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
Experiences from Eastern Africa

GELASE
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AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

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Preface

When African countries attained independence in the early sixties, they were all committed to achieve in a decade what had taken the departing colonial masters more than six to ten decades. In order to attain that, it was suggested policies had to be adjusted, institutions had to be restructured, new organizations had to be born, new skills and knowledge had to be acquired. Twenty years after devoting so much effort to that endeavor it seems that we have not come closer to developing and transforming our societies, and the route is still very long. There are indications that the process of development has come to a standstill, or indeed that it is being reversed.

What happened to make what seemed so obviously attainable only twenty years ago so difficult to attain? So many explanations have been given that an attempt to catalogue them would amount to yet another chapter. Students of public administration must only be interested in those explanations that single out the public administration system for blame. Numerous journal articles, reviews, and books have been written on aspects of the phenomenon and many of them do shed some light on what seems to be amiss. The most celebrated study, written by the late Amishadou Adu, was very comprehensive and attempted to explain why the administrative system in Africa was operating so ineffectively. Since he wrote that important book a lot has happened to African administrative systems and both his analysis and conclusions may need to be revisited. Goran Hyden, in a recent study called *No Short Cuts to Progress* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983), attempts in some way to review the experience with institutional and other administrative reforms, and even if one might not agree with his explanations and conclusions, the study provides an excellent description of the reform measures taken. Hyden's study, however, attempts to cover too much and hence ends up being too broad and too general. Indeed one could say the same thing concerning Adu's study, cited above. Both studies, therefore, tend to dwell too much on "the forest" and as a result end up neglecting the "trees."

There is a need for studies that focus on units smaller than the continent. Some of the articles and books do actually have this focus; they tell the reform experiences of particular countries. Many of these studies, however, are often too specific in addressing particular reform measures, such as decentralization, etc. Such studies and/or articles abound on Nigeria and Ghana, for example. East Africa has not received as much attention as Nigeria and Ghana, even when one considers only the studies of specific focus. Tanzania was lucky during the early seventies when a lot of attention

and writing was devoted to examining the reform measures in her machinery for rural development management. Kenya also received some attention with respect to rural development machinery about the same time.

There has not, however, been any attempt to comprehensively review the efforts to reform the public administration machinery either in a single country or, even more importantly, by comparing the experiences of two or three countries. The only comparative study focused on public policy-making and was interested in the political process. There is no study on the current public administration system in Tanzania to update the studies done by William Tordoff and Stanley Dryden in the late sixties, and there is no study on Kenya to update the volume by Goran Hyden, John Okumu, and Robert Jackson done in the early seventies. Zambia is more fortunate in that the volume edited by Tordoff is only five years old.

This study is therefore a first in its class. In one volume it attempts to provide to the student and practitioner of public administration, in our region and beyond, material on the measures that have been taken by the three countries to remodel their public administration systems since independence to date. It also gives an updated account of the administrative systems as they stand today. Obviously the material may in some cases cover similar ground as the journal articles or chapters in books that address particular reform measures in one country. The value of this study is that it attempts to synthesize and integrate what various authors may have said in bits and pieces about the administrative reform experiences in one country or several countries, and makes it available in one volume.

In this study we are therefore reviewing in comparative perspective the attempts at improving administration for development that three countries, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, have taken since independence. I try to document the content of the measures undertaken, the strategies used in adopting them, and the extent to which the measures and strategies adopted in the three countries compare and contrast. The study also tries to gauge the extent to which the various measures have attained the intended objectives, and reviews the factors that may have either aided or constrained attainment of the objectives.

Without rejecting offhand what we might call "comprehensive" explanations, the thesis of the study is that the explanation for the failure or success of any improvement efforts, including those in public administration, is contextual. Context is used very broadly to include many elements, including the environment, the content of the improvements, the process of instituting or adopting them, etc. Any of the three or more variables could positively or negatively influence the effectiveness of the improvement effort. And I submit that in cases under review, the reforms failed to properly take into account the context in which they were to be instituted.

This book is divided into six substantive chapters. Chapter 1 provides the context in which the improvement efforts were to take place. This in-

cludes a review of the conditions of the three countries' administrative systems shortly before the reforms were to be carried out, as well as the nature of the tasks to be performed by the public administration systems. The objective of providing this material is to indicate the extent to which the administrative systems were capable of meeting the new tasks ushered in by independence. The implication is clear; an agenda for reform action seems to emerge from the review.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical context of the study by reviewing writings and debates on the broad topic of administrative reform and improvement, in general, as well in Africa. The chapter also tells of previous experiences with administrative reform in general and in Africa, and whether or not knowledge of both the theoretical formulations as well as the practical experiences put leaders in a position to guide the efforts of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.

In Chapter 3, we survey the reform measures adopted by the three countries over the period, just to provide a broad base from which specific reforms could be picked for further in-depth comparative review.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 consider a number of reform measures, labeled decentralization, controlling bureaucracy, and training and development of personnel for development, respectively. These three issues constitute, in the author's view, the major reform measures undertaken by the three countries during the period under review and about which considerable debate still continues concerning their actual thrusts, effectiveness, and impact.

The decision to focus on the three countries, as well as the three reform issues, was conditioned by a number of factors. With regard to choice of countries for focus, one might have expected the focus to be on the traditional East African countries, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, given their common colonial legacy. Uganda, however, has been very inaccessible to researchers, and there is not much that has been written on its administrative system since independence. Since in writing the book, I had to rely mainly on secondary sources, there was no point in focusing on Uganda, since few if any secondary sources were available. In place of Uganda, therefore, I decided to focus on Zambia. It has much in common with Kenya and Tanzania in terms of legacies, and since independence it has taken measures that are similar to those taken by Tanzania. This provides an opportunity, indeed one of the first opportunities, to subject Tanzania and Zambia to comparison. Indeed, the absence of any earlier comparative study focusing on the three countries' administrative reforms and/or administrative systems makes the focus on Zambia an imperative.

The choice of measures dealt with in the study was, on the other hand, dictated by the relative importance enjoyed by the three reform measures vis-à-vis any other measures that were adopted, their topicality, as well as the interest of the author in the particular measures. It might, of course, have been helpful to include a review of many other reforms, including

reforms of the machinery for planning, as well as personnel management processes and procedures. Unfortunately these measures are only briefly reviewed in chapter 3. Constraints of time, resources (funds to carry out the research), and space (the volume might have been too big) made it difficult to include all those issues, important though they may have been in the past or indeed might be in the future.

The study was conceived in 1979 when I was preparing the Report on the State of African Public Services for the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), and I had the opportunity to visit eight African countries to study, first hand, problems of the public administration system. I was then intrigued by the similarities of the measures taken as well the similarities of the failures of these measures. I then thought, as I still feel now, that a comparative study focusing on the administrative reform experiences of Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana would be a worthwhile activity. Indeed, in 1980 I wrote a research proposal soliciting for funding to undertake such a study, but initial responses by research-funding institutions thought the exercise to be too ambitious. By 1981 I decided to scale down the project and settled for focusing on the three countries of our present study. In the same year I started to seriously collect documentation and data. Thereafter, whenever I had occasion to visit Kenya and Zambia, which fortunately was often, I included research as part of my activities.

While research for the writing of this book was extended over a five-year period, the writing of the bulk of it started in late 1983 and was completed in 1984. The book should have been published three years ago. The factors behind the delay in its publication are indicative of the level of our continent's underdevelopment. While the delay in publication has affected the currency of some of the information presented and observations and conclusions being made, on the whole the situation has not changed significantly and the major conclusions are still valid.

The study shows that little has been done since independence to remodel African public administration for the challenges of independent statehood. The multiple crises facing Africa have therefore found African public administration totally unprepared to withstand them and have in fact caused some of the public administration system to collapse or nearly collapse. As African governments are taking action, they should therefore bear this point in mind: the task is not simply to rehabilitate the public service systems, for they were never viable to begin with, but to transform and build viable systems that are capable of handling the "shocks" of independence and the crises in the economies, something that has since independence been neglected.

Gelase Mutahaba
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Acknowledgments

It is not possible to acknowledge all the contributions to a study of this kind. With all of the financial and material support and advice and encouragement one depends upon, one invariably ends up forgetting to mention some important help.

As noted in the Preface, the genesis of this book was an assignment I undertook in 1979 for the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) on the state of African Public Services, which gave me an opportunity to visit eight African countries to study, firsthand, the problems of their public administration systems. The commonality of their problems as well as their failures in tackling them prompted me to embark on a systematic, comparative study of efforts to reform the public administration system in Africa. In a way, therefore, this book owes a lot to that AAPAM assignment and I would like to thank the AAPAM Executive Committee for having included me on that review team in 1979.

The translation of that inclination to pursue the issue into an operational research project was then made possible by numerous senior- and middle-level officials in the bureaucracies of the governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, as well as by librarians at the universities of Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, and Lusaka. It was the patience of all these officials that made it possible to get access to data and documentation, without which it would have been difficult to write this book.

The project may never have moved beyond the stage of gathering material and documentation, however, if my teacher and friend, Carl Rosberg, Director of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, had not invited me to take my sabbatical at the institute and, with the financial help of the Ford Foundation and the University of California, actually made the sabbatical a reality. I want to express my gratitude to him, to the University of California, as well as to the Ford Foundation, for the generous assistance that was extended to me.

The authorities of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, who in the 1983-84 academic year gave me paid leave, also deserve my thanks in the same connection. I would also like to thank the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation, the Ford Foundation, and The Commonwealth Secretariat, all of whom made some contribution toward the AAPAM teaching materials in the Public Administration Project, under which this book is being published.

Like so many endeavors of this nature, the study has benefited from many people, including some academic colleagues at the universities of

Botswana, Zambia, Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam and at the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. Many of these people found time amidst their busy schedules to read the manuscript at various stages of its production and gave me valuable criticisms. To a great extent, therefore, the study belongs to them as much as myself and I owe great thanks to them. Nevertheless, the flaws reflected in the book are entirely my responsibility.

For typing the manuscript at various stages, my thanks go to Nadine Zelinski of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and Messelech Tadese, my secretary at AAPAM in Addis Ababa.

Finally, I owe great thanks to my family, both nuclear and extended, and especially to my late father, to whom this book is dedicated, for sacrificing so much to make it possible for me to go to school, a luxury during those days. Some six special people, the members of my nuclear family, have borne the major burden in the course of the writing of this book. Either I was away on sabbatical and they had to undertake the chores that otherwise are the responsibility of the husband or parent, or when I was around I was locked up in my study working on the book. In either case they took their loneliness in stride. My only hope is that the contribution to knowledge made by this study matches the sacrifice they made.

About the Author

Gelase Mutahaba is Secretary-General of the African Association for Public Administration and Management based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A Tanzanian national, he holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, which he obtained in 1973. He has held a number of teaching, research, and consulting positions at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, the University of Ghana, Legon, the University of California, Los Angeles, the Institute of Public Service of the University of Connecticut, and the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI). He is author and editor of numerous articles and books on public administration issues in Africa and is on the editorial board of several academic journals.

CHAPTER ONE

The Context and Legacy of Administrative Reform

This chapter describes the contextual framework within which the independent governments of Kenya, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) were to undertake the administrative reforms. There are numerous issues that one might discuss under this heading, but for the purposes of this study only two have been singled out: the socioeconomic and the administrative legacy of colonialism. The former includes, among other things, the nature and character of the economic system, and of the social structure, and the extent to which the socioeconomic system in existence would be acceptable to an independent government or might pose challenges to it. The latter involves the extent to which the administrative system existing at the time of independence was in a position to meet the challenges posed by the attainment of independence and by the prevailing socioeconomic structure.

I. THE SOCIOECONOMIC SETTING

Generally the three countries inherited a socioeconomic bases that presented immense challenges. The central challenge was, as elsewhere in Africa and in most of the third world, poverty. At the time of independence, per capita income in Kenya was \$85 (U.S.), compared to \$50 in Tanzania, and \$95 in Zambia. The differences are marginal, if one allows for the fact that in all three countries much of the wealth was concentrated in the hands of Europeans and Asians. The condition of the Africans in all three countries was markedly similar—very poor.

Another common attribute of the three countries' socioeconomic frameworks was what has been called their dualistic character.¹ There existed, on the one hand, a modern and relatively opulent segment of society dominated by Europeans and Asians, supplying entrepreneurship, managerial talent, and skilled labor for modern-sector operations. At the bottom end of the scale was the bulk of the African population who remained outside this sector, continuing to till their land using tools that were technologically underdeveloped, and who were only occasionally linked to the modern economy insofar as they purchased minor household items. Between these two extremes were a few Africans who were

linked to the modern economy in various capacities as artisans; laborers; clerks; petty traders; miners; marginal cash crop farmers; and, as in a few cases with the approach of independence, government executives.

Socially the condition of the two groups differed significantly in all three countries: the white and Asian minority enjoyed educational, health, sanitation, and housing facilities that were easily comparable to those of the upper middle class in the metropolitan countries, whereas the bulk of the Africans barely had any access to modern social services. They were afflicted, therefore, not only with abject poverty but also with very poor housing, illiteracy, high rates of mortality, and endemic diseases. The few Africans who were playing roles in the modern economy analogous to those of the whites and Asians were beneficiaries of marginal social services, commensurate with the minimum required to keep them fit and able to play their roles.

In spite of this generally similar socioeconomic situation that faced the three countries, there were several significant differences between them, the result of each country's unique colonial experience.

1. Kenya's Socioeconomic Legacy²

As noted in the foregoing introductory remarks, the newly independent government of Kenya inherited an economy that was marked by abject poverty for the bulk of the population, amidst reasonable levels of resources mainly in land and in an industrial, transport, and communications infrastructure that was unparalleled in the countries north of present-day Zimbabwe.³ Thus, although per capita income stood at \$85 (U.S.) a year, the bulk of the wealth was held within the European and Asian communities, while among the African population there was probably no more than \$50 a year of per capita income, much of it concentrated in the urban areas. The problem of poverty in the rural areas, where 90 percent of the population lived, was as distressing in Kenya as it was in most African countries.

The second major characteristic of the economy at the time of independence was its dualistic character. Two clearly differentiated sectors composed the economy: (1) an African sector confined mainly to peasant agriculture, handicrafts, very small industries, and trading activities associated with these enterprises; and (2) another sector consisting of plantations, large farms, large industries, and trading firms in the hands of non-Africans. Levels of technique, productivity, and income were low in the African sector and high in the non-African sector. At the end of the colonial period, for example, the greater part of marketed agricultural product was derived from non-African farms and plantations, i.e., \$36 (U.S.) million out of a total of \$46 million. As late as 1964 there were 4,200 Europeans compared to 2,000 Africans employed in professional and techni-

cal posts, while in administrative, executive, and managerial posts, the number was 6,900 for Europeans and 5,700 for Africans.

This dualism was further complicated by two factors. The first was that Kenya had attracted, since the early 1900s, a large group of white settlers from Europe and South Africa. The number had grown from thirteen in 1901 to sixty thousand toward the end of the colonial period. The second factor was that the country had a more intense colonial experience than either Tanzania or Zambia. While the white settler population did not approach the proportions of Algeria, South Africa, or Southern Rhodesia, the relatively small numbers of whites did dominate the country's economic life. Above all, the pattern of economic development saw the alienation of the African population from the "white highlands," around 13,355 square miles taken from the indigenous population. If one made allowance for forests, arid lands, urban land, and park lands, only 52,146 square miles were left for the greater number of Africans. This was to remain an invitation and indeed later led to the Mau Mau uprising.⁴

Secondly, the dominance of the economy by the white settlers had demanded the development of a relatively well developed and well equipped socioeconomic service infrastructure, which independent Kenya came to inherit in 1963. To cater to exports from the rich agricultural sector, a good transport and communications infrastructure had also been developed. Thus Mombasa provided a good deep-water port; a rail network ran from food- and cashcrop-producing areas to Nairobi and eventually to the coast; and while there were only 925 miles of bituminized roads in 1962, there were a number of good gravel roads that crisscrossed the settler areas.⁵ In addition, these areas were provided with security forces, agricultural extension personnel, etc.

African areas, however, remained relatively underprovided with these services. Thus educational facilities for Africans were very scanty other than in the Nyanza and Kikuyu areas, and even in these areas concentration was on providing primary education for the creation of a stable, loyal, and civilized mass. The first African secondary school was opened in 1926, and by 1955 there were only eighteen secondary schools for Africans, with a total enrollment of 2,167, as compared to a primary school enrollment of 400,000. In 1963, the figures were 12,872 and 840,000, respectively. These figures, though relatively low in relation to the population, were significantly higher than those of Tanzania or Zambia, as we shall see later.

Kenya had, therefore, a socioeconomic inheritance that compared very favorably in terms of potential with that of Zambia and far exceeded what Tanzania could boast of. But this potential, including such clear advantages as a superior communication, transport, and social services infrastructure, was embedded in a socioeconomic structure that gave disproportionate advantages to a tiny minority on which the country depended for its continued viability. Economic development demanded that the system

be nurtured as inherited. Such action would have meant leaving the mass of the population outside the mainstream of development, and it would have been interpreted as abandoning the interests of the majority of the population. The search for the resolution of this dilemma occupied Kenya's leadership in the years after independence, and the position taken greatly influenced the character of the administrative system Kenya strove to build.

2. Zambia's Socioeconomic Legacy⁶

Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) became a British territory in 1890 through the efforts of the British South Africa Company (BSA), which, chartered in London, was initially a South African enterprise. It was governed by the company until 1924 when, for mainly economic reasons, the BSA handed over its governance to the British Colonial Office. The company continued, however, to receive mineral royalty payments under questionable treaty arrangements, until they were eliminated by the African leaders shortly before independence. Zambia was later incorporated into the Central African Federation, uniting Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963, a situation that made the country the milk cow of white interests in Southern Rhodesia, predominantly. During this period, save for the interest in the production of its copper, all the rest of the country's economic sectors were neglected, as all its industrial (manufacturing) and agricultural requirements were met from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Zambia's economic heartland was the copper-mining industry, located in the Copperbelt (Province) and controlled by two groups of foreign-owned companies, namely the Anglo-American Corporation Group and the Loan Selection Trust Group. Commercial agriculture was undertaken almost entirely by white settlers along the railway line, while commercial activity in urban areas was dominated by South African- and Rhodesian-owned firms, even though the contribution of locally based white entrepreneurs was also significant.

The bulk of the African population (estimated at 3.5 million in 1964) worked as peasant farmers. In the Central and Southern Provinces they grew cash crops and reared cattle for their own needs and to meet the demands of the growing urban market. Away from the railway line, farming was less profitable, though groundnuts and tobacco were grown successfully in the Eastern Province. However, most villages in the outlying rural areas faced formidable marketing problems as the communication infrastructure was then chiefly geared to the needs of the mining industry and, to a lesser extent, to the commercial agricultural sector.

The predominance of the copper industry, with the attendant dominance of the economy by the white population, was also reflected in the way the socioeconomic infrastructure was distributed. Educational, health,

transportation, and other essential services served the mining industry, which meant Europeans received the highest priority, followed by those Africans immediately linked with the mining industry; the rest of the Africans were considered only if resources allowed, or they were left to the care of the missionaries.

The foregoing description gives us a dual economy more or less along the lines already described for Kenya. But whereas in Kenya the hub of this economy was the white highlands, in Zambia it was the Copperbelt.

Another colonial legacy in Zambia was, as briefly mentioned earlier, the economic dependency of Northern Rhodesia on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. For all practical purposes the former was an extension of the white south. It was South Africa and Rhodesia that were the sources of most of Northern Rhodesia's white immigrants, resulting in a European population of around 75,000 by 1960. The whites, who considered the south their home, monopolized managerial, professional, and skilled artisan occupations. Zambia depended on the south for almost all of its requirements for manufactured goods and also for the bulk of its food needs. The dependency was, moreover, complicated by the fact that Zambia's outlet to the outside world was through her southern neighbors. The significance of this relationship and the difficulties it would pose for a newly independent Zambia were brought forward when Rhodesia declared its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).⁷ It was then that the country realized how important it was to reduce this dependency, although it also realized how difficult this option was, as it had already been too intricately integrated with its southern neighbors.

The foregoing has revealed that in some ways Zambia resembled Kenya: in the dire poverty of the masses and in the duality of its economy, which was dominated by a white oligarchy. But whereas Kenya had a little more room for maneuver, Zambia found itself in greater difficulties. It was much easier to progressively Africanize Kenya's agricultural white highlands than it was to progressively Africanize the Copperbelt, which required technical expertise that would take longer to develop.⁸ Zambia's problems were also compounded by its dependency on a white south, which became increasingly hostile, a situation that made it even more difficult for the country to tackle the problems of poverty, economic dualism, and dependency.

3. Tanzania's Socioeconomic Legacy

Tanzania was governed by the Germans for a brief period. Their rule ended with their defeat in the World War I, and Tanzania was given to Great Britain under a League of Nations mandate. The terms of this mandate were to significantly affect the nature and character of British socioeconomic policies for the territory and subsequently affect the socioeconomic

legacy that the independence government came to inherit in 1961. It is significant, therefore, to briefly mention the main outlines of the socioeconomic policies pursued by Britain in Tanzania.

The terms of the mandate had the implication that Britain would govern Tanzania for the ultimate benefit of the subjects.⁹ For this reason, policies that were clearly against the interests of the indigenous population were not actively encouraged or were met with resistance at the Colonial Office in London. The outcome of this was that in comparison with Kenya and Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia), white settler immigration was not encouraged. Instead, Africans were encouraged to grow cash crops such as coffee, cotton, tobacco, etc., and by the time of independence African small farmers were contributing a significantly greater share of the marketed agricultural production (apart from sisal) than their counterparts in Kenya or Zambia. This is not to suggest that there were no white settlers in Tanzania. There were some concentrated in pockets around Mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru, and the Southern Highlands Province, but these never became a force to reckon with in comparison to their counterparts in Kenya and Zambia.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the Europeans' and Asians' share of the economy was disproportionate if one compares their numbers to that of the Africans. Thus, although per capita income was averaged at \$50 (U.S.) a year, for the Africans per capita income was between \$17 and \$22, while for the Europeans and Asians the yearly per capita income exceeded \$1,000. Again, even though they made up over 98 percent of the population, Africans controlled only 70 percent of the gross domestic product. Most devoted their working hours mainly to producing food crops for their own consumption. Even within the regions that engaged in substantial cash crop production and/or industrial production, most of their population fell within the category of subsistence in that they could grow crops from which to earn money for taxes, bride price, school fees, etc., and they could engage in some market activities, but most of their efforts were geared to feeding themselves.

In a sense, therefore, the economy of Tanzania could be labeled dual in the same way as that of Kenya and Zambia. But whereas the modern sector was relatively strong in the case of Kenya and Zambia, in Tanzania it was very weak, relatively underdeveloped, the dominant sector being the subsistence one. The major challenge of the newly independent government was therefore to attempt to capture this sector and propel it into modernity.¹¹ Reform efforts in public administration, as such, had as a major objective the evolution of a machinery that had the capacity and capability to develop this weak modern sector.

The same can be said of the other aspects of the socioeconomic fabric. Indeed there was a positive correlation between the extent to which an area had been co-opted into the modern sector and the extent to which

social services such as transport and communications infrastructures, schools, and health services permeated an area. Thus the coffee-growing areas of Kilimanjaro (also with a significant settler community), Bukoba, and Rungwe had equally relatively well developed school systems, health service systems, and transport and communications networks. On the average, however, the level of social services was poor, much poorer than in Kenya or Zambia. It is significant, for example, to note that at the time of independence the country had less than one hundred university graduates, only twelve secondary schools, and that total enrollment in primary schools stood at less than 200,000.¹² These were significantly lower numbers than Kenya had at the same time, in addition to the fact that Kenya had a university college and Tanzania did not. For this reason, therefore, in Tanzania the level of African involvement in servicing the machinery of government remained significantly small and marginal, a situation that posed problems for the newly independent government.

II. THE CHARACTER OF THE INHERITED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The foregoing review has shown that the three countries inherited immense socioeconomic problems that had to be tackled immediately by the independent governments. The extent to which these governments would succeed in tackling these challenges depended, to a significant degree, on the nature and character of the public administration systems these countries had inherited, as well as the improvements that were made on them.

The public administration systems inherited by newly independent African states had been designed for political domination and economic exploitation.¹³ The systems had essentially been constructed to carry out the imperial policies; their orientation and personnel were therefore suited to this purpose. Initially, their main tasks were to pacify the areas that by conquest, cession, or treaty had come to be part of the imperial empire. In nearly all the cases, this had involved compelling or persuading a number of hostile tribal states to live together in "peace" under the empire, and consequently developing the capacity to intervene in cases where this "peace" was disturbed.

As the pacification became routine, however, another function of the colonial administrative system came to be the creation of conditions and provision of facilities for the economic exploitation of the colony. The economic exploitation of the colonies was to take various forms that differed from one colony to another. These included the encouragement or enforcement of cash crop cultivation by the indigenous populations; the encouragement of settlements by colonists from the metropolitan countries,

who would in turn use Africans as farm laborers; the mining of rich mineral deposits; and commercial activities involving the importation of goods from the metropolitan countries and the export of agricultural produce and minerals from the colonies to the metropolitan countries. Each of these activities demanded a minimum level of support services, which could only be provided by the colonial administration. Such services included roads, railways, posts and telecommunications, labor recruitment, agricultural extension services, market information, health services, etc. The range of economic-oriented services to be provided by the colonial administration was a function of the character of economic activities taking place in that particular colony. In turn, the range of services provided were to influence the character of the administrative apparatus emerging in a colony.

Thus, even though it is fair to say that the administrative legacies inherited by the independent governments of Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania were similar in their orientation to the maintenance of law and order, and in the economic exploitation of the colonies by the metropolitan countries, there were still significant differences in the three countries specific characteristics. The differences arose out of the fact that the three countries faced problems of law and order of differing magnitudes, and arose also due to their differing ranges of economic activities, which required different support services. As a result, the administrative systems that developed in the three countries up to the time of independence showed differences in organizational structure, size, composition, complexity, capacity, and capability.

1. The Administrative Legacy in Kenya

We noted above that the intensity of the problems of law and order, as well as the character of economic activities, obtaining in a colony were to affect the nature and character of public administration that emerged in that colony. At the beginning of its colonial administration, Kenya did not experience intense law and order problems. After World War II, however, the country was to experience such problems in immense proportions. The Mau Mau crisis, which involved a rebellion by the African population in Kenya during the early 1950s directed at challenging Settler domination, especially in respect to land, and the consequential declaration of the emergency meant that law and order was disturbed. The country's economy was also greatly transformed as a result of settler occupation. Both developments demanded the creation of an administrative infrastructure of considerable complexity and sophistication, if it was to adequately deal with these two tasks. What then were the basic characteristics of this administrative system?

First, at the time of independence in 1963, Kenya had a strong and

relatively well developed public administration system.¹⁴ The size of the civil service was then about one-third larger than that of Tanzania, although the latter had about a 10 percent larger population. The civil service was more developed than elsewhere in East Africa because it had been constructed to provide services for the relatively developed settler economy and its white settler population, and also because, as a result of the Mau Mau emergency period, provincial administration and the security forces, in particular, had been strengthened to deal with law and order problems.¹⁵ Moreover, the Mau Mau period saw large numbers of Kikuyu being forcibly repatriated from the Rift Valley and from Nairobi—areas where they had constituted a sizeable proportion of the labor force—to the Kikuyu home-areas in the Central Province. The collection of many thousands of people and their forced migration back to home-areas necessitated the development of a civil service structure to cope with the problems this entailed.¹⁶ When the same colonial government used Kikuyu collaborators of the regime to push for land registration and consolidation in Kikuyu areas and to forcibly villagize the population, again it was the security forces and regional administration that took on this responsibility, and this demanded further elaboration of the administrative system. It did in fact necessitate the division of the Central Province into very many relatively small administrative units, requiring a larger force of provincial administration personnel.¹⁷

The need for facilitating increased agricultural production mainly in the settler areas, and (after World War II) to a lesser degree among the Africans, was to lead to an expansion and further elaboration of the administrative system. Thus, the service expanded from having 14,000 employees in 1945 to 45,000 in 1955. This expansion of the service was reflected in both the law and order units, such as the provincial administration and the security forces, as well as in the technical departments. Thus, while in 1945 there were 298 staff at all levels in the Agricultural Department, the number had increased to 2,519 in 1958. The African Land Development Department, which did not exist in 1945, by 1958 had 477 staff.¹⁸

Secondly, Kenya's administrative system was centralized, with the center playing a very significant role in policy formulation, and the central departments playing an equally significant role in policy execution right down to the lowest levels. In all these operations, however, the provincial administration, which had grown in size and strength during the emergency period, played a directing and coordinating role and was to eclipse even the regional governments that emerged under the Majimbo Constitution. In spite of the constitutional provision that made resident secretaries (the successors to provincial commissioners) accountable to the Regional Assembly, they were in reality to continue operating under the leadership of the central government and to give guidance to technical departments, which in turn continued to receive guidance and direction

from their Nairobi headquarters.¹⁹ Indeed when, after 1964, the Majimbo Constitution was abrogated (amended) the provincial administration reverted to its preeminent position of the preindependence period, and its officers were used by the president in respect to multiple duties and activities. In turn they were to acquire significant power and authority. The administrative officers not only collected taxes on behalf of local authorities but they also chaired land boards, loan boards, agricultural committees, licensing committees, etc. They were coordinators of all governmental activities in the provinces and districts, and because some departments had no representation at provincial and district levels, they also filled certain technical roles. But most important for the centralization of authority and the wide range of functions carried out by officers of provincial administration was their political power, which they acquired by being the personal representatives of the head of government—they became "governors."²⁰

A third characteristic of Kenya's administrative system was its relative unresponsiveness to reform, which was, in a way, a corollary of the point raised earlier, namely: the centralized nature of the administrative system. Unlike in Tanzania, where the administrative system had incorporated traditional chieftainship under the indirect rule system, Kenya's administration right through the village level was composed of centrally and bureaucratically appointed chiefs at the location and sublocation levels, and colonial civil servants at the divisional, district, and provincial levels. Moreover, there was little provision for the emergence of either elected, or even appointed, local councils responsible for local affairs—all government was essentially the central government.

A fourth feature of the inherited administrative system was its stratification based on racial lines, although after the Holmes Commission of 1948 this stratification had been modified, with the merging of the separate civil services.²¹ Up to 1948 there were very few Africans, if any, in the top strata of the service; this was occupied by Europeans, with Asians occupying the middle level, and Africans occupying the bottom. Communications across the color line were minimal, and those in senior positions surrounded themselves with a myth of superiority that exerted a lasting impact on relationships within the service, even long after the top positions had been occupied by Africans.

The tasks of independence included, among other things, the facilitation of economic development, the transformation of the socioeconomic legacy, the welding of a single united nation from a number of ethnic groups, the maintenance of territorial integrity, etc., and had to be carried out by an administrative system possessing the features that we have noted in the preceding paragraphs. There was agreement then that the system left a lot to be desired, especially insofar as it needed to be made more responsive and a little more participatory, and it had to be domi-

nated by Africans. But as will be seen later, the government of independent Kenya was to pursue policies that approached socioeconomic transformation a little more cautiously than its two southern neighbors. In these circumstances, therefore, an administrative system similar to the one the country had inherited at independence was, to a significant extent, considered by the government to be just right. All that needed to be done to it, as far as most policymakers thought, was to localize it and ensure that it was more efficient through reorganization, training, and development.

2. The Administrative Legacy in Zambia

The pacification exercise in Zambia was, as in the case of Kenya, fairly smooth, with BSA rule meeting resistance only from the Ngoni, who were, however, soon made to surrender after several bloody battles in 1897 and 1898. The subsequent concern of the Company (BSA) was to maintain law and order at minimal expense, hence the public administration system consisted of little more than the native commissioners posted by the central government throughout the territory, and charged with the responsibility of collecting taxes and keeping the population pacified. To discharge their responsibilities, native commissioners were given magisterial powers and the use of district messengers and civil police. The task of field administration during this time has been well described by E. Knowles Jordan in his reminiscences about his work as an assistant native commissioner in Namwala in the first decade of the century. He summarizes his duties as consisting of four activities: (a) collecting taxes; (b) ending cattle raids; (c) supervising traditional systems of justice; and (d) halting the slave trade.

The Company also laid the foundation for future economic development by building the railroad linking present-day Zambia to the south, which facilitated the settling in and farming in adjacent lands by European settlers.

Company rule ceased in 1924, but by that time the initial work of establishing colonial rule was virtually complete. Violent forms of resistance to the forces of colonialism had ceased. Armed conflict between African groups and the slave raiders had already ended. An administrative system had been established and was at least minimally operative. Copper was discovered about the same time, and the British South Africa Company came to concentrate its energies on mining the ore, with the colonial administration doing the job of facilitating the development of the mining industry. Government involvement consisted of the establishment of laws and taxation policies that gave the company the latitude and assistance they needed to extract the copper most profitably. The government ensured an adequate supply of labor through taxation regulations that made

it necessary for the Africans to seek employment in the mines so as to earn cash with which to pay taxes.

The expansion of the mining industry and the rapid rise in the demand for food by the labor force in the mines demanded that adequate measures be taken to facilitate the development of a complimentary agricultural system. The period after 1930 saw the colonial administration taking steps to encourage the immigration of European farmers and the provision of the help needed to achieve high rates of production. This assistance soon developed its own independent *raison d'être*, with help being given to European settlers for purposes of producing to meet demands beyond the mining industry market.

The effect of this emphasis on copper mining, and the primacy of white settler interests, retarded and discouraged economic development involving Africans and of the subsequent supportive administrative infrastructure. At times, Africans aspiring to participate in the cash economy were actively discouraged. Frequently they were disadvantaged in that the bulk of public resources for development was channeled to the European community. This was to severely handicap Zambia's postcolonial development efforts.

A final development that had its imprint on the character of Zambia's administrative legacy was the ten-year sojourn in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As white rule and supremacy became threatened by developments in India, Ghana, and Kenya, the white population in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland opted for the creation of a Federation linking up the three territories—a move that, it was hoped, could preserve their predominance. The ten years saw the development of policies and an administrative infrastructure that not only subordinated the interests of Africans even more in all the three countries but was also to subordinate the interests of Zambia-based European business activities in favor of Southern Rhodesia. These factors, then, were very much to shape the pattern of public administration that developed during the colonial period. What then were the major characteristics of Zambia's administrative system as it attained independence?²²

Due to the twin function of the colonial government, which were maintenance of law and order and the facilitation of economic development, essentially involving the development of the copper industry and related activities, the administrative structure of Zambia essentially consisted of two types of organizational units. The first type was provincial administration responsible in a specified geographical area for the collection of taxes, the supervision of the traditional legal system, and the maintenance of law and order—they had at their disposal a corps of civil police. The second type were technical departments responsible for the provision of professional expertise needed for the operation of government in such fields as mining, agriculture, health, education, public works, etc. Dur-

ing the initial period of colonial rule the administrative system was dominated by the provincial administration, essentially because the pacification activities were then more intense. As the years sped by, however, and especially when copper mining became a predominant activity and the white settler community expanded, the number of expertise units increased both at the headquarters as well as in the field. And as the government encouraged white farmer immigration after 1930 in order to increase food production for the mines, the size of agricultural, veterinary, and public works field units expanded correspondingly.

Ideally technical departments and provincial administration in a given area were to operate separately and independently. In effect, however, the operations of technical departments and provincial administration tended to be complimentary to each other. In order to combine the intellectual resources of technical departments and provincial administration, both were responsible to the chief secretary, who was the head of the civil service and the chief official adviser to the governor.

In spite of this differentiation of functions and expertise, which was the norm in almost all British colonies, provincial administration was considered to be *primus inter pares* with regard to other components of the administrative system. Its primacy was in part due to the general responsibilities that these officers had for ensuring good government and order, which gave them overall supervision over all aspects of administration in their areas.

The predominance of white settlers, however, necessitated another modification in the relationship between the technical departments and the provincial administration, based on the specialized knowledge of each. Technical departments in most other territories, including Tanzania, as we shall see later, worked to provide services to the entire population, in the process of which they came into contact with provincial administration. In Zambia, however, technical departments worked primarily to provide services to the European population, while provincial administration was charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order among Africans. Except for the fact that maintenance of law and order in many cases meant ensuring that the needs of the European community were met, there was little occasion for contact and coordination between the two sets of agencies.

