PUBLIC POLICY IN AFRICA



BY
AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
AAPAM

PUBLIC POLICY IN AFRICA

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CONTENTS

Page

Foreword - - -

FOREWORD

The African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), as a professional body, continues to be dedicated to the cause of efficiency, effectiveness and performance improvement in African public services and public enterprises. Annually, since its inception, it has provided a forum for its members to review their practices and the effectiveness of the machinery they use in the light of changing socio-economic and political conditions. In recent past, the Association has initiated a series of annual Roundtables, starting with the one held in Freetown in 1978, focusing attention on the challenges of the 1980s which African administrators and managers have to contend with in their effort to carry out development administration functions in situations that will be more difficult and more complex than hitherto experienced.

The Nairobi Roundtable of 1979 which followed that of Freetown has attempted to visualize the future of Africa's development environment and goals and on that basis endeavoured to determine the type of public service that African States need: a public service that will be more concerned with the basic needs of the masses of the people, with measures and programmes for raising the levels of living of the masses, particularly the rural population; a public service that is increasingly professionalized, dedicated and results-oriented; and, a public-service that is capable of rationalizing public policy making in the context of national development goals and having the necessary skills and the will to implement such policy with dedication and selflessness. It is the type of public service that calls for the review, reform and streamlining of administrative structures and procedures as well as for men and women with the right skills and attitudes in order to make the public service act as an effective instrument for socio-economic engineering and nation-building.

The Seychelles Roundtable of 1980 whose proceedings are published in this volume has carried the forward-looking self-examination a stage further by considering the crucial importance of public policy-making in the effort to keep the machinery of government and development strategy on course and the important role that public servants and other interest groups, including political parties representing the people, play in the process of policy analysis, formulation and review. From the deliberations of the Roundtable, it was obvious that the task of socio-economic transformation and of nation-building in the face of changing world situation can no longer be treated with indifference and without clear thinking, definite goals, rationalized policies and strategies and the will and self-confidence to achieve development objectives. It also requires that all actors concerned with framing national goals and development tasks and the policies that guide their realization must become increasingly enlightened in order to play their roles more effectively.

In publishing the proceedings of the Seychelles Roundtable, the Association hopes to reach a much wider circle of politicians, administrators, managers, party leaders and leaders of other social groups. More importantly, it also hopes that more serious thoughts will be given at the national level to ways and means of making public policy-making processes more effective, more rational and more participative. It is our hope that each African State would wish to consider how to bring about an increasing measure of democratization of the development process through the people's participation in the process of public policy-making.

Finally, the Association wishes to express its indebtedness to the Government and people of Seychelles and particularly the officials of the Ministry of Administration and Political Organization for hosting the Roundtable and for the support that they gave to ensure its success.

Adebayo Adedeji
President of AAPAM

Opening Address
by
Adebayo Adedeji

(AAPAM President)

Mr. Minister
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

We the members of the African Association for Public Administration and Management, together with other senior officials of African Governments and international institutions are today gathered in Mahe for the third in the series of annual Roundtables on the *African Public Services in the* 1980*s*. Since our arrival here we have received very bountifully from the people and Government of the Republic of Seychelles courtesies and profound welcome that make us really feel at home.

We all know that the Republic of Seychelles attained political independence only in June 1976 and consequently the country is still faced with the difficult task of making its public service relevant and capable of coping with the immense task of nation-building. This notwithstanding, the Government of Seychelles recognized the role that AAPAM has been playing in trying to draw attention to the need for and seek ways and means of making African public services relevant, efficient and results-oriented. This is what made it possible for the Government to invite us to meet here today in order to share ideas and experiences in public policy formulation and implementation. We are very pleased to be here. I am sure I am speaking for all members of the Executive Committee and of AAPAM, when I say that AAPAM highly appreciates the good gesture of the Government of the Republic of Seychelles. I would, therefore, like, in the name of the Association and of all the participants present, to express our deep gratitude and thanks to the Government and people of Seychelles for their hospitality and for all the facilities that they have placed at the disposal of this Roundtable.

May I seize this opportunity to welcome most heartily the representatives of the Zimbabwe Civil Service to this seminar. Their presence here only 5 months after their country's independence - an independence won after several years of a bloody but glorious revolution - shows the importance which their Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Mugabe attaches to the need, the urgent need of establishing a progressive, effective and responsive public administration in the new Republic.

This is our Third Roundtable on *African Public Services in the* 1980*s*. Even before the present series of Roundtables we have since 1962 held several annual seminars devoted to the consideration of specific problem areas of African public services. As professional administrators and managers, we are periodically re-examining our professional practices, our professional tools, our institutions and machinery and the entire environment in which we carry out our task. The purpose of this regular reassessment is to bring about greater consciousness of our responsibilities, to achieve improvements in our performance and to attain higher efficiency in the operations of the machinery that we use.

In this series of Roundtables, the first one was held in Freetown (Sierra Leone) in 1978 and was devoted to an extensive diagnosis of the forces that were making African public services perform less efficiently, appear less committed and less achievement-oriented. Most of us here are familiar with what we identified. In the Second Roundtable held in Nairobi last year and based on our conviction that the prevailing administrative and management structures and practices could not help African States achieve their declared development goals and policy of self-reliance, we advocated very earnestly that African public services be comprehensively reviewed and overhauled, realigned and where necessary redesigned

to make them more relevant and effective in coping with the task of development and the problems of our time as well as ensure of a fair distribution of the fruits of development.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our preoccupation in the present Roundtable is yet a further stage in the series of purposeful efforts to encourage African Governments to ensure that the machinery and tools for formulating and implementing government policies and action programmes, including the mobilization and use of scarce resources for these purposes, are relevant, effective, up to the task and efficiently. This is why AAPAM has now turned attention to the processes of formulating, implementing and reviewing public policies. As professionals, we consider public policies as fundamental; it is the cornerstone of all that the Government does or plans to do in the name of public security, public welfare, resource use and control.

While not attempting any scientific definition of public policies, it is, however, not out of place for me at least to describe the purpose of public policies and why they are made. We know that policy is articulated clear thinking and systematized ways, procedures and processes of achieving national objectives, preserving national interest or national resources and determining how scarce national resources could be used or shared or even regulating our individual behaviours in order to protect the group interest. Thus, public policies provide vital guidelines for the attainment of specific goals and targets and the expenditure of public funds to these ends. The process of public policy making enables all possible alternative choices and their implications to be considered and to arrive at guidelines for action. This ensures the avoidance of muddled thinking or confused initiatives in finding solutions to problems. It thus guides the executing public servants, providing them with a sense of direction and purpose; and the beneficiary individuals or the public with a clear notion of what to expect. In the latter respect, it provides a frame of reference with which to judge the performance of the government of the day and of the public servants themselves in terms of ability to discharge their duties, cope with national issues of development, resource conservation or meet specific needs.

If my rather incomplete description of what public policy is all about is fairly practical, then we will appreciate why AAPAM and our host should consider it a very appropriate topic for consideration by the present Roundtable.

For the majority of African States, after two decades of political independence and of attempted economic and social development efforts, their people are still unable to feed and clothe themselves in terms of basic minima. We also know that our States are saddled with an increasing burden of public debts which now demand about a third or more of our export earnings in foreign exchange to service. We have formulated sets of policies and development plans and have attempted to implement them with all our wits and resources only to find that we hardly move forward but rather sweating hard and running on the same spot without gaining distances in living standards and in the command of technology. Looking ahead whenever our internal instability and external economic pressures give us a little respite, we see the future more gloomy than the past, simply because our survival and economic and political independence are uncertain and rather shaky. It is under circumstances such as these that we consider the issue of what public policies in the 1980s can best safeguard our independence and protect our economic interests. Such is the African and international environment in which public policies will be formulated and implemented and these policies will be largely the products of the circumstances of the time.

The outstanding features of public policy in Africa in regard to socio-economic change has, virtually until now, been the conviction of analysts, policy-makers and planners that (a) the models of socio-economic change of the industrialized countries which we often do not understand and which have, in

any case, been in a state of crisis over the past decade, are appropriate for us to try to imitate; (b) the bulk of the resources required for the major structural changes by which mass poverty could be checked, basic goods and services for the bulk of our populations provided, unemployment halted and reversed, and a measure of economic dependence essential for underpinning political independence, must come from the same sources as the models.

The familiar channels of inflow are earnings from export trade, private foreign investment, technical assistance and debt, all of which have become substitutable for each other. We have continued to believe that 'more means better' in spite of the manifest failure of our economies to even reach the point of take-off into self-sustainment - not to say self-reliance - because we almost totally, in so far as public policies show, misunderstand their practical implications.

We are now, as recent studies and projections show, poised for a disastrous future in the 1980s and it is in order to avoid this that the Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy in an economic summit held in Lagos in April this year (1980). The Strategy is designed to set in motion genuine internal processes of development and economic growth in Africa - based on the Region's ample natural resources and on planned expanding capabilities - and the Lagos Plan places emphasis on implementation. The extent to which the Lagos Plan will depend on internally generated resources (both material and financial) can only be grasped by a brief examination of the prospects of obtaining substantial foreign money to finance imports of factor inputs for development and economic growth of the member states at the rate implied in the Lagos Plan of Action or even at the rates estimated for the 1970s.

As regards export trade we know that there has, over the last thirty years, been a decline in the share of primary products in world trade. Attempts by Third World countries as a whole to process the raw materials before exporting them to the industrialized countries have been repelled by a massive system of protective devices so that the African Region, which is not by any acceptable international criteria, a major exporter of any category of manufactures, cannot improve its foreign exchange earnings by trade. The list of commodities now inadequately propped up by commodity stabilization schemes has steadily lengthened without much apparent effect on the Third World's economic decline. Moreover it now seems clear that a recession will seriously slow down further the rate of growth of the industrialized economies so that demand for inputs of raw materials from the Third World are expected to be lower than in the past. In so far as foreign private investment is concerned, this is likely to be affected adversely not only by the economic recession in industrialized countries but also by measures taken in those countries to regulate the outflow of investments in order to protect their balance of payments and to encourage domestic investment as well as by the general atmosphere of uncertainty. Aid, technical assistance and debt are similarly likely to decline as international banks adopt more cautious policies of lending to the developing countries and as governments in industrial countries take steps to curb the excessive lending of the 1970s. One additional factor is expected to be the rise in interest rates for commercial loans. A second additional factor is that a large part of new loans will be made to re-finance old loans rather than to finance new imports of capital goods and services.

In the meantime, the Region as a whole will continue to be subject to massive import pressures: food, oil, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, educational supplies, building materials, clothing and shoes, fertilizers and other chemicals, implements, tools and spare parts. There is, furthermore, no certainty that droughts and endemic diseases will have abated.

As the World Bank argues:

"Sub-Saharan Africa has the most disturbing outlook. Even in the high case, its growth in 1985-

1990, would be a meager one percent/person-far below the average for the oil importers; and in the low case, average incomes would actually be lower in 1990 than they were in 1980."

This point is repeated again and again.

What seems clear is that the 1980s pose an alarming challenge to political leaders, policy-makers and planners in Africa. Failure to face up to it is likely to lead to economic, social and political instability far beyond anything that we could have imagined a few years ago.

What I am trying to do is to communicate a sense not of urgency but of extreme urgency about public policy in the 1980s. In circumstances in which the economies of the industrialized countries were strong, governments would have the alternative of retreating into a state of economic colonialism even more dreadful than before 1960 but this alternative is unlikely to be open to all Africa. Only countries known to have easily accessible raw materials in dynamic demand in industrial economics, e. g. oil, uranium, cobalt, nickel, chrome, etc., are likely to qualify for membership of the new neo-colonial "club."

I have deliberately left out of consideration here one of the most significant weaknesses in our approach to public policy-making, i.e. the consistent and astonishing neglect of thoroughly informing ourselves of the weaknesses and strengths of industrialized countries from whom we seem to expect so much and whose models we seem to be willing to adopt. It is true that there is a kind of man-in-the-street understanding of inconsistencies -- not to say conflicts -- of interests and purposes between industrial countries and developing countries and regions. But this cannot be regarded as a professional basis for public policy-making. We need to be able to judge in a professional sense, assumptions about the basic congruence of what we seek and what they seek not now or in 1984 or 1990 but all the time. We also need to judge, again in a professional sense, the realism of our expectations that the input factors we (and the whole of the rest of the Third World as well as the centrally planned economies) need can in fact be supplied in relevance and quantity by them from year to year. It takes little reflection to begin to doubt that this is realistic. Altogether this deficiency is remarkable because the countries that we have made our models, devote considerable attention to studying our strengths and weaknesses, particularly in preparations for international negotiations.

The known mineral (including energy) resources of the African Region are staggering yet after 20 years of independence very few African States are in a position to mine, independently of foreign enterprise and foreign aid, a single ton of iron ore for its own use. In effect, therefore, we have written off the only basis of expanding and diversifying our economies and of containing mass poverty and unemployment. The modern bits of our socio-economic "systems" continue to be dominated by enclaves, semi-enclaves and dysfunctional relations which aggregative planning does nothing to integrate and convert into dynamic factors in system-wide growth. Here again there is an urgent need for a new understanding of the internal environment, its dynamics and potentialities and for monitoring changes in it.

Next we come to what, for want of a better term, I would call the associated environment arising from the fact that the bulk of African economies are too small and too weak to stand completely alone and that intra-African economic co-operation is now more than ever a necessity. It would take us too far out to go into the problems of economic co-operation in Africa. I merely wish to point out firstly how little effort we are making in consulting the experiences of e.g. Latin America in this field and secondly that if we allow outside agents such as transnational corporations to organize economic co-operation for us as they have succeeded in doing elsewhere we must not be surprised at the results.

I am painfully aware of the inadequacy of the picture I have painted of the three environments within which public policy-making has to be undertaken and executed in Africa in the 1980s. I hope,

nevertheless, that it is now clear that a severe crisis is in the making and that there is little time left to prepare to face it. But before I go on to look for some features of public policy execution I should like to clear up a number of important conceptual confusions which still affect our understanding of the self-reliant and self-sustaining development and economic growth which we can no longer avoid and to which we can continue to pay lip service only at great peril to ourselves and the communities we serve.

Before considering some aspects of public policy execution in the face of such bleak prospects I should like to clear up a number of conceptual mistakes which have caused a great deal of trouble and may continue to cause even graver damage in future.

So far I have given a very brief glimpse of what I would call the external environment. Until recently our understanding of that environment has been extremely limited and uncritical in the sense that we have failed to consider whether that environment can and will be able to deliver to us the components of development and economic growth that we seem to require from it. We are thus faced with an urgent need for a new understanding of, and for the means of monitoring, that environment.

I now come to what I could call the internal, i.e. national environment: its main features and the dynamics on which self-reliance will now willy-nilly have to be partly based. First there has been the implicit assumption that expanding, diversifying, socio-economic change, providing improved levels of living and employment for our people and creating the basis for self-sustainment and self-reliance could be erected on the production and export of two or three primary products. Until this day the economy of individual African countries is associated with these products: coffee, cocoa, tea, timber, bananas, iron ore, copper, cotton, oil and natural gas, diamonds, groundnuts, palm oil, etc. The absurdity of this assumption does not need to be underlined. In most least developed countries in the Region, for example, it is known that there exist, inadequately evaluated and untapped, considerable endowments of natural resources for promoting economic growth to which inadequate attention is paid, whilst governments spend large amounts of foreign exchange and talent in international meetings to prevent the long-term decline in the external price of their export products. I should like to enlarge on this point a little in order to bring out the confusion in our grasp of certain essentials. Economic growth means, simply increases in the physical output of goods and services. Under African conditions these increases must inevitably come from the exploitation of each country's natural resources, supplemented by imports through trade. What is missing are national capabilities in determining the natural resource base, in extracting raw materials from it and in converting these raw materials into semi-finished products. Without increasingly detailed knowledge of the natural resources base, it is not possible to determine the pattern of skills to be developed, the kinds of technology to be imported or promoted locally, the institutional services to be provided and the directions of flow of financial and material resources to be encouraged. Yet these considerations play only a marginal role in our approach to education and training, to aid and technical assistance, to scholarships policy, to domestic and foreign private investment, and to institution-building.

The first misconception is about savings and investment. For most of us we have imbued with the belief that both mean money although it is known that the largest sector of most of our economies - subsistence agriculture - has for hundreds of years organized production and consumption without the involvement of money. As a matter of reality it is the availability of specific factor inputs and their mobilization and application to production and distribution processes that properly constitute investment. Money is merely one means of mobilization and application. As many of our central bankers have pointed out in recent years a superabundance of money without factor inputs leads to nothing. It is the failure to grasp this and to take vigorous and imaginative steps to develop indigenous factor inputs (entrepreneurship, skilled manpower, technology, institutional services, raw materials, etc.) that today accounts for our

extreme external dependence and our preoccupation with foreign exchange i.e. with trade, foreign investment, aid, debt and technical assistance. Indeed, even if vast quantities of foreign exchange were available but the relevant factor inputs could not be supplied from outside, foreign exchange would be of no use except to finance imports of consumer goods and services. I hope I do not need to give illustrations of this point. Thus when we are advised to mobilize domestic financial resources, without any regard to the supply of indigenous factor inputs, we are in danger of buying a piece of nonsense.

There is another associated misconception which I might as well bring in now: the demand for massive net transfer of resources from the "North" (i.e. the industrialized countries) to the South (i.e. the Third World including Africa). We now formally know that the West European economies are and will continue to be net importers of capital from the Third World (including Africa) so that it would appear that the appropriate policy is to reduce this South/North flow.

How does this South/North flow occur? We have for many years known that we export primary commodities to industrialized countries at relatively low prices and obtain high cost capital and consumer goods in return. We therefore spend time and money, struggling often vainly to get some little increase in the prices of our export products. In the meanwhile we are losing a very great deal more in the import of services (interest on foreign capital, insurance, re-insurance, banking, shipping, civil avaition, advertising. entertainment, consultancy, marketing) the volume and unit costs of which amount-up steadily with little awareness on our part. We are thus financing both capital formation and higher living standards in industrialized countries through commodity trade and invisibles! Every attempt to expand and diversify our economies escalates the drain and reduces the very means we have decided to use to do so. There is really nothing to stop us through appropirate policies to increase the supply of indigenous factor inputs.

The third misconception concerns the market, a concept that dominates the traditional economies we studied in universties abroad without realizing that to our professors and to the policy-makers in those countries "the market" meant primarily their individual national market. We, in contrast, spend a great deal of time, energy and money pursuing bits and pieces of other countries' markets, the dynamics of which we little understand and over which we have no control. Our domestic markets have never been a subject of interest or an object of policy, to policy-makers and planners in Africa. In the 1980s we shall have to pay attention to our bifurcated markets to a degree little anticipated today.

A fourth misconception relates to technology which fundamentally is merely a means of extending man's physical capabilities for getting things done. As I have pointed out earlier, economic growth means increases in the physical output of goods and services derived, in Africa, from the natural resources/raw materials base. Since the bulk of the natural resources are in the rural areas and the bulk of our people are also there, this clearly implies that the bulk of the technology we must develop, must relate to the rural sector. It must help create employment, assist in the fuller exploitation of local natural resources and contribute directly to raising living standards, all in the rural areas. Discussions of technology (and technology transfer) in the abstract whilst useful are unlikely to lead us far. Two points before I pass on: the first is that the bulk of the technologies we need at this stage of development is not, contrary to public belief, subject to property rights. The obstacle is our lack of capabilities for taking and using them. The second is that even the technologies for making use of tropical products are being developed in former metropolitan countries and we have made little effort in international negotiations to press for assistance to develop these capabilities in Africa.

We now come to some aspects of the problem of public policy execution and the first question that reasonably arises is execution by whom? Development plans are usually assumed to embody the core of public policy in Africa yet they are addressed to no one. Rarely is any effort made to identify, evaluate,

instruct or authorize, and encourage specific groups of entrepreneurs assumed to take responsibility for implementing sections of the plan. Evaluation of their capabilities to do so would of course lead to the establishment or improvement of institutions (industrial estates, development banks, business consultancy organizations, extension services, etc.) intended to help indigenous entrepreneurial groups do what is expected of them. If incentives are provided these are directed to the foreign private sector which has less need for them. Indeed, it can reasonably be said that the most crucial factor in the implementation of development plans is usually overlooked i.e. who does what, when, how and why.

In the secretariat, where we have been looking at the structure, capabilities, motivation and sectoral spread of African entrepreneurs, it has become clear that business support services - development financial institutions, business information and consultancy organizations, industrial estates, agricultural and industrial extension services, etc - which are so numerous, wide-ranging and important in industrialized countries, will have to play an even more important role in Africa. This raises questions about the range, geographical distribution and quality of these institutions providing such services in individual African countries and the extent to which their design reflects a genuine assessment of the weaknesses in African entrepreneurship and management in the light of burdens they are implicitly assumed to take on. We now believe that this subject is one which deserves urgent examination at national level if indigenous entrepreneurs and enterprises are to take part in development and economic growth processes in their countries in modern production and distribution rather than in peripheral and sometimes parasitical services. Here I should like to draw your attention to a phenomenon that is becoming widespread in the Region: the expansion of foreign entrepreneurship (often with the tacit collaboration of the public services) in medium and small-scale business: metal working, garages, hotels and restaurants, cinemas, hair-dressing, pharmacies, laundries, etc. I find this extremely disturbing and believe we need to enquire closely into the factors accounting for this development.

In African conditions today, public enterprise must occupy a central place in the structure of entrepreneurship. Even the World Bank now accepts this. It must provide policy leadership within its sectors, assist in organizing common services, promote R and D and technical innovation, assist small companies in various ways, including sub-contracting, encourage standardization and quality control, serve as technical consultant to government, etc. But are the public enterprises we know capable of shouldering these responsibilities?

If not what lessons can one learn from India, Japan, Italy, France, Latin America, etc. about re-designing and improving public enterprise?

It is, however, in the largest sector, agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) that we have displayed the most disdain for the problems of growth, outside of export crops. The transformation of the agricultural sector from our collection of enclave activities connected with export crops to a dynamic sector providing food and agricultural raw materials, labour, public revenue and savings for other sectors in return for technical inputs for agriculture (fertilizers and other chemicals, fuel and energy, implements, tools and machinery, spare parts, consumer goods, transport, building and construction, etc.) will call for support services in the agricultural sector at present unheard of.

I should like to add one last point before I end my address. The quality of public policy execution will obviously depend on the quality of public policy research and analysis and the quality of the system of communications between researchers and analysts and policy-makers and planners as well as between the latter and implementors of public policy. Improved management techniques, though of great importance and urgency, will not be enough. Even dedication will not be enough; insight and inventiveness are also required.

However, there is a particular aspect of public policy implementation to which I wish to draw attention: the importance of middle-level management in the years ahead. In times of intensifying and increasingly complex activities such as is implied in the Lagos Plan of Action, the competent supervision and co-ordination of operational activities of all kinds in all key sectors becomes crucial at the same time as the responsibilities of high level management are rapidly increasing. Thus close supervision and co-ordination gradually and subtly escape the span of attention and control of higher management. This becomes so even more in times of crisis of the kind which may arise in the 1980s. One of our priorities must therefore be the rapid improvement of management capabilities at the middle level associated with planned delegation of authority.

Execution assumes a continuous dialogue between planner and implementor. Yet we know that the communications system functions not at all or perversely.

These problems are made worse by gaps in the administrative system which have not been effectively repaired or even noticed since independence. These gaps include: domestic trade; the monitoring of internal financial and real resource flows; natural resources; technology; human resources development; external transactions with special reference to invisibles; economic co-operation; planning (intra-sectoral and intersectoral, integrative and spatial), statistical and information systems and their use; rural development.

In addition to gaps there are system discontinuities, some of which may superficially appear to be satisfactory. These would relate to, e.g., the public sector and the private sector; the public service and the universities; planning agencies and local institutes of development studies; the urban oriented public service and the rural sector.

Other than system discontinuities there are certain basic deficiencies characteristic of most of the region. Of these the most outstanding include lack of national capabilities in the preparation of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies and in project design, analysis, planning and management. Indeed, these account for much of the dependence on foreign technical assistance, for the accumulation of unimplemented or unimplementable feasibility studies which gather dust in the archives of virtually every ministry in Africa and for a good deal of the foreign exchange drain.

Finally, we must take note that the on-going crisis and its intensification will not only strain but challenge key functions of the administration including, e.g., central financial reporting; control of public expenditure; management of foreign exchange reserves; monitoring of industrial production output and capacities; the organization and supply of factor inputs in relation to the mobilization and redeployment of domestic savings, etc. It will be noted that some of these functions are, for many administrations, unfamiliar.

What do we foresee as the crisis develops? Extreme pressures developing in a number of areas all connected with the external sector. Included among these are imports of: food, energy, services, pharmaceutical and other medical supplies; educational supplies, implements, tools and spare parts, building materials; transport and communications equipment, chemicals, clothing and shoes, passenger cars and commercial vehicles. In other words, it will be difficult for most countries, especially the least developed to adjust to these pressures even in the medium term either by severe reductions in imports or by expanding domestic production. We need to bear in mind that even if the right policies are taken today, even if the right programmes are designed and adopted, even if committal decisions on specific projects are made, there are irreducible techno-economic time horizons involved in expanding production capabilities (e.g., ordering and setting up equipment, negotiating contracts, training personnel, and building essential infrastructures).

What demands will these pressures place on ministries and other government institutions such as: education; labour and manpower planning; food and agriculture, transport, public works and housing, mines and energy. natural resources, trade, health, industry, finance, planning and information? In what ways can they prepare for the anticipated impact of self-reliant and self-sustaining development and economic growth in general and the forthcoming crisis in particular?

In conclusion, let me pose at least four questions about public policy-making to which we must provide answers in the course of our Roundtable.

(i) What kind of socio-economic research background is needed for public policy-making and how are socio-economic research inputs to be organized?

(ii) What quantitative techniques should we make use of which do not make a caricature of reality?

(iii) What teaching/learning processes and arrangements should we consider to provide open-ended education for those engaged in public policy-making?

(iv) What institutional mechanisms will we need and how soon if we are to cope with the 1980s?

I wish our third Roundtable on African Public Services in the 1980s every success. Given the number of participants and their rich experience in African Governments, I have no doubt the next few days will be professionally rewarding and that the Roundtable will come out with findings and conclusions which will be of tremendous value to all African Governments, to policy-makers as well as to policy-implementors.

ADDRESS OF WELCOME BY MR GUY SINON
MINISTER FOR ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Mr Chairman,
Dr Adedeji,
Members of the Executive Committee of the African Association for Public Administration and Management
Honourable Minister and delegates.

I have great pleasure, on behalf of the President, the Government and people of Seychelles, in extending a warm welcome to you all on the occasion of this, the third Roundtable of the African Association for Public Administration and Management, or AAPAM as it is now so widely known.

I hope, Mr Chairman, that work schedules have been arranged over the next six days in such a way that allows delegates an opportunity to see something of our country and our people.

This conference of over fifty delegates from twenty one African countries and seven international organizations, represents one of the largest gatherings ever seen in Seychelles and it is fitting that it should have attracted so much African talents, from the political sector, the public sector and the university world. I am particularly happy, Mr Chairman, to welcome into our brotherhood the delegates from Zimbabwe released now to take their rightful place among free men after the long years of struggle.

The theme chosen for this third Roundtable is "African Public Services and Public Policy-Making in the 1980s". It is well-chosen, Mr Chairman, for today the formulation of meaningful policy is the very foundation of all the processes of national development. It represents the cumulative aspirations of the people, tailored and shaped for implementation, thus bringing those aspirations to reality. It is therefore the fountain head of national endeavour, and the manner in which it is formed should never be forgotten. If policy becomes indistinct or blurred, the direction, thrust and priority of the apparatus for implementation will suffer likewise and the very purpose of Government brought into disrepute. But this will not happen if the policy-making process is firmly in the forefront of the implementors' minds, and safeguards are built into that process. Clearly, the more involvement and conviction by the implementors, the less danger of deviation or a slowing of pace.

The essence is that from the people the process must begin, and by the people the process must be seen to come to fruition. All stages in this complete circle are interrelated. It follows therefore that those stages shall be as few as possible, be understood and used well, and be monitored properly. It follows too, that this process forms the very heart of the relationship between the ruling party and the Government.

Here in Seychelles the highest policy-making body is the National Congress of the Seychlelles People's Progressive Front. The Congress which meets at least once a year sets down the broad national objectives. The aspirations of the individual Seychellois are made known to, and articulated by, the local branch of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front and presented by the Branch Chairman direct to the Secretary-General. He in turn brings the matter to the Central Executive Committee which is the executive arm of the Congress. Here the amalgam of inputs from the Branches is co-ordinated and examined. Decisions are formulated, adopted and transmitted to the Council of Ministers. There is thus a four stage route in the process of policy formulation.

In terms of execution the responsible Minister now turns to his technical staff, both in the Public Service **per se**, and parastatal agencies. In matters affecting the law, bills are drafted and circulated to all branches. They are examined and further advice from technical advisers can be called for at any time. Indeed attached to the Central Executive Committee is an official, legally trained who is available to

assist the branch members in a complete understanding of the Bill. This is a most important step as when the time comes for the Bills to be presented to the People's Assembly, the members of that Assembly will bring a full understanding to any debate. If a Member, speaking with the voice of his branch, cannot support the Bill, he will say so and his reasons therefore will have been soundly researched.

And so the Bill becomes law and the involvement of the people has never been far removed.

In policy matters requiring administrative action, the Principal Secretary will put into motion all necessary steps. As with matters requiring legislative action, the Principal Secretary will advise on the legal and procedural steps. If there appears to the responsible Minister difficulties which require a new look at the policy then he will take the matter back to Council. This is not to suggest that policy will necessarily change to accommodate difficulties. Rather, a greater awareness of the implications prevails so that in the process of execution, the unexpected is reduced to a minimum.

Inserted into this process is the Project Appraisal Committee which I have reason to believe may be unique. It is chaired by the President, meets once a month, and consists of two Ministers and six Principal Secretaries. Where capital projects form part of the agreed policy, and there is needed a multi-ministerial approach, this Committee will examine all such projects. Priorities, timing, funding, executing agencies are decided and progress is thereafter monitored. Chaired as it is by the President it can have no better policy spokesman.

Members, in presenting a project to the Committee, will of course be guided by policy statements and the Development Plan, but they do nevertheless have this unique opportunity to contribute to the policy-*making* process as well as the policy - *implementing* process.

Additionally, all Principal Secretaries of our Public Service meet weekly to discuss, among other things, papers being put before the Council of Ministers later in the same week. They have therefore as direct a contact with Council's deliberations as it is possible to arrange, and Council has before it the recorded views of the Principal Secretaries.

