of Policies and Institutions

Policies tend to exist in a certain descending order, and each level has to have a specific institution that serves as the clearing house and/or lead agency with respect to each policy or group of policies.

National-level or Macro Policies

Policies of a national nature—those related to security and defense, economics, industry, and fiscal activities—should necessarily be taken by the highest policymaking body in each country. Depending upon each country's constitution, the highest policymaking body could be the office of the head of state, a cabinet, or other executive bodies. It is important that the macropolicy role of these bodies be clearly identified and recognized. In certain situations, there are other bodies immediately ancillary to the highest ruling body, such as in two-tier executive systems or cabinet subcommittees. This system calls for a clear delineation of policy roles and responsibilities; otherwise, duplication, conflict, and confusion tend to develop almost imperceptibly and create weaknesses in the machinery of government. In Ghana, for instance, there is the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which is the highest ruling and policymaking body and is vested with legislative and executive powers. There is also a Committee of Secretaries of State (ministers), which has a limited executive role, operating more as an advisory body to the PNDC with respect to important policy issues, such as macroeconomic and social-sector policies. The Committee of Secretaries operates with four Subcommittees—the Legal and Political Subcommittee, the Economic and Finance Subcommittee, the Utilities and Infrastructure Subcommittee, and the Social Affairs Subcommittee. Responsibilities between the two levels (such as between the PNDC and the Committee of Secretaries) are clearly defined, and there is, therefore, no jurisdictional conflict. In any case, final authority rests with the PNDC.

Sectoral Policies

Sector-specific policies are located within specific ministries and are expected to be in alignment with the main policies of government. From this standpoint, sector-specific policies fall into the category of micropolicies. The mandates of individual ministries should be so clearly defined so as to avoid unnecessary conflict. However, because portfolios sometimes unavoidably overlap (such as between a Ministry of Industries and a Ministry of Agriculture), it is always prudent to establish interministerial coordinating committees, structured on the basis of proximity of portfolios. It is the responsibility of the secretary to the cabinet or the head of the cabinet secretariat to watch out for any real or potential conflicts of jurisdiction and bring these to the government's notice (through the cabinet) for rectification, realignment of responsibilities, or even mergers.

Operational Policies

Implementing agencies or governmental departments derive their operational policies from the policies of the sectors under which they operate. In the Ghanaian situation, the mandates of ministries exclude implementation. Ministries are required to concern themselves only with policy formulation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. Implementation rests with the sub-ministerial departments, and responsibility for the formulation of operational policies is vested in the department head who has a reporting relationship with the sector secretary or minister. The sector ministry has the opportunity, through the monitoring and evaluation mechanism, to ensure that the operational policies of departments fall in step with sectoral policies.

Local-level Policies

This category embraces policy formulation at the local, community, and grassroots levels. There must be designated governmental institutions at all these levels to ensure that policy matters are effectively handled. The names and types of institutions will vary from country to country. In a decentralized administrative regime such as is the case in Ghana, districts are the focal point in the development process. There are district administrations (civil service departments) and district assemblies (political/legislative bodies). At the regional level, there are regional administrations and regional coordinating councils, which coordinate development within the entire region. In view of the fact that Ghana operates a unitary system of government, policies at the local level are required to be consistent with, or derive from, the national policy framework. The

ministry of local government has responsibility for ensuring that this consistency is achieved.

Source of Policy Inputs

In these days, when several African countries are in the grip of structural adjustment, it is necessary for policymakers and policy managers to resist the temptation to regard the generation of socioeconomic policies as the main province of the donors. The will must be developed for ensuring that donor or externally assisted policies fall in line with national policies and not the other way around. For this reason, policymakers and managers must increase their awareness of the existence of a spectrum of national sources that should inform national policy formulation and management. A random categorization of these sources will include policy declarations by heads of state and ministers, legislative decisions, existing legislation, judicial decisions and the professional opinions of management development institutes on major national issues, results of research in universities and position papers submitted by nongovernmental organizations, professional bodies, trade associations, traditional authorities, the news media, as well as the conclusions drawn from local seminars/workshops, policy-oriented memoranda from public officers and private persons and, above all, the social and political implications of national development plans and the national budget. There must be an institutionalized arrangement (as typified by the experience of the information services department in Ghana) for producing reports on public reactions to policy and capturing the various inputs described above, for the attention of government.

Policy Management Units

In order to ensure that national policies are well-articulated and their desired impact maximized, an adequate institutional framework must be provided. For instance, there should be units within ministries assigned the tasks of policy formulation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. At the macro and sectoral levels, as well as within management development institutes, policy analysis units should be established. A national strategic planning organization should also have a place in the policy management process. These features are particularly noticeable in Ghana, where a national development planning commission, a national economic commission, a structural adjustment program team as well as an economic review and management team exist to advise the PNDC on issues related to national economic policy and development. Debates on national policy issues related to the economy as a whole or to sectoral

issues have also become institutionalized features of the policy management process. This way, dissent is unearthed and useful hints incorporated in public policy.

Policy implementation capacity is another major area of concern. In Ghana this has necessitated the initiation of a program for major structural reforms in the civil service, the state enterprise sector, the social sectors (particularly, health and education) as well as the reform of the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and the Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI). A national monitoring unit, located within the office of the PNDC, ensures that government policy decisions are implemented expeditiously. This is in addition to an economic liaison unit, also located within the office of the PNDC, whose role is to maintain liaison between the agencies involved in formulating economic proposals and the approving authority, with a view toward cutting down on the time spent on processing these proposals to the final-decision stage.

With specific reference to the prospects for collective self-reliance in Africa, economic cooperation is hampered by a number of factors, particularly tariff and currency restrictions and the proliferation of small economic groupings. What Africa needs is a meaningful commitment to cooperation among the various states.

Constraints on the Enhancement of Policy Capacity in Africa

At the individual national level, there are several constraints on policy and management. Prominent among these constraints are:

- lack of a clear-cut policy in some vital areas of the economy
- duplication and conflict in institutional roles related to policy management
- inconsistencies between policy and existing legislation
- low level of policy implementation capacity
- absence of policy review mechanisms
- slow movement of the bureaucratic machinery in the process of policy execution and management
- at the intra-African level, the existence of divergences in attitudes toward concerted action and cooperation

Conclusions and Recommendations

The following conclusions and recommendations should be considered:

1. Adequate attention should be paid by individual African states to

the development of an effective institutional framework for policy formation and implementation.

2. Policies must be properly and carefully located within the appropriate units of government to avoid unnecessary duplication and conflict.
3. Policymakers and managers must be equipped with the critical skills and appropriate tools to enable them to manage policy institutions successfully.
4. There should be structured interactions amongst African policymakers and managers to allow for a free exchange of ideas, on a continuing basis, about how to improve the effectiveness of policy institutions.
5. African governments must begin, as a matter of priority, to involve policy-oriented institutions and policy analysts in the policymaking process.
6. African heads of state summits must make the utmost effort at breaking down the barriers that impede intra-African cooperation and seek to establish a commonly acceptable institutional framework for promoting concerted action on global economic issues.

Part II

Self-reliance and Foreign Aid: Case Studies in Policy Management

6

The Pattern of Foreign Aid Management in Nigeria

S. A. OLANREWAJU

To a very large extent, Nigeria depends on crude oil for its economic growth and survival. During the 1970s the oil sector accounted for over 90 percent of export earnings and government revenue. Naturally, the collapse of the international crude oil market in 1982 has badly affected the growth and performance of the Nigerian economy. The substantial decline in the crude oil price—from US$40 per barrel in January 1981, to US$18 in 1982, and further to US$10 in 1985—as well as the reduction in Nigeria's oil production quota from 2.3 million barrels per day in the 1970s to 1.3 million barrels per day in the 1980s (now marginally increased to 1.5 million barrels per day) meant a drastic fall in export earnings and government revenue. Nigeria's earnings from crude oil, which stood at about US$26.4 billion in 1980, fell to US$6.4 billion in 1986 and in 1989, to US$5.8 billion. This substantial reduction in Nigeria's capability to earn foreign exchange, coupled with a very low level of domestic savings, resulted in increased reliance on external resources in executing development programs and projects.

In an effort to promote rapid economic recovery, Nigeria adopted the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in July 1986. The successful implementation of this program substantially depends on the inflow of external resources. However, if there is a clear case for a substantial increase in the volume of external development assistance, there is an even stronger case for better management of such external development assistance in order to maximize the overall benefits. The long-term benefits of foreign assistance must be calculated in terms of greater self-reliance.

Against the background described above, this chapter focuses on the public-policy process as it affects foreign aid and self-reliance in Nigeria. The chapter's main objective is to examine the management of foreign

aid, identify weaknesses in the system, and offer suggestions for improvement.

Some Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

Self-reliance refers to the ability of an economy to generate self-sustained growth largely within its own resources.[1] The main elements of self-reliance are:

- heavy reliance on domestic resource mobilization and utilization for modernizing the economy and increasing the welfare of its citizens
- reduced dependence on outsiders for the supply of goods and services
- technological self-reliance

In order to appreciate the importance of self-reliance in the context of Nigeria, one has to understand the economic conditions that have prevailed in Nigeria in recent times. The oil boom of the 1970s transformed the Nigerian economy from one dependent on a number of agricultural commodities to a mono-product economy almost entirely dependent on crude oil exports. Agricultural production diminished, while national expenditure and production became closely linked with imports. The structure of industrial incentives and the import-substitution strategy adopted also encouraged the development of industries that were heavily dependent on imported raw materials. Nigeria was therefore ill-equipped for the sudden collapse of the world crude oil market in 1982. Even though foreign exchange fell drastically, the country's excessive reliance on imports continued. This external dependence led to chronic balance-of-payments deficits, escalating external debt, and a crushing debt-service burden. It is against this background that the federal government embarked on the SAP:

> aimed at altering and re-aligning aggregate domestic expenditure and production patterns, so as to minimize dependence on imports, enhance the non-oil export base and bring the economy back on the path of steady and balanced growth.[2]

The philosophy of self-reliance underlines the economic recovery program. Self-reliance is one of the key vehicles through which the SAP intends to achieve its objectives of domestic and external balance as well as economic recovery, economic development, and social progress. Self-reliance, as outlined in the SAP document, places emphasis on local sourcing of industrial raw materials, self-sufficiency in domestic food production, local fabrication of equipment and spare parts, enhanced

domestic savings, and diversification of the export base to minimize dependence on crude oil.[3] However, given the acute shortage of domestic resources, implementation of the SAP substantially relies on the inflow of external resources to fill the domestic resource gap. If care is not taken, this external orientation may defeat the lofty objective of self-reliance.

External resource inflow, which is not part of the foreign exchange earned by a country through its exports, is often referred to as external assistance. It includes various forms of concessional and non-concessional financial arrangements. Concessional external assistance relates to those generally not given on market terms. It includes capital transfers in the form of grants and low-interest loans as well as technical assistance in the form of human capital and capital equipment. Non-concessional assistance, on the other hand, is usually given under competitive market conditions in the form of loans, private foreign investments, export guarantee schemes, and debt rescheduling arrangements.

Only a part of the total inflow of development assistance to a country constitutes foreign aid. Pure aid would therefore be a grant (bearing no interest and not subject to repayment) to be used as the recipient wishes, with no strings attached. In reality, however, no aid is completely free; strings (economic or political) are often attached. Also, the grant equivalent of a soft loan is an element of foreign aid. The grant equivalent can be defined as the difference between the usually high market rate and the low interest rate actually paid or the net gain or value added accruing to the recipient economy from a loan or from technical assistance.

From the point of view of the recipient country, the objective of foreign aid is mainly to augment available domestic resources for its socio-economic development. However, from the donors' point of view, the objectives of foreign aid are more diversified. Prominent among these objects are:[4]

- maintenance of historical and cultural ties;
- promotion of political, diplomatic, military or strategic, economic, and commercial interests of donor countries;
- promotion of economic development of recipient countries; and
- humanitarian concern for the people of the recipient countries.

Thus the donor's and recipient's objectives may not always be mutually reinforcing for attaining the economic development of the latter. In fact, in most cases they tend to conflict. Foreign aid is increasingly becoming a sophisticated instrument for controlling the policy orientation of recipient economies. There is also a high degree of donor involvement in aid management, end-use control, and procurement practices. Given the multiplicity of aid objectives as well as the inevitable conflict of objectives between aid-giving and aid-receiving countries, an aid-receiv-

ing country must be concerned with how to maximize its benefits from development assistance.[5]

There is still considerable controversy over the exact relationship between foreign aid and self-reliant development. While some scholars believe that foreign aid stimulates growth and promotes self-reliance in the recipient country, others argue that the impact of aid on the development of the recipient countries is negative. Theoretically, it could be argued that foreign aid has the potential of bringing physical and financial capital along with technical know-how, skilled personnel, organizational experience, market information, advanced and innovative production techniques, and so forth to the recipient countries. Foreign aid may also train local labor on how to apply new skills. All these should go a long way to accelerate economic development in the recipient countries.[6]

From this perspective, the task force of the World Bank/IMF Development Committee[7] concluded that aid has been productive and helpful to development. Without it, a number of countries would not have been able to graduate from the ranks of poor- to middle-income nations; and the countries that remain poor would have been poorer.[8] The task force, however, conceded that in general, aid has had a better record in Asia than in Africa.

African scholars are of the view that foreign aid has not contributed optimally to the economic development of the continent. Indeed, there are suggestions that some of the components of the present crisis in public administration in Africa might have a lot to do with aid.[9] Claude Ake, for example, has argued that assistance is given to make the partnership look plausible, but as it is worked out, the proletarian countries get poorer and the technological gap widens.[10]

Generalization about the impact of foreign aid must, however, be made with caution. On balance, even though the inflow of foreign aid appears to be beneficial, there is no doubt that this source of development financing has fallen short of its potential and in some cases has introduced profound distortions into the structure of the recipient economies. While aid may ease the external resource constraint, it could foster an unhealthy dependency relationship with the donors. The political costs of such a dependent relationship may be enormous. Consequently, proper cost and benefit analysis of all aid projects should be carried out *before* its acceptance. A proper management of foreign aid is also important in order to enhance the benefits derivable from this type of development financing.

Public Policy and Foreign Aid in Nigeria

This section focuses on constitutional provisions on foreign aid as well as the management of foreign aid in practice.

Constitutional Provision

In 1914 the southern and northern protectorates were amalgamated, and Nigeria became a single political system. Between 1946 and 1954 several constitutional changes were made in Nigeria by the British government. One such change was the creation of three regions (East, West, and North) with legislative powers equal to, if not greater than, that of the central government. This constitutional structure had considerable implications for international economic relations.

Shortly before independence in 1960, the regions were permitted to have their representatives as agents-general in London, while the federal government had a representative of the high commission status. The agents-general had powers to negotiate business transactions, contracts, and matters within the jurisdiction of the regional governments.[11] The situation remained the same—even after independence in 1960—until January 1966, when the military regime that took over the government in a coup d'etat recalled the regional agents-general and abolished the office.

Under the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, the federal government could negotiate foreign aid for its use and on behalf of the regions. The constitution, however, also made provision for short-term borrowing by the regions on their own for a repayment period not exceeding twelve months. The constitution further assured the regions the security of their funds or assets held outside Nigeria. The 1979 constitution reviewed this provision and vested the power to negotiate foreign aid and external borrowing only in the federal parliament. This constitutional provision has been retained in the new (1989) constitution. The constitutional provision implied that no state government could directly negotiate foreign aid or borrow money externally without going through the federal government.

In spite of this constitutional provision since 1979, the Second Republic (1979-83) witnessed competitive borrowing among the state governments, giving rise to uncoordinated external debt commitments in the early 1980s. Such an uncoordinated external assistance constituted a huge liability and imposed excessive costs on the economy. However, since the overthrow of the civilian regime in December 1983, the constitutional provision limiting the power of state governments to directly procure foreign aid or loans has been rigorously enforced. The new arrangement enhances the ability of the federal government to monitor external aid and borrowing.

Aid Management Process

Management has been defined by Koontz and O'Donnell as the creation and maintenance of an internal environment whereby individuals working together as a group can contribute effectively and efficiently toward

the attainment of set goals.[12] Management of foreign aid can therefore be defined as the process of raising funds externally and administering them under the guidance of a body of principles and within the framework of an organization and established practices.[13] It involves taking actions, getting things done and exploring possibilities to achieve foreign aid objectives and accomplish human purpose.[14]

The major aspects of the management of external aid are: aid needs assessment, negotiation, coordination, monitoring and impact assessment, as well as the development of critical skills for foreign aid management. The effectiveness of the management of external aid depends on how effectively these management tools are applied. In this section we carefully examine the current practice in Nigeria, its limitations, as well as ways for strengthening the management process.

Aid Needs Assessment

Aid needs assessment is the articulation of the aid requirements of an economy. Its primary purpose is to promote efficient allocation of foreign aid. The aid package that a donor seeks to sell is primarily targeted at satisfying the weighted sum of its objectives, while the recipient's objective is often secondary. Therefore, it is important for recipients to carefully assess their needs for foreign aid by type, sector, and modalities for disbursement as a basis for seeking the correct type of foreign aid that will satisfy their development objective. Unless this is done, recipients will be tempted to accept any type of foreign aid donors offer, regardless of whether or not it has potential for contributing to their socioeconomic development.

Currently in Nigeria, only a small proportion of the nation's aid requirements is thoroughly assessed prior to the initial contact with potential donors. Therefore, current aid needs assessments are haphazard, ad-hoc and largely uncoordinated. More often than not, potential donors sell the idea of available foreign aid to the widely scattered agencies, which then reexamine their projects with the aid in view, rather than within the context of well-articulated plans and programs. In some cases, agencies, ministries, and state governments first contact potential donors, package their projects, and then try to squeeze the projects into the budget.

An aid needs assessment is best articulated within a country's planning and budgeting framework.[15] A country's development plan should provide information on the local and foreign resource requirements for all sectors and every agency at all levels of government. The foreign exchange requirements should also be clearly indicated in assessing foreign aid needs. This procedure should be repeated for the annual budget, which is the financial counterpart of the annual plan. Therefore, once a project or program has been incorporated into a plan or budget, the implications for foreign assistance should be clear.

Articulation of aid needs is not an easy task in Nigeria. The problem is complicated by an acute shortage of foreign exchange, thereby exposing the country to the temptation to grab whatever comes its way in the form of foreign aid. This is generated by a desperate bid to fill domestic resource gaps. Lack of continuity in development planning also makes an aid needs assessment problematic. The life of Nigeria's Fourth National Development Plan ended in 1985, although it was extended to 1986. Since then, the country has relied mainly on annual budgets for project and program articulation and implementation. The annual budget, in the absence of a plan, is an inappropriate tool for aid needs assessment. Aid articulation within the context of the SAP is also inappropriate because of its short time span.

Nigeria has now embraced the philosophy of long-term planning (perspective planning) to be implemented within the framework of three-year rolling plans. The first rolling plan was prepared in 1989, and each sector, state, or implementing agency was required to indicate clearly the foreign aid component of all the projects that they wished to implement during the plan period. Such projects were to be submitted to the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB) for approval.

This new procedure for an aid needs assessment is a welcome departure from the past procedure, which was haphazard and uncoordinated. In the past, external aid was accepted for some projects without due consideration for a counterpart local funding, thus resulting in a high rate of project abandonment (uncompleted projects) all over the country. The new procedure will hopefully eliminate this waste of resources.

Aid Negotiation

Negotiation is a very important aspect of the overall process of managing foreign aid. Since it enters the management process at the preparatory stage of aid projects and programs, it could be an important determinant of benefits derivable from aid. The aim of negotiation is usually to reconcile conflicting interests in the project proposals and provide an avenue for streamlining both donor and recipient interests, with a view toward achieving mutually beneficial results. Issues such as the nature of aid, rate and schedule of disbursement of aid, terms of aid (incorporating the volume and structure, maturity, grace period, interest rate, and concessionary element of loans), amortization plan, schedule of debt service payments, future recurrent costs, foreign exchange implication of the project, as well as the degree of synchronization of projects into the overall national development program and economic framework (especially the issue of the provision of counterpart funding) must be clearly addressed at the negotiation stage.[16]

The present procedure in Nigeria starts with the preparation of a draft document for negotiation. Donor countries often supply the draft

showing the terms of the aid, while the implementing and supervisory agencies in Nigeria study the document and prepare Nigeria's own document for negotiation. Donors often insist on some conditions, including the use of foreign consultants to supervise the aid project. In preparing its own document therefore, the recipient country should clearly identify project and input needs as well as local consultants available for project supervision. The documents for both parties are exchanged and integrated into a single document, which forms the basis of further negotiation.

There are usually two aspects of negotiations—the loan and the technical assistance aspects. Various experts—including financial analysts, economists, lawyers, and technical experts—are assembled for the negotiation. The negotiation is often done on behalf of the federal government by the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (FMFED), which is the national coordinating body. If the federal project is to be implemented by a particular state, the implementing agency's representative is often included on the negotiation team. If it is a state government that is seeking the aid for its own projects, a federal government representative must be on the team. This is because, under the present arrangement, the federal government has to approve all aid projects and guarantee all external loans. The negotiation team must be structured so as to enable the recipient country to derive maximum benefits from the foreign aid.

Information is needed for a successful and meaningful negotiation. However, it is often difficult for recipient countries, including Nigeria, to put together information on the donor so as to be able to evaluate and anticipate the position of the donor on various critical issues brought up in the process of negotiation. Consequently, the donors are usually at a vantage position, since they are always able to compile enough information on the recipient countries. Adequate preparation for aid negotiation by the recipient country is therefore critical for a successful negotiation and for maximizing the benefits derivable from foreign aid. It goes without saying that comparative data on terms and conditions offered by various donors would prove very valuable at the negotiation stage.

Aid Coordination

Aid coordination is the art of bringing together the essential aspects of foreign aid into their proper places. Aid coordination tends to present a country as a single coherent unit to aid donors and is an avenue to resolving inter-sectoral and regional conflicts and competition and generally to ensure efficient aid management. Proper aid coordination thus removes institutional and administrative bottlenecks preventing external aid utilization.[17]

The present practice in Nigeria is that the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (FMFED) coordinates all external develop-

ment assistance to Nigeria. The Multilateral Institutions Department of the FMFED is in charge of all loans from multilateral organizations, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Department of External Finance and International Aid of the FMFED also has six divisions responsible for external development assistance, as follows:

- International Capital Market Division (for loans from ICM)
- African Multilateral Division (cater for loans from bilateral sources)
- Africa and Bilateral Division (cater for loans from bilateral sources)
- Debt Management Division (monitors external debt)
- The Economic Affairs Division (for multilateral aid)
- Development Aid Division (for bilateral aid)

Thus, two divisions—Economic Affairs and Development Aid—coordinate all foreign aid components of development assistance to Nigeria. All federal ministries and agencies forward their applications for external aid to the FMFED for processing and approval, while the state ministries and agencies forward theirs through the various state ministries of finance and economic development to the FMFED. However, it is the responsibility of the executing agencies—whether at the federal or state level—to develop their proposals for external aid and link up with the donor before contacting the FMFED. It is also the duty of the ministries at the federal and state levels to ensure that their aid projects are approved by the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB) for inclusion in the plan and in the annual budget where necessary, since the OPB approves the release of counterpart funds by FMFED during the implementation period of the aid projects. Except in the case where the FMFED approves the application and therefore sponsors the aid project, no donor will release any fund to an implementing agency even if the donor has approved the project for funding in principle.

In the case of a bilateral agreement involving Nigeria and another country, the FMFED and the Federal Ministry of External Affairs jointly coordinate and negotiate on behalf of the federal government. The relevant ministries and agencies are later contacted by the FMFED. Interministerial meetings are held to decide what each ministry could benefit from in the bilateral agreement and differences are ironed out preparatory to the joint commission of the two countries. The team representing Nigeria at the joint commission meeting is usually assembled by the Federal Ministry of External Affairs, while the legal division of the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture often draws up the agreement. The FMFED and/or the Federal Ministry of External Affairs often sign bilateral agreements on behalf of the federal government.