The absence of coordination was not only notable in respect to provincial administration and field-based technical departments but was a major characteristic of colonial administration in Zambia generally. There was no agency in place that could exercise central control and coordination over the various units within the bureaucracy. From time to time coordinating units were established to direct the efforts of several agencies, either in specific policy areas or across a wide range of responsibilities. These structures were severely handicapped, however, in that they were

never given the power and authority required to command the respect of reluctant bureaucratic units.²³ Thus a major feature of the colonial administration in Zambia was its structural fragmentation. Departments enjoyed a great amount of autonomy and were not subject to control by a central body—either from within the bureaucracy or from outside—and attempts to impose control on them tended to meet resistance. The absence of a control and coordination agency, though problematic, may not have caused very serious constraints during the colonial period, since the colonial government never made any serious attempts to work for balanced economic growth. However, a newly independent government committed to such a strategy had to do something about the building of such institutions.

The nature and character of the new establishment was, again, very much influenced by the character of colonial administration in Zambia, and, like the bureaucracy, the size, structure, and composition of the establishment was heavily influenced by the major considerations of the colonial government, which were: initially to pacify the territory; later to facilitate the development of the mining industry; and as the 1950s approached, to maintain white hegemony.

Table 1.1 presents the growth of the civil service in Zambia up to the time of independence. The pattern of growth demonstrated by the table indicates the priorities of a colonial society with a substantial white community.

As mentioned earlier, top priority was initially given to the task of pacification, i.e., maintaining law and order among the African population, and as such the staff of provincial administration composed half of

TABLE 1.1
Growth of Zambian civil service staff (selected departments)

	1904	1914	1927	1931	1935	1940	1949	1954	1963
Agriculture	7	4	11	26	12	21	51	128	246
Veterinary	0	9	24	37	29	39	41	65	122
Public works	8	5	33	98	11	58	266	912	950
Health	0	28	36	61	61	84	186	368	
African education	0	0	5	16	18	21	51	112	441
Provincial administration	56	99	112	121	107	129	200	250	625
Total civil service	122	265	439	789	569	827	1,919	4,169	5,449

Source: Northern Rhodesia *Staff Lists* for the years as cited, by D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Services: Entrepreneurship and Development Administration* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), 24.

the entire bureaucracy. As the pacification exercise was well under way and the European settler population grew, the provincial administration staff represented an increasingly smaller proportion of the total civil service establishment. The bulk of administrative resources was used to serve the interests and welfare of the Europeans. Dennis Dresang notes, for example, that at the time of the inauguration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, there were more civil servants serving the health needs of Europeans than the combined total of civil servants in the provincial administration and the Department of African Education, at a time when the ratio of the black population to the white was 62:1.²⁴

This white-oriented civil service was, moreover, very heavily dominated by the whites, with Africans occupying very junior posts in the service, which was, again, divided along racial lines into two divisions—European and African. The European civil service was organized along the lines of the British administrative service (Whitehall model) with administrative, professional, and technical career streams, each being hierarchically structured with minimum educational requirements that had to be met before one could be appointed to positions at various levels within the career stream. The African civil service was divided into a junior and a senior service. The former required little qualifications, as it consisted of messengers, guards, and clerks. The senior service included such posts as adult education assistants, urban court registrars, dispensary assistants, etc.

The significance of these racial divisions was not so much in the differences in conditions of services and salaries but in the congruence between racial divisions and the levels of administrative responsibility. The fact that only members of the European civil service were eligible for higher posts in the administrative system meant that the benefits of authority and status attached to these positions were the exclusive property of the ruling minority in colonial Zambia. Africans were never allowed into these posts until 1955 when theoretically all service posts were opened to all suitably qualified people, irrespective of color, and tentative steps were taken to create a unified public service to replace the existing racially stratified divisions. But because of the dearth of Africans with the required qualifications and experience, the translation of this opening up into reality had to take a number of years.

When Zambia attained independence in 1964, therefore, the number of Africans occupying positions in divisions I and II were 2,462 out of an establishment of 9,652, or 25 percent, or if one took into account the fact that more than half the established positions were vacant, due to the flight of Europeans as a result of independence, Africans occupied only about 45 percent of existing staff strength. Thus the Zambian public service was not only unhealthily dependent on European personnel, it was also critically short of personnel since so many senior level positions were left va-

cant. This situation was to greatly constrain the country's ability to meet the socioeconomic challenges of independence.

3. Tanzania's Administrative Legacy

Unlike Kenya and Zambia, Tanzania's colonial experience was not marked by the presence of a sizable white settler community, although there were a few settlers in the northern and southern highlands. Secondly, British suzerainty over Tanzania was part of a League of Nations' (later United Nations) mandate; and the British government was expected to prepare the protectorate for eventual independence. Thirdly, and as a result of the manner in which the territory was acquired, there was not much pacification to be done by Britain, such activities having been completed by the Germans long before they lost the territory to Britain.

The system of administration that emerged, therefore, though resembling those of Zambia and Kenya in that it had a provincial administration responsible for the maintenance of law and order, with departments providing expertise service to the government machinery, was never as elaborate and as centralized as in the two countries. The pillar of the system was, of course, provincial administration, with a string of provincial commissioners, district commissioners, and district officers, but their number remained small and they covered large areas of jurisdiction. The territory, so vast in size, about 341,150 square miles with nine million people, was divided into nine administrative provinces with a total of fifty-seven districts. Many of the administrative chores fell on the shoulders of indigenous tribal chiefs, who had been incorporated into the colonial administrative system through the indirect rule system, formulated and first tried in Northern Nigeria.²⁵ Over time, the government came to encourage the coming together of several chiefs in certain districts into native authorities, institutions that came to be responsible for maintaining law and order and the provision of a range of services, all of which were financed largely from local resources.²⁶ Provincial administration officers controlled their areas through the supervision of the activities of these native authorities. Thus, although provincial administration remained the ruler in the rural countryside, the system of indirect rule ameliorated their omnipotence.²⁷ To the ordinary subject of the "Empire," his day-to-day contact was with the chief, whose source of legitimacy, in most cases, did not necessarily spring from the colonial regime but from tradition and custom.

Besides the provincial administration, there were a number of departments with offices in the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, as well as in the provinces and districts, dealing with specific functions. Unlike the case of Zambia, however, almost all of these departments were established to cater to African interests, or were at least dealing with Africans.²⁸ The number of departments, as well as their sizes, increased as the government became

increasingly involved in socioeconomic development. Before World War II, most technical departments were very small in size; provincial administration had the biggest establishment. After the war, when the need for increased production in all the colonies became emphasized, technical units started to expand; and this was particularly true of agriculture. Thus by 1959 the establishment of the agricultural department alone had expanded and surpassed that of the provincial administration.

Because both the technical departments and provincial administration were involved with the same people in the field, and also because the latter had a much more extended presence, the preeminence of provincial administration was very much acknowledged by all parties, and, therefore, provincial and district commissioners were accepted as the leaders of all governmental activities in their respective areas. This was true also for the local governments, known as district and town councils, which by the time of independence had been established through elections. The officers of the provincial administration spoke for the central government on all matters of general policy, and they were given overall responsibility for the progress and welfare of the people under their administration, including the guidance of local authorities along the path of development.

When independence came in 1961, therefore, the machinery of government consisted of a long-established, well-trying, and relatively well staffed provincial organization of central government, existing side by side with a number of rural local authorities whose inadequacies were glaring by comparison. Local authorities had evolved out of the system of the native authorities. Individual chiefs and other rulers had given way to semi-representative councils seeking to provide social and other services as well as collect revenues and keep the peace. Both the central and local government organizations had been transformed over the years of British colonial rule from simple into more complex mechanisms by the growing pressures of change and development.

At the center, "the member system," under which the civil service heads of technical departments took charge of their departments and were coordinated and directed by the governor assisted by the chief secretary, gave way to a ministerial organization under the leadership of the chief minister, with the civil service heads of ministries being designated permanent secretaries. The chief secretary held sway in Dar-es-Salaam, while the provincial commissioner and district commissioner held sway in their respective provinces/districts.²⁹ The grouping of governmental activities under ministries had, as in the cases of Zambia and Kenya, been done to facilitate the execution of colonial objectives, although toward the end of colonialism these objectives may have had some development traits.

An even more dissatisfying characteristic of the inherited bureaucracy was its being dominated in the middle and upper levels by Asians and Europeans, with Africans occupying only the junior positions. Out of 4,378

established middle and senior posts, Africans occupied only 547 (12 per cent), the majority occupying middle-grade positions. The situation was exacerbated by the paucity of facilities for training personnel to fill these senior positions even after the decision to open up the service to all races. As is well known, at the time of independence the country had no university, no institute for training administrators, and no polytechnic for the training of professional staff. The few Africans who had trained and were still undergoing training at professional levels had done so outside the country. The manpower problem was, moreover, accentuated by the sudden departure of a large number of colonial civil servants who had, as the country attained independence, opted to retire on pension from the service rather than work under "uncertain conditions" in independent Tanzania.³⁰ Two years after independence, therefore, about 21 per cent of all established posts at the senior and middle levels in the service were vacant despite the crash efforts at Africanization.³¹

What the foregoing has indicated is that the Tanzanian administrative system had to undergo immense organizational and structural improvements in order to be able to successfully shoulder the major responsibilities of an independent state.

III. CONCLUSION

What, in a nutshell, can one say about the context within which the governments of Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania took measures to reform their public administration systems? The inherited socioeconomic situation was very undesirable in all three countries; and the political environment dictated that the independent governments take serious steps to redress this undesirable situation. In Kenya and Zambia, more than in Tanzania, however, the colonial experience had led to the emergence of strong forces that could resist any measures aimed at significantly altering the character of the inherited socioeconomic system. A strong public administration system was needed, therefore, if these forces were to be thwarted.

In all three countries, however, the administrative system itself required major surgery, as it was either designed to serve the interests of the entrenched groups or was dominated by members of the entrenched minority groups or both. It was an administrative system that had been designed to serve the interests of colonialism. If the independent governments of Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania were interested in pursuing objectives that were, in any way, different from those of the departing colonialists, changes or reforms were therefore imperative. In the chapters that follow, an attempt is made to review each of these countries' efforts to reform their public administration systems, after first reviewing the concept of adminis-

trative reforms and a number of related issues that can give us a common ground from which to compare the efforts of the three countries.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of dualism, see B. Higgins, *Economic Development* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1959), 275-344.
2. For a review of Kenya's socioeconomic profile at independence, see H. Bienen, "The Economic Development," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).
3. For much of what follows in this section, I rely on the World Bank, *The Economic Development of Kenya*, Report of a World Bank Mission (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).
4. For a discussion of the Mau Mau uprising and the relevant land considerations, see D. Barnett and K. Njama, *Mau Mau from Within* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966; see also J. Nottingham, C. Rosberg, and M. P. K. Sorenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967).
5. World Bank, *The Economic Development of Kenya*, 14.
6. For this review of Zambia's socioeconomic legacy, I rely on J. Fry, "The Zambian Economy," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 43-67.
7. The impact of UDI on Zambia, as well as the country's response to it, is treated in R. L. Sklar, "Zambia's Response to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976).
8. R. L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 37.
9. For a discussion of the mandate and its earlier version, the trust territory, see R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), chap. 1.
10. See H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Enlarged edition; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 112.
11. For a discussion of some of the efforts to propel the sector into modernity, see G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
12. W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), Intro.
13. For a discussion of the legacy of African public administration, see F. G. Burke, "Public Administration in Africa: The Legacy of Inherited Colonial Institutions" (Paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Brussels, 18-23 September 1967).
14. For more details, see G. Hyden, "Basic Civil Service Characteristics," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 3-23.
15. Law and order problems had intensified during this period, as figures show that from 1952 to 1957, 419,000 arrests were made in Kenya, a country with a population of under

- nine million at the time. See A. W. Southall, "The Growth of Urban Society," in S. Diamond and F. Burke, eds., *The Transformation of East Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 463-93.
16. The percentage of Kikuyu and Embu in the total labor force fell from 47 percent to 22 percent between 1953 and 1956. The number of Luo, Luhya, and Kisii rose from 27 percent to 38 percent, and the number of Wakambas rose from 18 percent to 28 percent in Nairobi. *Ibid.*
 17. Thomas Mulusa shows that in 1952 there was one district commissioner and two district officers in the Kiambu district. In 1956, there was one district commissioner, twenty-six district officers, and eleven district assistants. See T. Mulusa, "Local Administration" in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 212-230.
 18. The discussion and data presented relies heavily on C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), 20-39, 166-73 and also G. Hyden, J. Okumu and R. Jackson, *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, esp. G. Hyden, "Basic Civil Service Characteristics" 3-32 and H. Bienen, "Economic Environment."
 19. For a complete discussion of the provincial administration, see C. Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 4, no. 3 (November 1966): 201-15.
 20. The consequence of this phenomenon has been that, unlike in many African countries where the political-administrative dichotomy was resolved in favor of the politicians, in Kenya the civil service, especially provincial administration, holds a very strong card against the politicians. See J. Okumu, "Socio-Political Setting," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 30; and J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).
 21. *Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zanzibar* (His Majesty's Service Overseas [HMSO]), London, 1948.
 22. For much of the following discussion on the characteristics of Zambia's administrative system, I rely on D. Dresang and R. Young, "The Public Service," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia* and on D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service: Entrepreneurship and Development Administration* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975).
 23. Dennis Dresang gives an account of the various attempts to establish such authority and the problems that were encountered. See D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*, 88-92.
 24. *Ibid.*, 94.
 25. For a discussion of the principles of indirect rule and its practical application in Tanganyika, see R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika*, 40-54.
 26. See S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968) chap. 7.
 27. R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika*, 42.
 28. See W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania*. This is not to suggest that the interests of the small number of white settlers were catered for on the same level with those of the Africans. Where the white population and Asian population's interests demanded, a separate organizational unit was usually set up. For more details on this, see H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation*, 4.

29. I am not, of course, saying that the phenomenon of bureaucratic fragmentation did not exist at all in colonial Tanzania, rather, I am saying that it was a less significant problem than in Zambia, mainly because of the absence of a strong white community to exert clientele pressures on technical departments in the former country.
30. The recommendation of a commission of inquiry, chaired by Amishadan Adu, had proposed that officers be helped to retire to create room for Africanization. But the "exodus" that followed was not anticipated or desired. For more on this, see A. Adedeji, *The Tanzanian Civil Service: A Decade After Independence* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1975).
31. Ibid.

On Reform in Public Administration: The State of the Art and Practical Implications for Africa

This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual backdrop to the study by first reviewing the literature on the subject of administrative reform in general, and in Africa in particular, and, secondly, the relationship of some of the theoretical and conceptual issues raised therein to Africa's administrative reform experience.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM MOVEMENT

Although reform in public administration as an activity has existed since time immemorial, theoretical and conceptual focuses on the phenomenon date only from the end of the last century.¹ Interest in formulating reform strategies arose out of the growing complexity of governmental activity, which in turn prompted men of ideas to feel that the new approaches, which were becoming increasingly used in the management of business and industry, could be gainfully adapted and adopted to the running of government.² In the United States it was Woodrow Wilson (28th U.S. president) and others who at the turn of this century, unhappy with the corrupt and inefficient spoils system, advocated a number of administrative reform measures including the elimination of the spoils system and the institution of a meritorious system.³ In Germany, Max Weber had earlier written about the need to adopt rational systems for running and operating governmental organizations. During the early years of the scientific management movement, which was spearheaded by Frederick Taylor in the United States and Henri Fayol of France, there were some spillovers of reform ideas from industry and business to governmental organizations at the practical level, but much of the theoretical and conceptual focus remained fixed on the use of scientific methods in improving business and industrial concerns.⁴

The depression of the twenties and thirties, and the subsequent efforts to recover from it, was to force some thinking on ways of organizing and operating government, as much as it was to attract thought on the role and scope of governmental activity. In the United States, for exam-

ple, a number of scholars studied how some novel public organizations, like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which had been formed to spearhead recovery from the depression, were operating, the lessons from such organizations and their operations thus being documented.⁵ World War II was also to occasion further thought on ways and means of organizing governmental activities for effective performance.⁶ It was British engineers who, while thinking of ways of fighting the war more effectively, came up with operations research as a management tool. Soon operations research came to be adopted to improve efficiency not only in government but in industry and commerce as well.

Much of the effort to improve the administrative system, however, remained very fragmented. Apart from the early efforts during the Woodrow Wilson era in the United States, there was no other public administration reform movement anywhere in the world during the period before World War II. The attainment of independence by many third world countries in the fifties and sixties, however, ushered in a new era. All of a sudden a number of countries with immense problems that required the attention of well-equipped public administration systems joined the international community. The governments of these countries; international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Labor Organization; many of the older states; and many individuals in both old and new states began to devote time and attention to thinking about how to make the administrative systems of these new countries more capable and able to cope with the problems and opportunities ushered in by independence.⁷

From the efforts of these groups, there developed an intellectual movement focusing on this phenomenon, which involved administrative practitioners in third world countries, development economists, consultants on public administration problems based mainly in the industrialized countries, professors in universities and institutes, as well as officials of aid organizations. In due course, the movement was nicknamed the "development administration" movement, representing a subarea within the broad discipline of public administration.⁸ The ideas of this movement were disseminated through the medium of books and journals, such as the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, *The Journal of Administration Overseas*, *The Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, etc. The focus of discussion for this movement related to the context of reform, the processes and meaning of administrative reform, as well as numerous case studies on the reform efforts of some of the developing countries.

More recently, after so many years of unsuccessful efforts at administrative reform under the banner of the "development administration" movement, disillusionment set in and fresh efforts using different sets of measures are being attempted. While the "development administration" movement has had its ups and downs and has shifted ground both on what it focuses on and its composition, it is still the most important source

of intellectual discourse on the subject of administrative reform and will continue to be so for a long time.

II. THE MEANING OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

When people use the term administrative reform there is a tendency to assume a commonly shared view of its meaning. However, a closer examination of the way the concept is used shows considerable variation.⁹ On the one hand, it is used synonymously with administrative change, describing all types of important revisions of administrative practices, organizations, procedures, and processes that all administrative organizations engage in on a regular basis.¹⁰ Defined in this way, there are no time frames, no limitations on scope and directions, and no normative implications. Any reorganization, behavioral changes, and changes in procedures would qualify as administrative reforms under this definition.¹¹

On the other hand, administrative reform is used in a meaning that is distinct from administrative change. Gerald Caiden distinguishes administrative reform from administrative change, the latter being a self-adjusting response to fluctuating conditions. Administrative reform is, according to Caiden, "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance."¹² To Caiden, the need for reform is occasioned by malfunctioning in the self-adjusting processes of administrative change. When conceived this way, reform is distinguished from administrative change in several other ways. First, the changes under reforms are sizable in scope; they involve what A. F. Leemans calls "reorganization of broad scope and high intensity."¹³ Secondly, again as Leemans would say, "reform" has a latent apostolic meaning, generally identified with improvement or the creation of "good administration," and consequently suggesting a clearly normative taint.¹⁴ Thirdly, it involves, as Yehezkiel Dror would say, directed change of the *main features* of an administrative system.¹⁵ This definition presupposes the existence of a continuum between administrative improvements, which can be used synonymously with administrative change, and administrative reforms, the exact borderline between the two depending on one's perception of what the main features of an administrative system are.¹⁶

The conception of administrative reform as a category separate from "change" has a number of problems, however. The first involves the question of whether or not it is possible to distinguish, in real life, between changes in the administrative machinery, processes, and procedures and changes in the organization of the political executive organs.¹⁷ Is the dichotomy, which is itself based on the traditional conception of the separation politics and administration, borne out by the administrative reform experiences of many countries?

Many of the so-called administrative reforms have implied immense changes in the structure and processes of political organs also.¹⁸ This in no way suggests, however, that there are no administrative reforms that have little or no political dimension. One may study such reforms, but such a focus would miss many important elements. Our study in any case, reviews administrative reforms that may be difficult to distinguish from political system reforms. So, while accepting the Dror-Caiden conceptualization as our working definition, we do so with a proviso: our conception of administration is broad enough to include some elements of the political system.

Again, the Caiden-Dror definition has another problem insofar as the objective of this study is concerned. The problem lies in what was referred to earlier as its latent apostolicism, in which reform is generally viewed in normative terms as improvement or the creation of "good administration." Although this is in line with the objectives of many administrative reforms, including most of those that will be reviewed in this study, some administrative reforms have no other purpose than to realign power relations in organizations or in the community, and this may be attained through methods that might seem to be fostering "bad administration."¹⁹ Additionally, a normative definition requires that the norms for "improvement" and the yardsticks for measuring them be explicated, but many times these are lacking in many reform efforts, and in our own case we will not be able to establish them.²⁰ On the basis of these considerations, therefore, in this study the term "administrative reform" will be used mainly to refer to *all consciously induced and directed reorganizations in the machinery of government.*

III. EARLY REFORMS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE OLDER COUNTRIES

In discussing administrative reform in the latter part of the twentieth century, there is the false notion that it is a phenomenon that has just come around, that many of the societies in the past ten thousand years, since man began to seriously organize his life in communities, never bothered to consciously induce improvements in their machineries of government. This is not quite true; as was noted in a major study on the phenomenon, man has always strived to improve the machinery of his government.²¹

In the older states of Europe and America, the reform process took two broad stages.²² The first stage, which coincided with the passing of the traditional society and the coming onto the scene of the industrial revolution, started at the beginning of the eighteenth century and involved the transformation of simple, undifferentiated state instruments into the complex machinery of the industrial state that we know of today. Insofar

as the state was involved only minimally in the regulation of the activities of its citizens, the need for an elaborate machinery did not arise, and therefore governments could make do with a relatively simple administrative machinery. The second stage, which dates from the beginning of the twentieth century, has been concerned with ensuring that the machinery in place performs efficiently and effectively.

Concerted efforts to evolve a machinery of government that was complex and had great capacity and capability dates from the time when the church, aristocracy, and the burghers acknowledged the monarch's role in temporal matters; and the "idea of the reasonable will of a single super person, who, as God's vice-regent, connects and constitutes a community under a scheme of order which he creates, and for the realization of which he appoints a government and an administration"²³ became accepted. The process of organizational differentiation, as well as greater complexity in the machinery of government, intensified in the period that followed soon after, as monarchs lost their absolute power and progressively ceded all responsibilities for community governance to the major social classes, including the landed gentry and the bourgeoisie.²⁴

In due course a number of developments, including great growth in population, the industrial revolution, increasing urbanization, and expanded international and maritime commerce, demanded that the state expand its functions even more. Communal services were taken over from the church, the nobility, and the burghers; and public administration became more noticeable as the state demanded more from its citizens in return for its fast-growing services. Clear chains of command and accountability became established, and regional units became created to link the center with the localities. The state bureaucracy became subjected to the law, and as public law developed, special bodies were created to adjudicate between the aggrieved citizen and the public official representing the impersonal power of the state.²⁵

Accompanying these functional and structural reforms were financial reforms. Up till then, there was no record of revenue collected, how it was spent, or who spent it. Once the state assumed responsibility for functions that were previously contracted out, a more accurate picture of income and expenditure was possible, and accounting officers were held responsible for funds under their custody.

These reform processes and others took a long time to complete; it is suggested two hundred years.²⁶ Gerald Caiden suggests, and rightly so, that some of the older countries of Europe have not completed the reform process yet, while others, like Russia, skipped a stage or two and leaped into political revolution.²⁷ The process of reform definitely differed from country to country, with each country going through its own cycle and adopting the attributes of a modern public administration system at its own pace.

Three distinct groups of countries can be discerned, however, with regard to the methods adopted in effecting reforms.²⁸ The first group, consisting of France and Russia, used mainly revolutionary methods in effecting reforms: administrative reforms being considered to be an essential part of sweeping reforms in the polity. The second group of countries, which included Great Britain and Prussia, reformed their administrative systems in an evolutionary manner. Most of their reforms were concessionary, i.e., they were inevitable if the regime was to survive in war and revolutions; their reforms were pragmatic and empirical, lacking ideological motivation. The third group of countries can be represented by the United States of America, which, having started with a new state, had an opportunity of creating a new organization, adopting the latest methods and insisting on the highest performance standards.²⁹

The older states were to experience yet another administrative reform thrust distinct from that of the earlier transformation phase. This was aimed at making the machinery of governments, which had been developed over time, work more efficiently and effectively. This new thrust derived its inspiration largely from the scientific management movement, which had been pioneered by engineers and industrialists from the late nineteenth century. Through the efforts of this movement, a number of ideas and principles on how to cope with the problems of control and coordination, which of necessity were accompanying the emerging complex organization, came to be suggested. The traditional rule-of-thumb methods of management and organization ceased to be adequate, and new scientifically based approaches took their place.

It was the Americans who provided the leadership for much of this managerial revolution. This is true of both the scientific management movement as well as the later caveats into the human behavior aspects of management. Thus the big names in scientific management, such as Frederick Taylor, famous for "Time Study"; Henry Gantt known for developing the "Gantt Chart"; and many others, were American, although French and German engineers also made some contribution.³⁰ In Britain, however, this movement did not make its mark for quite some time. It was not until after the World War I that some British industrial leaders got together to encourage the application of scientific methods of management.³¹ Even John Lewis, who is often credited with pioneering the scientific management movement in Britain, was not initially concerned with developing scientific management principles, rather he worked on "the relationship between engineering and scientific bookkeeping."³² This late development of scientific management ideas in Britain was to be reflected in the management improvement strategies adopted by the country's public administration system.

Though it eventually adapted some of the scientific management methods to its public administration system, Britain was at first slow and

cautious over them.³³ Its approach to improving public administration to cope with the complex problems of organization and management, which had in turn been brought about by the rapid expansion in the scope of government, had been equally slow and cautious. Thus the scope of organization and management (O&M) activities in the British civil service was for several years highly restricted in comparison to the scope of O&M activities in the United States.³⁴ France, like Britain, was slow in adopting modern scientific management techniques, whereas Germany and Russia (after the 1917 revolution) were fast in taking advantage of developments in industry to improve their public administration systems.

In fact, on the basis of the experiences of the public administration systems of the industrial countries, two broad, dissimilar approaches to administrative improvement can be noted. The first is of a consolidative nature, while the second is mainly innovative.³⁵ The first approach is restricted in scope: it responds rather than anticipates crises, and it aspires toward minimum change in organization. On the other hand, the second approach is wider in scope, relatively forward-looking, and is oriented towards maximum possible change in organization. Britain and many countries of southern Europe can be grouped under the consolidative approach; whereas the United States, Russia, and Germany can be grouped under the innovative approach.

The differences in approach between these groups of countries was not accidental but was due to several factors.³⁶ The first factor is partly historical and partly ecological. The United States as a country is a product of adventure and there was always the urge to conquer and tame something new. Survival meant adventure, innovation, and invention. Similarly, Soviet Russia was a product of a violent revolution in which tradition was destroyed. Opening up new vistas was therefore natural. On the other hand, with a long tradition, culture, and history, Britain had a reason for wanting to protect what it had already attained. What it needed most was order and security. Indeed, one might say that the opting for the consolidative approach by Britain was not so much a matter of choice—the long traditions, history, and culture already referred to could not have been conducive to the adoption of any other approach. Pragmatism was therefore not only the best course of action but the only course of action.

The second factor, which might account for countries like Russia and Germany falling under the innovative category is the magnitude of the problems facing public administration systems in the two sets of countries. The countries that adopted the innovative strategy did not do so only because of pressures—they had no choice but to do so. Either the public administration systems had to be developed to handle diverse activities that would otherwise be left unattended to or the systems that were then in force were obviously inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt and had to be changed. In the United States, for example, the development of a

career service took a long time; and by the time reform action was being proposed it was no longer an innovation but an imperative. President Franklin Roosevelt, recognizing the gravity of the situation, declared that liberal democracy was in danger of being disrupted by inefficiency in public administration:

Our struggle now is against confusion, against ineffectiveness, against waste and inefficiency. This battle . . . must be won, unless it is to be said that in our generation national self-government broke down and was frittered away in bad management.³⁷

Public administration in Britain and the other (traditionally-oriented) countries did not face similar pressures. The systems that were operating had been tried for some time and there was a feeling that they were working adequately. If anything, it was felt they would be subjected to minor surgeries.

In reviewing the first set of reforms adopted by the older states, we noted that the process took a long time and success was varied among countries. The adoption of the organizational-improvement reforms in the same countries has not been any easier; indeed, success has been as varied as it was with the earlier reforms.³⁸ Some of the countries, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, to name but a few, have had as many problems as developing countries not only in the adoption of organizational improvement technologies and methods but also in carrying out systematic transformation of the governmental machinery.³⁹

The foregoing review of administrative reform in the older countries reveals a number of issues that have implications for the analysis of the administrative reform efforts in Africa. First, as noted earlier, these countries invariably went through two separate stages of reforms in their government machinery. During the first stage, which was at times painful and very long—at least three hundred years in the case of Britain, the concern was with the creation and development of an administrative edifice, a machinery that could command legitimacy from everybody in the polity; and although considerations of efficiency and economy were to increasingly surface, they were never of prime consideration. By the time concern turned to economy, efficiency, citizen participation, and the like, the administrative machinery was already firmly established. Reform, therefore, was approached sequentially.

Secondly, the reform measures adopted in the industrialized countries in both stages were homegrown—they were born out of the socio-economic developments that were taking place in the respective societies. This is particularly true of the transformational phase.

Thirdly, as has already been said, the level of success attained in each of the countries is varied. This is as true of countries like the United States, which adopted an innovative approach, as it is of countries like Britain,

which adopted the consolidative approach. Studies of more recent efforts to reform public administration in Britain, Germany, and America reveal that for a number of reasons the success attained has not been high.⁴⁰ The reasons for the inadequate success range from an environment that was not supportive of reform to a poor choice of reform technologies.⁴¹

IV. APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA

While it is true that the colonial powers undertook significant administrative reforms of both a transformational and ameliorative nature in their African colonies, it can also be validly argued that independence ushered in a new beginning for the administrative reform efforts in many African countries. Independence called into question the appropriateness of the entire machinery of government, which had been designed by the departing colonialists.⁴² There was an emotional attachment to the need for changing "the colonial machinery even if only for its own sake." Also, the objectives, and consequently the functions, of government were to change considerably with the attainment of independence, thus government activities increased in number, scope, and size.

The order of importance attached to the various activities also changed. The function that was completely new was the maintenance of sovereignty, this function having been exercised by the colonizing country. The furtherance of socioeconomic development, though previously part of the functions of the colonial government, was until then accorded low priority. It was now to be a major function of the newly independent governments, and the requisite machinery for this activity had to be devised. Another issue that till then had not come up was the maintenance of national integrity. During the colonial period, the different ethnic groups comprising the territory were not committed to the colonial territorial unit—their linkage to it was a matter of administrative convenience. Independence transformed the situation: all ethnic groups falling within the boundaries of the newly independent state were claimed by it as its citizens, and they were expected to feel a commitment to it as their country—a commitment transcending the one they held for their tribe. Machinery for carrying out this new activity had to be developed.

These new and expanded functions would tax any administrative system, let alone one that had been developed for purposes of shouldering less diversified and simpler functions. Meeting all of them at once, in most uncertain circumstances and with no past experience as a guide, the newly independent states could only grope their way through, reacting to events rather than controlling them according to an overall master plan.

While it is true to say that there has been great variation with regard to the various countries' experiences with reforms, these can nonetheless

be grouped into several discernible patterns.⁴³ On the one hand, the countries can be grouped according to their propensity toward reform; while on the other, they can be grouped on the basis of the types of reforms they have adopted.

With regard to the former, four patterns can be identified. At one extreme are a few countries that have shown no propensity toward reform. Such countries have made no pretense at administrative reform at all, either because the inherited colonial administrative machinery was deemed adequate for the tasks thrust upon them, or because, like the departing masters, they did not see the need for much change. A second group improvised reforms when the occasion warranted, adopting an approach that was pragmatic, relying on hunches and improvisation. Examples under this group include Malawi, and very often Kenya has been cited in this group. A third group includes those countries that have consciously planned reforms and established formal machinery for the initiation and evaluation of reforms. Such countries have established commissions of inquiry or ministries of administrative reform or have invited outside consultants to review overall administrative conditions. Examples of such countries include Tanzania, Zambia, the Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, and at times Kenya. At the other extreme is the fourth pattern, consisting of countries that have shown the greatest propensity toward reform. Many of these countries have established completely new institutions and machineries of government mainly because the previous machinery simply collapsed. Cases in point are Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia in 1974, and Guinea. It is not in any way being suggested that these four patterns are tight compartments; they represent fluid positions on a continuum, and a country's reform efforts can indeed be grouped under more than one pattern.

For the countries that have shown some propensity toward reform, the choice of reforms adopted have been equally varied. They can, however, be grouped into two major broad approaches and two minor approaches.

There is the approach that has been taken by those countries that have placed a lot of emphasis on the adoption of maximum structural and organizational changes, techniques, and methods throughout the administrative system. Under this approach administration tends to be defined narrowly: it is defined in procedural terms. Since the administrative system is deemed to have its own internal logic, malperformance should be corrected internally. Broad societal reform was not only considered irrelevant to administrative reform but there was also a bias in favor of maintaining the status quo. Many African countries went through a period when, both on their own initiative as well as through the efforts of donor agencies such as the United Nations and USAID, they adopted this approach as an official doctrine. Public administration principles and practice were exported from the developed world to these countries. Programs

of technical assistance in development administration multiplied. U.S. government project funding in this field, for example, totaled \$85 million (U.S.) between 1955 and 1963, going to fifteen African countries. In 1967 it was \$18 million, while in 1970 it was \$11.7 million. Those funds went into setting up local training institutions in public administration, with staff, training philosophies, methodologies, and material being imported. It also included training, in Western institutions, of top-level practitioners in these countries, as well as their potential successors. Liberally distributed scholarships attracted a whole generation of students from African countries for education in universities and specialized management institutions in America, followed by attachments in private and public organizations.⁴⁴

The substance of most of the training reflected a public administration discipline based essentially on the "principles" enunciated by Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick, and Frederick Taylor. This point has been summarized most succinctly by Milton Esman:

It consisted of a set of politically neutral techniques that could produce economy, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing policies and programmes sanctioned by responsible political leadership. It was not addressed to the controversial substance of policy, to politics, but to the most efficient process for carrying them out. As codified in the PODSCORB framework, American public administration was a technocratic science (1) universally applicable to all cultures, and (2) committed to rationalizing structures and procedures within the bureaucratic institution of the state.⁴⁵

In general, there was an optimism concerning the practical contribution of this approach to administrative improvement in the new states. This general optimism is underscored further by a document released by the United Nations in the early sixties. It said:

In order to accelerate the pace of development a concerted advance on all fronts, i.e., governmental organization and procedures, personnel management and training, budgeting and financial controls, fiscal policy and administration, etc., is more fruitful than a piecemeal approach on individual sections.⁴⁶

The second approach toward reform was adopted by those countries that placed emphasis on the need for broad societal development as opposed to the development of the administrative system. To this group, the administrative system is only a part of a wider system consisting of many interdependent subsystems. Each subsystem performs functions that affect and are, in turn, affected by the other subsystems.

The advocates of this approach believe that in the underdeveloped countries the administrative bureaucratic system is already overdeveloped

in relation to the other subsystems, and that it possesses a disproportionate share of skills and modern technology, which make it overshadow other social sectors.⁴⁷ It is further argued that whereas in developed polities the increase in bureaucratic strength, which results from administrative improvements, is counterbalanced by strong extrabureaucratic subsystems, the absence or weakness of such subsystems in new states makes administrative improvements reinforce the imbalance. In the absence of these balancing mechanisms, bureaucracies in these societies tend to behave unpredictably, and generally "irrationally," irrespective of whether they have been reformed or not.

Under these circumstances, stress should therefore be placed on the development of extrabureaucratic institutions, such as a strong political system, organized interest groups, a healthy economic system, as prerequisites for the emergence of an effective administration. The first few years of independence saw some African countries take efforts to develop and institutionalize these sets of institutions. Most effort went into the development of the party system or, indeed, to be exact, the single party system.⁴⁸ Thus from Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Sierra Leone on the west coast, to Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, and the Sudan on the east coast, the ruling party became the sole political party; and administrative-bureaucratic institutions were subordinated to it. The countries where this has been attempted with the most vigor, however, are those that attained independence following long periods of revolutionary activity. These are the countries that relied foremost on social mobilization and the development of institutions for that purpose. These include Mozambique; Angola; and, to some extent, Guinea, during the period of Sékou Touré.