These two formalized vehicles enable top officials of the Public Service to contribute to the policy-making process. They do not however exclude the less formal interchange between the Principal Secretary, his technical subordinates and the responsible minister. Different situations require different approaches, but there can be no substitute for complete trust between, and an acknowledgement of the essential collaborative roles of, the three agencies concerned, namely the Front, the Council and the Public Service.

I believe these bodies in Seychelles move together with considerable harmony and Government re-organization is taking place - the creation of my own Ministry of Administration and Political Organization last year for instance. In a word this re-shaping of the Government machine has essentially one goal and that is a quicker, more effective fulfilment of policy.

The delegations before us bring the experience of changes made to reach out for that same goal in their own countries. And it is the fact we all share the same goal that is going to make the deliberations of this conference very interesting and rewarding.

I am equally certain that each of us will learn from the experience of others and be able to take away something of value which can be put to good use in policy formulation and implementation.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, let me wish this, your third Roundtable every success in its deliberations and I have much pleasure in declaring it open.

Thank You.

INTRODUCTION

by

IAN MACKINSON

Rapporteur-General

Debate among the fifty delegates at the third Roundtable revolved around four papers and four case studies, the latter exemplifying, for example, some of the main contentions raised by the former. Delegates were left in no doubt as to the magnitude and seriousness of the grand theme of Public Policy-Making as Professor Adedeji delivered his opening address. The sense of extreme urgency he communicated was reinforced by a succinct analysis of the chains of economic colonialism still binding most African countries, the political instability prevailing in many, and the remoteness from each other of the actors in the 'policy business'.

It was therefore not surprising that the Conference spoke often of its corporate sense of real concern at the manner in which affairs of State had been handled in the past and the enormity of the task of bringing about a better climate in the future. It was perhaps inevitable that in this atmosphere there were signs of professional unfulfilment or frustration which may well have generated the vigour and sincerity with which the conference reached out for, and brought into the open, the real problems so that meaningful remedial action could be proposed.

The address by the Conference host, Guy Sinon, Minister of Administration and Political Organization in Seychelles, stressed the paramountcy of the people in the total process from policy formulation to implementation . . . . "The essence is that *from* the people the process must begin, and *by* the people the process must be seen to come to fruition." If this golden thread is disregarded it signifies the absence of a developmental philosophy and all actors in the scenario are in danger of being thrown off course. Dangerous waters await them as they drift into an ambiance of policy-making to satisfy the policy-maker. Speaker after speaker identified some of the danger signs - the ethnic groupings, the elitist groupings, avarice - which are indicators of distance from the people when there should be no distance.

Public policy was accepted as deliberate and binding action by the responsible and authoritative organs of state (not always the Government) designed to influence the behaviour of society or a substantial section thereof. It is formulated to bring about a systematic way of solving fundamental national problems. Systematization is essential in order that the magnitude or severity of problems may be set against the resources available to deal with them and at the same time to harmonize the different sectoral aspects of the total policy.

And so to the environment for policy-making seen as " . . . . . representing the social, economic and political surroundings which both supplies the impetus for policy and feels its impact". The environment emerged clearly as the dominating factor in policy formulation and execution. The constituent parts were dissected and examined in detail.

It is not difficult to set out the troublesome areas making up the internal and external components of the environment - political instability, weak economies, scarce or badly distributed resources; and externally threats to national sovereignty, lack of economic self-sustainment and economic domination by industrialized countries.

The conference laid great stress on the fact that until the internal situation improves no expectation can be held out for an improvement in the external scene. In particular the cultural values of the nation were singled out as perhaps the most important part of the national fabric in need of repair and rejuven-

ation. Until then divisive forces would hold sway and a strengthened bargaining position in international deliberations will be as remote as ever.

At home the need was no less. Two decades of experience has shown how much dependence there still is on foreign (industrialized) models and theories, on foreign based educational programmes, on foreign skills. While not denying the need for these inputs, African countries must strengthen their determination to indigenize foreign inputs and revise education policy to accord with the felt needs of the nation. The mainspring of such determinism can surely only be the strength (or the strengthening) of those socio-cultural values which are conducive to self-analysis, creative thinking, " . . . . . and the fullest possible development of the human genius".

Constraints there are and looking at the dozen or more upon which attention was focussed one could sense a shift in emphasis, a clearer insight into those constraints we have lived with since Independence and the emergence at high level of constraints hardly felt a decade ago.

In terms of human resources, the conference noted that it was no longer just the lack of skilled and experienced manpower, but that a brain drain from African nations was now a major contributory factor. Likewise the poor deployment and utilization of available skills exacerbated the quantitative shortage.

Poor education programmes at the formal level and the tertiary level (to which should be added training programmes which clearly do not meet new national needs) reflect evaporating vision and insubstantial development philosophy. The insidious effect of these over-riding constraints can be seen in the pragmatic approach - unallied with the philosophical and the erosion of human values as avarice and corruption take-over.

Other constraints were examined as a backcloth, as it were, to the main thrust of debate which was the provision of sounder foundations and a broader technological base for policy formulation. This is not to say that the examination was casual; on the contrary lack of political stability for instance in a country which has had five Presidents in eight years dominates all thinking.

Some countries were ready for modern tools and methods in policy-making; others were not convinced. Some could measure well the time scale, resource mobilization factor, whilst in others administrators floundered hopelessly trying to meet political deadlines with inadequate resources. In all there was a lack of meaningful research capability, essential information flow and, generally, an absence of policy review apparatus.

In these areas many of the defects could be ascribed to a lack of trust and a lack of role definition, between the major actors in the scenario, namely the people and their political leadership - local and central - the public servants, the captains of industry, the advisers and the academics. It was towards the healing of this breach that the conference applied itself.

The conference noted that there was a tendency to call for new institutions as new problems arose. Off with the old and on with the new. The answer was rather to re-examine the existing institutions (indeed it was proposed that it might be appropriate for AAPAM to initiate a survey of existing institutes of administrative or management training to see how far they have fulfilled their original objective, and further, how far that objective is still relevant today). Professionalism must be developed and enhanced in all aspects of the policy-making process and that requires new tools, skills, methods and research capabilities, the provision of which may well be within the compass of existing or reorientated institutes.

Secondly, the application of the results of such inputs must be seen to be part and parcel of the socio-cultural environment and equally applied in the examination of external forces prevailing. There should be no further polarization between the new technology and the heritage of the people.

Again, in the process of striving for better understanding and fuller communication between the various actors - and in so doing narrowing the 'trust gap' - the conference felt that there should be a halt to the present tendency to narrow the level and scope for public debate. Public participation and public debate should be encouraged, indeed ensured, in the policy-making process. It is a vital mode of consultation. If intended policy measures are published as proposals with the intention of openly seeking public reaction, it follows that there should be a concomitant obligation by the appropriate authority to take into account the resultant comments and criticisms without seeing them as utterances of disloyal or dissident citizens. If we believe that there shall be democratization of the developmental processes, then there shall be first the democratization of policy formulation.

Fourthly, ways and means have to be found to create apparatus for a greater participation by the actors. The relative strengths of the actors will of course vary from one national system to another, but inevitably there is a top and a bottom. The one is the product of the other and a balance has to be found (always finely attuned to the socio-cultural environment) between the 'bottom up and top down' participation.

Stemming from these (far from exclusive) four major pointers, other supportive activities would subscribe to the goal of sounder foundations and a broader technological base for policy formulation. More realism and more attainable goals will emerge thus making the policy more capable of implementation. In particular the area of contention - not to say confrontation - around the features of time dimension and resource mobilization may well become defused as improved monitoring and review practices are introduced. The measured standards of all the actors - legitimacy, acceptability, commitment and implementability - will thus be more effectively satisfied.

The vital need for training in all facets of policy-making is undenied, but to be effective there should be concomitant adjustments in the organizational apparatus and in the utilization of manpower. A defective part quickly contaminates the whole. By the same token the absence of sanctions was recognized as a major impediment in the path towards better policy formulation. Given training and appropriate and effective conditions of work, non-compliance with defined policy must be met with clearly understood sanctions. There is no place for the all too familiar 'dead wood' at the very heart of national development.

If each policy-making body could better understand the nature and effect of the constraints (for they will always be there in one form or another) placed upon it, then the incorporation of that knowledge will improve the policy, making it more realistic with attainable goals. Hazards must be kept in full sight and accomodated. Only when these and all other ascertainable factors are evaluated and built in will the policy be at its best. "One cannot implement well a bad policy".

The ramifications of the relationship between the actors were explored constantly. Delegates saw the emergence of a one-party state with its President-oriented leadership style still encumbered by a traditional Civil Service structured to meet the needs of a parliamentary system as a source of discontent. But that same Civil Service is strengthened by virtue of its role vis-a-vis policy-making, when new Governments and military masters lean so heavily on it because of their own lack of political experience. These are abnormal circumstances though and do not detract from the fact that policy-making is ultimately the preserve of the politicians.

As the value systems of the actors in the policy-making process were examined, concern was expressed at the view that the actor himself and the role required of him, are often at variance. i.e. group interests and not society at large may command his prior attention. One delegate felt that these hazards could be avoided where the implementation of political policy by Civil Servants at least, left no chance for group interests to become predominant. If collectivity prevailed in the total process from formulation to evaluation (even though the end result is political) then collective accountability and responsibility should ideally be present. The absence of suitable apparatus in this regard clearly contributes to irresposible action.

It was apparent that if the Civil Service input into the policy - making process were to become more professional and more skilled, then the roles and relationship of the principal actors would be easier to see and understand. The present time was one of transition with poor utilization of available manpower e.g. top officials dismissed by a new President and international agencies being asked to replace them with foreign and often less effective people. The conference felt that participation in the policy-making process is right. It is an involvement of the people, politicians, top administrators and perhaps consultants and advisers. The exact relationship would vary from country to country, system to system, but the worth of the corporate approach will be enhanced as experience and skills are gained and shared by all actors. This is a priority and manpower development schemes should recognize this.

Mutual trust is equally vital. The genesis of a policy is not always from the same stable nor does it follow the same route to fruition. If the fact that it is *of* the people, *from* the people and *for* the people is not lost sight of, then the collective management of its path to fruition will succeed. On its route it must be monitored and tested but it must begin its journey as well researched and articulated as possible. It must be clearly seen as being under political leadership, for it is the political seal of legitimacy which signifies political responsibility. "Responsible and responsive Government presupposes responsible and realistic policy-makers".

For their part the Civil Servants must realize that as partners with the political class in the policy-making process the latter is primus inter pares. Co-operation is essential to enable their special skills to be incorporated in policies even in those with which they may not fully agree. Group interests, social values etc., should not come into conflict with their primary responsibility as part of the corporate approach. They should always remember that they are responsible and accountable to the Government in power and through it to people at large. As new emerging political systems take shape in Africa, new Civil Service structures will become necessary to ensure sound, realistic and well - founded policies. New structures must allow for the new expertise required from whatever sector. Security of tenure is vital if such mobility is to succeed, and this could well be achieved by the introduction of contributory superannuation schemes or all sectors of the economy - public as well as private. It is a thought to dwell on at length.

African Governments today control vast resources within their countries and it is more essential than ever that policy - making, as with the management processes, must become more professionalized. Policy-formulation and policy-implementation is one process and no dichtomy should be allowed, otherwise accountability will be eroded.

Policy-making has to be recognized as an area which requires special skills, not so far well developed, and which can be inculcated by good training programmes. If follows that a critical examination is necessary of the tools and manpower available or which are needed. The lack of a really systematic approach to policy-formulation had led to serious and costly errors. This trend had to be reversed and the recognition that policy-analysis is a major tool in this task is essential. It is equally necessary that current administrators become familiar with the specialized techniques even though they may fall short of being

expert in their use. Training in this area would predominate in the total effort to raise the professionalism of the administrators. Methods and techniques were complex and varied and for meaningful results problems should be reviewed and tackled within the capabilities and needs of the country concerned no more and no less. There are examples of institutional development in the process of policy-analysis in USA, Europe and in certain African countries. Their effectiveness in Africa has been unremarkable because of the shortage of skilled analysts, frequent changes of responsibility, isolation, lack of central machinery through which the various inputs can be co-ordinated and lack of regular policy review.

The case studies served to bring into the spotlight one or more of the factors mentioned in earlier debate, as being in need of repair or improvement if policy-making is to become more effective, e.g. a better data base, improved participation by primary actors, the time dimension, *intellectual honesty*, the stony path towards better popular participation in the Zambian paper on the decentralization of the administrative system; the forces at work which induce change in the relative roles of the top civil servant and the politician in the Tanzanian paper on decentralization; examples of notorious disharmony in decision making in Uganda's paper and the emergence there of the impartial neutralist officials.

The recurring theme of decentralization attracted strong comment. The rural areas have few young able bodied people. They have flocked to the urban areas thus eroding the productive capacity of their home areas and thus the sustenance of the towns themselves. The cities and towns still receive the lion's share of resources and the decentralized structures remain in the rural areas in an emasculated condition without access to resources necessary for survival let alone growth. Much homage is paid to decentralization with too little meaningful action to ensure success.

Remarks in Uganda's paper on the plight of dismissed top civil servants in the wake of sudden political change brought forth from the President of AAPAM a call for all such officials, individually and collectively as civil service leaders wherever they may be, to examine themselves to discover how much intellectual and moral honesty there is within them. Only when there is a sufficiency will they be able to stand and be counted, face the politicians unafraid and believe in the code of ethics.

PART ONE: DISCUSSION PAPERS

PUBLIC POLICY

by

RWEIKIZA BAGUMA*

I. Introduction

No country is short of public policies; just attend a campaigning rally before elections, or look at the annual and intermediate development plans, or look through the hansard, or better still drop in the office of a minister or permanant secretary, you will be surprised! There are public policies transcending the whole spectrum of social and political life. Just enquire, for example what is the foreign policy - non-alignment; education policy - eradication of illiteracy, self-sufficiency in manpower; incomes policy - a fair and equitable distribution; employment policy - full employment policy - full employment for all able bodied people etc. There is a chain of beautiful sometimes elaborate, high sounding and noble intentions covering all sectors of national life. The question at issue therefore is not whether public policies are, or should be made, but their rationale and substance.

This essay, limited in its scope as it is, attempts to discuss three issues in connection with public policy, namely factors, in the view of the author, which have constrained the policy substance and policy effectuation in the past two decades; secondly, it pretends to project a conducive (may be idealized) environment for effective public policies in the eighties; and finally it addresses itself to the role of the public servants in influencing public policies in the 1980's. The essay is divided into four sections; in section two after this introduction we briefly define public policy, if for no other reason at least to make sure that within the context of this essay the author and reader are looking at the subject phenomena with the same lens. In section three, we look at the public policy environment and how it has influenced public policy-making and effectuation during the past two decades. In section four, we look at public policy for the 1980's. This section addresses itself to three related issues, firstly, the need to improve the public policy environment; secondly the need for a systematized process of problem articulation to aid policy formulation, and finally the role of the public servant in public policy-making namely public policy-analysis, is discussed.

II. Public Policy: Definition, Rationale and Classifcation

Public policy has been variably defined. In the majority of cases, however, the differences are more semantical than substantive. Sharkansky defines it as 'important activities of government'[1]. Simons defines it as 'an indication of an intention, a guide to action encompassing values which set priorities and relations between government and society'[2].Freeman and Sherhood define it as 'the public response to the interest in improving the human condition'[3] and Mackinney and Howard define it as 'what happens to people as a consequence of what the government does.'[4] The list can be prolonged ad infinitum.

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1 Ira Sharkansky, *Public Administration Policy-Making in Government Agencies*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975) p. 4.

2 Robert H. Simons, el el Policy Flaw Analysis: *A Conceptual model For Comparative Public Policy Research*, The Western Quarterly (September 1974) P. 465

3 Howard E. Freeman & Clarence C. Sherhood, *Social Research and Social Policy* (Englemood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice Hall, 1968) p. 2

4 Jerome B. Mackinney/Lowrence C. Howard, *Public Administration; Balancing Power and Accountability*, (Illinois, Moore Publishing Company, 1979) P. 66

There is need therefore to have a precise definition that clearly conveys the conceptual content of public policy, if for no other reason at least so that our discussion has a clear perceptual focus. As Ortiz correctly argues 'classification of the term must relate to the intent of the analyst.'[5] We are defining 'public policy' as "deliberate and binding action, given in terms of declarations, laws, acts of parliament, ordinances etc, by authoritative organs of state with the aim of influencing the behaviour of society or substantial section thereof."

In our definition we emphasize three aspects of public policy. First that the actions taken are both deliberate and binding. This is to avoid simplicity and ambiguity, which is sometimes reflected in some definitions e.g. that any action of government is public policy (Sharkansky).

Secondly the policy must be an act of an authoritative organ of the state or at least the authoritative organ in the policy area. This takes care of the structural and institutional distribution of power and authority within various states. In capitalist countries of the west for example the government is invariably the single authoritative organ of the state, while in Third World countries and some eastern countries, the situation may be different. In Tanzania the Party is supreme and the main source of public policy, while the government is simply an implementor of Party Policies. In Uganda after the fall of the Binaisa government, the Military Commission, rather than the Government, constituted the supreme organ of the state.

Thirdly we emphasize that public policies must affect at least a substantial section or sector of society. For example, a decision to build a school in a certain location does not constitute public policy, although it may be a binding action taken by the supreme organ of the state. Such an action may be a government decision undertaken to implement the public policy in education.

Rationale

What are the objectives of public policy? In other words why are public policies ever made? The answer partly lies in the definition but we can elaborate it further. Public policies are made in order to have a systematic way of solving fundamental national problems. The need to systematize the process of solving national problems arises from another important aspect, namely scarcity of resources. Because the magnitude of problems is much greater than the available resources (capacity) to resolve all of them at the sametime, it is imperative that a longterm perspective of allocating resources among competing demands is made.

Second, is the fact that when public problems are attempted to be solved in a 'pragmatic fashion' that is, as they arise and as resources become available, there is the danger to create confusion both in the process of trying to solve them, and even more fundamentally in the policies' outcome. For example, if the education policy is divorced from the employment policy, or if the employment policy is divorced from the wage and income policy, there is a likelihood of one policy outcome and impact resulting in unanticipated problems. In some sense, public policies aim at economizing on scarce resources and maximizing output, i.e. deriving the greatest satisfaction from the available resources.

Classification

Lowi,[6] cast public policies, into four categories, namely, distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituency, on the basis of public policy biases. We would however want to classify public policies on the basis of the nature of problems they are addressed to.

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5 Sutti Ortiz '*Reflections on the Concept of Peasant Culture and Peasant 'Cognitive Systems*' in Teodor Shanin ed· Peasant societies (Middlesex, Hazel Watson and Vaney Ltd. 1973) p. 325

6 Theodore Lowi, *American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory*: World Politics (Jul. 1964)

Fundamental problems that public policies are addressed to are of three types, namely problems of survival, problems of growth and problems of development. Of course, the three are not mutually exclusive as sometimes they are intertwined and overlapping. Let us elaborate:

Problems of survival, are those concerned with national security, integrity and sovereignty Any country has or must have public policies on national security, a system of laws that guarantees peace and the freedom of citizens or at least that of the dominant class; a foreign policy that guides its intercourse with other states; a defence policy that guarantees the country's sovereignty. The policies of survival may be said to be the most important and demanding, as security and national integrity are a necessary condition for any other forms of undertaking, be they for growth or for development.

Problems of growth and development are closely related though different. Growth problems are primarily concerned with investment and placement of resources for increasing the national stock of goods and services available to the country. Thus the education policy, the communication and transport policy, the industrial policy etc., may all be said to be public policies aiming at increasing the country's capacity to induce further growth, although they may be equally said to increase national security and/or integrative capacities. Development public policies are mainly in the distributive sectors, i.e., how are the available resources and services distributed among the nationals or sectors/classes thereof. For example, is the education policy tilted in favour of a certain class of people and therefore in disfavour of another? What is the wage policy? The land tenure policy? The incomes policy etc. All these areas are distributive and therefore developmental in nature. We may reiterate at this point that public policies are made in order to rationalize the utilization of the scarce resources towards the resolving of fundamental problems in a manner that will result in the highest satisfaction from the point of view of the policy-makers.

III. The Policy Environment - in the 1960's and 1970's

The policy environment or ecology constitutes the single most important factor that influences public policy. A review of the public policies for the sixties and seventies demands therefore, a clear perspection of the prevailing environment under which the states operated. Sharkansky for example states that a 'policy environment represents the social, economic and political surroundings which both supplies the impetus for policy and feels its impact, he further argues that:

> 'Several features of the economic, social and political environment of a jurisdiction can influence the kinds of policy decisions which officials make and they can influence the translation of policy into outputs and impact. Certain features of the environment may intervene between policies and their outputs or between outputs and their impact on the community.'[7]

Over and above the environmental elements indentified by Sharkansky, we should add a cultural aspect. Moreover, it is important to make a distinction between the local and international environment, since factors arising from either have different, sometimes supportive and complimentary and at other times competing or conflicting influences on public policy.

Up to the end of the 1970's, most African states were embroiled in a matrix of complex problems which were urgent and sought immediate solutions. At the local level the problems included fragile

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7 Ira Sharkansky '*Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Policy*' in Ira Sharkansky ed. Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago, Markham Publ. Co. 1970) p. 66

national systems, inadequately experienced manpower and weak national economies. At the international level was the external threat to their sovereignty, continued colonial domination of some states, and a low capacity to influence extraction of international resources for their development. Thus at the local level attention was paid to: (1) consolidating national independence and national unity; (2) developing effective and adequate local manpower to man the various sectors of the national system; and (3) building self-sustaining economies so as to raise the level of national income and citizen welfare. At the international level particular attention was paid to first preserving their sovereignties in a hostile environment; second, to supporting efforts for the total liberation of Africa, and thirdly, efforts were made to maximize resource extraction from the international environment without jeopardizing other national priorities.

All the above factors had their imprints on the nature of public policies enunciated and pursued, during the last two decades. There have been observable successes in a number of fields and failures, sometimes dismal in others. We may note on the positive side for example, that there has been a more progressive level of stability in many countries during the seventies than in the sixties, as evidenced by fewer coups, mainly those outsting corrupt and tyranical rulers e.g. in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, CAR and I think Akufo's of Ghana; moreover there is now an observable tendency of military regimes giving way to elective representative government, e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, and Somalia. Secondly, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of nationals, qualified to man middle-level and some top positions in several sectors of the national economies.

At the international level, the most profound success has been in the liberation struggle as now only two states remain to be liberated, namely Namibia and South Africa. Moreover the African states over the past two decades, have been able to forge a united stand in a number of international bodies, notably at the UN, the group of 77, the Non-aligned movement, and the OAU itself, which have improved their capacity to exert pressure on the international community for the extraction of external resources while preserving their sovereignty.

Yet, in as much as to say that public policies of the African states for the last two decades have been a total failure is ridiculous and unjustifiable, to say that African states have pursued effective public policies is hypocritical and untrue. There has been, in varying intensity, systematic, consciously tailored public policies for the eradication of poverty, want, dependency, corruption and injustices. In the economic sector for example, 18 of the 25 poorest states in the world are in Africa, annual growth, except for a few states has not been higher than population growth. Although the majority of the population are peasants/farmers (or so called) Africa still cannot feed itself adequately; the commanding heights of national economies are still externally controlled as are trade and exchange systems. There are of course public policies on health, but many people still die of most controllable diseases, and of malnutrition. Even in the education sector where relatively more has been achieved, it has been possible to provide recipients with productive employment, hence unemployment is rife; and to cap it all, the little that is produced is so discriminately distributed that a handful of citizens enjoy a disproportionate share of the disposable wealth, while the majority continue to struggle in order to keep body and soul together; and this latter group have got a right to ask 'what is independence for us?'Indeed the chain of frustrations can be prolonged ad infinitum. These are the problems public policies for the 1980's must address themselves to. However, before we address ourselves to the eighties, let us briefly survey the causes for the past failures.

Five environmental constraints, mostly arising from the colonial legacy, can be identified as central to the failures of the last two decades. These are inexperience, resource constraints, an absence

of a development philosophy and political control, internal feuds and a hostile external environment. Let us elaborate on each of them:

Inexperience

The art of governing i acquired and not born. Although intelligence, foresight and intuition are necessary tools for a good leader, apprenticeship and experience are essential extra requisites for competent leadership. At the time of independence most political leaders lacked experience of guiding a nation towards achieving its goals. Surely they knew much of what their nations needed, stability, capital, expertise, hard work, education etc. as tools for generating growth. But they had previously only felt the problems and had not laid their hands on the tools of state to resolve those problems. It was optimistically believed that once in the saddles of power things could be easily squared; and hence upon achieving independence, each country made public promises (not policies) for bettering the lot of the people in the shortest time 'available'. However the reality of their new situations were to prove otherwise.

Even the few African public servants who had been absorbed in the colonial service, had played practically no role in charting the colonial policies; their functions had been administrative and routine not innovative and policy-oriented. Now once in policy-making positions, they were faced with the new role of matching the scarce resources with the avalanche of problems, and doing it fast. It was no wonder then that public policies made were ad-hoc and unco-ordinated, consequentially leading to failures.

Resource Constraints

At the time of independence, and for many years later, resources, particularly expertise and capital, were and still are constituting some of the basic problems. The manpower aspect of the problem has two elements, firstly is the adequacy of sufficiently qualified and experienced personnel in the policy-oriented fields, both politicians and public servants, who could chart well argued and rational policies; secondly is adequacy of experts, people with the necessary know-how and expertise to implement policies. At present there is an insignificant shortage of the former, but unfortunately African states still suffer from technical and technological limitations. Because of manpower constraints it was difficult to implement policies even in fields where other forms of resources were not very much of a burden. This problem was compounded by lack of material resources, particularly capital. Thus, while the magnitude of the problems has remained high and sometimes intensifying, the capacity to resolve them has remained low.

Absence of Development Philosophy and Political Control

Development philosophy provides the framework of reference in which to anchor and situate sectoral policies. It provides the broad guidelines and constitutes the focal point upon which future public policies, plans and programmes must be co-ordinated. Moreover, the philosophy provides the value system, morality and ethical basis for the development of a national culture; it is the whole embracing basic public policy.

In the past, however, many African countries have suffered from a philosophical vacum, which means a lack of vision of what future they are trying to build. Some so called philosophies like negritude, African socialism, benevolent capitalism, nyayo etc., are hollow and can neither provide firm policy guidelines, nor instil firm ethics. As a consequence therefore, public policies, in Africa have been based on what is called 'pragmatism', which in essence

means an absence of firm principles. Policies based on pragmatism while they may resolve specific problems temporarily, tend to be unco-ordinated and incoherent, sometimes contradictory and conflicting and as much as possible must be avoided.

In terms of political control and power concentration, most constituencies are explicit about the distribution of functions and powers among different political actors; means of access and succession to power are defined (though not always respected) but many constitutions remain silent, at best vague on the specificity of society to be built, how the national resources should be managed and in whose interest, which lead to a state of laxity and uncertainty. This situation has prompted Migdol to argue that the policy crisis in the Third World countries is due to a state of fluidity and instability in the power structures, that in practice the leadership does not exercise effective control and therefore cannot determine action. He further argues that 'when a country lacks concentrated power, not only does it have difficulty in implementing complex programmes, it also encounters problems in collecting data to find out what kind of measures are needed in creating lines of communication and coalition within the states institutions to formulate detailed policies and in mobilizing support'.[8]/ The lack of effective political control gives rise to the leaders reliance on external support; but such support distorts the country's image of its priorities, particularly in the investment and distribution policies. The distortions are further intensified by scarcity as we have already noted, for the 'donors' interests are not necessarily congruent with those of the recipient, indeed often times they are at variance. But the saying that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' is not an empty dictum. Here Dean Rusk is Perhaps very relevant when he says that:

> 'It is true that some of America's Third World friends do not understand that if they want investment they must compete for it *in terms of conditions and atmosophere*, since most investments still have extra-ordinary opportunities for investment within the industrialized world under relatively safe political and legal conditions'[9]/ (emphasis added).

Internal Feuds

Although for most countries constitutions explicitly indicated how powers were to be controlled, the colonial experience had not forged internal coherence necessary for stability; and the people themselves, particularly politicians and soldiers or sections thereof, had little respect for constitutions. This sitution was further aggravated by scarcity, both of material and political goods, such that soon after independence internal struggles erupted for the control of the state machinery and the accruing political and material goods. Thus local feuds reflected in corruption, nepotism, ethnicity, coups and even civil wars, occupied most attention of many countries in the early post-independence era. Such a situation, of course, does not render itself to progressive public policies, since both time and resources are channelled towards unproductive fields, leaving teething problems of growth and development to intensify.

A Hostile External Environment

The problems enumerated above which arise from the internal environment were exacerbated by other factors arising from the exterrnal or international environment. The scramble and consequent colonization of Africa was a conscious and purposeful act to control and exploit her resources. Independence did not erase the intentions of controlling Africa, in fact it only

8 Joel S. Migdol '*Policy and Power: A Framework for the study of Comparative Policy contexts in third world countries.*

9 Dean Rusk '*At a Great Fork in the Road, The Horizon* ? USA United States Information Agency (Washington D. C. 20547 Vol. 24) p. 34

multiplied and diversified competitors for control. As the developed countries both communist and imperialist vied to extend their spheres of influence, Africa was turned into a battle field, with external forces playing one faction against another, and one country against another. The result was to increase confusion, and to influence local policies to tally or at least reflect the external interests at the expense of local problems.

Such was the policy environment for the sixties and seventies under which African states had to operate. The intensity of the problems was of course unevenly distributed; some countries were able to identify their basic problems much earlier and therefore pursued more enlighted public policies than others; but on the whole, the policy ecology has been rather hostile.

IV. Public Policy for the 1980'S

The basic objectives of survival, growth and development will remain the basic objectives of African states for the 1980's and beyond. The public policies for the 1980's should address themselves to how they can best realize them without committing the blunders of the past decade. This will demand the improvement in the local policy environment, which means in other words, creating a conducive local atmosphere whereby every person will be able to play his full part in the political and economic fields. This demands that the leadership should first identify the basic national problems to which public policies will be addressed. Africa has by passed the adolescent stage of its generational growth, and therefore can no longer attribute its policy failures to inexperience. Two decades are long enough period for the African leaders to know their weaknesses, and how to overcome them. Even the younger states have had the opportunity to learn from the mistakes committed by their brothers which they should avoid.

More specifically the following broad policy areas can be identified to which African public policies should be focussed during the eighties. First should be specifying national development philosophies which will project the image of the society they need to build. This is essential to avoid the past confusion of ad-hoc pragmatic and unco-ordinated public policies.