Until January 1989 the Economic Affairs and Development Aid

Divisions were in the then Federal Ministry of National Planning. But, due to the reorganization (in January 1989) of the civil service and the entire planning machinery, the Ministry of National Planning was reorganized. The two divisions responsible for aid coordination (External Affairs and Development Aid) were transferred to FMFED, while the Budget Division of the FMFED was merged with the planning unit to form the new Office of Planning and Budget (OPB). The new office was placed in the presidency. Further reorganization, which will transfer the two units responsible for aid coordination back to the OPB, is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of aid management within the context of national planning and budgeting (which are the areas of responsibility of the OPB). The formation of a semiautonomous unit (the National Aid Coordinating Agency) to be supervised by the OPB has also been suggested as an avenue for more effective aid management in Nigeria.[18]

Aid Monitoring

Effective monitoring of aid projects constitutes an important instrument for ensuring that aid projects are completed on schedule and within the budget. Effective monitoring also ensures that deviations from an approved plan of action are detected early and that remedial measures are taken to put the project back on course before it is too late.

Apart from its coordinating role, the FMFED is the monitoring agency for external aid. Also, the respective supervisory ministries, at both the federal and state levels, have their monitoring machinery. For example, the Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU) oversees and monitors all agricultural development programs (ADPs) in the country. Similarly, at the state level, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development provides the central monitoring machinery, while the planning divisions of the various ministries also monitor their projects. The Project Management Unit (PMU), where applicable, also submits a periodic progress report to the supervisory ministries.

In practice, however, a good deal of monitoring of aid projects is currently done at the initiation of the donors. These are done through three different methods—namely, questionnaire; physical inspection by the FMFED and the supervisory agency; and tripartite review missions involving the donor, the coordinating body (FMFED), and the supervisory agency. The tripartite review mission's report is usually quite detailed and often useful in detecting problems. However, since the reporting guidelines are usually designed by the donors, more often than not the reports serve their interests and may not reflect the objective of Nigeria, the recipient country.[19] It is therefore necessary that Nigeria should carry out independent monitoring and evaluation exercises outside those done jointly with the donors.

Aid Evaluation and Impact Assessment

Evaluation and impact assessments are normally undertaken at the completion of a project. Evaluation of development assistance is useful for both the donor and the recipient. While the recipient countries need to determine the contribution of foreign aid to their development objective, the donor countries are accountable to their citizens to justify the need for more aid. Evaluation is therefore a suitable management tool aimed at improving the quality of decisions and the effectiveness of aid programs and projects. Aid impact assessment is part of an evaluation task. A meaningful impact assessment requires construction of relevant indices to provide a clear picture of the effect of the project on overall economic growth, societal welfare, employment generation, income, and productivity.[20]

The practice in Nigeria is to prepare a mid-project evaluation report for some aid projects, especially the World Bank-assisted projects, and to file a project completion report based on formats designed by the donor agencies. Based on the extensive data collected by the Final Tripartite Mission, the project is evaluated to determine the extent to which the objectives of the aid have been met. As in the case of aid monitoring, evaluation is currently done at the insistence of the donors. Consequently, the evaluation report may not reflect the true picture on the ground. Impact assessment is currently not undertaken in Nigeria as part of the evaluation procedure. For a more effective evaluation of aid projects, Nigeria needs to carry out independent evaluation outside the joint evaluation with donors. There is also the need to develop the practice of assessing the impact of aid projects at all levels of government.

Development of Critical Skill in Aid Management

A key limitation to the successful management of aid projects is a shortage of executive capacity. In this respect, efforts are being made to strengthen Nigeria's technical human capital base in the area of aid management.

The National Center for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA) was established in May 1986 by the federal government as a training institution for public-sector managers. The center designs and implements training programs for planners, budget officers, and policy advisers at all three tiers of government. As a means of developing the analytical skills of public managers involved in aid management and to improve their performance, the center organized a national workshop on aid programming, coordination, and assessment techniques for senior public officers on grade level 15 and above from federal and state ministries and implementing agencies in August 1988. The workshop addressed

four major themes: basic principles of aid policy, aid programming and management, assessment of aid effectiveness, and aid coordination.[21]

In order to assess the utility and impact of policy recommendations generated by the 1988 National Workshop and to allow for a wider coverage of public-sector managers, the program was repeated in November 1989. It was modified and extended to cover a period of two weeks so as to effectively capture some more current issues related to the role of external development assistance in Nigeria's economic reform program.

The 1989 workshop focused on the management of external development assistance in Nigeria and covered six main themes:

- overview of aid flows to Nigeria
- basic principles of aid policy
- aid programming and management
- assessment of aid effectiveness
- aid coordination
- Nigeria's economic reforms, aid flows, and the vulnerable group[22]

Participants at the workshop were top government functionaries on salary grade level 14 and above who were responsible for the formulation, analysis, and implementation of development aid policy at the federal and state levels and other government agencies. The center planned to repeat the program in different forms periodically for other categories of public officers.

The World Bank-Assisted Agricultural Development Projects: Foreign Aid Case Study

Background

The agricultural development projects (ADPs) were first conceived and implemented in Nigeria as enclave projects. The enclave ADPs were started in several places—Gusau, Funtua, Gombe, Ekiti, Akoko, Bida, Ilorin, and Oyo North—in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The success of these enclave projects led to the ADP concept being adopted nationwide in 1988. It was observed that the areas covered by the ADPs were more productive than areas that were not covered. All twenty-one states of Nigeria are now involved in the ADPs. Each state government had to negotiate individually with the World Bank, and all ADPs were carefully studied before implementation.

Features of the ADPs

The ADPs are funded primarily by the World Bank, which contributes up to 80 percent of the total project fund. The state government con-

tributes 12.5 percent, while the federal government contributes 7.5 percent. The aid from the World Bank is in the form of a soft loan with an interest rate of 3–5 percent, a moratorium of ten years, and a repayment period of twenty years thereafter.

The ADPs do not participate in direct production. Rather, they provide the infrastructure (roads, water, tractors, herbicides, extension services, etc.) needed by farmers to improve their productivity. The philosophy of the World Bank-assisted ADPs is that the small-scale farmer (with a typical holding of about 2.5 acres in Nigeria) is the backbone of Nigerian agriculture. The essence of the project, therefore, is to encourage these small-scale farmers to enhance their performance and to make them more efficient. The performance of the ADPs is measured in terms of the contact period of extension agents with the local farmers and the impact on their productivity.

The aid is governed by an agreement signed by the World Bank and each state government. This agreement is broken into schedules stating the different aspects of the agreement. The schedules define the expected behavior of the World Bank, the donor, and the recipient state government. The loan is guaranteed by the federal government of Nigeria. Unlike some other donors, the World Bank strictly keeps to its own side of the agreement and insists that the recipient should also faithfully keep to its own side so that the project could be kept on course. Once the recipient stops performing, the World Bank stops the disbursement of the loan.

The World Bank attaches some stringent conditions to its aid to the ADPs. Some of these conditions are:

1. The local component of the budget (the counterpart fund) must be put in a separate account, and there should be a written undertaking by the recipient that the fund will not be affected by the vagaries of the budget. This is to protect the counterpart fund against arbitrary cuts and to ensure that it does not lapse like other budgetary provisions not spent within the budget year.
2. Only the local component, and not the World Bank loan, can be used for payment of salaries and other routine expenses.
3. Two crucial inputs, land clearing/development and fertilizer, were excluded by the World Bank from the budget of the current statewide ADPs in the agreement. The World Bank insisted that land clearing/development, which was a component of the enclave ADP budget, was not cost effective; and that since fertilizer was highly subsidized in Nigeria, the World Bank fund was not to be used for fertilizer purchase. These two critical inputs excluded in the current agreement may badly affect the performance of the statewide ADPs, and is not in the best interest of agricultural development in Nigeria.

4. At least 80 percent of all procurements are to be made from abroad, through a competitive bidding system that requires that purchases should be from the cheapest source. The World Bank makes direct payment to the input suppliers.

Institutional and Management Support

The World Bank works with the federal government, since the loan has to be guaranteed by it. In view of the fact that the project is action-oriented, an alternative management structure is usually created. It is the belief that the existing civil-service structure is not capable of serving the project's purpose. However, the new structure still has to be within the compass of the public sector. The new structure is subjected to the operating principles of the private sector to enhance its efficiency. This alternative structure had been called by various names—for example, project management unit (PMU) and monitoring and evaluation unit.

The management requirements include the recruitment of competent personnel. The enclave ADPs were managed largely by expatriate staff (especially the project manager and the financial controller) under the pretext that there were no qualified Nigerians capable of managing such a complex project. However, it is no longer politically acceptable in Nigeria for the project manager and the financial controller to be foreigners. The Nigerian staff of the project are normally drawn from the state ministry of agriculture. Since the project has a definite life span, those ministry staff move to the project as contract staff. However, they enjoy higher remuneration than their civil-service colleagues, have better equipment to work with, and operate along private-sector lines.

Other aspects of the institutional and management support of the ADPs are:

- Solid data base: ADPs tend to operate a reliable information system.
- Institutional development: Institutional facilities exist to package and implement the aid project.
- Institutional continuity: The Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU) and the Ministry of Agriculture provide the guarantee that the system would continue should foreign support lapse.
- Facilities for training and retraining exist.
- Agro-processing and storage facilities are also available.
- There is a clearly defined legal instrument, usually in the form of an agreement, with well-explained schedules.

This institutional and management support for the ADPs is largely responsible for the success of the projects.

Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation

The FACU oversees and monitors all the ADPs in the country. At the state level, the Ministry of Agriculture supervises and monitors the activities of the ADPs in each state. The ADPs are also closely monitored by the World Bank.

Evaluation is done at two stages: during the project stage as part of project monitoring, and at the end of the project. It is mandatory for the project management team to produce a completion report at the end of the project. This report gives the history of the project, its achievements and problems. The World Bank also frequently sends experts to monitor the project. At the end of the project, the World Bank sends a team to write the final evaluation report, which goes to the board of the World Bank for consideration.

Problems

One major problem with the World Bank-assisted ADPs and almost all aid projects in Nigeria is that of sustainability. The final completion report of the World Bank always draws out this lesson. When the enclave ADPs ended and the statewide ADPs did not commence immediately (for example, the Funtua enclave ADP in Kaduna State), the problem of sustainability emerged in two forms:

1. How to continue with the project at the same level of support and performance in the absence of aid.
2. What to do with the contract staff.

With regard to the first problem, for example, the roads were handed over to local government councils that did not have the capacity to maintain them properly. As for the staff, problems arose regarding how to reintegrate them into the ministry after they had been used to higher pay and better conditions of service. Ultimately, some of them were reabsorbed, while the others lost their jobs. As for the expatriate staff, they left at the end of the project.

However, in every project assisted by the World Bank, there is a built-in consultancy element that is to assist in identifying further projects. Thus, in Nigeria, with the end of the enclave ADPs, the idea of the statewide ADPs emerged and is again being supported nationwide by the World Bank. The local staff then continued working for the statewide ADPs.

A general problem now created by the statewide ADPs is how to justify the retention of an organization parallel with the state Ministry of Agriculture. It must also be mentioned that the non-inclusion of land

clearing/development and fertilizer in the project budget of the statewide ADPs means that each state government has to make separate provisions for these critical inputs; otherwise, the productivity target in the aid package may not be achieved. Unfortunately, given the present economic situation, the state governments hardly have the resources to earmark anything significant for these critical inputs.

For example, the Kwara State of Nigeria could only purchase about one-third of its fertilizer allocation for 1989 due to resource constraint. The subsidy on fertilizer is very substantial in Nigeria. The government buys it at the rate of N120 per ton, spends N6–N10 to transport it, and sells it to the farmers at a heavily subsidized rate of N15 per ton. Since the fertilizer cost is not part of the project budget, it also means that the huge subsidy is not part of the state's contribution to the project budget.

Conclusion

This chapter focuses on important issues in the management of foreign aid in Nigeria. These issues are: aid needs assessment, negotiation, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment, as well as critical skill development. The World Bank-assisted ADPs in Nigeria were used as a case study to illustrate some of these aspects of management. Following are conclusions and recommendations.

1. Foreign-assisted projects are not cost free; they all have strings attached. In order to maximize the benefits derivable from foreign aid, the country has to articulate its own interest and manage the situation properly from the stage of negotiation to that of final evaluation.
2. All externally assisted projects must be watched carefully because some of the clauses in the agreements are designed not for the benefit of the recipient countries but to protect the interest of the donors. Therefore, good management requires that the recipient should give careful attention to the terms and conditions of aid as well as to the strategies and tactics of the donors.
3. Comprehensive and up-to-date information and competent personnel are essential for successful negotiation of favorable aid terms; the recipients should therefore strive to build these two important types of capacity.
4. More often than not, the reporting system in monitoring and evaluation is designed to satisfy the interest of the donor; as such, the report may have little bearing to what exists on the ground. To cross check the facts in evaluation reports, the recipients should endeavor to carry out independent monitoring and evaluation.
5. Many recipient countries, including Nigeria, have no well-defined

foreign aid policy to guide decisions on aid management. Such a policy is crucial to ensure that the recipients derive maximum benefits from foreign aid.

6. The sustainability of aid projects at the end of the project life cycle, when aid is no longer forthcoming, constitutes a serious problem. Unless means are devised to ensure the sustainability of an aid project after the end of each project, resources committed to the project may turn out to be a waste. It is therefore necessary to ensure that sophisticated management practices and incentive schemes that can not be sustained after the life of the project are avoided right from the inception stage.

Endnotes

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17. NCEMA, p. 57.

18. NCEMA, pp. 62–64.

19. NCEMA, p. 59.

20. NCEMA, p. 34.

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7

An Approach to Aid Coordination in Zambia

G. J. CHIVUNGA

This chapter seeks to discuss the concept of self-reliance in the context of Zambia's economic development and to highlight the recent government policies in development cooperation as outlined in the Fourth National Development Plan, which was launched by the former president K. D. Kaunda, on 1 January 1989.

The concept of self-reliance in economic development has long been recognized as an important concept by Zambia's policymakers and planners since independence was achieved in 1964. However, due to the nature of the Zambian economy, which has been highly dependent on one commodity—copper—for its export earnings, and due to various negative external factors (such as the oil crisis in the 1970s and 1980s and the fall in copper prices), the Zambian economy has been vulnerable to external pressures. As a result, Zambia's policymakers found it necessary to seek foreign assistance in the form of short-term and long-term loans at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.

In order to check Zambia's increasing dependence on foreign assistance, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and its government set up a number of institutions to be responsible for formulating and implementing development aid policy; these institutions have varied over the years. The responsibilities for policy formulation and implementation were shared between two wings of the Ministry of Finance and the National Commission for Development Planning. Some aspects of development aid policies were also handled by such ministries as Foreign Affairs and Legal Affairs and other sector ministries as well as the Bank of Zambia.

The other problems faced in the actual formulation and implementation of foreign aid policy in Zambia are as follows:

1. proliferation of the coordination mechanisms and the nonexistence of strong linkages within the government and between the government, on the one hand, and donor agencies on the other;
2. lack of a well developed, coherent, and systematic set of procedures and criteria for monitoring and disbursing external aid resources;
3. multiplicity of donor procedures and conditionality requirements;
4. lack of comprehensive mechanisms for planning, monitoring, and evaluating foreign aid inflows and debt management.

It is against this background that policy guidelines on development assistance in Zambia were formulated in the Fourth National Development Plan with the theme of "Growth from Own Resources," which emphasize the importance of self-reliance in economic development. The following are the objectives and strategies to be pursued under the Fourth National Development Plan (1989–93):

1. channeling all external resource inflows to projects and programs contained in the National Development Plan, taking into account the priorities specified in the plan;
2. shifting external resources to projects and programs that would enhance the country's capacity to produce more goods and services using local raw materials and skills;
3. restricting international, commercial, and short-term borrowing and limiting borrowing on non-concessional terms.

In order to attain these objectives, the following strategies were to be adopted:

1. The Fourth National Development Plan would be the only authoritative source for defining the priorities for external resource mobilization. This would be achieved by making the National Commission for Development Planning the sole body responsible for external resource mobilization.
2. Developing a coherent approach to relations with cooperating partners, with an emphasis on multiyear, joint programming of resource inflows.
3. Deliberately directing resource inflows to productive ventures as opposed to projects that only enhanced domestic consumption.
4. Effective monitoring and periodic review of all externally funded projects and programs.
5. Periodic reporting on disbursement trends, and on project and program performance during each year.
6. Expanding the capacity to mobilize external resources on concessional terms.

As a crucial facet of the strategies for external resource mobilization outlined above, the criteria for the ranking and selection of externally funded projects were expected to be supported by the following principles:

1. Projects and programs that came onstream (mature) within a five-year period would receive priority for funding and implementation so that they could enhance the capacity for economic recovery.
2. Resource inflows imposing policy reforms that were outside the policy framework of the New Economic Recovery Program would not be accommodated.
3. Agreements on external resources with a strong leverage of cross-conditionality would be avoided as much as possible.
4. Local personnel, consultants, and contractors would be put to optimum use when implementing externally funded projects and programs.

As can be noted from the preceding paragraphs, the emphasis was on "growth from own resources," which is basically the concept of self-reliance in development. This concept was deemed so important that former president Kaunda consistently reminded Zambians about its goals and challenges. At the Party Provincial Conference of the North-Western Province on 23 May 1989, he declared:

> The Interim National Development Plan and the current Fourth National Development Plan which has succeeded it have shifted the philosophy and the material basis of economic activity from looking to the resources of other countries and other people to looking to our own resources and our own Zambian people for our own economic resources. We must "grow from our own resources and Zambian people."

The former president went on to explain what "growth from own resources" meant. According to him:

> Growing from our own resources means self-reliance. Self-reliance as individuals, self-reliance as families, self-reliance as communities, self-reliance as towns and as cities, self-reliance as districts, self-reliance as province and self-reliance as a proud Zambian nation. At all these levels we must survive from our own resources and direct efforts. . . .

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to provide a brief introduction to the new initiatives in development assistance policy in the context of Zambia's Fourth National Development Plan. The plan stresses the need for

"Growth from Own Resources" and incorporates bold strategies aimed at promoting self-reliance and lessening Zambia's dependence on external aid. Depending upon how the various institutions perform their designated roles, Zambia stands to gain from a policy strategy that places a high premium on indigenous efforts and resources. This poses a serious challenge to the National Commission for Development Planning, which should not only critically scrutinize applications for, or offers of, foreign aid but must also actively promote the optimum utilization of local resources.

8

Foreign Aid and Local Capacity

The Tanzania Water Project as a Case Study

GELASE MUTAHABA

It has been said that aid is developmental only if it lays the foundation for its future rejection—that is, if it can be used in a manner that promises eventual self-reliance.[1] Both donors and aid recipients subscribe (at least in theory) to this view, as none of them would publicly support an aid relationship that nurtures perpetual dependency. The reality is different, however. There are, on the one hand, donors who will give aid only to enhance their self-interest, while others give aid for altruistic purposes—in the belief that the recipient needs help. The two may be said to constitute opposite positions on the same spectrum: with one extreme end representing donors that give aid purely for the purpose of enhancing their self-interest, and on the other, donors giving aid purely on philanthropic grounds. Most donors however would range around the center of the continuum. Where aid is used to enhance self-interest and hence strengthen the dependency relationship between the donor and the recipient, the tendency is to give the aid in a manner that makes the recipient more dependent in the future. Such aid is not meant to make the recipient self-reliant, therefore, there is no attempt to build the recipient's creative, productive, and absorptive capacity. Where aid is given for altruistic reasons, it tends to be given in a manner that supports the building and development of the recipient's capacity in such a way that in the future, the recipient country would be able to stand on its own.

A review of the aid situation increasingly shows that irrespective of whether the donor is motivated by altruism or self-interest in aid administration, the end result has generally tended to reinforce the dependency relationship rather than enhance the recipient country's self-reliance. The tendency toward being dependency-oriented is reflected both in the

form that the aid has assumed and in the methods used in the flow of aid. Moreover, these tendencies have been taking place against a clear awareness, on the part of the donor community, of the dangers inherent in the types of aid that reinforce dependency. Besides, even donors whose overt position with regard to aid is altruistic may be equally culpable.[2]

In this chapter our interest is to review the factors that have made even the most altruistic donors opt for forms of, and approaches to, aid that tend to negate their lofty objectives on the promotion of self-reliance. We shall review the experience of one donor with regard to Tanzania's rural water supply sector. In the review, we will look at the donor's aid perspectives over time. We will also look at the nature and character of the recipient's environment; how the environment has shaped the donor's approaches to aid administration; and the consequential effectiveness of aid, especially in terms of building the recipient's capacity.

The Context: Congruency of Donor and Recipient Positions

Tanzania's perspective on aid is well-known: it fits in well with the dictum we started with at the beginning of the chapter: that aid is only developmental if it can be used in a manner that promises eventual self-reliance. It has been suggested in some circles that this stance is more rhetoric than action; that Tanzania has, in spite of this stance, received enormous amounts of foreign aid; and that it can rightly be described as "aid-dependent." Without becoming involved in the dispute regarding the amount of aid Tanzania has received, we might suggest that much of the argument about Tanzania's aid dependency is misplaced and irrelevant because the issue is not whether a country receives huge volumes of aid, but rather whether the aid so received helps to increase its potential and possibilities for self-reliance.

It would make sense if the criticism of Tanzania's performance as an aid recipient were focused on the later point. A few studies are now taking that direction, arguing that much of this foreign aid has not helped Tanzania to enhance its self-reliance but has instead made it acquire a number of developmental artifacts that are often disjointed. In order to be sustained, externally assisted projects invariably require continued reliance on foreign aid. Why is this so? To put it in plain language, some donor institutions' approaches to aid are not geared toward "weaning off" the recipients or allowing them to move toward maturity.

A caveat is in order. While this may be true of many donors, there are some donors whose aid policies over the last decade have not shifted so significantly away from altruism. By and large, however, when it came

to aiding the water sector in Tanzania, the same altruistic donors also began to adopt direct interventionist approaches. There must be factors other than donor policies and perspectives influencing the donors to adopt direct interventionist strategies in such cases. An important factor that has influenced donors to adopt interventionist strategies is the character of the recipient's aid environment. Singled out among the constituents of the recipients' environment are the recipients' institutional and managerial capabilities. In the case of the rural water program, local capacity was initially far from adequate. In terms of the requisite professional human resources, institutional backup, and financial support, Tanzania was hardly in a position to handle the volume and types of aid that were coming to the sector. In those circumstances, donors had either to reduce the level and volume of aid and, therefore, the pace of the rural water program, or to handle the job directly. In most cases, they chose to do the latter.

While the foregoing explanation seems plausible and the cases to be reviewed might demonstrate it, it does not fully explain why some donors seem reluctant to switch to approaches that are less interventionist, even when the environmental conditions have changed and the recipient's capacity has improved significantly. We are arguing that it is in the nature of bilateral aid to lean toward approaches that will give the donor some say and control over the direction and pace of programs and projects. This donor control is facilitated by a malleable recipient organization or by an environment that can be circumvented by the donor altogether. Donors also do not hesitate to intervene where the recipient's environment is unpredictable, as was the case with Tanzania in relation to the rural water supply program. While both the donor's perspectives and policies and the character of the recipient's environment played a part in influencing the adoption, by the donors, of the direct interventionist strategy, a focus on only one of the two variables is not enough. We should examine how the interplay of the two variables conditioned the emerging aid approaches. In the section that follows we shall attempt to provide an overview of the context in which the donors provided their aid. We shall broadly outline the shifts in the donor perspectives that took place in the late 1970s and provide a broad overview of the recipient's environment.

Changes in Donor Policies and the Recipient's Environment

As mentioned briefly above, two broad variables were to influence the approaches adopted by the Swedish donors in providing assistance to the rural water program. On the one hand, it was donor perspectives and policies, and on the other, it was the various elements constituting the recipient's environment.

With regard to the former—donor perspectives and policies—it is worth noting that Sweden, through the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), was initially altruistic and tended to give aid mainly to enhance the interests of the recipients. They were thus prepared to give program aid that would best facilitate this aim. Thus Sweden, which was the first to enter the Tanzanian rural water scene, concentrated its aid on enhancing the capacity of the main recipient organization, the Ministry of Water Development. Funds were made available to train engineers, technicians, and artisans in Tanzania and abroad. Vehicles and drilling equipment were made available to the ministry. Swedish operating personnel (engineers, hydrologists, and technicians) were recruited to fill substantive positions in the ministry, often working alongside local personnel.