In between the two extreme approaches, some countries have pursued reforms through two other minor approaches: the administrative-consolidative and the environmental-innovative approaches. The countries that have adopted the administrative-consolidative approach, while viewing administrative reform in purely organizational terms, are conscious of the enormity of the reform problem and will tend to take a cautious, selective approach to the spheres and areas to undertake reform in.

Their position is that, for some obvious reasons, Africa's capacity and capability are very low, and its array of technological skills are equally low and not widely diffused in society. This capacity and capability can only be built up, it is argued, over time, as the introduced reform measures become effective and eventually become internalized. It is further put forward that this development may be greatly facilitated when administrative reform is planned in such a way that one reform or set of reforms induces or compels decisions that result in additional reforms. Consequently, the proponents of this approach prescribe an "unbalanced structural growth" strategy, i.e., minimum structural reform in strategic and specially selected areas from which developments in other areas can be

"induced." Examples of "growth-inducing" structures are those responsible for financial and manpower allocations, as well as audit units. This approach was adopted during the late 1960s and early 1970s in some of the former British colonies, including Nigeria, Malawi, and Kenya, but it has not had a wide following.

The fourth minor approach, the environmental-innovative, would predicate the success of administrative reform measures on societal reform but is conscious of the enormity of the problems involved in reforming society and would tend to take a much more cautious approach to societal reform. Emphasis on land reform, political participation, enhanced economic development, etc., would tend to be encouraged, and development in those areas would generate conditions for improved performance in the public administration system.

It is obvious from the foregoing review of approaches and types of administrative reform that Africa was trying to telescope several hundred years of the older states' experience into two decades, at the same time adopting all the latest innovations. There is general agreement that they have not had much success. There is, however, not as much agreement concerning the explanation for their poor performance.

V. CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION

That Africa's experience with reforming its public administration machinery has not been as successful as its supporters might have wished is an acknowledged fact.⁴⁹ As mentioned above, there is not as much consensus on the explanation for this state of affairs. There are those critics who focus on the substantive reform measures, and point out that those adopted were inappropriate for the problems then facing the administrative systems.⁵⁰ On the other hand, there are those who, though not oblivious to the inappropriateness of the reforms adopted, concentrate on the implementation of the reforms. To this group, even if the reform measures adopted might have been appropriate, the strategies and methodologies adopted by many African countries in their implementation could not produce effective results.⁵¹

The first set of explanations are essentially a debate over the relative efficiency and effectiveness of the four approaches discussed in the last section. The balanced administrative approach, for example, is faulted for being overambitious and unrealistic. Africa, it is suggested, has neither the capacity and capability nor the economic resources to handle multiple and complex reforms. While on a theoretical level this point may be valid, there is little evidence to support it. Most African countries have only talked about the need to carry out comprehensive administrative reforms, as is evidenced by the many times it is mentioned in their respec-

tive five-year plans, but few have actually taken steps to do so.

On the other hand, there is the explanation that the ineffectiveness of administrative reform in Africa is in effect a consequence of an over-cautious and piecemeal approach to administrative improvement, the result of which measures adopted usually end up without a system-wide impact. What is needed, as we noted earlier, are extensive and complimentary centers of innovation, personnel systems, budgetary and fiscal procedures, planning processes, organization, and methods, which buy each other's products and take advantage of each other's external economies. A big push is needed to overcome tradition-bound administration. Much of the foregoing criticism against the unbalanced administrative system approach is not only theoretically valid but is supported empirically by the fact that this is the approach adopted by most African countries; and yet there is not much success to show for it, so many years after they have adopted it. Thus it is a common experience in many African countries that the benefits expected from organizational restructuring failed to materialize because the trained personnel to fill the new positions were not available. Instances have been noted where the adoption of computerized accounting systems lasted only for three months because the country did not have the foreign exchange to import the software. One can give endless examples of these types of dissonance that easily justify the criticism.

A more significant criticism of both the balanced and unbalanced administrative system approaches, however, is that they place too much concentration on developing the administrative system to the neglect of other elements of the social system. As a result, improvements in the administrative system may have taken place—the personnel may have acquired more knowledge and better skills, the organizational structures may be tidier, etc.—but in an environment that remains relatively underdeveloped; and as a result there is a dissonance between the administrative system and the other components of society. Any improvements so attained in the administrative system do not become noticeable insofar as the whole system is concerned; or if they do, they may be noticeable in their dysfunctional consequences. Frederick Riggs was among the first to explain the poor record in administrative reform and administrative performance along these lines. Reinhard Bendix, in his *Nation Building and Citizenship*, and Samuel Eisenstadt, in his *The Political System of Empires*, later came to corroborate Riggs on the essential points of his arguments. Goran Hyden sees ecological imbalance as a major explanation for Africa's dismal performance in development administration and administrative reform.⁵²

To correct this imbalance, proponents of the balanced-systems approach continue to argue, measures must be taken to strengthen other sectors of society at the same time that the administrative system is being improved. Indeed, in countries where the administrative system may have been very strong relative to other components of the societal system, it

might be necessary to strengthen those critical counterbalancing elements at the expense of the bureaucracy.

When one considers Africa's total experience with administrative reform, both explanations have some validity. Both emphasize the need for paying attention to environmental or ecological factors in reform actions. Gratian Lungu, writing about the decentralized administration in Zambia, identifies the neglect of this factor as an important variable in explaining the ineffectiveness of the effort. Dennis Rondinelli also brings corroborative evidence from the Sudan, and shows how a culture of nonparticipation among the population made it difficult for innovations to take root in that country.

We have indicated that some countries tried to deal with the problem of bureaucratic imbalance. This involved the speeding up of developments in the nonbureaucratic sectors and deemphasis of administrative development efforts. But the approach begged the question in most situations where it was tried, as it was not tried seriously. Irrespective of the disposition toward "bureaucracy" by other sectors of society in almost all African states, it was the only organization that possessed the skills, capacity, etc., to shoulder the tasks of development. A policy that freezes administrative development will in effect have disastrous consequences on the development process. In fact, the overdevelopment of the sociopolitical system in a period of bureaucratic inertia may lead to political decay rather than development. The adverse consequences of an overconcern with sociopolitical development is demonstrated by the problems that countries like Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola are presently facing. The three regimes' capacities to exert control over their entire polities, let alone carry on development, seem to be seriously in doubt partly due to such an approach.⁵³

All the foregoing explanations of the poor state of administrative reform efforts have some flaws, however. We can find evidence to demonstrate the limitations of each one of them. We can find evidence, for example, to show how lack of reform in one aspect of the administrative system frustrated some administrative reforms that were adopted. Equally, we can give illustrations of countries where reforms may have failed to become institutionalized because they were too numerous and too frequent and overweighed the capacity of the administrative system to handle them. Focus on the effectiveness of the four types of reforms adopted may therefore not be very useful.

It might be more useful to redirect our discussion to consideration of a different set of explanations—those for which the context is not forms of reforms adopted but instead focus on the effectiveness of the administrative reform process. These explanations, while conscious that administrative reforms may have been ineffective due to a poor choice of the forms they took, point out the importance of ensuring that the implementation

of the reforms is done properly. Gerald Caiden has this to say on the point:

Administrative reform has run into trouble the world over, not because the reforms have been wrong, the strategies incorrect or the reforms unqualified, but simply because there has been insufficient support for administrative reform, the reformers have not been strong enough to overcome overwhelming odds and once out of their hands their reforms have been emasculated.⁵⁴

Other scholars who have addressed themselves to this issue include such big names in organizational theory as Yehezkiel Dror, who, informed by earlier studies on policy-making and implementation, is interested in the aspect of reform strategy.⁵⁵ To Dror, in order for administrative reform to be successful, a number of measures ought to be taken and, at times, these should be taken in a certain order of preference. They should involve careful consideration of the objectives or goals of the reforms, which may include questions of scope or boundaries; careful consideration of the character of the reform environment, the extent to which it is potentially supportive of the proposed reforms and whether anything can be done about it; and, finally, questions of resources, funds, expertise, time, instrumentalities, etc. One combination of these elements may produce different results from another set. Reformers must therefore have a clear grasp of which combinations will produce optimal results. This has been a major problem with respect to administrative reform efforts in Africa to date.

It should be noted that there is, in a sense, some similarity between the position of Cohen and the systems approach to administrative reform considered earlier in this chapter, in the sense that both emphasize that reforms will only be successful if there is congruence between the reforms being suggested and the elements of the environment. However, partly because he is concerned with introducing reforms, Cohen notes that the reforms and the environment are in a dynamic relationship; and that they can condition and induce changes in each other. It is for this reason that he calls on reformers to employ the collaborative strategy to enhance the level of congruence. His concern is that many reform attempts have not actually done this; they have tried to introduce reforms by *fiat*, hence the low levels of effectiveness.

Not many theoretical studies focusing on Africa have addressed themselves to this issue; the few studies that there are are case studies of the reform experiences of some African countries. Both James Nti and Kwabena Owusu-Ansah, however, in their studies on Ghana's administrative reforms, point out how both the behavioral and strategic factors adversely affected Ghana's administrative reform efforts.⁵⁶ In Sudan, according to a study by Rondinelli, the decentralization efforts of the early seventies did not attain marked success because key central government

civil servants based in the capital were not adequately involved in the formulation and implementation of the reforms.⁵⁷ In the main, however, those concentrating on the problems related to reform implementation have ignored the two studies, tending to focus on explanations that deal with the substance or content of the reforms. This neglect is unfortunate since implementation has been the major bottleneck to African reform efforts, as the few studies that have addressed themselves to the issue show.

To sum up, Africa's efforts at reforming its machinery of government have been constrained by the prescription and adoption of inappropriate reforms, as much as by the poor and ineffective implementation of the reforms. As a result, many reforms that might have been appropriate were never properly implemented. This takes us back to the question raised earlier: given the magnitude of the task, the need to transform the machinery of government to handle the activities of a modern state in just two decades, while adopting all modern innovations and improvements, has Africa done very badly? Are these evaluations of Africa's performance in this area valid, given that the reform process has in effect only just started? We are in no way suggesting that we should not be monitoring the reform process, but only noting that many of the "judgments on Africa's failure" are intended to be not monitoring exercises but terminal evaluations. If one considers the time it has taken the industrialized world to effect administrative reform, then the time for valid conclusions on the effectiveness of Africa's efforts is yet to pass.

NOTES

1. G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 18. The review of the literature on administrative reform relies on this work, especially on its second chapter.
2. One of the earlier writers on administrative reform was Woodrow Wilson; see his "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* (July 1887):197-222. In addition to Woodrow Wilson, other important students of administration whose studies were grounded in reform, though barely mentioning it directly, include Frederick Taylor, *Scientific Management* (New York: Harper, 1947); Max Weber, *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (London: Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1947); L. D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1955); and C. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).
3. Some of the other important studies of administrative reform include H. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour* (London: Macmillan, 1946); D. Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948); P. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); D. McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); and B. Gross, *The Managing of Organizations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
4. The notable studies of scientific management include, P. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962); A. Etzioni, ed., *Complex Organizations* (New

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961); D. Waldo, *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953); A. Lepawsky, *Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1949); V. A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York: Knopf, 1961); P. Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); and C. Argyris, *Executive Leadership* (New York: Harper, 1953).

5. Some of such studies include R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953); K. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Y. Dror, *Public Policy-Making Re-examined* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968); and A. Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
6. For thoughts and ideas generated during this period, see W. Bennis, *Changing Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); A. W. Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Russel and Russel, 1965); and J. G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).
7. In the early period of the fifties and sixties, the most concerted studies of these issues were conducted under the umbrella of the Comparative Studies Group of the American Society of Public Administration. The works produced under this group included J. Montgomery, *Sources of Administrative Reform: Problems of Power, Purpose and Politics* (Bloomington, Ind. Comparative Administration Group, 1967); R. Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966); and J. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin, *Approaches to Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
8. Some scholars have raised questions about the artificial nature of any distinctions between development administration and the parent discipline, public administration. It is argued that the basic concerns of both are no different, i.e., they both concentrate on how to increase the administrative capacities and capabilities of public organizations. See B. Loveman, "The Comparative Administration Group, Development Administration and Anti-Development," *Public Administration Review* 36, no. 6, p. 617. For a spirited defense of the distinction, see B. Siffin, "Development Administration as a Strategic Perspective," in United Nations, *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms*, vol. 3, ST/TAO/M/62/Add.2, p. 152. See also B. Schaeffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration," in C. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 181. Though accepting the distinction, however, he still thinks the subdiscipline lacks boundaries.
9. The only few books dealing specifically with the subject of administrative reforms include G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*; K. C. Konig, *Civil Service Reforms in Europe*, *Speyer Arbeitshefte* 17 (1977); A. F. Leemans, ed., *The Management of Change in Government* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976); and F. Mosher, *Governmental Reorganizations* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967). Books dealing with related subjects are numerous, however. For a most recent bibliography of books and articles on administrative reforms and related subject matter, see G. Caiden, "Administrative Reform: A Prospectus," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 44, nos. 1-2 (May 1978): 118-20.
10. A. F. Leemans, "Overview," in A. F. Leemans, ed., *The Management of Change*, 7.
11. *Ibid.*, 8.
12. See G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 15.
13. A. F. Leemans, "Overview," 8.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Y. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," in A. F. Leemans, ed., *The Management of Change*, 127.

16. A. F. Leemans, "Overview," 8.
17. Leemans surveys the various attempts to define the concept and makes the same conclusion. *Ibid.*, 6-9.
18. J. D. Montgomery, "Sources of Bureaucratic Reform: Typology of Purpose and Politics," in R. Braibanti, ed., *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), 427.
19. For an elaboration of this point, see F. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970), 573.
20. For a discussion of the problem of explication in this connection, see A. F. Leemans, "Overview," 8.
21. For an account of efforts to improve government machinery in premodern bureaucratic empires, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press, 1963).
22. For the account on the reform effort in the two places, I rely very much on E. Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660-1930* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); B. Chapman, *The Profession of Government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959); G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, chap. 4; and F. M. Marx, *The Administrative State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
23. G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 87.
24. B. Chapman, *The Profession of Government*, 180.
25. G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 88.
26. *Ibid.*
27. For another attempt to categorize the patterns adopted, which is a bit different from that of Caiden, see M. J. Balogun, "Management Improvement in a Period of Transition: A Paradigm and a Suggestion," in C. Baker and M. J. Balogun, *Ife Essays on Administration* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1975), 21-47.
28. *Ibid.*, 24.
29. G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 87.
30. W. Nassau, *Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy*, vol. 1 (London: P. S. King and Son, 1927), 339-41.
31. *Ibid.*
32. J. S. Lewis, *The Commercial Organization of Factories* (London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1896), 11.
33. *Ibid.*, 95.
34. *Ibid.*, 92, 93.
35. We are borrowing the terms "innovative" and "consolidative" from M. J. Balogun, "Management Improvement," 21.
36. For a review of the reasons behind the differences, see B. Chapman, *The Profession of Government*; and G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 85-97.
37. Quoted in *The Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management*, Brandon Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 1937), 111.

38. See *The Civil Service*, vol. 1, Report of the (Fulton) Committee, 1966-68 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Service [HMSO]).
39. G. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, 94.
40. For an account of the success attained in reforms in Europe, see K. C. Konig, *Civil Service Reforms in Europe* (Bonn: Speyer Arbeitshefte, 1977); and J. Dunnett, "The Civil Service: Seven Years After Fulton," *Public Administration* (Winter 1976), 361-68.
41. K. C. Konig, *Civil Service Reforms in Europe*.
42. A. Adedeji, "Strategy and Tactics for Administrative Reform in Africa," in A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *A Decade of Public Administration in Africa* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 225.
43. For this account of the approaches to reform adopted by African countries, I have relied on A. Adedeji, "Strategy and Tactics," G. Hyden, "Reforming the Structures in the Public Service," in A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *Decade of Public Administration*, 147-57; and M. J. Balogun, "Management Improvements."
44. See W. J. Siffin, *Approaches to Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); and University of Pittsburgh, *Organizing Schools and Institutes of Administration, A Handbook* (Pittsburgh, 1969).
45. M. Esmar, "Development Assistance in Public Administration: Requiem or Renewal," *Public Administration Review* 40, no. 5 (1981):426.
46. United Nations, *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms*, vol. 3, St/TAO/M/62/Add. 2, p. 160.
47. F. Riggs, cited earlier, is a major proponent of this view. See F. Riggs, *Ecology of Public Administration* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961).
48. See H. Barlow, "The Development of Administrative Sciences in English-Speaking Africa," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 44, nos. 1-2 (1978): 93-105.
49. See African Association for Public Administration and Management, *Ten Years of Professional Activity in Public Administration in Kenya*, Proceedings of the Tenth Anniversary Conference of the African Association for Public Administration and Management, held in Lagos, Nigeria, December 1982, (Mimeo).
50. See G. Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress* (see Introduction); and J. Senghor, "The Ideal Environment and the Ecology of Public Administration in Africa," in African Association for Public Administration and Management, *The Ecology of Public Administration and Management in Africa* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1986), 32-49.
51. See G. Caiden, "Implementation: The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform," in E. F. Leemans, ed., *The Management of Change*.
52. G. Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress*.
53. The author is, of course, aware that the problems being faced by Angola and Mozambique are, to a great extent, due to destabilization by South Africa. The extent to which their commitment to socioeconomic transformation made them neglect the development of a strong bureaucratic infrastructure, however, should not be discounted.
54. G. Caiden, "Administrative Reform: A Prospectus," 118-20; and *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 44, nos. 1-2 (1978).
55. Y. Dror, *Public Policy-making Re-examined*.

56. J. Nti, "Ghana's Experience in Administrative Reform of the Central Bureaucracy," in A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *Decade of Public Administration*; K. A. Owusu-Ansah, "Administrative Reform at the Grassroots: The Ghanaian Experience," in A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *Decade of Public Administration*.
57. D. A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 47, no. 2 (1981).

CHAPTER THREE

The Reform Efforts: A Survey

In the preceding chapter, it was noted that although there might have been minor differences with regard to how much the administrative systems of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia were prepared to cope with the tasks of independence, on the whole they were not adequately prepared for their new tasks. We saw that there were certain features, including their law and order orientation; the dominance of the government by the provincial administration (the administrative class); the low capacity or inadequacy of the technical infrastructure; the domination of the top echelons of the service by Europeans; the dearth of facilities for training citizens for senior positions; etc., that were all inimical to the emergence or development of a public administrative system for independence. Steps had to therefore be taken to rectify the situation. This chapter undertakes a comprehensive survey of the measures undertaken by the three countries to improve the capacity and capability of their administrative systems since attaining independence.

Earlier studies on the administrative reforms in the three countries have tended to suggest that of the three countries, Kenya has made the least effort to remodel the administrative system she inherited at independence, especially with regard to the law and order orientation of the service, its dominance by the provincial administration, as well as its centralization tendencies.¹ Zambia and Tanzania, on the other hand, are said to have carried out major structural, organizational, and personnel reforms resulting in administrative systems that are less law and order oriented and deemphasize the role of the administrative class (provincial administration), placing a lot of stress on decentralization of decision-making power, authority, and responsibility.²

I. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN KENYA

The observation that there has been very little structural or organizational change in Kenya since independence is, to a significant degree, correct. The system of administration that existed at independence provided for a machinery whereby government functions were managed through a departmental or ministerial system at the center, the number and composition of departments or ministries being determined essentially by the need for an efficient organization, with as little overlapping of jurisdic-

tions as possible. Ministerial organization was of course a recent phenomenon, having replaced departments only in 1959, in order to facilitate the transition to a cabinet system of government as independence approached.

Right before independence, however, and one can venture to say even up till now, the major consideration in grouping governmental functions into ministries, thus determining the number and composition of the cabinet, has increasingly become political: there is a need to ensure that all major ethnic groups are presented in the cabinet in order to ensure continued support for the regime.³ This has had the effect of increasing problems of coordination in the development process, resulting from jurisdictional conflicts, as aptly demonstrated by Goran Hyden.⁴

The creation of some ministries might have been prompted by the need to emphasize certain activities at certain times, however. This was the situation that prompted the creation of the ministry of Lands and Settlement: the need to have a separate agency with full ministerial status to take charge of the transfer of land from departing white settlers; to carry out land registration; and to ensure the success of the land consolidation program. The creation of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs were also a direct consequence of the attainment of the status of an independent state, as was the creation, in 1964, of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning.

These reorganizations and creations of new ministries did not, however, significantly change the pattern of relationship between the ministries as a whole, the cabinet, and the president's office. The latter continued to provide leadership, although in economic matters, the Ministry of Finance and Planning and/or the Ministry of Planning (when it had been separated from the Finance portfolio) have increasingly played a significant coordinating and directing role. Through the requirements for planning and the need for budgetary control, the activities of the individual sectoral ministries have come to be subject to scrutiny; and the conflicts and duplication of efforts and the resultant waste that may have existed when planning was not coordinated centrally have at least been reduced.

Much government activity, however, takes place at levels below the center and any serious reorganization of the machinery of government would have to include changes at that level. It has been previously noted that the machinery for local administration was highly centralized, emphasized law and order maintenance, and was dominated by the provincial administration. Translated into organizational terms, this meant the presence, at the provincial level, of a provincial commissioner with overall jurisdiction over law and order, ensuring that good government was maintained in his area. In the provinces, there were also representatives of technical or specialist departments or ministries. Theoretically, the provincial commissioner had no jurisdiction over the field representatives of technical or specialist departments or ministries in his province. They

were answerable and accountable to their headquarters; they had no authority over most operations and had to seek constant guidance from the headquarters. In effect, however, because of the authority and status he derived from being in charge of security and order, and being the personal representative of the head of government, the provincial commissioner came to be accepted as the chief coordinator of all governmental activities in his area.

This system was replicated at the district level, with the district commissioner being in a relationship with the district-based specialist staff similar to that of the provincial commissioner with his provincial specialist staff. At the district level, however, there was an additional unit, the country council. This was an elected local government body that had been given power and responsibility over certain governmental functions, including the provision of certain services, with commensurate authority to raise revenues for financing these services. The district commissioner was to exercise certain powers in relation to these authorities. He was, for example, ultimately responsible for the collection of the tax revenues of these councils, with locational chiefs (central government employees) carrying out the actual collection of the taxes, aided by the administrative police.

In the period immediately after independence, when the Majimbo Constitution was in force, the structure of local administration was supposed to have changed to what Brian Smith calls the functional system, at least insofar as the relationship between the provincial commissioner and the technical field staff were concerned.⁵ The provincial commissioner (with the title of civil secretary) was the head of the civil service in the region, and was responsible to the regional authority for the coordination of the specific functions that the constitution allocated to the regions. In addition, he was to be responsible for conveying to the districts central government decisions, as conveyed to him through the regional authority.

At the district level, the district commissioner, or regional government agent (RGA), found himself in a similar position. The once powerful provincial and district administrators would thus have simply become the executive officers of the regional assembly; they were to have lost all their power over the security forces in the region and were left without communication with the central government, except through the regional assembly and the president of the region. In effect, however, as Colin Leys points out, the central government made it possible for the civil secretary to retain much of the influence he previously had, especially insofar as he continued to be used by the central government as its agent.⁶

This sojourn into regional or federal government lasted only a brief period. By the end of 1964, the (Majimbo) constitution had been abandoned through a constitutional amendment, and the country returned to a centralized, unitary state in which the system of field administration

existing before independence was revived almost intact. All the functions that had been transferred to other governmental bodies were also progressively restored to provincial administration. By the end of 1965, the government presence had once again come to be symbolized throughout the countryside by uniform-wearing assertive provincial administrative officers, who were the personal representatives of the president. The years that followed saw this centralization trend grow more, especially at the expense of the power, authority, and responsibility that had been at one time enjoyed by the local authorities, who now became subject to tighter and more stringent controls by the district commissioner's office and the Ministry of Local Government. Starting from 1969, some of the local authorities' responsibilities were also taken over by the specialist ministries.⁷

Despite the power and status of provincial administration, specialist activity in the provinces, districts, down to the locations, continued to remain independent. The situation was complicated by the activities of the various boards, as well as local authorities, and even by the mushrooming of local, single, or multipurpose voluntary associations in the richer areas, including churches, cooperatives, and self-help groups. To integrate and coordinate the activities of all these groups would have been possible if a coordinating office had been given the requisite power and authority, and so too the foremost officer in the field; as it happened, however, the provincial and district commissioners did not have the requisite power, authority, or status to perform such a task. It was against such a background that the Kenyan government came to introduce, late in 1966, what both Tanzania and Zambia had introduced almost straight from independence: a string of development committees at the provincial, district, divisional, and locational levels, supported by planning officers at both the district and provincial levels.

The new planning and coordinating organization had as its pivot an officer called the provincial planning officer (PPO), who would act as an adviser to the provincial commissioner on development and planning matters. The other structures for planning and implementation of development policy were the provincial and district development committees, chaired by the provincial and district commissioners, respectively. Paralleling these committees were provincial and district development advisory committees, drawing membership not only from officials but also from politicians and local notables. Finally, parallel to the district development committee structure was a system of community development committees that extended down to project level and was linked vertically to the National Community Development Committee, Provincial Development and Planning Committee upon which the MDPC had representation. These structures were to remain in force for a long time. Their contribution to increased integration in development activity has been documented fully elsewhere,⁸ but it is, however, acknowledged that they were gener-

ally not as effective as their counterparts in Tanzania and Zambia, as shall later be seen in the chapter. All the same, there is no question that it made a significant contribution and reorienting its incumbents toward a more developmental posture.

The appointment of the Ndegwa Commission in 1970 to look into the structure, conditions of services, and salaries in the Kenyan public service, and its report, which was prepared in 1971 and subsequently received wide publicity, might have implied that the Commission's recommendations and their subsequent implementation were to significantly affect the structure of the administrative system. This was not the case, however, and no review or independent commentator on the Ndegwa Report has suggested anything to that effect. The report's proposals simply concentrated on pay matters and neglected the questions of organization, structure, and administrative process. Indeed, it has been suggested that the report found no basic weakness in the structure for the management of government and hence, it could only suggest how the existing structure could be made to work better. Before turning to the reforms that were undertaken in this direction, a brief focus on one other reform thrust that took place much before the Ndegwa Commission's report—the Africanization, or Kenyanization, exercise—might be in order.

In chapter 2, we pointed out that Kenya had inherited a public service establishment that was dominated in its upper echelons by Europeans and in its middle-level echelons by Asians. The statutory basis of this phenomenon had been removed long before independence by the adoption of the Holmes report in 1948, which abolished the racially based civil services for Europeans, Asians, and Africans, integrating them into one service.⁹ Even after this, however, the fact that there were few Africans with the requisite qualifications and experience to fill the top positions, and that the colonial government was not ready to expand educational and training facilities for Africans, ensured that the top- and middle-level positions continued to be filled by Europeans and Asians, respectively.

This racially based structure of administration may have been bad enough for a colonial government; for a free and independent state it was utterly untenable. For this reason, the newly independent African government, which succeeded the British, took immediate steps to Africanize all top administrative posts, including permanent secretaries and many others throughout the service.¹⁰

The Africanization exercise was to be managed after 1963 by the Public Service Commission, which had been established by an act of parliament in the same year.¹¹ The Commission consisted of a chairman, a deputy chairman, and five members, all appointed by the president. Its job was to ensure that only properly qualified people were appointed to any post, and that in selecting from those who are qualified, only considerations of merit were to be taken into account. From time to time the Com-

mission instituted operating rules, and delegated some of its powers to senior officers of the service. It is this commission then that had the overall responsibility for ensuring that a number of colonial officers would be asked to vacate their positions to make room for Africanization, and where some colonial officers left on their own accord, to ensure that suitable replacements were picked from among qualified Africans.

The exercise was not made easy by the fact that the colonial government had not bothered to consider the need for training Africans for top- and middle-level positions. It was only in 1961, two years before independence, that the chief secretary articulated the intention of his government "to increase the supply of qualified local candidates for every grade of the public service by expansion of facilities for local education and training."¹² This exercise was not, however, realized before independence, in spite of the opening of the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) as a facility for training administrators, as well as the sending of some officers for training abroad.

To facilitate Africanization, therefore, serious steps were taken by the newly independent government to institute crash training programs and open up a number of training facilities. Thus the Kenya Institute of Administration was expanded to offer courses in executive development, local government, cooperative training, and community development. The Government Training Institute at Maseno and secretarial schools in Nairobi and Mombasa were all part of this frontal approach to training. The record of the government in providing training became impressive, significantly contributing to the Africanization exercise. This is attested to by the pace at which Africanization was moving. Thus, whereas in 1963 the percentage of Africans in the public service stood at 72 percent, by 1965 it had increased to 92 percent, rising further to 94 percent by 1969.¹³

The increase in the number of Africans in the public service may not necessarily have contributed positively to improved performance; it may, in the short run, have resulted in reduced performance levels, as some commentators have noted.¹⁴ Many of these commentators, however, do not take into account the fact that with the attainment of independence the public service objectives may have changed and that the standards of performance may also have changed, or should have changed.¹⁵ The observation that levels of performance may have declined may therefore, not necessarily be valid. This might be so to the observer who is still using the old criteria for evaluating performance.

To return to the Ndegwa Commission reforms: What did they entail? A major aspect of the Commission's recommendations was the emphasis on the use of modern management methods in the running of government business. The Commission undertook a serious study of the system for running government work that was then in force and identified a number of bottlenecks in the activities, stages, processes—as well as

methods. To resolve the bottlenecks, a few changes were proposed in the system, and these included improving the tie between planning objectives and the actual work program; clearer demarcations between the political and the civil service roles in management of national growth; and an optimum solution on how best to coordinate the work of government organizations at key points in the work-flow. It was emphasized that the key to making the system operational is the evolution of new procedures, and the infusion of the practice of "plan-mindedness" in the work routine,¹⁶ as well as the progressive adoption of such techniques as management by objectives, organizational development, etc.

The government did, in the main, accept the major recommendations of the Report and proceeded to implement them. The Directorate of Personnel, for example, was renamed the Directorate of Personnel Management; the importance of training was emphasized with senior officers in the public service being required to attend management training; and a series of management by objectives seminars were organized for officers who would be charged with seeing the recommendations through, especially those requiring management improvement. The adoption of the measures have had some impact on the performance of the service, as a report by yet another recently appointed commission of inquiry suggests.

Of all the Ndegwa Commission's recommendations, the one that has caused the most controversy, with regard to the effects it has had on the performance of the public service, is the recommendation to encourage civil servants to become involved in business. The Commission, having noted that there was no reason why the most competent section of Kenyan society should be barred from playing its part in business and commerce, recommended that the regulations that barred public servants from involvement in business be relaxed, as this would indeed be one way of relieving the Treasury from having to shoulder serious salary increases.¹⁷ A number of commentators on this subject have tended to suggest that the effect of this measure has been to intensify the conflict of interest on the part of the civil servants; reduce their productivity; and generally result in absenteeism, corrupt practices, etc.¹⁸ In Tanzania and Zambia, on the other hand, a leadership code barring civil servants from engaging in business has been imposed. It might be interesting to note the extent to which the imposition of the measure in the two countries has prevented the emergence of similar malpractices.¹⁹

The foregoing historical and typological survey of Kenya's attempts to reform its public administration shows that the two major tendencies of Kenya's pre-independence administration system—centralization and a bureaucratic orientation—seem to have been left intact by whatever reforms were effected. Whether that was to affect the system's ability to carry on both the old and new governance tasks will be reviewed in the subsequent chapter.

II. ZAMBIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Zambia was to adopt a much more active stance toward reforming its public administration than Kenya did. The country has a long story to tell of continuous structural reorganization, starting from 1964 when it attained independence, to date. This is so in respect to both the machinery for managing administration at the center, as well as to that for managing administration at the local level. The country also devoted a lot of attention to Africanizing its public service, as well as carrying through a few other improvements.

Starting with efforts to develop a viable central administrative machinery, the framework for its creation had already been taken care of in the independence constitution, which provided for the creation of ministries responsible for managing particular aspects of governmental activity.²⁰ According to the constitution, the question of how the functions were to be grouped, the number of ministries, etc., was the prerogative of the president, although his hand in this was, to a significant extent, constrained or influenced by a number of factors. These have included the stage-by-stage growth of governmental functions; the institutionalization of the chief executive's accountability to local public opinion; and a colonial legacy that has left its imprint writ-large on Zambia's administrative system in terms of organizational format, nomenclature, and operating style.

The first attempt to introduce elements of political accountability into the governance system was in 1949, when two elected European members of the Legislative Assembly were granted portfolio status within the Executive Council (the colonial equivalent of today's cabinet). For the ten years of the federation, no further developments occurred in this direction, other than in 1959, when, following the territory's election under a multiracial franchise, all six elected members in the Executive Council were given portfolios.

In itself, the introduction of such a mechanism for establishing political accountability greatly influenced the nature of ministerial organization. The requirement that such a politically manned body retain a sufficiently intimate size to allow deliberations and decisions precluded direct representation of individual governmental departments formed mainly on specialization criteria. The fact that ministers were both responsible to a legislature and might be answerable to possibly shifting congeries of social and political interests meant that the criteria by which grouping could occur would be governed not simply by considerations of administrative rationality or convenience but by a concern for the political management of linkages with these broader publics—a fact apparent with the creation of the first portfolios in 1949, as with others since independence.

The number of central ministries has varied within fairly narrow limits. At the cabinet level, central representation varied at between fifteen and nineteen offices, including the offices of the president and the vice president, or of the prime minister, when the former was abolished. The creation of eight provincial ministries in the decentralization reforms of 1969 was done by cutting the number of central ministries from eighteen to nine, seven of them very large-scale "umbrella" bodies, and by swelling the president's office to a considerable dimension. These enlarged units proved administratively cumbersome, however, and by 1972 five of the seven umbrella ministries had been broken down into smaller units and the cabinet size stood at twenty-five. Following elections in 1978, however, the cabinet was pruned once more, and the post of provincial minister was abolished. Accompanying this change, however, the number of central ministries were increased, including a new Ministry of Defense and Security.

The combination of previously separate departments into ministries, as well as the emergence of new tasks, entailed the elaboration of the administrative apparatus for purposes of coordination and control, in turn providing an organizational nexus, which facilitated the creation of yet additional departments. Over the past twenty years this growth has been impressive, though most rapid around the period of independence. The ministerial system introduced in 1959 had consisted of nine ministries, most having two departments, though the largest, the Ministry of Transport and Works, had five. By 1976 there were seventeen central ministries, including the offices of the president and the prime minister, both containing five divisions each capable of subdivision into departmental agencies. There were also nine provincial ministries, and seven further commissions and special offices (five being service commissions covering the various branches of government service). At a lower level, and excluding the parastatal sector, there were over seventy departments, and under these thirty-one sections.

These changes in ministerial organizations were also insignificant compared to the changes made in the system for administering development at the local level. First, between 1964 and 1968, the government made several, though piecemeal, attempts to reform local administrative structures. The obvious targets of reform were the prefectural system in the provinces and districts, as well as the native authorities.

The provincial administration reforms involved the reorganization of the old law and order oriented provincial administration and its replacement by a development-oriented administrative organization. The new organization, which was to be headed by a politically appointed officer, called variously under-minister, provincial minister, and minister of state, was divested of a number of functions including law and order, which was transferred to the police; magisterial functions, which were transferred

to the Ministry of Justice; supervision of a reformed local administration system, transferred to the Ministry of Local Government. The major task of the new organization was to coordinate the work of technical ministries and departments under the under-ministers, who were in turn directly responsible for their conduct to the president. The under-ministers were supposed to avoid involving themselves in the day-to-day management of the civil service and they were expected to perform a number of functions including the chairing of provincial development committees and provincial information committees; making consultations with pressure groups such as political parties and trade unions; and extensive touring and contact with workers and citizens at the grass-roots level.