Second, is self-reliance. African states must, as a rule, make self-reliance a cornerstone of their public policies. This is essential because to the extent that African states continue to rely on external resources for their development, to the same level will their economies remain dependent and vulnerable. Self-reliance, to be effectively persued, demands control of the commanding heights of the economy. I understand that many leaders dismiss nationalization as a strategy of development, because, it is argued, that it scares away external investors. However, without control of the economic base, national economies are bound to remain externally oriented, and surpluses generated will continue to be syphoned off for the betterment of the industrialized countries. Moreover, overdependence on external resources has a negative implication on the evolution of locally appropriate technologies essential for a realistic industrial take-off, without which Africa is condemned to remain buttressed in poverty and weakness.[10]/

Third, is economic co-operation: In order to weaken African dependence on the industrialized countries, it is high time for African states to forge stronger economic links. The Lagos summit is a positive start towards a right direction, but it will need sustained political will on the part of individual states to bring it to fruition. Unfortunately, the historical evidence on inter-African state co-operation in the economic field is nothing to go by.

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10 See, among other works on industrialization strategy Rweikiza Baguma 'The New International Economic Order and the Transfer of Technology to Third World Countries' in Journal of International Relations, Dar es Salaam University of Dar es Salaam (March 1979 Vol. 3 No. 1)

Finally, public policies in the eighties should address themselves to the problems of human rights and fair distribution of the available wealth. Of basic concern is to liberate man from poverty and want, which can be achieved when man himself is able to participate in the process of defining his wants and taking decisions that are of consequence to him. Of equal concern is raising man's social and moral status which can come about when he has a fair share of the disposable wealth available. To achieve these noble objectives, there is no substitute for democracy and a fair distribution of (access to) the national wealth.

Moreover, it must be strongly remarked that as problems are identified and solutions sought, African states must strengthen their public policies implementation capabilities and will-power. It is not enough to propound enlightened and highsounding public policies that cannot be implemented. African statesmen must guard against falling victim of what G. Myldal[11] calls the 'soft-states' whereby problems are identified, measures to resolve them sought and prescribed; however for lack of will-power they are not implemented according to prescription such that the problems continue to intensify.

Effective implementation of public policies will call for institutional innovation so as to strengthen what can be called three related sets of policy effectuation, namely:

1. Policy management: the identification of needs, analysis of options, selection of programmes, and allocation of resources on a jurisdiction-wide basis;

2. Resource management: the establishment of basic administrative support systems such as budgeting, financial management, procurement and supply and personnel administration;

3. Programme management: the implementation of policy or daily operation of agencies carrying out policy along functional lines. On to these let us add;

4. Participation: creating organs - for the general citizenry participation in influencing decisions and the implementation process.

To successfully create such institutional innovations calls for collaborative efforts of the polictical leaders and public servants. Let us now look at the role of the latter in public policy for the 1980's.

The Role of the Public Servants in Public Policy-Making in the 1980's

The public servants are very central in influencing public policies from their formulation to their execution and evaluation. Mackinney and Howard are correct when they say that no longer can we view administrators as neutral; they as much as elected officials; must be held accountable for what actually results from governmental policies'.[12] In the African context, there are occasions when one might dispute the above statement, such as when politicians, particularly those in uniform, declare irrational public policies that are detrimental to the interests of the state; witness: Amin's economic liberation policy, whereby he confiscated without compensation Asian's property, threw the Asians out of the country, turned the businesses to inexperienced and irresponsible local people (particularly soldiers) with subsequent disastrous impact on the national economy. Yet, administrators had to implement the policy for their own survival. However, such cases are rare and exceptional to the rule.

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11 Gunner Myrdal - The Asia Dramma

12 Jerome B. Mackinney/Lawrence C. Howard op. cit p. 64

The impact of the public servants, unlike that of the politicians who are concerned with generating policy ideas, transcends almost the whole policy spectrum, including policy analysis, articulation, execution and evaluation. Of our immediate concern is their role in policy analysis, since that takes place at the source where one can influence the policy orientation.

Public policy analysis according to Beckerman is:

> 'The systematic investigation of alternative policy options and of the assembly and integration of the evidence for and against each option. It involves a problem solving approach, the collection and interpretation of information, and some attempt to predict the consequences of alternative courses of action. The fundamental purpose of policy analysis is to facilitate the reaching of sound policy decisions - it may include the examination of problems, issues, legislation, positions of politically accountable, leadership, programmes agencies, policies of private sector organizations, or any subject of significance which calls for attention and decision-making. It calls for analysis of underlying assumptions and their implications; information gaps, internal inconsistencies; conflicts with other goals; policies; programmes; political consequences impacts on society; the economy; the environment problems of administrative implementation; interdisciplinary impact; the hypothetical alternatives; with disqualifying reasons for those ruled out; realistic alternatives, with pros and cons of each;and evaluation,oversight and follow-up requirements and procedures'.

Public policy analysis is thus, a very demanding exercise which public servants must undertake. Its complexity notwithstanding, it is through their role as public policy analysts that they influence policies and the kind of development that will ensue therefrom. This requires them to have an investigating mind for identifying the national problems; to equip themselves with policy analysis techniques, to understand the value system the nation cherishes and advise the politicians on the basis of the objective and subjective situation obtaining whether the policies they eschew are the best alternatives or not; it, moreover, demands their commitment to the welfare of the state, even when the states interests conflict with the analysist's personal ambitions.

African public servants as chief advisors on public policy issues must refrain from the habit otherwise common among many African academicians, who prescribe 'idealism' about how things should be done, then sit back waiting for the occasion when things are done differently and falter, to come back in full force saying 'I said it shouldn't be done that way, now see! The problems of African states are great and sometimes scaring, yet, the future belongs to the descendants of all of us; we will therefore be failing in our historic mission, if we think that politicians alone should chart future policies. The public servants, particularly because of their central and strategic position in government, coupled with their knowledge, access to information and their guaranteed tenure, must play a role in public policy-making commensurate with their previleged position in society. From each according to his position.

PUBLIC POLICY

Discussant: Professor G.O. OLUSANYA

Professor Olusanya came directly to the heart of the matter viz. that the environment was the single most important factor in influencing policy and that the author was right to state this. Because of its omnipotence it was necessary to dissect and examine the constituent parts.

On the external scene, the emergence of the beginnings of a North/South dialogue showed not only the shape and relationships of a new economic order, but also served to remind us that the gap between the rich and the poor is getting winder. To ignore these truths is to distort the environmental influence, thus impeding the process towards improved policy generation.

In participating in this new economic order of such significance, it was essential that national, sociological and cultural factors be kept clearly defined and demarcated in the reaching out for an equitable working relationship with other parties. This need cannot be overemphasized. If policy is decided without due reference to, and complete understanding of, these factors, then abroad (as at home) that relationship will be far from equitable, indeed it will throw the Third World countries back further into the web of neo-colonialism from which they are striving to escape.

The cultural values must be examined, superstitious beliefs rejected and a developmental ethos framed so that nations can come to grips with the social and economic realities of the 1980s. Educational reforms should be designed to foster societal self-analysis thus preserving and strengthening those aspects of cultural heritage which are conducive to creativity and the development of human genius. In other words, we must strengthen our bargaining position.

A major constraint in this environmental field, as in so many others, is the lack of experience. Of course the numbers of trained young people coming forward is slowly increasing. but they have yet to be tried and tested. Political instability, involving changes of Government, means likewise that new, untried and inexperienced politicians are moving into positions of power from which often policy is generated in vacuo.

The historical reasons for this situation are well known - the decades of colonial rule under which no indigenous leadership, management or conceptual capability was encouraged. Indeed if it were, it would have found little outlet as the raison d'etre of the colonial presence was diametrically opposite to that of an independent sovereign government. So a deep-seated lethargy prevailed and the emergence of a nationally-based developmental philosophy has thus been more difficult to attain. But, "without vision the people will perish". Getting the vision co-ordinated - the orientation of people, direction and results is the greatest of the tasks facing us. But in the meantime pragmatism prevails - or would seem to - because although the development of the vision *may* be proceeding in parallel, it is far less easy to quantify.

In reality there is a need for both philosophy and pragmatism in public policy-making. Ideally they come in that order, in practice often the reverse. The vision - ideas, concepts, philosophy - should always nourish and sustain the pragmatists. Moving towards this ideal from the present ad-hoc practices is the essential meaning of our work as partners in policy formulation and execution. This indeed is difficult enough but is made all the more intolerable if those in the "ideas" business run dry and refuse to leave the national stage.

Turning to nationalization as an important component of policy, it was thought that **this** course of action was not always necessary to achieve desired objectives, certainly not in its total form. Some dependence on external resources is still necessary in terms of capital and skilled/experienced manpower

(as with other constraints) but self-reliance must always be a primary target. In moving towards that target not only the ways and means but the time dimension are all important. State control of strategic sectors is probably justifiable as is control of those sectors in an economically commanding position. The balance will change as constraints diminish and fresh appraisal is necessary. But in order that positive momentum towards stated goals is maintained, good leadership is indispensable. It must be able to articulate needs and goals and the subtle changes required along the path thereto, so that all other actors in the scenario can respond harmoniously. Too often there is imbalance, with crisis and blame - and blame and crisis - as political leaders blame the civil servants and academics, and vice versa. Implicit in the quality of good leadership of course, is the capacity to generate trust and confidence and to demonstrate that there is necessarily a place for many actors in the achievement of development and growth - the local leaders, regional leaders, national leaders, the executive arms of government and ruling party, the captains of industry, and the theoreticians and researchers.

Participants' Observations

In responding to the paper and the comments by the Discussant, there fairly rapidly emerged a consensus that the present approach(es) to the articulation, formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy leave much to be desired and in the majority of cases cannot be defended.

It was clear that there was insufficient and inadequate consultation and involvement in the total process. Who indeed should be consulted and involved was not always clear. The biggest communication gap was certainly between those responsible for formulation and those for implementation. Those who articulate policy and those who evaluate it- on either side of this gap-had even less attachment to the true heart of the matter. This was defined by one delegate as "the improvement of the human condition" a single, paramount policy - that nevertheless becomes befogged as the actors attempt the process of manifestation with inadequate resources.

The gap widens as one introduces the most important actors of all the people. How are they to be involved? Too often they receive scant attention. Is the machinery too weak for their voice to be heard? Is their voice heard and mistranslated to satisfy the policy-maker? Certainly, as with all other endeavours worthy of the name, to lose sight of the paramountcy of the people and their aspirations in the process of policy-making, is to give way to the destructive and self-destroying forces of avarice and factionalism.

The people cannot be considered outside their cultural and social fabric and where this fabric is frayed it must be strengthened because no people without a common bond can ever hope to be self-reliant or self-fulfilled. The dialogue with foreign institutions, and the partnership in the new north/south economic order, will thus be more successful and longer lasting because of the mutual respect prevailing.

The closer integration between the actors and the improved apparatus to achieve this will bring a sense of corporate responsibility, a sense of togetherness and mutual respect. A more serious and interdependent approach could then be expected, with the primary actors calling on modern means of analysis and technology undisturbed by troubled thoughts of exclusive groups. Success would be shared among all those responsible; likewise failure but without the indignity of pointed fingers.

So too would a better balance be achieved between a parochial wish and a regional necessity. There is justifiably a place for the leadership to say with confidence 'this will be good for you' measuring with great care the local and national needs. There is equally a place for the local voices saying 'this is what we want'. If the 'bottom up - top down' balance is right - and it stands the best chance of being

right only if consultative and planning machinery is effective - then national development and growth are assured and policy is vindicated.

Too often public announcements are made without adequate care and research. They may take the form of rash promises in support of which senior administrators have then to prepare documents. Such papers have to be tailored to save political face particularly when the promises made are not, in whole or in part, capable of being implemented, e.g. the promise of wells where there is no water. Further examples of the need for collaboration between the primary actors are the announcements at a tribal ceremony of a national wage increase, and a constitutional change announced under 'any other business'.

It seems inevitable that conflict will prevail when the time dimension falls for consideration by the policy-makers. Time waits for no man. It is fixed. It cannot be borrowed or bargained with. It is ever present and perhaps above all other features of the environment of policy-making and implementing, is the most prone to subjective treatment. What actually is essential to the policy and in what order? To what standards, in what quantities shall the work be done? How are the other constraints - cash flow, manpower skills, physical difficulties - to be measured against the time factor? Unless the balance is right the targets, otherwise sensible and thoroughly justified, will not be reached. If it really is unrealistic, then it is clearly bad policy. If there are severe staffing problems in the country's universities for example, is it realistic to build half as many again within a given time dimension determined long ago? No one can implement well a bad policy.

The risk then arises that failure or partial failure, because of the over-ambitious nature of the programme in terms of time, is blamed on the wrong factors as emotively clouded judgements are passed.

The political reasons for setting a time scale to the programme may often be generated by situations far removed from the pragmatics of implementation moving through the minds of the administrators. But they are not mutually exclusive areas. Both have pride of place in the final decision-making and the closer the actors are working, the clearer will be both the vision and the fulfilment.

It was clear that a major impediment in translating the 'grand vision' into reality was the lack of a research capability, information flow and a policy review apparatus. Policy was often announced without adequate research, without essential statistics and often based on out-dated information. Even so, good review systems, monitoring the early stages of implementation in particular, could perhaps suggest corrective measures but this was a rare event indeed.

There was clearly a place for a policy research and review unit right at the heart of the body politic. It should be manned by well-trained, well motivated, experienced researchers and advisers able and willing to work equally well with politicians and top civil servants alike. The recognition of the importance of such a facility seems to be more pronounced in multiparty states than in one-party states.

The collation and interpretation of information requires special training and calls on many disciplines. The national universities have an important role to play in this respect and the specific manner in which they do so is for each country to determine. It is however clear that there is room for improvement in the relations between the political leadership and the academics.

The emergence of high level institutions such as the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Bukuru, Nigeria, is particularly significant in not only developing and refining the skills of leaders from the various sectors, but also in generating a climate of trust and commoness of purpose

among those leaders. Such an institute could be viewed perhaps as a neutral ground, dominated by no one influence except a striving for better national development through more rational policy-making. Here the party policy researchers and reviewers can, from their unique position, mix on equal terms with the leaders of all sectors. Their advice to the politicians will therefore be that much better which in turn will help improve the quality of political policy-making.

The poor supply and utilization of skilled manpower in all stages of policy-planning and implementation is a serious constraint. The lack of skilled manpower can in part be put down to the education systems and the academic and professional background of many of those responsible. They have been educated in Western universities and are not perhaps as ready to adapt or to innovate as they should, to meet national needs - ..... "the system is producing a generation of professors and not action-orientated practitioners". The need is for professionals and not a battery of generalist Under-Secretaries and Permanent Secretaries. But the need is equally apparent in the political arena for development orientated education. Good policies have to meet the standards of both groups, viz. legitimacy, acceptability, commitment and implementability.

The shortage is exacerbated by the brain drain as professionals leave their homeland and international agencies are asked to provide replacement 'experts' who in fact could never hope to match the unique talents of the nationals they are replacing.

The shortage of skilled, well orientated and well-motivated manpower is one aspect which can possibly be quantified and rectified more easily than the other factor viz. the utilization of available manpower. Here, we are on much softer ground as defects in the whole process of man management are revealed. It is a highly sensitive area and he would be a brave (or stupid) man who could stand up and say he has the answer.

Shortages and poor utilization of manpower notwithstanding, the Presidential system of government means inevitably that top civil servants will come and go, stability is put at risk, and advances made and knowledge gained sometimes destroyed. The political leadership must understandably surround itself by trusted lieutenants, but with a change of Government the political leaders themselves are untried and untested. They tend to lean on the established civil service until such time as they feel the need for a change in staff. This is not conducive to stable, long range conceptualization. It is a hazard and as with the other hazards need to be accomodated in a good public policy. The difficulty is to see the situation as hazardous !!

There appeared to be little evidence of effective sanctions to enforce compliance with agreed policy. Staff, efficient or otherwise, were moved or dismissed for a variety of reasons, but rarely as a punitive measure - stated as such - for non-compliance. The 'get on or get out' practice seen elsewhere has yet to gain the essential place it should in Africa. Unless sanctions are imposed and be seen to work, there will be little progress in the path towards national development.

Particularly insidious among the environmental factors affecting policy formulation is the effect of inimical foreign influences in the form of literature, mass media, technology etc. It is important to be aware of these influences and to control them. They are insidious because they often find a warm reception in the hearts and minds of leaders who themselves were educated and trained in the same foreign countries and institutuions and thus are susceptible to influences therefrom. This in turn was and still is a legacy from the colonial past and the attachments which were generated during those days.

The need for foreign-based resources is not denied, but equally there is a need for some detachment, objective appraisal and control where necessary.

THE AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVANT AS A PUBLIC POLICY-MAKER

BY

CHIEF J. O. UDOJI

Introduction

In many African countries the term 'Public Servant' is defined as the holder of any office the emoluments attaching to which are paid out of the consolidated revenue fund or any other public fund. Such a wide definition includes not only traditional civil servants but holders of political and judicial offices, as well as holders of posts in public corporations and universities. For the purpose of this paper, the term will be used in its restricted sense of referring to only permanent and pensionable public officers, that is, civil servants.

Public policy may be defined as a sanctioned course of action addressed to a particular problem or group of related problems that affect society at large. Public policy-making denotes the whole process of articulating and defining problems, formulating possible solutions into political demands, channelling those demands into the political systems, seeking sanctions or legitimation of the prefered course of action, legitimation and implementation, monitoring and review (feedback). Who participates in what role in this process depends to a great extent on the structure of political decision-making.

Viewed thus, the central argument of this paper is that the public servant as defined above is not and should not consider himself as a policy-maker. Admittedly, he has an important role to play in this process: he can collect, collate and analyse data, he can pose options or alternative courses of action, he can advise on possible consequences of the various options, but the question of choice of a course of action and the sanctioning of the same is political action which is the domain of politicians. Today in Britain, the Ministers are determined to demonstrate that they and not the civil servants, make policy.

Colonial & Military Aberrations

Civil Servants, no matter how highly placed, should therefore, resist the temptation of arrogating to themselves a role that does not properly and legitimately belong to them. They must not allow the abnormal circumstances of colonialism and militarism to delude them to believing that they have a decisive role in policy-making. Nor should they be so naive as to interpret their important supportive role of assembling, collating and interpreting data and suggesting alternative policy implementation options as policy-making.

There is no doubt that during the colonial era, civil servants had very wide powers and appeared to be both initiators and executors of policy. To a casual observer, they played a double role of politicians and civil servants. A closer examination would however reveal that colonial civil servants from the Governor to the District Officer were merely executing the policies of the party in power transmitted through the Colonial Office. No colonial governor would make any deviation from established policy without the sanction of his political master, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He could however advise on policies he would like adopted but the decision rested with the Colonial Secretary.

Top civil servants also had extensive powers during the early independence period and during the military regime. The first crop of politicians were in the main freedom fighters. They concentrated on wresting power from the colonialists and had little time for articulating post-independence policies. The result was that on independence, they relied on civil servants to help them formulate government policies.

In those days it was very common for a minister to ask his permanent secretary to prepare a policy paper for the ministry. The paper did not however become government policy until the minister had taken it to the Executive Council and obtained the approval of his colleagues. As the ministers acquired administrative and political experience they assumed their rightful roles as policy-makers. But no sooner were they able to do this than they were corrupted by power and fell foul of their countrymen. This was the case in both Nigeria and Ghana. The result was military take-overs and the reversal of the trend towards the development of proper roles in the policy-making process. Young army officers were less educated and less politically experienced than the politicians they outsed. Civil servants were once again called upon to help formulate and execute policies. These roles, important as they were, should however be regarded as aberrations caused by the abnormal circumstances of imperialism and military intervention.

Role of Civil Servants in the context of recent developments

The question which this Conference is called upon to answer is whether, in the circumstances of the 1980's the civil servant should continue to play this double and potentially precarious role. In answering this question we must take note of two recent developments in the African political scene. The first is the move from the parliamentary to the presidential system of government. Today, there are very few parliamentary Prime Ministers in either francophone or anglophone Africa. Most of the countries, such as Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia have Presidents whose powers are close to those of the American President. The argument is that the division of powers between the Head of State and Head of Government is meaningless in the light of African political experience and history. No African Head of State has been content with the position of a mere figure head. The experience of Nigeria, Uganda, Lesotho and Swaziland are cases in point. In these countries, the system of sharing power has resulted in a clash of personalities and interests, a conflict of authority and an unnecessary complexity and uncertainty in government relations. The built-in conflicts make it difficult to determine ultimate responsibility for success or failure and, in a crisis, who is to act. The latest move towards the presidential systems is the Nigerian post-military constitutional experiment which resembles the American system in many respects.

The second polical development is that of one party system. The only multiparty governments in black Africa South of the Sahara are in Nigeria, Gambia, Mauritius and Botswana. The rest have one form or the other of one party democracies. The development started with Tanzania in the sixties and the argument has been that the multiparty system is alien to African political culture. Besides, the present day urgent and complex problems of national unity and development cannot be solved by the wasteful divisive and dilatory processess of a two party system. They require the mobilization of all forces, economic, social and political including the civil service bureaucracy.

Surprisingly, these developments, especially that of the presidential system, have not been accompanied by any changes in the parliamentary hierarchical structure of the Civil Service. The countries are operating White House type governments with Whitehall type Civil Services. This is causing considerable strain and stress to the Civil Service. The greatest strain is the threat which the new political system poses to the integrity, authority and security of the service. In almost every African state, the installation of a new President is accompanied by a series of premature retirements or termination of the appointments of top civil servants. In 1975 over 1,000 public officers in Nigeria lost their jobs on the coming into power of a new Head of Government. The harm done by the purge is still with the Nigerian Civil Service. Outsiders and some relatively junior serving officers are usually appointed as replacements. Even when replacements come from within the Service, they are appointed without due regard to civil service norms and procedures.

These actions are part of a determined attempt by politicians, particularly those operating the presidential system to control top civil servants.

To an executive President the hierarchical structure of the Service and the orientation of the encumbents of its top echelons are not conducive to a programmed deliverance of his election promises. He requires not a hierarchy of generalist Assistant Secretaries, Senior Assistant Secretaries, Principal Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries etc., but teams of action - oriented professional managers, engineers, architects, town planners, agronomists, veterinarians, teachers, lawyers, doctors, organized for the expeditious execution of specific projects. As a politician and a man of action he expects from civil servants not learned minutes in files but action on the ground.

These problems of structure, calibre and orientation of the Civil Service are not new. They have confronted older democracies and have been solved, at least in presidential systems, by the introduction of a structure that has a clear distinction between policy-makers and policy-implementors, between politically appointed officers and those appointed by an independent Public Service Commission. The former are a cadre of elite specialists in various disciplines with sypmathy for the success of the party in power. As specialists they are able to martial all the necessary data and materials necessary for the formulation of party policies and programmes. They occupy top and sensitive posts in ministries where some of them engage in policy formulation and others in the supervision of their excution. It would be asking too much to expect a civil servant busily engaged with policy implementation, and management of projects to find time for policy deliberation. He could however make useful comments from his practical experience but he should not and must not be saddled with substantive policy-making.

A lot of the failure of government projects and programmes in the past could be traced to the amaturist use of busy civil servants in the formulation of government policies. Modern government is big business and if it is to succeed it should adopt modern business methods. These include the use of consultants and experts in the formulation of policies. The success of the private sector largely depends on its proper use of human resources and modern tools of management. One of the ways of improving the management system in government would be to give some of its top officials, especially those in economic ministries, a period of secondment to industry. Such interchange would also help to improve the relationship between the two sectors. It is interesting that even non-presidential governments like that of Britain have realized the need for some top specialist appointments from outside the Civil Service in the fields of economics, science and technology. The new men come from Industry and the Universities to assist in policy matters. They are accepted by the Service because their recruitment has not affected the prospects of the members of the career servicee.

Besides the team of policy-makers a presidential system has a cadre of career civil servants who form about 90 percent of the Service. The members consist of action-oriented professional men and women who get things done if they are to be done at all. They have the know-how and provide continuity and practical experience. They come under the Public Service Commission which operates the merit system and provides protection against the pressures of politics. The execution of policies is as important if not more important than policy-making. Policies will remain dreams or blue prints in file jackets unless they are implemented. This emphasises the importance of recruiting more and more professionals into the Service and offering them attractive conditions in order to retain them. In the United States of America, three out of every five Federal career civil servants are professionals.

The importance of a contented permanent Civil Service cannot be over-emphasized. They not only implement policies but offer useful advice to policy-makers. More importantly, they provide continuity

in government policies and, in times of great discontinuity, to the nation itself. Between 1947 and 1967, Italy had about thirty governments some lasting only a matter of days. The nation however survived because it had an efficient permanent Civil Service. The same is also true of France which has, in the past, experienced frequent changes in government. During the heat of the Nigerian crisis in July, 1966, it was the Civil Service that kept the country together.

If the Civil Service in new African States is to survive it has to adapt itself to the changes in the political structure. This adaptation will involve separating sensitive policy advising jobs from the normal Civil Service jobs and prescribing separate terms and conditions for each cadre. In practical terms it would mean removing the posts of Permanent Secretary and Heads of Departments from the career cadre. Persons holding such posts will consequently lose their security of tenure and anonymity. They should formally retire from the Service and take up new appointments preferably on contract. Contract appointments would enable the officer and the appointing administration to review further employment at regular intervals and, in any case, at the end of the administration.

Once the officers concerned have demonstrated intellectual competence and enthusiasm the in-coming administration will want to retain their services. This has happened in Britain with the Rothchild group. They were brought in by the Labour government to assist in policy matters (research and policy analysis) but due to their devotion and commitment the succeeding Conservative government retained them. In this manner a third group of public officers are emerging, an elite group distinct from the straight forward political appointees (usually from outside the Civil Service) and professional civil servants. This group occupies the grey area between the two distinct cadres. They resemble what in America is known as the 'in-and outers'. These are men who come in government service for a limited number of years (three or four) and return to private life to be available at a future date for either further government or political appointment. There is a great need in African governments for such an elite professional group.

Conclusion

I have taken a rather negative view of the conference theme. This is because of my belief that policy-making is politics and that it should not, in the generally improved educational circumstances of the 80s, be the responsibility of traditional civil servants. It is the responsibility of politicians assisted by politically appointed experts who may be in the Public Service but outside the Civil Service. To saddle civil servants with policy-making will lead to the destruction of the attributes of the Service, namely security, impartiality, anonymity, and pensionability. Civil servants should be eligible for appointment to political posts but on such appointments, they should leave the civil service proper.

I am aware that such an ideal model of the relationship between politicians and civil servants in the process of policy-making can function satisfactorily where there is a big private sector with abundance of talent and expertise. African countries are bound to experience difficulties in operating the model in view of the real shortage of talent in both government and industry. But having opted for a presidential system of government we should not drag our feet in fashioning an appropriate Civil Service structure capable of servicing the political system.

CIVIL SERVANTS' VALUE SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC-POLICY-MAKING IN AFRICA FOR THE 1980'S

by

Z.D. Kadzamira* and A.A. Namalomba

Introduction

This paper attempts to deal with conceptual issues concerning how the values held by civil servants may relate to their efficacy in public policy-making. This aspect of public administration, which requires an inter-disciplinary approach, has not received much attention in the literature. Some scholars of public administration in the United States have even asserted that the field is in a crisis as a result of super-specialization.[1] The same may apply to Africa where, except in a few casess the systematic study of public bureaucracies has been ignored.[2] We may, therefore, be tempted to share Dwight Waldo's lamentation in 1968 that the field "is a subject matter in search of a discipline," and which ought to ". . . act as though it is a profession."[3] Since that time the tendency towards super-specialization has stifled concern with such issues as how values held by civil servant impinge on public policy processes. [4]

The crisis which prevails in the field of public administration especially in terms of African public bureaucracies, seems to arise from inadequate links between what ought to be happening, if one goes by the rhetoric of African politics, and what is actually happening. This gap between theory and practice is more pronounced in the area of public policy processes. It is particularly evident in Africa in the sense that while African governments are actively involved in policy formulation and implementation relatively little is known about what actually happens. Secondly, while we may be able to identify the principal actors in the policy-making arena, the extent to which each one of these is involved remains an aspect for further exploration. Thirdly, although it is accepted *a priori* that values held by the principal actors will affect their stance on public policy issues - again little is known about what values they hold. This third aspect warrants further explanation because it is of central importance to the theme of this paper.

Public policy-making aims at solving present problems with a strong bias toward better alternative futures. However, the solutions that emerge are found in a set of conflicting questions of values and compromises. It is these questions of values and compromises which determine policy objectives and their order of priority. One's values influence the manner in which he perceives "disparities or opportunitie

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1. Ostrom, V. *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, 2nd ed., (University of Alabama Press, 1974); Uphoff, N.T. and Ilchman, *The Political Economy of Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
2. There are exceptions. For instance, papers by senior African civil servants are to be found in the Inter-African Public Administration seminars (1962-1973) to which A.H.M. Kirk-Green drew attention in his review article "The New African Administrator," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1 (1972), pp. 93-107. A selection of these papers was published under the sponsorship of AAPAM in A.H. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden (eds.), *A Decade of Public Administration in Africa*, East African Literature Bureau, 1975; G. Hyden, R. Jackson, J. Okumu (eds.), *Development Administration: the Kenyan Experience*, OUP Nairobi, 1970; D.L. Dressing, *The Zambian Civil Service*, EAPH, 1975. Also articles published in The *African Review*, EALB, Nairobi; *The Quarterly Journal of Administration*, University of Ife, Nigeria; and publications of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD).
3. Waldo, D. "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration" in Charlesworth, ed., *Theory and Practice of Public Administration: Scope, Objectives and Methods*. Monograph 8, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadephia, 1968, p. 2.
4. For instance see Gould, D.J. *From Development Administration to Underdevelopment Administration: A Study of Zairian Administration in the light of the current Paradigmatic Crisis*, (Atlanta, Georgia: American Society of Public Administration, 1977).
   Dror. Y. *Ventures in Policy Sciences* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc., 1971) p. 9

in the present scheme of things.''[5]/ Thus, in terms of public policy-making, the value systems of the policy actors influence their identification of problems and the solutions they choose to solve them. The identification of problems, disparities or opportunities which are translated into policy objectives is thus an externalization of internal values of the policy actors.[6]/

The first task is naturally to identify the policy actors. There are several actors in the African policy processes. Significant among these are the politicians, the senior public bureaucrats, domestic and foreign business interests, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and other non-bureaucratic elite. While it may be relatively easy to understand the underlying value systems of principal actors such as politicians, from the kinds of public statements they make, it does not seem to be the same case as regards the civil servants.