By the late 1970s, however, as the world recession set in, almost all donor countries involved in the rural water sector were progressively switching to project aid as opposed to program aid. It has been documented that even countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—which are generally altruistic and highly recipient-oriented in their aid policies—came to adopt stances that smacked of self-interest as a result of the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Olav Stockke has shown that Norway and Denmark, for example, passed legislation in the late 1970s intended to ensure that overseas development assistance, especially when given in the form of grants, had a high return flow. The return flow of overall Norwegian overseas development assistance, for example, increased from 40 percent in 1978 to 58 percent by 1982.[3]

This high-return flow was to be ensured by aid agency administrators through the use of forms of aid that would ensure high rates of return, with technical assistance topping the list, commodities and import-support following, and cash disbursements being the least popular form. It is against this type of thrust in donor perspectives that we witness shifts in approaches and methods in Tanzania's rural water supply program. It is no wonder, therefore, that the donors adopted approaches that were interventionist, since such approaches fitted in well with the emerging perspectives in development assistance.

Donor policies by themselves, however, might not have been enough to induce the adoption, by the donors, of interventionist approaches, since it was generally acknowledged that such approaches tended to constrain the overall effectiveness of aid. There were other factors that also played a part, and most significantly, it was the nature and character of the recipient's environment, especially the low level of institutional and organizational capacity. As the government adopted the 1991 target date, it was clear that the structure, organization, staffing levels, type, and number of the equipment available to Tanzania would be totally inadequate. Measures still had to be taken to streamline the organizational structure to provide in turn for greater supervision and coordination, develop and increase the numbers and skill levels of the personnel

available, and acquire a wider variety of highly sophisticated equipment.

With regard to the structural and institutional dimension, a Ministry of Water was to be created with the authority and responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the program and ensuring that the 1991 deadline was met. No sooner had the ministry been created than the government pulled the rug from under the ministry's feet and created Regional Development Directorates with overall authority and responsibility for integrated cross-sectoral development, including rural water development. The Ministry of Water, like the Ministries of Works and Education, could only advise these area authorities and provide them with professional backup services. In light of the new institutional setup, donors were asked to concentrate on a region or a group of regions, and they found themselves dealing with the regional development authorities rather than the Ministry of Water. If the Ministry of Water had a low absorptive and executive capacity, the regions had a capacity that was even lower. Therefore, asking them to handle and administer donor resources was tantamount to giving the donor a free hand. As the case study will demonstrate, the regions did not have the human resources to undertake projects even if the donor had provided finances and equipment; neither did the regions have the human resources to supervise the donor if the donor had chosen to do the job directly. The situation was so desperate that often they did not have the human resources to work with donor personnel as counterparts. The low organizational and technological capacity gave the donor a free hand, or indeed, dictated that the donor act independently if donor resources were to be optimally utilized. Furthermore, the recipient's environment became even more turbulent as the world economic recession started hitting small countries such as Tanzania and made it difficult for them to acquire inputs such as oil products, machinery, and the funds required to finance local components of foreign-assisted projects.

Swedish Aid Case Study

Sweden is a pioneer donor in Tanzania's rural water supply program, having commenced in 1965—long before the big push of 1971. A total of SK120 million worth of technical and financial assistance was provided during the initial period. Much of this assistance went into financing a number of activities on a nationwide basis—water schemes personnel training, the supply of equipment and vehicles, and a host of other items. Reviews of this earlier period indicate that the value of the aid was well realized; that its impact was substantial; and that generally, the aid was utilized effectively.[4] Both the Ministry of Water as well as the donors agreed that performance during that time was satisfactory despite some noise in the Swedish media in 1978 about the Tanzania water scandal.

Since the mid-1970s, however, Swedish aid disbursed in the water sector has not received the usual acclaim. Both donors and recipients currently feel unhappy about the way Swedish aid to the sector has been administered over the last few years. The ministry has voiced its disquiet in recent consultations with the donors. At a recent meeting in Arusha, it criticized the donors directly, with Sweden receiving much of the criticism.[5] What happened over a period of ten years to cause this turn of events?

In the foregoing paragraphs, we noted a number of explanations for the emergence of this situation. The most popular explanation is that the situation emerged from a shift in donor policies with effect from the late 1970s. It is suggested that foreign donors, Sweden not exempted, have increasingly become self-centered in their aid policies. In other words, they are becoming less altruistic.[6] Altruism has given way mainly because of the world recession, which resulted in declining exports, increasing unemployment, and balance-of-payments problems. In those circumstances, donors adopted aid policies which would at least not compound their own economic problems. Hence, their support for types of aid that ensured greater return flows.[7]

As noted earlier, the recession of the 1980s provided only a partial explanation for the change in donor policies. Certainly, developments within the recipient's environment also influenced the approaches chosen by the donor. The question is, which of these two factors better explained Sweden's choice of approach in Tanzania?

The Early Period, 1965–74

Sweden's initial involvement in Tanzania consisted of the provision to the Department of Water Development of inputs required for the development, operation, and maintenance of the rural water supply program. The Swedish engineers and technicians were attached to the respective units and organs of the department, often doing consultative and operational work but always working under the authority of the Ministry of Water officials. The same was true of equipment and materials supplied: they were stocked and allocated on the authority of the department, although on occasion some items were earmarked for particular programs and projects.

The rural water supply system was managed by the regional water engineer (RWE), often with the help of the district water engineer (DWE), a position which until the mid-1970s was often occupied by a technician. These officials were responsible for the design and construction of water projects in their areas with funds made available by the Department of Water Development and under the supervision of same. Swedish funds and Swedish technical assistance were deployed in the same manner.

Records show that during the period up to 1971, over twenty Swedish engineers worked with the department at the headquarters (design section)

and in the regions.[8] Indeed, a number of regions had Swedish technical assistance personnel as regional water engineers, and they regularly filed reports to the headquarters of the Department of Water Development.

This situation was sustained by two factors. Firstly, donor policies on aid were clearly recipient oriented. There was little attempt by Sweden to control the process of resource allocation, and aid was meant to enhance local capacity to take professional and managerial decisions. This is supported by reviews of Swedish aid policies during the period. Secondly, the organizational arrangements for the management of the rural water supply development program placed full responsibility on the Water Development Department, the government having effectively phased out the District Councils from the sector. It should be recalled that in 1968, the government transferred financial responsibility from the councils to the central government and abolished user charges. Since the regional and district water authorities were answerable to the department's headquarters with respect to financial, administrative, and professional matters, this made the latter the de facto authority in the water sector. Donor resources, even when channeled to the regions, were allocated as part of the overall national water program.

The adoption in 1971 of the Water for All Program did not initially change the character of Sweden's involvement, although its role was expected to be more substantial than before. There was at first little or no change in its aid policies and in the administrative arrangements. The creation of the Ministry of Water Development was to strengthen the authority and expand the coordinating role of the center. Responsibility for design was to be centralized within the design and planning division of the newly created ministry. Despite the fact that Swedish aid was now to be increased and to go into almost all activities in the rural water program—including project planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance—its involvement remained nominal, merely dovetailing into the policies and organizational apparatus specified by the Ministry of Water Development. Much of the new aid went into the training of local experts, which was to be attained through the creation of a Water Resources Training Institute, with a target of training around 100 water technicians (hydrologists) a year.

Sweden provided funds for the construction of the buildings for the institute, but the execution of the project was supervised by the ministry. Sweden was also to provide the institute with initial trainers. Funds were provided for the training of Tanzanian engineers in India, with approximately 150 in the first group. The choice of India as a venue for the training of engineers (with Swedish funding) is particularly significant. It was based on the need to derive optimum advantage from the aid. It was believed that an Indian university would have great potential for effective training. The plan circumvented the language problem that training in Sweden would have created. Above all, it was cheaper. For the same

amount of money, more engineers could be trained than would have been possible if the training had taken place in Sweden. The measure, therefore, goes further to demonstrate the extent to which Swedish aid was calculated to bring maximum return to the recipient rather than to the donor at that time.

The Shift to Direct Administration of Aid

We noted earlier that decentralization led to the transfer of responsibility for the management of rural development activities, including water development, from the central ministries to integrated regional authorities. The implication of this move for donor efforts, including Sweden, was that when it came to aid that was project-oriented, as opposed to program support, donors had to deal with regional authorities.

Moreover, as more donors entered the rural water scene, the Ministry of Water became worried about the possible impact of scattered donor involvement and urged them to concentrate on particular regions.[9] This went further to strengthen the relationship between the regions and the donors and, in turn, to distance the ministry headquarters from the area and process of aid administration.

The regions, however, were ill-prepared to deal with the donors, including Sweden. They did not have the capacity to absorb and supervise the amount of aid a donor such as Sweden was willing to provide.[10] Thus, in the late 1970s, the Regional Water Office in Mwanza was staffed by only two executive engineers, one of whom had only two years of professional experience. That was definitely not the type of capacity needed to supervise the utilization of millions of Swedish kroner coming into the region. The office was even worse off when it came to the possession of requisite infrastructure—including equipment, materials, and vehicles. In circumstances such as these, the linking of donor involvement to the region and regional authorities had the implication of freeing the donor from any local (recipient) supervision and control, since the appointed recipient could not do the job even if it wanted to.

Therefore, Sweden was left to go it alone. The story of Sweden's involvement in the lake regions is one of active involvement of a number of consultancy firms, interrupted only by the occasional involvement of regional political authorities, as well as regional water authorities in the process of project review. In the pages that follow, we shall describe how this situation came about, how it manifests itself, and its consequences on the efficiency and effectiveness of the donor involvement.

Water Master Planning Exercise

Having chosen to concentrate on the lake regions, Sweden started with the preparation of water master plans for the three regions, using a con-

sultancy firm called Bro-Consult, a Swedish branch of an American-owned company. The work was carried on from 1975 to 1977. Sixteen expatriates from nine different professions participated during various periods of the master plan preparation. The team operated from Mwanza, independently of the authorities in the three regions. The consultants did not involve the Ministry of Water headquarters either, other than through the occasional attachment of local counterparts (five of them), at various stages of the projects; these were, in any case, inconsequential to the major thrusts of the exercise.[11]

Essentially, the water master plans were written by the consultants, who were only interested in the production of a professional document. And true to form, the water master plans were well-prepared and ready in record time. However, since the regional authorities had not been involved and since the national authorities were only marginally involved, little or no transfer of technology took place. No local professionals were involved to acquire skills for replicating the exercise in the future. The net effect of these two factors was that the water master plans prepared were not worth the paper they were written on. They were mainly good for filing or, more appropriately, to fill empty wastepaper baskets. No implementation was ever made on the basis of the plans prepared. Instead, another Swedish consulting firm (VIAK) was called in to prepare an implementation plan for the three regions. The work was carried out in 1980 and 1981, resulting in a program that emphasized the construction of shallow wells, user participation, and improved management capacity. VIAK was replaced by another consulting firm called HIFAB. HIFAB was the first firm to implement seriously the water master plan, first thought out in 1975.

Implementation

We have observed that even after the Swedish consultants, Bro-Consult, had completed the water master planning exercise, it took another two years and the involvement of two other consulting firms before the construction of water schemes could begin. During the intervening period, the consultants were supposed to work out an implementation plan and strategy. The period also coincided with the serious soul-searching that was going on in Sweden concerning what had happened to its assistance to the Tanzania water sector over the previous decade. The Swedish public was worried about the effectiveness of the aid to the water sector. Public disquiet was fuelled by stories in the Swedish media about water projects that were constructed with SIDA funds but which for some ludicrous reasons could not be put to any use at all.

It is against such a background that in 1978 and 1979 SIDA took far-reaching decisions regarding the approaches to adopt in aiding the rural water sector. In any case, the decision on strategy had to wait until 1981,

by which time the dust from the SIDA Tanzania water scandal (exposed by the Swedish press in 1978) would have settled. It is this situation that explains the considerable amount of time and resources that were spent by SIDA on implementation planning. SIDA was not sure whether to channel the aid resources through the recipient organization, the Ministry of Water and the regional water engineer (which its recipient-focused aid policy would have entailed), or whether to show a greater interest in the way aid was used by the recipients. SIDA chose the latter.

Sweden decided to be actively involved in the implementation of the projects in its areas of concentration. Aid funds were channelled through HIFAB, the Swedish consulting firm, leaving the ministry and the regional water engineer in the cold. SIDA-funded projects were programmed, designed, and constructed by HIFAB. The consultants operated from their own premises and involved the regional water engineer only indirectly through the provision of occasional technical and artisan personnel to the projects. In fact, the secondment of personnel to the Implementation Unit did not give the regional water engineer any leverage over the consultants, since for all practical purposes, such personnel never regarded themselves as *Maji* personnel. (*Maji* is the Kiswahili word for water and is used by the local people to refer to the department responsible for water resources in Tanzania.) Their loyalty tended to be to the donor-managed Implementation Unit. This view was confirmed by the majority of the operatives we interviewed, who no longer regarded themselves as *Maji* workers and might not return to *Maji* when the consultants had completed their assignment. In effect, the *Maji* personnel, who were meant to be the recipient's link to the donors, had defected permanently to the donor-appointed consultants.

It is true of course that direct management by the donor through the use of consultants might have facilitated faster project construction by reducing much of the delay caused by shortage of materials and other administrative bottlenecks in the recipient's purchasing systems. This benefit, however, was attained at great cost to the other objectives of giving the aid in the first place. It was definitely inimical to skill and technology transfer and to the institutionalization of recipient participation. As the consultants' major interest lay in timely completion of the projects, they tended to be less interested in the finer aspects of aid administration, such as the transfer of technology or skills. During the 1982–83 period, there were no local counterparts attached to the donor/consultant engineers and senior technicians. The only local skilled personnel who worked with the projects were the artisans. It is possible and indeed, highly probable that the recipients did not provide local counterparts because there were none to spare. However, there is no evidence that the HIFAB consultants were anxious to be provided with any understudy.

For the reasons already noted, the use of consultants in project implementation would tend to inhibit user participation in project implemen-

tation, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Indeed, the water master plan, partly because it had been prepared by the consultants, Bro-Consult, with a turnkey orientation to project implementation, had suggested that "village labor contribution may be more trouble than they are worth," and they thus recommended against the idea of village-employed pump attendants in project operations and maintenance.[12] Even if the consultants were not averse to user participation in implementation, the grafting of the consultant's (HIFAB) activities onto the existing rural water supply management system, rather than fully integrating the local users into the implementation mechanism, meant that it would be difficult for the consultants to take advantage of the limited participatory mechanisms that existed.

Until recently, there was little attempt to activate and incorporate, at the construction stage, the idea of user participation in many of the schemes. In Mwanza, of the twenty-five water schemes that were constructed in the region by the HIFAB Implementation Unit in 1982–83, only five could show any serious user participation during the process of construction.[13] This is not to suggest that projects or schemes that were managed by the regional water engineer or *Maji* had better luck in this respect.

More recently, SIDA has attempted to encourage user involvement even more significantly. If the past offers any lesson, the potential benefits will be constrained by two factors: the donor's plan to operate outside the country's organizational framework, and its decision to leave work to consultants to coordinate. In principle, there is a strong emphasis on participation in the program, called HESAWA. It also incorporates water improvements, health education, and sanitation activities. It has not been in place for long, and evaluation might be premature. However, after talking to *Maji* people and significant population groups in Mwanza, one is left with the impression that people know more about the name HESAWA rather than the substance. Even among those directly involved, they are conscious of a change in program emphasis (for example, to incorporate health and sanitation) rather than of the issue of participation.[14]

The *Maji* people, whether at headquarters or in the regions, are totally against the HESAWA program, not so much because of the emphasis on user participation but because of the broader conception of the problem to be solved by aid. To include health and sanitation might marginalize *Maji* and put it on a par with health and community development.[15]

Talking to the HIFAB consultants, including those in charge of community activation, one gets a similar impression: that they conceive of the project change as entailing a change in program content rather than in program methods. The community development consultant thought her job was to push recognition of the importance of sanitation and the centrality of sanitation rather than the activation and institutionalization

of participation by the community in project selection, construction, operation, and maintenance. As the consultant said,

> At the end of the day, it is how many improved latrines I have pushed to build and how many improved water sources have been constructed, rather than whether people were a party to their construction. . . . We must push process but never at the expense of the goal, which is to increase the number of better latrines and better water points.[16]

What emerges from the foregoing is that Sweden's approach to the implementation of water schemes (construction) has developed into one of doing the job directly with as little recipient involvement as possible. The adoption of this strategy is mainly because of changes in the Swedish aid policy stimulated by the low capacity of the recipient to absorb and utilize the aid. The SIDA "water scandal" was a major factor in the adoption of the strategy by Sweden.

The implication of the foregoing, as well as the views expressed earlier by the recipients, is that the donor has, through the consultant, become actively involved in the implementation process of rural water supply. This situation persisted even as the donor experimented with a new type of user participation program, called HESAWA.

Operations and Maintenance

Even during the earlier period of Sweden's involvement, operations and maintenance activities were never considered to be part of SIDA's responsibilities. Up to 1972, Sweden's position could be maintained with little or no adverse impact on projects it had previously supported, at least theoretically, since operations and maintenance were the responsibility of the Ministry of Water (which was also responsible for decisions on the nature and character of projects to be funded by donors, including the issue of design, technology, and others). Donors, including Sweden, simply provided resources that were used by the ministry in the manner it thought fit.

With the direct involvement of SIDA in project implementation, a wedge was driven between design and construction activities on the one hand, and operations and maintenance activities on the other. The donor expected the recipient institution to take on operations and maintenance activities arising out of the aid provided. Invariably, many projects tended to have designs and technologies that could not be easily operated and maintained by the recipient organizations. They posed standardization problems, were often too expensive, and might demand skills or knowledge that did not exist at adequate levels within the recipient organizations.

The HESAWA program described above has been adopted by Sweden to deal with this problem. It assumes the use of a technology that is not

only relatively simple to install but more importantly, simple to operate and maintain. Rather than go for diesel-operated schemes, which entail the heavy costs of buying diesel fuel and maintaining the engines, recourse was made to the construction of shallow wells and the use of hand pumps. The latter were not expensive to operate, and their maintenance did not demand sophisticated skills. As such, villagers could operate them. But the program had another element—the scheme was supposed to be handed over to, and operated by, the users, who were to form themselves into a user association, work out ways of raising resources needed for operating and maintaining the schemes, and do all that was necessary to ensure that the scheme was successful. The intention, therefore, was to build up capacity not within the apex recipient organization, *Maji* (which was dubbed by the donor as "bureaucratic"), but within, and among, the real beneficiaries of the scheme—the villagers.

While encouraging the participation of the real beneficiaries might be commendable in theory, one consequence of this development—the marginalization of the regional water establishment and the engendering of ill feelings between the Department of Water Development on the one hand, and Community Development Department and the villagers on the other—might also be inimical to effective institutionalization of a community-managed water scheme.

Conclusion

The case presented in this chapter highlights at least four important issues with regard to Swedish aid in Tanzania's rural water supply sector. First, it shows a shift in Swedish aid policies and perspectives that, starting in the late 1970s, became increasingly self-centered and interventionist. Second, two factors that have largely contributed to the shift in the donor's perspective are the recipient's environment (including low institutional and skill capacity) and a turbulent economic and organizational environment. Third (and as a consequence of the first two issues) is the increasing dominance of the donor in decision making at various stages of project development and implementation, resulting in the fourth aspect: that of failure to achieve the basic objective of building local capacity through transfer of technology, as the local people have continually been bypassed by the donor in the administration of aid projects.

On the whole, Sweden has been consistently altruistic in orientation. Even during the recession of the 1980s, it became only mildly self-centered. Due to the recipient's environment, though, Sweden found itself with little choice but the direct interventionist approach—if at all, the project was to be implemented.

Once the interventionist approach had been adopted and the donor's expatriate consultants were in place, the interventionist approach was found to be administratively convenient. The consultants were not interested in the broad developmental objectives that the donors shared with the recipients. As far as the consultants were concerned, they were handling an assignment that was best performed if the boundaries were clear and local environmental interferences were minimized. We found that even when a donor might have preferred local involvement, often the consultants found ways of dispensing with that in order to avoid being constrained in their operations.

What this appears to prove is that the use of foreign consultants as contractors does not only constrain the power and authority of the recipient over project direction; it may also limit the power, authority, and influence of the donor. In this case the donor definitely shared with the recipients the need to train local personnel, but this was considered by the consultants to be diversionary and time-consuming. Finally, one lesson that the recipients of foreign aid would find useful is that there is no alternative to a policy of self-reliance. Even where foreign donors are wholly altruistic and their resources are limitless, not much benefit would be derived from aid if the recipient failed to take the necessary steps to mobilize local institutions and prime local resources to receive and optimize the impact of foreign assistance.

Endnotes

1. See Stokke, Olav. "European Aid Policies: Some Emerging Trends." In Olav Stokke, ed. *European Development Assistance,* Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway, EADI Book Series, 1983.

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5. See Ministry of Water, Housing and Urban Development. "Donor Participation in Implementation of Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in Tanzania." Paper presented at a seminar on Implementation of Rural Water Supply in Tanzania, Arusha, March, 1986.

6. See Jellinek, S., K. A. Larsson and C. Story. "Swedish Aid: Policy and Performance." In Olav Stokke, ed. *European Development Assistance,* Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 365–95.

7. See Jellinek, S., K. A. Larsson and C. Story. "Swedish Aid: Policy and Performance."

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9. See Boesen, J. *Rural Water Supply Development in Tanzania Before the 1980s.*

10. See H. W. Balaile, "Rural Water Development and Sanitation in Tanzania" in Lium and Skofteland, eds. *Water Master Planning in Developing Countries.* Oslo, Norwegian National Committee for Hydrology, 1984.

11. Discussion with regional water engineer, Bukoba, February 1986.

12. Bro-Consult, Water Master Plan for Mwanza, Mara, and Kagera Regions, Vol. 1–12 (1978).

13. HIFAB project personnel in charge of promotional activities, interview in May 1985.

14. See Kleimeir, Lizz. *Preliminary Report on Participation in HESAWA in Mwanza*. Dar-es-Salaam. 1986. Mimeo.

15. See Kleimeir, Lizz. *Preliminary Report on Participation in HESAWA in Mwanza*.

16. Discussion held in May, 1985.

9

Regional Economic Integration and Self-reliance

OYE OGUNBADEJO

A common feature of contemporary international relations is the proclivity among states to associate together in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) for a variety of purposes.[1] In line with this trend, African countries have increasingly joined IGOs, in particular, the regionally delimited economic organizations. Indeed, virtually every subregion of Africa now has at least one major economic grouping. The list includes: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) in the north;[2] the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) in the central region; Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), both in the east and south;[3] and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west.[4]

The wisdom that propels such major subregional groupings stems, in large part, from the premise of using these blocs to steadily work toward an all-encompassing African Common Market by the year 2000—or so the Lagos Plan of Action envisaged.[5] In itself, the logic is a product of the differing perspectives on development and underdevelopment, the relationship of Africa to the world economy, and the ways in which global economic conditions limit Africa's economic policy choices.[6]

Specifically, it is widely believed that a function of each of the subregional blocs would be to serve as an invaluable weapon in the battle for economic survival, since each was a unit large enough to help stimulate the internal economies of the member states and attract foreign investment. Besides, at the systemic level—and given the complex politics in the trade and aid relations between the industrialized countries of the North and the relatively technologically backward developing countries of the South—regional economic integration is often seen by the latter states as a means of attaining the objectives of the New International

Economic Order (NIEO). This viewpoint has gained added weight in more recent times with the scheduled attainment of a single European market within the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1992.[7]

Moreover, the regional integrationist drive is adjudged by several of Africa's progressive leaders and intellectuals as the major pillar of collective self-reliance. To them, any subregional economic integration in any part of the continent offers the member states the opportunity to maximize their internal capacity for self-reliance as well as to collectively reduce their dependency on the North.

Even from the standpoint of functionalism,[8] the idea of tackling Africa's dependency through self-reliance, within the framework of regional integration, is of great relevance to the continent's economic development. Such an idea, in fact, fits in well with the gradualist approach to pan-Africanism favored by the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as opposed to the strictly instant—and indeed grand—political drive toward continental unity, which Kwame Nkrumah had pioneered soon after Ghana's independence.[9] After all, according to the theoretical premise of functionalism, the idea of establishing an IGO is to facilitate international cooperation with respect to a specific technical problem, not to establish an overarching political authority with broad scope and powers.