The changes in the native administration system, which had previously provided links between the district commissioner and the people below through the chiefs and headmen, included, first, the abolition of the statutory functions of the chiefs and their relegation to performing traditional functions in their areas for which they were to be paid an allowance by the government; and, second, the replacement of the old native authority structure by a new system of representative rural local government, based upon elected rural councils. The new council system, however, came under the surveillance of the Ministry of Local Government, and there was no easy chain of communication or formal link between them and the district secretary. The new council, moreover, had a much more reduced scope of activities than its predecessor, being limited to the maintenance of local roads, water supply, mail delivery, and environmental health services.

The assumption that the new provincial and district administration would settle down quickly seemed to have been a long shot. First, the transfer of functions proved to be a much slower process, so that the burden on the reduced administration did not decrease. In fact it was increased, because a number of departments that could not afford stationing officers in the field relied upon the administration for assistance in the field, and resulted in a situation in which, "in short the Provincial and District Government [became] the leaning post to some and the maid of all work to others, while the Resident Minister [remained] the kingpin responsible for the co-ordination of development in the province."²¹ Secondly, the new administrative system lacked the authority of its predecessor, especially at the district level. Essentially, the district secretary's position lost the political power enjoyed by the district commissioner, especially when it came to asserting himself vis-a-vis departmental officers; although even with the political clout afforded to him by his position, the resident minister was not faring much better with the provincial departmental officers.²²

The government took a number of measures directed at making the new system work better, including strengthening the provincial adminis-

tration by recruiting more personnel; making efforts to strengthen and emphasize the importance of the provincial and district development committees and their responsibility for the coordination of development;²³ and the creation of a provincial block vote in 1967 intended to overcome local holdups in the implementation of development projects. These measures did not, however, resolve the major problems in the new system of provincial administration: as a semipoliticized generalist administrator, the head may have performed well the functions of communicator and coordinator of governmental activities, but he lacked the power and authority that was previously wielded by the provincial and district commissioners before him. After four years of experimenting with this system, a decision was taken to radically depart from the old system. The government was to be completely politicized and decentralized.

In 1968 the government therefore introduced a new system of administration at the provincial and district levels known as decentralization. The changes involved the posting of a cabinet minister and a permanent secretary to each province, and the politicization of district administration by the appointment of a district governor to each, assisted by a district secretary. This was intended to be accompanied by a great measure of decentralization of government activity from Lusaka to the provinces and district development committees, under the chairmanship of the cabinet minister and the governor, respectively, were to play an enhanced role as coordinating bodies.

These changes were intended to strengthen the structure of the provincial and local government, but not to restore it to the role of a law and order agency of the colonial period. It was viewed first and foremost as an agency of economic and social development that would rely upon persuasion and conversion and not upon the powers of arrest and imprisonment. The object of the new system was to accelerate development at the local level by ensuring more direct contact between the people and the government; reviving the district as the basic unit of administration; mobilizing popular support for development at the local level; and by transferring much decision-making to the regions.

A concomitant move of the 1968 reforms was the reviving of the village as a basic unit of administration in the rural areas, and making it an effective unit for development. This was intended to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of native authorities, and to create a new structure linking the village with the district. District governors were therefore directed to help in the setting up, in their areas, of village and section productivity committees, as well as ward development committees, the latter being linked through their elected representatives to the rural councils.

The decentralized system introduced in 1968 was in operation for over ten years. Many reviews of the effectiveness of the decentralized system agree that the declared objectives of the system were never attained, partly

because the corresponding measures were not taken, and more importantly, because the measures had not provided for corresponding decentralization of responsibilities by the ministries to the regions.²⁴ A government report on the same subject also pointed out that the 1968 reforms did not solve the problems of coordination between the central and local government units at the district level; that there was a lack of financial responsibility at the district and provincial levels; and a host of other problems.

In 1980 the Local Administration Act was passed with the aim of correcting these anomalies. The objective of the new reform measures was to integrate central and local government administration in the form of district and provincial councils.²⁵ All the departments of the central ministries and local government were now lumped under the local government council, under the overall leadership of the district governor. District administration was also given the requisite authority to match their responsibilities, including the formulation of their own budgets under the overall supervision of provincial and national authorities. The main emphasis of decentralization was, as in the 1968 reforms, administrative rather than political. These reforms gave the decentralized system some teeth.

The government also devoted serious attention to the nature and character of the Zambian public service establishment since the colonial legacy in this area left much to be desired; the public service was organized to service the interests of the colonial system; its composition was heavily dominated by Europeans; and the system for its growth, regeneration, and general management reinforced these tendencies. The long absence of training and development of African personnel and their exclusion from senior posts bequeathed to the new government problems almost unparalleled in postindependence Africa. In both East and West Africa the British had left relatively more Africanized civil service systems than in Zambia. At independence, for example, Ghana (1957) had 60 percent of her senior civil service posts Africanized; Nigeria (1960) had 61 percent; Kenya (1963) had 23 percent; and Tanzania (1961) had 18 percent. By contrast, Zambia had only 4 percent of her senior civil service posts Africanized in 1965, a year after independence. The situation was further compounded by the lack of training facilities in the country: all the countries mentioned earlier had a university either located in their countries or to which they had direct access. There was no university in Zambia prior to 1966, and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury did not cater to African educational needs. In 1964 the country had only 100 university graduates to rely on, all of whom had been trained abroad. This educational deprivation was in part responsible for constraining the effort to Africanize the service. How did it fare within the foregoing background?

Simultaneously with the Africanization of the public service, meas-

ures were taken in the late 1960s to build institutions for training public administrators, notable among them being the National Institute of Public Administration and the President's Citizenship College. The University of Zambia's Department of Political and Administrative Studies trained undergraduates in public administration. The Africanization program was to proceed with training programs and the government spent an annual amount of K5,000,000 on financing training conducted locally. The training was intended to ensure that recruitment into the service, and especially the replacement of departing expatriates, would not be done at the expense of efficiency; and to this effect all necessary measures were taken, including the formation of the Civil Service Commission, an independent body charged with the responsibility of effecting civil service appointments, promotions, transfers, and dismissals.

The Africanization or Zambianization exercise had marked success. By 1981, over 95 percent of senior positions in the public service had been Zambianized, but as has been noted by Gratian Lungu, this success has been accompanied by a great decline in the level of performance in the service. This decline may, to some extent, be explained by the newness in post for some of the personnel, increased work pressures, and a host of other factors. The decline may also have been occasioned, to a significant degree, by another important reform measure: the politicization of the public service. We have seen earlier in this chapter that in an effort to elicit public service accountability at all levels, the government had created a number of strategic positions in the public service, which it had filled with politically appointed persons. These included the posts of under-ministers, ministers, as well as those of political assistants at lower levels. The scope of politically appointed positions was to later include even permanent secretaries. In due course, all the senior and middle-level public servants were required to join the ruling party. There has been a lot of debate about the desirability and practicability of civil service neutrality, and whether this neutrality is necessary in one-party states; but many commentators on the Zambian scene suggest that it has had an adverse effect on the performance of the public service.²⁶

The problem of civil service productivity has continued to receive the attention of the Zambian government. It was noted earlier that in Kenya, in addition to providing civil servants with incentives of pay, the erstwhile colonial regulation that barred civil servants from engaging in business was also removed to enable them to supplement their incomes.²⁷ Like Tanzania, Zambia has, however, instead reinforced the ban, through the imposition of the leadership code as part of the policy of humanism. Under the leadership code, all political leaders and senior civil servants are not allowed to own businesses that would give them extra income, or earn more than one salary. The objective of this measure was to prevent the situation of conflict of interests from arising. The pertinent question, how-

ever, is whether or not the government compensation package is high enough to keep the barred official from undercover involvement in business or from taking bribes. In interviews by the author with senior public officials in Zambia in July 1983, the feeling was that the leadership code was now disregarded anyway—economic problems had made everyone turn a blind eye to it—and, as Lungu notes, the problem of civil service responsibility and accountability is in the forefront again.²⁸

Unlike Kenya, therefore, the Zambian public administration system has been subjected to numerous changes in its structure, operating style, and orientation. The ostensible reason for the numerous changes was the need to reorient the system toward meeting the challenges of independence and nation-building. These reforms shall later be subjected to a greater scrutiny, and then it will be possible to evaluate the extent to which they were effectively institutionalized, as well as whether or not their objectives were attained.

III. TANZANIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Tanzania has probably been more active in its approach to public administration reform than either of its neighbors. This is particularly so with regard to organizational restructuring. In a recent article, Jon Moris itemized twenty major reorganizations that have been attempted during the period 1961–81, a number of these having multiple components.²⁹ This degree of reform activism is evidence of a sense of dissatisfaction with the performance of inherited structures. But such continuous changes may also mean that many of the various reorganizations may not even have had the time to take roots before they were restructured. Attempts to describe the basic features of particular reorganizations at certain times may flounder simply because many of these were in a state of flux. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to outline the major reform efforts undertaken by Tanzania since independence.

As was the case with Kenya and Zambia, some of Tanzania's major efforts have been directed at the creation of a viable, well-coordinated central guidance machinery. Efforts in this direction had first been taken just before independence, when the country attained internal self-government and the erstwhile bureaucratically and technically dominated departments became reorganized into ministries under the charge of politically accountable ministers. The grouping of governmental function into ministries then, as later, was a function of a number of factors including rational management concerns, the need to reward loyal supporters, as well as administrative inertia.

Over the twenty years since independence, there have been numerous ministerial reorganizations, the most comprehensive ones taking place

right after every general election. The general thrust of many of these reorganizations, however, has tended to involve the creation of new ministries out of departments or divisions that, over time, had come to acquire a new policy-importance of their own; or the regrouping of functions for purposes of minimizing conflict and competition; and at times to make ministerial space for a favorite politician, although the latter has happened less often in Tanzania than in either Kenya or Zambia.

This reorganization has invariably tended to result in an increase in the size of the cabinet. Thus, whereas in 1961 there were only ten ministries, by 1963 the number had increased to fifteen, rising to eighteen in 1964. Between 1967 and the beginning of the eighties, however, the number seemed to have stabilized at twenty, probably indicative of the fact that much of the expansion in governmental activity after 1967—when the Arusha Declaration was passed—could easily be handled pretty much under the same ministerial arrangements. Alternatively, the stabilization may be a function of the fact that subsequent to the Arusha Declaration there has been a tendency to move many of the additional state activities out of the traditional ministerial system. The era of the parastatal had arrived.³⁰

This phenomenal expansion and the consequential proliferation of units required a much more complex control and coordinative mechanism. At the time of independence, coordination of government machinery at the center was performed by the office of the prime minister, which had a very small cabinet secretariat, and the treasury, the latter exercising its control through the budget system and through control of the establishment (size of service). The first few years of independence did not see any effort to expand the capacity of the prime minister's office (later the president's office)—control was exercised through the cabinet. As the author has noted elsewhere, however, there was considerable autonomy on the part of ministries, and little attempt was made to demand integration of policy actions across ministries.³¹

As development planning came to be undertaken seriously, however, there was greater need to ensure coordinated development activity on the part of ministries. A development planning agency was thus created in 1963, and since then it has seen many lives. It first started as a full-fledged ministry, of Development Planning; then it was moved to the president's office and had three ministers jointly responsible for the function; it then moved out to become a full-fledged ministry. It has subsequently been merged twice with the treasury, only to be separated again into a separate ministry on both occasions. These frequent movements were essentially a search for the most appropriate location of this important coordination organization, which would secure for it an optimal relationship vis-à-vis other ministries.

The second, and probably the major thrust, has been directed at the creation of a viable machinery for facilitating development at the local level;

ensuring greater national integration and greater central authority over local areas; and ensuring the accountability of administrative organizations to the initially dominant, later the sole, political party in the country.

The first administrative organ to be reorganized was the provincial administration. Early in 1962 the provinces were renamed regions, but the districts retained their title; and the number of territorial administrative units remained undisturbed. Provincial commissioners were replaced by political appointees, called regional commissioners. The first regional commissioners had served as full-time, centrally appointed provincial secretaries or as locally elected provincial chairmen of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and were generally either natives of, or had worked for some time in, the region where they were now the political heads. To create a link between the party and the public administration, regional and district commissioners also became, *ex officio*, regional and district party secretaries. The regional and area commissioners were served by a civil service administrative and area secretary, respectively, with the intention of making their relationships like that between the minister and his principal secretary.

The regional commissioners inherited almost all the powers of their predecessors, other than the judicial powers, which were progressively transferred to the ministry of justice, and the day-to-day supervision of the local authority work, which became the responsibility of newly designated local government officers, directly responsible to the Ministry of Local Government.

The main functions of the regional commissioners, however, were not detailed administrative functions—these were to be attended to by the administrative secretaries. Regional commissioners were to be responsible for overall policy and direction; contact with the people; and the coordination of the local government machinery with that of the party. Like their predecessors, they had the overall responsibility for the business of government in the areas under their charge. There was theoretically no aspect of government that was immune from their surveillance. The day-to-day administration, including the control of funds and staff, was not a part of their function, however, as these were attended to by the administrative secretaries.

In pursuance of the objectives of national integration development and greater central authority noted earlier, the local government system was also overhauled in the early years of independence. The former native authorities were replaced by elected district councils for each district, and town councils emerged in urban areas. The new local authorities were broadly similar to one another in status and functions. Each authority could issue bylaws; each could regulate its procedure by means of standing orders; and each authority was similarly financed partly by revenues raised itself and partly by grants from the central government. The reor-

ganization of local government also entailed the removal of the chiefs from their traditional place as the head of local affairs and the relinquishing of their powers in relation to law and order. This was deemed necessary in order to remove what was considered to be a potential source of problems—the persistence of local participation and communal or ethnic sentiment—and give way to a sense of national unity and purpose. Their administrative functions were taken over by people appointed by the district councils in consultation with local TANU leadership, and not infrequently they tended to be TANU activists or sympathizers.

Another important development in the local-level administrative machinery in this early period was the creation of a series of development committees at the village, ward, divisional, district, and regional levels, interlocked with each other, and with the objectives of acting as vehicles for mobilizing people in the development efforts, and coordinating development activity at their respective levels. The district and regional committees were particularly important, since they provided a forum for ensuring that the activities of the various central government departments, district councils, and of the respective departments at the regional or district levels were dovetailed into each other; and they also ensured that there was a minimum wastage of resources and duplication of efforts. Between 1965 and 1972, the government did indeed take a number of measures in an effort to improve coordination as well as increase local developmental initiative. In 1968 the regional development fund was created; in 1969 responsibility for primary education, health centers, and district roads was transferred to the central government; and in 1968 the post of regional planning officer was created with the responsibility of acting as the technical adviser to the regional commissioner and the regional development committee in planning matters.

The most significant structural changes in Tanzania's local administrative machinery, however, were the 1972 reforms—popularly known as decentralization. The reforms were carried out ostensibly to facilitate greater coordination, reduce duplication, increase speed in decision-making, and increase local participation and control in the development process.³² The measures taken involved the abolition of the district councils and the creation of a regional development machine composed of all units of central government departments based in the region, and which were, in turn, to cut off their financial or authoritative links with ministry headquarters. The new organization was headed by a regional commissioner who remained regional party secretary and played the role of a minister in relation to his regional development director, who in turn played the role of a principal secretary. The regional commissioner was to be responsible for a range of development functions. These functions, which included agricultural extension, public works, health, primary education, water supply, etc., had previously been the responsibility of regional-level-

based officers responsible to headquarters as well as to those functions of respective ministries. They also included activities that had been the responsibilities of District and Town Councils. The region was to prepare an integrated budget (development and recurrent), and submit it to the parliament through the office of the prime minister. Once parliament passed the budget, there was no need to consult with headquarters for funds: the regional development director had now become the accounting officer. This structure was replicated at the district level, and the political head of the district, known as area commissioner, also remained the district party secretary, whereas the administrative head became known as district development office.

At both the regional and district levels, this administrative machinery was capped by some participative organs called regional and district development councils, respectively. These bodies, composed of senior political figures and technical officers, were supposed to provide a forum for discussing proposed plans, budgets, and for reviewing development performance.

A final feature of decentralization was the incorporation, in 1975, of the newly reconstituted villages (as a result of the massive villagization exercise of about the same time) into authoritative local governments, linked directly to the district development directorate.³³ The new village governments were given authority to make bylaws, raise revenues to finance local development activities, negotiate loans from financial institutions, and carry out activities that village governments had till then never carried out, such as road works and water supply. The village government organ consisted of elected village councils, and as in similar posts, the party branch chairman automatically became the village government chairman, ensuring the linkage between the party and administration, which now existed from the national down to the village level.

The 1972 and 1974 decentralization reforms remained in operation until 1983, when as a result of major criticisms of the system, especially its having resulted in "departicipation" and the creation of a "dependency" tradition on the part of local communities, the government decided to return to the pre-1972 local government system.³⁴ Subsequent to the passing of the legislation and the holding of elections in early 1984, the district councils were reconstituted and are now fully operational, involving essentially a full swing to the pre-1972 system, minus the erstwhile duplication of functions and conflicts between the central and the local governments. The present system is an integrated local government system.³⁵

Alongside these reform attempts, there were several measures intended to improve the capacity and capability of the establishment. The inherited establishment had a number of undesirable characteristics: relative to the tasks to be handled, it was too small; its structure and composition was too law and order oriented; its senior- and middle-level posts

were heavily dominated by Europeans and Asians, respectively; and, finally, it was too elitist in orientation. The government therefore took a number of measures to deal with these inadequacies. Africanizing the senior- and middle-level positions in the public service was the first measure taken. This entailed adopting as government policy a set of regulations including the insistence that every vacancy should, if possible, be filled by an appointment made locally; that African candidates should have prior claim to consideration in the case of new appointments; and that other candidates in the case of new appointments were to be considered only if no suitably qualified Tanganyikan African candidate was available.³⁶ The intention was to push the appointing authority to give priority to Africans, without, however, abandoning the principle of merit.

The number of African candidates eligible for consideration under the Africanization program was nonetheless small, given the fact that few Africans had had opportunities to attend requisite educational and training institutions. Africanization was therefore accompanied by a complimentary program involving the organization of crash training programs to prepare Africans for senior service appointments, or retraining programs for those who had already been appointed. It was in this way that the Institute of Public Administration of the University College of Dar-es-Salaam came to be founded in 1961. These efforts paid off well in that by 1970, 70 percent of the occupied established posts were filled by citizens, compared to 16 percent in 1961.³⁷ These efforts continued through the 1970s and 1980s to the extent that the civil service is now essentially fully composed of citizens.

The training efforts that had originally been intended to facilitate Africanization were expanded to deal with yet other establishment bottlenecks. The first was to train personnel to staff the new positions in the service resulting from expanded development programs. The second was training personnel for the purposes of improving and maintaining good performance. Both meant the opening up of numerous educational and training institutions.

The most intractable area, which many newly independent governments decided not to tamper with but which Tanzania decided to deal with, was the elitist character of the public service. The country was aware of this elitism's negative impact on public service performance, as President Nyerere's remarks indicate:

The civil servants considered themselves apart from the rest of society and to a significant degree, in so long as it was a colonial service, they were. . . . We have been independent for more than five years now, and our civil servants and our ministers consider themselves still to be apart from society. . . . This cannot be, we must find ways of stopping it. We are only sons of those poor peasants in the villages."³⁸

Steps had already been taken along this line even before President Nyerer's above statement. They included the subjection of civil servants to political control and direction in provincial administration; the increasing fusion of the political and administrative dichotomy by appointing politicians to civil service positions and vice versa; and the politicization of civil service by allowing civil servants to join TANU, the then sole political party. A silent, though serious, thrust involved the gradual elimination of many fringe benefits previously enjoyed by civil servants, as well as progressive increases in taxes, which resulted in the reduction of the income gap between civil servants and the general public.

Civil service elitism came to be "hit on the head" by party guidelines known as *Mwongozo* in 1971 when the party declared an all-out war against "bossism" and decreed that junior workers and citizens be involved in managing and governing public organizations along with the leadership. Reviews on whether the *Mwongozo* era has produced a new nonelite civil servant indicate that there has been a significant change; the civil servant is now less of an elite type than was the case in 1971.³⁹ Whether or not this development has made the service a more effective development instrument is probably the more relevant question, but this shall be dealt with in a later chapter.

IV. CONCLUSION

The picture that emerges from the survey of the three countries' administrative reform efforts indicates that all of them took the need for reform seriously, and have accordingly taken many measures in that direction. Zambia and Tanzania, however, seem to have devoted more attention to restructuring their administrative organizations than Kenya, and this is particularly so with respect to local-level organizations. Much of these efforts in Zambia and Tanzania, moreover, took place amidst complementary reform efforts in their respective socioeconomic systems; in most cases administrative reform measures were taken to facilitate socioeconomic development objectives. On the other hand, Kenya was not about to seriously transform the inherited socioeconomic structure; and for this reason, the newly independent government did not see much need for overhauling its administrative system, but was content to try and make it work better, hence its reliance on the unbalanced administrative reform strategy.

The most important question, however, is whether or not the reform measures in each country succeeded both in terms of being institutionalized as well as in making the administrative system facilitate the objectives of each respective government; and whatever were the results, what were the factors responsible?

There is ample evidence to show that the measures adopted have had a greater level of institutionalization in Kenya than in either Tanzania or Zambia. This is mainly due to the fact that Kenya undertook fewer reform measures, and thus could see them through, compared to Tanzania and Zambia, which undertook too many reform measures, without having the manpower, resources, resilience, etc., with which to see them through.

It is also worth noting that structural or organizational changes were easier to carry out than qualitative improvement of the processes, personnel, and system, and this is why all three countries went for the former, taking very little action on the latter, which were more fundamental if efficiency and effectiveness of the services was to be realized. It is not surprising, therefore, that only marginal improvements, if any at all, have been realized. It is these issues that are addressed in greater depth in the rest of the book.

NOTES

1. See C. Gertzel, "Administrative Reform in Kenya and Zambia," in A. H. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *Decade of Public Administration*, 185; G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, op. cit., chapters by Hyden, Okumu, T. Mulusa; J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy* and G. Hyden, *No Short Cuts to Progress*.
2. See W. Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia*, chap. 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8; W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania*; S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania*; G. Mutahaba, "Local Autonomy and National Planning: Complementary or Otherwise," *The African Review*, 6, no. 2 (1976).
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CHAPTER FOUR

Administrative Reform and Decentralization

In the preceding chapter we noted that one of the major reform thrusts all three countries adopted was the decentralization of decision-making power and authority lower down the hierarchy. This chapter summarizes and analyzes the experience of decentralization in each of the three countries by reviewing the measures taken to that effect. It is from this review that the rationale and purposes of decentralization can be seen; the forms of decentralization used and their general impacts and results described; and the administrative, political, behavioral, economic, and other factors that influenced their implementation analyzed. Before doing this however, it may be useful first to place the review in a broader context.

I. THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALIZATION

The concept of decentralization is often discussed by scholars and government officials without a concise indication of its meaning and without a real understanding of the alternative forms that it can take. For the purpose of our analysis, we shall use the term to mean the transfer of legal, administrative, and political authority to make decisions and manage public functions from the central government to field organizations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semiautonomous public corporations, area-wide development authorities, functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or nongovernmental organizations. The degree of political and legal power that is transferred or delegated (i.e., the amount of power that the central government "gives up" to subordinate or autonomous institutions) may be one way of differentiating the approaches or forms of decentralization, while the forms adopted will generally be a function of the motive for which decentralization was introduced. It may therefore be worthwhile to discuss the question of the degrees of decentralization and the forms that decentralization may take.

Decentralization may be used to refer to a territorial or areal phenomenon or to refer to a functional phenomenon. The former centers on transferring responsibility and authority for public functions to organizations within well-defined subnational, spatial, or political boundaries, such as a province, region, district, municipality, etc. Usually the transfer of

authority is to an institution that may legally perform those functions only within specified geographical or political boundaries. The latter is used to refer to the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks to specialized organizations that operate nationally or at least across local jurisdictions. Authorities created to deal with functions such as highway construction, power supply, health care, etc., are some of the popular forms of functional decentralization. The former type of decentralization, a territorial phenomenon, can be divided into two forms: deconcentration and devolution.

Deconcentration

Deconcentration is a form of decentralization that involves only a minimum power transfer. It entails the shifting of work load from the central government ministry or department headquarters to offices outside the headquarters. This may, on the one hand, merely involve the shifting of work load on an *ad hoc* basis, without shifting authority to decide on how those delegated functions are to be performed. On the other hand, it may be possible to have a greater degree of deconcentration by formalizing the hiving off of functions through the creation of a system of field administration with decision-making discretion given to staff based in the field, allowing them the latitude to plan, make decisions, and to adjust the implementation of central directives to local conditions, within broad guidelines set by the center. Under a system of field administration, even though government officers are working within local jurisdictions that may have semiautonomous or delegated powers, field staff remain employees of the center and remain under its direction and control.

Another distinction within deconcentration lies in its approach to field administration. Brian Smith's categorization of three models of field administration provides a useful framework in discussing this.¹

The first is the functional model in which the chief agents of central administration working in the provinces and districts are part of separate functional hierarchies responsible for distinct aspects of governmental activity, like education, health, water supply, or public works. Administration of these services in the field is not integrated with the central administration since each one operates independently. Lines of command and channels of communication run directly between departmental headquarters and the local field unit. Each functional ministry tends to create geographical units suitable for its own purposes. The boundaries of these units are not necessarily shared by other departments or by the local government. Where local government exists, it does so in the form of separate authorities to which power over specific matters has been devolved from the central government. This type of field administration, however, is a rare phenomenon in Africa.

The second type is the "integrated prefectural" model, most closely identified with the French system of administration. According to Smith this is prefectural because the principal agent of central government in the field exercises control over all other field officers as well as supervising locally elected authorities and thus becomes part of the chain of command between central headquarters and the field for all government services. This generalist administrator embodies the authority of each ministry and the government in general. He is also the chief executive of the territorial assembly to which specific power has been devolved.² The French used a variant of this system of local administration in their African territories. Although the pattern in those countries may have changed to some extent since independence, the basic feature of the integrated prefectural model are still retained.³

The third type is the "unintegrated prefectural" system. As the name suggests, this system is a hybrid between the functional and the integrated prefectural systems, under which the prefect is the central figure in the field but by no means as powerful as in the French integrated prefectural system. Under this system, the prefecture is only one channel of communication among others and each specialist functionary in the field maintains independent links with his or her departmental headquarters. Although normally there are contacts between the prefect and the field officers, the prefect has no overriding authority over their operations. Nor does the prefect occupy the position of chief executive in the local government system, although he supervises it. This is the form that the British tried to institute over their colonies in Africa, although toward the end of colonial rule attempts were being made to introduce democratically elected local governments and nascent functional systems.⁴

Devolution

This is the more extreme form of transfer of governmental power and authority and involves the legal conferment of powers upon formally constituted local authorities to discharge specified or residual functions. It entails an interorganizational transfer of power to geographical units of local government lying outside the command structure of the central government.⁵ Ideally devolution should have certain basic characteristics that include, first, that there be a serious intent about the granting of autonomy and independence from the center, as well as having the local units outside the central government's direct control. Second, the local units ought to have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions. Third, the local units have to be given corporate status and the power to raise sufficient resources to carry out specified functions. Fourth, it implies the need to "develop local governments as autonomous institu-

tions" perceived by the people as belonging to them, in the sense that the local governments provide services that satisfy their needs and remain subject to the people's control, direction and influence. Finally, devolution does not imply federation; the local unit remains linked to the central government and with other units in the political system through arrangements of mutual support and reciprocity. Always the autonomy is granted by the center.

These characteristic features, however, remain part of the ideal in most countries, and this is more so in new states. In these countries devolution tends to be seen as a form of decentralization in which local government units are given responsibility for some functions, but in which the central government often retains some supervisory powers and may play a large part in financing. Even where the central government has allowed the evolution of devolutionary local governments that have the above characteristics, the tendency by the central government has been to ensure that local governments act in consistency with national development policies and plans in the performance of their functions, with certain formal and informal controls often being maintained. Very few developing countries have a system of formal devolution that meets the basic requirements noted earlier, though some national constitutions devolve specific functions and responsibilities to local governments or give them residual powers that are not claimed by the central government. What is significant in ensuring the effectiveness of devolution, however, may not be their legal status as independent units but rather their "strength," i.e., the number and some of the functions they perform, the skill and professionalism of local officials, their sources of funding, and the effectiveness with which they carry out their responsibilities.

In reality, however, devolution and deconcentration are not mutually exclusive. When implementing decentralization programs, a balance of these elements is usually sought. It is important to note also that administrative decentralization takes place in political contexts, and the implementation of any of the forms mentioned above may assume some political significance. Thus, while it is analytically convenient to distinguish devolution from deconcentration, in real life it is probably more practical to consider the two together.

The Rationale for Decentralization

Decentralization has been undertaken for varied goals. Those that are cited must include: organizational effectiveness; making public administration more responsive to the citizens; and promotion of national development.⁶

Organizational effectiveness is characterized by relatively high levels of employee motivation and productivity; smooth communication between various levels of organizational hierarchy; participation in decision-making

by employees at lower hierarchical levels; and increased capacity to achieve organizational goals at reduced cost.

Decentralization may be potentially useful in motivating junior employees when it increases their participation in decision-making, especially through delegated authority and responsibility. It may also assist the personal growth of junior members, especially if it results in their being better recognized within the system. Decentralization may also help improve the quality of decision-making at the center by enabling better information flow from the lower levels to the top. With improved motivation and commitment among the employees, and a well-informed central organization, it may be possible to have a much more productive organization.⁷

A responsive public administration, a second goal, is one that is sensitive and responsive to the needs and views of the citizens and whose personnel and programs represent their interests and serve their needs. The administration's close interaction with client groups, as well as the latter's direct influence on administrative decisions, are also considered important in a responsible and responsive bureaucracy. Decentralized organizational systems may bring government officials in close contact with the citizens, improve the government's perception of client needs and problems, and through the creation of social territories, government response to some policy issue can be better focused and more effective.

Of the three goals, the aspect of decentralization for purposes of facilitating national development has perhaps received the greatest attention. As early as 1957 an eminent agricultural economist, Sir Arthur Lewis, wrote thus:

If an underdeveloped country wants to achieve economic development, it must first change its system of government to provide local self-government for its villages and rural districts. . . . Basic social services such as elementary schools and adequate roads from farms to markets are indispensable prerequisites to economic development, and that such services can only be provided in adequate measure when local people have the power and responsibility to tax themselves to pay for their own basic governmental services.⁸

On this aspect other people have suggested that decentralization can allow local leaders to locate services and facilities more effectively within their communities; enable them to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economics; and make it possible for them to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development projects more effectively than can be done by central planning agencies.⁹

African leaders and many third world leaders do publicly accept the noted contribution by decentralization to development, as well as its other benefits.¹⁰ When it has come to deciding on institutional forms for local-

level administration, however, they have tended to opt for forms that have the least decentralist orientation. Even in those countries that had inherited some nascent forms of decentralist-oriented local administrative systems from the colonial governments, the leadership of the newly independent states proceeded to curtail the powers of these units, or even do away with them completely.¹¹

Constraints to Effective Decentralization in Africa

Studies of decentralization in postindependence Africa have generally been theoretical, with little case material presented. They have, as a result, been of little help in explaining current problems faced by African decentralized systems. Even these theoretical concerns, however, have been raised usually in the form of sporadic arguments rather than in the form of coherent and systematic inquiry.

It is suggested on the one hand that decentralized administration fails to work in Africa because of either the organizational format adopted, the division of responsibilities, the levels of competence of personnel, inter-personnel relations, the level of resources available, etc. In short, the cause of failure is managerial or administrative. Supporters of this position argue that problems related to administrative decentralization arise mainly from poor management of government bureaucracies. The decentralized administrative systems are said to be plagued by poor design, acute shortage of manpower, financial mismanagement and collapse, and other dysfunctional elements.¹²

The managerial argument cannot be taken lightly, for it has been shown in several studies to be an important category of constraints in contemporary African administration.¹³ On its own, however, it is not an adequate explanation of the problems facing current decentralization reform efforts in Africa. It ignores or underemphasizes the significance of other factors like the political, the contribution of interferences from the center, as well as socioeconomic factors, including the differing resource bases of different parts of the country. For that reason it must be supplemented.

Another increasingly popular explanation of the current problems of decentralization in Africa is the class argument. Adherents of this argument suggest that problems in decentralization emanate from the attitudes, behaviors, and orientations of the ruling class, which tend to be at variance with the requirements of popular participation in government, the major objective of administrative decentralization. Ollawa observes thus about this point:

There is always an inevitable tension between the interests which a dominant group in society will like to protect and the aspirations of the masses of the population. This paradigm is significant in understanding how the value-orientation of the Zambian ruling class in-

fluence[s] their attitude toward both the decentralized structures, and the official ideology of humanism. . . . Given these circumstances, it is not surprising to observe that although certain changes are promoted they are implemented in such a way as not to undermine the control of the members of the ruling class over political power and economy. . . . Consequently, all activities of the provincial party leader and local administrative officers are assigned a definite role in the process of national development, namely the maximization of unified support for the party.¹⁴

It would be difficult to dismiss the existence of an income and status gap between the bureaucrats and the mass of the people, and as such dismiss the class problem of decentralization. But this argument tends to ignore a number of important factors related to decentralization programs, including the administrative and other environmental constraints to decentralization. It is ludicrous, for example, to dismiss the effect that human resources and financial constraints have had on decentralization efforts. We must, therefore, move beyond the class perspective and try to look for a more varied explanation of the problems of decentralized administration in Africa and other new states.

A more comprehensive perspective may be one that attempts to integrate both the managerial and class explanations and examines them in the light of the broad environment within which the decentralized systems have to operate. This might then involve identifying all critical socioeconomic elements in the environment, on the one hand, and all possible management or bureaucratic attributes internal to the decentralized system, on the other, as well as the interactions between these two. The emerging picture would then form the environment of the decentralized system, which could either be supportive or a hindrance to decentralization. It is in this light that an attempt is made to review the three countries' experiences with decentralization and try to establish the part played by the environment and other factors in their successes or failures.¹⁵

II. DECENTRALIZATION IN KENYA

It was noted in the preceding two chapters that Kenya's colonial experience had generated an administrative system that had strong centralist tendencies and orientations. A review of Kenya's system of local administration since independence reveals how resilient this centralist tradition has been. Efforts to provide for increased decentralization in its administrative system have many times floundered because the center found itself unwilling to cede requisite power and authority to lower level institutions. This has been particularly so not only when these institutions were autonomous but even when no devolution was intended. A review of the ex-

periences of the county councils during the period 1963-69 and attempts later to use deconcentration methods illustrate this point well.

Decentralization by Devolution

From the time Kenya became a British protectorate, the interests of the dominant elements of society, the settlers, and those of the government converged. The former expected the central government to provide them with all facilities; roads; military protection; and above all cheap human labor, which they had no capacity to provide for themselves. They realized that the best strategy to ensure that they always had the center's attention was to cooperate with the central authorities; therefore they proceeded to work for the establishment of a strong working relationship between themselves and the central government. Little attention was thus given to the development of a strong and responsible local administration.¹⁶

The African people, on the other hand, were squeezed into isolated areas known as "African reserves," which were subjected to strong central control through provincial commissioners, district commissioners, and government-appointed local chiefs and headmen. Any traditional political or administrative systems were largely discarded and replaced by a new bureaucracy that derived all its authority and legitimacy from the center, and not from local traditional leadership and popular support.

With the expansion of governmental activities, it became increasingly felt that the government might benefit if it had a way of getting the advice of the settler community on a number of essentially local issues and also by getting the advice and feedback from the chiefs in the African reserves. As the burden of administering the territory increased without a corresponding increase in governmental capacity and resources, it was also felt that some of the governmental activities could be shed off to "trusted" local organizations.

As early as 1919, therefore, the government proceeded to set up some local authorities in the white highlands known as district committees. These committees, consisting of ten members nominated from among the local settler residents, were to advise the district commissioners on a wide range of issues including the allocation of land, the development of urban centers and communication, security, and the collection of taxes. Soon after, in 1922, the government set up District Advisory Councils (DACs) in the densely populated reserves. Like the district committees these had no statutory basis, and their members were nominated by the colonial administration, but unlike the district committees they were only consulted on minor matters affecting their areas and even then their advice was not taken seriously.¹⁷ The members of the DACs were selected by provincial commissioners from among chiefs, headmen, and any private citizens.