An attempt to understand the values of African public bureaucrats will enable us to appreciate the role they play in the systems within which they function. However, trying to understand the value systems of the African civil servants or of any civil servant is a difficult if not an impossible task. As Baier puts it:

> '. . there is no agreed or even promising method for finding out and stating what changes in the values of an individual or groups have taken place during a given period, or what these values are at a given time.'[7]/

This situation seems to arise from the fact that philosophical arguments suggest that we cannot derive the value of things or what they are from empirically ascertainable facts alone. However, this does not suggest any absence of values.

Given our failure to pinpoint the value systems of the African civil servants, inspite of their importance on policy issues and outcome, what we need to do perhaps is to address ourselves to the normative issue: What social value system(s) ought to be possessed by the African public servant in view of his critical role in the on-going socio-economic and political changes in his country? The most pressing problems facing African nations, and which are likely to be of major concern for some decades to come, centre around the challenges of under-development and nation-building. To overcome these challenges requires, among other institutions, the now stale but crucial injunction - an effective public administration. The need for an effective administrative apparatus is very patent such that it needs to be considered as a major prerequisite for socio-economic and political development.

Apart from the role public administration plays in development and nation-building public servants must behave and perform in line with the long acknowledged tradition that public servants should be motivated significantly toward sacrifice for the greater welfare of society, that is, toward a commitment to serve the bulk of the society. The sources of that motivation are to be found in the social values, even if changing, that they hold.

Generic types of Social Values

In all types of society, social values and acts based on them necessarily play a dominant role and are thus of great importance in the life and well-being of the members. This proposition does not change even if one or more of these values is breached. In face to face, pre-technological, coherent and generally

5. Kraemer, K.L., *Policy Analysis in Local Government: A Systems Approach to Decision Making*, (Washington, D.C. International City Management Ass., 1973) p. 33
6. *Ibid.*
7. Baier, K. and Rescher, N. (eds.) *Values and the Future* (New York: The Free Press, 1969) article by Baier "What is Value: An Analysis of the Concept" p. 34.

homogenous communities, we can identify four basic social values These are survival, honour, community and freedom.[8]/

We can recognize considerable differentiation and again convergence on the amount of importance each one of these values is accorded in different societies and at different times. Nevertheless, it would seem that those values which characterize a pre-technological homogenous society change when society undergoes changes. Thus as society changes they assume the pattern as conceptualized by Rescher. At any point in time and space these four values are often in conflict and that is why we find differences in the way they are emphasized in different systems. What this suggests is that attitudes, perceptions and actions based on these can vary between circumstances and cultures.

When the values of survival, honour, community and freedom are taken as the core of societal philosophy and an aggregative polity's principle the government of such society assumes the responsibility of allowing its people satisfy their basic needs since these values become translated into the generalized goal of reducing human suffering of economic, social, political and psychic dimensions. The reduction of this suffering is thus seen as instrumental to the "enhancement of life opportunities for those inside" the system.[9]/ This involves the acknowledgement of the value of distributive justice which apparently binds the other four values together. Pursuing the value of distributive justice normatively leads to equitable distribution of societal rewards and collective goods.

African Civil Servants and the Value of Distributive Justice

The value of distributive justice seems to have become a guiding light for most governments in Africa. At least politicians have proclaimed their commitment to this concept at mass rallies, in their party manifestos, ideologies and in their different generations of five-year development plans. However, in spite of this proclamation and overt commitment to the general societal welfare, the type of policies which are made in this direction leave much to be desired. There is little evidence of success in translating the distributive justice value into genuine equitable distribution of societal or national rewards and collective goods. Although the second development decade of the seventies ushered in unprecedented rates of economic growth in many African countries people are asking questions relating to the extent to which the fruits of such growth have reached all segments of the population of these nations.[10]/

Questions of this nature have led to the questioning of the role of African public bureaucracies in the distribution process. For example, collective goods theorists, with their concern over bureaucracies' role in public policy-making and distribution of collective goods, focus on the socio-cultural infrastructure of the principal actors in the policy arena and thus argue that social change efforts cannot be effective without directing concerted attention to the larger socio-economic-political determinants of administrative behaviour. Dependency theorists, in a similar spirit, look at the role of public bureaucracies as terrains

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8. Of all the four values survival is perhaps the most universal and commanding value for individuals and groups. However, we also find that within a community there are some people who put honor (or cause) above mere survival, e.g. the saints, martyrs and heroes. There is also the search for cohesion and it is this search which demands a complementary set of attitudes and actions which makes a community. We can also have community growing out of common experiences and education as an expression of a distinct culture. Thus the elite of whatever character (religious, cultural, economic, political or ideological) may exploit the community for its own benefits. Therefore, freedom becomes the fourth pillar of society; for without freedom there is exploitation and oppression. On the other hand, freedom without the value of community brings forth chaos and anarchy.
9. Brief, A.P. Delbecq et. al. "Elite structure and attitudes: An Empirical Analysis of Adoption Behaviour" *Administration and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 2, August, 1976, pp. 224 - 234 also see Laporte, T.R., "The Recovery of relevance in the study of Public Organizations" in F. Marini (ed.) *Toward a New Public Administration.*
10. The distribution of the benefits from the economic growth of the 1960's has particularly been questioned by people who have been disappointed by the attitude of the ruling elites in Africa who are seen as committed to self-aggrandizement and thus use the state apparatus to accumulate more wealth for themselves.

on which collective goods are manipulated to the advantage of elite and to the disadvantage of the larger segments of society. The elites have access to the political-administrative resources which they exploit to their own benefit. The incumbents of such systems also benefit from the relationship they have with the ruling elites. Thus, they cannot do anything for the welfare of the majority of their countries' citizens that may endanger their interests. Advocates of dependency theory go on to look at the impact of the world political economy on the performance of the African public bureaucracies. Taking this perspective they argue that lack of administrative reforms and the presence of the sequels of colonialism and neo-colonialism have resulted in continuing systematic and exploitative international relationships whose main victims are the majority of the African population who are at the periphery. This relationship, which also benefits the ruling elites including the public servants, works against even the minimal attainment of the four basic values of survival, honour, freedom and community.

Policy Issues

Our argument is that African public bureaucracies are not being successful in promoting equitable distribution of the much sought after scarce resources not because they are inherently unable to do so; rather, that it is the behavioural patterns of the public servants, which arise from the infrastructure of social values which work against equitable distribution efforts. We therefore hold the perspective that in view of the challenges facing modern African nations, the African civil servant must have or acquire the value of distributive justice which he will add to the already existing arsenal of legitimate administrative values. This view is aptly supported by Frederickson when he notes that the 'present social stress suggests the need for a mid-course correction' in public administration norms, a correction designed to improve the capabilities of government to satisfy the needs of all citizens. The much needed course of correction is the introduction and reinforcement of the value of social equity in the public servants.

How do we introduce and promote the social equity value in the public bureaucracies? Before anything is done to change the orientation of the public servants, the value of social equity should be made one of the basic conerstones of the overall social control systems of the African nations.[11] In terms of policy processes, this value should be the most salient feature of any metapolicy being pursued. Social equity value is a value which once institutionalized should condition the perception of the public servants in terms of need for any given course of action which is seen as leading to either societal survival, welfare, advancement and reality-adjustment or all of these.

Institutionalizing the social equity value requires a systematic normative re-education system whose prime objective will be to change the general conservative orientation of the civil servants. As Thompson pointed out;

> 'The bureaucratic orientation is conservative. Novel solutions using resources in a new way are likely to appear threatening . . . . The first reaction to new ideas and suggested changes is most likely to be "how does it affect us?"[12]

In terms of African bureaucracies this orientation is not a healthy one in view of the urgent and immediate challenges they confront. The challenges cannot allow us to take our beliefs and values, and the consequent policies for granted. Rather, we need to transform our values, attitudes, institutions and the accompanying practices so that they can effectively act as rational determinants of our societal choices.

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11. Dror, Y. *Ventures in Policy Sciences*, (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc., 1971) p. 9. Here the term is used to describe the central guidance system whose main actors are the politicians, civil servants, corporate groups and technical personnel.
12. Thompson, V. "Bureaucracy and Innovation", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. X No. 1 June, 1965

As our knowledge and capabilities increase each day, we need to examine which of our values should be modified and toward what direction. What this simply suggests is that we should question how sound are the value systems to which our civil servants subscribe or should subscribe.

The Value system Framework of the African Civil Servant

As indicated earlier it is difficult, if not impossible, to adequately describe the value system of any one individual, let alone a complex group like the African civil servants. The most we can do is to examine a given situation and make normative suggestions in terms of what value system could be viable for that situation. Therefore, we return to the earlier normative question we raised; namely, what social value system(s) ought to be possessed by the African public servant considering the challenges of underdevelopment and nation-building? To answer this question we need to look in general terms at the role being played by public bureaucracies in development and nation-building exercises.

The role of African public bureaucracies in policy-making and implementation related to development and nation-building efforts is an issue which has generated a variety of academic debates. For instance, we find that liberal scholars of Public Administration, particularly those following the institution-building perspective, point at the importance of improving the management dimension of any government system whose primary responsibility is initiating and sustaining development programmes. However, there is an apparent neglect of the value-system variable in their suggestions of how such management improvement can be brought about.[13] On the other hand, political economists argue that African public bureaucracies are essentially used by elites to branch out their control over all facets of societal life. This is a bold claim but one hardly substantiated by empirical data.[14] The primary motive of the elites in using the bureaucracies, according to this perspective, is to ensure that their interests are not endangered or offset. In this respect public bureaucracies are the engines of the state apparatus which operate to the disadvantage of the masses.[15] This trend of thought reflects the traditional Marxist view which sees administration as the handmaiden of repressive state-power which is designed to carry out the dictates of the ruling elites.[16]

Our view is that both the liberal and the traditional Marxist views are not adequate explanations of the role of public bureaucracies in development (or underdevelopment) and nation-building efforts of the African nations. This is mainly because in the political sphere, and in the complex relationship between ruling elites and public servants, there a lot of variations and subtleties which cannot adequately be explained by either monodimensional approaches or deterministic theories. Our approach is an eclectic one which accepts the class analysis perspective without adopting its deterministic stance. Within this perspective we view African public bureaucracy as favouring class interests. Consequently there is a discrepancy between what is said by the ruling elites and what is actually achieved. However, the bias that public bureaucracies reflect toward the ruling elite is not deliberate; rather, it arises from the value systems which have been acquired and reinforced through many decades because of colonial experience and continued dependence on Western institutions and practices. For example, we find that the major role of the colonial bureaucracies was that of policing institutions observing fervently the need

13. The value system variable in the Institution-Building framework is only taken into consideration when a development-oriented institution is looked at vis-a-vis the environment; thus we have normative linkages while looking at the value-system of the institutions actors as a matter of course. See Joseph Eaton (ed.), *Institution-Building and Development* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

14. The 'penetration' syndrome highlighted in several studies is in itself an admission that central bureaucracies have not managed to control all facets of society. See for instance, M. Staniland. "The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 8, 4 (1970) J.R. Moris, "Administrative Authority and the Problem of effective agricultural administration in East Africa", The African Review, 2, 1 (1972).

15. Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment Revolution*, (Monthly Review Press, 1969) Chapter 1.

16. Gould, D.J. *op. cit.*

for law and order which, in essence, meant overcoming any forces which would endanger or offset the interests of colonial rulers. The African civil servants were in the forefront in safeguarding the status quo. Thus, even though the African population did not have access to the colonial political-administrative structures the African civil servants had a significant, albeit prescribed, role to play in the welfare of their colonized country men.[17]

The key basis of the colonial governments was the philosophy of liberalism with its emphasis on materialistic individualism. This mainly arose from the long established belief in western societies that individuals have an inherent right to seek private ends and thus they must be free to have and use private property. However, liberalism has contradictory undertones. First, pure liberalism considers government's role in society as primarily that of protecting individuals in the full enjoyment of life, liberty and property and perhaps provide only those services for protection which individuals cannot themselves provide. There is an assumption that before a government plays the role of protecting individuals with property the individuals have already accumulated it. Secondly, liberalism scoffs at those members of society who do not own property. Thus Russel Cornwell wrote, 'it is all wrong to be poor', while he preached that human differences diminish in the overpowering perspective of God and that all men become equal before him.[18]

When western liberalism is grafted on the African set-up we note a lack of congruity. This is more accentuated when we put the economic dimension into perspective. The picture that emerges tells us that public administration machineries are used for personal and corporate group interests by elites. While many scholars of new states argue that this is essentially a phenomenon characteristic of new political systems they tend to overlook the fact that colonial rulers used the public bureaucracies for the same purpose.[19] We would rather argue that most of the societal problems being experienced by African nations can be explained in terms of the asymmetrical synchronization of western values and institutions with the socio-cultural environment of these new nations. This imbalance is reflected in the values of the civil servants and the acts based on them. However, it is neither the civil servants nor the elites who suffer from this 'value institutional' gap; rather, it is the majority of the populations of these societies in spite of proclamations that the governments are working for their welfare. The policies that are made and the programmes that follow do not reflect any concern over the welfare of the masses. Therefore what is needed is a psychological and cultural redirection on the part of the civil servants and the ruling elite so that the policies they make are geared toward the welfare of the masses instead of benefiting only a few individuals. On the other hand, where civil servants are seen as monopolizing the control of resources in politically unstable situations then the premium should be placed on extra-bureaucratic authority in promoting wider distribution of goods and services.[20]

Earlier we noted that in view of the challenges facing Africa today the value of distributive justice and social equity should form the core philosophy of any government system that is genuinely concerned about the welfare of its people. Restated the issue is how can African public servants acquire the value of distributive justice which will lead to equitable distribution of collective goods in their societies? How can the goal of social equity be pursued given the long established and sanctioned relationship between

17. Markovitz, I.L. *Power and Class in Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice Hall, 1977) p. 213.

18. Russel, H. Cornwell, *Acres of Diamond*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, n.d.) cited in J.D. Smith, (ed.) *The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965) pp. 11-12.

19. Montgomery, J. A. and Siffin, W.J. (eds.), *Approaches to Development Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968) p. 71.

20. For an explication of the concept of extra-bureaucratic authority see M. F. Lofchie, "Representative Government Bureaucracy, and Political Development: The African Case." *The Journal of Developing Areas*, II, 1 (October, 1967), PP. 37-56.

those who have access to the political-bureaucratic apparatus and those who are denied such access? Put more bluntly; how do we change the zero-sum relationship between the elites and the masses by use of the public bureaucracies? What qualities, arising from their value systems, should civil servants possess, especially those qualities that influence their participation in public policy-making and implementation processes?

Many people do agree that the pace of change and the accompanying increased needs, desires and aspirations of the African nations, the increased complexity of the institutional arrangement that consequently emerges and the death of colonialism inevitably have brought forth increased socio-economic and political pressures. These require an effective brokers mechanism. At the centre of this mechanism is the civil servant. Thus, in an effort to introduce a non-zero sum relationship between all members of society the civil servant does not only have to be a moral leader, broker, co-ordinator, and issuer of orders; he also needs to be adaptable and knowledgeable about changing trends. He must know, or at least learn, how to exploit some of these trends and identify those which need to be resisted. The governing principle should be that of public interest and social equity.

Public interest and social equity are vague concepts; they can and do indeed mislead both policy-makers and client systems of policy-making institutions. As Jacob notes, when policy-makers have to justify their decisions and acts based on these they often justify them by talking about social equity and public interest.[21]/Thus public interest in practice is nothing less than ethical evaluation, a normative commitment which in reality, especially in Africa, is not very evident. Public interest and social equity as concepts are currently being mentioned by both African politicians and public bureaucrats not as a criterion for their policies and programmes; rather, as a mark of moral legitimacy which is often eroded away by the results of such policies as they promote the asymmetrical economic and political relationship between the elites and the majority of people at the periphery.

Of the several qualities which African civil servants should bring into the policy-making area perhaps the most crucial is honesty and impartiality in the discharge of their responsibilities. These qualities will not only bring about public confidence in the capacity and integrity of the political-bureaucratic machinery but will also facilitate the mobilization of various resources that are necessary for national development and nation-building. Honesty and impartiality will enable them become cognizant and responsive not only to the desires and wishes of the elected political leaders but also to the desires and aspirations of the public which they normatively serve. The public bureaucracy should not fight against rising expectations of the masses by denying them access to societal collective goods; rather it should enhance redistributive policies and programmes aimed at social equity.

If the answer to the question 'who benefits'? is tempered by honesty and impartiality public servants are likely to become more aware of the value and worth of individuals both within their political-bureaucratic web and outside. To a large extent it can be argued that African politicians, especially those who sought power through the ballot box, are aware of the fact that they hold their offices at the pleasure of the masses to whom they accord due respect. However public servants do not seem to share this spirit mainly on account of the way they are recruited. They posses immense powers which other institutions and non-bureaucratic groups are unable to offset. And so long as their internalized value system remains unchanged this asymmetrical power relationship will always negate the fundamental aims and objectives of an administration which should serve the needs of its citizens. Thus what is needed is reorientation of the bureaucrats including their procedures so that not even the humblest citizen shall be deprived of certain specific rights.[22]/

21. Jacob, C.E., *Policy and Bureaucracy* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1966) p. 192.
22. United Nations, *A handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and Practices with special Reference to Developing Countries* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1961) p. 11

Civil servants have to take a fresh look at their role in the process of enhancing the welfare of the people they are supposed to serve. They need to re-examine the relationship that prevails between them and the masses if they are going to avoid sabotaging the efforts of political leaders to bring forth societal improvements. Indeed, the catalogue of complaints against civil servants by African political leaders is a long one.[23]/

Therefore, there is need for introducing normative re-education programmes whose basic aim is to change the systems of beliefs, values and attitudes of the civil servants. In this way the values of distrib utive justice and social equity relating to collective societal goods can become guiding principles instead of the materialistic individualism which for centuries has formed the backbone of western societies and their public administration - a perspective which is not viable for African societies.

Concluding Remarks

This paper can be summarized tersely. We cannot neglect the impact the value system of the African public servant has on policy issues and the various programmes and operations that arise from them. At present the value systems of the African bureaucrats are working against the goals and aspirations of the societies that they serve. Because of this there is need for introducing normative re-educatonl programmes whose basic aim will be to change the systems of beliefs, values and attitudes of the civil servants so that the values of distributive justice and social equity relating to collective societal goods can become guiding principles of African public administration.

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23. Comments made by Sekou Toure and Nkrumah are pertinent;

> "Often civil servants are reluctant to establish close co-operation and joint action with political cadres. This reveals inadmissible lack of confidence in the political capacities of the people's representatives, sometimes even intorelable contempt of the masses - an attitude which betrays in the officials a gross exaggeration of their own role and their own purpose"

"Relationship between political and administrative bodies", in Mutiso, G. (ed.) *Readings in African Political Thought* (Nairobi: Heineman, 1975) p. 499.

> "It happened too often . . . that whenever government policy was to be put into effect, the officials either dilly-dallied or saw that nothing was done . . . if there was any movement afoot against the government, every attempt was made on the part of the civil service to enhance the opposition against government."

Ghana (London: Nelson and Sons, 1957) p.51.

THE AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVANT AS A POLICY-MAKER AND CIVIL SERVANTS' VALUE SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING IN AFRICA FOR THE 1980s

Discussants : Chief Falae and Mr Z. Danha

The bold statement in the first paper that the public servant "..... is not and should not consider himself as a policy-maker", came under strong attack on two main fronts viz, that the public servant is a partner with the politician in the collaborative effort of policy-making and secondly, that it is the People who decide policy - not the public servant or the politician.

Persuing the theme of collaboration, which was never to be far from the surface, the finer features of that difficult to define relationship between top civil servant and politician were explored fully. Who is the shoemaker? the leather tanner, the designer, the man who assembles, the craftsmen along the way? All make the shoe. And so with policy *except* that at the apex there is always the politician. How the civil servant participates will depend on many variables some of which are reflected in the historical and societal paths followed in the shaping of today's public services and the individual value systems of today's top officials.

It was noted, en passant, that the third group of elitists - the special advisers - described in the first paper, had already emerged in Nigeria. The role of the established top official could now perhaps be re-defined vis à vis the Special Adviser.

If there was criticism that top civil servants allowed, indeed encouraged, the dominance of their own group interests which were often at variance with those of the common man and society at large, would the new group of special advisers be blameless in this respect? Much would depend on the role and in particular the nature of the policy executing machinery. In the event though as with others, it is for the politician to resolve these differences. There was a minority view that with strongly controlled political policy to implement, the civil service would not be able to reflect group interests.

The author of the first paper was quick to react to the comments on his paper, by saying that essentially those who opposed his views were looking at the present and immediate past whilst he was looking at the future - the 1980s and beyond. The day would come when the professionalism of all the actors would be much improved so that expediency would not (seem to) be the order of the day. Where expert attention was needed then experts would provide it. There were still far too many non professional civil servants. Once the professional calibre of the civil servant and the political calibre of the politician has been improved, then there would be less difficulty in defining the role of the former. It would be supportive to that of the politician who would always have the final say in legitimatizing declared policy. But policy-making is, and will remain a very complex proscess with politicians relying on their civil service technocrats more than they should, which could be seen as a reflection of their own inadequacies.

Governments manage huge resources and need to use every proven system to do so properly. Foreign systems, if borrowed, should be indigenized to be accepted and become effective. Governments employ perhaps a third of a nation's total work force and indisputably must be in the most capable of hands.

Technology and politics will go hand in hand but with politics remaining always paramount. Vigorous and results - orientated training programmes are vital if there is to be progress. In certain countries policy formulation is specified as a training requirement in Schemes of Service for top administrators. The participatory role of the public servant will remain empty and barren - or at best contentious

unless its occupants acquire those skills, knowledge and attitudes to bring it to fulfilment and thereby to its rightful place in public affairs and nation-building.

By introducing the third group of actors - the people - the definitions and machinery were by no means so clear. Development Plans were drawn up by civil servants, often incompletely understood by politicians and more often revealed a distortion of the wishes of the people at the grassroots through the passage of time and distance. But it brought into focus the grey areas of public accountability (to whom?) and public responsibility (for what?)

The dichotomy still existed between the policy formulators and policy implementors when the total process from articulation to review and evaluation should be regarded as one with - however finely balanced - collective management responsibility throughout that process. The question to be put and answered concern basically how to re-shape the civil service into a dynamic and development-orientated body and secondly how to sharpen and enhance the role to be played by the top civil servants in the policy-making process. Those experienced top civil servants can and do articulate well on political issues. The duality can be seen well at question time in parliament and at international forums. To say they are not involved, or are neutral (silent)? is to reveal well known features of a defence mechanism. It is not very helpful in the developmental process.

Politicians have to live with their own sanctions e.g. elections every four years, and must dictate the pace and content of policy in order to survive. To maximize the relationship between the 4-year man and his permanent and pensionable Principal Secretary requires much thought and intelligence. Each has his role and his place, but each has to explore the interface between them to make those years productive. It is a highly individualistic affair but experience has shown that Ministers respect frankness, intellectual honesty and competence. It may take time to demonstrate these qualities but there is no substitute if the duet is to be meaningful.

It is not uncommon for the Minister and the top civil service leadership to come from the same background and share the same value systems. Provided the political direction and development philosophy of the state are sound and omnipotent, this commoness of value systems could go a long way to strenghtening the policy-making process for the good of society as a whole.

The second paper presented a broader dimension to the debate. Policy-making is a process that should involve the people, politicians, the civil servants and even outside experts and advisers. Civil servants have a responsibility in initiating policy proposals for their political masters, and conversely. Politicians should not fight shy of testing their policy ideas on their civil servants. This is the only way in which a Government can ensure that policies are well articulated, well researched and well formulated. In the final analysis, the stamp of approval - the legitimization of policies is the responsibility of the political class. But responsible and responsive Government presupposes responsible and realistic policy measures.

In order to achieve this, it is imperative that the political class must be manned by people who are competent, knowledgeable and experienced. This means that the present trend of appointing to ministerial positions inexperienced and not highly qualified people as ministers, should be reversed. The ministerial political class must be more or less as technocratic as the higher echelons of the civil service.

For their part, the civil servants must realize that they are subordinate partners to the political class in the policy - making process. They must therefore co-operate fully with the politicians and assist in every way possible in the formulation of sound policies even when they do not agree with such policies. They must not allow their social values or their personal and group interests to conflict with their public service

responsibilities. They must always recognize the fact that they are responsible and accountable to the political class and through them to the public at large, and are subject to their sanctions.

In order to facilitate the formulation of sound, realistic and well-researched policies, the structure of the civil services may have to be reformed to fall in line with the political systems that are emerging in Africa. Such restructuring should allow for the participation of individuals from the other sectors of the economy, appointed to serve for a period of years. In order to make possible such mobility and minimize the tendency to corrupt practices which insecurity of tenure tends to breed, African Governments may have to introduce, inter alia, on a national basis, contributory superannuation schemes covering all employees in all sectors of the economy - private as well as public.

African Governments today control vast amounts of resources relative to the national income of their countries that it is becoming imperative if we are to meet the challenges of the 1980s that policy-making must be increasingly professionalized. And there must be no dichotomy between policy formulation and policy implementation, otherwise accountability will be eroded.

In order to ensure the widest possible participation by the public at large in the policy-making process, there should not only be as wide a consultation as possible, but also the encouragement of vigor ous and critical public debate. This may require that such policy measures are published as proposals n order to test public opinion and take into account criticisms and suggestions for improvement without the Government, or the Party in a one-Party State, feeling that the critics are dissidents and disloyal citizens. The present tendency of narrowing the levels and scope of public debate on public policies ought to be stopped. Democratization of the development process requires as a prerequisite the public democratization of policy formulation process.

The need is undeniable to offer training to policy-makers, politicians and civil servants - in order to enhance the quality of policies being formulated and thereby minimize unecessary frictions and conflicts. It is training in a specialized area, highly sensitive and differing from one country to another. It constitutes a major gap in existing training programmes and it has to be filled.

TOOLS AND MANPOWER FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY-MAKING IN GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

MICHAEL A. BENTIL*

Introduction

This paper attempts to portray the general growing interest in the processes of public policy-making, constraints and problems impairing those processes, and different measures for dealing with some of the difficulties encountered, especially in developing countries in Africa. The major focus will be on the description of different techniques and tools for effective public policy-making, as well as the requisite skills for properly applying them. Tools in this context are categorized as:

(i) different management techniques for policy analysis; and
(ii) institutional arrangements, including manpower support, for improved policy-making.

These will be reviewed from the perspective of the nature and scope of public policy, as well as the salient features of policy analysis.

Public Policy and Public Administration

Public policy-making connotes long-standing and continuing inquiry into political, economic social, scientific, technological, administrative and environmental issues and problems pertaining to state administration. Its scope and perspectives have become broader and more crucial following the rapidly expanding responsibilities of Governments, generated, in turn, by the challenging and complex demands of economic and social development of the nation. This activity has embraced participants from different disciplines and specializations including politicians, administrators, social scientists, physical and natural scientists, technologists, and citizens at large. In particular, administrators and bureaucrats in many developing countries have become more involved in the process of policy-making because of their direct responsibility to make the system of public administration more effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of economic and social development.

The function of policy analysis has become more crucial with the advent of systematic planning for economic, social and technological development. Development planning has generated a new and special interest among policy-makers with respect to systematic analysis of public policy issues as well as orderly and co-ordinated inter-relationships among different policies. Indeed, policy analysis has recently emerged as an activity in public administration that can make a significant contribution towards the improvement of the quality of administration and management of state affairs. At the highest level of decision-making, policy analysis can better guide political decisions-makers to make appropriate choices among different alternatives. At the operational level, policy analysis tools and techniques can equally facilitate the translation of overall policy objectives into workable action programmes. For these reasons it is important that public administration systems should develop concrete policy analysis capabilities, including the necessary tools and skills.

Constraints of Policy Analysis in Developing Countries

In December 1979 the United Nations organized an *ad hoc* expert group meeting on Methodologies of Policy Analysis and Development. That meeting identified the following specific constraints in relation to the use of scientific and technical tools for policy analysis in developing countries:

(i) lack of clarity in the definition of inputs, means and outputs, and the consequent possible conflicts in the use of those terms;

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* The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not in any way represent those of the United Nations. Mr. Michael A. Bentil is Deputy Director, Division of Development Administration, United Nations, New York

(ii) the absence of influential social groups to articulate public policy making demands;
(iii) unpredictability of the political and economic environments due to both internal and external factors;
(iv) the scarcity of administrative resources in terms of manpower, financial and information support;
(v) the wide gap between the national educational systems and the needs of economic, social and technological development needs;
(vi) the rapid turnover of politicians as well as the conflict of interests and values among them;
(vii) continuing dependence on, and blind copying of foreign techniques and tools which have limited relevance to local needs; there is a great need for the systematic and selective adaptation of the useful ones;
(viii) limited role and isolation of research institutes or universities in the process of national policy-making.

Systems analysis as a key technique in the process of decision-making has recently been receiving considerable attention; a few comments on its limitations would therefore be in order. In spite of its acclaimed usefulness as a tool in the processes of decision-making, system analysis is, in general, ineffective where the problems to be solved are behaviour-oriented and therefore do not lend themselves to quantitative measurements. Secondly, its successful application has been impeded by the lack of the necessary skills. Thirdly, the attitudes and perceptions of professional systems analysts have in many cases proved to be at variance with needs to be met.

More specific weaknesses and difficulties associated with the application of systems analysis as a tool of policy analysis in developing countries could be categorized as follows:

(a) imprecise formulation and frequent and radical changes in the definition of national goals, this undermines the stability of policies;
(b) the dearth of reliable data; and
(c) alien foundation and orientation of the policy-making processes, stemming in most cases, fro m the influences of colonial administration of pre-independence days.

Salient Features of Policy Analysis

Discussion under this heading will be limited to the processes and some of the techniques foi conducting policy analysis. Policy analysis is an approach to helping decision-makers choose a course of action to solve problems of public importance through the use of scientific and rational methods. It embraces a number of systematic steps in the following order:

— the perception and identification of problems and/or issues;
— the formulation of possible alternative courses of action in terms of costs, benefits and effectiveness for meeting identified needs;
— construction and experimentation of solution models;
— cognizance or recognition of factors that condition the success of the different models;
— the review and appraisal of solution models for possible modifications;
— presentation and implementation of prospects for new action.

Policy analysis is pervasive activity; it is applicable to decision problems associated with different types and levels of functions and responsibilities ranging from routine day-to-day operations in different government departments and offices, to complex high-level decisions. The spectrum of decision problems may be categorized as:

(a) operational;
(b) programming or management; and
(c) developmental.

This categorization is arbitrary and is therefore likely to involve overlapping in specific instances. It is used only as a convenient means of analysis and discussion.