In any case, the functionalist option toward pan-Africanism must, by its very nature, consider collective self-reliance. Indeed, proponents of this option stress the point. Typical of the familiar argument in this regard is the contention of Kofi Buenor Hadjor, who maintains:

> As long as Africa is divided it will remain too weak to fight neocolonialism. Many of the countries created in the colonial era are not viable economically and cannot thrive on their own . . . Pan-Africanism is not an option but a necessity. Only the collective effort and resources of Africa can provide the foundation for progress.[10]

In a similar vein, scholars of the political economy school maintain that the territorial state is no longer capable of dealing with problems posed by the globalization of the economy and by interdependence. The nation-state must therefore be transcended by either an international civil service, which could manage the problems that have escaped from the grasp of national governments, or by a confederal arrangement, which would make the pursuit of "collective rationality" possible.[11] Obviously, these recipes have subregional implications as well. In other words, the quest for regional integration and collective self-reliance in Africa can also be situated in the political-economy setting.

In this study, we examine the experience of, and the possibilities for, ECOWAS—arguably, one of Africa's most ambitious experiments in regional integration to date—as a factor in an inward-oriented develop-

ment strategy. In doing so, we hope to examine the efforts of the organization as a counterweight to other economic groupings in the subregion; the different aspects of the organization's quest for self-reliance; key issues in, as well as the ramifications of, striving toward a bloc trade regime; Nigeria's role as the dominant power in the organization and the implications of such a situation for integration and self-reliance; the challenges of economic crisis pertaining to the subregion; the sensitive subject of externally imposed structural adjustment policies as a vehicle for self-reliance in ECOWAS; the major factors that militate against integration and self-reliance, as well as some policy recommendations for dealing with them.

Economic Groupings in West Africa

Historically, there has always been a strong tendency toward economic groupings among the West African states. By 1989 there were at least some thirty-five IGOs in the subregion.[12] These organizations range from the larger bodies, including ECOWAS and the seven-nation *Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), to several smaller, but more specialized, bodies—such as the four-nation Gambia River Development Organization (OMVG) and the three-nation Mano River Union (MRU). Of course, every one of these numerous organizations has its functional justifications, at least from the standpoint of the member states.

ECOWAS itself was formally established through the signing of the Treaty of Lagos, on 28 May 1975. However, the Community did not effectively come into being until 10 June 1975, when the provisions of Article 62 were fulfilled when seven member states ratified the treaty. Even so, it was not until November 1976 that decisions were taken as to where to locate the organization's headquarters and which countries were to provide the statutory appointees. True, the ECOWAS executive secretary, as well as the managing director of the fund for cooperation, compensation and development (hereafter referred to as the Fund), assumed duty in January 1977. By March 1977 a task force had been established to build the Community from scratch. In addition, in the same year, Cape Verde had joined the fifteen original signatories to become the sixteenth member state.[13] Nevertheless, the first permanent staff members of the two institutions of the Community—the Fund and the Executive Secretariat—took up their posts only in late 1979 and early 1980, respectively. Moreover, the task force was not fully replaced by a permanent staff until 1981.[14]

From such slow beginnings, the organization can now be said to have effectively taken off the ground. Yet the existence of rival groupings constitutes, among other things, a constraint on integrative efforts in the subregion. Nigeria, for one, has always maintained this position. At the

1983 ECOWAS summit in Conakry, President Shagari offered a policy option to all his colleagues, namely, "to streamline the existing institutions in the interest of our economies and eliminate institutional overlaps or conflicts of objectives which only hamper our march toward the achievement of our desired development goals."[15]

Admittedly, the Nigerian position has since been endorsed by some countries, including, most notably, Burkina Faso. Equally, the ECOWAS heads of state had requested the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to take a critical look at the existing intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), with a view toward aligning their activities, and of merging some of the groupings with ECOWAS. It is also significant that in 1983 the Council of Ministers of ECOWAS had recommended a merger of the CEAO and MRU with ECOWAS. Nonetheless, to date, there has been no major progress in streamlining the numerous rival organizations within the framework of the Community. Indeed, such was the frustration of the organization's executive secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu, that he contended at the 1989 summit in Ouagadougou that all IGOs in the subregion should be subordinate agencies to ECOWAS. As he has stated, "ECOWAS must be the subregional organization."[16]

The truth of the case seems to be that some of the smaller countries still consider it worthwhile to group themselves together, partly because in their view, it gives the members of such a bloc a stronger bargaining position with Nigeria than they might have individually; and partly because some of the countries believe that their economic development can best be hastened or enhanced in an organization of small countries. In arguing against the concern of possible conflict in objectives between the MRU and ECOWAS, for example, the late President Doe of Liberia echoed the latter theme. According to him, "We must realise that a small group of countries can promote economic cooperation and integration more rapidly than a larger group." In the Liberian leader's view, countries that are more or less at the same level of development will, when grouped together, "find it easier to agree on specific projects which would be impossible if there were wide differences between these countries."[17]

It is thus clear that there is a clash of objectives on the crucial question of economic integration between, on the one hand, member states of the smaller groupings and, on the other, the larger ECOWAS outfit. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the political dimension of regional groupings in West Africa in general. Let us take the position of Nigeria, for example. Because it is the most populous and, in military terms, the most visible in the subregion, the smaller countries often view the country's role in ECOWAS with suspicion, sometimes quietly levying against it the charges of harboring tendencies toward hegemony.

In any case, such fears had been expressed even before ECOWAS came into formal existence. The leaders of CEAO, for instance, were

deeply suspicious of Nigeria's true motives in the region. The fears had not been helped by the Pompidou administration's persistent urgings that the francophone states should remain together in a separate organization, so as to counterbalance the weight of Nigeria in the subregion.[18]

Successive French policies have not deviated from the Pompidou regime's stance. If anything, France has repeatedly played up the CEAO/ECOWAS dialectical relationship to maintain, defend, and even advance French national interests in the small francophone countries. True, the states are relatively poor, but for a country such as France, which very much believes in the promotion of Franco-African understanding as a way of enhancing its political stature in international relations, the need to maintain France's political influence in these states remains an important policy objective.

ECOWAS and the Quest for Self-reliance

As used in this study, the concept of self-reliance does not mean an exclusive and isolationist strategy of development among a group of geographically contiguous states. Rather, it refers to an inward-directed development. In this regard, Julius Nyerere's analysis is apposite. The former Tanzanian president has contended that:

> We in Africa went through one process of liberation—the political liberation. . . . There is another layer of dependence. We have to recognize that we are economically a semi-colonized people. We must at least, say: economically we are not independent, this economic dependence is unacceptable and we must organise ourselves to change this situation.[19]

The question that naturally arises is: to what extent has ECOWAS been able to meaningfully embark on the policy of self-reliance? To answer this question, let us turn to specific areas in which modest gains have been recorded or beginnings made. We start with the provision of basic infrastructures. After all, it stands to reason that until such a time as the economic infrastructures are provided, efforts toward integration or self-reliance in the subregion will remain a difficult goal to attain. This is more so as these infrastructures are essential in providing avenues for physically linking ECOWAS member states, thus making it relatively easy to cultivate economic ties among themselves.

It can be argued that the most positive achievements of ECOWAS to date seem to be in the area of the provision of these economic infrastructures. High on the list has been the organization's investment in telecommunications, which understandably was declared a priority by the meeting of heads of state at Dakar in May 1979. The project, which attracted a partial financing of US$12.5 million from the Fund in the first phase (Phase A),[20] and which is a major contribution to the West African part

of the Pan African Telecommunications project of the ECA, will establish (when all the phases are completed) microwave links between West African capital cities and secondary towns. The telecommunications project is important, since prior to its inception, most West African states had no existing direct links with one another. Rather, they often routed their calls to each other through European capitals.

Aside from telecommunications, ECOWAS has commenced work on two trans-West African roads: a coastal road from Nouakchott to Lagos, and a Sahelian road connecting Nouakchott, N'djamena, and Lagos. When these two roads are completed, the member states will be physically linked. The Fund has also granted loans amounting to US$6 million to Benin for the construction of two bridges of Community interest and to Liberia for the construction of the Liberia-Freetown highway. In addition, the ECOWAS Secretariat announced in 1988 that the organization had provided a loan of US$2.5 million to Liberia and Sierra Leone to assist the two countries in the completion of their respective portions of the trans-West African highway.

Furthermore, ECOWAS has plans to connect all West African capitals by air, so that there could be daily flights to each capital, and to form a West African shipping line wherever the volume of production in the subregion would justify such a venture. We should mention that the Fund has made several grants for studies carried out by the Executive Secretariat, especially in the fields of energy and monetary affairs.[21] Lastly, the Fund has contributed to two other projects: namely, a 40 percent finance of its own US$10 million headquarters, and US$5 million to Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI), a commercial bank established under the aegis of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, whose membership covers the sixteen member states of ECOWAS.

The latter project is noteworthy, at least insofar as ETI is West Africa's first offshore bank. It was incorporated with a capital of US$100 million, of which US$50 million has been allocated in 50,000 shares of US$1,000 per share. Of this amount, 40 percent has been allocated to Nigerians, 10 percent (US$5 million) to the Fund, and the remaining 50 percent to private investors from other ECOWAS member states. The principal objective of the company is to establish or acquire operating units for the provision of banking, economic, financial, and development services within the subregion. Aside from its headquarters, which is based in Lome, ETI currently has five affiliates through Ecobank-Togo, Ecobank-Côte d'Ivoire, Ecobank-Nigeria, Ecobank-Ghana, and Ecobank-Benin.

It seems probable that when all the outstanding economic infrastructures are completed, they will not only facilitate the drive toward integration in the Community but would also, in the process, enhance economic activities in the organization, particularly in terms of trade

relations. The trade dimension is quite important when we bear in mind that a major shortcoming of ECOWAS has been its failure to implement the protocols dealing with trade. It is true that trade is usually one of the main objectives of establishing an economic community. It is also a fact that the ECOWAS treaty was relatively more explicit on the trade cooperation program. Indeed, the Community was based on the strategy of first establishing a customs union.

Even so, there are various reasons why ECOWAS has not made any major progress in trade relations. These include the problems of determining the origins of products, the absence of a common regional monetary policy, and the reluctance of countries that are already in subgroupings within the Community to dismantle their existing arrangements. Consequently, after fourteen years of existence, there has been no major impetus toward stimulating legitimate trade among the member states. Unfortunately, the vacuum created by the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS trade protocols has been enthusiastically filled by smugglers who traffic in imported manufactured goods. We shall return to the subject of trade relations in the next section.

With regard to the implementation of the protocol on the free movement of people, the rights of residence and of establishment, ECOWAS has yet to take the last decisive step on the subject. Indeed, the topic has always remained a sensitive one. And, as if to underscore this point, Nigeria unilaterally closed its borders in 1984 for over one year.[22] Prior to the border closure, the movement of people seemed to have been the major area in which ECOWAS had its most practical impact in the subregion. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that until the Babangida administration reopened Nigeria's land borders in 1985, several of the members, particularly the francophone neighbors, expressed grave concerns about the continued utility of ECOWAS.[23]

Admittedly, member states have since recovered from the shock caused by Nigeria's unilateral action. All the same, it is significant that implementation of the protocol has not yet been achieved. Bureaucratic obstacles, especially in the printing and issuance of ECOWAS travel certificates, have constituted bottlenecks. In a communique issued in April 1989, after a meeting of the ministers responsible for internal affairs and state security, member states called for the effective implementation of the protocol. In particular, member states were urged to print, without further delay, the required travel document. Stressing that the program for educating national officers who are responsible for immigration should be intensified, the communique recommended that adequate information should be disseminated among their citizens and that public campaigns should be stepped up.

A few months later, at the twelfth summit, the issue of free movement of ECOWAS citizens was once again keenly considered. Apart from ordering member states to print the stipulated travel certificate and

deciding that all immigration officials be further sensitized on the issue, members were requested "to take all necessary measures to prevent and stop violations of the free movement protocols." To provide a measure of legal backing on the latter subject, a tribunal was established to investigate those violations.

The effective implementation of the protocol remains an important test case for ECOWAS. Unless member states take concrete steps to reinforce awareness at the grassroots level, whereby the people of the subregion would be free to cross national frontiers in pursuit of their legitimate business, ECOWAS will remain fragile and shaky.

The efforts of ECOWAS in the field of food production, and in agriculture in general, are still at their infancy. Be that as it may, there are encouraging developments in the promotion of certain policies. These policies pay particular attention to the creation of seed production centers, the harmonization of agricultural pricing policies, control of animal diseases, development of cattle breeding centers,[24] control of floating weeds, plant and wildlife protection schemes, and support programs for the development of crop production. An important challenge that is likely to confront ECOWAS member states in the future, especially if the issue of self-reliance is to be meaningfully tackled in the field of agriculture, would involve devising full-scale strategies to boost food production, the provision of adequate storage facilities, rehabilitation of cash-crop farms, fostering agro-allied industries, and addressing the issue of low international prices of the major cash crops of the subregion.

In the interim and to highlight the special problem of inadequate food production and supplies, Executive Secretary Abass Bundu announced in 1989 that the organization had set a food sufficiency target in the subregion for the year 2000. Hopefully, the organization, in the years ahead, would embark upon positive measures that would make the attainment of such a target realizable.

Toward a Trade Bloc Regime

For understandable reasons, ECOWAS places an important emphasis on trade relations among its member states.[25] After all, a trade liberalization scheme is often designed to enhance intracommunity trade and economic integration. Besides, such an emphasis is part of the self-reliance strategy. It should be noted in any case that currently each member state's trade with the Community constitutes less than 5 percent of its total exports.

Indeed, the subregion's international trade epitomizes a neocolonial economic relationship, with the bulk of the trade being carried out with Western industrialized countries, and with the former metropolitan powers being in the dominant position. In contrast with this, a typical

West African country's trade with its fellow ECOWAS member states is minimal. In other words, the pattern is still overwhelmingly North-South, with South-South trade links remaining on the periphery.[26]

The four relatively developed states in the Community—Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Ghana—clearly highlight the trend. Admittedly, Nigeria's trade in the subregion has been on an upward trend in recent years. Even so, the volume, as a percentage of the country's overall exports, is still low. In the first six months of 1988, for example, Nigeria's trade surplus with its ECOWAS partners stood at N700 million, with imports at N117.9 million and exports at N812.7 million. But, as a proportion of its total trade, the N930.6 million was only 4.4 percent of Nigeria's trade.[27] Little wonder that the organization's secretariat set an intra-ECOWAS trade target at 10 percent in 1989, from the current level of 4.6 percent, of the Community's total trade.

It is pertinent to point out at this stage that ECOWAS has adopted a trade liberalization program, which includes industrial goods, and has taken steps, by way of doing some of the essential administrative spadework, that would facilitate such a process. The program, which as envisaged would eventually lead to the creation of a free-trade zone, has three components:

- Liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods
- Liberalization of trade in traditional handicrafts
- Liberalization of trade in industrial goods

As it is, the heads of state and government of the Community have already decided to abolish all duties and taxes and to eliminate all non-tariff barriers to unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts circulating within the subregion. Two major reasons were advanced for taking such a decision. First, the free flow of unprocessed goods would encourage further trade, since some of these unprocessed items would constitute the inputs of the budding industrial sector. Second, the handicraft industry is seen as a good base for developing manufacturing skills; in any case, being rural-based, it needs all the encouragement it could receive.

For the purposes of the liberalization of trade in industrial products, member states were divided into three categories in 1985 (see Table 9.1). Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Ghana were all placed in category G3. They therefore have the shortest period of four years for priority industrial products, and six years for non-priority industrial items, respectively, for completing the essential trade liberalization.[28]

The trade liberalization scheme for industrial products is scheduled to be launched on 1 January 1990 with a selected range of products. In all, twenty-six products from the organization's sixteen member states would be commercialized. In the case of Nigeria, the leading industrial-

ized country in the subregion, for example, only four of its companies would be allowed to export one product each.

Table 9.1 Program for the Attainment of Liberalization of Trade in Industrial Products

Country (G)	*Priority Industrial Products (P1)*	*Non-Priority Industrial Products (P2)*
G1: Cape Verde The Gambia Guinea Bissau Burkina Faso Mali Mauritania Niger	8 years, on the basis of a 12.5% reduction per annum	10 years, on the basis of a 10% reduction per annum
G2: Benin Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone Togo	6 years, on the basis of a 16.66% reduction per annum	8 years, on the basis of a 12.5% reduction per annum
G3: Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Senegal	4 years, on the basis of a 25% reduction per annum	6 years, on the basis of a 16.66% reduction per annum

Source: ECOWAS Secretariat, Lagos, 1985.

Arguably, until certain hurdles are removed, it may be difficult for the member states to expand their trade relations on a significant scale. Members would have to shed their allegiance to the various smaller groupings; a concerted effort would have to be made, with the assistance of the ECOWAS secretariat, to devise a fairly reliable form of determining the origins of goods; and, perhaps most importantly, efforts should be made to harmonize the national currencies by establishing a West African monetary zone, so as to facilitate easy payments for all trade transactions among the member states. Indeed, with regard to the latter point, Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Lagos provides for cooperation in monetary and financial spheres through the harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies of member states, while spelling out the institutional arrangements to be set up to achieve these goals. In May 1983 the heads of state, at a meeting in Conakry, authorized the secretariat to work out the details for the creation of a single monetary zone. Accordingly, the secretariat, along with the study group set up for the purpose, submitted their recommendations to the 1986 summit.

Following consideration of the report, the governors of the central banks of the member states met and drafted modalities for the new scheme. To assess its future potential, the ECOWAS currency would circulate for a probationary period of five years. It was further stipulated that the authority of heads of state would be the supreme organ to formulate policy, while the Council of Ministers of Finance would supervise the scheme's monetary operations.

The establishment of a single monetary zone, which would embrace the present ten currency zones in West Africa, would be a remarkable feat in the context of economic integration. In any case, given the present multiplicity of currencies, with varying exchange arrangements, it is doubtful that any major economic integration can be attained in the subregion without a monetary union. Aside from the point that such unions tend to promote monetary stability in developing countries by exercising restraining influence on an individual national government's ability to borrow excessively from the banking system, a common currency within ECOWAS would facilitate intraregional trade, as there would be no exchange controls. As of now, 1992 has been set as the target date for the introduction of a single monetary zone in the entire subregion.

Economic Crisis and Recovery: Implications for Integration and Self-reliance

Given the prevailing economic circumstances of West African states, the task of tackling the problems of underdevelopment, dependency, and poverty in the subregion seems to be a herculean one. The debt crisis, for example, has forced several of the ECOWAS member states to implement the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), or the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) as a cross-conditional remedy for getting out of the economic woods.[29] The debt crisis is debilitating by any standard, especially if we bear in mind that the member states are obliged to repay and service an external debt that stood at US$55 billion at the end of 1987. In most of these countries, the leaders claim that either SAP or ERP would ensure rapid economic recovery and promote self-reliance. Yet, the avowed objectives have remained a distant dream, primarily because the policies adopted tend to negate the objectives.

The distinctive common characteristics of these policies include massive currency devaluation; export promotion for primary exports, which face dwindling foreign markets and protectionist barriers in the industrialized countries; greater foreign control of the debtor-countries by transnational corporations (TNCs) through such avenues as external investment, privatizations, debt-equity swaps, and increased foreign loans; deflationary policies, such as drastic budget cuts, a severe credit squeeze,

and higher interest rates; flexible exchange rates; massive retrenchment of workers; and withdrawal of subsidies and price controls.

The impact of the policies on the affected West African states often exacerbates the plight of their respective economies. Radical African scholars and statesmen have persistently challenged the IMF and the World Bank to identify a single African country that has implemented these policies and recovered from its economic straits. They contend that essentially, the policies further promote foreign domination and sharpened class contradictions.

Bade Onimode, for one, argues that the major beneficiaries of SAP or ERP are the TNCs, which have:

> reaped enormous gains from higher import prices and lower prices in local currency from massive devaluation, cheap raw materials, easy repatriation of super-profits from foreign currency auction and the dismantling of exchange control, rising bank profits from rising interest rates and greater exploitation of debtor countries from tumbling wages, privatization and debt-equity swap.[30]

In a sense, it can be argued that ECOWAS is not totally oblivious of some of the major issues that surround SAP, particularly in relation to subregional integration and self-reliance. Modest as the efforts may be, the organization launched its own inward-propelled US$920 million economic recovery package in December 1986. The recovery program, which would cover 136 projects grouped into "national" and "regional" categories, would pay attention to certain strategic areas: notably, rural development, transport, telecommunications, energy, and industry. Specifically, forty of the projects would be of a regional nature, with an estimated cost of about US$548.5 million. The balance of ninety-six would be "national" projects, which in turn would cost about US$371.7 million.

Budgetary Constraints on ECOWAS Effectiveness

While these efforts are to be commended, it should be stressed that many of the stated projects are still on the drawing board, due in the main to lack of funds. Indeed, as of December 1988, Mahenta Fall, director of the Fund, could only announce the availability of funds to execute fifty-four of the 136 projects. The Community has been financially strapped, a major reason being that several of the member states have been unable to pay their annual contributions in time.

The financial problems of the organization raise an important issue at this stage of our analysis—namely, to what extent can ECOWAS continue to survive or even pursue the twin tasks of economic integration and self-reliance when funds are low or simply non-existent? At the 1989

summit the executive secretary reported that only US$6.5 million had been received out of the US$82 million contributions outstanding. He specially pleaded that all member states should settle their arrears by June 1990 and that those who were unable to do so by that date should pay in four quarterly installments, beginning 1 July 1989. As of now, Nigeria, in spite of its own economic difficulties, still manages to honor its obligations by regularly contributing 33 percent of the organization's annual budget. Table 9.2, for example, shows the country's contributions from 1985 to 1988.

Table 9.2 Nigeria's Annual Contribution to ECOWAS Budget, 1985–1988

Year	*ECOWAS Budget*	*Nigeria's Contribution*
1985	N30,397,560.00	N10,031,194.80
1986	N28,018,800.00	N9,246,204.00
1987	N27,523,400.00	N9,082,720.00
1988	N31,083,792.30	N10,257,651.46

Source: ECOWAS Headquarters, Lagos, Nigeria.

Ordinarily, Nigeria's statutory contributions for the years under reference—1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988—would have been N5,471,561, N5,043,384, N4,954,212, and N5,595,028, respectively. This is because the country's share of the annual budgets, as worked out through its GNP and population, ought to be 18 percent. In recent years, Lagos has expressed a desire to limit its contributions to the normal statutory share of the annual budget. While that stance had initially been accepted at the 1988 Council of Ministers meeting in Lome, Togo, Nigeria was later prevailed upon to stick to its usual 33 percent contribution so as "to save the organization from collapse." Accordingly, Nigeria contributed US$2.046 million (about N20 million) out of the US$6.2 million (about N60 million) budget for 1989. In essence, Nigeria thus constitutes an important factor in the provision of financial support for ECOWAS.

Arguably, the inability of ECOWAS member states to settle even basic bills such as the annual dues to the organization highlights the magnitude of the economic crisis that confronts these countries. On a comparative basis too, many of them are even unable to settle their indebtedness to the United Nations. As of 30 June 1988, fourteen of the sixteen ECOWAS members were indebted to the world body in their contributions. Altogether, they owed US$2.16 million. Only Nigeria (US$.43 million) and Ghana (US$172,413) had paid their dues by that date.

From all indications, the financial straits of most of ECOWAS member states will continue to handicap their ability to provide resources with which the organization could boldly embark on a strategy of self-

reliance. Even Nigeria, which contributes generously to sustain the organization, owed as much as US$30 billion in foreign debt by the end of 1988.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Without gainsaying, a properly functioning ECOWAS offers many advantages. Aside from the fact that it constitutes a single large market of over 150 million people, the organization can negotiate more effectively with, and stands to obtain better terms from, other international economic organizations, including the post-1992 EEC. Moreover, ECOWAS can mobilize resources to achieve optimum results in the subregion; serve as an important cornerstone for a future African Common Market; reinforce the collective will of the members to strive toward political unity; and formulate results-oriented economic policies in such key sectors as agriculture, industry, energy, technology, research and development, as well as commercial and financial services, that will take account of, and indeed accommodate, the social, economic, cultural, and political realities of the subregion.

Furthermore, a virile ECOWAS can devise and successfully implement innovative strategies that will further promote the goals of economic integration and self-reliance. It can, in any case, effectively foster South-South links, establish a single monetary zone with a convertible currency, and when the need arises, challenge the problem-laden economic orthodoxes of the leading Western international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

In all these areas, ECOWAS certainly deserves the encouragement and active support of its member states. The modest gains in the provision of basic economic infrastructures such as telecommunications and road networks, and the drive—albeit a slow one—toward establishing a bloc trade regime need to be improved upon and consolidated. At the same time, member states ought to address certain factors that may militate against economic integration and self-reliance. Let us identify some of them.