In the course of time both sets of local authorities acquired more power,

authority, and responsibilities, and they increasingly became composed of elected members. This was particularly so for the local authorities in the white highlands. Thus in 1924 the district advisory councils, renamed local native councils, became established by ordinance and were granted powers to levy taxes and make bylaws affecting education, agriculture, and other functions assigned to them by the central government. They remained, however, advisory to the district commissioner who was their chairman and chief executive officer. In 1926 the district committees in the white highlands were replaced by a body known as the district council, consisting mainly of elected members and a chairman elected from among the members. These councils were given wide powers to levy taxes and were expected to provide social services in their areas. Local authority district committees in the white highlands were very slow in taking on their responsibilities, despite their autonomy. The local native councils, on the other hand, with comparatively less autonomy, were able to become self-reliant much earlier and more effectively.¹⁸

Both sets of local authorities were to undergo further changes in the early 1950s. Local authorities in the white highlands were reorganized into a two-tier system of local government: an upper tier called country councils, which replaced the district councils; and a rural and urban district council, which assumed responsibility for the rural and urban subdivisions within the country. These changes, however, were merely cosmetic; much activity remained at the country level. The local native councils, which had undergone a few changes including, starting from 1948, the employment of their own chief executive officers and treasurers and the election of a vice-chairman who deputized and eventually took over the chairmanship from the district commissioner, were replaced by new authorities, the African District Councils (ADCs), with wider powers and an increasing number of elected members. Responsible local government had set in, as a government statement claimed at that time.¹⁹

Unfortunately, however, the establishment of stronger local government within the African areas in 1950 coincided with the outbreak of the Mau Mau crisis and the subsequent emergency, which resulted in the enlargement of provincial administration by appointing more district officers and district assistants to aid the British forces in their war against the freedom fighters. Local authorities in the affected areas lost all their powers to the provincial administration, and even for those outside the area, the district commissioner's power of control and supervision over the African district councils was to be exercised closely throughout the period of the emergency.²⁰

Kenya thus came out of the emergency period and approached independence with a local government system that, though subjected to tight control by the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Administration, provided for significant devolution of some functions and adequate

sources of independent revenues. This tended to make the councils feel that they had control over what they were doing.

With the attainment of independence, however, the general enthusiasm generated by independence and the decentralist tendencies generated by federalist pressures resulted in the sudden transfer of extensive duties and functions to local governments including the administration of health, education, and district roads, which had hitherto been central government functions. These functions were, moreover, being transferred at a time when there was tremendous pressure, also generated by independence demands, for their expansion; and citizens were already expanding them on their own.

The local authorities were expected to raise funds for financing these functions through a new form of tax called a graduated personal tax, a series of cesses on certain agricultural products, and through some specified grants from the central government. The center was to continue to guide the councils, through advice and supervision extended by the Ministry of Local Government and through officers of some of the technical departments.

Seven years after independence, in October 1969, the government introduced the Local Government Transfer of Functions Bill which transferred three basic services, primary education, health, and secondary road maintenance, from the councils to the central government. The minister of Local Government cited "prevalence of administrative problems including, incompetence, dereliction of duty, failure to collect revenue, failure to keep accounts and failure to maintain financial control. . ." as the major reasons why the central government was taking over these functions and therefore reducing the scope of local autonomy.²¹

A closer analysis of what really happened, however, reveals that local authorities in Kenya faced several other problems besides those emanating from poor administration within the organizations. First, local authorities had, since independence, faced a functional overload in relation to available administrative capacity; secondly, they had faced a declining financial base; thirdly, as a consequence of this, they were becoming increasingly dependent financially upon the central government.

A principal aspect of the decline in the running of local authorities in Kenya was the administrative overload. Three new services that had previously been administered by the central government were suddenly placed on the shoulders of the country on independence. Many of these councils, however, had been managed by council clerks who, as Hannigan points out, were not always to the mark: "They were all too often worthy men of clerical grade, who lived under the shadow cast by the effulgence of the district commissioners, persons who had neither the training nor the qualifications to play the role of leader in council affairs when the time came for the disappearance of the district commissioner."²²

The crucial problem, however, was not so much the lack of competent clerks but the lack of treasurers, as there was a dearth of Africans with the requisite training and qualifications. The government did try to ameliorate this problem by undertaking training programs for both clerks and treasurers at the Kenya Institute of Administration, but such efforts were made difficult by the fact that upon graduation many of these people left for jobs either in the central government or in the private sector. So most councils remained staffed, at the senior levels, by people whose qualifications and experience were quite inadequate even to handle the few functions handled by the country councils before 1963, let alone the increased and expanded duties since independence.

As mentioned earlier, the increased and expanded activities were again not matched by commensurate revenues. The new graduated personal tax had replaced the poll tax as the main source of revenue for local authorities. The government commission that had recommended its institution had believed that "there was sufficient capacity available within the gambit of the new tax to offer a major contribution to the major problems."²³ In reality, however, the graduated personal tax proved difficult to collect in rural areas where most taxpayers were self-employed peasant farmers with low and often fluctuating cash incomes, in addition to the fact that because they were living in scattered communities, collection became very laborious and expensive. Other sources of revenue, including produce cesses, were to prove even more volatile than the graduated personal tax; total revenues from produce cesses were generally difficult to predict as they were dependent upon weather conditions as well as the fortunes of these crops on unpredictable world markets. In general, therefore, many of the councils could hardly ever expect to meet most of their increased financial obligations from these independent sources of revenue.

In order to be able to finance these activities, the councils progressively became dependent upon central government grants, which tended to be accompanied by the imposition of further controls and directions on council activities by the governments, over and above the statutory controls and supervision already exercised by the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Administration. With time, council committees found themselves being steered not by the councils but by central government departments. The councilors could find little reason in these circumstances to regard themselves as being responsible for council activities, many of which had in any case been ceded to the central government. It was no accident, therefore, that the council faced the administrative problems cited by the Minister of Local Government, as referred to earlier—these problems were symptoms of problems that were more fundamental.

Thus it may be said that although mismanagement may have taken place, as evidenced by the many adverse reports by the auditor-general, decentralized administration in the form of devolutionary local govern-

ment was never given the necessary political support by the central government. The division of responsibilities and authority was from the beginning not balanced. Councils were given a lot of responsibilities, yet they were constrained with regard to ways of raising revenues to finance these responsibilities, as well as by being subjected to constant control and supervision by central government agencies. By 1969, therefore, the inevitable happened: many councils found it difficult to operate the decentralized functions as they did not have enough financial resources. It was in these circumstances that the Local Government Transfer of Functions Bill came to be introduced in October 1969; and with the transfer of these functions, the county councils became reduced to insignificant debating-society-type local organizations. The center had now regained full control over all major aspects of local-level socioeconomic development.

Decentralization by Deconcentration

The second approach to decentralization involved a progressive buildup of the Development Planning Committee system within the provincial administration. This thrust, which had been started soon after independence, came to be given a push during the 1966-70 five-year-plan period.

Organizationally the thrust entailed, on the one hand, a tagging of a planning capability onto the provincial administration at the provincial level, by posting there several planning and statistical personnel under a provincial planning officer. This planning office, as it was called, was to provide advice, support, and backup to the provincial commissioner, who was to increasingly become involved in ensuring that plans by the respective ministries took into account the provincial "interest." On the other hand, a series of provincial and district development committees, which were chaired by the provincial and district commissioners, respectively, were set up throughout the country. The provincial planning officer acted as secretary to these committees. Paralleling these committees were provincial and district development advisory committees whose membership included politicians and local notables, as well as government officers. Finally, beneath the district development committees were community development committees that extended down to the project level and were linked vertically to the National Community Development Committee acting as the supraorganization for encouraging community development efforts nationally.

It should be pointed out, however, that the intention of setting up these committees was not to alter the vertical relationship that field-based ministerial representatives had with their ministerial headquarters. These remained accountable and responsible to their headquarters: they were appointed, paid, and disciplined by the headquarters, with much of their planning activity being integrated vertically into the ministry's national

plans. All they were expected to do under the modified arrangements was to keep the provincial planning organization informed about what their ministry was doing in the province; and it was hoped that if they were ever consulted by the ministry headquarters regarding project developments in the province, they would try to protect the interests of the province. The basic relationship between these technical officers and provincial administration remained as it had always been: they viewed the latter as "a first among equals," insofar as operational activities were concerned. The unintegrated *prefectural* type of field administration was still in force.

To what extent did the limited objectives of securing some horizontal coordination at the provincial, district, and local levels; and facilitating some participation in planning succeed?

As noted earlier, coordination of planning at the province and district was supposed to be performed by the provincial planning officer, using the authority of the provincial commissioner, which, as noted earlier, was considerable. The provincial and district development advisory committees, which were intended to participate in one way or another in the coordination system by involving politicians and local notables, had no better luck: observers have noted that generally they are moribund—the politicians tended to ignore them, mainly because they considered them to be irrelevant to the process of resource allocation, which is what planning is about.²⁴ So planning continued to remain a technical activity that was vertically oriented with little, if any, formal opportunity to influence action from lower and intermediate levels.

Indeed the center tried to bring under its control the only remaining area for people's participation, by attempting to bring under its ambit almost all privately initiated development projects. This was tried by requiring would-be development project initiators to liaise with these committees, with the expectation that information on all planned projects would eventually find its way into the provincial planning system, and any projects that would be deemed undesirable would be stopped before take-off. Available evidence suggests, however, that the expected "order" in planning did not take place as most project initiators preferred to work outside the prescribed organizational framework; and where it did, it tended to discourage community participation.²⁵ The institutionalization of the role of the provincial planning officer proved difficult to achieve—departmental planning and programming predated the new provincial planning machinery and both the ministry's headquarters as well as their field representatives were just not ready to accept the interference of the provincial planning officer. Many provincial technical heads regarded the office as an interloper, while others simply ignored its presence and continued to plan independently like they had always done.²⁶

Coordination and control was also supposed to be performed by the series of development committees, which were charged with responsibil-

ities for the general coordination of planning activities at each level, including the pursuit of plan objectives and targets, the evaluation progress, the improvement of implementation, and the coordination and control of self-help projects within broad plan objectives. In this regard the committees could make recommendations to sectoral ministries regarding development projects to be included in ministerial plans. In reality, however, they rarely made recommendations regarding concrete development projects, concentrating on politicking and resolution of intralocal squabbles.

More recently, the center has decided to introduce some amount of deconcentrated decision-making at the district level by requiring ministries to grant more authority and responsibility to the district-level personnel. This is supposed to be so with respect to the authority to spend development funds after having been passed by the parliament. These new arrangements include also measures for strengthening horizontal coordination at this level through the development committee system. The system has just recently been implemented and, therefore, not much can be said, it may be too soon to make valid conclusions regarding its effectiveness, though Walter Oyugi tends to suggest that the amount of discretion given to the district officials is just too little and the mechanism for securing horizontal coordination cannot be expected to yield better results than earlier measures.²⁷ The system of decision-making essentially remains very centralized and, like before, the measures adopted could never be expected to result in meaningful decentralization.

III. DECENTRALIZATION IN TANZANIA

Although the basic features of the inherited system of administration in Tanzania resembled its Kenyan and Zambian counterparts, the centralist tendency had always been less pronounced in Tanzania than in either Kenya or Zambia. Partly for this reason, appeals for, and possibilities of, decentralization have perhaps been greater in Tanzania than in Kenya and Zambia. Ecologically, Tanzania is a large country, consisting of varied groupings of regions and districts where an effective system of centralized administration would be difficult, even if there was the desire and capacity to develop one. Thus decentralization was, and still is, a practical necessity—it is the only way that burdens on central decision-makers can be reduced and delays and distortions in local administrative action be avoided.

Politically, Tanzania was in a better position to try decentralized forms of administration than many African countries, including Kenya, since the country lacked, and still lacks, the marked ethnic and regional differences that might otherwise have posed a threat to the center under a decentral-

to abolish in 1972 the district councils altogether. The explanation by the central government then was that most of the problems faced by the councils were due to incompetence and dishonesty on the part of council staff and councillors, who could not maintain tolerable standards of integrity and efficiency.³¹

Whilst accepting that, as in the case of the country councils in Kenya, the standard of financial integrity and honesty on the part of the councillors left a lot to be desired, as the reports of auditors show, this was more of a symptom rather than a cause.³² Other more encompassing explanations must therefore be sought.

One explanation ascribes the problems that the local government system faced, as with the case of Kenya, to an administrative overload. Put simply, the local government system faced problems because it was asked to shoulder responsibilities that were not commensurate with its authority and power. The argument proceeds along the same lines as that on the Kenyan local government system.

First, the new system had placed many new responsibilities on the local government system, including education, health, and secondary roads, responsibilities that had not been previously handled by them. The transfer of these responsibilities took place when pressure for the expansion of these services was most intense, with both the general populace and the central government, through self-help schemes and grants-in-aid, contributing directly to the expansion of these services. Secondly, as the district councils were experiencing this increase in the number of their functions, most of them were experiencing a decline in administrative capacity. They were losing some of their more qualified and experienced personnel to the Africanization exercise or some simply had their service ended as a result of the abolition of chieftainship. The departing officers therefore tended to be replaced by less qualified and less experienced personnel. Thirdly, these developments took place at a time when the supervision of the day-to-day operations of the local authorities, which had previously been performed by the district commissioner, was now to be exercised by the elected councillors, who did not have the experience and the competence to exercise that control. The councils remained under the overall supervision of the regional commissioner, as "proper officer," together with the local government officers; but the former was to exercise control in very major issues, and the latter were few and did not have the experience to cope with councils bedeviled by expanded loads and constrained with inadequate capacities. The noted irregularities were therefore a result of irresponsibility, as much as they were a result of deliberate malpractice.

This administrative overload expressed itself even more blatantly when it came to financial resources. The independence movement had thrived partly upon the citizens' dissatisfactions with the level of social services

provided by the colonial government. The attainment of independence, therefore, led to rising expectations on the part of the citizens with regard to these services. The new councils, which were even closer to the people, thus faced greater pressures along these lines. The central government, moreover, made matters worse by asking the councils to take on responsibilities that had formerly been performed by the voluntary agencies, such as the churches, and by requiring some local authorities in the less developed areas to expand the level of certain services beyond what the councils might have wanted to.³³

As this expansion was taking place, the revenue situation of many councils was progressively becoming worse. Local rates, which were supposed to be the main source of revenue, proved to be difficult to collect; and it was almost impossible to apply elements of progressiveness in making tax assessments since it was hard to determine the incomes of the rural agricultural population. As a result, in time the local authorities started to resort to using high-handed methods in collecting the taxes, methods reminiscent of the colonial government practices—a development that the central government and the ruling party could not countenance. The central government was to increasingly intervene to prevent councils from imposing unreasonable tax rates and from using unpopular methods in the collection of taxes. There is evidence, in any case, that revenues lost as a result of this intervention by the center would have made little difference to the councils' revenue position: the economic base just simply could not yield the revenues required to finance the expanded services.³⁴

A few local authorities, however, experienced improved revenue situations and they were able to expand the level of services appreciably. These were situated in areas possessing a good economic base, areas that raised several major cash crops and provided a good tax base. Given the central government's unhappiness with the poor performance of most local authorities, it might have been expected that the government would have appreciated and encouraged those few councils doing well. "Good" performance, however, was to attract the center's displeasure.³⁵ The reasons for this "bizarre" behavior on the part of the central government forms the other, and probably the more important, explanation for the lack of effectiveness in Tanzania's local government system.

The central government was not prepared to see the development of an alternative power center, which could challenge its authority effectively, as much as it was not prepared to see the development of a power vacuum. The central government was committed to a policy of progressive elimination of geographical inequalities within the country, and soon after independence steps were taken to ensure that the depressed areas received extra attention from the center. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 reinforced this policy commitment. The "good" performance of some of the district councils, therefore, tended to be seen as detraction from the attainment

of this objective; while depressed areas when left on their own were neither able to expand the level of services nor even maintain what they had inherited, those areas with potential seemed to be investing too much in development and expanding social services a little too fast. If left to continue, this trend could subvert the center's egalitarian objectives.³⁶

As such, the government's reluctance to grant more effective power and authority to the councils, the imposition of so many controls, the abolition of the major independent sources of council revenues, the Transfer of Functions Act of 1969, as well as the final abolition of the District Councils in 1972, ought to be understood in this light. When viewed in this perspective, one also understands why the councils performing well became subjected to a similar treatment as the incompetent ones.

Decentralization by Deconcentration: The 1972 Reforms

In 1972 the government announced a major reorganization of its system of local administration, and in the words of the president, the action was aimed at "transferring decision-making powers and responsibilities to the people."³⁷ This move was praised by observers who viewed it as an unprecedented revolutionary and democratic action.³⁸

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, several reviewers of the reform effort, including the government, were writing to the effect that the exercise had not resulted in the anticipated citizen participation in decision-making.³⁹ Indeed, many reviewers have used it to demonstrate how participatory-oriented decentralized systems are difficult to institutionalize in third world countries.⁴⁰ It is suggested, on the one hand, that because of a centralist tradition, central authorities were not willing to release power to people-controlled organizations; and, on the other hand, that locally based bureaucrats often usurped the power and authority transferred by the center so that it did not reach the people for whom it was intended;⁴¹ and that the kulaks, in concert with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, usurped the people's power.⁴²

The foregoing arguments are essentially invalid because they are based on assumptions about the objectives of this form of decentralization that are erroneous. Many of them assume that participation was a major objective of the reform measures. It is our view, however, that the decentralization measures of 1972 were not intended to facilitate people's participation. In effect citizen participation was then viewed as a constraint to the attainment of the principal objectives of the exercise. A review of developments preceding the 1972 reforms as well as the content of the decentralization reforms does lend support to this view.

Earlier on it was demonstrated how, in the late 1960s, the government had been progressively diluting the autonomy devolutionary local government was all but in name dead. Indeed in the same year, the government

appointed a commission to look into ways of reorganizing local administration, with terms of reference that precluded consideration of autonomous or participatory local administrative structures. The commission's report recommended, in broad outline, a deconcentrated system at the level of the region.⁴³ When, therefore, McKinsey and Company were commissioned to "study the present machinery for planning, identify administrative and implementation bottlenecks in the development planning system and recommend solutions that take into account the existing constraints and manpower at all levels,"⁴⁴ they were to address themselves to organizational and structural dimensions of a deconcentrated system. Specifically they were to suggest organizational and management solutions to: (1) problems of duplication and lack of coordination among government departments based at the regional and district levels, as well as between them and the district council; (2) delays in decision-making occasioned by the need to consult headquarters by ministerial field units; and (3) problems emanating from development disparities among regions. The aspect of participation, though mentioned among the objectives, tended to be referred to peripherally, mainly in terms of its possible contribution to the attainment of the other objectives.

This organizational and management orientation of the reforms is, moreover, not only suggested by the use of a foreign management consultancy firm but also by the composition of the committee that was to guide the consultancy firm. The membership of this committee included the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Development Planning, as its secretary; principal secretaries of the ministries of Rural Development, Agriculture, Communications and Works, Commerce and the Treasury; and the general manager of the National Development Corporation. The principal secretary in the president's office was its chairman. The committee was definitely high-powered, technical in orientation, and it might have been a "miracle" to expect it to find participation as a relevant subject matter. The absence of a serious participative component in the decentralized machinery proposed by McKinsey was not therefore a function of either forgetfulness or even a part of a neocolonial plot, as has been suggested in some circles.⁴⁵ It had all along been intended by the government to be that way.

The emerging organizational structure did indeed attempt to feature the objectives referred to earlier. First, in order to deal with the problems of horizontal coordination and attain some level of integration, the existing machinery for field administration was restructured. In place of the hitherto fragmented field organizations of central government ministries and semi-independent district councils, a strongly integrated development organization became established at the regional and district levels. These regional and district organizations were charged with planning and implementing local development programs and administering local affairs

with a minimum of interference from Dar-es-Salaam, and also with a minimum of duplication and confusion at the local level.

The task of managing and leading these organizations was shared between the regional or area commissioners, on the one hand, and the regional or district development directors, on the other. The former continued, as before, to ensure the smooth conduct of political affairs, including informing local communities of national policies; providing support to the elected party leadership; and generally ensuring political stability in their areas. In view of the increased scope of activities, the status of the regional commissioner was made equivalent to minister. Regional and district development directors were made responsible for ensuring that development plans were well-prepared and implemented and that finances were properly utilized and accounted for. In order to avoid getting bogged down by administrative details so as to devote their time to setting priorities and reviewing implementation progress, they were to be assisted by three staff officers in the fields of planning, finance, and personnel. These staff officers were to ensure that the functional or technical officers were provided with requisite logistic support to perform their development tasks.

The second aspect of the decentralization measures was the redistribution of powers and responsibilities among different levels and branches of government. Essentially this involved the transfer of responsibilities and some authority for the running of certain governmental functions, including aspects of primary education, health, water supply, public works, agricultural extension, and natural resources management from ministries to the newly integrated regional district organizations. These organizations were in the future to plan, program, budget, and disburse funds in respect to these deconcentrated functions. A paraphernalia of committees that were part of this new organizational structure were expected to make their contribution in planning, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of plans. To facilitate the transfer of responsibility and avoid the administrative overload problem, resources were also to be relocated to lower level organs. Thus the exercise involved the relocation of very high caliber personnel from the center to regional- and district-level organizations to fill both the newly created directorate and other administrative posts, as well as the technical and functional posts.

The third aspect of the measures, which was indeed a continuation of a trend that started when district councils still existed, was the centralization of decision-making in respect to budgetary matters. The new organizations were to retain no authority for raising revenues—this function was centralized in the treasury, the cabinet, and the parliament. The deconcentrated organizations, using all the machinery at their disposal from the village to the regional level, were to work out development proposals and their budget proposals and submit these to the treasury,

through the office of the prime minister, and ultimately to the parliament, which decided on all government expenditures. True, the regional officials were expected not to be innocent bystanders, they could lobby and apply influence in support of their budgetary requests, and this made some difference regarding the level of allocations by parliament. Yet it remains that the decision had ultimately to be made by the parliament and not by local decentralized authority.

A fourth aspect of the 1972 decentralization measures was that they were centralist in orientation. The measures were to strengthen the control powers of central organs. Thus the office of the prime minister was charged with providing guidelines in planning, budgeting, and coordinating the regions' and districts' plans for consideration by the Ministry of Development Planning and the Treasury, as well as supervising the operations of these ministries. The latter included a major function—that of ensuring that the decentralized system had adequate personnel.

A final feature of the decentralization measures involved a tagging, onto the essentially bureaucratic organization, of a series of development committees stretching from the village level to the regional level. These committees were to guide and be guided by the bureaucratic organizations with respect to the planning and implementation of development plans at respective levels. If the decentralization reforms had any participatory component, it was probably this aspect.⁴⁶

It is worth noting, however, that all these committees had existed prior to 1972, and theoretically they had about the same type of relationship with the regional, district, and village officials when it came to planning. What changed in 1972 was not so much the introduction of the committee system but the integration of the regional and district developmental units into a prefectural system, making it possible for the committees at various levels to deal with a unified development organization.⁴⁷ People could now have a say in what type of project they wanted, but the ultimate decision rested with the parliament in Dar-es-Salaam. Gone were the days when locally elected councillors, under pressure from constituents, could push for the financing of undesirable development projects or, alternatively, sit idle because their areas were too impoverished to undertake development projects. The central government was now, at least theoretically, in control; and this tallied well with what the center considered to be desirable.

How successful were these reforms? Research indicates that integration of development activity with the consequential reduction in duplication and waste did result from the reform; decision-making with regard to certain governmental activities became simplified and faster; and central control over local-level planning was increased. There is, however, no evidence to show that the center managed to control the growth of regional inequalities, although when measured in terms of the expansion of social

services, there has been some marked success. All in all, however, the 1972 reforms in relation to real objectives were, as judged by most observers, significantly successful.⁴⁸

This success, however, caused other types of problems for the central government, including the transfer of the overload problems noted earlier to the center. The transfer of ultimate decision-making power in respect to decision over budgets to the Treasury and the Parliament resulted in the redirection of all demands for development resources to the center. From then on, local officers and citizens became spared of the responsibility for having to think of how the development projects they were proposing were going to be financed. Research indicates that the center was never able to develop the capacity to generate enough revenue to finance all public development projects, together with recurrent expenditure, especially at a time when the country was embarking on several major development activities, including villagization and universal primary education.⁴⁹

The situation was further complicated by the fact that, in many cases, the development projects and consequential budgets submitted from the lower levels were very unrealistic and had to be severely trimmed as they moved up the ladder, to the extent that by the time the parliament eventually passed regional budgets, there was no resemblance between the original proposals and what had been approved.⁵⁰ With time, lower level organizations became demoralized and stopped taking the budget exercise seriously. They simply waited for the center to allocate the amount it considered fit, which was often mainly a function of how much revenue the center expected to raise, plus the amount of political pressure exerted by the regional officials.⁵¹

Over time, the center came to realize that the level of service delivered at the local level was progressively becoming poor and that one of the main reasons was because much local initiative, which had previously supplemented central government funding, had petered away with the 1972 reforms, and a dependency syndrome had set in.⁵² The center was well aware that it did not have the capacity to sustain this dependency, especially at a time when the country was experiencing its worst foreign-exchange and fiscal crisis. So in 1982, it decided to reactivate devolutionary local government once again in order to lighten the pressure on itself.

The 1982 Local Government Reforms

In June 1982 the Parliament passed the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, enjoining the minister of Local Government to work toward:

the promotion of local government in mainland Tanzania, including

the evolution, progressive development and perpetuation of local government institutions geared and devoted to the pursuance of meaningful involvement of, and participation by the people in the making of decisions on matters affecting or connected with their livelihood and well-being at all local levels.⁵³

Structurally, the act seriously reorganizes the 1972 decentralized system. At the regional level the structure remains very much as it was under the system adopted in 1972, with the regional development director in control of a series of regionally based technical and professional activities. At the district level, however, the district council for the pre-1972 era has been reinstated with almost the same powers, authority, and responsibilities. A major difference from the pre-1972 local government system, however, is that in the present system all development activity is integrated under the management of the district council. Central government can only be represented at the district level by the nondevelopmental departments, as well as by the law-and-order arm of the government.

To what extent has the government attempted to deal with the problems of the two previous arrangements in the present setup?

It was noted that in the pre-1972 organizational arrangements, the major problems included the following: first, because central government ministries tended to post their representatives to the regions and districts, there was little cooperation and coordination among the various technical agencies; if anything, these tended to conflict. Secondly, there tended to be little cooperation and coordination between these agencies, on the one hand, and the district councils, on the other. The system that came into force in 1972 tried to take care of the problem of integration by organization. The system of 1982 did not abandon the integrated administrative system, except that now all operations were integrated into a local authority, and the district council.

Another problem that the pre-1972 district councils faced was finance. We saw that many councils were nearly insolvent by the time the district councils were abolished in 1972, mainly due to inadequate generation of revenues, poor resource bases, or simply inefficient management of revenues. During the decentralization period, such problems were not experienced, since all revenues were going to the consolidated fund, expenditure being debited to it. The present arrangements provide for the levying of taxes, cesses, and local rates by the district councils, more or less as in pre-1972 arrangements to "deserving" cases. Since 1972, however, many districts have been subdivided to the effect that there are many more district councils whose economic bases are very precarious, more so than was the case previously.

Furthermore, the new district councils are more likely to have top-heavy bureaucracies than their counterparts in the pre-1972 days; and this

would tend to add to the cost of operating them. This is because, whereas in the pre-1972 system the level and size of senior personnel were determined by the grade of the district council (the grading in turn determined by the scope of activities, levels of revenue generated, geographical size, and population), the present arrangements provide for a uniform approach to staffing. Each district council will be headed by a district executive director, with all the executive directors being uniformly graded at MS 12, a treasurer at MS 9, and a series of technical officers at MS 8. The consequence will be that councils with highly differing revenue bases and scopes of activities will be paying more or less the same wage bill for their senior level officers.

The question of poor management of financial resources, however, may be less of a problem this time since the number of qualified personnel available to the government has increased; and the care that has been taken in selecting treasurers will probably reduce the chances of losses through incompetence. Furthermore, the government has appointed and posted well-qualified local government officers to the districts, and these should be able to oversee the use of district council funds more efficiently than was the case when the overseeing function was being performed at the district level.

A final problem that the reestablishment of the district councils is supposed to deal with, and which manifested itself in the decentralization arrangements of 1972, is the domination of the decision-making system at the district level by the bureaucrats and the near elimination of participation by the citizenry. The new system provides for the direct election of the councillors and their chairmen, the making of all decisions that relate to finance by the council and its committees, etc. Even though technocrats can advise the councils and their committees, they are not supposed to take part in decision-making. This is definitely a great improvement over the decentralization system of 1972 and should go a long way toward restoring initiative at the local level, which was progressively dying out.

The consequence of the reinstatement of participative devolutionary decision-making under the existing financial arrangements, however, may lead to the reemergence of acute regional disparities, since areas with rich resource endowments will, as in the past, tax themselves into development; whereas the poorly endowed areas will not afford to do so, a situation that may tend to cause, as in the past, conflict between the center and the local areas.

One way of dealing with the problem of regional inequalities without sacrificing local autonomy is for the government to approach devolution of local autonomy differentially. Responsibilities should be devolved into local areas on the basis of their respective capacities and capabilities to manage such responsibilities. The greater the capacity and capability

a local area has, the more should be the responsibilities devolved onto it, and the less involved the center would be with such an area. With transferred responsibilities would follow commensurate authority and power. The implication of the above proposal for Tanzania's new local government system is that not all district councils should have the same responsibilities and authority transferred to them. Councils ought to be graded on the basis of capacities, with those graded higher being given more developmental responsibilities and those at the bottom of the scale being given less responsibilities. Those with greater responsibilities would be given greater authority to raise revenues on their own from more diversified sources with the authority diminishing on a sliding scale as the scope of responsibilities got reduced. Those districts whose capacities would be minimal would be under the central government and would thus be the greatest recipients of central government resources. This would ensure that areas with least development potential receive adequate attention, without killing the initiative of the well-endowed. That way the local areas can enjoy some autonomy without threatening the center's egalitarian objectives.

IV. DECENTRALIZATION IN ZAMBIA

When Zambia gained independence in 1964, she inherited an administrative structure at the local and intermediate levels that could at best be characterized as a blend of the unintegrated prefectural system and the devolutionary system, with the former being more dominant.⁵⁴ The unintegrated prefectural system was composed of a fragmented collection of field units of central government; technical departments that were linked authoritatively to ministry headquarters; and an essentially bureaucratic administrative structure. This structure was generally known as provincial administration, responsible for law and order and the general administrative conduct of each respective province and district. Its responsibilities many times included the administration of justice, collection of taxes, supervision of local government units, and a host of other residual functions.⁵⁵ Provincial administrative personnel, like their counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania, did generally enjoy a first-among-equals status, vis-à-vis field-based technical ministerial representatives; although Kenya's provincial administration had amassed even more status and power ever since the days of the emergency.

The devolutionary component of the local administrative system had, like its counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania, been developed over time since 1924, when the British South African Company handed over its administrative role to the British colonial office and a decision was made to apply the principles of indirect rule to the new territory. The implementation

of indirect rule involved the creation of a special institution known as the Native Authority for each tribal grouping, presided over by the tribal ruler, now christened "paramount chief." Below the paramount chiefs were territorial chiefs, each with their own councils but coordinated by the Native Authority Council. The powers exercised by these authorities were initially concerned with tax collection, police, and judicial duties, but in due course they came to share with central government ministries the management of certain social services, including primary education, rural health services, and minor public works. Efforts to strengthen the local authorities were also to entail the democratization of these authorities through the progressive incorporation of nonchiefly elements into the councils, either through informal elections or by appointment.

The incorporation in 1953 of Zambia into the Central African Federation, which was under the control of white settlers, weakened the devolutionary efforts within the Zambian administration, as the white settlers opposed any efforts to strengthen the powers of the Africans. The period between 1953 and 1963, therefore, witnessed a gradual strengthening of the provincial administration and a gradual loss of the local authorities' powers to the field-based central ministerial representatives. As the country approached independency, therefore, local authorities were existing but in name and most governmental functions at the provincial and district levels were being performed by field agencies of central government ministries, under the general supervision of the provincial or district commissioner.

Since independence the government has taken steps to remodel the inherited system of local administration; and, like Kenya and Tanzania, it has attempted to decentralize decision-making through both the devolutionary and deconcentration approaches.

Decentralization by Devolution

When Zambia attained independence in 1964, the local authority system that had been developed from the indirect-rule system of administration was initially retained subject to minor restructuring and streamlining as per the Local Government Act of 1965. The rationalizing involved the bringing of all local authorities under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Government, as well as making all of them responsible to an electorate, although elections could be informal in some of the smaller communities.

Up to this point, the changes that took place resembled developments that had taken place in Kenya and Tanzania. When it came to the devolution of powers and responsibilities, however, Zambia preferred to transfer them very discriminatingly, doing so only when a local authority could satisfy the minister responsible for local government that it had the capacity to handle new functions. In effect, the postindependence rural lo-

cal authorities, like the native authorities before them, were to be responsible for only very minor functions, including water supply and rural public works. Major activities, including primary education and public health, continued to be run by the central government remarked in 1977, "no rural Council ever developed requisite capacity to handle such complex activities."⁵⁶

To meet the financial obligations arising out of these functions, councils were empowered to raise revenue from several sources, which mainly included graduated personal levy, licenses, and fees. Even then the turnover tended to fall far short of council expenditure, necessitating a reliance on grants from the central government.

The central government did maintain some supervision and control over council performance, but this control tended to be much less than in the cases of Tanzania or Kenya. In the first place, the councils employed all their own personnel, including those in the provincial local government service boards, who handled discipline and provided some sense of security for council employees. The other control was over finance, and this was exercised by the local government division of the prime minister's office. Day-to-day supervision was maintained by the provincial local government officer, who, with the assistance of financial advisers and auditors, checked the estimates, audited the books of accounts, and oversaw their finance and administration. These arrangements meant that the councils operated largely independent of the district administration, and hence it was difficult to ensure an integrated approach to development at district level. The councils did their own things, and, however minor they were, they did them with very little interference from the center, always hoping that with increased capacity they could be given more responsibilities.

For some time the central government did not mind this situation: on several occasions it restructured the provincial administrative system, as well as the system for managing technical services in the field, without disturbing the rural local authorities. Three years ago, however, in a major reorganization of local administration, the devolutionary district councils, as well as other district-based central government agencies, were integrated into a new district-level authority, known as the district council. Unlike in Tanzania and Kenya, where the local authorities had experienced immense problems and their abolition or restriction was in view of that factor as much as it was part of a propensity for centralization on the part of the central leadership, it is fair to say that in Zambia the abolition of the district councils in 1981 was more a function of the propensity for centralization since the local authorities seemed to have been doing well.⁵⁷

Decentralization by Deconcentration

It appears from the foregoing that the central government was not enthusiastic about decentralizing administration through devolution. So the bulk of governmental activities were to continue to be performed through the central government, and since it was necessary to have some activities decentralized, this would have to be done through other methods. The past twenty years, therefore, have witnessed the Zambian government's reorganization of the nondevolutionary components of its local administration with a view to providing for some decentralization within the decision-making system.

The first reform measures, which were carried out on a piecemeal basis between 1964 and 1969, consisted of measures intended to reduce the dominance of the erstwhile provincial administration over all institutions in the province. This was to be done by abolishing the positions of provincial and district commissioner and with their replacement by two other posts: that of a politically appointed head of the province, variously known as under-minister, resident minister, or minister of state, who was to politically be in charge of the province; and that of a civil service appointed resident secretary, who was to be the civil service head of the province. No political head was appointed at the district level, although the district secretary was, like this regional counterpart, expected to shed his political roles. In addition, some of the functions of the provincial administration, including police and judicial functions, were to be taken over by the police and judiciary departments, respectively.