Operational Problems

This class of decision problems is found in the day-to-day operations of the government, which are generally characterized by single purpose and easily defined objectives and criteria. Efficiency of the operations in the immediate future is the major concern. The analysis of problems in this category is generally subject to fairly rigorous quantification and the application of systematic computational routines, including the use of generic models that can be adapted to a wide variety of activities. Problems in question can be found in such activities as: buying policy and inventory control; assignment of personnel to different jobs; allocation and use of facilities such as public transportation systems and the provision of water supplies, school and health-care centres; maintenance and or replacement of equipment, machinery etc.

Tools and techniques applicable in the analysis of operational decision problems are generally mathematically and statistically based. These include linear programming, inventory control and scheduling techniques.

Programming or Management Decision Problems

The questions of immediate concern to programming or management problems are centred on the effectiveness and appropriateness of a system beyond the perspectives of the immediate future. This category of problem is characterized by multiple and conflicting objectives and criteria which are not easy to define. The objectives are also effectiveness-oriented as in the case of operational decision problems, but it is difficult to reach a consensus on them. In the choice of criteria, one may have to depend upon intuitive evaluation of net benefits. Alternatives to solving programming or management problems are limited; new alternatives are often very different from the existing ones; also inventing new alternatives is a difficult process.

As in the case of operational decision problems, there are standard models to be applied to many solutions. These could include **ad hoc** computer and gaming models as well as behavioural models. The actual solutions are usually attained through trial and error or approximation methods. Sometimes the most satisfactory solutions are not possible.

Techniques employed in dealing with programming or management decision problems are both quantitative and qualitative or judgemental in character. Examples of these decision problems relate to activities such as organization, design, scheduling, budgetary and other aspects of financial and operations management, and certain aspects of planning.

Development or Planning Decision Problems

Development or planning decision problems are generally generated by activities which involve the determination of objectives for future systems and actions as well as the invention of different alternative approaches to realizing the objectives established. The questions of cancern in this regard are "What needs will emerge in the future?" and "How can systems be designed and developed to effectively meet those needs?" Development problems are essentially long-range planning problems but also share the characteristics of programming or management problems.

Development decision problems are more complex than either of the two other categories of decision problems identified. One reason is that formulating objectives for future actions with long-term perspectives is a formidable undertaking. Another reason is the uncertainty of the results and impact to be achieved from the actions that are planned. Further, there is an element of unpredictability characterizing the impacts of external factors (that is, external to the country) which creates problems in policy analysis at the level of development decisions. Consequently, the task of evolving alternative solutions to development or planning decision problems is not an easy one.

Very often, quantitative techniques will not be helpful in either the process of defining objectives or in the process of determining alternative approaches to action implementation and problem solving.

Examples of development or planning decision problems are found in activities such as the development of transportation, building and other urban physical systems; the development of policies for education, health, welfare, public safety and similar activities in the Government.

Process of Policy Analysis

Regardless of the nature, type and level of the policy to be analyzed, the analysis process is fairly standard. It embraces, broadly, and as previously noted, three interrelated steps of:

(i) perception;
(ii) design; and
(iii) evaluation.

Another common characteristic is the notion that analysis is iterative and often requires delving into or working through each activity or the whole process several times. Also important is the fact that while models and quantitative techniques may be used extensively, the process of analysis is permeated with numerous judgements, intuitions, and subjective assessments.

Analysis in the decision process can start at any point. However, it has to be initiated by someone with the perception of disparities in the existing scheme of things and opportunities for dealing with them. Perception in this context comprehends, first, the identification and classification of objectives and, second, the identification and delineation of problems. The process of identification of problems involves an attempt to isolate questions or issues and to place them in the right context and perspectives. Similarly, the process of identification and clarification of objectives comprehends specification of general goals which in turn are externalizations of internal values and preferences. It is more crucial to formulate the right objectives than to make the right choice among different alternatives. The choice of a wrong alternative may merely mean that something less than the best system is being applied. The choice of a wrong objective on the other hand means that the wrong problem is being solved.

The *perception* phase of policy analysis requires much interaction between policy-makers and specialist policy analysts. There is a general tendency for policy analysts to accept statements on problems made by politicians without much scrutiny to ascertain the soundness or correctness of those statements or how they could influence the policies that emerge from them. Another difficulty experienced in this phase of policy analysis stems from the ideological, professional and communication differences between politicians as policy-makers and administrators and technocrats as executors of policies.

The *design* phase of the policy analysis process is basically concerned with finding alternative solutions to problems and determining the criteria for comparing one against the other. Design is the process of discovering new elements and building on known or existing elements in such a way as to produce a desired whole. It also means constructing different alternatives to solving a particular problem given

that the possible number of alternatives in any given situation is virtually unlimited. While it is technically possible in many cases to consider all possible alternatives and their impacts, the time, cost and relevance of doing so is often prohibitive. Policy analysts and decision-makers invariably find a way of judging which alternatives seem more relevant than the others. Real World constraints also limit the number of feasible alternatives to a few choices. The danger, however, is that some important alternatives may be overlooked.

The evaluation phase of policy analysis is an intellectual process which involves predicting the consequences of selecting each of the various alternatives and deciding which of them to select. It may simply require the judgement of an individual expert or it may involve using a quantitative model such as an elaborate computer programme that combines in a single computation various sub-models for determining the financial cost, environmental forecasts and goal achievements. It may also involve a variety of processes including quantitative and qualitative methods and gaming exercises. What is common to all evaluations is that they are done with the aid of some kind of model which is used in an experimental fashion to try out the various alternatives.

Techniques of Policy Analysis

Policy analysis involves the use of different types of modern management decision techniques and strategies, depending upon the nature of the decisions to be taken. These techniques are largely different aspects and applications of systems analysis, and include operations research, systems engineering, and network analysis tools embracing programme evaluation and review techniques (PERT) and critical path analysis (CPM), scheduling, planning and programme budgeting system (PPES), cost-benefit analysis, and statistical methods. Others are scenario construction and paradigms, organization analysis, management by-objectives, etc. Most of these techniques have been developed or given greater attention during the past two to three decades and are aimed at clarifying the task of policy analysts, policy planners and policy makers. Almost all of these techniques are based on scientific methods for solving problems and will lead to rational decision-making.

In the process of applying the management decision techniques different models in the form of mathematical equations, computer programmes, management games, scenarios, organizational charts, maps, charters, rules and regulations, standard procedures, budget documents etc., are used. These facilitate experimentation which is a crucial step in the process of policy analysis. Policy analysis models could be viewed as a continuum reflecting different degrees of their physical or symbolic characteristics as well as the types of techniques suited to the various levels of quantification or use of judgement. Five types of models have been identified by writers on the subject; they range from the most quantitative models to the most qualitative or judgemental models:

(a) analytical models;
(b) computer models;
(c) people models;
(d) people/computer models;
(e) verbal models.

Analytical models take the form of sets of mathematical equations which are susceptible to mechanical solution. They deal with generalities not with specificities, and the techniques often applied in these models include linear, non-linear and dynamic programming, queuing theory, network theory, game theory and information theory.

Computer models are more suited to decision problems in which the relevant variables are too numerous and the interrelationship too complex to be handled analytically by conventional methods.

In contrast to the analytical models, all computer models deal with specific situations. Simulation models usually suggest computer applications.

People-oriented models are those in which the components consist of role-players or actors, a set of rules which governs the activities of the actors, a model of the environment in which the actors operate, and a set of rules for manipulating the environment model. Business games, urban community games and other role playing models are examples under this category.

People and Computer models involve a mix of people and all computer models in the overall structure of the situation being studied. Thus in a gaming situation, the model of the environment in which the actors are operating and the rules for manipulating that environmental model would be embedded in a computer programme.

Verbal models are those models which have no quantitative content. Basically they involve determining what factors in a given situation are relevant, measuring the relativities among those factors, and tracing out their interactions and implications. These models are very extensively used. In most cases they are implicit and difficult to make explicit. When they are made explicit, they fall into the verbal category. Examples include scenarios and paradigms.

A scenario is a description of the conditions and events under which a system which is being studied is assumed to be existing. Most scenarios are future-oriented, although they may be reconstructions of the past or synoptic descriptions of the present. Scenarios are particularly suited to dealing with conditions and events taken together and to integrating several aspects of a situation more or less simultaneously.

Paradigmc and scenarios are closely related but differ somewhat in purpose and use. A scenario is used as an aid to stimulate thinking about future conditions and events and to develop alternative futures. Paradigms are used to compare or to show side by side a set of ideas such as those which might be developed in a scenario. Thus a paradigm is a structured set of assumptions, concepts, propositions and questions about a subject; they are used as a basis to analyse a set of ideas, thereby permitting simultaneous inspection and evaluation of the set or of several sets. The paradigm does not represent a set of ideas constructed **de novo**, rather it is a codification of concepts, ideas, or problems found in existing theory, research or experience related to a particular subject.

Institutional Support for Policy Analysis

In addition to the different management decision techniques identified as policy analysis tools, institutional arrangements in support of policy analysis constitute another form of tool. These institutional arrangements also provide the necessary support to enhance the use of the various policy analysis techniques. The foremost institutional prerequisite is that there must be clearly defined national goals to be established by the political leadership. Other institutional prerequisites include:

(i) the existence of the necessary manpower with the relevant skills;
(ii) ready availability of relevant data or information;
(iii) acceptance of, and support for rational approach to policy-making by political leadership; and
(iv) the existence of the suitable institutions and organizational arrangements to support policy analysis work, including the provision of central technical guidance.

Adequacy of institutional support to the central policy-making has received special and increasing attention in several countries since the end of World War II, as a means of improving public policy-making. Different approaches have been adopted towards this end. Even though the institutional arrangements for

policy-making vary from country to country according to their respective political systems, socio-economic conditions and prevailing ideologies, the approaches that have been followed seem to fall into three broad patterns:

(a) the use of central "guidance clusters" that have the direct support of the office of the Chief Executive or the Head of Government; the institutions concerned include the Cabinet Secretariat or the Secretariat of the Chief Executive, Planning Commissions; Ministries of Finance; Central Personnel Agencies, etc.;

(b) centralization of data and information generation, collection and analysis; this approach has included the use of statistical offices, data processing centres, government research institutions and the creation of special advisory councils, committees, comissions and lately Think Tanks;

(c) the commissioning of private and non-government research and consultancy institutions to undertake specific consultancy assignments on a contract basis.

Illustrative Country Experiences

A notable example of experience in institutional arrangements in support of policy analysis can be drawn from the United States following the First and Second Hoover Commission Reports (1949 and 1955). The initiatives taken include the establishment of the staff agencies and special advisory bodies such as Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Similarly policy analysis units or staff have been established in different departments and agencies.

Another significant feature of the U.S. experience is the substantial use made of non-government policy analysis institutions often referred to as 'think tanks'. These institutions conduct studies which are either contracted out by Government agencies or undertaken as independent initiatives. The leading non-government think tank institution include the Brookings Institute, the Rand Corporation, Hudson Institute and Future Institute.

The United Kingdom is another developed country from which an example can be drawn. Compared to the U.S. the experience in the U.K. has been rather *ad hoc* and piece-meal with respect to the development of institutions to support policy analysis work in the Government. However, following the Fulton Report of 1968, policy making capability has been strengthened through the creation of policy planning units/cells in government departments. In addition, Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was established as a "think tank" of the Cabinet. The establishment of the CPRS marked the formal recognition by the government in power of the need to strengthen the policy planning and co-ordination function of the Cabinet.

The experience of developing countries including those in Africa, with respect to the development of institutional support to policy analysis, reflects limited and *ad hoc* efforts at both governmental and non-government levels. In a few scattered cases the Ministry of Planning, or a Planning Board or Commission, the Ministry of Finance or the Office of the President/Prime Minister has been used to back up policy analysis work in the government. The isolated cases include recent actions by government in Nigeria and Ghana where some forms of "think tanks" have been developed to strengthen the policy making capability of the Government. The unit developed in Nigeria was known as the National Policy Development Centre and that in Ghana was known as the Policy Review and Development Committee located in the office of the Head of State.

Several reasons have accounted for the slow development of institutional support of policy analysis in developing countries. These include:

— shortage of skilled policy analysts, trained in systems analysis and other related modern management decision techniques;

— frequent changes in the location of responsibility for policy analysis;

— isolation and lack of inter-dependence and effective communication between the theory and practice of policy analysis;

— excessive use of jargons in the reports and research findings of systems analysts; and

— the absence of exchange or flow of personnel between the public service and the academic and/or research institutions.

Another problem faced by developing countries in the area of policy analysis is the lack of co-ordination among the various research units concerned with policy studies. In Kenya for instance, each of most substantive ministries has a research unit. In addition, the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Nairobi maintains a research unit which relates its studies to the policy formulation processes in the Government through the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. The Ministry also maintains a Project Management Section which keeps a catalogue of all national projects as well as a record of the progress of implementation of the projects. The problem experienced is that there is no machinery through which the results of the different research studies are processed and channelled into the pipeline of policy formulation of the government.

Lack of systematic and continuing review of policies to adapt them to changing situations is yet another major weakness experienced by developing countries. Policy review should take place at all stages in the implementation process in order to facilitate the necessary modifications without which policies tend to be resisted or rejected. In many developing countries policies are hardly systematically reviewed or evaluated for a number of reasons. A major one is that most of the policies that are formulated have lacked clarity in set-out goals. The lack of clear goals is a severe constraint limiting any attempt to undertake an objective analysis of government policies. Some governments have created special institutions to attack this problem. The examples include the Implementation and Co-ordination Unit (formerly National Operations Room) in the Prime Minister's Department in Malaysia; Project Operations Status Information Centre in Jordan and the Regional Review Room in Nepal.

Policies review and evaluation should not be limited to one central location in the government. It is a responsibility that should permeate through all levels, sectors and agencies of Government. Ministries and departments require periodic reports on the progress of all their major activities to enable them to adapt their policies and work programmes to changing situations. In this regard policy review at the local government level is crucial since rural development and stability contributes to the sound foundation of nation-building. In most cases feedback of information on the implementation of policies at the local government level has been poor due to the lack of effective communication systems and limited or absence of delegated authority.

A final issue is that of the interface between different policy agencies both within and outside of the machinery of government and administration. To achieve maximum effectiveness it is imperative that such agencies perform in harmony with one another, that they have a systematic way of allocating and utilizing available resources within a given time frame and that they develop practicable linkages with each other. Any contradictions in the working arrangements of these organizations can defeat the purpose of efficient policy analysis. Such requirements also apply to necessary relationships between political goal setters and policy agencies.

Manpower and Training needs in Policy Analysis

Acute shortage of trained and skilled manpower, as previously stated, is one of the major problems many developing countries are experiencing in the discipline of policy analysis. At the United Nations meeting on Methodologies of Policy Analysis and Development held in December 1979, to which reference has been already made, this problem was extensively discussed. Training of policy analysts was identified as a crucial prerequisite to the successful application of modern management tools, including the techniques of policy analysis.

The role of policy analysts in Government is to contribute to the process of policy-making, professional knowledge and expertise based on social science research methods as well as systems analysis techniques. As has been pointed out these policy analysts generally work in central guidance clusters, line departments and agencies, advisory councils or groups including "think-tanks", universities, and private research institutions. They have to be soundly trained and equipped with the requisite knowledge, skills and tools of analysis suitable to the requirements of the institutions in which they work. In addition, they need the full support and backing of top level policy-makers who use the results of their studies.

Because of the diversity and complexity of the policy requirements of different organizations and institutions, policy analysis is an activity in which different classes of people including politicians, bureaucrats, researchers and academicians participate. However, these different classes of people are often required to work on a collective basis in order to effectively contribute to the process of policy-making.

Each of the different classes of people involved in policy requires the right training or orientation, depending upon their respective roles. The types of training needed may be classified as:

(a) appreciation courses for politicians and civil servants;
(b) general training for senior civil servants who manage different programmes; and
(c) professional training for policy analysts.

Appreciation Courses

The aim of these courses should focus on making the top policy-makers aware of the need for systematic and rational approach to policy formulation and the role of specialist policy analysts in this respect. Equally these courses should absorb policy analysts who are also required to have a sufficient appreciation of the political implications of the policies that are formulated. Mutual understanding between politicians and policy analysts is essential for sound formulation of policies. A good understanding by politicians of the work of policy analysts is essential to attract the necessary support for the use of tools of policy analysis. Similarly, a concrete understanding by policy analysts of the strategic objectives and national goals pursued by politicians is a *sine qua non* for realistic and meaningful policy studies and research.

For the purpose of increasing recognition among political leaders of the need for developing the necessary capability for systematic and rational approach to policy making processes, a number of strategies could be adopted. These strategies could include contribution by the research wings of political parties; interaction between politicians and trained senior bureaucrats; special seminars, workshops and conferences.

The United Nations sponsored Asian and Pacific Development Administration Centre (APDAC) has conducted a number of courses for this purpose for the benefit of the region. It is hoped that CAFRAD may wish to try the experiment for the benefit of the African region.

Training of Senior Civil Servants

Senior civil servants need a deeper understanding of policy analysis as bureaucratic decision-makers. Given the importance of the role of senior bureaucrats in the policy process, it is essential that policy analysis should feature prominently in the training programme of the relevant institutions. An **ad hoc** course of a few weeks can serve the initial needs; suitable courses should follow this from time to time to be included in the regular management development programme for senior civil servants.

Professional Training of Policy Analysts

Professional policy analysts need much more intensive education and training in the techniques of policy analysis. In order to prepare professionals for policy analysis positions either in the government or non-government research institutions, university education should as far as practicable incorporate courses on policy analysis. Government training institutions should also develop training programmes on policy analysis. A major feature of such training programmes should be a policy analysis workshop directed at developing capacities to design and organize policy studies. The actual contents of such programmes would depend on the relevance of the various social science methods, planning models and other systems techniques of a particular country and institution.

The development of such training courses requires new university programmes which have been successfully tried in some developed countries. In this connection, provision of adequate funds for social science development must be recognized as of the utmost priority. The maintenance of physical research infrastructures as well as their expansion, requires a regular supply of funds. A steady supply of substantial funds for social science research is probably the best means of ensuring that research priorities are determined in the light of national realities.

In some developing countries the introduction of special policy study courses runs the risk of being a luxury if available basic training programmes in such fields as economics, management, administration and sociology are weak. Attention must be given to improving these simultaneously with, or as a condition for, the initiation of special policy courses.

It is also desirable to develop schemes to encourage the flow of personnel between government and research institutions. Because of the potential contribution of practical experience to the development of social science knowledge, universities and research institutes should encourage their staff members, at some point in their careers, to spend periods of time ranging from six to twenty-four months on appropriate practical assignments. Similarly, practitioners in the civil service should be encouraged to spend comparable periods within universities and research institutes so that they can contribute to the development of social science knowledge from the insights that they have accumulated on their own different assignments. Such arrangements, however, are subject to national circumstances which may require change in civil service laws and regulations.

At the international level, institutions of policy analysis and social sciences can contribute to an exchange of information and knowledge on relevant aspects of policy analysis and development. The afore-mentioned United Nations meeting noted that the United Nations has a major role to play in establishing a workable network of such institutions. Regional institutions should also strengthen their research capabilities and disseminate information on the subject. In the African region, CAFRAD is in a position to conduct extensive research on this subject and pioneer such efforts on behalf of national institutions. Inter-state exchange of information should also be encouraged, particularly among developing countries.

Conclusion

This paper has been concerned with the salient techniques of policy analysis in general as well as the current experiences of developing countries in the use of models in management decision techniques in policy-making. Attention has been particularly focussed on available tools of policy analysis and the necessary institutional support and training. Constraints limiting the use of policy analysis techniques have also been reviewed.

Generally speaking, resistance to rational analysis by some politicians and senior bureaucrats responsible for formulating policies, difficulties in identifying and clarifying national goals, dearth of needed data and information on policy analysis, inadequate infrastructure for policy analysis and acute shortage of skills are some of the major factors limiting effective policy formulation in many developing countries.

The conclusion of this paper is that even though the limiting factors to policy analysis are not unique to developing countries, sustained efforts should be made to overcome them. Policy analysis capabilities must be developed extensively in the government in order that public policy formulation in developing countries can be placed on a sound basis. Effectiveness of government and public administration is very largely dependent upon the soundness and relevance of public policies that are formulated and the competence with which they are executed.

Various techniques and manpower needs in policy analysis discussed in this paper illustrate how the processes of public policy can be improved. It is hoped that the paper will provide a basis for dialogue among administrators, politicians and policy analysis specialists and motivate them to work collectively towards more rationality in the processes of public policy-making for national development. Without sustained political support and fullest co-operation from administrators policy studies may turn out to be wasteful and end in undeserved disrepute.

PART TWO: CASE STUDIES

UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY IN POLICY-MAKING AND EXECUTION

by Prof. G. O. Olusanya*

The Universal Primary Education programme in Nigeria illustrates *par excellence* the problem of *policy-making and execution* in developing countries. It is true that there can be no argument about the laudable objectives of the programme:

(1) the desire to provide educational opportunity for all children with a view to building "a just and egalitarian society";

(2) the promotion of rapid economic development of the country by destroying ignorance and superstition and providing skills and knowledge;

(3) the utilization of education as an agent of unity by bridging the gap between the educationally disadvantaged and the educationally advantaged areas of the country.

But certainly, the inability to learn from past mistakes in the process of policy formulation, the method and mechanism of implementation, the lack of active involvement of agencies responsible for its execution in all policy decisions and the lack of co-ordination of these agencies, leave a great deal to be desired and were responsible for the serious short comings bedevilling the execution of the programme.

The first attempt at introducing free and universal primary education in Nigeria was in the 1950s when two of the then three Regional Governments - Western and Eastern Region - sembarked on the programme. The Western Region Government's efforts were to a great extent successful though they encountered various problems in such areas as the inadequacy of classroom space arising from inadequate data for planning. For example, only 271,000 children were planned for but 526,000 turned up for instruction on the first day of the programme. Then there is the fact that the number of qualified teachers was inadequate. The Eastern Regional Government had to modify its own programme because of inadequate funds. One would have therefore expected that the lessons of that experience would have proved useful in embarking on the national programme; but it would appear that like the Bourbon Kings we Nigerians learnt nothing and forgot nothing. The desire of the advocates of Universal Primary Education was such that they were ready to plunge into it without adequate preparation.

The debate on whether or not to introduce Free Universal Primary Education has been going on since the late sixties during the Gowon regime. Leading members of his administration namely, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Alhaji Shehu Shagari held opposing views. Awolowo, as a strong believer in the virtue of education, was for its introduction, no matter the cost. On the other hand, Alhaji Shehu Shagari believed that the time was not yet ripe and the country could not afford it. This debate in which the members of the public actively participated gradually gathered momentum.

The advocates of free education were confirmed in their belief that the project was a feasible one because of the unprecedented oil-boom which Nigeria began to enjoy in the 1970s. They pointed to the "petronaira" which rained down like Manna from heaven as undisputable evidence that the scheme was financially possible, ignoring the unpredictable nature of the oil revenue which is sensitive to external forces, and of course, the inflation which later set in and increased to a considerable extent the cost of the scheme. However, they did not succeed in realizing their dream until the fall of Gowon's regime in 1975 and the emergence of Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo regime of 1975-79, although it must be pointed out that the first announcement that the country would launch a Universal

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Primary Education scheme was made in 1974. The way in which the announcement was made left a great deal to be desired and demonstrated clearly the nonchalant attitude towards planning, The then Head of State, Yakubu Gowon made the announcement off-the cuff during an official engagement in Sokoto. There was therefore no consultation with planners before the announcement was made. It is obvious then from the on-set that the attempt to execute the programme would be affected by inadequate planning and since planners were not taken into confidence before the intention to embark upon the scheme was made known, there was little time left to plan seriously. Moreover, the years 1974-76 when the intention to embark upon the scheme was made known and the scheme actually started were troubled times. Gowon's regime was toppled in July, 1975 and some months later on February 13, 1976, his successor was assassinated in a coup d'etat attempt. The problem of the change-over of government, the temporary dislocation and the re-organization which invariably accompanied it, did not give the civil servants enough time to plan adequately for the scheme. But even if enough time had been given, the scheme would still have faced the problem peculiar to many developing countries and that is, the lack of reliable statistical data on which sound planning rests. It is common knowledge that since the 1963 census, Nigeria has not been able to successfully conduct a head-count. Attempts made have been unsuccessful because they have always been viewed from political angle and given the problems - sociological and otherwise in attempting a head-count in a developing country it is difficult to ascertain the degree of accuracy even of the 1963 census. In any case, these were the figures that could be used in the absence of any other and it would be seen later, how these figures were used with disastrous effects.

Some half-hearted attempts were made at obtaining the precise figures on which to project primary school enrolment by requesting the various State Governments to provide the necessary figures, but many of the States were incapable of doing this for the reasons stated above and some therefore conjured up figures merely to comply with the request by the Federal Government. The figures produced were so unrealistic and made the project seem unattainable. The civil servants therefore advised the government that on the basis of the figures available, the plan could not be carried out as the financial burden would be too heavy to bear. However, the demand for free education had become so widespread and had become entangled with emotion and politics that the Government had no choice but to proceed with the plan. The result, of course, was that there was really no adequate basis for making projections and for planning successfully for as huge a scheme as the Universal Primary Education. The Federal Government then decided to use the 1963 census as a basis assuming that the anticipated population of the six year olds to be enrolled would be 3 per cent of the population of each State. But as has been pointed out earlier, the accuracy of the 1963 Census itself had earlier been a subject of controversy before the figure was finally accepted. Using this as a basis, projected enrolment figure in Primary One for the first year of the introduction of Universal Primary Education was 2,297 million, but 2,992 million school children were actually enrolled for that year alone giving an excess of 31 per cent or 694,000 (See Appendix 'A' Table I). The implication for adequate classroom space and adequate number of teachers is obvious. Thus the 1955 experience in the Western Region has repeated itself.

Funding of the Scheme

When the Universal Primary Education Programme was embarked upon the Federal Government, owing to the buoyant oil revenue, decided to fund the whole scheme, both capital and current. This was due to the unprecedented oil boom the country was enjoying. The year 1974 was the peak of oil boom in the country. The country had an international currency reserve of $5,626 million. Comparison with the 1972 and 1973 figures which were $376 million and $583 million should drive home the point. Basking in the sunshine of this unprecedented wealth Nigerians lost all sense of balance. For example, a top government functionary declared in a public speech that money was no problem but how to spend it.

The buoyant oil revenue also gave rise to a false belief that the oil revenue will continue to rise. It was estimated that production would reach 3.0 million barrels a day by 1978, the second year of the scheme and by 1980 it would rise to 3.5 million barrels a day. The optimism, as we know, was not borne out by later development. Instead of a continous rise in oil production, there was a decline. Production

of fringe benefits and the low status now accorded to the profession, only the WASC failures have been applying for training and sometimes no sooner were they trained than they started looking for other jobs or avenues to further their studies and they deserted as soon as these were available. Thus the policy that made the Nigerian Certificate of Education (NCE) the basic teaching qualification for primary school is, as a writer on Universal Primary Education puts it, "..... an ambitious statement of future intentions whose prospects of realization are very remote in the light of current facts".[6]/ Thus many of the teachers were unqualified with the result that the standard of education is badly affected.

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3. For example, in Benue State, actual number enrolled was 679,000. The Federal Government worked on a theoretical projection of 335,000. The disparity is staggering.

4. See Akiga, E.A., *Policies and Strategies for Post-Primary Education with special Reference to Benue State of Nigeria*, A project study submitted to the National Institute in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of M.N.I. (Member of the National Institute) February, 1979, p. 26.

5. See Appendix 'B'

6. Lekwot, Z., The U.P.E. Programme, (The Rivers State Case)-Original Essay submitted to the National Institute in partial fulfilment for the award of m.n.i. (Member of the National Institute) p. 32.

dropped from 2.5 million barrels a day when the Universal Primary Education scheme was planned to 1.9 million barrels a day by December 1976 three months after the programme was launched. There was thus a downward trend from oil revenue as shown below:[1]/

1975	—	$ 5,509 million
1976	—	$ 5,203 ,,
1977	—	$ 4,259 ,,
1978	—	$ 1,916 ,,

Moreover, the enhanced oil prices during the peak of oil boom had started giving rise to inflation. In addition, the unprecedented upward revision of wages and salaries following the Udoji Report in 1974/75 coupled with the payment of 9 months arrears to all workers helped to increase inflation. Because

As the same commentator puts it: "In point of fact, the negative effect of the untrained and inexperienced teachers in the inventory is a worse problem for the system than the shortage of teachers itself".[7]/ These defects are being rapidly remedied, although it would take sometime before the effect of those being propely trained now can be felt and there can be no doubt that some damage had been done in the meantime.

One serious problem that was not fully tackled by the last military administration which began the scheme is what to do with the products of the Universal Primary Education when the first intake gets out in 1982, given the limited number of post-primary instituttions available.[8]/ This problem has engaged the attention of many people in Nigeria. Dr. Lekan Oyedeji, writing on the 'Plight of U.P.E. products' has this to say: "In 1982, 2.3 million children will have completed their primary education; in 1982,0.3 million children will attend secondary schools; in 1982, 2 million school leavers may have no secondary schools; in 1982, 2 million school leavers may be roaming the streets".[9]/ Professor T.M. Yesufu voicing his own concern stated: "There can hardly be a group of men more discontented, disillusioned and politically and socially more dangerous for example, than those who find themselves useless to society because they have been educated out of context of their environment and are therefore economically unproducive".[10]/ The prospect is frightening enough but fortunately, both the Federal and the State Governments are acutely aware of the problem and are doing everything possible to provide a solution. More secondary schools are being built and local communities, voluntary agencies and private individuals are being encouraged by some States to be more involved in funding education and more emphasis is being placed on increasing facilities in the areas of vocational training, trade schools and technical or polytechnic colleges. Furthermore, efforts are being made to integrate rural development concepts in the UPE curriculum so as to give local relevance to the scheme and thus help sustain the rural population who will in turn help to enhance the success of these schemes. A vigorous pursuit of this policy will help to eliminate the problems that have been identified.

At this state the question may be asked as to whether the military administration that introduced the scheme was totally oblivious of the possible consequences, given the speed with which it was introduced. The answer is that they were not. The basic problem was that the last military administration was anxious to initiate and implement a number of desirable social policies before leaving the scene in consonance with their desire to build a just and egalitarian society and were not certain that the incoming civilian administration would carry out such policies; hence the Land Use Decree, the U.P.E., the Promotion of Indigenous Enterprises Decree and the creation of new Universities to mention only a few. The belief was that these were desirable programmes that have the support of the people and that once started, the incoming civilian administration's hand would be tied, and since they had set a definite date to their departure from the scene, time was of the essence. Thus there was an element of haste in the introduction and execution of these policies. With regard to the Universal Primary Education in particular, there was the belief, difficult to fault, that if Nigerians were to wait until a proper head-count was taken they might have to wait for a long time and that though the scheme may be bedevilled with problems the principle would have been established and problems would then be gradually solved by the succeeding administration.