First, there is a pressing need to streamline the number of economic groupings in the subregion, particularly as many of them promote narrow group nationalism and strive to achieve the very self-reliant economic goals for which ECOWAS was set up in the first place. In any case, given the current economic difficulties facing the sixteen West African countries, including a huge external debt burden, the other thirty-five IGOs in the subregion can only make competing demands on the limited financial resources of ECOWAS member states.

Second, the twin issues of non-convertible currencies and the problem of a common payments system must be tackled. In this regard, the

establishment of a single monetary zone with a convertible currency would, among other things, facilitate trade liberalization and further promote intracommunity trade.

Third, all the major protocols—including the one on the free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment—which are bound to encourage social and economic interactions, should be energetically pursued, with a view toward their effective implementation. Similarly, and equally importantly, the member states need to promptly ratify and implement all the outstanding protocols as well as any other future decisions of the Community.

Fourth, there must be a concerted effort to break the language barrier in the subregion, notably, through the establishment and the promotion of bilingual policies in the short run, and trilingual policies in the long run. Fifth, member states ought to be more alive to their financial responsibilities to the organization by settling their annual dues. Arguably, a cash-starved subregional organization would be hard put to marshall the necessary resources to execute key projects that have been designed to promote economic integration and self-reliance, or even projects that could act as catalysts for other programs.

Sixth, since West Africa is essentially a peasant and predominantly rural society, more attention needs to be paid by the member states, as well as the ECOWAS Secretariat and the Fund, to agriculture—whether in terms of production of adequate food supplies or the growing and maintenance of cash crops—and rural development. Indeed, there ought to be a stronger emphasis than hitherto on rural development as an alternative to the urban-centered development policies of the past. In particular, there should be a well-coordinated subregional policy that would ensure that member states extend massive credits to small-scale, labor-intensive agriculture as a way of readjusting, where applicable, export-oriented agriculture toward production for domestic consumption.

Seventh, West African states should be alert to, and indeed, wary of laissez-faire development economic policies, as recommended by the IMF and World Bank—especially the attendant socioeconomic and political consequences—before being implemented.

Eighth, each member state should be encouraged to develop a more positive attitude toward ECOWAS and cultivate a deep-rooted commitment and political will to see the organization succeed. Ninth, anti-integrationist and bureaucratic obstacles toward ECOWAS ideals should be narrowed down as far as possible, if not totally eliminated.

Tenth, an inward-propelled and self-reliant strategy of industrialization, with the appropriate linkage effects, as opposed to the much-tested and often discredited import-substitution industrialization process, should be evolved and put into practice by the ECOWAS member states. The dependent nature of the economies of the subregion is such that key industries are externally controlled, principally by virtue of the requisite

technology. While the relevant TNCs involved have been anxious to maintain their dominant positions in these local economies and, correspondingly increase their profits, they have not been forthcoming on the crucial issue of transferring their technology. If any lesson can be learned at all from the dire consequences of the adoption of SAP or ERP by some ECOWAS member states, it is probably that in order to move faster on the industrialization front, local sourcing of raw materials for industries as well as the ultimate development of indigenous technology are essential.

True, foreign technology—in particular the sophisticated technology of the world's leading industrialized countries—can never be excluded altogether. Even so, some bold initial efforts at mastering basic rudimentary technology on the scale of India, for example, can at least be encouraged. It may be essential too to go into partnership with the notable and most successful of the Third World newly industrialized countries, with a view toward benefiting from their own experience and hopefully receiving a measure of their technology. In other words, the South-South emphasis can and ought to be encouraged as a conscious policy. It is in this regard that the pursuit of self-reliance in a Third World framework makes ECOWAS an important enterprise.

Eleventh, ECOWAS needs to pursue the task of attracting external aid to the subregion to execute key self-reliant projects. The relative success of SADCC in this regard should be quite instructive. Twelfth, to the degree that no meaningful economic integration or self-reliance can be attained in West Africa if the subregion is bedeviled with major crises and conflicts, there is an urgent need to devise an effective framework for resolving conflicts, including border clashes. The task of conflict resolution is all the more important if we bear in mind the ramifications and the negative consequences of the 1989 ethnic conflict between Senegal and Mauritania for the two states, on the one hand, and for ECOWAS, on the other.

Thirteenth, the issue of illicit trade or smuggling needs to be addressed. True, most of the borders in the subregion are porous. Even so, devising effective means to curb the mammoth smuggling that currently occurs in the subregion would boost official trade among member states. All things being equal, the impact of illicit trade would become minimal when full-scale trade liberalization is attained in the Community. Fourteenth, the issue of the unrealistic trade drawback procedure also needs to be addressed.

Fifteenth, ECOWAS member states should endeavor to provide an export credit guarantee and insurance scheme that would facilitate trade within the Community, as a further policy option. Such a scheme could provide, among other things, guarantee for loans granted to exporters by each member state's banks to finance the production of goods destined for export and could also enable the banks to extend credit facilities to foreign importers. Moreover, the scheme could provide the exporters

with insurance cover against default in payment by foreign importers and also raise funds in foreign currency from various international banks, as well as lines of credit from foreign creditors.

In sum, the goals that ECOWAS sets out to attain are particularly laudable at the subsystemic level. Besides, in the larger context of the ideals of achieving the economic integration of Africa, as an important functionalist step toward the ultimate pan-African goal of continental unity, a successful and mature ECOWAS is bound to be an important cornerstone. It is hoped that the problems that we have highlighted in this study, as well as the policy recommendations, will facilitate the organization's task of identifying key areas that deserve serious and urgent attention to the degree possible.

Endnotes

1. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Jacobson, Harold K., William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers. "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1986): pp. 141–159; and Jacobson. *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System* (2nd. ed.) New York: Knopf. 1984.

2. The latest of the major African groupings, the UMA came into existence on February 18, 1989, when Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania signed the relevant treaty at Marrakech, Morocco. For details, see *West Africa* (1989), pp. 517–518. See also, "The Maghreb Five-Nation Bloc: Problems Unite North Africans." *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 11–17, 1989. p. 3.

3. For some background readings on the two organizations, see, for example, Douglas G. Anglin, "Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA." *International Organization*, Vol. 37, no. 4 (1983): 681–712; and Reginald, Herbold Green, "SADCC: Economic Regionalism in a War Zone." In Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1985–86. New York: Africana. 1987. pp. A103–A118.

4. For background analyses on ECOWAS, see, among several others, Asante, S.K.B. *The Political Economy of Regionalism: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States*. New York: Praeger. 1985; and Okolo, Julius Emeka, and Stephen Wright, eds. *West Africa: Regional Cooperation and Development*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 1989.

5. The Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development in Africa was adopted at the second extraordinary session of the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government in April 1980 in Lagos. The report is widely regarded as an important economic blueprint for the continent.

6. Cf., for instance, the section on "Political Economy" in *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. 1988.

7. See, for example, the arguments of General Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian head of state and the current Chairman of Africa Leadership Forum, in "Leverage against 1992." *West Africa*. 1989. pp. 716–18.

8. The theory of "functionalism" was developed by David Mitrany and his followers. See, in particular, Mitrany. *The Progress of International Government*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1933; and *A Working Peace System*. Chicago: Quadrangle. 1966. For a critique of the theory as well as of "neo-functionalism," see Groom, A.J.R., and Paul Taylor, eds., *Functionalism*. London: University of London Press. 1975.

9. See Rooney, David. *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*. London: Tauris. 1988; and Baynham, Simon. *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 1988.

10. *West Africa* (1987), p. 2543.

11. See, in particular, the chapters of Chase-Dunn and Solo in W. Ladd Hollist, and F. Lamond Tullis, eds. *An International Political Economy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 1984.

12. See Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States." In Colin Legum, ed. *Africa Contemporary Record, 1986–1987*. New York: Africana. 1988.

13. The fifteen original signatories are: Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast (now Côte d'Ivoire), Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

14. See the special issue of *West Africa* (27 May 1985), entitled: "A Decade of ECOWAS."

15. See "Growth of Rival Groups," *West Africa*. 1985. p. 1053.

16. See *West Africa*. 1989. p. 1121.

17. See *West Africa*. 1985. p. 1053.

18. For some background analyses on Nigeria's role in founding ECOWAS, see Ogunbadejo, Oye. "General Gowon's African Policy." *International Studies*, Vol. 16, no. 1 (January-March, 1977): 35–50; and Ojo, O. J. B. "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS." *International Organization*, Vol. 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980): 571–604. Note that President Pompidou had taken major steps to institutionalize francophonie through annual summits during his presidency.

19. See "OAU at 25: Nyerere's Vision for Africa." *The Guardian*, June 8, 1988, p. 7. The emphasis is added.

20. While phase A involves seven member states—Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria—phase B is for the links between Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania.

21. *West Africa*. 1986. p. 1059.

22. See the chapter on Nigeria in Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1984–85*. New York: Africana. 1986.

23. See Oye Ogunbadejo, "West African Regional Groupings: Questions of Size, Effectiveness and Honesty." In *Africa Contemporary Record, 1985–86*. New York: Africana.

24. To be set up at Narahoue (Côte d'Ivoire), Nadina Diassa (Mali), and in the Gambia. See *West Africa*. 1988. p. 1419.

25. For a general analysis on world trade, see Kihl, Young W. and James M. Lutz. *World Trade Issues: Regime, Structure, and Policy*. New York: Praeger. 1985.

26. For a background reading on the politics of North-South trade see, for example, Rothstein, Robert I. *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979.

27. *West Africa*. 1989. p. 566.

28. By trade liberalization, we mean the process of eliminating import duties and taxes of equivalent effect on industrial goods. Note that provision has also been made for the gradual introduction of a common external tariff to be applied to all commodities imported into the ECOWAS zone from their countries.

29. For a recent analysis of Africa's debt crisis, see Parfitt, Trevor and Stephen Riley. *The African Debt Crisis*. London: Routledge. 1989. Also, see their "Africa in the Debt Trap: Which Way Out?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, no. 3 (September 1986): 519–27.

30. Onimode, Bade. "Crypto—SAP," *The Guardian*, September 30, 1988.

Part III

Policy Management Capacity Building: Role of Training Institutions

10

Policy and Management Training in Africa

Approaches and Priorities[1]

M. JIDE BALOGUN

This chapter begins by examining the developments in Africa's socioeconomic environment and the implications that these developments have for management training. In the second section, the chapter discusses contemporary trends in management training and capacity building. The third section looks at the factors inhibiting the effectiveness of the training institutes, while section four suggests ways of coping with some of the critical problems.

Africa's Socioeconomic Crisis and Its Implications for Management Training

Within the last decade Africa has passed through a phase of relative prosperity to one of severe crisis. The first development decade (the 1960s) was that of independence. The 1970s, the second development decade, was one of guarded optimism. The decade of the 1980s will go down in history as one characterized by economic depression, large-scale poverty and destitution, hunger, famine, desertification, and sociopolitical upheavals. It was a decade during which Africa's development aspirations were dampened by external payment difficulties, debt-servicing obligations, and deficits on the current account. In contrast to the 1960s, when development plans were drafted conscientiously and launched with fanfare, the hardships of the 1980s shifted attention from development to survival. In effect, if Africa had a dream in the 1960s, this had

[1]This chapter is partly based on an earlier paper presented by the author at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Institute of Public Service (International), University of Connecticut, West Hartford, in July 1986.

turned into a nightmare by the middle of the 1980s. Today, Africa is fully awake, conscious of the realities of underdevelopment, but perhaps not certain which way to turn. A few years back, an observer remarked rather unkindly that Africa had no future. While the majority of the peoples of Africa would condemn this gloomy conclusion, not many can say precisely what the future holds for Africa. Indeed, developments in Eastern Europe—and particularly, the prospects toward European economic integration in 1992—are triggering off alarm signals in the policymaking centers of Africa.

One thing is clear: if Africa has a past, it ought, as part of the human race, have a future. But before a future course is charted and other dreams are dreamt, Africa should stand back and look at itself, focusing particular attention on the mistakes of the past.

It is true that a continuously adverse international economic (and political) environment contributed in no small measure to Africa's troubled past. However, that is only part of the story. If we are to be fair to ourselves, we should accept that our own response to developments in the increasingly complex global environment have been anything but adequate. In plain language, inappropriate policy and managerial response to problems are also implicated in Africa's economic development crisis. Granted that the international environment narrows down the range of options open to policymakers in African countries, it is possible to formulate and implement policies with incremental benefits to the people. It is precisely this inability to take incrementally rational decisions that has manifested itself as the crisis of policy and management, a crisis which fuelled other crises.

Because of its preeminent position, the public sector has come in for sharp criticisms. Supply-side economists have particularly argued that this sector produces little but consumes huge amounts of resources. To this extent, it has to take the major responsibility for the general economic depression in Africa. However, management in the private sector has its own share of the blame. While private business firms amass huge profits every year, they have isolated themselves from the basic socioeconomic problems confronting the various countries. In particular, they have done very little to check hoarding and profiteering, to explore local sources of raw materials for manufacturing products, to promote full employment, and to foster technological development and economic self-reliance. As a matter of fact, a comprehensive capacity-building strategy has to take into account the problems facing both the public and private sectors.

Capacity-building Problems in the Public Sector

The prominent position occupied by the public sector in the economy of African countries underscores the importance of a comprehensive capac-

ity-building strategy. In nearly all African countries, the state maintains its dominance over every sphere of life. The economy, in particular, is controlled largely by government and parastatal organizations. Institutional expansion, therefore, was one major characteristic of African public administration—that is, before the recent structural adjustment reforms.

As development plans extend the frontiers of public administration, bureaucracies in Africa have had to bridge what has been termed the "managerial credibility gap"—the gap between the tasks to be performed and the decisions to be taken on the one hand, and the number and caliber of the persons available to perform the tasks and take the decisions on the other. Bridging the gap has proved particularly difficult in Africa. The reasons lie not merely in the shortage of facilities for imparting knowledge and skills in the various specialized areas but in the nature of the changes taking place within and without the administrative systems. The first of these changes came about in the early days of independence, and it took the form of the "localization" of the senior and middle grades of the public sector. Localization was a logical corollary of the transfer of political power from the colonial regime to the indigenous political elites. However, it resulted in the rapid promotion of indigenous officers, many of whom were probably not adequately prepared for their new responsibilities. Generalizations can be misleading, and necessary allowances must be made for differences in experience among African countries. All the same, in nearly all these countries, localization tended to be preceded or accompanied by "crash" training programs.

While "crash" training programs might serve the purpose of the immediate postindependence administration, formal education and training schemes are necessary if public servants are to grasp the increasingly complex situations around them. In the context of Africa's recent experience, public officials—particularly those operating within public enterprises—need to be exposed to techniques that would enhance their efficiency and productivity, notably, those of human and material resource management, project management, work scheduling, office layout, work simplification, activity sampling and work measurement, sequencing and coordination/precision management, external debt management, and international finance.

Tempting as it may be to emphasize the utility of management techniques in the public sector, a purely technical response will not be adequate in coping with Africa's development administration problems. The problems of resource mobilization, stock and inventory management, matrix management, work flow and process charting, procedure simplification, to mention a few, most frequently take a technical form, but underlying them are fundamental questions of ethics and public morality. If this is actually the case, what are the various regional and national training institutes doing to inculcate appropriate norms of public service?

Equally important is the development of strategic thinking at the policy and senior-management levels. This is to ensure that each system is able to foresee problems before they do irreparable damage to the economy. Strategic thinking belongs within the province of PARUs described by William Shellukindo in an earlier chapter.

Capacity-building Problems in the Private Sector

It is sometimes argued that if the private sector had been allowed to take the lead in economic development activities, Africa would have been spared the agonies of a crushing depression. The counter argument is that as of now, Africa has no private sector—at least, not the type that could be relied upon to bring about economic development and foster collective or national self-reliance. In many countries of Africa, the bulk of the assets in the private sector are controlled by the multinational corporations, which have so far placed a greater premium on profit accumulation than on the alleviation of human suffering through sustained economic and technological development.

It is true that in a number of countries, retail and wholesale trade is dominated by Africans who act mostly as the multinational companies' "trading-post" agents. It is equally true that various governments have promulgated "indigenization" measures aimed at transferring the ownership and control of certain categories of business enterprises from aliens to local entrepreneurs. However, the fact that such developments were promoted by government intervention is very revealing. It implied that without a deliberate application of state power, Africans would probably remain on the periphery of business activity for an indefinite period.

But just as the localization of the public service was not without some difficulties, the indigenization of business enterprises was accompanied by its own set of problems. The first major constraint on the efficiency of African business enterprises is the weakness of the entrepreneurial spirit. The success of expatriate firms in business is attributable mainly to the importance attached by these firms to the entrepreneurial function. Conversely, the high "casualty" or "drop-out" rate among indigenous enterprises can be explained in terms of the persistence of traditional social values and religious beliefs, which discourage thrift, enterprise, and innovation.

The second constraint is managerial. The skills of planning, organization, and project evaluation, which are so essential in managing complex undertakings, are not within the reach of indigenous businessmen, who operate mainly as "sole proprietors" or in small partnerships. Evidence of managerial ineptitude is provided by the defective systems of procurement, transportation, and warehousing of raw materials and spare parts; the persistence of excess capacity; the chaotic layout of factories, plants, and equipment; the loose financial control and accounting systems; and the weakness in employee supervision.

The third constraint is structural. In order to attract substantial capital and compete effectively with the large multinational corporations, African business enterprises need to create organizational structures that do not revolve around families, clans, or ethnic groupings. However, the ability and willingness to team up with "strangers" in pursuit of industrial glory is not yet widely distributed among the peoples of Africa.

While focusing on factors internal to indigenous enterprises, we should also strive to appreciate the environmental constraints on their effectiveness. Prominent among these is the overbearing influence of the public sector. One may even go as far as to maintain that the reason why indigenous enterprises fail to attain high standards of efficiency is that the development policies of African governments have not given the private sector the chance to succeed. Apart from participating directly in manufacturing and trading activities, African governments have, in one way or the other, applied their regulatory powers (especially in respect of direct and indirect taxation, import licensing, foreign exchange allocations, wages policy, and labor legislation) to strangle potentially successful business enterprises. In an effort to circumvent a restrictive legal environment, the private sector frequently resorts to corrupt and generally unethical practices. In a different form, therefore, the development of a new ethical orientation constitutes a priority in any capacity-building effort in the private sector. This means that as in the public sector, exposure to the techniques of effective management is not enough; beneficiaries of training programs must also be brought to the realization that the long-term development of their society rests on a firm ethical foundation.

In any case, the recent structural adjustment reforms, by eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic controls and by substantially deregulating the economy, may yet create the appropriate atmosphere in which innovative and entrepreneurial activities would flourish.

Role of Regional and National Training Institutes in Policy Management Training

The preceding section described the challenge of development administration and concluded that, in order to meet this challenge, training institutions should integrate training in techniques into an ethical reorientation program. They may approach their tasks not only by organizing formal training programs in the different branches of management, but also by influencing organizational and individual behavior through research and consultancy assignments. The question is, how many of the training institutions recognize the magnitude of the challenge before them?

There are relatively few regional and subregional institutions with managerial capacity-building functions in Africa. Among these are

African Training and Research Center in Administration for Development, based in Tangier, Morocco; the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) located in Arusha, Tanzania; the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) with headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya; and the Institute of Development Management (IDM), which serves the three states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The Public Administration, Management and Manpower Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa occupies a special position, with its technical advisory and training missions supporting national efforts in capacity building. In addition, there are a number of regional institutions administering manpower development programs in specialized areas, particularly food and agriculture, animal husbandry, and aerial surveys.

Of the regional training institutes that are active in the area of management capacity building, at least two (ESAMI, Arusha; and IDM, Botswana) deserve special mention. ESAMI started as an organ of the defunct East African Community, and its participants were drawn mainly from East Africa. In 1979 its charter was amended to enable it to extend its operations to the whole of southern Africa. It has since organized a series of programs aimed at strengthening the linkages between policy, strategy, and operation and at broadening the perspectives of senior managers to enable them to function within a dynamic environment. ESAMI's regular training programs last between two and six weeks and include those designed to enhance capabilities in the following areas: transport economics and management, project procurement and contract negotiations, stock control, maintenance and operations management, human resource management and development, management training for women entrepreneurs, health sector economics and finance, health services management, budgeting and budget control, public finance management for senior planning officers, credit analysis for banks and other financial institutions, interministerial workshops on international trade promotion and facilitation management, training of trainers for entrepreneurial development in the private sector, agrobusiness management, statistical tools for management, and records management.

In 1980 ESAMI organized a total of thirty-nine different programs in which 1,048 individuals participated. By 1983 the number of programs had increased to 109, and the number of participants to 1,160. As of the end of 1990, a cumulative total of 30,000 participants holding middle- and senior-management positions in government and the private sector was recorded by ESAMI. It should also be noted that in recent years, the institute has made an effort to reach the policymaking category by organizing short-duration (2- to 3-day) policy seminars to which ministers, heads of civil services, chief executives of public enterprises, and other senior officials were invited. The themes addressed at the senior policy

seminars range from transport management, through development plan management, debt management, and energy management to the management of structural adjustment programs.

In contrast to ESAMI, the Institute of Development Management (IDM) Gaborone has not been able to reach the top echelons of management in the three countries it serves (Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho). The institute was established with the primary aim of organizing middle- and senior-management programs. However, senior managers in the subregion have not taken advantage of the facilities available at the institute. This is probably due to the managers' lack of interest in training or to the IDM's bias toward long-duration courses. Such courses, while amenable to classroom teaching techniques and to certification, may not be relevant to the problems facing senior managers. In any case, senior executives can hardly afford to leave their desks for long periods. If the IDM could find a way of balancing its academic and horizon-broadening approach with a practical, problem-solving focus, it would have succeeded in overcoming the limitations to which many institutions in Africa are subject.

National Institutes

It is at the national level that there is a proliferation of training institutes. As part of the preparation for the challenge of the first development decade, institutes of administration and administrative staff colleges have sprouted in many African countries with the same rapidity as other government establishments. In fact, just as development plans and development planning became a fad after independence, the creation of administrative training institutes became a mark of "administrative progress." Unfortunately, and with the possible exception of a few, the training institutes that were established amidst high hopes in the early sixties are, as with many other institutions, threatened with decay. They have either lost their bearing or have succumbed to neglect and, in any case, have stood out as a monument to unfulfilled expectations. The subsequent paragraphs focus on some of the limitations on the institutes' effectiveness.

Civil Service, Non-Business Orientation

One major gap that African training institutes have to bridge is in program content and orientation. Even with all the emphasis on "modern" management techniques, a significant number of these institutes have closed their eyes to management practices and methods adopted outside the civil service. They seldom experimented with the committee system that operates in universities. Business-related subjects such as cost accounting, inventory management, production control, transportation,

warehousing and distribution, export trade, and foreign trade finance receive little or no attention in the curricula of many institutes of administration. In contrast, civil service personnel and financial regulations, together with their methods and procedures, are given prominence in the institutes' training activities. There are a few exceptions, however. The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (Achimota); the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute, Arusha; and recently, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, Topo-Badagry, are among the training institutes which provide an opportunity for the cross-fertilization of ideas between government and business.

Need for Integrated Strategy

The gap in orientation is not as serious as the incomprehensive nature of the institutes' activities. Capacity building, it should be remembered, has four aspects. The first and second aspects are the formal training programs organized for the benefit of the organization and the individual. The third and fourth aspects of capacity building are the informal training activities, from which both the organization and the individual benefit. The question may be asked as to how it is possible to "train" an organization either formally or informally. The organization-focused training activities include the formal organizational development interventions supplemented with seminars, workshops, and training conferences on specific organizational problems; the informal training includes activities such as reports of consultancy assignments, research reports, and published material disseminating new techniques, ideas, or values. In most cases, these organization-based training activities tend to be neglected by the various institutes. Instead, they concentrate their efforts on formal, individually based training programs. One cannot overemphasize the multiplier effect of an integrated approach to training. It is that approach that balances the institutional reform and team-building requirements of organizations with the educational and skill requirements of members.

It should be pointed out that a few training institutes have started to experiment with this training strategy. Under the impetus of administrative reforms, and particularly, with the renewed emphasis on decentralization and rural development, the National Institute of Public Administration, Lusaka, Zambia; the Kenya Institute of Administration at Lower Kabete, Nairobi; and the Management Development Institute, Kanifing, the Gambia have organized a series of programs aimed at developing individual capabilities and revitalizing decentralized institutions. The Department of Local Government and Field Administration of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria has also outlined a strategy seeking to upgrade the general level of performance in local government and field administration units.