The post of the under-minister did not entail any statutory powers over ministries and departments based on the province. In this respect, therefore, there was little change from the earlier position of the counterpart, whereby the provincial commissioner had not exercised any statutory authority over field units of departments and ministries. He was nonetheless expected to provide guidance to the entire province, and through his chairmanship of the provincial development committee, he could, theoretically, influence the actions of these units to some extent. In effect, however, neither the under-minister nor the civil service secretaries were able to secure the cooperation of technical services field-based representatives; the latter continued to report to their departmental headquarters.⁵⁸ Indeed, even the under-minister was, to some extent, many a time unable to make the resident or district secretaries feel accountable to him. Cases of disputes and quarrels between them seemed to be the norm rather than the exception.⁵⁹ It seemed that the anticipated coordination of government and party activities, as well as the development work that these moves were aimed at, was proving difficult.

It is against this background that the 1969 "decentralization" measures were introduced. As President Kenneth D. Kaunda said, they were

intended to:

ensure that the influence of Government is felt at all levels of society right down to the village and to make doubly sure that Government policies and intentions are clearly explained to and understood by all our people who gave us the mandate to manage the country's affairs. . . . To ensure that there is integration in respect to all Government activities at all levels and that the Party and Government cooperate.⁶⁰

A cabinet circular of May 1, 1970, further outlined the objectives thus:

- A. To ensure, as much as possible, direct contact between the cabinet, as the central policy-making body of the government, and the people in the provinces and districts, whose well-being was the main objective of all government activity, with the overall aim of accelerating the development of rural areas;
- B. To revive the villages as a basic unit of administration in rural areas and make it an effective unit for rural development;
- C. To bring home to the people the need to strive constantly for economic and social progress through the development of both self-reliance and mutual cooperation; and
- D. To ensure that the government's development plans are implemented rigorously.

It is clear from both President Kaunda's statement and the cabinet circular that the main objectives of the reforms were to facilitate harmony between the party and government hierarchies, to facilitate horizontal coordination of development activities, and to facilitate greater party and state penetration into the localities. This view is reinforced when one reviews the organizational restructuring that was undertaken as part of the reform measures.

The implementation of administrative decentralization was guided by one major principle, namely "decentralization in centralism," which was defined by President Kaunda as:

a measure whereby through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of our Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and Government machinery at the centre in the interest of unity.⁶¹

This approach to decentralization has been linked to Lord Lugard's indirect rule system, which was essentially a form of decentralization with strong coordination at the center.⁶² It was clearly exclusive of political devolution. As demonstrated by the following facts, the emphasis was on de-

centralization along deconcentration and the revival of a strong prefectural system in the provinces and districts.

First, the reforms entailed a reactivation of the prefectural system of field administration both in the provinces and the districts, although it was the unintegrated prefectural type. A cabinet minister was appointed for each of the eight provinces. He was assisted by a deputy minister and a permanent secretary, the latter being the chief civil servant in the provincial administration. The minister was the chief political and administrative officer in the province, reminiscent of the colonial provincial commissioners. As a member of the cabinet, he was equivalent in rank to other cabinet ministers and shared collective responsibility with them on government policy and in advising the president. Their provincial responsibilities were specified as follows:

- A. He is the personal political representative of the head of state within the province.
- B. He is the government's coordinating minister for the province and chairman of the Provincial Development Committee, supervising generally the activities of all government departments within the geographical area of the province, and will therefore need to be fully aware of the policies of the ministries in Lusaka.
- C. He is charged to ensure that the presence of government is felt throughout the province, especially at the village level, and that government policies and procedures are fully understood by the people;
- D. He is to ensure productivity in all fields and morale of all people in the province including the public, civil servants, police, the defense forces, etc., and
- E. He is responsible within his province for coordinating the functions of all government departments through the Provincial and Local Government Division of the Office of Vice President.

The provincial permanent secretary was to assist the cabinet minister in administrative matters. However, he not only reported to his minister but also to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament; to the permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance and Development; and to the permanent secretary, Provincial and Local Government. Relationships between provincial permanent secretaries and their counterparts in the central ministries were to be of those among equals, mainly on horizontal coordinative and consultative lines. The latter were to coordinate the staffing and routing matters in the provinces and districts through the provincial

permanent secretaries.

The above arrangements were replicated at the district level with the district governor playing the role of the minister and reporting to the provincial cabinet minister; while the district secretary played the role of permanent secretary, and in turn reported to the provincial permanent secretary.

As in the unintegrated prefectural systems of field administration in other places, however, field activities continued to be managed through vertical relationships between districts, provinces, and ministries. This was particularly true in respect to three of the major functions—plan formulation, budgeting, and financial control. The field representative of technical ministries at each level continued to be responsible and accountable to the officer at the next level and not to the district secretary/governor or provincial cabinet minister/permanent secretary.

A second indication of the emphasis on decentralization along deconcentration was the creation of a series of development committees, as was the case particularly in Tanzania and to some degree in Kenya, with elements of participation at the provincial, district, ward, and village levels. These committees were, at the rhetorical level, supposed to provide for people's participation, as stated by President Kaunda:

Development programmes and participatory democracy require an administrative machinery which is efficient and effective as a means of not only transferring power and responsibility to the people but of guaranteeing that such power and responsibility are exercised fully by the people for their own individual social and economic welfare.⁶³

In effect, however, even the design of the committees clearly indicated that they were intended to be instruments for coordinating development activity at the respective levels and ultimately to secure coordination between the various levels and the center, as can be seen from the report that specified the functions of the provincial development committees:⁶⁴

- A. To maintain overall responsibility for the planning and implementation of development projects for the province;
- B. To prepare for submission, by the provincial permanent secretary to the Ministry of Finance, a comprehensive annual capital and recurrent budget for the province;
- C. To assess and coordinate district development proposals in accordance with provincial and national targets; and
- D. To establish and maintain effective communication between district and provincial levels.

Membership of the committees was to include several top civil servants; the members of Parliament from all constituencies in the province or district; and a few selected local government councillors. The committees were chaired by the provincial ministries in the provinces and by the district governors at the district levels. Below the district level, ward development and village productivity committees were to be established, and in turn these were to be linked to the district development committees, especially with regard to development planning.

With these measures, the government hoped to increase the effectiveness of development administration by increasing horizontal cooperation and coordination, leading to reduction in conflict and waste in the use of resources. Reviews have indicated that these anticipated results did not materialize, mainly because the anticipated horizontal cooperation and coordination never materialized, due to several reasons.⁶⁵

To start with, the reform measures has a number of structural and organizational weaknesses. In the first place, the organization was supposed to provide for participation by the citizens in plan formulation and implementation, however, all the institutions that were to carry out these functions were, at all levels, mainly composed of government bureaucratic and technical officials, with only a sprinkling of a few nonofficials, members of parliament, and councillors. In the second place, even though decision-making in respect to plans and budgets was supposed to be horizontally integrated at each level, with the provincial minister or permanent secretary and the district governor or secretary providing coordination, district-level and provincial-level technical ministry officials were expected to submit their plans and receive funds from their headquarters. The regional government minister was not given any precise portfolio of responsibilities for his province's affairs, having control neither over national projects nor over the recurrent expenditures of field-based sectoral departments. With that structural constraint, therefore, one wonders how the provincial minister and his permanent secretary were expected to coordinate development! The decentralization of authority through deconcentration was therefore stillborn, mainly due to the fact that central government ministries retained control over the wherewithal (the purse) for effective decision-making.

Secondly, studies do indicate that even those aspects of decision-making that had managed to escape the centralistic structural bias were to be bedeviled by certain environmental variables. These included:

- A. A negative attitude by Zambia's elite toward decentralization, as exemplified by the fact that many ministerial permanent secretaries in Lusaka considered that it would be irresponsible on their part to give their provincial officers increased authority and discretion on use of funds;⁶⁶

- B. Political turbulence expressing itself in frequent conflict between politicians and civil servants and among politicians of the various parties, often based on ethnic and tribal lines, until the country became a one-party state. (Efforts by the center to control these conflicts tended to draw the presidency into the picture, which in turn reinforced the centralizing tendency existing within the Zambian sociopolitical fabric. The result is that locally based organizations were kept in a state of flux and locally based officials could not develop stakes around their areas. No wonder decentralized administration did not develop effective roots);
- C. The tendency by peasants, the target group of the participative objective, to be unresponsive to participation.

The situation was no different in other African countries, for studies report similar behavior by peasants. It is suggested that they tend to be apathetic and conservative. However, recent studies suggest more complex factors behind nonparticipation in government programs. According to Joel Migdal, and more recently Goran Hyden, peasants are a calculating group that will participate only when the program in question promises some benefits for them. They are intensely aware of their subordinate positions in relationship to other groups, especially the bureaucratic class:

Owing to their relative powerlessness in their societies, peasants have, as much as possible, shunned participation in unstable societal institutions in which they could suffer exploitation at the hands of those above them on the social ladder.⁶⁷

Zambian peasants had been excluded from political power during the colonial era, their initial involvement was in support of UNIP's call for independence, which, when it was obtained, seemed to mean very little for them as a group—the fruits of independence went elsewhere in Africa, to the bourgeoisie. The village and ward were more instruments for the extraction of labor committees for self-help projects, collecting taxes, etc., than means through which they could get an opportunity to influence decision. Given such a situation peasants found little reason to participate in the forms. Thus Ollawa, in a study of this issue, found that only 4 percent of the peasants among his respondents attended ward development and village productivity committees, partly due to the small size of the bodies, but more so due to the lack of interest on the part of the respondents. By 1969 the government had anticipated a total of 25,000 village productivity committees. By 1977 there were less than one-half of these.⁶⁸ Thus, with the target group being largely unimpressed by the new structures, the 1969 reforms had suffered a big blow from below. It was incumbent upon the center to have a fresh look at these arrangements.

The 1980 Decentralization Reforms

In the review of Zambia's earlier attempts at decentralizing decision-making we noted that both the devolutionary decentralization strategy and the 1969 deconcentration strategy had not involved any serious transfer of responsibilities to lower level organs, whether these were the rural councils in 1965, or the provincial and district governments in 1969. This was in spite of the publicly stated objectives in both reform measures.

The objectives of the 1980 decentralization reforms, however, remain the same as those stated in respect of the Local Government Act of 1965 and the 1969 reforms: the mobilization of popular participation in government-sponsored programs, especially development projects in rural areas. There are, however, several points of departure from the local government system of 1965 and the 1969 decentralization reforms.

First the 1980 reforms bring together central and local government organizations into an integrated body known as the district council. Secondly, and probably most importantly, the 1980 reforms widen the scope and increase the number of functions to be performed by the newly created units. Thus all the functions that were previously performed by the local government authorities, the district administration (the district governor's office), as well as those activities that were performed by district agencies of central government ministries, are transferred to the district councils. Similarly the councils are empowered to work out budgets for purposes of financing these activities, including the raising of revenues through the imposition of taxes and levies on persons and property. Councils can also receive central government grants and subventions. Thirdly, the new measures entail an apparent loss of local autonomy, by the districts, especially, since the membership of the district councils are to be composed of ex-officio members (the bulk of whom are either party officials or government officials), as well as the fact that the chairman is to be the district governor. This apparent loss of autonomy, however, may be compensated for by the expanded scope of delegated responsibilities, which now gives the councils a reasonable and serious array of functions to deal with. Fourthly, the staffing of the councils will be a dual responsibility; on the one hand, the senior staff of the councils will continue to be hired and will be paid by the central government, while on the other hand, junior staff will be hired by the councils. The danger that this may bring some schism in the operations of the councils is taken care of by the fact that the district governors are chairmen of the district councils.

No one is in a position yet to judge how well the new reforms are going to work. But from the short account above there is little doubt that the designers of the new structure were very perceptive in their diagnosis of the problems encountered in the 1965 and 1969 attempts at decentralization, and there is no justification as yet to feel, like Lungu, that they

have very much neglected extrastructural concerns in their prescriptions. Contrary to Lungu's observation, the new integrated structure, which brings the government, local leaders, trade unionists, and army officials together under the supervision of trusted party officials, makes it possible to decentralize a large degree of responsibilities, power, and authority without fearing disintegrative tendencies.⁶⁹ It is the supervision of the new system by trusted party officials that has created, on the part of the would-be beneficiaries of the new measures, feeling that the main objective is control rather than participation and has thus generated mistrust and opposition. It is important to free the population from this feeling, otherwise the reforms may be ignored by the target group and, as such, may never succeed, especially with respect to the participative goal.

Beyond these observations, however, it is still early, and thus difficult, to predict the outcome of the reforms.

V. CONCLUSION

Having seen the experiences of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia with decentralized administration since independence and the approaches and strategies adopted by the three countries in that respect; the problems and difficulties encountered, as well as the overall results of the various approaches: (i) are there any discernible similarities or differences among the three countries' experiences with decentralization; and (ii) can one draw any valid conclusions and generalizations regarding decentralization and administrative reform in general and particularly with respect to African countries?

On the question of whether or not the study reveals any similarities or differences in the three countries; commitment to decentralization remained essentially superficial: when it came to working out institutional and organizational superstructures, the leadership of these countries preferred to use systems that would facilitate greater compliance by rural people to central government policies. Thus, all the three countries were to progressively dilute the autonomy enjoyed by local areas by reducing the scope of devolved functions, subjecting the local authorities to increased central controls, or by doing away with autonomous local authorities altogether and transferring their functions and powers to central government agencies. In all three countries, therefore, there was a progressive movement from devolutionary local government, at the time the countries became independent, to some variant of a prefectural system of local administration ten years after.

Secondly, the three countries' efforts at including some elements of participation in the various forms of decentralization adopted were essentially unsuccessful for one reason or another. This was true of the

county councils, district councils, as well as of the rural councils, as it was also true of the various development committee systems that were tagged to the prefectural-oriented administrative system.

Thirdly, and as a corollary of the foregoing conclusions, a major concern of the leadership in all three countries was the securing of coordination in planning, and it was this objective more than any other that influenced their choice of forms of decentralization. It is in this light that one can understand why all three countries preferred the integrated prefectural type of administration.

Are there any generalizations or significant conclusions that can be drawn from the three countries' experiences with decentralization?

Earlier in the chapter, we noted that the literature on decentralization in the third world, in general, and Africa, in particular, suggest that the effectiveness of efforts to decentralize power and authority to lower level government organs may be mainly determined by the extent to which the environment in which the decentralization system operates is supportive of a decentralized form of government, rather than by organizational and administrative factors.⁷⁰ We also noted that in most African countries governments have so far not been supportive of decentralized administration.⁷¹

The foregoing review on the three countries seems to confirm all this: the three countries' efforts to decentralize authority and responsibility to lower level organizations were constrained not so much by poor choice of organizational systems but, first, by the lack of a political will to decentralize on the part of the central leadership, which was itself a function of the low level of national integration. Secondly, their efforts were constrained by the absence of a culture and resources at the local level that were developed well enough to sustain decentralized forms of administration. The first problem pushed a preponderance for centralization on the part of the center. But even when the center was willing to decentralize, the second problem made it difficult for decentralization to grow, develop, and mature; and the center found it necessary to intervene and recentralize.

Organizational and managerial factors may also have had their share in the problem. Thus we find that in all the three countries attempts to decentralize by devolution were significantly constrained by the problem of administrative overloading; the autonomous local authorities were given too much responsibility in relation to the authority, power, and resources that were available. Under these circumstances they could not effectively handle their duties. When this was coupled with a center that had decentralized reluctantly in the first place, a decision to recentralize was quickly taken.

NOTES

1. B. C. Smith, *Field Administration: An Aspect of Decentralization* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
2. *Ibid.*
3. H. F. Alderfer, *Local Government in Developing Countries* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
4. R. Wraith, *Local Government in West Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964).
5. Frank Sherwood argues that devolution is a concept and arrangement quite different from decentralization in that it involves the divestment of functions by the central government onto new units of governance outside the control of central authority. According to Sherwood "devolution is not decentralization. . . . it represents the concept of separateness, of diversity of structures within the political system as a whole." See F. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organizational Strategy," in R. T. Dollard, ed., *Comparative Urban Research* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1969), 60.
6. See G. Lungu, "The Purposes of Decentralization in Zambia," in Institute of Public Administration, *Decentralization in Zambia: Readings on the New Local Government System* (Lusaka: Mimeo, 1981).
7. I. Swerdlow, *The Public Administration of Economic Development* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965). Fred Riggs suggests that organizational responsiveness and, therefore, to decentralization. See F. Riggs *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971).
8. A. Lewis, Sir, "Local Self-Government: A Key to National Economic Advancement and Political Stability," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (January 1958); 54-57.
9. U. Lele, *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
10. See, for example, J. Nyerere, *Decentralization* (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1972); K. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia*.
11. G. Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress*, (see introduction), 88.
12. D. A. Rondinelli, J. Nellis, and Shabi Cheema, "Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience," *World Bank Staff Working Papers* No. 581 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983).
13. AAPAM, *African Public Services: Challenges and a Profile for the Future* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984).
14. P. Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development* (Elms Court: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1979), 186-187.
15. Two recent studies of this phenomenon include G. Lungu, "The Purposes of Decentralization," in Institute of Public Administration, *Decentralization in Zambia: Readings on the New Local Administration System* (Lusaka: Mimeo, 1981); and D. A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization," 139-42.
16. T. Mulusa, "Central Government and Local Authorities," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*.
17. See Kenya Government, Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1924; and A. Hannighan, "The Role of Rural Local Government in an Independent Kenya," *Journal*

of *Local Administration Overseas* 5, no. 3 (1965).

18. A. Hannighan, "The Role of Rural Local Government." One explanation might include the lower service level in the Local Native Councils than in the white highlands.
19. Kenya Government, *Some Aspects of Development of Kenya Government Services for the Benefit of Africans from 1946 Onwards* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1953).
20. A. Hannighan, "The Role of Rural Local Government."
21. T. Mulusa, "Central Government and Local Authorities," 250.
22. A. Hannighan, "The Role of Rural Local Government," 168.
23. Government of Kenya, *Report of the Fiscal Commission*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).
24. For an analysis of some of the factors behind this situation, see R. Jackson, "Planning, Politics and Administration," 197; and C. Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya."
25. F. Holmquist, in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 151.
26. G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* and H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation*, 195.
27. W. O. Oyugi, "Centre-Localities Linkages in the Development Process: An Assessment of the Kenyan Experience," in F. Kiros, ed., *Challenging Rural Poverty* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1985).
28. The criteria included an above-average level of competence among elected councillors and staff, sufficient financial resources, which with some assistance from the center would guarantee existing services. These conditions were hard to come by in rural areas. See S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania*, 8.
29. Tanzania minister of Local Government, *Circular Letter to Regional Commissioners*, 12 June 1962.
30. S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania*.
31. See Kenya Government, *Local Government Transfer of Functions Act* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969). (See preamble.)
32. See *Report of the Auditor-General*, for the years 1967, 1968, and 1969.
33. G. Mutahaba, "Local Autonomy and National Planning," *African Review* 5, no. 2 (1975).
34. See R. G. Penner, *Financing Local Government in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1972); and G. Mutahaba, "Decentralized Administration in Tanzania: The District Council" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1973).
35. See G. Mutahaba, "Local Autonomy and National Planning," 210.
36. For a full argument along these lines, see G. Mutahaba, "Local Autonomy and National Planning," 207-23.
37. J. K. Nyerere, *Decentralization*.
38. See F. J. Mchauru, "The Government and the Governed: The Tanzania Model," in A. H. Rweyamamu and G. Hyden, eds., *A Decade of Public Administration in Africa* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975); and A. H. Rweyamamu and B. Mwansasu, *Plan-*

- ning in Tanzania: *Background to Decentralization* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974).
39. For discussions on the absence of participation, see G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*; and F. Hill, "Administrative Decentralization for Development, Participation, and Control in Tanzania," *Journal of African Studies* 6, no. 4 (1979): 182-92.
 40. D. A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 47, no. 2 (1981): 210-32.
 41. Government of Tanzania, *Report on Re-establishment of Local Government* (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1980).
 42. I. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann, 1976).
 43. Oral source from one of the commissioners.
 44. Terms of reference given to the consultants, McKinsey and Company, in 1970. See McKinsey and Company, *Managing Rural Development* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mimeo, 1972).
 45. I. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*.
 46. For a full description of the various committees at different levels, as well as their relationships, see J. Nyerere, *Decentralization*.
 47. The only critical change in this system that definitely had serious participative potential was the reorganization of village governments under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975. For a review of the Villages Act, see P. Mawhood, ed., *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa* (Chichester: Wiley, 1983) and R. Mayaya, "Public Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of the Village Managers Policy," M.A. dissertation in Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam 1984.
 48. Professors Paul Maro and Samuel Mushi are completing a manuscript reviewing the experience of Tanzania with decentralization to be published by Dar-es-Salaam University Press.
 49. Ibid.
 50. G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*.
 51. G. Mutahaba, "Local Organization for Development," in F. Kiros, *Challenging Rural Poverty*.
 52. S. Mushi, *The Institutionalization of Participation in Tanzania* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mimeo, 1979).
 53. Parliament of Tanzania, *Local Government (District Authorities) Act* (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1982), paragraph 4.
 54. H. Heisler, "Continuity and Change in Zambian Administration," *Journal of Local Administration Overseas* 4(3) (July 1965): 183-93.
 55. W. Tordoff, "Provincial and Local Government in Zambia," *Journal of Local Administration Overseas* 9(1) (January 1970): 23-35.
 56. Quoted by J. Howell, "Local Government in Zambia," *African Social Research*, no. 23 (June 1977).
 57. For a discussion of this point, see G. Lungu, "The Purposes of Decentralization," in Institute of Public Administration, *Decentralization of Zambia: Readings on the New Local Government System* (Lusaka: Mimeo, 1981).

58. National Institute of Public Administration, *Administration for Rural Development* (Lusaka: Mimeo, 1973).
59. *Ibid.*
60. K. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia*.
61. *Ibid.*
62. G. Lungu, "The Purposes of Decentralization."
63. K. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia*.
64. Republic of Zambia, *Report of the Commission on the Establishment of a One Party State* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972).
65. There were several official reviews of the operations of decentralization, including the *Simmance Working Party*, 1972; the *Mwanakatwe Report*, 1975; as well as several scholarly reviews including W. Tordoff, "The Administration of Development in Zambia" (Lusaka: Mimeo, 1970); G. Lungu, "The Purposes of Decentralization."
66. P. Ollawa, "Political Participation in a Developing Society: Theoretical Considerations and the Case of Zambia," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2, 169-89.
67. J. S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). For more on this, see G. Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*.
68. P. Ollawa, "Political Participation in a Developing Society:"
69. Gratian Lungu, in the article cited in note 56 argues that the reforms do not decentralize any authority; they only increase the scope for control by the center.
70. P. Ollawa, *Political Participation in a Developing Society*; D. A. Rondinelli, et al, "Decentralization in Developing Countries." and G. Mutahaba, "Local Autonomy and National Planning."
71. G. Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress*, 84-96.

Public Control over Bureaucratic Power

In chapter 2 we saw that the bureaucracies that Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania were inheriting possessed a number of undesirable characteristics that had to be corrected in order for them to effectively shoulder the tasks of independence. In chapter 4 we reviewed one of the measures taken to this effect: the attempts to decentralize administration. In this chapter we shall review the three countries' attempts to deal with yet another problematic situation—the imbalance between the bureaucracy and the political institutions. Before reviewing the attempts, however, it may be useful to discuss the concept of bureaucratic dominance, a discussion that may help us to place our review of the three countries' efforts in proper perspective.

Making the decisions and actions of bureaucratic organizations responsive to the needs and preferences of the sovereign has long been a central concern of most societies.¹ With the rise of elected assemblies and appointed bureaucracies during the last century, this issue has come to be viewed as a matter of restraining the unwarranted use of power by the appointed executives. Much attention has thus been given to philosophizing and working out practical suggestions on controls to ensure that these officials exercise their authority within certain bounds.²

At one extreme, some observers of the phenomenon are of the view that checks on excessive bureaucratic power can only be exercised by bureaucrats themselves—a system, so to speak, of internal self-restraint. Several decades ago, Carl J. Friedrich advocated the reliance on such internal checks by arguing that even though he was not saying that extrabureaucratic controls are wrong, he believed that “the expertise and professional skill of the bureaucrat are so formidable that no untrained lay politician can even hope to oversee effectively the decisions that bureaucrats are called upon to make.”³

This view was, even at that time, subjected to sharp criticism by Herman Finer, who sets off from the other extreme, arguing that “reliance on an official's conscience may be reliance on an official's accomplice,” since “the political and administrative history of all ages . . . has demonstrated without the shadow of a doubt that sooner or later there is an abuse of power when external punitive controls are lacking.”⁴ He thus insists on the subordination of bureaucrats to political authority in policy-making.

Policy is only legitimate, he further argues, when it meets with acquiescence from the public or its elected representatives.

In actual fact, the differences between these two extreme positions is only in emphasis. The first view stressed the importance of internal checks over the decisions and actions of bureaucrats—certainly an appropriate emphasis for areas of administrative behavior where skilled professionals are making decisions the public does not even know about. When viewed in this way, external and internal controls do not substitute for, but complement, one another; both controls are necessary. What is important is ensuring that a proper balance between these two elements is maintained.⁵ The second view also concedes that certain kinds of auxiliary devices, including internal controls, may be gainfully used in enabling the public to influence the decisions, actions, and the behavior of bureaucrats.⁶ There is, therefore, some level of agreement between the two extremes that both internal and external controls are important.

While sharing the view that emphasizes the complementarity of external and internal controls in ensuring bureaucratic responsiveness, in this chapter I shall be focusing only on external controls. Fred Riggs identifies two forms of external controls: an effective party system and a legislature.⁷ Other scholars have identified several types of external controls,⁸ and these include: (1) the establishment of the office of ombudsman; (2) efforts to include or incorporate the views of citizens in the decision-making processes of the bureaucracy, the most popular being citizen-participation; and (3) reducing the likelihood of abuse of bureaucratic power by having the administrative personnel closely resemble in characteristics the population they serve, i.e., making them what has been called a "representative bureaucracy."⁹

The idea of the establishment of the office of ombudsman was initially developed in Scandinavia, and has since spread to many parts of the world besides the United States, where it is believed such a role is effectively performed by Congressmen.¹⁰ The ombudsman was to hear and investigate citizens' complaints of alleged misuse of official power and to provide aggrieved parties with an appropriate remedy. Control through having administrative personnel's behavior and life-style resemble that of the population they served was particularly pertinent to the situation obtaining in most ex-colonial countries where the bureaucracy had, during the colonial period, been dominated by the citizens of the imperial power, and thus the need to rectify the situation that arose out of such an arrangement become urgent when these countries attained independence.

In the developed world, a combination of these controls as well as the internal controls on bureaucratic power are significantly in place and are now properly institutionalized, resulting in bureaucracies whose power, in relation to the society, is not enormously great. When most third

world countries attained independence, however, their bureaucracies enjoyed a significant institutional autonomy, as well as social dominance over the rest of the society, mainly because the external controls either did not exist or, when they did exist, were in a very underdeveloped stage. This point is well articulated by Fred Riggs:

A phenomenon of utmost significance in transitional societies is the lack of balance between political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-making institutions. The relative weakness of political organizations means that the political function tends to be appropriated in considerable measure by bureaucrats.¹¹

A number of scholars have accepted, at least in part, the above position regarding the relative balance between bureaucracies and extrabureaucratic institutions in the developing countries. Ferrel Heady, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Lucian Pye all strongly support his line of argument.¹² Pye concludes, with reference to Vietnam (before the communist takeover) and Pakistan, that "power and authority are concentrated in the realm of administrative officialdom." Writing on Africa, David Abernathy states that the bureaucracy plays a significant role in economic development by influencing the level of available resources, the development strategies that are drawn up, and the manner in which plans become concrete programs and projects.¹³ He adds that in the absence of strong private forces to stimulate and control development, the bureaucracy may as well be the only instrument through which a country can attain ambitious economic objectives. Bereket Selassie argues similarly by saying that due to its monopoly of administrative and technical skills, the bureaucracy becomes very difficult to control: "It is simply too strong for other institutions to challenge."¹⁴

The foregoing characterization of the bureaucracy in the third world in general, and Africa in particular, fits very well the position of the bureaucracy in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia when they attained independence. In all the three countries, colonial powers tended to be disinclined to encourage the development of political controls. This was particularly so in respect to political controls over bureaucratic power.

In all of its overseas colonial possessions, Britain consistently dispensed with competition in politics and preferred to vest in the administrative organ the complete powers of government decision-making. The governor was, for all practical purposes, the supreme rule; and with the assistance of the provincial, district, and divisional administrators, he fully carried out the functions of the government of the territory in the name of the Crown. The colonial civil service primarily differed from the Whitehall counterpart in the sense that whereas the latter operated like a team of anonymous technocrats, the former was a strong policy-making organ charged with decision-making in essentially political matters.¹⁵

This background had contradictory implications for the organizational methods of the postindependence era. Among others, the following questions might be asked: How was the authoritarian civil service of the colonial days to be reconciled with the need for a responsive service in a free nation? By what process of attitudinal change was the civil servant to be reduced to anonymity as a mere policy implementor as opposed to policymaker?

One way of solving all these problems was to try to emulate the Whitehall tradition *par excellence*, i.e., to strive to separate politics from administration insofar as it was feasible through progressive takeover, by politicians, of the policy-making function and the passing of legislation, rules, and regulations intended to ensure the neutrality of the bureaucracy in the political process, while imposing internal and external mechanisms for ensuring effective and fair performance within the service. The other alternative was to politicize the bureaucracy, something that could be done by using several approaches, including subjecting bureaucrats to control by the party. Irrespective of the strategy adopted, however, the need for controlling bureaucratic power was an imperative.

I. PUBLIC CONTROL OVER BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN KENYA

As mentioned before, during the colonial period Kenya had developed a strong and dominant bureaucracy that had enjoyed freedom in policy-making and untrammelled discretionary powers.¹⁶ The view held by most observers is that the foregoing twenty years have witnessed the strengthening of the bureaucracy's dominant status *vis-à-vis* political institutions; while efforts to secure bureaucratic responsibility and accountability have concentrated on using mechanisms that are internal to the bureaucracy.¹⁷

That the bureaucracy has increased its strength over the years is indisputable. There is also evidence to support the view that the increase in the strength of the bureaucracy has been attained mainly at the expense of growth in extrabureaucratic institutions.¹⁸ What much of the foregoing observation tends to miss, however, is that this development has been engineered by the political executive because it was considered desirable, as well as the fact that those twenty years have seen the bureaucracy being subjected to stringent controls by the political executive. So whereas in Zambia and Tanzania the political executive used extrabureaucratic institutions (mainly the party) to control the bureaucracy, in Kenya the political executive could not use such an instrument because it was weak; and, as such, it proceeded to impose the controls directly.

Independence and the Normative Framework of Neutrality

When Kenya got its independence in 1963, the constitution provided for a public bureaucracy that, though having to lose some of its hitherto untrammelled discretionary powers and initiative in policy-making to political institutions, was to remain strong and dominant vis-à-vis these institutions, mainly because it was to be independent of their control. It was to consider itself a separate estate from the political order, seeing itself as a profession whose fundamental principle was neutrality and whose tools were in the nature of data and other politically free values. Its purpose was to implement, technically and as professionally as possible, decisions whose policy underpinnings had been laid by elected persons.

Steps in this direction had been taken since 1959 through the progressive replacement of the "member system" by ministries; the replacement of the executive council composed of civil service department heads by elected ministers; and the democratization of the legislative institution. Independence was to complete the exercise and lead to the appointment of fully accountable ministers served by neutral civil servants, a cabinet, and a parliament. The ministers would initiate and develop policies through the cabinet and the parliament while permanent secretaries and other junior-level bureaucrats would implement the policies.

To ensure that the bureaucracy remained politically neutral, the constitution provided for its placement under the control of an independent supervisory body, the Public Service Commission (PSC). It was the duty of the Commission to "appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the public service, to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices," and to "remove such persons from office."¹⁹ In the highest public service offices, such as those of the attorney-general, the controller and auditor-general, permanent secretaries, etc., the governor-general made the appointments with the advice of the Commission.²⁰

The membership of the Commission was comprised of a chairman, deputy chairman, and five other members: all appointed by the governor-general acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (the most independent public body under the independence constitution).²¹ Restrictions were imposed to ensure that the PC members were neither political figures nor public officers already indebted for their appointment to the political leadership. Their tenure of office was made secure to enable them to discharge their functions independently. Like the supreme court judges, they could only be removed from office "for inability to exercise the functions of (their) office... or for misbehaviour."²² And even where these conditions were met, there was a further safeguard: the question of removing a member had to be referred to an independent tribunal whose recommendation was conclusive.²³

The principles on which the PC made appointments and exercised

disciplinary control were spelled out in a detailed government code of regulations that formed the terms of service for every civil servant. A central feature of the code was the virtual prescription of political activity among civil servants. No officer, without express government permission, was to "publish in any manner anything which may be reasonably regarded as of a political nature, whether under his own name, under a pseudonym or anonymously."²⁴ Civil servants were not permitted to stand as candidates for political elections unless they first resigned their posts.²⁵ They were also not allowed to form or join any political associations—the ground being that such political association was "not consistent with the duties and obligations of a public servant who is required to carry out the government's policy, unbiased by any political view he may hold."²⁶ They were also barred from speech-making or voting at political meetings.²⁷

The civil service was visualized as a neutral tool of implementation of government policies. This entailed a rather extreme approach to the concept of separation of powers. A neat demarcation was being drawn between the government functions of policy-making and policy implementation; and the civil service was seen as the specialized implementation unit within the executive organ, completely free from the process of policy-making. It is recognized, however, that the various organs of government do operate in close interaction and, as such, a rigid conception of the doctrine would not be practical.²⁸

But if the express provisions supportive of a dominant or at least a neutral and independent bureaucracy were expedient at the time of independence, they were likely to be in dissonance with the political reality of independent statehood. A major reason behind the British government's insistence on an independent bureaucracy for newly independent Kenya was to keep government powers in check as a safeguard for minority rights and interests,²⁹ as most of those that were to be preserved at independence were largely conditioned by the prevailing forces and institutions of the colonial order that was now being replaced. The logical effect of independence was to vest in the new regime the sovereign power to reorder the whole society and its main institutions. The primary reorganizational instrument was, of course, the bureaucracy. An intimate interaction between political leadership and the civil service was thus imperative if the newly independent government was to play a key role in national development. In these circumstances, the bureaucracy was likely to be subjected to pressure not just to fulfill the "neutral" function of policy implementation but also to be an active partner of the political leadership in policy initiation and formulation.

Realizing that the constitutional provisions providing for an independent and neutral bureaucracy were a major clog upon its efforts at both societal transformation and political control, the postindependence government quickly decided to change those provisions in order to give itself

increased executive capacity.

The first constitutional amendment, in 1964, vested in the president wide powers in relation to the civil service.³⁰ Whereas the members of the PSC were previously required to be appointed by the governor-general, acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, now they were to be appointed by the president on his own discretion. While the PSC had been required to operate independently of the executive or officers directly appointed by the executive, now it could, with presidential authority, "delegate any of its powers. . . to one or more of its members or to any officer of the public service."³¹ The provisions relating to the offices of the attorney-general, the controller and auditor-general, and the permanent secretaries were also changed: the president now enjoyed complete appointive discretion in relation to these officers. This relationship was extended further by another constitutional amendment that gave the president "the power of constituting and abolishing offices of the Republic" and "of making appointments to any such offices and terminating any such appointment." It was provided that "every person who holds office in the service of the Republic of Kenya shall hold office at the pleasure of the president."

The apparent shift of these changes was to turn the PSC into a professional rubber stamp of political decisions. The tenure of office by public servants no longer depended on the observance of the code of regulations, as such, but, more importantly, on the "pleasure" of the president. And as the president could abolish offices at his own discretion, it followed that the idea of protecting offices by vesting their control in independent bodies was no longer valid. In theory the president became the employer of all civil servants and he could terminate their services at will. The normative barriers designed to insulate public bureaucracy from the vagaries of political will had been constitutionally removed. The practical significance of this move in the development of the civil service in subsequent years remained to be seen.