The next question is what lessons or lessons in policy making and execution can we draw from a study of the Universal Primary Education scheme in Nigeria?

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7. Ibid.
8. Attempts were made to provide a solution. For example, a minimum age for entering the labour market was put at 16. Also a new national policy on education was introduced. This policy is designed to keep primary school leavers for another 3 years in vocational training centres & to ensure this vocational & citizenship training schools have been established by the Federal Government in all the States.
9. Oyedeji, L. "Plight of U.P.E. Products" *Daily Times*
10. T.M. Yesufu, 'Philosophy for Nigerian Education' cited in Akiga *Op cit*, p. 28.

(i) First, is the problem of planning without facts, which has been a barrier to effective planning in developing countries. In the cases of the Universal Primary Education scheme, there was no precise figure of the number of 6-years olds on which planning could be effectively based and therefore resort was made to the 1963 census figures which were in themselves not too reliable. Thus 31 percent excess of the number of pupils envisaged were registered for the first year of the scheme. How then do we avoid this in future? The single and most obvious answer is that all African countries should undertake an effective head-count. However, the problem, as we have seen, is not as simple as it appears. Take the case of Nigeria, which possesses the manpower (it has the largest concentration of Demographers in Black Africa) and the machinery for conducting census effectively and yet has not been able to do so. The reason, of course, is that census taking is always politicized. States and ethnic groups see in this exercise an opportunity to gain more representation on the Legislatures than they deserve and also an opportunity to gain more from financial allocations by the Federal Government; hence the deliberate inflation of figures. To over come this, deliberate attempt must be made to divorce planning from politics. This may be difficult considering the level of political sophistication in the African countries. Consequently, some other solutions are called for. If effective head-count is not possible, then sample survey conducted in States, regions or defined areas regularly and quietly so as to ensure that the exercise is not politicized may be a solution, though not an ideal one. The second solution is the introduction of identity cards as is being attempted in Nigeria. But experience so far has shown this cannot be effective for it can also be manipulated.

(ii) The next lesson to be drawn is that every African country must introduce compulsory registration of births and deaths. It is true many of them already have this policy; but it is more in the breach than in the observance mainly because the means for achieving this is slender. It has been possible in a country such as Tanzania because of the monolithic party structure. The possibility of its success in a country as large and complex as Nigeria with a multi-party system is not bright. Teachers may be used as in China to register children in their locality. Traditional rulers, local government officials may also be used. But in a country where State consciousness is still very strong and where, as stated earlier, there is a tendency to always politicize attempts at getting the right population figure, the possibility of success is very slim.

(iii) There is the need to educate people to be conscious of the value of record keeping. The level of consciousness even amongst educated people is still very low; hence the inability to obtain up-to-date and adequate records from various government ministries. Moreover there is a need for each Ministry to ensure a continuous flow of such data from the local to State Government and from State Governments to the Federal government. Such a gathering, processing and co-ordination of facts ought to become a normal function of all government ministries. There is a need therefore, to give the necessary professional training to ensure this.

(iv) It is also necessary for public servants to regularly monitor public opinion and thereby anticipate as much as possible government policies and plan ahead for them.

(v) There is a need too for Government to involve public servants totally in the whole process of policy formulation or at least to keep them informed of Government thinking at all times. The way and manner in which the announcement to embark upon the U.P.E. scheme was made without consulting public servants and obtaining their view and without giving them enough time to plan is certainly undesirable.

(vi) There is the need also to make haste slowly. One, of course, is acutely aware that African countries are in a hurry to bridge the gap between themselves and the developed countries But certainly undue haste involving poor planing cannot provide a solution whe eas good planing which involves more time will yield by far better results. One cannot leap over centuries of achievement by other countries in one decade or two. For example, in the case of the Universal Primary Education scheme, the haste with which it was embarked upon led to high cost of construction etc., in order to meet the target.

(vii) There is the need for probity in public affairs. Corruption and maladministration cannot help development. Despite the drastic reduction in oil revenue, the financial allocations made by the Federal Government would have gone a long way to cope with the problem were it not for the problem of corruption and financial maladministration. Costs of construction were highly inflated as a result of conspiracy between some government officials and contractors. So also were costs of supplies of school materials. One of the syndicates of the first Senior Executive Course of the National Institute that examined the problem of education in Nigeria was so incensed over their findings with regard to misuse of funds allocated for the Universal Primary Education scheme that it stated as follows:

> "We feel very much concerned about the careless way in which the Federal grants for the Universal Primary Education were spent in the States between 1975 and 1978. During our domestic tour of the country (sic) many States and Local Government functionaries expressed the same feeling and complained that the Federal U.P.E. grants were not well utilized and up till now many school blocks are without roofs and children have to receive tuition under trees particularly in the northern parts of the country. The way the funds were used in Lagos State has become a serious matter for a Commission of Inquiry to look into and the revelations contained in the Commissions's report are to say the least, extremely embarrassing and unpatriotic".[11]/

(viii) Finally, there is the danger of a country losing all sense of balance in a s tuation of sudden wealth. Nigeria is a typical example of this. More money was available to the society than it could manage. The result, of course, was extravagance and wasteful spending. Consequently, all types of projects were embarked upon and cost were not properly assessed if assessed at all, and both aliens and unpatriotic Nigerians exploited the situation by excessive inflation of costs. Besides the executive capacity to handle the pace of sudden and rapid development projects was not available. The country has now learnt a bitter lesson. The only fear is that men quickly or conveniently forget the ills of the past and if they do not, they do not seem to learn much from it.

I suppose in concluding this paper, it is vital to assess the Universal Primary Education scheme within the context of the problems that we have identified. There can be no doubt that the scheme despite all the attendant problems, is on the whole a success. It has awakened the desire for education throughout the country - a desire which can no longer be stemmed. It has led to phenomenal increase in the number of pupils attending schools, though this has been accompanied by a fall in standard as would be normally expected. The phenomenal increase in school population has created an awareness of government process and individual rights which should help check the misuse of power by governments and thereby ensure the building of a truly democratic society. Finally, it has provided a basis for a proper economic take-off by releasing the energies and creative genuis of many.

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11. Taiwo, T.A. *op at.*, pp. 14-15

TABLE 1
ENROLMENT IN PRIMARY GRADE I
(Projected and actual figures)

In 1976-1977

STATE	Projected Enrolment* (000)	Actual Enrolment (000)	Actual as Per cent of Projected	Difference between actual & proj. (000)
Anambra	148.1	292.8	198	+ 144.7
Bauchi	100.1	102.9	103	+ 2.9
Bendel	101.3	174.4	172	+ 73.1
Benue	99.9	276.2	276	+ 176.3
Borno	123.4	88.2	71	— 35.2
Cross River	143.2	233.9	163	+ 90.7
Gongola	107.3	112.7	105	+ 5.4
Imo	151.2	260.9	173	+ 109.7
Kaduna	168.8	281.1	167	+ 110.3
Kano	237.8	193.1	81	— 44.7
Kwara	70.6	87.3	124	+ 16.7
Lagos	65.2	84.6	130	+ 19.4
Niger	49.2	72.3	147	+ 23.1
Ogun	63.9	75.6	118	+ 11.7
Ondo	112.4	112.6	100	+ 0.2
Oyo	214.4	198.9	93	— 15.4
Plateau	83.4	171.3	205	+ 87.9
River	70.8	94.6	136	— 23.8
Sokoto	186.9	78.7	42	— 108.2
NIGERIA	2.297.9	2.992.1	131	+ 694.4

* Assumed to correspond to the estimated 6-year old population (source of population estimates FOS).

Sources: National Policy on Education Part I Blue Print Page 66.

TABLE 2

Enrolment in Grade 2 Teachers Training Colleges - 1975-1976 to 1977-1978.

STATE	1975-1976 Total	1975-1976 Final Year	1976-1977 Total	1976-1977 Final Year	1977-1978 Total	1977-1978 Final Year
Anambra	3,920	2,143	6,640	2,741	8,673	3,178
Bauchi	...	561	4,156	961	6,999	753
Bendel	9,281	2,681	8,026	2,213	10,573	2,643
Benue	5,701	2,167	8,958	1,120	12,692	1,244
Borno	6,404	...	6,898	...	6,666	1,338
Cross River	7,123	1,883	7,622	2,093	...	...
Gongola	...	...	6,104	619	5,835	576
Imo	6,939	3,148	8,212	3,444	..	...
Kaduna	8,702	186	10,767	1,760	14,798	1,138
Kano	8,444	1,424	12,405	1,043	...	...
Kwara	4,649	1,136	7,215	1,267	9,353	1,555
Lagos	3,510	1,207	4,727	1,148	...	...
Niger	...	...	7,220	1,530	8,326	1,530
Ogun	3,141	1,205	3,462	1,137	4,100	2,197
Ondo	4,493	1,541	6,353	2,260	7,757	3,022
Oyo	6,539	1,399	7,091	2,248	...	—
Plateau	6,246	766	8,384	993	10,088	786
River	...	...	8,000*	...	...	...
Sokoto	9,736	1,408	12,349	1,342	15,799	1,725
NIGERIA	...	...	144,499	...	...	...

* Estimate

Source: National Policy on Education Part I, Blue Print, Page 99.

TABLE 3

Grade II (Certified & Failed) Teachers as Percentage of all Teachers in Primary Education

1975 - 1976

	1975 - 1976			1976 - 1977			1977 - 1978		
	Gr. II	Gr. II F	Total	Gr. II	Gr. II F	Total	Gr. II	Gr. II F	Total
Anambra	60.1	5.9	66.0	48.2	3.8	52.0	47.3	3.6	50.9
Bauchi	...	...	...	...	...	36.2	...	...	33.2
Bendel	44.5	14.2	58.7	42.4	13.5	55.9	39.6	16.4	56.0
Benue	40.2	7.3	47.5	...	...	...	16.7	5.1	21.8
Borno	28.4	37.8	66.2	18.9	31.2	50.1	14.6	25.4	40.0
Cross River	27.2	9.2	36.4	...	...	36.4	...	...	...
Gongola	33.7	30.1	63.8	24.2	20.4	44.6	19.2	21.4	40.6
Imo	62.9	...	...	62.4	...	...	...	...	...
Kaduna	27.9	37.5	65.4	...	...	41.6	...	...	...
Kano	10.8	33.7	44.5	8.3	23.1	35.4	25.8	20.4	26.2
Kwara	48.6	11.8	60.4	35.4	17.1	52.5	33.3	16.4	49.7
Lagos	59.7	...	...	59.3	10.9	70.2	59.8	11.2	71.0
Niger	...	...	...	...	...	55.8	...	...	...
Ogun	37.0	12.0	49.0	35.7	15.5	51.2	38.1	12.3	50.4
Ondo	36.3	14.2	50.5	50.3	21.3	71.6	44.3	22.3	66.6
Oyo	42.6	19.7	53.3	42.7	14.0	56.7	...	...	...
Plateau	...	...	...	19.1	4.1	23.2	...	...	...
River	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sokoto	...	...	56.4	6.7	46.7	53.4	6.5	39.0	45.5
NIGERIA	(42.5)	(14.8)	54.2	(40.9)	(15.3)	50.5	(31.5)	(14.2)	45.0

TABPE 4

Enrolment in Primary Grade I as percentage of the 6-year old population

1975-1976 to 1977-1978

STATE	Federation of Nigeria		
	1975-1976	1976-1977	1977-1978
Anambra	108	198	152
Bauchi	59*	103	116
Bendel	153	172	173
Benue	78	276	190
Borno	50	71	..
Cross River	116	163	136
Gongola	97	105	93
Imo	115	173	...
Kaduna	31	167	110
Kano	14	81	58
Kwara	72	124	175
Lagos	115	130	124
Niger	23*	147	148
Ogun	109	118	108
Ondo	82	100	96
Oyo	74	93	...
Plateau	45	205	126
River	117*	136	..
Sokoto	12	42	60
NIGERIA	72	131	...

Source of Population data : FOS
* Estimate.

CASE STUDIES - 1
UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN NIGERIA: SUMMARY O F DISCUSSION

The case study concludes with eight lessons to be drawn from the Universal Primary Education Scheme in Nigeria. These were underscored and others added during discussion.

Here we have in factual terms a living situation affecting millions of people and indeed the very character of the nation, which exemplifies the major points raised earlier. It shows the manner in which all the imperfect features of modern policy making and execution are inextricably entwined.

Viewed as a whole, four paramount features emerged.

Firstly, the sheer unpredictability of the political and domestic environment. There was little evidence that any of the actors was aware of the need for contingency planning in the light of past political instability, the changes this brings in administrative leadership, and the obvious vulnerability Nigerian economy faced with the advent of the oil boom. How to predict the unpredictable? At least we are wiser if we can hold in our minds the fact that all programmes are subject to influences which are going to come from many directions. We ought to be able to calculate the effect from known quarters but the unknown should never be ruled out. The monitors - the sensors - must be ever vigilant and contingency plans, legislation etc., prepared.

Secondly, and in a manner following the same theme of unpreparedness, there is need for much more precise and well-researched assessment of the effect of the cultural environment on the programmes for policy implementation. It is a subjective area indeed and the planners may be saying that they (instinctively) know all there is to know about the cultural factor. Nothing is quite so shocking as to discover that one's basic instincts have let one down. Like other aspects, cultural values are susceptible to influences and many change in subtle ways which make appraisal difficult.

Thirdly, human frailty. If a situation arises where wealth and loose or untidy administrative machinery come together it seems certain that avarice and corruption will flourish. Individuals or groups will find ways of enhancing their self-interest and if they are public servants, in so doing they are betraying their sacred trust as servants of the people. But a good policy by definition will have taken cognizance of all factors - palatable and otherwise - and will have been shaped accordingly. The Nigerian example showed how the ideal is from reality.

Fourthly, the communication gap between the political and administrative actors or the gap between the promise and the performance. Was the announcement in Sokoto really as of-hand as it appeared to be? Politicians, it must be presumed, have their reasons for acting as they do. They are, after all, skilled in survival tactics. That their unilateral statements often leave the other actors in the scenario in a state of alarm and despondancy, is another matter. Hopefully lessons are learnt and with the very quantifiable evidence of mismanagement available, the essentiality of closing that gap can surely no longer be in doubt.

Particularly significant was the lack of monitoring of the enormous changes taking place on the domestic scene (increased and disproportionate military budget, inflated costs and statistics) and the international scene (OPEC decision to reduce oil supplies) which had overpowering influence on the programme for universal primary education. Monitoring or not, there was an unacceptable rigidity displayed by the project directors in their lack of appreciation of the real significance of the changing circumstances. Equally so with the poor planning as the people saw the opportunity for education not only open to the 6-year olds but all those-up to twice that age - who had never been to school.

The national education policy placed emphasis on citizenship education and the curriculum reflected this. The employment opportunities would await the throughput in the secondary schools via automatic entrance, and the polytechnics and vocational schools thereafter. The curriculum included integrated rural development courses for school-leavers so that they may be absorbed in the agricultural sector.

Ghana, when faced with similar constraints, manpower, equipment, funds etc., reviewed its policy on U.P.E. and decided on voluntary and not compulsory education.

THE ROLE OF ZAMBIAN PUBLIC SERVANTS IN THE EFFORTS TO DECENTRALIZE THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

by
Dr. C. Chibaye*

Introduction

The conventional view of public servants is that they are concerned with translating into practice political decisions which are independently derived from other sources. As Peter Self observes, it is this distinction between political decisions and their translation into practice which provided the starting point for the attempted construction of a science of administration, "concerned solely with the most efficient means of achieving any given set of political objectives."1/ Writing in the 19th century, Woodrow wilson advanced what came to be known as the instrumentalist theory of public administration. According to this theory, administration was the instrument of politics. Politics decided what to do and administration was concerned with the execution of the policy decided through the political process. Following the path laid out by Woodrow Wilson, Goodnow advanced what came to be known as politics - administration dichotomy. In line with this thinking, it was argued that politics and administration were not the same and that each should not interfere with the other. This argument was especially strengthened by the spirit of the public service reform movement which was striving to rid the American public service of nepotism introduced by the "spoils system" which followed the election of Andrew Jackon to the U.S. presidency. At best, the distinction between the role of public policy - makers, politicians, and public servants who are supposed to be solely concerned with the execution of the policies made by politicians, is drawn as a matter of institutional convenience. The artificiality of this distinction would be revealed even by a casual examination of the working relationship between politicians and public servants. For example, politicians have often been accused of busying themselves with minute questions of operational detail which if the distinctions were workable would be the preserve of public servants.2/ Similarly, as drafters of memoranda and proposers of policy alternatives, public servants have contributed to policy formulation to no small degree.

Indeed, in developing countries which were hit by the dearth of qualified personnel, especially in the period immediately after independence, the interchangeability of personnel between political and administrative roles is not only accepted but openly encouraged. It is argued in these countries that due to the scarcity of required personnel distinguishing between politicians and administrators is a luxury which cannot be afforded. Thus Zambia, especially after the 1969 administrative reforms witnessed a frequent interchange of roles with some Civil Servants becoming politicians as district governors or ministers, while some ministers (politicians), became permanent secretaries (Public Servants). The advent of the one-party state has further diminished the importance attached to the distinction between political and administrative roles.3/ It is argued that since there is only one political party, the distinction between political and administrative roles should be underplayed so that qualified personnel can be fitted wherever they are required because ideally, their loyalty is to the one political party which is allowed to function.

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1. Peter Self, *Administrative Theories and Politics: An Inquiry into the Structure and Processes of Modern Government* University of Toronto Press. Toronto, 1974 - p. 149

2. See, for example, S. P. Aiyar, "Political Context of Indian Administration" *The Indian Journal of Public Administration* Vol. XVII, No. 3 (July - September, 1971) P. 341

3. *Government of the Republic of Zambia, Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy in Zambia.*
Government Printer, Lusaka. 1972, pp. 29 and also 30.

In the light of the foregoing, the conventional view of making a distinction between politicians and public servants on the basis of the argument that politicians determine policy while public servants implement such policy should be modified. Indeed, Peter Self suggests a much more realistic way of making a distinction between politicians and public servants. He does this by looking at politics and administration in terms of process.[4]/ This view is presented in the form of an arc, with the left arc representing the political process and the right arc the administrative process. The meeting point at the top represents a critical place at which political will flows into and energises the administrative system. It is also the point at which influences which have been generated within the administrative process flow back into the higher levels of the political process. As a result, there is at the apex of the arc, a fusion of political and administrative influences which have been generated lower down the two arcs. This view takes cognizance of administrative feedback which is expressed by Peter Self as the "accumulated reactions of modern bureaucracies to the tasks assigned to them, reactions which limit and guide the formulation of political decisions.[5]/ As we move away from the apex of the arc, we find much less interaction between the two processes. As Peter Self puts it, voters and politicians at election time have their eyes set upon the rungs of political ladder, and are not much concerned with administrative operations. Similarly, administrators lower down the hierarchy, are primarily concerned with getting policies or regulations effectively applied without bothering over much as to how or why they were formulated.

Policy-making is indeed an important area of interaction between politicians and public servants. Politicians do possess formal responsibility for policy-making but public servants supply the missing elements of political decisions. What is considered as the most obvious and universal contribution of politicians to policy-making comes in through the formation of general attitudes, opinions and ideologies. This is called "Climate Setting" and it influences the way in which particular issues are handled and the kind of measures which are favourably regarded. Climate setting is however, too general an activity to produce specific policies. Rather, actual influences on policy are numerous and diverse but public servants play a major role in obtaining and organizing the inputs of information and opinion which finally shape public policy, as well as in adding some contributions of their own.

This paper looks at the role of Zambian public servants in the country's attempts to decentralize the inherited administrative system. These efforts have passed through many stages and have of late, culminated in the recently announced proposals for integrated local government administration. At the time of writing, the bill incorporating these proposals had not yet been presented to Zambia's National Assembly.

Historical Background

Nearly every newly independent country in Africa has sought to modify its inherited administrative structure in order to meet the requirements of an independent state. Zambia is no exception to this general rule. The system of Provincial and District Administration which former British Colonies inherited has especially attracted a great deal of criticism. This system of administration was found to be too preoccupied with law and order functions and thus unsuited for these countries new tasks of effectively prosecuting socio-economic goals.

In Zambia and indeed in many other ex-colonies Britain had produced a strong pattern of field administration, and a some what weakly articulated central administration under the Governor in the Capital City.[6]/ Central administration was divided into specialist departments some of which had their

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4. Peter Self, *Administrative Theories and Politics*. op. Cit. p. 150-151

5. Ibid. p. 151

6. V. Subramaniam, "The Zambian Administrative Experiment & Experience" The *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, Vol. VI (April 1972) p. 281-299.

staff posted to various parts of the country. These departmental staff received technical guidance from their respective departments' headquarters but they were all expected to work as a team. This is where the system of Provincial and District Administration came in to co-ordinate the work of the specialist departments into which central administration was divided.

Under the system of Provincial and District Aedministration, Zambia was divided into eight administrative units called provinces. These units were placed under Provincial Commissioners, to whom all heads of specialist departments at the provincial level were subordinated. Provinces were in turn divided into districts each of which was placed under the administrative care of the District Commissioner. Departmental Staff posted to the district were subordinated to the District Commissioner who in turn was responsible to the Provoincial Commissioner. Provincial Commissioners reported to the Governor.

In September, 1964, Provincial and District Administration lost some of its powers, especially those which it had exercised on behalf of specialist departments.[7]/ Thus, the responsibility for law and order was placed directly under the police. The Ministry of Justice assumed supervision of local courts. The Ministry of Local Government took over the training and supervision of Local Authorities, while the Ministry of Finance took over the collection of most kinds of revenue and the issuance of many types of licences. Also, labour, agriculture, forestry and similar functions were assumed by respective departments.

Despite the loss of powers, Provincial and District Administration was expected to continue co-ordinating field administration, a task which was by no means easy, especially in the absence of disciplinary powers. The 1964 changes were also accompained by a change in titles. Thus, the title of Provincial Commissioner became Resident Secretary and that of District Commissioner became District Secretary.

A further change that took place with regard to Provincial and District Administration was that it was progressively brought under political control. Thus, in 1964, a Minister of State was posted to the province to represent the President. The Resident Secretary as the provincial head of the civil service, was therefore placed under the Minister of State. This change was carried further in 1969 when a Cabinet Minister was posted to the province and the post of Resident Secretary was replaced by that of Permanent Secretary for the Province. This change created un-usual Provincial Ministry; unusual in the sense that it was part of the Ministry of Provincial and Local Government itself with a Minister and Permanent Secretary based in Lusaka. Political Control over Provincial and District Administration was carried further by the creation of the office of the District Governor in 1969. The District Governor became the head of district administration, replacing the District Secretary, who now worked under the District Governor, in the same way the Permanent Secretary of the Province worked under the Cabinet Minister.

The implications of the system of Provincial and District Administration which was largely staffed by generalist administrators were such that specialist and technical staff were subjected to dual control. They were expected to report to their respective department' headquarters and they were also subjected to the on-the-spot-control of the Provincial or District Commissioners, who were the back-bone of field

7. W. Tordoff, "Provincial & District Government in Zambia, Part I". *Journal of Administration Overseas.* Vol. VII. No. 3 (July 1968) p. 425

administration. Further, Provincial and District Administration was virtually insulated from any form of citizens participation. Reform-minded governments in the post-independence period found the system of the omnipotent district and provincial administrators incompatible with the democratic development of political power. They also found its stress on Law and Order functions incompatible with resource development.[8]/

At the time of independence, Zambia had two types of local government; urban and rural. Urban Local Authorities were introduced into the country initially by the white settlers and for the white settlers. It was not until 1956 that Africans resident in town were allowed to participate in the affairs of Urban Local Authorities through the advisory African Housing Boards, which had a small elected element.[9]/ Whereas Urban Local Authorities had an elected element by the time of independence, this was not the case with Rural Local Authorities. In the rural areas, the British colonial policy of indirect rule had led to the establishment of tribal Native Authorities. These traditional authorities were designed to assist the government in the maintenance of Law and Order and in revenue collection.

Soon after independence, the principle of elected local government was extended to the rural areas by the passing of the Local Government Act of 1965. The Act grouped Native Authorities into Rural Councils for each district, and provided for elected Councillors. Three kinds of Councils were provided for by the Act: the Municipal Council in big towns and on which City Status can be conferred by the President, the Township Council in smaller towns and the Rural Council in rural areas.

For legal purposes, a local council is treated as a body corporate. It has a legal personality. It can own property and it can sue and be sued. Local authorities in Zambia have only those powers which are conferred on them by the Local Government Act of 1965. Some of these powers are:

1. to provide and maintain streets, bridges and water supplies;
2. to collect personal levy from inhabitants;
3. to establish markets;
4. to act as licensing authorities; and
5. to preserve and improve public health.

The Policy to Decentralize the Administrative System

Zambia's ruling political party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) set the climate for the adoption of the policy on decentralization when it accepted Humanism as its philosophy. One of the objectives of the party's humanist stand is that "popular participation in the decision-making processes of government should be secured, not only at the level of the central parliamentary process, but also down to the very grassroots of the society itself."[10]/ A further objective was that in the interests of national development, greater efficiency and economy in the operations of government should result.

8. *A.L. Adu, The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa.* George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 1969. especially Ch. 2.
9. Government of the Republic of Zambia, *Decentralized Government: Proposals for Integrated Local Government Administration.* Government printer. Lusaka. 1979. p. 7.
10. Government of the Republic of Zambia; Cabinet Office. *Report of the Working Party Appointed to Review the System of Decentralized Administration.* Government Printer. Lusaka. May 1972, p. 25.

A Working Party which was appointed in 1972 to review the system of decentralized administration, declared that decentralization meant much more than the simple devolution of authority down the administrative hierarchy. Quoting from the 1967 report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana, the working party stressed that it sought "to decentralize by the creation of the institutions outside the ministries which are legally vested with responsibility for defined functions within the totality of Government."[11] The Party, however rejected regionalism.

In addition to the objectives we have identified here, three factors in 1968 encouraged the adoption of the policy of decentralization.[12]

a) the First National Development Plan was falling behind schedule;

b) the ruling party and the public were critical of the Civil Service; and

c) within the Civil Service, a Working Party of the Civil Service had been examining Provincial and District Government.

A number of reasons can be advanced to explain why the First National Development Plan was falling behind schedule. First there was the effect of the Rhodesian UDI which diverted expenditure into unplanned for projects. Secondly, there was the non-response of farmers to the encouragement given them by the Government agencies coupled with the exodus of expatriate commercial farmers. Thirdly, there was the Government's own decision in the 1969 Budget to control inflation by cutting capital expenditure and not recurrent spending. Over and above all this, the Civil Service was also blamed for the shoddy performance of the First National Development Plan.

At the Kitwe National Convention held in January 1967 and attended by a wide cross-section of people, complaints were raised against the Civil Service. The Civil Service was especially accused of not properly identifying itself with the aspirations of the ruling party. These complaints led to the president's declaration in November 1968, that "the time has come when we must accept the supremacy of the Party openly."[13]

For the purposes of this paper, it is worth noting that, although from a negative point of view, the Civil Service in Zambia contributed to the immediate factors which led to the adoption of the policy of decentralization. On the positive side, the Civil Service itself undertook an examination of Provincial and District Government, when a Working Party was appointed in January 1968, to examine ways to strengthen Provincial and District Administration. The proposals of the Working Party of the Civil Service called for a strong District Secretary and the abolition of the dualism between the District Secretary and the District Local Authority. A number of arguments were advanced in favour of this call. It was argued that the Central Government should have an office in the district for some years to come to ensure that the Government machine worked effectively. A strong District Secretary would supervize all Civil Servants in the district and co-ordinate them. In addition, it was argued that:[14]

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11. Ibid. p. 24
12. Ibid. p. 27
13. Ibid. p. 32.
14. Ibid p. 28

> 'Rural Councils were often weak because of their limited finances, poor staff and often uninterested Councillors. Also, the Rural Councils might tend to have a parochial outlook, i.e. they will not always put the national interest first. For these reasons, the Central Government ought to control Rural Councils closely. This required both a merger of Provincial and District Government and the Ministry of Local Government, thus having a strong field level officer.'

For the purposes of this paper, these proposals are very significant in terms of their similarity with what is contained in the recently announced proposals for Integrated Local Government Administration whose bill is coming before parliament this year (1980).

The President's January 1969 Administrative Reforms

The President responded to this mood for decentralization by announcing administrative reforms in January 1969. The reforms led to the creation of Provincial Ministries which we mentioned above. It was explained that this move would speed up the decision-making process in the rural areas. A Cabinet Minister at the provincial level, it was anticipated, would not shy away from making decisions so that more and more decisions would be made in province and fewer questions would be referred to Lusaka. Later, after the creation of a one-party state, a more senior person, the Member for the Party's Central Committee, was appointed to head the province in place of Cabinet Minister.

The reforms also led to a further superimposition of political control over the Civil Service by the creation of the office of the District Governor, once again as mentioned above. To start with, District Governors lacked statutory powers which would have enabled them to perform their functions as co-ordinators of government business in the districts. These were, however, later given to them progressively.

The 1969 administrative reforms also led to the creation of giant Lusaka-based or Central Ministries by grouping together departments dealing with similar subject matter. This move was designed to promote co-ordination and it led to the reduction in the number of Central Ministries from fifteen to eight. The exercise, however, led to the overloading of the top-most levels of the Ministries. This development delayed rather than speeded-up decision-making. A few months later, some of these Ministries had to be split up so that by mid 1970, the number of Central Ministries outside of the offices of the President and the Vice President, had climbed to eleven. Central Ministries were responsible for forming policy and for planning department programmes on a national scale after consulting provincial Ministries. This consultation was the first aspect of decentralization.

One other creation of the 1969 reforms was the office of Secretary-General to the Government. He was charged with the responsibility of securing the efficiency of the Civil Service.

The 1969 reforms also gave further impetus to the Development Committee System whose formation had been started in 1965, with the setting up of District and Provincial Development Committees. Wards (electoral constituencies for the purpose of Local Authorities elections), were now required to have Ward Development Committees and Villages were required to have Village Productivity Committees. These Committees were meant to be concerned with general development at their respective hierarchial levels. They were designed to achieve two objectives:[15]/

1. to provide a forum for discussion about the development of their respective communities. They attempt to discover the felt needs of their community as well as the residents' ideas about priorities, thus help the Government make rational decisions; and

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15. Ibid dp 41. 42.

2. to involve people in decision-making, i.e. give effect to the policy of participatory democracy and decentralization.