Restricted Target Population

But where the training activities of an institute might have been integrated, its overall impact might be limited by its failure to reach all relevant target groups. An administrative reform program, for instance, cannot be successfully implemented unless its message gets to at least six interested parties: the political leadership category, senior generalist administrators, senior professional officers, the "middle management" cadre, the "other ranks," and the clientele outside each organization. The last is an amorphous category comprising, among others, civic groups, community leaders, trade associations, and the diverse interest groups. In most cases, the training programs of the institutes are directed at the junior and intermediate cadres of the career civil service, particularly administrative officers, middle managers, executive officers, bookkeepers, and secretary-typists. Until the last five years or so, when policy seminars began to gain acceptance, little attempt was made to "train" policymakers and senior members of the civil service. The "training" and reorientation of outside groups is out of the question—even though these social groups might be badly in need of training in new techniques coupled with ethical reeducation. The farmers' associations, for example, comprise persons who require exposure to extension services methods, new high-yielding varieties, the latest storage techniques, and straightforward (non-corrupt) ways of availing themselves of agricultural credit facilities. Yet, very few training institutes fill this vital gap.

Neglect of Ethics and Values

The training institutes have not come to grips with the problems of development because they have focused on training in management techniques to the exclusion of efforts geared toward the revitalization of administrative ethics. The inculcation of the ethic of development administration, the broadening of the educational base of public officers and business executives, and the development of their sensitivity to the external (international) environment—these and other academic subjects have received little attention in the programs of the institutes of administration. However, while matters of technical detail are important to the functioning of Africa's administrative systems, the ethical dimension can only be ignored at the peril of disconnecting the mind from the body of development administration. Ethics and values constitute the "mind," while systems and procedures represent the "body" of administration. If we proceed from the premise that the mind is capable of shaping the body, it becomes clear that one way in which the training institutes could significantly influence the course of African administrative development is by embarking on an ethical regeneration program.

It was in realization of the importance of ethics that the author has

proposed that a critical analysis be made of the impact of the traditional African cultures on administrative behavior. An interim survey of these cultures has produced a rather negative theory of social action, Theory N. The underlying assumptions of this theory are as follows:

1. Truth depends upon who is telling it; relatives do not lie, but strangers are never to be trusted.
2. The perfect order of things can only be guaranteed by steering clear of trouble or by avoiding unnecessary risks.
3. Wisdom consists of following the ways of one's ancestors and maintaining the solidarity of the kinship group, the clan, or the tribe.
4. The Devil rules the earth, and if one does not want trouble, one should not cross his path or challenge his authority.
5. The Kingdom of the Devil is inhabited by chaos, corruption, and brigandage; to wish to restore order in place of chaos or to suggest decency as a possible alternative to corruption is, at best, to attempt the impossible, at worst, to invite the wrath of the Devil —with dire consequences.
6. Success in life's pursuits in any case, is not due to one's efforts or good deeds, but to the capricious behavior of nature or the support of powerful patrons (mostly blood relatives or acquaintances).
7. By the same token, lack of progress at work or instability on the home front is attributable not to one's own actions but to the whimsical behavior of nature, evil spirits, or the conspiracy of powerful adversaries.
8. Material progress is a sign that the stars are in one's favor.
9. The wise person makes the best of his opportunities for material advancement; if his star shines, he should put something aside in anticipation of the time when the star falls.
10. A constant pledge of allegiance to powerful groups and/or individuals is likely to help put the shine back on a fading star.

It is not the argument of this paper that every African's world view is defined by Theory N. But, if in a given environment chaos is accepted as a *normal* part of daily experience, what measures can a government take to ensure that its machinery for policy implementation operates like clockwork, and what impact can management training have to develop in public employees an attitude of mind that places a high premium on precision, order, systems, and procedures? If it is normal in a society for people to evade responsibility for their actions, are the management training institutions not getting something wrong when they insist that, as required by the classical principles of organization, the authority which a public official exercises must be based on the responsibilities or

obligations to be discharged? If the elder or a ruler can do no wrong, how can he be held accountable for his actions? Where everybody believes that everybody else is corrupt and high-handed, how effective can the training institutes be when imparting new lessons on probity, accountability, and responsiveness?

Such questions as those posed in the preceding paragraph never come up when management training institutes start to design new programs or evaluate existing ones. Yet unless the questions are explicitly asked and honestly answered, the efforts and resources invested in management improvement/development in Africa will always yield negative results.

In the belief that it helps to accentuate the positive, an alternative theory has been proposed for the consideration of management development institutes in Africa. Theory P, as it is referred to, is based on a whole set of assumptions that are at variance with those of Theory N:

1. Truth is independent of who is telling or denying it; the first test of truth is whether it welcomes or discourages independent verification and inquiry.
2. Wisdom consists of assessing the ways of one's ancestors in the light of new knowledge, goals, and challenges.
3. The perfect order of the world is guaranteed by assuming the perpetual motion of the planets and anticipating what changes we need to effect as inhabitants of our own planet to ensure constantly harmonious rather than discordant movements.
4. The Cause of all causes, the Mover of everything that moves, the Creator of whatever is, rules the universe; the sometimes invisible but ubiquitous Devil is one of the creatures operating in parts of the universe.
5. This Devil is powerful; it/he/she is capable of victimizing, cajoling, bullying, ensnaring, enticing, blackmailing, and corrupting its victim. It (the Devil) will succeed only with those who accept its authority and who look for shortcuts to wealth and fame, but not with those who persevere against all odds and are devoted to the cause of truth, fairness, and excellence.
6. Man's illusion of a world without work, sweat, or pain ended when Adam was evicted from Paradise; the reality on our planet Earth is that man cannot survive or grow if he refuses to observe certain natural laws—particularly, the laws of cause and effect and of retribution.
7. By the same token, he who sows a whirlwind will reap a whirlwind; an adult cannot plant bananas and expect to harvest coffee.
8. Material progress may prove to be a mirage; a good name and clean record are a lasting asset.

9. A wise positionholder acts as if he may be asked at any moment to step down and account for his stewardship; he therefore avoids any action that will not stand close and independent scrutiny.
10. When the time is up, no earthly power can put the shine back on a fading star. Conversely, if a star has not reached its appointed time, human conspiracy cannot pull it down.

Factors Inhibiting the Effectiveness of the Institutes

The weakness of the various training institutes could be attributed to at least three factors: the background of trainers, the confused orientation of the institutes, and financial resource constraints.

The background of the trainers constitutes a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the various institutes. If each institute is to provide an atmosphere for the cross-pollination of ideas in management and public administration while at the same time administering an integrated and all-inclusive training strategy, it must have on its staff persons with a rare combination of qualifications, skills, and experience. In contrast to the present situation, whereby the trainers tend to be drawn either wholly from the civil service or exclusively from the universities, the instructors must be persons who could hold their own in the realms of business and public administration, public enterprise management, local government, and university administration. They must be comfortable in the roles of university professor, business decision maker, civil service bureaucrat, and local government manager. They must combine oratorical skills with analytical, research, and case-writing skills. In a nutshell, they must be well-rounded professionals who have practiced the art and can teach the science of management and public administration. Such individuals are rare, if they even exist. But bearing in mind the challenge facing the institutes in Africa, these all-rounders are precisely what they need. In addition, they require persons capable of blending the pedagogic (lecture) method with andragogic, adult-learning techniques and of making effective use of multimedia presentation techniques. The staffing problems facing Zambia's National Institute of Public Administration in implementing its public policy training programs are fully discussed in the next chapter. They not only illustrate the problems facing other institutions but point to what needs to be done to enhance the capacity of the institutions to design and implement training programs.

The problem of staffing could be tackled through the recruitment and training of persons with aptitudes for training and organizational development. However, the confused orientation of the various institutes still poses a problem. The staff colleges and institutes of administration in Africa fall into two categories—those attached to civil service depart-

ments and those that form an integral part of universities. Rarely can one find an institute that is genuinely autonomous—an institute which is free from the shackles of the civil service bureaucracy or the overbearing influence of the academic community. As to be expected, the parentage of each institute determines not only the pattern of recruitment into it but its training philosophy and its final outputs. An institute with civil service forebears is likely to be dominated by trainers who are passionately committed to the preservation of civil service traditions. Conversely, an academic-oriented institute tends to put out volumes of research material having no bearing on the problems of the day. An ideal situation is that whereby the institute would be free to draw its resource personnel from a wide variety of organizations and experiment with different approaches in policy analysis, management, and administration.

Even if the problem of orientation is solved, there remains the problem of finance. Budget cuts in recent years have frustrated efforts to recruit and adequately remunerate qualified instructors. Government austerity measures have also affected other essential items such as procurement of instructional materials, equipment, and office stationery; training of trainers; and fellowship programs and research activities. Equally telling is the effect of austerity on the construction of new physical structures and the maintenance of existing facilities. The edifices that were erected in beautiful surroundings in the early 1960s are in a sorry state today. The washrooms are barely usable, the walls are cracking, and the once-exquisite office furniture items are showing signs of neglect. The lawns are trimmed and the flowers are watered—but only when money can be released to supply fuel to the lawnmowing machine and procure garden implements. The financial bind has its positive side. It compels the various training institutes to practice what they teach: effective mobilization of resources, judicious allocation of the resources, and constant monitoring of results. Their ability to ride out the storm will go a long way in reinforcing their credibility as management development institutions.

Management Development Strategies and Priorities for the Future: A Summation

If this paper seems to have been too critical of the training institutes, it is because of the high standard by which they are increasingly being judged. It certainly makes no sense for these institutes to organize so many programs and produce so many trained persons every year when the fundamental problems of underdevelopment remain unsolved. The recent socioeconomic crisis in Africa, in particular, dictates the need to put the entire administrative system in a combat-ready position. It should be realized that the crisis has shifted the focus from development

to survival, and from growth to the problems of recession. In such circumstances, an institute of administration cannot be an optional extra in a modernization package, but a crucial force in the battle against economic backwardness and institutional decay. At the very least, the institutes should collaborate with government departments in stabilizing the turbulent economic environment.

In line with this new expectation, the institute should view part of its mandate to produce officials who, in the words of Adebayo Adedeji, "have brains in their heads as well as fire in their bellies"; that is, individuals who are sufficiently angry to wish to do something about Africa's economic tribulations and sufficiently cool-headed to know what to do. The institutes should provide a forum whereby those participating in their programs would return to their desks better prepared to anticipate environmental problems, analyze multidimensional problems, and work out satisfactory, cost-effective solutions. The institutes, like the universities, run the risk of being too academic in their approach to urgent national problems. At the same time, they may wish to please their practice-oriented clients, and in the process, discard the useful analytical tools at their disposal. It is therefore necessary for the institutes to reconstruct themselves into a bridge between "theory" and "practice." One way of going about this is ensuring that their training programs are complemented by research and consultancy activities. In particular, they should encourage the trainers to study community problems and apply their analytical and creative abilities in working out solutions.

To be effective as agents of change, the institutes should themselves be shining examples of good government and sound administration. If they are unable to manage conflicts or balance their budgets, and if they cannot evolve, and stick to, some acceptable personnel, accounting, or material-handling standards, they cannot expect the society outside to take them seriously.

11

Training in Policy Formation and Management

The Experience of NIPA

MULENGA BWALYA

Although public policy is a critical variable in the process of national development, little concerted and systematic attention has been devoted to either the training of trainers and the training of those assigned the task; or to those involved in the process of policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Accordingly, one finds very few training institutions worldwide with programs specifically aimed at education and training in public policy. This was particularly true of all the Zambian institutions until recently, when recognition of the grave deficiency compelled a few institutions, such as the University of Zambia and the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), to initiate modest efforts in the area.

This chapter is an attempt to recount the experience of NIPA with regard to training in public policy. The chapter examines the main achievements and problems as well as NIPA's future role in developing the policy and management capacity for self-reliance.

Training in Public Policy in Zambia: Introductory Background

Perhaps the earliest attempts at initiating public-policy training in Zambia can be traced to the establishment of the University of Zambia in 1966. Following the creation of the Department of Public Administration in 1967 under the leadership of V. Subramaniam, a third-year course, "Advanced Organization Theory," was introduced as part of the four-year bachelor's degree program in public administration. The course had a small policy analysis component, and it went no further than the introduction to public-policy analysis. It therefore remained limited and unsatisfactory.

In 1980 Gatian Lungu and the author of this chapter spearheaded the design and introduction of a full-fledged final-year course in public administration titled, "Public Policy Analysis." The course was set in the basic traditions of Herbert Simon and Yehzekel Dror's decision theory and public-policy analysis expositions. It covered such topics as the following:

- What is public policy?
- What is policy analysis?
- Models and processes of public-policy analysis
- Policy choices and strategies of implementation
- Policy evaluation and the feedback process

But even this innovation did not go far enough. The Lungu/Bwalya course, though an improvement over the "Advanced Organization Theory," still remained too general, basically theoretical, rather academic and targeted to undergraduate students. The course was furthermore aimed at a pre-employment audience and not at the practitioners who were actually involved in policy analysis, formulation, implementation, and evaluation. It did not therefore provide policy and management skills to public servants, who needed to apply such skills to real-life development problems. For a training scheme in public policy to be relevant and task-oriented, it had to address the in-service training needs of public officers, who were daily involved in public-policy issues. This is where NIPA came in.

Public-Policy Training at NIPA

The year 1983 marked a major turning point in the history of NIPA. Firstly, it was a year in which the public image of NIPA reached an all-time low, as both the government and the public expressed immense dissatisfaction with the institute's performance. Secondly, and springing from the first, swift changes were made in the leadership of the institute to bring on-board individuals with both theoretical preparation and practical experience in public administration. The outcome in the following years was a dramatic reorientation and reorganization of NIPA.

The main thrusts of the reorientation were: a shift from "crash" training for Zambianization, to training for the professionalization of the civil service; and a new stress on top-level management training for senior civil servants (simultaneously with the training of the lower-cadre officials). A curriculum review suggested a three-pronged approach consisting of:

1. Refresher training, mainly for senior-level civil servants, involving short courses, workshops and seminars, and focusing on particular

issues or deficiencies identified in the management of national development programs.
2. Professional training for various levels of staff involving long-duration professional diploma and certificate courses.
3. Research and consultancy services aimed at developing teaching materials and offering advice to the civil service departments, as and when necessary.

Consequently, the following diploma courses were introduced (in addition to the various six-month and one-year elementary and certificate courses, respectively):

- Institute of Local Government Administrators of Zambia (ILGAZ) – 3 years
- Accounting Technicians Diploma (ATD) – 3 years
- Incorporated Society of Valuers and Auctioneers (ISVA) – 3 years
- Diploma in Public Administration (Dip. P.A.) – 2 years

Diploma in Public Administration

Of particular interest to this paper is the two-year Diploma in Public Administration. This diploma, comprising a total of ten courses, including a research project, is intended for officers serving within the general administrative streams of the civil service, district councils, and parastatal organizations. The following general entry requirements have to be satisfied by prospective candidates:

1. A good pass in a Public Administration Certificate course, or other related field, from a recognized institution.
2. Four GCE "O" level passes or equivalent, including English, with at least three years' experience in a senior administrative/executive position.
3. Proven understanding of basic principles of management/administration; and experience in management/administrative positions in which the applicants can demonstrate the scope for personal initiative and decision making. (The Selection Committee reserved the right to call for documentary evidence to that effect.)

The diploma program has attracted a large number of applicants, averaging 500 for a maximum of only twenty-five places. Accordingly, many applications that meet the basic entry qualifications have had to be rejected in favor of those backed by more impressive credentials. Three batches of students have so far been enrolled at the institute since the introduction of the program in 1985.

Within the Diploma in Public Administration, a full one-year course

has been included, namely, "Public Policy Analysis and Evaluation." We outline below the objectives, content, methodology, and target group of the course.

Public-Policy Analysis and Evaluation Course

Aims and Objectives

The main objective of the course is to equip participants with the tools and analytical skills for understanding, formulating, implementing, and evaluating government policies. At the end of the course, participants should be able to:

1. Identify and understand the significant societal values and aspirations and clarify any ambiguities so as to give correct interpretations and priorities to issues and actions.
2. Develop relevant policies on the basis of the identified societal values and aspirations.
3. Translate general policies into specific operational goals, targets, and projects so as to fulfill public-policy objectives.
4. Coordinate many complex policies, programs, and projects at the operational level so as to achieve tangible outcomes.
5. Assess attainment of targets and identify constraints on policy implementation with a view toward proposing the necessary corrective measures.

Course Content

In order to meet the stated objectives, the following areas are covered as part of the course:

1. *Introduction to Public Policy:* It is difficult to understand a subject without knowing what it is. Accordingly, the concept of public policy, its importance, how it differs from planning, the approaches to, and problems in, studying it—these and other related topics are discussed.
2. *Policy Analysis:* The choice of effective policies in large part depends on a rigorous analysis of previous policies and societal demands. Different ways of analyzing policies in order to determine their feasibility or suitability for adoption and implementation are presented and discussed.
3. *Policy Implementation:* Issues of policy implementation common to most developing countries are discussed. Participants are exposed

to different models of implementing policies and their problems and why policies fail or succeed.

4. *Policy Evaluation:* Participants are introduced to the methods and concepts of policy evaluation.
5. *Societal Environment:* Policies are formulated and implemented within the context of a socioeconomic and political environment in which there are several groups, actors, and forces at work. These influences have to be taken into account in the policy process.
6. *Understanding Organizations:* Policies have to be formulated and carried out in organizations. There is the need to expose participants to the various ways of analyzing organizations so that they can understand the implications for designing or redesigning organizations for purposes of effective policymaking.
7. *The State and Administration:* Public policymaking is an important function in public administration. This is even more so in the Third World, where the state has taken on a leading role in the promotion of socioeconomic development. There is thus the need to examine critically the role of the state and administration in this process.
8. *Public Policymaking in Zambia:* Although throughout the course examples are drawn from the Zambian experience, there is an attempt to make the first seven parts of the course outlined above general rather than specific to Zambia. It is after a generic treatment of the subjects that Zambian institutions, interest groups, the environment and their influences in policymaking are closely examined using case studies and referring to sectoral policies such as agricultural, educational, and industrial policies.
9. *Improving Public Policymaking:* Many policies in the Third World are considered unsatisfactory or of poor quality. Participants are therefore exposed to ways and means of improving the process of policymaking.

Methodology

The lecture method is mainly used, although a lot of emphasis is placed on discussions during lectures to clarify any issues that may arise. More detailed discussions take place in small groups in the form of tutorials, where individual participants prepare a paper on a topic each week for presentation to the group. Participants are also given assignments in which emphasis is placed on the application of models, concepts, and theories to policy problems in Zambia. These assignments are assessed, and they count toward the final assessment of candidates' performance. In addition to these, end-of-term tests are conducted to assess the progress being made by participants. These, together with term assignments, count for 25 percent of the final assessment.

The institute has its own lecturers to administer the course. Where particular specializations are not available within the institute, the University of Zambia will then be approached for assistance.

Public-Policy Training, Policy Formation, and Self-reliance: A Critical Assessment

An evaluation of the impact of the public-policy analysis and evaluation course on Zambia's public-policy and policy process in general, and in relation to the management of self-reliance and aid policies, would be presumptuous. For one thing, the course has been running for only the last four years, and the first set of graduates of the program only came out in 1987. For another, the course is only a small part (one-tenth) of a program intended for a general administration cadre in the civil service, district councils, and parastatal organizations, who may be neither particularly concerned with public policy nor with the management of self-reliance and aid policies. Moreover, so far only two groups of about twenty graduates each have been released into the amorphous public service system, too few to exert any reasonable influence and observable impact.

But even if we were to make an evaluation of the likely impact of the course on the Zambian public-policy process and the management of self-reliance and aid policies, the impact would seem to be very insignificant for the following reasons: training would continue to be theoretical and academic; training was not specifically focused; the training period was too long; and the target group was too broad. Let us look at each of these factors in greater detail.

Theoretical Focus

A glance at the content of the public-policy analysis and evaluation course reflects a heavy theoretical and academic bias. The methodology of delivery is essentially pedagogic, interrupted by an occasional discussion and field visit. Assignments and other activities are aimed basically at meeting examination requirements rather than the development of practical skills in public-policy analysis, formulation, implementation, and evaluation. The course has yet to take full advantage of simulation exercises, real case studies, and practical attachments to organs of government with key responsibilities in the areas of public policy.

Moreover, even as the diploma in public administration program as a whole was being designed, it was evident that NIPA lacked competent and experienced trainers, especially in public-policy studies. From the start, it was envisaged that staffing resources for some of the critical

courses would come from the University of Zambia's departments of political and administrative studies and sociology. The university lecturers, for their own part, lacked practical experience in the public-policy process and consequently had to rely on theoretical and academic treatment of the subject. The lecturers rely extensively on books and teaching materials from the former colonial masters and from the Western industrialized societies. This defeats the purpose of self-reliance, besides making the course too alien to the Zambian environment.

Broad Target Group

Another source of pessimism over the course's impact on public policy is the lack of focus arising from covering too broad a target group. Being just one of the ten courses, albeit a core course, the public-policy analysis and evaluation course had to contend with difficulties in relating materials to the broad group. Covering, as the course had to do, a wide target group of participants with very divergent interests, it became difficult to focus on particular issues of immediate practical relevance to all. In the end, the course had to remain general and only introductory. Unless this is rectified, the course will remain inadequate in providing useful skills of practical application to the public-policy process in Zambia.

The focus of the course can further be criticized on the ground that it omits the specific categories of people who are daily involved in the policymaking and management process. It leaves out, for example, permanent secretaries, directors of planning and officials in similar categories, members of Parliament, party leaders at Freedom House and other highly placed government functionaries. Yet these are the people who decide on national policies and the broad strategies for managing the policies. They are precisely those who need knowledge of the public-policy process.

Training Period Too Long

Perhaps arising from the preoccupation with the professionalization of the public service, sight was lost of the need to relate programs of in-service training to the development of appropriate skills required to perform very specific and well-defined functions. As a consequence of this, a disproportionate length of time (two years) was set aside for the diploma program, and a whole year was devoted to the public-policy course—a course which does not offer value for money, as it fails to address the salient and practical skills needed in a developing country. The program as a whole is too long and needs adjustment by devoting part of it to practical attachments.

Making Public-Policy Training Relevant to the Strategy of Self-reliance

How then can we improve on the existing efforts and make public-policy training more effective and relevant to the needs of the people? After all, it is the people who should be the target and beneficiaries of any public-policy initiatives. It seems that a three-pronged strategy is required: the consolidation of public-policy education at the theoretical/academic level at the University of Zambia; at the professional level at NIPA; and at the practical level in the field.

Public-Policy Education

This would involve the strengthening of the existing public-policy analysis course at the University of Zambia and the infusion of aspects of public-policy analysis in the general education curriculum at the university, especially for students of public administration. It is also useful to introduce a full-fledged master's degree program in public policy at the university. These programs would focus on the fundamental aspects of the subject and thereby provide a theoretical base.

Professional Training in Policy and Strategic Studies

This will essentially entail the introduction of a program whose duration would not exceed one year and would be specifically devoted to policy and strategic issues. The target group for such a course would be the technocrats and middle-level civil servants charged with the responsibilities for advising on public policies, formulating guidelines, producing policy documents, and implementing and evaluating policies. This should be strengthened by practical attachments of students to relevant government and party offices with the intention of developing policy proposals for *actual* implementation. Further consolidation of the training can be achieved through the use of actual case studies of the policy process in Zambia. At the end of the course, participants should be able to analyze, design, implement, and evaluate public policies and take a strategic view of developments in the society and in the economy.

Practical Exposure to the Policy Process

This should involve a series of seminars, workshops, teaching, and so forth conducted on location in ministries, departments, or agencies for officers engaged in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. They would be practical in the sense that the outcomes of these seminars and workshops would be actual policy proposals to be considered for implementation by the organizations concerned.

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The Role of the Gambian Management Development Institute

S. M. B. FYE

The importance attached to the development of the policy formation and management capacity in the public service emanates from the influence that public servants have on national development.

The reason for this influence is not difficult to see. Firstly, public servants play a key role in the policy formulation and implementation processes, even if the final authority rests with politicians and political officeholders. The analysis, evaluation, and drafting of policy proposals are the tasks of public servants. Consequently, their views and perceptions influence the selection of options presented to politicians.