Politicization of the Civil Service

The securing of political control over the bureaucracy that had been obtained through changes in the normative provisions, though giving immense latitude to the political executive with respect to the shaping of the bureaucracy, was considered inadequate by the bulk of the politicians, since it left them with little influence or control over that bureaucracy.³² Many politicians therefore raised the question of the relationship between the civil service, especially the provincial administration, and the politicians. This was particularly so after the dissolution of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the abandonment of the Majimbo Constitution. The more outspoken ones pressed for party control over the bureaucracy and the creation of political heads in each province on the

Tanzanian and, later, Zambian model,³³ arguing that the provincial administration had to go, as its continued existence often reminded the country of the role it played during colonialism. One member of Parliament proposed a motion that civil servants in all constituencies be required by law to be responsible to the elected representatives of those constituencies. The motion was, in effect, carried, and as Cherry Gertzel points out (see note 33), the passing of the motion was in part reflective of the general unhappiness, on the part of backbenchers, over the intrusion by the civil service in the leadership of the community, which was their prerogative; the vice president of Kenya at the time seems to have shared this sentiment, although he did not publicly support the motion. Writing on this point, several years after leaving the vice presidency, he says:

The civil service, I found, could frustrate the best plans of the best intentioned government. Given a chance, top civil servants can direct a minister, not the other way about. An experienced, naive, or unconscientious minister can be committed to a policy in flat contradiction to the overall policy of his government. . . . The ideal policy effected in Guinea where the party network of organization moved in to take over the administration was not easy to operate in Kenya where independence was played out in slow stages, managed by the British, and where KANU (Kenya African National Union) was never strongly centralized by an amalgam of many diverse tendencies and policies.³⁴

The debate should, however, be viewed in another perspective: it was intended to touch off other issues, including the question of the role of the legislative organs in providing guidance and supervision of the executive. It does suggest a certain level of disquiet on the part of the members of the legislature over a trend that was then in its infancy but came to develop in full blossom later, whereby the legislature came to be neglected to a subsidiary role and decision-making shifted in a descending order to the president, a small informal kitchen cabinet, the cabinet respectively in collaboration with the bureaucracy.³⁵ The motion was in part intended to stall this trend.

The subjection of the civil service to party control was, however, rejected by the government, partly because of the realization that the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party in question, was a weak party and could not be expected to provide the guidance and leadership that TANU was providing in Tanzania; and also, and probably more so, because the political executive preferred to use the bureaucracy in ruling the country. Why was this so?

As John Okumu has pointed out, in the first place this was because the country's then chief executive, Jomo Kenyatta, had very little linkage with the party.³⁶ KANU had been formed in his absence while in deten-

tion, and he assumed its presidency when he came out of detention in 1961. Moreover, as a political party, KANU had been formed by amalgamating preexisting autonomous district organizations that controlled grass-roots politics; and the district political associations were simply converted into district branches under essentially the same leadership.³⁷ This denied the president of the party any opportunity to link up directly to the grass-roots. Indeed, Kenyatta himself found it necessary to become a district political boss in the Kiambu area, and in Kikuyu land as a whole, following his release from detention in 1961. Thus, between his release from detention and the gaining of independence in December 1963, Kenyatta found it necessary to work within the framework of the long-standing intraparty norms of behavior, which included a higher degree of factionalism. Attempts to change the norms would have brought him into serious personal conflicts with other political bosses, at a high cost to his political standing.³⁸

Because of such a situation after the country became independent, President Kenyatta decided to remain above the day-to-day conflict of party politics by assuming the role of the father of the nation (*Baba wa Taifa*) or, as he was popularly known, "Mzee." Such a role made it possible for him to establish indirect political control and influence with the grass-roots through a series of informal patron-client linkages with regional and district bosses and other leaders on an individual basis, rather than within an organizational framework.³⁹ The control of patronage by the executive was to become a key instrument in sustaining this pattern of influence; patronage was dispensed from the president, through the cabinet, members of Parliament, councillors, all the way down to chiefs. In return, district and regional bosses were to demonstrate to the president that their compatriots supported him, his government, and its policies. As the system seemed to be working, there was, therefore, no need to prop up the party.⁴⁰

Under these circumstances the bureaucracy was to remain an instrument for carrying out the policies of the chief executive, supporting this system of clientele relationships of which it eventually became an important element. Its accountability was to be to the chief executive, and so long as it was conscious of this fact, it could afford to disregard any other element of the political system, especially such institutions as the party.⁴¹

In effect the bureaucracy, while remaining free of party and parliamentary control, came to become increasingly controlled by the chief executive. First it increasingly became an instrument for political communication from below, mainly because for the grass-roots it was the major, and probably the only, point of contact with government, other types of organizations, such as the party, being essentially moribund. Henry Beinen refers to queues at district and provincial commissioner offices ("bomas")

where citizens, not frequently excluding a KANU official, wait to state their problems.⁴² This situation is contrasted with the situation in Tanzania where people waited on area commissioners, both as party and government officials, or many times at TANU offices to see party chairmen about solving their problems.⁴³

At the lowest levels of provincial administration, chiefs, who were the grass-roots agents of the provincial administration, would call meetings to explain government policies. At these meetings appeals were often made for loyalty to the nation and the president; government plans were communicated; pleas were made for payment of taxes and contributions to self-help projects; and exhortations against membership in parties that were against the nation were frequently heard.⁴⁴ Many of these functions could have been performed by political functionaries if they had been available, but since they were not, it fell on the shoulders of chiefs.

The bureaucracy was also used to routing out and muzzling political opposition, whether this be opposition parties, during the brief period when these existed, or "opposition" politicians within the one-party system. The bureaucracy was first used in this manner to destroy the KADU opposition party, as well as the Majimbo Constitution. The new provincial administration (civil secretaries), which under the new arrangements was supposed to service the new regional governments, continued its links with the central government, and this ensured that the regional governments did not actually take off. After less than a year of frustrating regionalism, the KADU members of parliament dissolved their party and joined the government party, KANU. This also marked the death of regionalism.

The use of the bureaucracy as an instrument for routing out political opposition intensified after Oginga Odinga and his colleagues resigned from KANU and formed an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). Through judicious application of laws and rules the bureaucracy made it difficult for this party to function.⁴⁵ First, the registrar of societies refused to register it as a political party until nomination day. Secondly, the civil service-managed state radio refused to report KPU members in their limited electioneering, "except insofar as KANU statements referred to them."⁴⁶ Indeed, contrary to the code of regulations, senior civil servants are reported to have participated in arranging and actively participating in KANU rallies, their presence and involvement symbolizing the association of "KANU with government and so with government power and authority."⁴⁷ In the uneasy three-year lease on life of the KPU, the civil service served as the handmaid of the president's will, a will that vowed not to allow the establishment of any organization that might effectively challenge the central power as personified in the president.

The bureaucracy was on several other occasions to come to the aid of the government in dealing with a number of opposition politicians. The office of the attorney-general was infamous for placing trumped-up crimi-

nal charges against members of parliament who were considered either too vocal or radical in and outside the parliament; and in many cases it was able to obtain their convictions.⁴⁸ The district commissioners would generally "refuse such M.P.'s permission to hold rallies or Harambee Barazas (community development meetings) in their constituencies."⁴⁹ Not too infrequently, the constituencies of such M.P.s would be starved of development resources by the bureaucracy, either until the M.P.s toed the line or until they became voted out by their constituents for not delivering the fruits of independence.⁵⁰

Membership in Political Parties

As the foregoing forms of politicization of the bureaucracy were quietly going on, however, the question of membership of the civil service in political parties remained mute. On the one hand, this silence could be construed to mean that the national political leadership did not find fault with the normative provisions barring civil servants from joining political organizations. On the other hand, the silence may have been deliberate on the part of the KANU bosses at the branch, district, and regional levels, who did not welcome the intrusion of fresh and articulate political blood into their "Kingdoms." In my discussions with several Kenyan senior civil servants, however, they gave the impression that they may not have minded being allowed to play an active role in politics.⁵¹ However, this is not the way it was to be—civil servants were not encouraged, let alone allowed, to belong to political parties until 1975, the regulations providing for an unpoliticized public service remaining in force throughout this period.

In 1975, however, at a meeting of all KANU branch chairmen that was presided over by President Kenyatta, a resolution was passed that all senior civil servants be required in the future to become KANU members. The resolution further stated that all public officers "earning a good salary" should be compelled to become lifetime members of the party.⁵² To translate this idea into normative regulations, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the president issued an official circular noting that "while the code of regulations, as it stood heretofore, prohibited membership by civil servants in political associations it has been decided that they may, if they wish, become members of KANU."⁵³ This circular thus amended the code of regulations mentioned earlier.

Although the circular had, *ex facie*, merely given an option to the civil servants, indeed, as it was argued then, the intention was to grant the civil servant, like any other citizen, his fundamental right of freedom of assembly and association, it had important political implications.⁵⁴ Whereas until now the loyalty of the civil service was reserved only for the president, who was virtually the sole employer, attention was now also to be

paid to the party bosses at the branch, district, and provincial levels. In actual fact, however, the basic situation did not change, since the party was to remain as moribund as it had always been, and a strong civil servant could continue to ignore it as he or she had always done before. Indeed if there was any change in relationship between civil servants since they could now, on occasion, use their party membership as an extra resource in extracting advantages from the intricate patron-client network.

Conclusion

From the foregoing review it has become apparent that the popular view that the Kenyan bureaucracy is untrammelled by political authority is highly fallacious. Although the Kenyan bureaucracy, unlike its Tanzanian and Zambian counterparts, managed to avoid being brought under by the party—mainly because there was no party of serious consequence—it was to lose much of its autonomy to a strong political executive who strengthened it and made it into a supportive institution, using it to carry through his goals and objectives. This initially involved the abrogation of the provisions that placed the civil service outside the control of the political executive and, later on, the abandonment of the principle of civil service neutrality; the bureaucracy was to become an instrument for carrying out highly partisan functions and activities. It is significant to point out, however, that all this was done quietly, without fanfare.

Two consequences resulted from these developments. First, the imposition of political control over the civil service had the effect of undermining the enforcement of the internal controls, which had been intended to facilitate the emergence of an efficient and professional civil service. Soon the principle of merit in recruitment and promotion was progressively abandoned to be replaced by political and ethnic loyalty.⁵⁵ This was particularly so as jobs in the public service became scarce. The result of this was a civil service that was not up to the mark, as several observers have pointed out.⁵⁶ Secondly, politicization was to make the senior civil servants a strong force that was not amenable to control by the political class, other than the president himself. It soon became apparent that local-level politicians (party leaders and M.P.s, and to some extent ministers) were no match to the power exerted by the provincial commissioners and permanent secretaries.⁵⁷ Evidence is available to suggest that even Parliament as a constitutive body could not exert pressure over the civil service.⁵⁸ Indeed, what had happened as a result of the quiet politicization of the civil service is that the senior civil service became another political estate that competed with elected politicians for influence and power, which was dispensed and monopolized by the political center. During much of this competition, only those local politicians who knew how to pull and push the central political senior civil servant nexus could get any-

where.⁵⁹ In Kenya, therefore, the politicization of the civil service strengthened the bureaucracy and placed it in a position of power and influence vis-à-vis the bulk of politicians. The only exception to this loss of power was the president of the country.

II. DEALING WITH BUREAUCRATIC DOMINANCE IN TANZANIA

Like Kenya, Tanzania inherited a bureaucracy that had enjoyed immense political power during the colonial period mainly because of the fusion of political and administrative authority.⁶⁰ With the attainment of independence, the reduction of the power of the bureaucracy came to be a major goal; and both the party and the government were to take several measures at both the normative and practical levels to change the nature and character of the bureaucratic-political relationships at the local, intermediate, and national levels.

The first set of measures for dealing with bureaucratic dominance entailed the strengthening of political control over the bureaucracy. Under the constitution of 1961 political control over the civil service was to be exercised at the central level through a separation of policy-making from administration. The former function was supposed to be performed by individual ministers, the cabinet, the Parliament, and the policy-making organs of the ruling party. The latter function was supposed to be exercised by permanent secretaries, directors, provincial and district commissioners, and village-level functionaries. It was incumbent upon civil servants to implement the policies made by politicians when handed down to them through the right channels, irrespective of their personal feelings concerning such policies. Civil servants, in turn, were to be recruited and retained in their posts on the basis of their technical and professional abilities—questions of their political views were never to arise. To ensure this, the civil service was to be controlled by an independent body, the Civil Service Commission, which was responsible for the recruitment, promotion, and discipline of civil service servants using standards, procedures, and methods that would best ensure an efficient, effective, and accountable civil service.

The Republican Constitution of 1962 changed this provision. It provided for changes in the management structure of the civil service by transferring the responsibility and authority over the civil service to the president. The Civil Service Commission was to remain, but only in an analogous position in relation to the president, from whom it now derived its authority and power. This change made it possible for the president to ensure that the persons appointed to important civil service positions were at least sympathetic to the goals, objectives, and policies of the government; and although they were to continue to be picked from the

career service, there was nothing to bar the president from appointing people from outside of it.⁶¹

The effect of this change was to increase the incidence of political control over civil service operations. Civil servants were now not simply expected to be silent, neutral, humble, and obedient servants whose job was to implement their ministers' policies: they now had to show that they were loyal to the regime in power. Now it was not only local civil servants who were appointed to senior positions in the service—even loyal party supporters were awarded with jobs in the civil service. Thus the posts of divisional executive officers and assistant divisional executive officers, which had replaced those of chiefs and sub-chiefs respectively, were in the main filled with party activists who, at many times, were appointed despite their not having the requisite qualifications as per Civil Service Commission regulations. The result was that the public service progressively lost much of its technical capacity as it became more and more responsive to "here and now" political dictates. In due course, this was to have disastrous consequences on the ability of the service to shoulder both the traditional responsibilities of the state and, more so, the new developmental responsibilities.⁶²

The second set of measures in reducing the power of the bureaucracy entailed its politicization.⁶³ This was done through two strategies. The first involved changing some civil service positions into political roles. The positions of the provincial and district commissioner, which were the key government positions at the provincial and district levels, respectively, were renamed regional and area commissioners, respectively, with politicians who were picked from among TANU activists being appointed to fill the new positions. As if to emphasize the political character of these new positions, the incumbents were to perform the role of regional and district party secretaries at the same time. Although statutorily they were to inherit almost all the powers and functions of the provincial and district commissioners, it was expected that they would concentrate on providing political leadership in their respective areas and carrying out mobilization work. The change was intended to subject the regional and district prefecture to political leadership.

The second strategy entailed amending general orders that barred civil servants from participating in policies and, thus, opening the way for those who wished to join TANU to do so.⁶⁴ In actual fact, however, this restriction had already been loosened since 1957, when, as a result of pressures exerted by the nationalist movement, the subordinate class of the service had been allowed to "participate in any lawful political activity provided such activity does not interfere with the employees' duties or bring government into disrepute."⁶⁵ Pressures to remove the restrictions in respect to other classes of the service had been exerted in the period leading to independence, but the colonial government had decided that the restric-

tions should remain unamended "in the interests of maintaining the impartiality of the civil service."⁶⁶ After independence, President Nyerere argued against the retention of the restriction on the ground that such restrictions and the distinction between politicians and civil servants is desirable only in the context of a multiparty system, "where the continuity of public administration must be not thrown out of gear at every switch from one party to another." But once you have a one-party government, which was *de facto* the case in Tanzania, it becomes "absurd" to exclude a whole group of the most intelligent and able members of the community from participation in the formulation and discussion of politics simply because they happen to be civil servants.⁶⁷ Staff Circular No. 7 of 1964 therefore represented a culmination of efforts and a trend that had been in the wings for quite some time.

While no one knows for certain the proportion of higher and middle-grade civil servants who have become members of the party since independence, observers have suggested that a sizable proportion did join. Many civil servants have proceeded to contest political office while retaining their civil service status. This was made possible by the amendment of the regulation that required civil servants to resign from the service before contesting elections. Now they do not have to resign; the new regulation only requires them to take "leave" if they wish to contest elections, and should they fail to win the election they may return to the service. Those who win the election are allowed to go on a leave of absence for the period, and the period of parliamentary service is counted toward their pension. More recently, civil servants have contested elected positions in the party hierarchy at the branch, district, regional, and national levels. This has also been facilitated by the application of the same sets of procedures regarding the continuation of the officers' service as it applied toward contesting parliamentary elections.⁶⁸

The third strategy has involved the appointment, from time to time, of career civil servants to political positions. Some have been assigned to work in the party secretariat, while a number have been appointed regional commissioners, area commissioners, and ministers.⁶⁹ This is intended to be an effort to fuse politics and administration; although the injection seems to have been so far a one-way affair—very few politicians, if any, have been moved into the civil service. All the principal secretaries, including the principal secretary in the president's office, are career civil servants, even though all of them are currently party members. One major reason for the lack of injection of politicians into the civil service is that the party is so desperately short of able administrators that it has depended on seconded civil servants for the running of its professional business. As more and more personnel with considerable administrative capability emerge from within the party, movement from the party bureaucracy to the civil service will no doubt develop.

In realization of the fact that the filling of critical civil service positions with trusted party members would be next to impossible, the party decided to sensitize the bureaucracy through the creation of party branches in all major civil service establishments, as well as having civil servants attend ideological education classes at the party ideological school at Kivukono.⁷⁰ The party branch in the work places had to be accorded organizational and operational support such as transport, secretarial services, time off for party meetings, etc. Reviews of the operations of these branches indicate that they have become very powerful units that compete with the established organizational hierarchies and have on many occasions paralyzed the functioning of the administrative system.⁷¹

Party Supremacy

Of all the measures that have made the bureaucracy in Tanzania lose its dominance to political institutions, the introduction of the concept of party supremacy has been the most significant. The concept of party supremacy owes its origins to the 1965 one-party constitution, which not only gave TANU, and the National Executive Committee (NEC) in particular, a high constitutional status but also increased its powers, scope, and involvement in government affairs. According to the constitution, the NEC can not only lay down broad lines of policy to be followed by the government but it has the power to summon witnesses and call for papers from all government organs.⁷² A decision was subsequently made in 1968 requiring the government to submit for discussion and approval to the NEC all major policy measures before they were sent to the parliament to be enacted into law. This was to become a normal working procedure between the party and the state, underlining the critical role of the party in decision-making.

The power to discuss and approve development and policy proposals was extended down to the district and regional executive committees of TANU when the government was decentralized in 1972.⁷³ This gave the party a greater supervisory role over regional administration, marking as well a major step toward the completion of a process of structural reforms to fully ensure party supremacy. In 1975 the process of party supremacy was carried a step further when the National Constitution was amended to make the party the supreme authority in the country; legally and structurally it became the most important locus for policy-making in the country. Whether or not this would be translated into reality remained to be seen.

The period after the adoption of the 1965 one-party constitution witnessed many instances whereby the party played a major role in policy-making, not only in terms of approving government-initiated policies but also as a major initiator of policies in its own right. Thus it was the TANU

National Executive Committee that called for the promulgation of the policies of socialism and self-reliance in the 1967 Arusha Declaration; the decentralization of the government machinery in 1972; and the movement of the capital from Dar-es-Salaam to Dodoma in 1973, to mention only a few cases. More recently it was the NEC that decided to abolish cooperative societies in 1976; to introduce Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1976; and to demand that potential university entrants first spend two years at work.

These are the kinds of decisions that require strong political will and commitment, extensive resource bases, and elaborate organizational and institutional structures for effective implementation. Previously, such momentous policy decisions would have been initiated by the bureaucracy together with the cabinet, the party getting involved only in respect to approving them. The order of things had changed, with the Party National Executive Committee now making policy decisions, and the bureaucracy being expected to implement them as best as it could. Many times, however, unanticipated problems were generally so momentous as to almost break the policy.⁷⁴

This is not to suggest, however, that the bureaucracy (including both the civil servants and ministers) has completely surrendered policy initiation to the party. The bulk of policy initiatives have been made by ministries, and the party (mainly the Central Committee and National Executive Committee) is involved in policy-making at the broad level, indeed like most parties in the Westminster model are. There is little reason to suggest that the party's role in policy-making has in any way approximated the situation in East European countries, where the party plays a very active and leading role in policy-making.

A number of factors account for this situation. The first is the party's poor resource base. A party's capability to adequately perform tasks such as those TANU, and later CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), set for itself depends on its ability to command sufficient political, financial, and management resources. Effective decision-making requires a strong information base, which in turn requires manpower that is sufficiently capable and adequate to supply this information base. This further demands, therefore, that the party be in a position to recruit and retain personnel who are capable, competent, and knowledgeable; and who have a high sense of commitment to the party's objectives, policies, and programs. The leadership of the party must also be popular with the citizenry. Finally, the party must have an independent financial resource base.⁷⁵ Without these resources, it may tend to be difficult to maintain a strong party leadership in decision-making.

While it is true that the sole political party, TANU—and later CCM—has experienced tremendous improvement in its decision-making capacities and capabilities since 1962, it is important to note that much of this

improvement has remained essentially normative. For a long time the party did not exercise its right to summon witnesses and call for papers, partly because it did not have the qualified staff who could process and analyze the information that would be supplied, for an essentially semi-literate National Executive Committee. After 1965 the government made available to the party funds for the payment of salaries to some functionaries, which made it possible to attract some qualified functionaries. A system was worked out for seconding senior and experienced civil servants to the party headquarters to enable the NEC to receive better information and well-prepared policy papers.

By the same token, however, the party lost some of its independence, since now it had to observe some of the bureaucratic norms and practices, things that party supremacy had been intended to do away with. This came to be even more reinforced by the election to party offices of people whose competency, perceptions, orientations, and world-views were more or less similar to that of the bureaucracy. While it might be true to argue that party supremacy has made the bureaucracy institutionally subservient to the political system, the injection of bureaucrats, either through appointment or election, into the party has neutralized the party's vigilance and made it more amenable to bureaucratic norms and ideals, thereby reducing the potential for conflict between the bureaucracy and the party. In essence the party became increasingly bureaucratized.⁷⁶

The growing bureaucratization of the party caused great concern within the party leadership when it became apparent that the party was now finding it difficult to censure the government and bureaucracy for certain actions or inactions, since it was itself a party to many of these. Calls for the separation of the party and the state, therefore, came to be increasingly made in the press. In August 1980, when officiating a graduation ceremony at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Party Chairman Mwalimu Mulius Nyerere, also president of the country, called for the separation of the party and state.⁷⁷ His argument was that the fusion of party and state roles, which had steadily taken place since independence, had weakened both bodies. The party had lost its teeth as a watchdog organization: it was difficult for it to criticize the government for malpractices, since many times the party and state officials were generally the same individuals; or where they were different, party institutions had been intricately involved not only in intermediate decision-making but also in policy implementation. State institutions, including the bureaucracy, came to be overwhelmed by the immense interference by the party in their work of policy implementation, resisting it whenever they could; and where they failed to resist, they abdicated their responsibilities and became cynical.

Mwalimu Nyerere's call was followed up in 1981 by an amendment to the Party Constitution that clearly tried to separate party and state func-

tions and also attempted to democratize party organs as well as strengthen them organizationally, in order to enable the party to carry out its leadership and supervisory roles over the government and bureaucratic organizations more effectively.⁷⁸

The separation of state and party functions meant that regional and area commissioners were no longer *ex officio* regional and district party secretaries, respectively: they were to perform purely state functions. Regional and district party secretaries were to be appointed by the NEC from the party itself. The organizational strengthening and democratization process involved an elaboration of the party's institutional structure from the branch level to the national level, including the setting up of strong full-time elected secretariats to service the party machinery at each level. At the national level, the Secretariat, which was to resemble a minicabinet, was to be elected by the NEC from among themselves; and in line with the decision to separate party and state functions, membership in the Secretariat barred one from being a member in the cabinet and vice versa.⁷⁹ It was indeed even suggested that the party national chairman should not be the president of the country, so as to ensure that the supervisory role of the party would be performed with absolutely no problem of role conflict.⁸⁰

The new organizational arrangements on the basis of the new party Constitution are now in place and elections to fill the positions were held in 1982. Little time has elapsed for one to make an informed opinion on whether or not the problems that this move was intended to solve have been contained. At the national level, however, there is evidence to show that the emergence of a strong party organization headed by a heavyweight secretary-general has exacerbated the problem of party interference in government business to the extent that the then prime minister, the late Edward Moringe Solkoine, mentioned it as a major problem and issued a circular delineating the channels of communication between the party and the government.⁸¹ The circular specified that the party secretariat was to issue directives only to the office of the prime minister: it was not to deal directly with ministries. The implication of this circular is that the party must have then become very active and vigilant: the days of passive involvement in policy-making were gone and it now wanted to play a leadership role in policy-making.

The central conflict here, however, was defining what policy-making entailed. The government machinery, including the bureaucracy, viewed it as broad statements of policy directions, while a well-educated and bureaucratized party machine thought it included the refinement of policy, as well as supervision of policy implementation. This seems to have increasingly become the position held by the regional and district party secretariats, headed by very senior party- and definitely bureaucratically-oriented officials, who, in the light of a reduced arena for issuing broad

policy guidelines at their levels, will be tempted to give directives to regional and area commissioners on matters that are clearly implementational. When this happens, the ground will be set for internecine conflict. There is definitely no question now that the party is on its way to making the government machinery, including the bureaucracy, subservient.

Conclusion: A Weakened Bureaucracy

We have seen through the foregoing review that the Tanzanian political leadership has, through the medium of the foregoing measures, succeeded to tone down the dominance of its bureaucracy: it is definitely more amenable to political leadership; less bureaucratic and authoritarian in orientation; and definitely less elitist than it was at the time of independence. The party has on the other hand emerged as a strong force that can, and does, exert influence on the bureaucratic system. This does not, however, mean that bureaucracy has completely been robbed of power: as Goran Hyden observes, it certainly has more influence than many other groups in the society,⁸² but compared to that of the political leadership, its influence is much less. The remaining question is whether the bureaucracy can sustain further loss of influence, power, and authority without critically affecting its ability to serve the political system; or, indeed, whether this is not already the case.

Recent observers of the Tanzanian scene believe that the onslaught on bureaucratic dominance has indeed proceeded to a level where dysfunctional consequences have set in.⁸³ This is what the late prime minister, Edward Sokoine, wrote about this phenomena:

This attack on the professionalism of the Civil Service has neutralized and demoralized the civil service as an organization. Under such circumstances, some of the top civil servants play it safe by avoiding being involved in decision-making. They only do what they are told to do by politicians. They have no initiatives of their own. . . . The reforms undertaken in relation to political-civil service relations are too radical to breed efficiency. We must swallow our pride and go back to the colonial concept of the neutrality of the civil service and the need to adhere to its professionalism. The civil service is an organization characterized by laws, rules, regulations, and customs. Let those regulations and ethnics govern the civil service.⁸⁴

Such a statement from such a critically placed person is definitely indicative of the problems presently faced by the bureaucracy, many of which are a consequence of the measures reviewed above. While not holding efforts to reduce the dominance of the bureaucracy solely responsible for the declining performance levels, all these observers do apportion considerable blame to that factor. Tanzania may have to reverse the trend in

the years to come if the public service capacity and capability is to be restored.

III. CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY IN ZAMBIA

As noted earlier Zambia inherited a bureaucracy that was very strong and autonomous, at least in relation to its then political organs. In this, Zambia's bureaucracy was not unique; many bureaucracies in third world countries could be characterized similarly, as the above cases of Kenya and Tanzania have demonstrated. Compared to those of Kenya and Tanzania, however, Zambia's bureaucracy had a number of peculiar features. First, whereas the bureaucracy in Kenya, and more so in Tanzania, was tightly unified under the direction of the governors, Zambia's bureaucratic structure was highly fragmented, consisting of loose collections of departments enjoying a great deal of autonomy, and loosely tied to each other.⁸⁵ Secondly, at least in comparison to Tanzania, the provincial administration, which was the linchpin of central control during the colonial period, possessed extraordinary discretionary power. Thirdly, in the terminal years of colonial rule the metropolitan interests created a bureaucratic apparatus not easily subjected to central control, political or otherwise. Lastly, there existed, for quite some time before independence, a multiparty system, and an independent, elitist, and politically neutral bureaucracy modeled along the lines of Whitehall. As a consequence, bureaucrats were not only in theory expected to adhere to "universalistic criteria" and insist on a distinction between politics and administration, they actually had to observe these conditions for some time. In view of the foregoing, therefore, securing control over the bureaucracy in Zambia was to be a much more arduous endeavor than in Tanzania or Kenya.

Internal Controls

When Zambia attained independence, provisions for controlling and supervising the bureaucracy were styled after the Whitehall model. The Constitution provided for a civil service that was supposed to be autonomous of the political system and governed by laws, rules, and regulations imposed and enforced by an independent Public Service Commission. This body was also responsible for the recruitment, promotion, discipline, and termination of all civil service employees on the basis of rules and regulations that highly prized the principle of merit and performance. The bureaucracy had to serve the political executive, which was composed of a president elected by universal suffrage and ministers appointed by the president from among members of Parliament, diligently and neutrally, irrespective of its personal inclination toward the ideologies, philosophies, and policies pursued by such an executive. In turn, the bureaucracy was

protected from victimization, as it was ensured that the political executive had nothing to do with the management of the civil service.

During the colonial period such regulations had been intended to ensure that the bureaucracy contributed its utmost toward the objectives of the colonial regime: to facilitate the economic exploitation of the territory's economic potential for the benefit of the mother country as well as a sizable settler community. The continuation of these regulations after independence were to some extent intended to ensure that the bureaucracy would take some time to change its composition—which was dominated by Europeans in the upper echelon—and hence remain protective of minority interests, as much as it might have been intended to reflect the political reality obtaining in the country, i.e., the existence of a viable opposition party.⁸⁶

In reality, however, this meant that the new political masters could not exert control over the bureaucracy in as effective a manner as they might have wanted. The situation was complicated by the deep suspicion of the bureaucracy felt among the politicians, which had been engendered by the bad relations between the nationalist politicians and the colonial bureaucracy, especially the Europeans, although even Africans who were identified with the colonial regime were equally resented.⁸⁷ The result was a wary attitude toward the bureaucracy, as can be seen from a statement made by a senior United Independence Party (UNIP) official in 1967:

With an efficient and powerful party in motion and a powerful parliamentary set-up, it is possible to sandwich a civil service that may—in the initial stages—not be considered loyal. An organization of this nature would make all Zambians vigilant in safeguarding their hard-won national independence.⁸⁸

The situation was exacerbated by the dominance of the civil service by foreigners whose loyalty the politicians did not trust, and as a corollary, by the severe shortage of Zambians in responsible positions. In 1964, for example, of the 848 administrative and professional posts, only 36 were filled by Zambians.⁸⁹

It is against this background that the Zambian government, like its Kenyan and Tanzanian counterparts, came to change the constitutional provision limiting the political executive's involvement in civil service management. Through a constitutional amendment effected in the second year of independence, the appointive authority of the civil service came to be vested in the president rather than in the Public Service Commission; and although the latter was to continue to exist, it now derived its authority from the president and not from the Constitution; and much of its dealings were restricted mainly to middle-level and junior personnel.⁹⁰ Top appointments were to be made by the president at his own discretion.

The effect of this change with respect to increasing the political executive's influence over the bureaucracy was tremendous. First, the president and his ministers were able to ensure that critical civil service positions, like those of permanent secretaries, were filled by loyal and often partisan persons. Secondly, since the Public Service Commission was constituted at the discretion of the president, it was now possible to influence the appointments it made. Through this way UNIP was to leave no stone unturned to ensure that the party faithfuls would be considered first by the Public Service Commission whenever there were jobs to be filled; and as some people have indicated, the Zambian civil service was significantly to become a replica of UNIP in composition much before the one-party constitution was introduced in 1973.⁹¹ Thus despite official pronouncements that continued to be made in support of the merit system and the neutrality of the civil service, the jockeying for power among the dominant political parties and the desire to reward political supporters had occasioned a reexamination of the normative controls that had hitherto ensured a meritorious and neutral bureaucracy, and was changing these controls with a view to ensuring political control over the bureaucracy.

Politicization under the Dominant Party State

In addition to the foregoing measures, control over the bureaucracy was effected through politicalization. Several strategies were employed under this broad category. The first strategy, taken several months before independence, involved the breakup of provincial administration. This move contrasted sharply with the action taken by Kenya to deal with a similar problem.

In both countries, the colonial system of provincial and district administration was frontally attacked by the nationalist movements. As Dresang has rightly noted, district officers, district commissioners, and provincial commissioners were the most visible symbols of colonial rule to most Africans. Since they were responsible for the maintenance of law and order they had considerable power,⁹² acting as a major instrument of colonial power to fight the nationalist movements. Thus, as the activity of the nationalist movements increased, the confrontation with the colonial administrative officers was intensified. Whereas Kenya took steps immediately after independence to assert African control over an otherwise intact strong provincial administration,⁹³ like Tanzania before her, Zambia felt it would best demonstrate her independence to weaken and restructure the system of field administration.

The provincial administration was renamed provincial and district government, and was stripped of much of its former functions, which were now distributed to other newly created central departments. At the same time, what remained was politicized, and a politician known as under-

minister (and subsequently known as resident minister and minister of state) was posted to each province as political and administrative head; although no corresponding political head was appointed at the district level. For the first time, this gave a Zambian politician the right to control the power and the actions of the provincial administration. As Ian Scott has noted, one of the main reasons for the introduction of under-ministers was to ensure closer control over a still European-dominated bureaucracy, and to ensure a closer supervision of the local party organization, which had hitherto enjoyed a great deal of local-level autonomy.⁹⁴ At this stage, the problem was not really one of "politicizing" the administration so much as it was one of transferring accountability.

As political problems intensified, partly as a result of race tensions that gripped the Copperbelt areas in 1966 and 1967, and as a result of the founding of the United Party with a stronghold in Barotseland,⁹⁵ the president created more political positions at the provincial and district levels, and appointed UNIP activists to fill them.⁹⁶ In 1966, for example, four special presidential public relations assistants (SPPRA) were appointed to the office of the minister of state. Their specific functions were to improve race relations and improve worker discipline. By 1968, there were twelve SPPRAs, one assisting each provincial minister of state, with four in the Copperbelt.

Notwithstanding the foregoing measures, however, the level of political control over the bureaucracy remained significantly weak in the provinces, mainly because the party remained a weak organization in the provinces, this weakness in turn being further worsened by intraparty and sectional conflict that led in 1968 to a brief resignation by Kaunda as the country's president.⁹⁷ Dresang cites the example of the conflict between the Department of Cooperatives, the party, and the government over the question of the establishment of new cooperatives as a demonstration of how difficult it was for the party to tame the bureaucracy. President Kaunda and other UNIP officials had considered cooperatives as the best way of using traditional forms of organization for achieving economic development. Shortly after independence an extensive campaign was waged to get people to form cooperatives. The reaction was very good, so much so that the number of cooperatives increased from 220 in 1964 to 875 in 1967. This growth, however, was overstressing the resources of the Cooperative Department and, as such, it decided that for some time it would not register any more cooperatives. Despite this decision, UNIP officials, including President Kaunda, continued to urge the establishment of more societies. Soon a confrontation developed. Personnel in the Department of Cooperatives either ignored the efforts of UNIP or actively worked against them.⁹⁸

The president's prescription to this problem was that the bureaucracy needed to be controlled more closely and effectively by UNIP, which was

assumed to be dynamic and development-conscious. In response to what was seen as a lack of development consciousness within Zambia's public administration, as well as its nonresponsiveness toward the party objectives, two changes in the administrative system were announced by the president in November 1968. The first entailed the involvement of the party in the implementation of a number of development projects; while the second involved what President Kaunda called "decentralizing in centralism," meaning "that power would be decentralized while retaining effective control of the Party and Government machinery in the interest of unity."⁹⁹

The first measure entailed the establishment of village productivity committees in rural areas and section productivity committees in the urban areas, all of which would be used as government and party instruments for encouraging and facilitating grass-roots participation in development projects.¹⁰⁰

In order to establish firm and institutional control by UNIP over the bureaucracy and to institute "decentralization in centralism," each province was to be under the command of a resident cabinet minister, and each district was to be under the charge of a political district governor. On the administrative side, permanent secretaries and district secretaries were respectively appointed at the provincial and district levels.¹⁰¹ The president promised that a great deal of authority would be given to the district governors in the districts and ministers in the provinces in order to remedy existing problems.

At the central-government level the major feature of the reform was the creation of the post of secretary-general to the government, who was also to be head of the civil service and a cabinet minister. The post was previously held by the secretary to the cabinet, and the incumbent was a civil servant. The same reforms also empowered the president at his discretion to declare political any post in the public service.