Shortly afterwards, it was felt both in the Civil Service and Political Circles that what was anticipated by the 1969 administrative reforms was not being achieved. This realization prompted the office of the Secretary-General to appoint the Simmance Working Party to review the System of decentralized administration in 1972. With the exception of one University Preofessor, the membership of this Party was drawn from the Civil Service. Thus, the Civil Service contributed greatly to the monitoring of the system of decentralized administration. The Simmance Working Party undertook countrywide tours receiving both oral and written submissions. Of the sixty people who sent in written submissions, eighty five percent were Civil Servants, and of the three hundred and seventy one people who made oral submissions, close to ninety one percent were Civil Servants.[16]/ Here again, the Civil Service contributed greately to the generation of information designed to evaluate the system of decentralized administration.

The Simmance Working Party's discovery was that the 1969 administrative reforms had not led to the desired decentralization. A variety of factors were given to explain this situation. Starting with the Provincial Ministry, it was discovered that Permanent Secretaries of Central Ministries were often reluctant to sub-warrant to the Provincial Ministries funds for the implementation of projects. As a result, Provincial Ministries lacked sufficient funds to carry out their programmes. Secondly, the Permanent secretary for Provincial and Local Government, of which the Provincial Ministry as we said above was a part, kept a very tight control over Provincial Permanent Secretaries, controlling their policy-making, establishment, accounting and other administration. Thirdly, provincial Heads of Departments remained primarily responsible to the Permanent Secretary of their own ministry and could not, as a result, be responsive to the Provincial Permanent Secretary. The Simmance Working Party called for a change of attitudes in these areas. It also called for the creation of the office of the Prime Minister to whom Provincial Ministries would be responsible.

On District Governors the Working Party found that lacking statutory powers over civil servants, and having no role in financial and accounting matters, they could not effectively co-rdinate government business. The Working Party recommended that these weaknesses in the system be remedied. As reported above, the District Governors were later given statutory powers over Civil Servants, in the districts.[17]/

The Simmance Working Party found Development Committees weak. Like District Governors, they too had no statutory powers over Heads of Departments. These remained responsible to their Ministries' headquarters.

What is apparent is that whereas the Civil Service had played a very significant role in initiating ideas for decentralization and in monitoring its implementation, top Civil Servants particularly in Central Ministries, were somewhat reluctant to sufficiently delegate responsibility to their officials in the field. This makes it difficult for field official to be responsive to Local bodies. Decentralization should go hand in hand with delegation, if it has to succeed.

On the whole, the Simmance Working Party called for an improvement in all the areas where it identified shortcomings. It also called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to implement those recommendations of its report which would be accepted by Government. The Ad Hoc Committee was

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16. Percentages worked out from the lists of people who made submissions to the Working Party. The lists appear as an appendix to the Working Party's report.

17. Government of the Republic of Zambia, *Decentralized Government*: op. cit. p. 38.

appointed in 1973 and its membership consisted of the Parmanent Secretaries of Provincial Administration, Finance, Development Planning, Personnel Division, and the Principal of the National Institute of Public Administration, with the Assistant Secretary, Provincial Administration, as the Secretary. Once again Civil servants were asked to monitor implementation of the recommendations. The Committee meets regularly to review progress and consider implementation of some of the recommendations. So far the Committee has succeeded in ensuring the transfer to provinces of some legal powers, e.g. with regard to the Marriages Act and the Club Registration Act. It has also ensured delegation of disciplinary functions to Permanent Secretaries in the provinces and District Secretaries as responsible officers for disciplinary matters of all public servants in the districts and provinces. In addition, Capital and Recurrent Expenditure has been decentralized. Most significant, a Department for Decentralization headed by a Minister of State was created in 1978.

The Simmance Working Party only briefly touched on Local Government. Essentially, what it did was to reiterate the call made earlier by the Civil Service Working Party (1968), to integrate the Rural Councils and the District Administration to avoid, in the words of the Simmance Report, existing duplication and tension between Rural Councils and District Governors.[18]/

Decentralized Government: Proposals for Integrated Local Government Administration

In 1979 proposals for Integrated Local Government Administration were announced by the Minister of State for Decentralization. These proposals were produced by a special Working Party headed by the Minister of State, and whose task was that of studying the system of decentralized administration since the Simmance Report.

The initiation of this study was done by the Research Bureaus of UNIP's Central Committee, and was discussed by the Central Committee and Provincial Political Committees before it was passed to the Minister of State for Decentralization and his Civil Servants. The proposals concentrate on District Administration. The Working Party listed two anomalies of the existing District Administration.[19]/

1. there is a very large number of departments and organizations in each district.
2. each department in the district appears to have a separate administrative organization.

These anomalies lead to an overlap in functions, proliferation in division of work and delay in policy-making. Also citizens are faced with too many officials. It was also found that District Development Committees were never informed of how much of the available funds they were to plan for. Often, this results in districts having their plans drastically cut. In addition, the Working Party found that Central Government departments often duplicated the functions of the inadequately funded and understaffed Rural Councils.

The proposals call for the wiping out of these anomalies by integrating District Administration Local Councils. For our purposes, let us note that this call was first made by Civil Servants in 1968 and was reiterated by the Simmance Report which had a very significant Civil Service input, in 1972.

The latest proposals in the effort to decentralize the administration call for the creation of an, integrated District Council to combine and replace the tripartite Local Government structure (Township, Rural and Municipal Councils, the District Development Committees), and will incorporate party organ-

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18. Ibid. p. 62.

19. B. Mwape, "*Zambia's Proposals for an Integrated Local Government Administration*", (Unpulished) paper presented to the School of Humanities & Social Sciences Staff Seminar, University of Zambia, 1980. p. 5.

ization.[20] The Council will have statutory authority over all the affairs of the district and will be answerable to the provincial headquarters. It will decide policy and formulate regulations for the efficient running of the district, authorize annual district budgets and ensure compliance with provincial and national plans, maintain law and order and ensure national security. It will also approve operations of parastatal organizations and private enterp ises.

Membership of the District Council will be composed of the District Governor (Chairman), the Political Secretary, two District Trustees, all Councillors (elected component), Member of Parliament in the District, one representative from each of the Trade Unions operating in the District, one representative from each of the Security Forces, and one Chief elected by fellow chiefs to represent them in the District. The District Council will have a secretariat composed of:

— the Administrative Secretary, Political Secretary, Social Secretary, Security Secretary, Financial Secretary, Development Secretary and Commercial and Industrial Secretary.

These proposals as said above will soon be presented in form of a bill to the National Assembly. However, a Committee chaired by the former Chairman of the Local Service Commission and of which two of the remaining three members were Civil Servants, was appointed last year to work out the mechanics of implementation. It has been recommended that the proposals be implemented in stages. Stage one, to last for two years, will be for the integration of the present City Councils into District Administration, stage two, lasting one year, for the rest of the present Municipal Councils; stage three lasting one year, for the Councils in the present rural provincial headquarters districts; and stage four, lasting for one year, for the rest of the present rural districts.

The success of these proposals as decentralization measures will, like that of the 1969 reforms depend largely on the preparedness of Central Ministries to delegate responsibility. Evidence so far suggests that the Zambian Central bureaucracy although contributing to intentions to decentralize, has been unwilling in practice to go along with effective delegation which is a corollary to decentralization. Finances may also present an impediment to effective decentralization. Reading from the Third National Development Plan's (TNDP) figures, Mr. B. Mwape observes that a greater proportion of the development projects in the TNDP are dependent on foreign aid.[21] The relevant question we should ask is: To what extent will foreign financiers be prepared to finance projects managed by District Councils? In the absence of adequate funding, District Councils are likely to end up under the close superivision of Central Ministries. This would defeat the intentions to decentralize. The question of personnel may also pose imponderables. The one advantage of centralized administration is that it does not demand as many qualified personnel as decentralized administration. The tendency among Zambian Civil Servants is to work in urban areas. This may seriously rob District Councils in rural areas, of the required personnel.

In conclusion, we wish to observe that the frequency at which decentralization reforms have been introduced may be an indication that these reforms have not usually been preceded by comprehensive research. Piecemeal reforms can be disruptive. All in all, Civil Servants in Zambia as we have observed, have contributed greately to the initiation of ideas intended to decentralize Zambia's administration. There has however been a certain amount of unwillingness on the part of the top levels of Zambia's central bureaucracy to sufficiently delegate responsibility. This is one issue which Zambia Civil Servants will have to positively address themselves to, if the effort to decentralize administration has to succeed in the 1980's. Initiation of decentralization ideas, however brilliant these ideas may be, is itself not enough. There has to be a willingness to carry out such ideas.

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20. Republic of Zambia, *Decentralized Government*, op. cit. p. 50.

21. B. Mwape, "Zambia's Proposals" op. cit. pp. 17 and 18.

CASE STUDIES - 2
THE ROLE OF ZAMBIAN PUBLIC SERVANTS IN THE EFFORTS TO DECENTRALIZE THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

The Zambian experience illustrates the troubled waters which have to be crossed before effective decentralization can be seen to be working. Inherited and inhibiting structures from an era long past, inadequate skilled manpower, the imbalance between the rural and urban sectors, inadequate funding, inadequate confidence in the new machinery and the reluctance of those at the centre to delegate. Permeating these situations is the ill-defined relationship between decentralized central administration and local administration, and the ever present acrimony between the political and civil service sectors.

With an undisputed need for more rapid and effective decision-making involving more popular participation - there was nevertheless much evidence that there were serious shortfalls in the execution of the First National Development Plan. Fingers were pointed and the Civil Servants were accused by people and politicians alike of lacking identification with the ruling party.

Strong politicization of the Service followed and new structures were created. Still decentralization was not successful and civil servants put their minds to seeking remedies. Commissions of inquiry were set up, reforms introduced, but with the benefit of hindsight it seemed that one set of changes had hardly time to settle down and produce the goods before another set was on its way. It was difficult therefore to analyse the one in order to determine whether or not there was a real need (imaginary or otherwise) for the next. This situation indicated a lack of proper research and planning, and the monitoring of anticipated progress. In particular the position and role of local councils vis-a-vis the decentralized administration defied a good solution. On the one hand the rural areas were being denuded of their human resources - in quality and quantity - as the cities bulged with these very people who were needed in the rural areas, inter alia, to feed and sustain the urban masses. On the other, the central Government would not provide the central resources to the rural areas to enable the centrally planned programmes to be executed. Lip service only was being paid to decentralization.

Personal antagonisms prevailed as local, inarticulate, politicians abused the civil servants seconded to backstop the local developmental effort, thus exacerbating the ever-present reluctance to serve in the rural areas. Likewise, local political interference in established, indeed legal, procedures concerned with personnel selection did nothing to improve harmony.

And so the probing goes on into the cause and effect. In Tanzania, with effective decentralization for over eight years, researchers working in the same region, on the same information, came up with widely differing results. In Zambia, there were reforms springing from political origins and administrative necessity, both emanating largely from research activities by the ruling party and the civil service itself. The latter body was energetically seeking to re-establish its credibility following the disenchantment shown in the five or six years following independence. But the crisis of confidence persisted and the climate for calm objective proposal and evaluation seemed as unconducive as ever. Proposal and counter-proposal could be taken as disloyalty, even opposition.

Perhaps too much homage is being paid to decentralization. On the one hand it has been described as 'an organizational imperative'; on the other it is seen as requiring the central agencies which have grown powerful, to share this power thus apparently diminishing the lustre they have enjoyed as 'the providers'. If it is ever to blossom from an intention to a policy, all factors must be very carefully weighed, costs, source and manner of revenue raising, local vs. central funding, realistic targets, positive steps to minimize the failures which have bedevilled efforts so far, and the degree of responsiveness of the centre. The danger has to be avoided of an inward looking approach whereby because of the unremarkable track record of

local institutions, they will consider handling only those programmes which are assured of success no matter how minuscule thereby slowing down or reducing essential development.

At the end of the day there seemed little change in the nature of the impediments to successful decentralized administration from those found elsewhere in the whole field of policy generation and implementation.

— shortage of trained manpower, exacerbated in this case by the unattractive prospects of serving in the rural areas and the knowledge that what local competence there is will seek advancement in the urban areas. A good breeding ground for the uncommitted!

— shortage of funds, exacerbated again by restrictive legislation for the local generation of revenue, and the reluctance of central and foreign agencies to provide funds or to delegate real authority.

The poverty trap closses in.

THE ROLE OF SENIOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS IN THE INITIATION, FORMULATION AND ARTICULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

A STUDY OF
TANZANIA'S DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIENCE

by
*Wilson J. Mukama**

A. Introduction

The primary objective of this paper is to discuss critically, the role played by Senior Public Administrators (SPAs) in the initiation, formulation and articulation of Governmental Development Policy in Tanzania. Tanzania's decentralization experience is supposed illustratively to serve as a case study in the attempt to practically demonstrate the influence amassed and exercised by these SPAs.

Tanzania presents a unique example in its ideological orientation and its overall development strategy. It is one of the few post-colonial African States to have gone through two colonial administrations, each representing a different model of administrative style. The German mode of administration, was harsh, brutal and centralized. In sharp contrast, the British colonial mode of administration, was, more subtle, soft, and based on a decentralized form of "divide and rule" principle - so called Native Administration. The historical significance of these two divergent modes of administration, does not emanate from the softness or harshness of style. Rather, it is still a subject of significance, because ever since our country got its nominal flag independence in 1961 the emergent administrative philosophies and experiments have see-sawed between the two modes of administration.

Tanzania's ideological path of development needs a special mention too. Our country represents a radical "disobedience" to its expected post - colonial behaviour. The construction of a society based on egalitarian principles in the distribution of social wealth is not an easy task, especially for a developing country. The inequalities of the contemporary world economic order pose such serious questions as to the efficacy of our ideological and political strategy, in creating organizational structures for effective mobilization of peasants and workers in our country. Yet, it is no longer just an expression of intent. For the past 13 years, major political and economic decisions have been made to underwrite the success of the kind of society envisaged in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. [1]/

B. A Conceptual Wrangle Over SPAs Role

It is with little doubt that there should be some conceptual variations as to what ought to be the proper functional role of SPAs. And that these conceptual variations, floated in a multiplicity of theoretical models, are reflective of the different models of socio-political systems obtaining in our politically variegated continent.

At this juncture we may begin to analyse the so-called *Inherited Model*, 2/a supposedly typical construct of a SPAs role. Simply put, there is an "uncontested" conventional view of a Civil servant in

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1. The Arusha Declaration is a basic Party Policy Document passed by TANU, the then ruling Party, in January 1967. It spells the meaning of Socialism and Self-Reliance and their relevance to Tanzania. It is available from the Goverment Printer, Dar es-Salaam, (Tanzania Copy - 1967)

particular, and the Civil service in general. It is nevertheless important to mention that I am not contesting the general view that SPAs are "top level officials in the public services, and in the services of public enterprise, who are concerned with the formulation of major policies, whose duty it is to advise on policy matters at the highest levels, and who have the responsibility for making decisions on administrative policy, and for translating into operational policies and programme decisions taken on matters of major policy by Ministers or boards of directors".[3]/

The situation succeeding the post-independence date has however, made the continued sanctification of this view tenuous. It has become amply evident that the "Inherited Model" bequeathed to us by Westminister constitutional architects, demonstrably displays more cracks both in its design and roofing. The inherited government machinery, structure of public services, and procedural regulations, were not in architectural consonance, with the barrage of wants and expectations the populace expected from the "wananchi" (peoples') government. The above notwithstanding the dire need for political, constitutional and technological changes as a result of an increase in the cultural level of the Masses buttressed with an aggressive drive towards national integration and consolidation of economic independence, laid bare the inherent obsolescence of a structure not internally geared.

C. 1961 - 1965: A Period of Open Search

The 1961 - 1965 period in the political history of Tanzania, could be labelled, as one characterized by an open search for a new political-administrative machinery. A few cosmetic changes were unveiled-mainly the Africanization of the top echelons of the civil service administrative hierarchy. Along side such psychic changes, was however a serious turnabout in the literature. Just like most of the ex-colonial civil services, ours too, found itself amidst a paradoxical dilemma of reacting to the exigencies of law and order to consolidate independence, and the demands of a populace wanting speeded "Matunda ya Uhuru" (Fruits of Independence).

TANU, which was the ruling political party by then, carried out a broad surgical re-examination of our inherited political system. The need for a redefinition of goals and objectives, a revamped role of a civil service which is an instrument for spearheading changes in the political, social, economic, and cultural aspects of our people, was floated to the surface. There was a need for SPAs:

a) who have moved away from a regulatory and controlling function to one in which they exercise leadership and initiative;

b) who assume responsibility for the development administration of our country albeit under the political leadership of TANU; and

c) who are responsible for formulating or advising in the formulation of policies designed to achieve development goals, and mobilizing, organizing and managing resources to carry through development policies.

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2. For a longtime in the literature on Public Administration, an intellectual discourse has centred on whether there ought to be a conceptual distinction between "Policy-Making as a legislative prerogative and "Policy-Implementation" as an administrative function. The wrangle has brought to the fore a division between those who uphold this rather fallacious view hence identified as *traditionalists*- & those who contend that the policy-administration dichotomy is non-existent, either at top-level or at operational level. To the second category the author of this paper subscribes.

3. See ADU, A.L., "*Role of Senior Public Administrators in Developing Countries*
UNReport of the Interregional Seminar on the Development of Senior Administrators in the Public Service of Developing Countries, Vol. I Geneva, 19-29 August 1968, p. 52

The end result of this soul-searching scenario, was the adoption of a one-party system in 1965 a strategy designed to serve as an integrative mechanism for mobilizing and organizing the masses for the serious tasks of overcoming our poverty, disease, mass-ignorance, and all forms of squalor obtaining in the rural and urban centres.

1965 stands as a date of historical significance with regard to the ensuing changes, carried out in the political - administrative machinery. Consequential to the adoption of a one-party system, was:

a) a restructuring of our governmental machinery to make it a better instrument for task initiation, formulation, and execution;

b) a revamped conception of the civil servant as:

i) one who is required to identify the most urgent and priority targets within the policies of the Party and Government;
ii) one who should be a spearhead of planning developmental policy; and
iii) one who should be prepared for working on the fontiers of policy.

For the first time the civil servant was looked at by the political leadership, as an integral part of the policy-making machinery. He was no longer seen as a disjunctive implementor within the realm of political and economic participation. For, during this period, the main drive behind our social development policy, was the political strategy of mobilizing for popular participation of the masses in the development of our country.

Naturally, when one mobilizes for mass participation - say through adult education campaigns it creates a typical phenomenon in developing countries; the increase in the cultural level of the masses.[4/] This in turn promotes political activity of the people, accompanied by new demands on the system. It is needless to mention that the "Inherited Model" based on the administration of law and order, administration of tax collection and token fiscal regulations - could not stand to the development challenge of providing such basic needs as education, water supply, health clinics, or improved infrastructural adjuncts to the small modern sector.

One ugly fact still stands out through this period of soul-searching. The whole exercise of re-orientating our civil servants and the civil service, was being done within the gamuts of a highly centralized model of administration.

D. The Arusha Declaration and After.

The Arusha Declaration was passed by TANU in January 1967.[5/] It explained the meaning of of socialism and Self-Reliance, and their relevance to Tanzania. On 6th February, 1967, all private Commercial Banks were nationalized; ever since steps were being taken to bring the economy of the country into the ownership and control of the people.

The promulgation of the Declaration not only had a multiple impact on the political, ideological, and socio-cultural aspects of our country's development, but also its extended turbulent impact was felt

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4. See RYBICKI, ZYGMUNT, "*Decentralization and Its Significance for Reforms of Public Administration*", UN Report on Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries, Vol. III. Technical Papers (part two), Falmer, Brighton, United Kingdom (25 October - 2 November 1970) p. 89.

5. See, NYERERE, JULIUS K., *The Arusha Declaration Ten Yeaar After* Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1977), p. 1.

in the orientation of our administrative cadres. For what was conventionally delineated as "public" and "private" soon foundered on diminishing marginality of differentia specifica.

It is nevertheless important to mention, a priori, that the semantic eclipse, did not per force obliterate the existence of an administrative hierarchy in our public bureaucracies. To the contrary, it exacerbated the demand for SPAs, to be deployed in the public service and in the rapidly expanding parastatal sector and regional administration. In fact, a shortage of SPAs to man top-level jobs in the nationalized sector was experienced.

The nationalization salvo pre-empted an avalanche! The demand for SPAs as General Managers, Chairmen of Boards of Directors, Financial Administrators, Economists, Statisticians etc. was so much that Doctors and Engineers found themselves doing administration too!

It is obvious up to this point, that the traditional view of there being a separation of roles between the political heads and Senior Administrative cadres, in the context of a policy-administration dichotomy, was being rendered fictitious.

E. Background to Decentralization: a strategy of giving more power to the people

The need to decentralize our government machinery in 1972 has had a multiplicity of explanations. In the realm of political participation, it is seen as a strategy aimed at:

a) increasing mass participation in plan formulation as well as in implementation;

b) enhancing the leading role of CCM in development activities;

c) a redistribution of development resources more equally in the country; and

d) peoples' control over bureaucracy.[6]/

In an administrative context, emphasis has been on the need to:

a) increase efficiency in the operation of government activities;

b) create a more effective integration of development programmes at the local level; and

c) increase accountability of both administrators and the local government organs.

A mixed blend of political and administrative factors alone were not enough to force the political and administrative leadership to undertake such massive shake-down of governmental machinery. Certainly the background to the 1972 decentralization still remains a complex matrix.

In purely ideological terms, the exercise has been analysed as a move towards giving more power to the people; to have them decide on matters which affect their own lives and their own development. From this principle emanates the notion that peasants should participate in the management of their communities and thereby make decisions regarding their own economic development.[7]/

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6. For a lucid explanation of the politico-administrative rationale behind the decentralization of our government machinery, the reader is kindly requested to read: MAEDA, JUSTIN H.J., *Popular Participation, Participation in Tanzania's Rural Development*), A. Ph. D Dissertation at Yale University (USA), 1976 pp. 245-296.

7. See Decentralization: "The Peoples Role in Planning" President Nyerere's statement to the NEC Meeting in Iringa, May 1972. (Mimeo)

As a logical follow-up to the Arusha Declaration, that in order to make a reality of our policies of socialism and self-reliance, the planning and control of development in the country must be exercised at the *Local Level* to a much greater extent than was at that time. The above rationale is seen as a mechanism needed to stimulate grassroot enthusiasm in responding to calls for development work decided upon and planned by an authority hundreds of miles away.

Needless to mention the strive to eliminate frustration for the District and Regional Officials - who found all their ideas buried in the mass of papers flowing forwards to and backwards from Dar es Salaam. Hence it was felt there was a need for creating problem-solving teams at grassroot levels of administration.

The sum-total of the conceptual analysis behind decentralization was:

a) to work out a system which gave more local freedom for both *decisions* and *actions* on matters primarily of *Local Impact*;

b) to work out a system, though maintaining the Central Government's role of guidance, which reduced red-tape and excessive bureaucracy;

c) to work out a system which made sure that delays in receiving central policy decisions in remote areas, due to the system of centralization, were no longer given as excuses for inefficient decision -making at the local level; and

d) to work out a system which was no longer bottle-necked in the decision-making machinery due to the inadequacy of effective and reliable statistical data.

The broad goals of decentralization were, therefore, aimed at a gradual equalization of well-being between regions with the Central Government, setting the framework and giving technical assistance; as well as responsibility for inspecting the performance achieved.

It is important to point out that the conventional view that top SPAs could only serve at the centre and were not to be deployed to man field assignments was seriously brought into problematic foci. Traditionally, field assignements carried low status weight, and being brought to the "HQ" was in itself considered a status rise.

The underlying objective of Tanzania's administrative decentralization was to increase popular participation in the formulation and implementation of development plans. To effectively carry out this noble undertaking, completely new administrative organizational structures were introduced. A new staffing cadre was introduced, with a status commensurate to "assignment" rather than "location". Top SPAs outstanding qualities of leadership, good judgement, dedication to national ideals, with ability to apply an analytical and objective approach to problems and ability to advise politicians without fear of criticism, were sent out to the regions.

A corresponding change, was also instituted in the central planning machinery. The traditional approach of planning from the top was now replaced by an emphasis on planning from below. To make it more meaningful, lest it be mere shopping lists (Regional Plans), it was felt that men and women of analytical skills were needed in the initial stages of evaluation and processing of development projects.

It is without doubt that SPAs were conspicuosly deployed at the regional and district levels of territorial administration.

A brief descriptive analysis of politico-administrative organs at the district, regional, and national level is worth some time and space. An evaluative note will be made on the critical role played by SPAs

at each level in the formulation, articulation, and evaluation of planning policy, and hence a direct or indirect influence on the National, Regional and District leadership in the promulgation of public policy.

The basic organ in the decentralization planning machinery is the Village Council. It is however deliberately left out of the presentation in this paper due to the simple reason that it is managed by very junior public officials.

At the district level, there are three main organs each of which is assigned specific roles within the decision-making process. The first organ is the District Development Council. The District Party Chairman presides over its sessions as the Chairman, and the District Development Director, a senior public official, serves as the Secretary. Other members of the council are: All Ward Representatives in the district; the Member of Parliament for the district; the District Party Secretary as well as members of the District Development Team who become ex-officio members.

For effective working at the district level, an executive arm of the council, the District Development and planning Committee (DD and PC) has been created. The District Party Secretary presides as its Chairman and the District Development Director serves as its Secretary. Other members are the District Party Chairman, the District Member of Parliament, one quarter of the elected members of the District Development Council, or ten such elected members (whichever is greater), and members of the District Development Team.

The second basic organ is the District Party Executive Committee. Its membership is mainly the Party Branch Secretaries and the District Party Chairman. It is, within the context of Party supremacy required to approve all the programme proposals adopted by the District Development Council.

The final basic organ is the District Development Team-indeed the district's government bureaucracy. It is made up of the District Development Director, three staff officers and all the functional Managers-Heads of the various "decentralized" ministries. In honesty, due to its technical known-how, the District Development Team formulates all the development programmes in the district, by executing such functions as estimating project costs, their viability, the district's technical capacity to carry them through, time of completion, etc.

Prior to the formulations being forwarded to the District Development Council for legislative purposes, they are presented to the District Development and Planning Committee. It discusses them and may as it feels fit (though very unlikely) alter, drop or add onto them.

The most significant relationship is the key role played by the technical organs, namely the District Development Team and the District Development and Planning Committee, in the formulation, articulation (to the DDC members), co-ordination and supervision of adopted programmes.

At the regional level, basically the same basic organs are replicated with, of course, a wider area o. operational authority. The main function of these regional organs is to co-ordinate all the districts' plans, and consider them on a regional basis.

The various regional plan proposals are submitted to the Prime Minister's Office where their consistency in terms of national objectives, priorities, technical and financial feasibilities are reviewed. A point to be noted, the PMO's sitting is constituted by top-echelon administrators, namely the Regional Developmnet Directors, Regional Party Secretaries with the Prime Minister as the Chairman. A cohort of very senior desk officers under the guidance of the Commissioner for Planning does the primary work of co-ordination, evaluation and priority ranking.

Finally, these national "regional" development plans are integrated with sectoral (ministerial/parastatal) plans by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning into a National Development Plan.

The integration of regional plans with sectoral plans into a National Development Plan by the Economic Affairs Ministry does not end the process of planning in Tanzania. At best, at this stage, it is not officially a National Development Plan until it has gone through the National Planning Commission and finally adopted by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Party.

The whole purpose of this gruelling exercise is to underscore the role played by Senior Public Administrators at each level of decision-making in the planning process, a major area of public policy formulation. The planning process under decentralization stands out as a good case study compared to the politics of budgetary allocations, a more or less faded area of public policy.

F. A Resume on Policy-Making

It is therefore important, in a form of a resume, to note what kind of lessons of experience, in a historical as well as an operational context, we can learn from this exercise which was started in Tanzania since July, 1972. The period so far is long enough to be able to provide us with enough lattitude of assessing its effectiveness.

Policy-making in the Tanzania political system is a very complex affair. As such, sometimes, it is very difficult to exactly pin-point where that suppossedly grand idea, which ultimately ends-up being legislated into public policy, actually originated. To students of Tanzania political system, with a slight leaning to the left, policy-making operates within the context of Party Supremacy.[8]/

Not everybody, however, has the vision to see it that way. Goran Hyden uses a different analytical model, to describe policy-making in Tanzania. He summarily calls it. "We must Run While Others Walk."[9]/

a) the strong urge to do everything and do it at once;

b) that policy-makers often decide on matters without first having obtained full and detailed knowledge of the possible consequences of their decisions;

c) the unwillingness of policy makers to use the past as source of guidance for the future; and

d) that employees in the public sector are compelled to work in a context where public expectations constantly exceed what can actually be attained by incumbent officers.[10]/

The implications of such a model, so says Goran, have had multiple impacts on the smooth implementation of the decentralization programme. Goran asserts that:

a) to many civil servants it has been difficult to adjust to this new way of policy-making;

b) that their opportunity to influence the formulation of a given policy has been very limited, and they have been consequently forced to resolve conflicts between ends and means, that is, to sort out feasible alternatives of implementation only after the decision to go ahead with a certain policy or programme has been made.[11]/

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8. The Tanzania constitution clearly stipulates the leading policy-making role to be the monopoly of the Party. The underlying philosophy being the philosophical argument that, the Party, unlike the Government Bureaucracy, is *CLOSER* to the people. Therefore the party supremacy doctrine simply puts emphasis on this philosophy.

9. See HYDEN, GORAN., "*Policy Making in Tanzania*: *We Must Run While Others Walk*", Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, ed. by Joel D. Barkan with John J. Okumu, Praeger Publishers 1979. pp. 96-103.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

According to Goran, the role of SPAs in policy-making can only be seen in an implementation context, that as executing agents they interpret the policy and devise a feasible implementation strategy. But as far as initiation of principal decisions are concerned they exert very little influence.

With regard to decentralization as such, Goran says that:

a) it has diminished the traditional role of local patrons, thus making the rural masses come to stand eye to eye with government authorities in a manner not experienced before;

b) the practice now is for the Government to patronize villages with the expectation that it will ensure a more effective implementation of Government policies; and

c) that there has been an increase in the number of senior officials appointed by the President or the Prime Minister.

Finally, Goran concludes that this intrusion of political appointments has had a negative impact on the appointees themselves. One, they do not enjoy a security of tenure; two, they are not sure that their expert views are being seriously considered in the formulation of policies; and three, they regularly get whipped by politicians who accuse them of inefficiency, among others.[12]

G. Conclusion

It is my conviction that the decentralization exercise, viewed critically, has brought about a new relationship of variables in the matrix of public policy initiators, formulators, and implementors. Whereas before SPAs were mainly concerned with administration of whatever policy directives came from the top, the period after 1972 reversed the manner and style of policy-making. In place of District Administrative Secretaries, you have District Development Directors, charged with the duty of mobilizing and organizing for accelerated development. The change in official designation, could not be dismissed off hand as semantic.