Secondly, the task of policy execution is generally entrusted either directly or indirectly to public servants. The speed and efficiency with which they fulfill this function are major determinants in the attainment of national policy objectives.

Thirdly, public servants are the principal actors in the process of initiating development programs and projects and in negotiating bilateral and non-bilateral development assistance. Consequently, their skills, perceptions, and preferences have a major impact on the nature and scope of such assistance.

Role of the Management Development Institute

Given the important role that public servants play in policy formulation and implementation, the need for developing and/or improving the expertise and skills they bring to bear on policy issues does not require any elaboration. The acquisition of the skills and expertise needed can be gained through either on-the-job training and/or formal training in management development institutions.

On-the-job training is very effective if the supervisor/trainer has the requisite knowledge, skills, and expertise as well as the time and patience

to transfer this knowledge and expertise to his subordinates. It is a well-known fact that many senior people themselves may not have the requisite training for the posts they hold, or if they do, the pressure on them to get so many things done within a short period leaves them with very little time to train subordinates on the job.

The establishment of management development institutions, particularly in Africa, is in part a recognition of the limitations of non-formal training methods and facilities. Management development institutes are established to provide the knowledge and skills required by public servants to perform their duties efficiently and effectively. These duties, as has been stated earlier, involve contributing to the formulation, implementation, and management of policies. Thus, it is the role of management development institutions to promote the development of policy-management capacity.

This paper seeks to highlight the experience of the Gambian Management Development Institute (MDI) in the development of such capacity through the services it offers. In particular, the paper addresses three basic questions:

1. How do the institute's programs contribute to effective policy formulation and execution?
2. What factors impede the utilization and impact of skills imparted in the training programs?
3. What strategies or measures can be employed to develop the capacities of management development institutes in general to overcome the barriers identified?

Development of Skills Critical to Policy Management

Training has been the major vehicle for the development of skills critical to the policy formulation and implementation processes. The Gambian Management Development Institute organizes regular training activities in three core areas:

- General Management (including Personnel Management)
- Project Management
- Financial Management and Accounting

In all these programs, the main objective has been to impart modern concepts and techniques of management and to help participants develop skills that can be employed in the formulation, implementation, and management of public policy. Consequently, a wide range of training methodologies are used, such as case studies, group discussions, action learning, syndicate exercises, role plays, lectures, and films. The partici-

pative approach is given greater emphasis than the lecture method. An atmosphere is generally created to enable participants to interact closely with one another and to encourage them to discuss the problems faced by their organizations and to formulate action plans designed to aid the achievement of organizational objectives.

Quite apart from the courses in general management, project management, and financial management, programs that are directly related to the development of skills essential for policy formulation and management have been organized by the institute either on its own or with the assistance of external agencies such as the Public Administration Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Association for Public Administration and Management, and the United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation for Development.

In May 1987, with the aid of a consultant funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the institute mounted a two-week seminar on "Reading Effectiveness and Report Analysis" for twenty-one senior managers drawn from seventeen ministries and departments. The objective of the seminar was to assist policymakers to acquire skills and techniques in the handling of information flows, the quick analysis of documents, and the production of concise synopses of reports as inputs to policymaking. The techniques and skills acquired were generally believed by the participants to have improved their proficiency in report analysis—a skill needed in the effective analysis and evaluation of policies.

In May 1988, African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) organized, in collaboration with the institute, the first in the series of workshops on "Critical Skills in Public Policy Management." The workshop was attended by senior managers from the public services of the English-speaking African countries. Among the delegates were Gambian public servants, three of whom were permanent secretaries. A wide range of instructive topics was covered at the 1988 workshop:

- the socioeconomic, political, and institutional environment in which policies are made
- the public-policy process
- problem-solving techniques
- the role of senior civil servants in the policy process
- cost/benefit analysis
- management by objectives
- management of change

The workshop helped to illuminate the public-policy process and the roles that senior managers can effectively play in this field.

One particular subject that aroused profound interest at this work-

shop related to the source of public policy. This is because of the acknowledged fact that public policies have a multiplicity of sources that are difficult to categorize into neat compartments. An attempt is sometimes made to distinguish between primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include the formal agencies of the state and of the democratic political process—political party programs, parliamentary legislations, proposals put forward by ministers and their speeches, and recommendations from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Other sources that may be classified as informal and secondary but which are nonetheless very important include:

- the mass media
- occupational and professional interest groups
- religious bodies

In the Gambia, some of these forces, both formal and informal, have exerted significant influence on the policy process. The annual "Meet the Farmers Tour," undertaken to every part of the country by the president of the republic, provides valuable sources of information and inputs for policy formulation. Statements made by farmers and the head of state on grassroots problems are taken very seriously by ministers and senior civil servants and sometimes provide the initial inputs and thrusts for policy formulation. Secondly, the annual visit of heads of Muslim communities to the head of state during the end of Ramadan (*Id-el-Fitr*) provides a significant forum for highlighting matters of concern to the Muslim community. The pursuit of policies on the spread of Arabic and Islamic education has been strengthened by statements made at such a forum. The May 1988 workshop fully discussed these sources and thereby significantly improved the insights and understanding of participants.

In September 1989 a two-week seminar on "Policy Analysis and Management" was organized by the Institute, with the assistance of a UNDP-funded consultant. The basic objectives were similar to those of the workshop on critical skills in policy management:

- to promote an appreciation of the political, economic, and institutional environment in which policies are made;
- to help participants to acquire the necessary skills for the evaluation of policy options;
- to improve skills in the analysis of financial and operational data needed in planning and programming;
- to highlight problems and obstacles encountered in the implementation of policies.

The seminar covered issues and concepts in strategic planning, strate-

gic management, policy objectives, steps and methods in the evaluation of policies, and various forms of *bureaupathologies* or organizational diseases, as well as their causes and consequences.

To further promote an understanding of the policy process and enhance the skills essential for sound policy management, the institute periodically organizes a series of one-day seminars for top management personnel at the level of permanent secretaries, managing directors of parastatal organizations, and their deputies. The themes addressed generally include strategies for achieving targets and objectives, particularly for parastatal organizations that have entered into performance contracts with government.

These seminars afford top-level policymakers an opportunity to discuss issues such as:

- steps in policy formulation
- the role of politicians in the policy process
- ways and means of coping with political pressures and short-term expediency
- the involvement of beneficiaries in policy execution

In the course of the seminars, top managers are encouraged to adopt a team approach in the pursuit of organizational goals and objectives. It is stressed that policy formulation and management involve many activities, and unless the contributions of each actor or interested party are recognized and coordinated within an overall strategy, policies will continue to be frustrated by bureaucratic inertia and the pursuit of conflicting interests. Experience in the Gambia has proved that this forum has been invaluable in helping top-level management to reflect on the process of administrative reform, to evaluate the role of different sectors in the exercise, and to devise strategies capable of generating increased commitment to administrative reform. Similarly, the experience has afforded managing directors of parastatal organizations the opportunity of subjecting organizational goals and policies to careful scrutiny and evaluation.

In recent months, the institute has sought to involve the political class in similar policy- and management-oriented seminars. Parliamentarians have on a few occasions initiated the organization of specific one-day seminars (under the leadership of the speaker and the vice-president) for the purpose of acquiring increased information on the roles and activities of nongovernmental organizations. Such seminars have helped the legislators to understand the contributions of voluntary organizations to socioeconomic development and the need for their effective coordination at the field level if duplication of efforts and resources is to be avoided.

The institute plans to organize a one-day seminar for ministers and their advisers, under the chairmanship of the head of state or the vice-

president, to discuss, among other things, the following subjects:

- Plans in the policy formulation process; and
- The need for close partnership in the formulation and pursuit of national developmental policies, goals, and objectives.

Experience gained in the organization of top-level management workshops has confirmed that permanent secretaries and managing directors face serious management problems stemming from:

- undue political interference
- lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities
- differing perceptions of organizational goals, and policies

A frank and free exchange of ideas on these subjects should help to improve working relationships and thus facilitate the common pursuit of goals and policies. The institute is aware of the fact that unless carefully and efficiently handled, the seminar could degenerate into a confrontation exercise, which could in turn have adverse consequences and impact in the work situation. In conducting it, therefore, the institute intends to utilize the experience gained by other institutes of management such as the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON), and the Kenya Institute of Administration.

Consultancy and Organizational Development

One other area in which the intervention of the institute has yielded a positive impact on policy management capacity is that of consultancy. Since its inception in 1984, MDI has undertaken four major consultancies for government ministries and departments. The first exercise involved an evaluation of the organizational/administrative effectiveness of a major agricultural station in the country concerned with research, extension, production, marketing of agricultural inputs, and the provision of social services (education, health, recreation) to officials and their families at the station. Through this study, the institute was able to diagnose the root causes of the organizational problems at the station. Many of the recommendations made as a result of this study have been put into operation. A proper organizational structure has been established with a proper chain of command and leading to the coordination of work at the field level. The coordination of the activities of donor agencies involved in the implementation of projects located in the station has also been significantly enhanced by better communication and increased delegation of functions and authority to the station officer (who previously served as a figurehead, unable to either provide the needed leadership or take critical decisions on resource allocation). The study further questioned

mission of the station: should it continue to operate as a research and extension-oriented station and also serve as a marketing institution for agricultural inputs and products? It is pleasing to note that the study encouraged in-depth discussions and reevaluation of the role and mission of the agricultural station. Thus, following a major reorganization of the entire Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the station was classified simply as an agricultural research station.

Similarly, in 1987 the institute had to undertake a critical assessment of the optimum utilization of all categories of staff in local government and municipal councils. The functions and duties of all cadres were exhaustively examined, and the qualifications and experience required for the efficient execution of various duties were closely studied. The study, among other things, disclosed that over 30 percent of the staff of all councils were grossly underutilized and that meager council resources were devoted more to consumption than to the delivery of developmental and social services to rural and urban communities. Each of the six councils investigated was subsequently compelled to undertake major retrenchment exercises, particularly of dead wood and unqualified staff. Without an objective inquiry and a well-documented report, it would have been extremely difficult for top management in these local authorities to adopt unpalatable measures, least of all, the retrenchment of redundant staff with powerful political connections.

The benefits of the consultancies undertaken were not one-sided. The institute itself gained many advantages and helped to dispel misgivings that research and consultancies tended to transform training institutes into academic ivory towers unrelated to the world of work.

Our experiences in this area confirm that research, consultancy, and training are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Research and consultancies provide the needed professional opportunity for trainers to remain in touch with reality and gain useful insights into the dynamics of administration. These activities help training institutes to generate appropriate training materials in the form of case studies and exercises based on actual indigenous experiences with which course participants are acquainted.

It is well-known that one of the problems faced by many training institutes in Africa is the dearth of indigenous training materials. Very often, trainers rely heavily on materials developed in societies with different cultural values and whose cases and materials do not always take cognizance of the ecology of African public administration. This alien nature of the materials limits the impact and effectiveness of training programs.

In recent months many of the institute's staff have been deeply involved in another major consultancy exercise—an examination of the ways and means of enhancing the management effectiveness and efficiency of the Ministry of Finance and Trade to ensure the fulfillment of

its mission. As a major coordinating ministry whose role is vital to the sound management of the country's meager resources, the level and quality of the management service of the ministry are major determinants of the development process in the country.

The study has been a source of considerable education, particularly to the technical assistance training staff not closely acquainted with the day-to-day operations of government ministries and departments. The study has helped the institute to be better equipped to formulate tailor-made programs that can directly address the training needs of this particular ministry.

The institute has equally played a pro-active and interventionist role through its membership in various government bodies and committees involved in policy planning, policy reforms, and implementation. The management of the institute is represented in the Civil Service Advisory Committee presided over by the head of the public service. The advisory committee is charged with the duty of monitoring progress in the implementation of the administrative reform program, advising on the adoption of new policies and programs designed to facilitate the reorganization of ministries and departments, and the establishment of planning units. All major policies designed to improve the culture, discipline, work ethic, and performance of the public service have to be evaluated by this committee before final decisions are taken by the cabinet. Recently, a code of conduct was discussed and approved by the committee.

Factors Impeding the Effectiveness of Training Institutes

Indigenous professional trainers with requisite experience and qualifications are few, particularly in small countries such as the Gambia. Even where experienced and competent officers in the public service are available, they lack the aptitude and interest to regard training as a career, more so as trainers do not enjoy a high social status. They do not wield political influence and power and do not have access to many privileges. Training consultants sponsored by the ECA, UNDP, EEC, and USAID have helped to transfer skills to Gambian trainers and managers. However, there is need to guarantee the sustainability of externally supported activities. It is thus necessary to accelerate the recruitment and training of indigenous trainers and encourage the utilization of parttime trainers.

Secondly, the database essential for guiding research in, and investigation of, the policy process is often chronically weak or nonexistent. Consequently, the amount of information required to advise and influence political authorities is not always available. This is a major handicap in the Gambia.

Thirdly, political commitment to certain programs and policies initiated by donor agencies is at times so strong that there is resistance to rig-

orous analysis of their merits and weaknesses and the offer of alternative options. Where donor assistance confers certain benefits to constituencies, politicians find it difficult to reject such external assistance.

A fourth problem is the tendency of many training institutes to be too obsessed with the status quo and the maintenance of traditional core programs and courses. Many of the programs related to public-service needs are not sufficiently updated to cope with changing needs and priorities dictated by economic and social circumstances. There is still a widespread tendency to focus on public-sector training, even when innovations within the sector are limited. The MDI has taken some bold steps designed to avoid these pitfalls. It has for example introduced non-traditional courses in the area of entrepreneurship development. Training has been conducted in local languages for entrepreneurs and, in particular, businesswomen who are anxious to set up their own business ventures. A major impediment confronted is in the recruitment of trainers with the requisite communication and professional skills and the production of training materials and visual aids in this area.

Finally, a major problem is in respect to skills acquired in policy analysis and management courses, which do not always find fertile ground for fruition in the public service. One hears this complaint quite often: "We have learned a lot of useful tools and techniques that one would like to utilize in the work situation. Our major problem is the hostile environment—one which is not conducive to change and innovation—as well as the indifference and skepticism of our bosses." If measures could be developed to make the hierarchically structured work environment receptive to change, well over half of the problems facing management training institutes would have been solved.

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The Role of the Liberia Institute of Public Administration

THOMAS G. KOON

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) in meeting public-sector training needs. It is also the aim of this paper to broaden our understanding of the challenges facing the institute and other governmental training institutions. Finally, the chapter will examine the relationships that should develop between the training institutions and their clients.

A successful career in administration—public or private—requires training in management. This training was almost completely lacking in Liberia's development initiatives. It was common knowledge in Liberia in the 1960s that the skilled labor resources required to successfully carry out development projects were in short supply. Every major government report on public administration brought this out. An example is the report of the Technical Assistance Commission of the Republic of Liberia, released on 20 December 1967 which stated, among other things, that:

> The Department of Planning and Economic Affairs has expressed concern that sector plans of the various departments point to shortage of trained middle-level employees and this is a retarding factor in progress and development.[1]

President Tubman, in his 1968 annual message, informed the legislature of his intention to take steps leading to the early establishment of an institute of public administration. A year later (in 1969), an act was passed by the legislature establishing the Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA). The act empowered the institute to organize and conduct conferences and discussions for the purpose of exchanging opinions and views on the critical issues in the public service of the government of

Liberia. In the performance of its functions, the institute was also empowered to solicit and receive assistance from external sources.

The institute was charged with the primary responsibility for improving the administrative performance and professional capabilities of the public service through training of personnel; conducting research into problems of public administration; and undertaking consultancy assignments with the aim of developing, for maximum utilization, the labor resources of the country.

The institute became operational in 1972. The main thrust of its mandate has been the improvement of the administrative/managerial capacity of public servants in Liberia through in-service training. The development of the training program of LIPA has been based on research conducted throughout Liberia to assess the training needs of government officials at the middle level of the government's administrative hierarchy—the level at which policies are implemented. Redesign and redevelopment of training activities at LIPA are also based on findings of surveys of existing training courses offered at the institute. The research findings also result in the design and development of special courses to fit particular or specific, short-term, organizational needs.

Aims, Objectives, and Role of LIPA

Within the scope of the law, LIPA has the following broad goals:

1. Establish itself as a viable organization, contributing to the social and economic development of Liberia by increasing governmental administrative and managerial capacities and by promoting greater individual and organizational productivity.
2. Develop and implement integrated training, research, consulting, documentation, and publication services.
3. Train and develop a corps of competent Liberian staff to carry out training, research, consultancy, and related programs.
4. Initiate projects to better define Liberia's administrative and management needs as well as their relationship to LIPA's role.
5. Create appropriate procedures to periodically review, monitor, and evaluate LIPA's programs and activities.

In light of these goals, the prime role of the institute is to help create and maintain improved management of public policy. This can best be achieved by developing the skills of management to cope with changing needs and circumstances, and then to advise and assist the trained managers to make optimum use of the resources available. LIPA has been established to serve as the center for developing the management capability needed to attain the nation's development objectives as set forth in

the National Socio-Economic Development Plan, 1976–1980. As the institutional source of this capability, LIPA continues to create and implement programs to strengthen and extend its professional capacity to fulfill its role. As a government-owned and managed institution, LIPA is primarily engaged in non-degree training programs.

The Role of LIPA in Meeting Public-Sector Needs

Among the functions and duties specified in the Enabling Act are the following:

- creating and improving the capability needed for administering economic and social development programs;
- enunciating career development programs by encouraging in-service training, management interns and executive development programs, and promotional programs based on merit;
- providing leadership and guidance to the agencies of government in developing more and better quality on-the-job training programs, serving as a research group to study particular governmental organizational and management problem areas;
- conducting research in administration to provide adequate systematic and precise information in critical areas of government for the purpose of improving planning and administration.

Objectives and Scope of Training

One of the responsibilities of any government is to publicly declare the objectives and scope of public-service training and the importance it attaches to this function. By making its expectations clear to both the employees to be trained and those who perform training tasks, government provides adequate guidance on what knowledge or skills should be imparted to participants in a training program and how the program would be ultimately judged. It is important for the government to relate its objectives for training to the basic national goals and developmental aspirations. Almost invariably, most governments expect training to lead to an improved and more efficient public service through the development of appropriate skills, knowledge, and abilities in their personnel. It is therefore necessary that a comprehensive national training policy be developed, reviewed periodically, and updated as the need arises.

Assessment of Training Needs

For any training institution to design or develop viable training programs, it is necessary for it to participate in the assessment and identification of training needs. Indeed, an important component of training is

that of relating the policy guidelines on systematic assessment of training needs as well as the assignment of responsibility for this task to relevant agencies. This would facilitate an orderly planning of training activities. Identification of training needs is essential at three levels: national, institutional, and program. A broad assessment of training needs from a national perspective must be undertaken periodically so that training institutions can be assigned appropriate training tasks and made to adapt to the changing requirements of the nation. Unfortunately, this is not always the case in many Third World countries, including Liberia. As a matter of fact, most developing countries have not developed comprehensive training policies which would, among other things, define the basic approaches to training needs assessment. This at times results in duplication of efforts and programs. A national assessment must take into account both the maintenance and developmental needs of the government.

Assessment of training needs at the institutional and program levels must be undertaken within the framework of priorities identified at the national level. Once each institution is assigned an area of training responsibility, a more detailed exercise in identifying the need must be undertaken by its professional staff. The failure to share responsibilities among training institutions also results in duplication of efforts and waste of limited resources, as training institutions compete among themselves in the development and implementation of training programs.

LIPA's Training Assumptions

LIPA's training approach does not consist of a fixed set of programs locked into a specific time frame. Rather, the institute's plans and programs are flexible enough to respond to changing situations and needs, while ensuring effective and consistent development of its resources to meet continuing program requirements. The design and development of the institute's courses are based on the needs surveys conducted between 1973 and 1986. The institute's periodic review of its programs (such as workshops, seminars, and courses) and their content helps ensure the relevance of the training.

Training centers such as LIPA play a major role in laying the groundwork and continuing support for administrative improvement efforts. Yet training alone cannot effect a policy of administrative development. It must be complemented with changes in operating policies and practices, personnel administration, financial, accounting, and organizational systems. Without a supportive work environment for personal and professional growth, marked improvements in performance cannot be expected. It must also be stressed that in training, as in other areas of policy, successful implementation requires strong political and bureaucratic support.

In meeting the needs to improve the skills of managers and the performance of organizations, two major groups of activities are necessary. One group of activities must be concerned with the upgrading of knowledge and skills in management practices. The second must provide a structure for organizational development interventions in the operations of the various agencies to improve their effectiveness.

LIPA has a responsibility to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the managers/administrators in both the public and private sectors. It is worth mentioning that since 1986, LIPA has intensified its efforts toward meeting the critical needs of the private sector. All things being equal, this trend will continue so that by the year 2000, a significant number of managers and administrators in both the public and private sectors will have been exposed to the institute's training programs.

LIPA fulfills its role with regard to the public sector by designing and developing training courses that not only impart the basic knowledge and skills to participants but are also relevant in terms of current administrative practices and the needed changes. The training methods bring the participants face-to-face with practical managerial situations and stress the importance of group exercises, individual research projects, and the involvement of participants in discussions.

Training programs should in any case avoid raising unrealistic expectations on the part of public servants. The institute has accordingly been careful to clarify the exact nature and purpose of its courses and to emphasize that they were not yet linked to promotion. Rather, they were intended to build and strengthen managerial competence.

In furtherance of the objective of merit in the civil service, it is important that promotion be related to improvement in work performance. However, experience in a number of developing countries shows that if training is to be effective, governments must intervene in their personnel policies to create strong linkages between career development plans and the training of personnel. It is also necessary to improve career prospects of the trainers themselves. There is need to link training to performance appraisal systems and promotion policies so as to motivate public servants to make better use of training. LIPA will in any case continue to liaise with the Civil Service Agency in this endeavor to ensure that its programs are supportive of the move to install a merit system for the public service.

LIPA's training plan rests on the availability of personnel with the skills needed to design and organize courses, seminars, and workshops. The effectiveness of the institute also depends on the funds to implement the programs. In this connection, it is necessary to acknowledge the efforts and contributions of the United Nations Development Program/ Royal Institute of Public Administation partnership in supporting the institute's training programs.

LIPA's Relationship with Other Organizations

A necessary condition for an institute's development is its linkages to other organizations and agencies. Such linkages are important to LIPA, since it alone cannot meet all public-sector training needs. Other organizations and institutions must play an active role in achieving the national goal of enhancing administrative and managerial capabilities. It goes without saying that the limited resources of the country dictate that cooperation among training institutions be promoted and sustained.

Against this background, linkages with other national organizations and institutions have sought to avoid competition, duplication, and waste of resources. The institutions have endeavored to operate in unison to accomplish that which each cannot achieve alone. Such cooperation and collaboration, if effectively managed, will continue to have a strong multiplier effect on LIPA's programs and projects.

The Civil Service Agency (CSA) is one institution with which LIPA interacts on a fairly regular basis. This is understandable, taking into account the institute's role in seeking to improve public-service management and administrative practices. Both institutions (CSA and LIPA) play vital roles in upgrading and strengthening public-service performance. It is essential that the two organizations should work together in defining training needs (based on the CSA's determination of skills requirements); developing performance evaluation systems; assisting ministries, departments, agencies, and public enterprises in developing their training plans as well as identifying their critical training needs; and training those appointed to positions of training officers in these organizations.

LIPA also mounts joint activities with other agencies of government —particularly the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Bureau of the Budget.

An operating linkage has been established with the College of Business and Public Administration of the University of Liberia. Efforts are being made to establish similar linkages with other colleges of the university as well as with the Cuttington University College. The aim of such cooperation and collaboration is to utilize, to the optimum, their specialized resources. In specific terms, collaboration would entail:

1. faculty exchange in specialized areas for courses being conducted at LIPA or at these institutions;[2]
2. library exchange to avoid duplication of materials;
3. cooperation in undertaking research projects;
4. joint consultancies;
5. coordinated use of classrooms and other physical facilities and equipment.

Finally, links with other institutes of public administration in Africa and organizations such as the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), African Training and Research Center in Administration for Development (CAFRAD), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have proved most valuable in terms of their ability to provide additional resources and experiences.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the role of the Liberia Institute of Public Administration in meeting public-sector training needs. LIPA fulfills this role by ascertaining the administrative and management training needs of the Liberia public service and by taking steps to meet those needs.

It should be noted that personnel policies and the prevailing administrative culture are two crucial variables that influence the effectiveness of training. Thus, where career development linkages with training are strong, there is an equally strong incentive on the part of public servants to respond to and internalize training inputs. When the administrative culture is performance-oriented, a ministry/agency will demand more training inputs for its personnel if this helps in improving performance. Above all, for training institutions to enhance their role in meeting training needs, it is necessary for them to actively participate in training needs assessment.

Regarding the relationship that should develop between LIPA and its clients, it is emphasized that if LIPA is to play its proper role in national development, then it must take definite steps to bring itself into very close association with the ongoing administrative processes and also become actively involved in planning for future reforms and adjustments.

Endnotes

1. The Department of Planning and Economic Affairs has changed its nomenclature since the 1970s and is now known as the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

2. In fact, this cooperation has already begun as one of LIPA's senior staff did parttime teaching at Cuttington University College last semester.

14

Seychelles Institute of Management

A Brief Introduction

COLIN BANKS

The Seychelles Institute of Management (SIM) has responsibility for the training of personnel in administration and management within Seychelles. The role of SIM in administrative and managerial training is part of a coordinated approach by the Seychelles government to improve the performance of the public sector. As almost 50 percent of the GDP and 70 percent of employment are generated by the public sector, the importance of this plan cannot be overstated.

The responsibility for public-policy management rests with the president's office, and the improvement plan has developed along two broad lines:

- improvement of management information systems and decision-making procedures within governmental ministries and parastatal organizations
- labor resource improvement

Three divisions have been created within the president's office to oversee these improvements:

- Management Services Division
- Information Systems Division
- Manpower Division

The Management Services Division and the Information Systems Division jointly share the responsibility for improving management information systems and decision-making procedures. These divisions also have other responsibilities, but this is not the forum to elaborate on these.

The Manpower Division has the responsibility for labor resource development within the country, including the enhancement of managerial capacity within the public sector. At the present time, SIM is a part of the Manpower Division, but consideration is being given to granting it either full divisional status or complete autonomy. Although it is a relatively young institution, SIM is now focusing its efforts on high-level management training. SIM's approach to training takes different forms. The features mentioned herewith include current practices and future aspirations:

The first plan of action takes the form of an active involvement in as many aspects of public-policy management as possible, including policy initiation, implementation, and evaluation. Although our involvement in policy initiation is relatively limited, recognition has been given to the fact that SIM has an institutional role to play in this area. Our staff were involved in the formulation of the recently approved labor resource policy as well as in several of the major sectoral committees associated with the National Development Plan for the 1990–94 period.

It is likely that SIM will also play an increasing role in policy implementation. Already, institute staff have been responsible for developing the procedures used within the country for appraising investment projects. We are also aspiring to institutional membership of such important committees as the National Manpower Development Board and the Project Appraisal Committee and to membership of boards of directors of parastatal organizations.

One of the principal benefits of institutional involvement in policy initiation and implementation would be the early recognition of training needs. Often, training does not occur until long after a problem has been recognized through an evaluation. The involvement of trainers in the early stages of planning can lead to preventive training action being taken.

Policy evaluation has been the traditional domain of academic and training institutions throughout the world. However, it is through participation in the other aspects of public-policy management that such institutions can play a more dynamic role. Perhaps such involvement is more likely to occur in a small country such as Seychelles.

The second major plan consists of the use of a wide variety of interventionist methods (including training, research, and consultancy), all geared toward the major objective of improving organizational performance. Until now, SIM's role has been to provide educational opportunities to all those people denied them by previous administrations. In effect, the institute has played a social role based on the needs of disadvantaged individuals rather than on an economic role geared to the needs of organizations. Adoption of this latter approach is more likely to improve the efficiency of the organizations concerned, whether they are from the public or private sector.

The adoption of strategic management practices at the institute itself is the third aspiration. This will ensure that SIM provides a role model for other organizations to follow. I cannot stress this point enough, as I believe that it has universal application. Management institutes must be at the forefront of management change within the country—they must provide leadership. As an example, SIM is about to introduce a vigorous system of time reporting in order to improve productivity. It is hoped that this will form the basis for time analysis within the entire public sector.

Fourthly, SIM intends to pursue a policy of regional cooperation to seek assistance in organizing programs that are outside the capacity of our own organization to run (perhaps this is an aspect of the collective self-reliance policy). For example, the need for courses in "Aid Negotiation Skills" has been recognized in Seychelles, as in other countries, and SIM proposes not only to develop such a course but also to enlist the cooperation of outside consultants in organizing it.

Another priority is the documentation of management problems and experiences within the country to serve as guides for future action. I would also suggest that a data bank of such case studies developed throughout the African region should be established for the benefit of all our countries.

Above all, SIM plans the introduction of a scheme of service that is sufficient to attract appropriately qualified local staff. Attraction and retention of staff by academic institutions are global problems, but the disruptions caused by the turnover of expatriate staff every two to three years make them more acute for a small developing country such as Seychelles.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate four main points that I think are necessary to make training more effective. Specifically, we need to:

1. Coordinate training with other public-sector performance improvement programs through the close cooperation of all agencies concerned.
2. Enlarge the role of training institutions to permit involvement in as many aspects of the policy process as possible.
3. Practice what we preach. Let each training institute serve as an example in the application of sound management principles so that other organizations will be attracted to follow suit.
4. Share experiences and share resources within the region: of particular importance is the need to promote exchange of training and research material, case studies, management games, films, and other learning resources and methodologies. This is probably where networking among training institutions proves its worth.

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Networking and Coordination of Training in Policy Management

ALI D. YAHAYA

Africa is today battling with a devastating socioeconomic crisis. One widely acknowledged aspect of this crisis is the weakness of African public services in the areas of policy and management. This weakness derives largely from the absence of critical skills in policymaking. It is for this reason that management development and training institutions should become increasingly involved in the policy process and in imparting skills, attitudes, and values that would facilitate national development.

The strategy for the resolution of Africa's development crisis focuses on economic recovery through self-reliance. Economic recovery is to be achieved through economic reform measures embodied in Structural Adjustment Programs. These reform programs contain a significant component of self-reliance, which is to be achieved through South-South cooperation, human resource development, local sourcing of raw materials, and local design and fabrication of machinery and spare parts. The strategy for the attainment of these objectives has always emphasized the need for cooperation and collaboration among African countries in the effort to combat these features of underdevelopment. It is therefore valid to state that collective self-reliance, as defined in the African context, is indeed one other model of South-South cooperation. Policies for collective self-reliance have been clearly articulated in the Monrovia Accord (1979) and the Lagos Plan of Action (1980). Under these imaginative plans, African governments have agreed to:

1. Promote the economic and social development and integration of their economies with a view toward achieving an increasing measure of self-sufficiency and self-sustainment.

2. Promote the economic integration of the African region in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse.
3. Establish national, subregional, and regional institutions that will facilitate attainment of the objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment.
4. Cooperate to eliminate illiteracy; encourage science and technology; achieve self-sufficiency in food production and supply; stimulate industrial development; control the exploration and extraction of national resources; develop indigenous entrepreneurship, technical human resources, and technological abilities.[1]

The success of these self-reliant programs and reform measures depends largely on the internal capacities to manage the process. Here lies the challenge to development, research, and training institutions. Training and research institutions may cope with this challenge through several means. Some of these are:

- strengthening the institutional capacities of management training and research institutes;
- networking among training institutions for greater self-reliance;
- creative forms of intervention designed to transform the attitudes of public officers as well as foster internal capacity for policy analysis and implementation.

The focus of this chapter is on the networking and coordination of training. No attempt is made to focus on networking for the development of skills in policy management for the simple reason that networking is at the moment merely an instrument for fostering self-reliance and has not been fully developed in Africa as a training methodology.

Networking As an Operational Concept

The concept of networking is increasingly gaining recognition as a process for the attainment of the goals of collective self-reliance. At a recent international forum sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Asian and Pacific Development Center it was clearly demonstrated that networking had been accepted as the process for fostering cooperation and collaboration among training and research institutions within nations and in specific regions.

A distinction is made between networking as a process and a network as an instrument for carrying out a stipulated project either in training or in research. This distinction is clearly articulated in a paper by Getubig Jr. et al. (1989), who explained that networks were project-related forms of collaboration and cooperation.[2] The network will wither

away at the completion of the project. The network therefore terminates at the end of the project cycle.

In contrast, networking is a process designed to foster institutional development and capabilities. As a rule, it goes beyond the conventional project cycle. It involves collaboration and cooperation among partner institutions on a more intense and a long-term basis. Since networking is concerned with current and emergent issues, the collaborative relationships binding members can last as long as members have a common concern to resolve these issues. In Africa, for instance, the scope and thrusts of administrative reform, competence in formulating and implementing economic recovery programs, as well as issues related to management training and development require urgent attention. These are matters that can be handled through networking.

Networking and networks as instruments for the attainment of training and research objectives are more highly developed in the Asia-Pacific region than in Africa. Two examples will suffice to demonstrate how advanced the Asia-Pacific region is in networking. There is the Asian and Pacific Development Center based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The center comprises nineteen member countries and performs the following principal functions:

- acts as a catalyst in strengthening the capabilities of national research and training institutions;
- promotes research and training activities on a collaborative basis by fostering the establishment of networks of individuals and institutions;
- strengthens the linkages with regional networks in an effort to promote economic cooperation among countries of the region;
- undertakes research studies that provide a regional dimension to the development problems faced by national governments;
- identifies existing and emerging needs and problems with a view toward increasing the awareness of governments on the long-term impact upon the structure of the economy and the basic institutions of their societies;
- provides assistance in fostering programs to develop human resources to meet the changing needs of the region;
- serves as a clearing house for information on development;
- offers consultancy services, in cooperation with national institutions, where appropriate, to countries of the region.

The second example is the Association of Management Development Institutions in South Asia (AMDISA). This is the other type of networking based on the voluntary coming together of national institutions. The objectives of AMDISA are stated below:

1. The mission of the association shall be to promote management education and management development activities in Southern Asia, taking into account the economic, social, and cultural context of the region, with firm dedication to worldwide exchange of experiences and ideas in the fields concerned.
2. In furtherance of the above mission, AMDISA shall pursue the following objectives:

   - creating a forum for sharing institutional experiences on management education and management development in the South Asian Region;
   - promoting educational and professional development of those involved in management development as teachers, trainers, researchers, administrators, consultants, and others with similar functions;
   - promoting management development activities in the region through stimulating dialogue between professionals and the clients they serve—government, industry, and other organizations and sectors;
   - promoting cooperation among member institutions for development of teaching/training materials and facilitating sharing of same;
   - promoting cooperation among member institutions for research, consulting, training, and education;
   - strengthening institutional capabilities through faculty and staff development, improved infrastructural facilities, and activities of a similar nature;
   - establishing an institutional mechanism for disseminating management development information within the region; that is, through newsletters, data-banks, clearing houses, publications, and other networking arrangements;
   - developing effective cooperation with similar associations in other regions, international agencies, intergovernmental organizations, foundations, and any other organizations that may further the cause of AMDISA;
   - generating resources through membership fees, contributions, donations, endowments, subsidies, fees, programs and projects, publications, and any other activities, including loans and investments for furthering the objectives of AMDISA;
   - acquiring, transferring, mortgaging, and disposing of all kinds of assets, including equipment, vehicles, facilities, and real estate, for realizing the objective of AMDISA;
   - undertaking any other measures which would further the above objectives.

In Africa networks and networking are still in their infancy and are still to make any notable impact. There is the West African Management Development Institutes Network (WAMDEVIN), Association of Management Training Institutions of Eastern and Southern Africa (AMTIESA), and Association des Institutions de Formation et de Perfectionnement en Management d'Afrique (Francophone African states). There are other Regional Training and Research Institutions like the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), the African Training and Research Center in Administration for Development (CAFRAD), and Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

There does not seem to be unanimity about the appropriate structure for networking arrangements. Some argue that inevitably, at a certain stage, networking will require a certain degree of formalization of structures, procedures, and modalities. Others argue that a "loose" organization with an officer to coordinate the activities of the network will be adequate. Both forms of organizations do influence the structuring of networking arrangements.

Networking can be initiated in several ways. But it is principally initiated through either the establishment of a regional institution that will act as a catalyst or by the coming together of national institutions within a region as a result of the initiative of an external agency. AAPAM and CAFRAD fall into the former category, while WAMDEVIN and AMTIESA fall into the latter category.

If we focus attention on the economic recovery problems facing all African countries, it will be noted that this poses a major challenge to training institutions. The cost of not adjusting to changing circumstances is heavy, and the hardships experienced by groups adversely affected by the adjustment programs are real. There is therefore the need for training institutions to investigate the social cost of the adjustments. The objective here is to develop and maintain an adequate database on the impact of adjustment measures on the poor, so as to help governments to assess the socioeconomic dimensions of adjustment and take decisions on specific compensatory policies and programs. This in a nutshell emphasizes the need for the development of local policy analysis capacity in Africa. The World Bank itself emphasized this viewpoint when it remarked:

> The reform effort in sub-Saharan Africa can be described as an accretion of important policy changes in several areas. . . . To keep the adjustment process going, there is also a need for institutional development that not only fosters effective macroeconomic management, but also builds an internal capacity for policy analysis and implementation.[3]

So far, many African countries use World Bank technical assistance programs to support their adjustment efforts. The development of internal competence in these countries in initiating and implementing economic recovery policies is of utmost priority if the measures are to be seen

as home-grown and not externally imposed. The pertinent question to ask at this juncture is the extent to which the objectives and strategies of training institutions in Africa have responded to the adjustment situation.

A quick answer is that these institutions have not responded adequately to the new challenge. An assessment of their performance would reveal that the training institutions have focused attention primarily on conventional skills development and have not been able to formulate proposals that will foster structural transformation and economic recovery. In a message inserted in the 1989 brochure of the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), the director-general recalls a 1988 U.S. Agency for International Development review that credits the institute with "fulfilling a unique role as regional management development center. . . . It can offer management training in an indigenous (African) setting, using well trained, qualified and experienced Africans with a proper mix of experience and skills and other resources to undertake tasks. . . ." The same can be said of[4] many other management training institutions in Africa. The Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON), for example, has so developed a capacity and relevance in training that the generality of its programs are oversubscribed. The desire of the average Nigerian public officer to enroll in an ASCON course is a manifestation of the confidence which the clients have in the services of the college, particularly in the area of training.

However, the challenge of economic recovery and long-term growth requires much more than African training institutions can achieve on their own. These institutions have made minimal impact in the area of policy development through applied research and in providing services through consultancy. These institutions may have research departments or units, but they have never been able to accord research the prominence it deserves. In the context of the development problems of Africa, research in the training institutions should not be merely basic research but action-oriented research that should address policy issues. In every country in Africa, research activities in the training institutions should be designed to resolve clearly identified national problems. Such research activities should provide information to policymakers in the articulation of national development policies and programs. In view of their limited scope and narrow focus, training institutions in Africa have not served as think tanks offering advice on policy and strategy to their governments, and they have hardly located themselves in the nerve center of public-policy formulation.

The Networking of Development Research and Training Institutions in Africa

In the face of resource constraints, African training institutions are expected to meet international and regional standards for well-trained managers and public administrators. The challenges ahead are immense,

particularly in the area of in-service training. Yet in the circumstances of the economic predicament in Africa, it will be difficult to meet these challenges through resource input from single-country sources. As Adebayo Adedeji predicted in 1970:

> The task of administrative training for development will be extremely difficult to accomplish if each country is left to fend for itself. No African country has enough resources to provide such comprehensive training programmes. There is therefore the need for greater cooperation among countries. While each country will no doubt wish to, and should in fact be encouraged to, provide the basic administrative training, the more sophisticated and high level programmes should be undertaken on a continental or at least regional basis.[5]

This view provides the fundamental rationale for the establishment of associations and networking arrangements in Africa. Indeed, in 1967 CAFRAD, mentioned previously, was formed, with headquarters in Tangier, Morocco, among other things, to:

- undertake, promote, and coordinate comparative studies and research on administrative problems connected with social and economic development in Africa;
- organize scientific meetings, seminars, and in-service training courses for high-ranking officials from the public and private sectors in African countries who undertake a significant role in development.[6]

For a variety of reasons, however, CAFRAD has only minimally met the expectations of its founding fathers as a forum for sharing experiences in African development administration and as a catalyst for strengthening the capacities of training and research institutions in Africa. Other regional associations, such as AAPAM, the co-sponsors of this workshop, and subregional institutions, such as ESAMI, have also existed for some time. AAPAM is making commendable contributions in the development of critical skills in policy management through some form of networking arrangements.

Regional cooperation for policy research and development training is therefore not new to Africa. However, it has gained currency in recent times through the formation of the subregional networks. The most notable of these networks, as noted earlier, are:

- The West African Management Development Institutions Network (WAMDEVIN)
- The Association of Management Training Institutions of East and Southern Africa (AMTIESA)
- Association des Institutions de Formation et de Perfectionnement en Management d'Afrique (AIMAF), based in Abidjan.

Portuguese-speaking African countries plan to inaugurate an Insti-

tuto Naçional de Administracao e Gestao, another network of training institutions, with a regional center to be located in Cape Verde.

While AMTIESA and AIMAF were established in the mid-1980s, WAMDEVIN was formed in November 1987. These networks are dedicated to the principle of enhancing the potential for self-reliance through collaboration. With all modesty, the objectives of WAMDEVIN typify this collaborative spirit:

1. To create a forum for sharing the institutional experience on management development and training in Anglophone West African countries.
2. To promote educational and professional development of those involved in management development as teachers, trainers, researchers, managers, administrators, consultants, and others with similar functions.
3. To promote management and administrative development activities in the WAMDEVIN region through stimulating dialogue between professionals and the clients they serve (that is, governments, parastatals, industries and other organizations, businesses and other sectors).
4. To promote cooperation among member institutions in the development of teaching/training materials and facilitating the sharing of the materials.
5. To establish an institutional mechanism for disseminating relevant information within the region, through newsletters, databanks, clearing houses, publications, and other networking arrangements.
6. To promote cooperation among member institutions for training and education, research and consultancy.
7. To promote cooperation between the educational and training institutions and practicing managers in the region.
8. To strengthen institutional capabilities through faculty and staff development, improved infrastructural facilities, and activities of a similar nature.
9. To develop effective cooperation with similar associations in other regions, international agencies, intergovernmental organizations, foundations, and any other organizations that may further the cause of WAMDEVIN.
10. To generate resources through membership fees, donations, endowments, subsidies, fees, programs and projects, publications, and other activities, including loans and investments, for furthering the aims and objectives of WAMDEVIN.

Networking of training institutions in Africa is also intended to help each institution to enhance its capacity to train managers at various lev-

els. The networks have begun to identify the strengths and ascertain the expertise of constituent training institutions, which are developing to meet the requirements of both the private and public sectors in the subregion covered by the network. Furthermore, training institutions now appreciate the value of collaboration in dealing with issues that they could hardly tackle alone.

However, a number of problems exist. First, the governments of the various countries in Africa are not sufficiently aware of the value and strategic importance of networking as a process for the advancement of the practice and status of the profession of public administration and management. One of the immediate challenges of each network is therefore to generate and nurture awareness of the positive value of networks at the highest levels of government. We should not spare any effort at educating our various governments to appreciate the role of networks as instruments for improving overall managerial training capacities in each region as well as developing skills and resources at higher standards than training institutions could undertake alone. In WAMDEVIN we have begun this process of building consciousness in government circles. In this regard, efforts have been made to enlist political and administrative support for the establishment of WAMDEVIN as a regional management development center and preferably as an Agency of the Economic Community of West African States. We certainly will be more successful in our institutional collaboration if we have the support of our governments.

The second problem relates to funding. At this formative stage in the evolution of networking systems in Africa, the networks are almost wholly dependent on the goodwill and financial support of international donor agencies. It is gratifying that these agencies recognize the importance of networking. However, their financial support needs to be more readily available if the programs of the networks are not to be stultified. WAMDEVIN is in a particularly precarious funding situation in Africa. AIMAF is backed by the CFA, a convertible currency, while AMTIESA has ESAMI's relatively developed training infrastructure at its disposal. WAMDEVIN is not only relatively new but has fragmented training facilities. It needs to be assisted to overcome its foreign exchange difficulties so that it can stand firmly on its feet. With the continued support of international donor agencies and the goodwill of national governments, training institutions within each network should be able to develop indigenous learning resource materials, including relevant case studies, so as to make training methodology less pedagogical.

Future Directions for Networking in Africa

As we have seen, networking confers immense advantages on member institutions. The phenomenon will grow in popularity in Africa. This extrapolation accords with the current experiences in the Asia-Pacific re-

gion. Apart from Asian and Pacific Development Centre (ADPC) and AMDISA, there are regional organizations that facilitate networking arrangements—the Eastern Regional Organizations for Public Administration based in Manila, Philippines. For purposes of effectiveness and ability to cope with future challenges, management institutions in Europe are also beginning to come together. In order to achieve the critical mass in the size and quality of their faculty and to be effective and competitive, one can also see training institutions in Africa forming new partnerships as well as strengthening their networks.

Much of the collaboration under each networking arrangement takes the form of running management programs in the identified areas of competence of each constituent institution. This trend is likely to continue. More importantly, there are possibilities of its being complemented by the exchange of resource persons as well as learning resource materials, including management exercises and games, video films, and case studies. Once the tradition of designing and conducting development research becomes established in training institutions, the leadership of each network is likely to devise techniques for, and means of, utilizing and disseminating indigenous research results. This should lead not only to the conduct of joint research projects but ultimately to the establishment of a network research center.

In WAMDEVIN, for instance, we have prepared a work program for 1988–90 as follows:

1. Survey of member institutions' resources, training materials, equipment, and other assets (joint collaboration of all institutions under a network coordinator)
2. Governance of West African Management Development and Training Institutions—comparative study of WAMDEVIN institutions (joint collaboration by network members under a coordinator)
3. Women in Management in West Africa—a study of the sociopolitical constraints inhibiting the career advancement of women in West Africa (joint collaboration by network members and a coordinator)

Network Training Courses

Six courses will be available to the countries in the network as follows:

- Management Consultancy Course Specially Designed for Small Scale Industrial Development: ASCON, Nigeria
- Regional Senior Management Development Course: GIMPA, Achimota, Ghana
- Regional Workshop on Training Materials and Case Study Writing in Management Development for West African Training Institution: MDI, Banjul, the Gambia

- Regional Advanced Management Trainers Course: CMD, Lagos, Nigeria
- Computer in Management Development: IPA, Freetown, Sierra Leone
- Agricultural Project Management: ARMTI, Ilorin, Nigeria

The comments presuppose that networking in Africa will flourish in the years ahead. If this happens, one can see project activities being subcontracted by international donor agencies to the networks of local institutions. This will certainly develop the capacity in each network to carry out the work of each project after the donors withdraw. Currently, the continent is polarized along foreign linguistic groups, notably, the Anglophone and Francophone. Each of these groups has one or two networking relationships. It is important to bring these linguistic groups into a single networking relationship so as to strengthen the contact of training institutions across the language blocs. The language barrier has to be overcome and communication and understanding across the barrier will need to be facilitated in the spirit of Pan-Africanism. Indeed, the whole of Africa should constitute one strong network with fresh cross-cultural insights into the enunciation and implementation of the economic recovery programs of the continent. The UNEDIL Program, which is now being implemented by the United Nations Development Program, Economic Development Institute, and International Labor Organization, should be seen as a nucleus of this continental venture.

Conclusion

The socioeconomic crisis in Africa dictates the need to strengthen the entire administrative system in each country. Research, development, and training institutions have a crucial role to play in this challenge, not only by conducting responsive in-service training for the managers of the economy, but also undertaking development and policy research. Training institutions need to collaborate with one another and stimulate their effectiveness through networking. Such associations should assist in resolving the problems of relevance, staffing, finance, effectiveness, and so forth, currently plaguing the generality of training institutions in Africa.

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Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa

EDITORS

Gelase Mutahaba, M. Jide Balogun

AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

This volume is targeted at improving the quality of institutions managing national policies in Africa. From the insight of Africa's leading thinkers on the subject, public administrators will find new energy and incentives to be pro-active decision makers, to confront Africa's burning development management issues, and to work toward African self-reliance. Mutahaba and Balogun give a clear and honest overview of Africa's development management problems and outline what needs to be done to confront the issues at hand.

Readers will want to consider the management issues the editors raise: the need for cooperation among public institutions to formulate policies; the importance of analytical capabilities at the commanding heights of government; the role of foreign aid in building local capacity for policy analysis; and the role of regional management training institutes.

THE EDITORS

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