As it can be construed from the attached chart depicting structures of the planning process, the District Development Director and his team play a key role in the identification, appraisal, formulation and eventual articulation of development projects to such legislative organs as the District Development Council and to the Party Executive Committee.

Increased morale, a rekindled enthusiasm in the execution of approved projects, has been physically displayed in areas where SPAs have an attached seriousness to work. Just like in an industrial factory, if the labour force has no intrinsic attachment to what is being done, it is not atypical to see apathy.

Many of the shortcomings pointed out by Goran, i.e., the unwillingness of policy-makers to use the past as source of guidance for the future, amount to nothing short of a gross overstatement. In any planning situation, premising is accepted as a must. One principle as such is the principle of flexibility and navigational change. Periodic checks, given space and material time are, to say the least, necessary. Sticking to past practice in changing times is of course baseless rigidity, and in no way demonstrates the hallowness of the partnership established between SPAs and their nominal political heads.

The mushrooming of political appointments is again pointed out by Goran as a technique of the centre - the appointing authority - rotating control over the decentralized bureaucracy. The contradictions between how much to decentralize and what powers to retain at the centre, are as old as the discipline of administration itself. Just as you can not politically resolve the contradiction between the individual and the collective (society), similarly you cannot administratively resolve the centre - field contradiction. Yet, one can still seriously argue that delays in receiving central policy decisions in remote areas due to the system of centralization are no longer hampering local implementation of projects identified.

I am concluding this paper by making one remark: Developmental policy-making cannot be formulated by linear models. Cyclical models having sometimes no clear patterns have to be used. And it is obvious that the traditional perception and conception of SPAs vis-a-vis politicians has, at least in Tanzania, been thrown asunder.

12. Ibid.

CHART 1

GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION UNDER DECENTRALIZATION



Chart 2

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES



CASE STUDY - 3

THE ROLE OF SENIOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS IN THE INITIATION, FORMULATION AND ARTICULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

TANZANIA'S DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIENCE: DISCUSSION

Tanzania's path to decentralization appeared less traumatic than Zambia's, and the role change for and by senior administrators better accomodated in the restructured models for development in the Districts and Regions. Certainly the leaders gave themselves time to think and research following independence in 1961. Four years leading to the decision to establish a one-party system with the concomitant changes in the politico-administrative scenario and roles; a further two years until the refinement and definitiveness of the national philosophy-the Arusha Declaration - leading, inter alia, to the extended and complex demands being made on the senior administrator as the vast parastatal sector emerged.

And then in 1972, eleven years after Independence, the carefully planned decentralization of the central Government machinery and the emergence of mass participation in plan programme formulation (within ceilings set) as well as implementation. The manner of accountability seems well-entrenched in the structures then emerging. Likewise the transformation of the senior civil servant from his regulatory to his developmental role, and his neutralist to his politicized stance was complete. The actors and their institutions were shaping up to the grand design stage by stage.

The time scale, timing and place of major policy pronouncements, allowed for discourse, preparation and testing the development of the awareness of each others' roles in the forthcoming scenario. Perhaps the magnitude of the all-out offensive on all fronts stretched the supply lines of skills and funds, but the masses had been conditioned and the new structures were so participatory that their strength and survival were assured.

If the strategy for decentralization means ensuring mass participation, then it follows that the representatives of the masses, the Party officials, and the civil servants must stand united, shoulder to shoulder. It also implies that the best talent and expertise must be at work at the very source of the mass participation. One cannot recognize the ominpotence of the masses with a wave of the hand. That omnipotence *requires* that mechanisms must be established for:

— administrative efficiency;

— an integrated approach to the development programmes; and

— better accountability.

THE AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICES AND PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING IN THE 1980s:

THE UGANDAN EXPERIENCE
A CASE STUDY

by
G.W.B. Gowa*

1. Introduction

This paper is aimed at providing a brief outline of Uganda's experience since her independence in as far as the formulation, analysis and implementation of public policy is concerned and to bring out to the conference the various situational dispositions that the public servant may find himself faced with or indeed entangled into.

The Ugandan Civil Service was by and large initially founded on the lines of the British Civil Service blended with a local civil service flavour operating largely on traditional lines. The BIKANGAGA COMMISSION (1973-1974) Report revealed that these two blends had combined well and greatly contributed to the smooth public administration that Uganda felt rightly proud of.

Notwithstanding that observation, Uganda has had a rich variety of experiences in the way and manner her broad statements of intentions and courses of action have been reached and decided upon since 1962, the year of our independence.

I shall categorize the period under review into four sections deliberately intended to reflect the four major political changes that Uganda, as a sovereign state, has passed through todate namely:

a) The first five years of independence, 1962-1966;
b) The second five years of independence, 1966-1971;
c) The Military Regime period, 1971 - 1979;
d) The after liberation period, April, 1979.

2. Uganda: The First Five Years of Indpendence-1962-1966

During this period, Uganda's public policy was generally formulated after a wide range of consultations. Listed below are some forums in which the civil servants participated:

a) intra-Ministerial consultations of public officers in the initiating ministry;

b) inter-Ministerial consultations at both the official as well as at the political levels. At this stage, as much as at the intra-ministerial consultations, the pros and cons of the policy in the offing, would be analysed in a satisfactory manner;

c) There would then be a submission to the relevant Cabinet sub-committee before the full cabinet would be presented with the same;

d) Finally, the government's intentions would be presented to Parliament, for further scrutiny and for Parliament to reject or pass the Government's intentions into public policy and subsequently legislate these intentions into law.

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In short, during this initial period of independence, public policies were made after a satisfactory analysis by both the Civil Servants (Career Officials), the Political Leaders and the general public, through opinions expressed in the press and the elected representatives of the people.

An example of a policy passed under this manner was the Local Governments Act of 1963 which established local governments and instituted constitutional heads in District units that had no previous monarchical tradition.

3. Uganda: The Second Five Years of Independence - 1966-1971

During this period, Uganda exprienced a decline in her parliamentary performance. The 1966 political crises which culminated in the abolition of kingdoms, the suspension and eventual abrogation of the 1962 independence constitution, and declaring Uganda a Republic, witnessed the pronouncements of major public policies with the minimum of consultations with the three most conspicous sectors of a state, i.e. the Civil Servants as Career Officials, the citizens and the political leaders.

From the 1966 crisis to 1971, Uganda's public policy formulation record drifted and shared a mixture of systematically analysed and debated policies as well as pronouncements that would take everyone by surprise. In the latter category are examples such as:

a) the abrogation of the 1962 constitution;

b) the establishment of National Service Schemes;

c) the introduction of the 1967 constitution.

During this period, emergency conditions were instituted, detentions without trial set in and consequently parliamentary democracy drastically curtailed. Parliament became a rubber stamp. Under these conditions the civil servants' influence in the formulation of policy got very much reduced and as a result the policies themselves became rather impractical to implement.

4. Uganda: The Military Rule Period - 1971 - 1979

This was a dictatorship by the Military which dissolved Parliament, banned political parties and suspended political activities. Even the initial declarad top policy-making body, the Defence Council, was later to become a rubber stamp. Major policies got pronounced under very peculiar circumstances. For Example, on the night of 3rd August 1972, the Head of State happened to have had a dream after attending a District Agricultural show in one of the country's most dry districts - Karamoja, the next morning 4th August 1972 he abruptly left to fly back to the capital. On the way he decided to visit one of the Military barracks at Tororo - and to everyone's surprise (including his Principal Private Secretary) he declared the famous or rather infamous Economic War, a public policy that later ignited a lot of operational problems. Several other policies came to life in this manner, e.g. the Land Reform Decree under which all unutilized land became public land regardless of its previous ownership status.

5. The After Liberation Period - April 11th. 1979

After the liberation of the country, in April 1979, the situation improved especially with the re-institution of a parliamentary type of body - the National Consultative Council. Nevertheless, there is still a lot to be desired as the case below reveals:

Sale of Duty-free Motor Vehicles to Civil Servants

It has been government policy to encourage Civil Servants, particularly those based in rural districts to own private motor vehicles not only as a morale booster but also as a means to insure an uninterrupted mobility for these public officers while on duty to deliver technical advice and extension services to the general public as well as to collect information for planning and follow-up functions.

Over the past years there has been a steady departure from the fulfilment of this objecteive. After the war of liberation in April last year, the central guiding theme in whatever programmes the subsequent governments have undertaken to do, has been the "Rehabilitation and Reconstruction" of the badly run down machinery and infrastructure for economic revival. It was with this rehabilitation and revival objective view that the Head of Government, while closing a Performance Improvement Conference attended by District Agricultural Officers, District Veterinary Officers, District Co-operative Officers and the District Commissioners, announced that government will allocate private motor vehicles to them as a matter of urgency. The Public Officers welcomed the announcement but hurried to observe that according to the current prices of vehicles in the country, a Datsun 120,Y for example, costs U shs 120,000/=. It would therefore be financially very difficult for them to purchase these vehicles. Consequently they suggested that the vehicles be sold to them *duty-free*. The duty includes an import tarrif and sales tax totalling about 50 per cent *advalorem*. This suggestion would bring down the cost per car to half the full cost i.e. U shs 60,000/=. The civil servants involved earn an average of U shs 40,000/= p.a. The Head of Government welcomed the suggestion. But I immediately cautioned him that there would develop several difficulties that would render the duty-free policy unadvisable. It would set a precedence that would be very costly to implement, create unwecome social pressures and isolate civil servants from the rest of the citizens. With these explanations, the Head of Government seemed to have got convinced and we parted for the weekend, leaving the Head of the Civil Service to work out other alternative ways of enabling Civil Servants to buy private motor vehicles without too much financial constraint. But the following Sunday, while addressing a public rally, the same Head of Government who on Friday had accepted the advice, declared that government would sell motor vehicles to civil servants duty-free.

Consultations ensued between my immediate staff and that of the Treasury Department. The Treasury first came out with a *Yes* response. Later on however, it was discovered that even the Treasury Department's '*yes*' decision had been reversed by further discussions between the Budget and Treasury departments.

The following may be learned from this case:

a) There may be occasions when the public policy-making environment is over-politicized and the correct judgement of the public servant succumbs to the politician's mercy. The result is to have the declaration of policies that are geared towards the 'felt' rather than the 'real' national interest;

b) Lack of thorough intra- as well as inter-ministerial communication worsened by the absence of properly documented information;

c) A multiplicity of economic and social problems deeply embeded in our systems that very often blindfold even the civil servants from taking decisions in the national interest and resort to sectional or indeed occupational considerations.

d) The presence of abundant economic problems in our systems does reduce to the barest minimum the opportunities to break-up the vicious circle and propel the system into an u ward trend.

What should top-Civil Servants as formulators and implementors of Policy do under the circumstances?

Amongst the courses of action one could suggest the following:
Collective advice-giving and decision-making by top civil servants.

In Uganda, the Permanent Secretaries' meet at least once a month to review critical policy issues of the day and offer recommendations to Political Leaders.

Recently for instance, this body advised government to discourage civil servants from active participation in politics but remain as neutral officials. The contents of that Permanent Secretaries' paper have since been accepted by government and a standing instruction to Public Officers has since been issued.

International Public Administrative Solidarity

Civil Servants need understanding from their immediate co-actors i.e. the Political Leaders. However, in the event of clash between the two and in cases of the later trying to suppress the former, international opinions against such suppression could serve as a strong weapon to the African public servants in their efforts to direct their countries to progress. For example, when hundreds of Civil Servants got sacked in one African country and twenty two Permanent Secretaries sacked at ago by Idi Amin in 1973, no outside bodies and not even AAPAM raised a finger in solidarity with these civil servants so summarily sacked.

Establishment of Information Centres

Uganda since the liberation has made efforts to establish a Management Information Service Department (MIS) based in the Office of the President charged with collection, analysis and documentation of information. It is hoped to develop this department into a miniture Uganda 'think tank' to facilitate effective policy formulation and implementation.

CASE STUDY - 4
THE UGANDAN EXPERIENCE: DISCUSSION

The politico-administrative history of Uganda since independence in 1962 fell clearly into four phases. The contrasts between them are little short of traumatic and could be said to cover all the peaks, troughs and stages in between of Public Service involvement in public policy-making. Indeed the troughs were those of emasculation and utter despair which no doubt led to the criticism from the top Ugandan administrators to international bodies such as AAPAM for the aloof stands taken.

As the third of the four phases ended only in mid 1979, and as the following eighteen months have seen further instability, it was natural that the events of the military regime period should loom large. Zero consultation and emotive decision making sums up the condition of those eight years. Indeed there was little else to say; the scars are too clear.

But Uganda historically brought into clear focus the dilema of decentralization. The Kingdoms, as decentralized regions, did not gain strength following the process of decentralization from the centre; they began (post independent) life already far stronger than the centre. Something had to give way and the kingdoms were dissolved to strengthen the central government. Without a *national* development philosophy the pulling and the pushing in the decentralization process, the strengthening and then weakening of various areas will dominate the scene. Without direction how can there be thrust; it is contradiction in terms. The people suffer and the very sectors in need of decentralized attention and efficiency are worse off than ever, as they receive no attention and no efficiency from any quarter.

Uganda's administrators give perhaps the impression of a punch drunk man, reeling between the extremes of human behaviour, unable to decide where their role is. So they take refuge in neutrality. But surely not for long. Impartiality and commitment are strange bed fellows and one is going to be pushed out before long. When? When the positive signs return which will attract positive responses. The administrators too, can take an initiative in that process to effect the consultative machinery that is essential, even if only by positive neutrality in the first instance. Perhaps the Management Information Service Department can provide a helpful forum in this respect. It is a new institution in a critical position and therefore lends itself to be fashioned to meet the needs of data flow in policy analysis.

As President of AAPAM, Professor Adedeji responded to Uganda's criticism that AAPAM, and other like-minded bodies, remained silent in face of the wholesale decimation of the country's administrative cadres, by posing three questions.

Firstly, how much intellectual honesty is there among today's top administrators? A good deal of self-analysis is needed.

Secondly, what can the Public Service - as a corporate identity - do to organize itself and protect people in the face of political excesses. In order to build an influential stand - a force to be reckoned with a high level of intellectual and moral integrity is required. More heroism is needed. When such a condition is present, e.g. in Nigeria in 1966 when the Head of Service brought such influence to bear on the new military leadership, it saved a nation.

And lastly, just what can an organization like AAPAM actually do that is helpful at the time and in the future? The host Minister, Seychelles Minister of Administration and Political Organization, made it clear that politicians and top civil servants are not going to agree all the time. Disagreement must however be seen in its proper perspective viz. that those two actors are only part of the scenario and they represent only part of the whole national need. Everyone has a part to play in the political system and

should be seen to play their part fully. The disagreement, coming at the end of considered dialogue and debate based on the best information available, articulated with the interests of the people in the forefront of minds, is not a negative but a fully positive situation, he said. They should learn to live with disagreement as part of the policy process if the situation so demands. AAPAM, he concluded, has a part to play in devising systems to accomodate this perfectly natural phenomenon.

The theme was taken up by many other delegates. A system allowing for shaping of national needs and structures which is not static, allows for, and can endure, change and review. A corporate voice is stronger than ,the loan cry. In either case, speaking out openly, face to face, courteously, at the proper time and place, with honesty and intelligence, is to be commended. The alternatives are only too well known devious behaviour, "walking, by night", embellished and twisted reporting and silence. The target is unity in the development process, not a move towards polarization.

INTRA-AFRICAN CO-OPERATION IN DEVEPOPING EFFECTIVE POLICY - MAKING CAPABILITIES

A PANEL DISCUSSION

Panel members: Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, Mr Michael A. Bentil, Mr Raja Gomez & Mr.S I. Edokpayi

The framework for discussion was established and it was suggested that the topic be discussed under four components namely:

(i) *Actors*: to cover the people already making policy decisions and others who are potential policy decision-makers. What capabilities are needed in terms of knowledge required and in which areas; skills-especially to incorporate the analytical mind in the process of policy formulation, decision-making and implementation. This would embrace attitudinal or behavioral change together with an awareness that one's own behaviour may need to change in the process;

(ii) *The data base*: in particular, the implications for international co-operation in this area;

(iii) *Institutional framework*: within which policy making takes place. This would cover Institutes, and organizational framework;

(iv) *The Methodology of co-operation*: This would cover the strengthening of the components in National, Regional, Continental and international co-operation.

The justification for policy decision study and co-operation is undeniable. The future environment is certain to be more complex and more difficult. The economy too is likely to be more complex. The type of policy needed in these situations will therefore inevitably be complex.

It is necessary to thoroughly prepare for the task of policy-making which lies ahead. Up to now it has been a fire fighting exercise. It cannot continue as such in future because we are making ourselves far too vulnerable to our enemies who can plan against us that much more easily. One way of neutralizing our enemies is to develop economic self-reliance, collectively at national, regional and international levels and to have that co-operation reflected in our future policies.

Not all member states can establish what some countries have, like the Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Nigeria or the Think Tank in Ghana. It is therefore necessary that countries join hands in establishing Economic Co-operation.

PADIS (Pan African Development Information Service) is in the process of being established under ECA. It will cater for entire African economies such as agriculture, industry, labour etc. It will have linkages with established nodal points in member countries and it will be possible to retrieve information from PADIS either by telephone, telex or by mail.

A second project - still a proposal and in the pipeline - is the establishment of an African Institute for Public Policy Analysis and Perspective Studies. OAU, ECA, UNDP, ADB, are co-operating in the project which is still under active study. It is noted that a number of civil servants in Africa are often

too busy to think ahead and some even go to Conferences unprepared. The Institute will cater for perspective studies and will also mount suitable programmes which individual states may be unable to run alone.

In dealing with the question of information flow, the focus should be on the implications and requirements. The need for a relevant data base, carefully analyzed and researched data, is an essential prerequisite in policy - making. A paradox existed in some governments where there is plenty of data which is inexpertly stored and incapable of ready retrieval.

It is pointless to talk about interregional co-operation before the situation in our individual countries is examined. Ultimately, it is information from individual countries which makes up the international data banks and from which the sharing takes place. In some countries the need for information has been realized and National Information Systems have been developed. CAFRAD is developing an African Administration Network of Information Systems and is aiming at producing dosiers for each country.

Establishing an information unit has obvious manpower and cost implications. There is need to delineate subjects and items in subject areas. This involves considerable preparatory work and much sifting to distinguish what is required from what is not required.

Codification, even for descriptive information, puts it into a style readily available in manageable and storable forms in, say, abstracts and this can be achieved through the use of punch cards, indexing, tapes, microfilms and micro-fiches. Proper codification facilitates retrieval and storage.

In using mechanical aids such as micro-fiche punch cards, microfilms and computers, there is need to consider what can be afforded in terms of manpower and costs, and what can be accommodated in the existing communication systems. In other words the scope and extent of use of a particular facility and the reason for establishing data base at national level must be linked and decided.

It was emphasized that it is only after a national systems capability has been established that international linkages can be considered.

The possibilities in the area of intra-African Co-operation were outlined. Policy-making and policy analysis especially in regard to training, involves many people. Some of the options available in other disciplines like chemistry, physics etc, are available abroad *but* policy analysis is a strategic area and no country can expose the substantial issues involved to outsiders. In addition, literature in policy studies is difficult to assimilate.

Regarding policy analysis techniques one may be lucky in that case studies may be available, but the interpretation of the factors which go into the cases will be conditioned by personal experience. Gaming or role playing can be employed but these training methods have problems. Probably the most effective way of learning from each other's experience is through an exchange of staff from both the training institutions and from the civil service. Malaysia has made a start by including policy analysis generally in training programmes aimed at building an efficient civil service. Mexico and Brazil have also made significant developments in this area.

It was imperative that third world countries should not be left too far behind the industrialized countries in the area of policy analysis. Research in this area must be undertaken and information researched and gathered in forms which have a ready use.

The conference noted in regard to actors that many third world countries have little or no proper machinery for selecting experts. The tendency is to work more with overseas experts than with experts selected from developing member countries. This shows a lack of mutual trust so that even when states sit together, discuss problems and agree on issues, nothing much materializes as follow-up action.

The conference expressed concern that whenever new issues arise the tendency is to establish a new institution as a means to solving the problem. Africa has many institutes like CAFRAD, ESAMI, Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in addition to national institutes and Universities. It was recommended, therefore that attempts should be made to strengthen and use existing institutions.

The need was expressed for up-dating the directories of training Institutions as published by ECA, Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations. It was suggested that AAPAM should commission a study of the role/mission of the management training institutes and their impact, in relation to the purposes for which they were originally established.

It was stressed that delegates need not be disillusioned about co-operation in policy analysis. There is so much ground work to be done in member countries that a correspondingly gradual pace of development in the field of co-operation should be allowed.

It was realized that training in policy analysis techniques was not so suitable for pure academic study. It is much more a practical need suitable for mature managers. The difficulty of gaining access to information in government was stressed. There is far too much secrecy, confidentiality when it is not needed and some measures are needed to improve this situation. Whatever developments are made in information gathering, storage and dissemination, it should always be realized that the user is the important factor. Unless such information reaches the user in a properly presented useable form, it is of no avail.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION

Both the Seychelles and the Nairobi Roundtables have stressed the need for AAPAM to go beyond problem analysis and suggesting possible solutions and move on the next stage of practical action either to assist or encourage member States in taking needed action to solve identified problems. It is in this regard that participants made various suggestions for possible Roundtable follow-up action. They wanted to ensure that the Seychelles Roundtable will not be reputed as just another well attended, well organized and very stimulating Roundtable. They wanted it to lead to concerete action at both national and regional levels. This calling for action and indicating what ought to be done and thereby setting for both AAPAM and African States specific tasks is one way of encouraging action. The assumption is that both the will and the means for taking needed action will be available.

Follow-up action is on more rational and systematic approach to public policy formulation, implementation and review. It is for those addressed, African governments and AAPAM itself, to consider for initiative and implementation as well as for members of AAPAM as professionals and senior officials of their governments to encourage needed action to be taken.

Although various sensible and feasible recommendations for action were directly and indirectly suggested in the course of the debates on various aspects of the Roundtable theme, only the more pertinent ones are hereunder listed and elaborated for consideration.

A. Action by African Governments

1. Policy making capability

Each state should endeavour to critically review its existing national machinery and capability for policy formulation, implementation and review. The object of the review is to ensure adequacy and effectiveness of machinery and capability with a view to achieving improvements. Such a review may consider the very nature of the machinery, its terms of reference, its location, operation, composition, level of participation and the resources for its operations. As revealed in the Roundtable discussions, African States can only safeguard their own interests in the decades ahead when they are able to rationalize their policy options and pursue these options in consonance with their declared development goals on a sustained basis. It means that where a government has not yet established the necessary public policy-analysis unit and capability, this should be established, however, modest, as a matter of priority. A country must be very clear what its longterm goals are, the means of attaining those goals, the strategy options and the will to sustain its efforts to attain declared goals. Not every African State can afford a "Think Tank" or Institute for Policy Studies, but every one has the means to develop for itself the modest capability for sustained efforts in research supported policy analysis and review.

2. Policy making capability at Agency Level

It is not sufficient that policy analysis capability should be adequately developed at the national level and in the office of the Head of State; the capability should equally be available, howbeit, on a modest scale at the sectoral level. This is necessary since most policy measures have sectoral origins and impact and since it is at the sectoral level that implementation and review usually take place. Absence of the required capability or insufficiency of it, may render ineffective the available capability at the national level, however dynamic is the latter. Capabilities at both levels are mutually reinforcing and complementary. It is in this regard that African governments should consider the desirability of obliging each Ministry, autonomous Departments and parastatal organizations to have in their establishments a small unit or Desk Officer for policy analysis, formulation and review of implementation effectiveness and impact.

3. Developing the individual's capability for policy making

As part of the effort to develop national and sectoral capabilities for public policy analysis and review, the training of personnel is vitally important to the achievement of the desired capabilities. It is generally agreed that policy analysis with all its scientific requirements is a specialized discipline. That notwithstanding, all senior officials in a position to contribute to the process of policy making should be familiar with, and be able to use some of the modern tools and aids to policy analysis and implementation evaluation. To this end, African governments should see to it that senior officials are given the opportunity to undergo intensive short courses to prepare them for their role in public policy-making and policy analysis and evaluation. In furtherance of this objective there should be a greater and freer flow of data and management information, especially as relate to socio-economic development situation.

Equally politicians should be better prepared for leadership and initiative in public policy formulation and evaluation. This requires that African governments should see to it that politicians are better educated regarding the national development plans, and the national as well as world economic situations. Specific programmes to achieve this should be considered and the possibility of political leaders, social and military leaders as well as higher level civil servants participating in annual policy oriented and policy review conferences should be considered.

4. Intra-African co-operation

While for the present it is a long way to contemplate the possibility of developing a regional capability for probing into the distant future in order to mirror policy strategy options for Africa, there are other practical steps that can be taken to strengthen individual as well collective capabilities in the area of public policy analysis. Through programmes currently being developed by ECA (PADIS) and CAFRAD, valuable information can be shared and policy analysis personnel can be trained. Similarly, through bilateral arrangements countries that currently lack institutional infrastructure for the training of their senior officials in public policy-making and the techniques of policy analysis and evaluation can take advantage of what training facilities their neighbours are willing to put at their disposal. African States are therefore urged to exploit this opportunity to the full; organize and sift existing stored away information in a manner that facilitates speedy retrieval and sharing of non-confidential information; and to develop their own Development Information Units so that they can participate in the network of information sharing that ECA (PADIS) and CAFRAD are currently developing.

B. Action by AAPAM

1. Seminar for New Ministers

Having regard to the differing educational and occupational backgrounds of African politicians in general and of those of them coming into politics and holding ministerial portfolios for the first time in particular, their performance in their role as policy-makers can be greatly enhanced if they had non-political fora to reflect on their role and responsibilities. Rather than being blamed for not understanding the full implications of the policies they advocate or for lack of capability to initiate rational public policies in their field of competence, they should be helped to acquire the required capabilities, or at least develop the self-confidence for doing so. Accordingly, and on the request of African governments, AAPAM Secretariat, in collaboration with ECA, CAFRAD and other appropriate institutions such as IDEP, should endeavour from time to time to co-sponsor and organize national seminars for newly appointed ministers on such general themes as "the Machinery of Government"; "Development Administration and Public Policy Making". Such themes should look into how governmental machinery operates and the role and responsibilities of the various actors who operate the machinery; the formulation of

development goals and public policy, etc. In order to promote a spirit of partnership, mutual trust and the comradeship required for the effective functioning of the machinery of government and to foster positive politico-administrative relationship, the higher level civil servants (Principal/Permanent Secretaries) should also participate in these seminars. Experienced Ministers and Principal Secretaries from other African countries can be invited to participate. Another possibility to explore is to promote a mobile Institute of Politics for the education of politicians and other public leaders. Unless local support was forthcoming there might be some difficulties by way of reception by politicians.

2. African TCDC for Performance Improvement

The performance of African public sectors - the public services and public enterprises - can be considerably improved if African States learn sufficiently from their neighbour's successful and unsuccessful experiences and experiments in administrative reforms and public policy-making. This can be done through exchange of specific study reports and research findings, exchange visits of technical officers and of ministers and policy-makers (e. g. legislators). Mention has already been made of co-operation in exchanging data and information on development issues as well as in the training of personnel. The area of exchange and short-term lending of expertise which has great potentials for technology spread and sharing of know-how, however remains underexploited. Some African countries have more trained personnel and more experienced public officials than others in particular disciplines. Language teachers are being exchanged between Anglophone and Francophone African States. Our public enterprises can benefit if government entertained some short-term lending or exchange of their management personnel. In spite of the opportunity that has not yet been adequately exploited. African States spend annually. several millions of dollars in scarce foreign exchange to pay for the services of foreign consultants and management services of the type that experienced African officials can provide to other African countries at triffling costs and in more relevant manner.

Accordingly, AAPAM Secretariat is urged to seek the assistance of appropriate donor agencies such as DANIDA, SIDA, CFTC, including the United Nations - through ECA auspices - with a view to securing funds with which to promote and facilitate the short-term employment of African experts, particularly those in the public services and parastatal organizations, applying the principle of technical co-operation among African developing countries.

3. Research in Public Policy Analysis

Unlike project research, development research is a continuing activity; it is never a short in the arm Public policy research belongs to the latter category, it is a continuing process. Policy analysis to be meaningful, rational and balanced has to be research-based. Further research is needed to evaluate policy implementation, its impact and the effectiveness of resource use. Still more research is called for before abandoning a given policy, modifying it or developing new dimensions to existing policies. These requirements were duly recognized by the Roundtable. while public policy statements constitute a good crop of practical politics and administration in Africa, what seemed to be lacking or inadequate, Roundtable participants admitted, was well researched public policies. The first demand for policy research therefore was to inject quality and rationality into public policy-making in African States. The second demand was for a wider application of quantitative discipline in public policy analysis and evaluation. The third area of the call for policy research was in respect of future studies, involving monitoring African and world socio-economic development secnarios and within that complex situation pursue Africa's long-term goal of economic independence and evolve strategy and policy options for the attainment of that goal.

Accordingly, the Roundtable further urged AAPAM secretariat to encourage more research activities in the field of public policy analysis and evaluation. To this end, the Secretariat should follow

up on policy-oriented research activities that ECA, CAFRAD, IDEP and other African development institutions might initiate, and particularly the future activities of the proposed African Institute for Public Policy Analysis and Future Studies when it gets established. The Secretariat should, resources-permitting, provide for, and commission studies on specific aspects of public policy-making and policy analysis and evaluation, and disseminate to all member States the findings and recommendations of such studies.

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What is AAPAM?

The African Association for Public Administration and Management is an international professional association for African administrators and managers. The Association was formed in 1971 at Freetown, Sierra Leone. Its headquarters are in Africa Hall. P.O. Box 60087, Addis Ababa — Ethiopia.

It has a membership of over 200 top administrators and managers from many independent African states and fifteen corporate members which are Institutions and Schools of Public Administration and Management in Africa. Many African nations and a few Foundations interested in the development and professionalization of public administration and management support AAPAM with annual grants.

Why AAPAM?

The Association was formed to:

i) Provide a forum for exchanging ideas and experiences between public administrators, managers, scholars and teachers of public administration and management in Africa;

ii) To foster professionalization of public administration and management in Africa;

iii) To assist, encourage and contribute to the study of the problems and techniques of public administration and management in the African continent;

iv) To promote research in public administration and management in Africa;

v) To foster affiliation and maintain liaison with other international bodies and organizations interested in public administration and management.

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