The attempt to make the bureaucracy an instrument of UNIP involved not only the creation of political posts within the government but also the inclusion of civil servants in the party in a direct, formal way. After the 1968 elections, civil servants were invited to join UNIP; and the invitation was interpreted by both politicians and civil servants alike as an order: and, so, many joined. Later, pressure was exerted on the lower levels of the service to secure party membership. As Simwinga relates, the then minister of information openly told civil servants in his ministry that "they could not effectively perform their jobs of communicating government policy to the people unless they were loyal to UNIP," going to the extent of even asking all non-party members to seek ministerial transfers out of his ministry.¹⁰²

The effort to establish control over the bureaucracy by involving civil servants in the activities of the party was of course contrary to the spirit

and letter of establishment circulars and the general orders that were then in effect. Unlike in Tanzania, where the bureaucracy came to be asked to join active politics at a time when there was virtually no opposition party, in Zambia they were being asked to declare their support for UNIP, and by implication against the opposition party—the African National Congress (ANC). The principle of neutrality had thus been thrown overboard.

Politicization under the One-Party State

In December 1972 Zambia officially became a one-party state. The establishment of a one-party state had been undertaken in an effort to thwart the growth of what seemed to be a burgeoning opposition that had increased its strength in the 1968 parliamentary elections and looked like it was poised for greater gains in the 1972 elections, especially after Simon Kapewepe had resigned the vice presidency and formed the United Peoples Party (UPP).¹⁰³ Realizing the potential for dissent, the Zambian leadership saw that the only way to broaden support for the regime was to have a party that was open to all groups, including the civil service.¹⁰⁴ So not only were civil servants to be allowed membership in the party, they could also stand for election to parliamentary and party office. Furthermore, civil servants were, like other important sectors in Zambian society, to be represented in the policy-making bodies of the party, such as the Party National Council.¹⁰⁵ At the normative level, at least one area of concern by the politicians—that of the role of the bureaucracy—was resolved. Politicians and civil servants were no longer artificially divided: they could legitimately become members of the same political organization—UNIP. It remained to be seen whether practice matched theory or not. In fact, civil servants took advantage of this measure to join the party, as well as to occupy many of the party's leadership positions as the more gave them the same rights and status within the party as long-time UNIP members. In 1973, the trend was continued with a number of senior and middle-class civil servants, including several permanent secretaries, standing for election to the National Assembly.

Another area of concern by top political leadership was the dominance by the civil service of policy-making and implementation. We have previously noted efforts taken by the government in the late sixties intended to increase the civil service's subservience to the political system. Up to 1972, the constitution of UNIP provided for a situation whereby the National Council was responsible for policy formulation, and the Central Committee for implementation. In practice, however, the president and the Central Committee not only made policies but, again, given that the majority of Central Committee members also belonged to the cabinet, they also implemented policies in their capacity as cabinet members. Therefore, it was difficult under such circumstances for the party to supervise

government, since too many people doubled roles. To deal with the problem, the new arrangements attempted to separate "policy formulation from policy execution," with the former being performed by the party, and the latter being performed by the government. With the exception of the president, the prime minister, and the secretary-general of the party, membership of the Central Committee now precluded membership of the cabinet.

It was, however, provided in the constitution that, notwithstanding this separation of roles, the party was to be supreme; members of the Central Committee should take precedence over the cabinet; and in the event of a conflict between the decisions of the two bodies, that of the Central Committee would prevail.^{105a} To make the Central Committee better organized for its new role, it was divided into several functional subcommittees, each dealing with a number of functions currently handled by one or two ministries. These subcommittees, which were chaired by a Central Committee member, would on occasion include some ministers as well as some M.P.s, with some civil servants being included in the committee as advisers.

In effect, however, control over policy-making, which was expected to be exercised through this medium, proved difficult, as has been noted by a number of observers.¹⁰⁶ Much policy-making was generally made in the ministries and not in the cabinet as had been anticipated. Attempts to control decision-making outside the ministerial setup came to be seen by senior civil servants as unnecessary intrusion. This feeling was in turn supported by the ministers, who, since the separation of the roles of ministers and Central Committee Members, had come to be chosen from among former civil servants. This ensured a relatively harmonious working relationship between the ministers and the senior civil servants; but it did nothing to make members of the Central Committee feel a part of the policy-implementation body; and, as Ian Scott has noted, there was some resentment, especially among those members who had been in the cabinet before, that their role had been devalued.¹⁰⁷

The influence of the party on policy-making was, if anything, even less significant. Constitutionally, policy matters were supposed to be decided by the Central Committee and the National Council.¹⁰⁸ In practice, however, policy decisions were increasingly being made by the president together with a team of advisers in the State House. Moreover, when outside opinions on policy matters were sought, reference was made not to the Central Committee but to the relevant civil servants in the ministries.¹⁰⁹ A major reason for the lack of influence by the Central Committee and the National Council on policy formulation was that these two bodies were not given adequate technical support. Although a party research unit had been established and staffed with senior civil servants, the unit found itself bogged down by operational activities of the party, and thus had very little time left for research on new public policies.¹¹⁰

The result was that it was not in a position to supply adequate data to support any policy decision to the major party organs. Policy formulation therefore remained the prerogative of the instruments with requisite logistical bases—the government machinery—as had been the case all along.

We have seen from the foregoing that the Zambian political leadership took a number of steps to bring the bureaucracy under its control. Initially this was done by attempting to influence the operations of the agencies that were charged with the function of managing the bureaucracy, and some success was achieved in this. It is suggested, however, that this success was leaving the bureaucracy intact as an organization and generally unpenetrated by the political system. Indeed the bureaucracy was in the end stronger.¹¹¹

The view that bureaucracy has been strengthened is fallacious, however, on the ground that it is the progressive involvement of civil servants in the party that indicates the dominance the bureaucracy, as an institution, has over the political system. The foregoing account clearly shows that the autonomy of the bureaucracy came to be eroded, and that power was shifted to the political party. It is possible that the several party organs may not have been able to translate into reality the normative of power in their favor, but the Presidency, the Party Central Committee, the National Council, and individual members of the Central Committee enjoyed, and still continue to enjoy, far greater power over bureaucratic organizations today than they did in 1964. The power imbalance against political institutions has therefore been significantly redressed.

The more important question is whether or not this has been attained at some cost to the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, as was the case in both Kenya and Tanzania. Available evidence indicates that during the first twenty-year period, the civil service has experienced a decline in performance.¹¹² What is difficult to establish is whether or not the decline in performance can partly be attributed to the efforts to subject the bureaucracy to political control. Even if this were the case, one should also try to consider whether or not the greater bureaucratic responsiveness that resulted from these measures had a positive effect on the performance of the bureaucracy. More research is therefore required before one can make any conclusive observations on the subject.

IV. CONCLUSION

A number of pertinent conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing review: the first relates to the extent to which the three countries can be said to have succeeded in bringing the public bureaucracies under political control, and the factors that may have accounted for the level of success attained; the second concerns the consequences resulting from this control.

In the first respect, we may validly say that, given the set objectives, the efforts by the three countries paid off to a significant extent: the public bureaucracies that obtain in the three countries are definitely a far cry from the autonomous, independent organizations that these countries inherited at independence. They are now all subject to some degree of control by political institutions, although the types of control, the extent of this control, and the manner in which it is exercised may differ among the three countries.

With regard to the types of control, for example, all three countries approached the issues by using a similar method—they progressively abandoned the principle of civil service neutrality and autonomy, which had been enshrined in the constitutions and civil service regulations of their countries as they became independent. The management of the public service also progressively became the responsibility of the chief executive, rather than that of an independent regulatory body—the Public Service Commission. This made it possible (at least in theory) for the elected chief political authority in these countries to appoint trusted and loyal persons to important and sensitive positions in the public service, thus ensuring that the public service would now become responsible and loyal to them.

This move was carried further several years later, when additional political influence over bureaucratic organizational behavior was obtained by subjecting the operations of the bureaucracy to control by party institutions. Either the civil servants were required to join the dominant, and later the sole, political party or trusted party members were given civil service jobs; and bureaucratic institutions became subject to operational supervision by party organs, or the party institutions simply assumed supreme power and authority over state institutions. These efforts were to attain different levels of success in the three countries, the greatest success being recorded in Tanzania, followed by Zambia, with Kenya recording the least success.

The major explanation for this is the relative level of party institutionalization in the three countries. As has been seen, Tanzania had a well-organized, strong, and dominant single party well before the country attained independence, and since then serious efforts have been taken to strengthen it at both the normative and practical levels. But even in the case of Tanzania the measures undertaken have to a significant extent not been as effective in terms of changing the political-bureaucratic relationship, and there have been suggestions that they may in effect have strengthened, instead of weakened, the bureaucracy.¹³

Zambia, on the other hand, though starting with a dominant ruling party, found itself in a situation in which there were other parties that were challenging the hegemony of that party both at the normative and practical levels; so the ruling party had to contend with the problem of

controlling the opposition party at the same time as it was trying to control the bureaucracy. It was only after the institution of a one-party state that the party seriously applied itself to imposing controls over the bureaucracy, and so far it has not developed enough legitimacy and organizational capacity and capability to effectively ensure its dominance over the bureaucracy.

For its part, Kenya has never had an effective party organization. This is partly because of the colonial legacy, but even since independence no effort has been taken by the political leadership to develop the political party, mainly because developing it into a well-organized, closely knit institution on the scale of TANU and UNIP was considered too gigantic an exercise. In the absence of such a political institution, recourse was made to the bureaucracy, which progressively came to perform political roles, over and in addition to its traditional civil service functions.

Now as to the second concern: What conclusions can one draw on the consequences resulting from this control? Earlier in the introductory part of this chapter, it was noted that Fred Riggs, as well as Carl Friedrich, suggested that control over the bureaucracy by extrabureaucratic institutions should be of just the right amount; otherwise, it becomes dysfunctional. This advice seems to have gone unheeded by the three countries; for the controls were a little excessive. In spite of our earlier observation that efforts to control the bureaucracy have been significantly constrained, there is an indication that high levels of control are being exerted over the bureaucracy in all the three countries which are choking it and making it difficult for it to operate efficiently and effectively.¹⁴ It has been advanced that the politicization of the service has resulted in the abandonment of the principle of merit in recruitment; indiscipline has set in; and the overall performance of the bureaucracy has seen a downward trend.

While it might be difficult to reverse the trend toward political dominance over bureaucracy, it may still be possible to ensure that the politicized bureaucracy increases its capacity, capability, and effectiveness by emphasizing internal measures for generating effectiveness. What has happened in the case of the three countries is that these internal measures have not been emphasized adequately: they have in fact been neglected. It is important that corrective measures be taken before the bureaucracy collapses and becomes unable to shoulder its responsibilities.

Again there is the question of whether effective control over bureaucracy is possible or not, and if possible whether or not it is desirable. It has been observed that bureaucracies in Africa have been growing in size and competence, and one scholar has gone to the extent of observing that bureaucracies are indeed once again dominant. If what has been observed to be true of Africa, in general, is also true of our three case study countries, then much of the effort undertaken, and what we have just reviewed, was useless. As the parties and political executives

were taking institutional means to control bureaucracies, developments internal to the bureaucracies were making them more difficult to control. This was and is true of their growing size, complexity, as well as competence, making any institutional measure to control them ineffective.

To become effective, the party and the political executive would have to develop attributes that would make them akin to the civil services. They would have to become increasingly large, complex, and competent. This would, however, tend to make them become less responsive toward the public whom they are supposed to serve, and thus they would be no different from the bureaucracy. Tendencies along these lines are already taking place and, unless stalled, responsiveness in public administration may be in danger. The answer to the problem does not lie, therefore, in transforming political institutions into protobureaucracies; rather, efforts to continue political controls over bureaucracies have to be intensified.

NOTES

1. In traditional governments this question of controlling the power of bureaucracy did not arise because all power was concentrated in the sovereign. For more details, see F. Riggs *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970).
2. In a modern activist state, which has been the condition of the third world during the last two decades, the problem is how to ensure that the powerful bureaucratic organizations develop adequate enthusiasm to pursue the goals of transforming society. This was a major objective for wanting to control bureaucracies in the three countries we are studying. When reference is made to the efforts to control the bureaucracies from the excessive and unrestrained use of power, it should be kept in mind that the need to control the bureaucracy may have been prompted by the opposite objective—making it enthusiastic about the need for intervention and action.
3. C. J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in F. Rourke, ed., *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 413.
4. H. Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Societies," in F. Rourke, ed., *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics*, 442.
5. For a very well argued point on this, see F. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness*, 576–80.
6. See H. Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Societies," 418.
7. F. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness*, 577–88.
8. I have relied on Francis Rourke's summary of external controls on bureaucratic power, which appears in F. Rourke, ed., *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics*, 394–98, for what follows.
9. For a discussion of this approach, see S. Krislov and D. H. Rosenbloom, *Representative Bureaucracy and the American Political System* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 107–17.
10. For a comparative study of the roles of ombudsmen around the world, see K. M. Weeks,

Ombudsmen Around the World: A Comparative Chart (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1978).

11. F. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in J. La Palombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 120.
12. F. Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Political Development," in A. Etzioni and E. Etzioni, eds., *Social Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 310-23; and L. Pye, "The Political Context of National Development," in I. Swerdlow, ed., *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963).
13. D. Abernathy, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development in Africa," *African Review* 1, no. 1 (1971): 101. See also D. Abernathy "Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Decline in Sub-Saharan Africa," (Paper presented at 24th Annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston, Mass., December 1983).
14. B. Selassie, *The Executive in African Governments* (London: Heinemann, 1974), 215.
15. For a characterization of the colonial administrator in a colonial situation that best depicts this position, see R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika: An Essay and Documents on District Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), chap. 4.
16. See H. Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 30-43; and C. Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya.
17. For more arguments of the pros and cons of this development, see J. Nellis, "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?," *African Studies Review* 14, no. 3 (December 1971): 389-402.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *The Independence Constitution*, Schedule 2 of the Kenya Independence Order in Council, 1963, sec. 188.
20. *Ibid.*, sec. 185.
21. *Ibid.*, sec. 186.
22. *Ibid.*, sec. 188(1).
23. *Ibid.*
24. Republic of Kenya, *Code of Regulations*, Rule G.7(b).
25. *Ibid.*, Rule G.11.
26. *Ibid.*, Rule G.12(i).
27. *Ibid.*, Rule G.13(i).
28. For a pioneering statement supportive of the extreme position on separation between policy-making and administrative, see F. J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1900), 22-25. For a contrary view on the limitation of this extreme view, see F. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness*.
29. See G. Wasserman, "The Politics of Consensual Decolonization," *The African Review* 5, no. 1 (1975).

30. *The Constitution of Kenya* (Amendment) Act, no. 28, of 1964.
31. Sec. 186(2) of *Independence Constitution* repealed and replaced.
32. For more details on this, see C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*; C. Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya"; and J. Nellis, "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?"
33. C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*, 206.
34. *Ibid.*, 205.
35. O. Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (London: Heinemann, 1967), 247.
36. For this view, see J. Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 30; J. Okumu, "Party and Party State Relations," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 49-51; and G. Hyden, "Administration and Public Policy," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 103-106.
37. See J. Okumu, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya," *East African Journal* (June 1968): 9-16.
38. The establishment of district-based parties had been a result of the colonial government's ban on territorial parties. See J. Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 49.
39. On clientelism in Kenya, see J. Barkan, "Bringing Home the Pork: Legislative Behaviour, Rural Development and Political Change in East Africa," in L. Musolf and J. Smith, eds., *Legislators and Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978); and J. Barkan and J. Okumu, "Semi-Competitive Elections, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in a No-party State: The Kenyan Case," in C. Hermet et al., eds., *Elections Without Choice* (London: Macmillan, 1978).
40. J. Barkan, "Bringing Home the Pork."
41. For a review of other salient factors that may have been responsible for the decline of the party, see J. Okumu, "Party and Party-State Relations," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 59-60.
42. H. Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control*, 39.
43. *Ibid.*, 40.
44. See N. Nyangira, *Chiefs, Barazas as Agents of Administration and Political Change*, Institute of Development Studies, Staff Paper, no. 80, Nairobi, (July 1970), 41.
45. J. B. Ojwang, "Kenya and the Concept of Civil Service Political Neutrality: A Case of Silent but Determined Politicization," *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 24. (April/June 1978): 431-40.
46. C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*, 49.
47. *Ibid.*, 80.
48. Although such activity was suspected by the general public in respect to the convictions of George Anyona, C. Mutai, and several other "opposition" politicians, it was not until the suspension of Charles Njonjo from the cabinet in 1984 and the appointment of a commission of inquiry into his conduct that the preponderance of these forms of practices during Njonjo's heyday came to surface. The office of the Attorney-General under Njonjo worked out a number of harassments of prominent politicians, and many

of them came to be convicted or toed the line. For an account of this phenomenon, see various issues of the *Weekly Review* during 1984. The most prominent politicians whose convictions were thought to be "political" were George Anyona (1978), C. Mutai, (1979), and Kimani (1981).

49. J. B. Ojwang, "Kenya and the Concept of Civil Service Political Neutrality," 436.
50. See J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*.
51. In December 1977 the author conducted a course in Development Management for Kenyan senior civil servants at the Kenya Institute of Administration. It was during this course that these views were expressed, although by that time civil servants were already allowed to join KANU.
52. J. B. Ojwang, "Kenya and the Concept of Civil Service Political Neutrality."
53. Personnel Circular No. 5, 24 September 1975, Office of the President, Directorate of Personnel.
54. *Ibid.* Since October 1984, civil servants have been forced to join KANU, however.
55. C. Leys, "Recruitment, Promotion and Training," in G. Hyden, J. Okumu, and R. Jackson, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, 126-50; and Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Public Service Commission for 1967* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1967).
56. For more details on this, see C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*, 166-73; J. Nellis, "Is the Kenya Bureaucracy Developmental?" *African Studies Review* 14 (1971): 389-402; J. Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting," 25-42; and G. Hyden, "Administrators and Public Policy," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*.
57. C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt, and D. Rothchild, eds., *Government and Politics in Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969).
58. See J. Okumu, "Party and State Relations," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 43-63. The dominance exerted by senior administrative officials as a consequence of politicization is best exemplified by the power that was wielded by Charles Njonjo, the attorney-general of Kenya, during much of this period, as revealed recently in the report of the commission of inquiry investigating his conduct. See issues of the *Kenya Weekly Review* since January 4, 1984.
59. Frank Holmquist describes how the phenomenon of pushing and pulling manifests itself with respect to self-help and Harambee projects in F. Holmquist, "Class Structure, Peasant Participation and Self-help," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 129-49.
60. For a characterization of the bureaucracy in colonial Tanganyika that brings out this point sharply, see R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika*, chap. 3.
61. In a major reshuffle of the Senior Civil Service in 1963, a trade unionist with considerable experience in economics, who was then a parliamentary secretary, was appointed permanent secretary to the Treasury.
62. For an account of the adverse effect of interfering with the work of the public service commission in Africa, see A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1969), 136-53; W. N. Wamalwa, "The Role of Public Service Commissions in New African States," in A. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, eds., *Decade of Public Administration*, 51-61. For an account of the manifestation of this phenomenon in Tanzania in the early independence period, see A. Adedeji, *The Tanzania Civil Service: A Decade After Independence* (Mimeo, 1972).

63. I have relied on W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania: A Collection of Essays Covering the Period 1960-1966* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); and S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968) for the account that goes to the end of this section.
64. Staff Circular No. 7 of 1964.
65. General Order No. Q.19, 1957.
66. Staff Circular No. 14 of 1961.
67. J. K. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party-System," in *Freedom and Unity* (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 203.
68. Ministry of Manpower, *Circular No. 4* of 1982.
69. Examples of civil servants who have been appointed ministers include Cleopa Msuya, who was appointed minister in the Ministry of Finance, the same ministry he had been working in before then as a principal secretary; and Augustine Mwingira, who was moved from the post of principal secretary, Ministry of Communications, to that of a minister in the same ministry.
70. TANU, *Mwongozo: The Party Guidelines of 1971* (Dar-es-Salaam: Printpak, 1971).
71. For a review of the effect of the party branches at workplaces and other related issues on organizational performance, see S. R. Mukandala, *Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania: The Case of the Civil Service* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mimeo, 1983).
72. P. Msekwa, *Party Supremacy* (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1974).
73. *Ibid.*
74. For an account of the nature of problems encountered as a result of this mode of decision-making, see G. Hyden, "Administrators and Public Policy," in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 93-113; R. M. Mayaya, *Public Policy-Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of the Village Managers' Policy* (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar-es-Salaam, September 1981); and B. G. Moses, *The Policy-Making Process in Tanzania: The Case of the Relocation of the Tanzania Capital from Dar-es-Salaam to Dodoma* (Master of Development Studies dissertation, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, December 1980).
75. For a detailed account of the major prerequisites in maintaining party dominance in decision-making, see J. Okumu, "Party and Party-State Relations," 54.
76. This argument goes against the grain of the point raised earlier in the chapter that the party branches' influence on decision-making tends to be counterorganizational and inimical to bureaucratic norms and interests. But as Goran Hyden points out (see his *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*) and also Issa Shivji (see his *Class Struggles in Tanzania*), there has been more harmony of interests between the national party organs and the civil service than there is between primary party organizations and parallel bureaucratic units.
77. *Daily News* (Dar-es-Salaam, 21 August 1980), 1.
78. TANU, *Mwongozo: The Party Guidelines of 1981* (Dar-es-Salaam: Printpak, 1981).
79. A few members of the Secretariat, however (three), are members of the present cabinet.
80. In subsequent debate on this issue, the National Executive Committees of the party thought the separation of the posts at the top-most level might create conflicts between incumbents. In recent constitutional amendment proposals, the separation of functions at the national level is not suggested. See CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) *National Ex-*

- ecutive Committee Proposals to Amend the Constitution, Daily News* (4-6 January, 1983).
81. *Daily News* (11 March 1984).
 82. G. Hyden, *Beyond Umjamaa in Tanzania*.
 83. See J. Morris, *The Quality of Institutional Performance within Tanzanian Rural Development* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mimeo, 1982); and L. G. Mashamba, *The Abolition of Administration in Tanzania* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mimeo, 1982).
 84. E. M. Sokoine, "Public Policy Making and Implementation in Tanzania: An Analysis of the Constraints and How to Overcome Them" (Draft in progress of M.A. thesis in Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1984, 75-76).
 85. For a review of the fragmented character of Zambia's bureaucracy, see D. D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service: Entrepreneurialism and Development Administration* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), chap. 2 and 6.
 86. For details on this, see W. Tordoff and R. Moltano, "Government and Administration," in *Politics in Zambia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
 87. I. Scott, "Party and Administration under the One-Party State," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia*, 140.
 88. Cited by D. C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1956-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 233.
 89. *Report of Zambianization and Training Committee*, 1969, 3.
 90. Republic of Zambia, *Constitutional Amendment Schedule II*, 1965.
 91. G. K. Simwinda, "The Changing Role of Public Administration in Zambia," *Zango*, nos. 4/5 (August): 13-14.
 92. D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*, 120.
 93. See Section II of this chapter.
 94. I. Scott, "Party and Administration."
 95. For a review of these issues, see W. Tordoff and R. Moltano, "Political Parties: Structures and Policies," in W. Tordoff, ed., *Politics in Zambia*, 107-54.
 96. For the following account, see B. C. Chikulo, "The Zambian Administrative Reforms," *Public Administration and Development* 1-1 (1981): 59.
 97. For an account of these conflicts, see W. Tordoff and I. Scott, "Political Parties: Structures and Policies," in W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Zambia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 107-54.
 98. D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*, 128.
 99. President Kaunda, "Guidelines for the Next Decade," *Speech to National Council of UNIP* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 9 November 1968), 19.
 100. G. Lungu, *Administrative Decentralization in the Zambian Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Constraints* (Mimeo), 58-72.
 101. For a more detailed account of the features of this reorganization, see G. Lungu, *Administrative Decentralization*, chap. 4.

102. G. K. Simwinga, "The Changing Role of Public Administration," 15.
103. For an account of political developments during this period, see I. Scott, "Party and Administration," 137-61.
104. *Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party State*, Lusaka, 1972.
105. *Ibid.*
- 105a. *Constitution of Zambia*, Lusaka, 1973.
106. I. Scott, "Party and Administration," 151-55; and W. Tordoff and R. Molteno, "Government and Administration," 265-74.
107. I. Scott, "Party and Administration," 152.
108. *Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Schedule: UNIP Constitution*, sec. 12.
109. I. Scott, "Party and Administration"; and D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*.
110. W. Tordoff and R. Molteno, "Political Parties: Structures and Policies," 150-54.
111. See I. Scott, "Party and Administration," 157.
112. For more details, see D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*, chap. 6; and G. Lungu, "Africanization and the Merit Principle," *Journal of Administration Overseas* 14, no. 2 (april 1980).
113. See, for example, P. Msekwa, "Party Supremacy," 115, and I. Shivji, *Silent Class Struggle*.
114. See R. Baguma, "The Changing Ecology of Public Administration and Management in Tanzania" (paper presented at the African Association of Public Administration and Management, Annual Roundtable, Arusha, Tanzania, 29 November to 3 December 1983); G. Hyden, "Administration and Public Policy"; S. R. Mukandala, "Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania"; G. Lungu, "Africanization and the Merit Principle"; and E. Sokoine, "Public Policy-making and Implementation."

Training and Development of Personnel for Improved Administrative Performance

In the foregoing two chapters we have reviewed two measures taken by the governments of the three countries to remodel the public administration systems in order to make them cope better with the tasks and circumstances of independence. In this chapter we shall focus on a third thrust: efforts to improve the competence of the public service system through training and development of personnel.

Before proceeding to review the efforts, however, our study may benefit from a review of, first, efforts to train administrators in developed countries as well as in Africa and, second, the contribution of such efforts to improved public administration in these countries.

I. ON TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

For a long time training of personnel in public administration organizations was regarded as a waste of time. The predominant view was that administrators are born, and not made. What future administrators needed, therefore, was a sound and rounded education, after which they would acquire the necessary know-how and skills solely through practice. This view of the unimportance of formal training in public administration was, moreover, until recently reinforced by the relative simplicity and routineness of most public administration activity—consisting mainly of the maintenance of law and order, the collection of revenues, the maintenance of secure borders, as well as the facilitation of good relations with other countries.¹

The Napoleonic revolution in France was to change fundamentally the nature of not only the French state but most European states and consequently their public administration systems. The absolutist state, whereby the sovereign ruled absolutely and independently, was to disappear in all these countries, and in its place there came what has come to be known as the "administrative state." Under this new state system, permanent public officials working on specialized assignments came to be appointed to work under political appointees, and, as such, their prepa-

ration, recruitment, promotions, dismissals, and discipline had to be systematized. It is during this turbulent period that Max Weber, and before him Hegel, came to write and argue for a permanent bureaucracy, which demanded, among other things, specialized training?²

The demand for a permanent specialized bureaucracy was, moreover, further necessitated by the industrial revolution and the consequential technological development in the industrialized countries, which led to the dramatic expansion of the tasks of government and greater complexity. Of necessity such a bureaucracy could only come to the scene through deliberate efforts, including efforts directed at training.

Four different approaches have been adopted by the various industrialized countries in training their public administrators. The first approach is that of the countries that conceived public administration activities as of a juridical nature. Most of these countries are of continental Europe, including Switzerland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. The study of public administration in these countries consists of the study of law and related subjects: the same type of training as would normally be given to judges. This study consists of three stages: first, the candidate passes the general university examination in law; this is followed by a lengthy period of service in various sections of the administrative service; followed, finally, by taking a final examination of the administrative service.³

Second is the French approach, which, though not placing undue emphasis on law, puts a lot of emphasis on formalized and systematic training of potential recruits into the public service. Accordingly all future administrators, after passing a competitive examination, have to undergo a two-stage training program managed by the *École National d'Administration*. The program consists of an assignment to either prefectures, departments, or an overseas office of a foreign country. After this initial period, all trainees return to Paris for intensive training at the *École National d'Administration*, where practical applications of administration, politics, law, economics, finance, sociology, statistics, accounting, as well as organization and methods, tend to be emphasized.

The third approach groups countries like Great Britain and Ireland. For a long time these countries did not have formalized pre-entry training programs for their public administrators and did not have any particular disciplines from which administrators could be recruited. The view was that administrators, who would be recruited by a competitive general aptitude examination, needed a good rounded formal education, which could help the graduates form solid characters, develop the mind, and give them the ability to think. Such individuals would then be developed into administrators mainly through practice, no matter what their original fields of education were. Since the recent adoption of the Fulton report, however, there have been innovations among these countries.⁴ The

Civil Service College, where young administrative trainees who have been in service for a year or so go for ten weeks of induction training, has come to be established.⁵

Fourth is the approach used in the United States of America, where professional training in public administration is, in theory, supposed to have started in the early part of this century. Now there are more than 150 universities and institutes offering training programs in the field.⁶ Much of the training at these institutions, however, covers little beyond the social sciences and deals only fragmentarily with public administration. In many of these schools the assumption has been that a curriculum in public administration should consist of the study of political science and a few specialized courses in such fields as personnel management, finance, organizations, management, and administrative law. They are not organized to prepare personnel for particular jobs and tend to be open-ended. There are, however, a few schools that have been established by state governments with programs meant specifically to train people for the public service, although the graduates of such programs are not guaranteed jobs in the public service. It is partly in recognition of this fact and the adverse impact it has on the professional development of public administration that Blue Wooldridge has called for clear linkage between what the programs of public administration (MPAs) give and the jobs available.⁷

The foregoing review of focuses and orientations of public administration training in industrialized countries clearly indicates that in spite of the headstart by industrialized countries, public administration training still remains haphazard; and professionalism is still far away.

Since almost all African countries were subjected to colonial rule they all witnessed the grafting of a foreign administrative system onto the fringes of society. In these colonies, the whole structure of the metropolitan administrative infrastructure was established, demanding, in essence, the same capabilities as those of the metropolitan countries. The established administrative infrastructure, however was simple; it required only small numbers of personnel, and for the most part, the senior personnel were supplied by the metropolitan power. Where these senior personnel needed to be trained, they usually underwent similar training as their counterparts in the home establishments: the French colonial administrators went through rigorous training at the *École d'Administration*, while British colonial administrators were trained in the public school system and "Oxbridge" before being absorbed by the colonial service.⁸ In both British and French colonies, Africans occupied only very junior positions in the administrative system, which did not require elaborate training: they were either simple clerks and typists or at the very best, chiefs. As a result of this situation, therefore, there were few or no facilities for the training of administrators in many of the colonies.⁹

The late fifties and early sixties saw a major change in the thrust of

public administration training in Africa. A number of measures were taken to embark on training national personnel either at home or abroad.

First, it was realized that even if the nature and tasks of the administrative systems in these newly independent states were to remain the same, the replacement of expatriate personnel was an imperative—unnecessary retention of colonial public service personnel was incompatible with the demands of self-rule. As such, localization of administrative personnel came to be taken as a priority, and in order to ensure that optimal operating standards were maintained, the indigenous staff replacing them had to be prepared and trained. Much of the training that was undertaken in the early period of independence, therefore, was directed toward this objective.

Secondly, the nature and scope of governmental activities came to change very dramatically with independence. Governments were now dealing not only with the maintenance of law and order but also with the consolidation of national integration, the establishment and maintaining of relations with other sovereign states, and the maintenance of territorial integrity, activities which were of no concern to colonial governments. In addition to the above, all African countries were committed to the furtherance of economic development. This demanded not only a greater number but also a much more qualified personnel.

What measures in particular were adopted by the three countries in this direction, and to what extent have these measures helped in making the public administration systems more efficient?

II. TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATORS FOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT: TANZANIA

When Tanzania attained independence in 1961 she inherited an administrative legacy that badly needed training for its personnel. As in most colonies, the departing colonialists had not had a good public-service-personnel training program and, therefore, there were very few qualified Africans to take even minimal public service responsibilities. According to a survey conducted in 1962, only 23 percent of Tanganyikan men and 7 1/2 percent of Tanganyikan women over 15 years of age had attended school.

With such a poor educational base, it is not surprising to note what the report also revealed: the lopsided racial distribution of high- and middle-level employment, as can be seen from Table 6.1. The situation was even more alarming if one considers the status of education at levels higher than primary school. It is worth noting that no university had been established in the country from which public service personnel could be recruited. Makerere College, based in Uganda, was the only university

TABLE 6.1

Typical high- and middle-level employment by race, in Tanzania, 1961

Title	Africans	Asians	Europeans	Total
Architects	0	2	9	11
Agr. engineers	1	0	0	1
Surveyors	1	1	92	94
Agronomists	0	0	1	1
Soil scientist	0	0	1	1
Hort. scientists	50	10	129	189
Physicians	16	60	108	184
Surgeons	0	0	1	1
Dentists	0	1	3	4
Nurse (profession)	158	10	156	324
Teacher primary school	36	130	57	223
Accountants	12	120	82	214
Govt. adm./executives	427	93	442	962
Adm. (banks)	0	6	31	37

Source: M. Tobias, *Survey of High Level Manpower Situation*, Table 10 (extracted), Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1962.

in East Africa. Because of its small size, only a few Tanganyikans could be admitted—by 1961 only 22 Tanganyikans had graduated from there. The country also had graduates from Britain, India, and the United States, but the number was very small.

Similarly, educational facilities at levels lower than the university were equally scanty. The country had only ten secondary schools with a total student population numbering 2,400. Thus, the pool of secondary school graduates from which civil servants could be recruited to fill middle-level jobs was equally inadequate.

Facilities for the professional training of administrators and administrative technicians were either nonexistent or existed only in a rudimentary form. There was no facility for the training of senior-level public administrative cadres, with the exception of the local government training school for chiefs, which had been established in the forties.

If satisfying the training requirements only meant dealing with the past neglect by the British, the task might have been somehow manageable.¹⁰ This was not the case, however, as the need for qualified manpower was exacerbated by the expansion of development activity, itself a response to the expectations of independence. The three-year plan, prepared as the country attained independence, for example, targeted an expansion of health services, secondary education, and agricultural production that was unprecedented. The gross domestic product was targeted to grow at the rate of 6.3 percent per year. A number of qualified personnel were essential to carry out this planned growth. Plans had to be worked out, there-

fore, of whether to recruit these from abroad or/and, especially in the long run, to train them.

The training measures adopted in the course of the early period of independence can be categorized into two approaches. The first approach was in the main influenced by the need to make the public service indigenous, popularly known as Africanization. Steps were taken in this direction by the TANU government, which had taken over the reins of power in September 1960 to contain the pressures of the M.P.s, the rank and file of TANU membership, and members of the trade union movement, who were outspoken in their demands for the rapid Africanization of the public services.¹¹ Members of government did of course share the general desire that Tanganyikans administer the country according to the wishes and interests of the people. But the then chief minister, Mwalimu Nyerere, preferred a pace of Africanizing the public service that would not unduly disturb the efficiency of the public service.¹² At this time the government wanted to retain not only the technical and professional expatriate officers but also the expatriate administrative officers. But since the party rank and file were becoming ever insistent on the Africanization of the public service as independence approached, the prime minister found it necessary to Africanize senior- and middle-grade posts more quickly than was warranted by the small number of Tanganyikan graduates and trained personnel then available.

The prime minister would have also preferred to have made citizenship and not race the precondition for entry to, and promotion in, the public service, consistent with his ideas on the race question.¹³ However, the feeling in the part—shared by most members of the cabinet—was that the existing racial imbalance arising from historical factors ought to be redressed before accepting the idea of racial equality. Preference was therefore to be given to the Africans in the indigenization process.

In as much as it was desirable to have Africans in senior- and middle-level positions, the number of Africans with the requisite education, training, and experience was, as indicated earlier, very small. There were a number of ways to handle the shortage and avoid a crisis of performance in the public service. One, use could be made of the colonial approach under which the pace of Africanization could be pegged to school and university output and the length of time that it took an African officer to prove himself within the service. The government obviously rejected this method on the ground that it would take a generation before any significant progress could be made on the issue. On the other hand, use could be made of the "accelerated promotion approach," under which an African could take over an expatriate-held post after a much shorter apprenticeship than would otherwise be required to serve. This was the approach used by the government. Another approach used was called the "job analysis approach," under which promising Africans were selected

and trained intensively to fill posts for which no local officers were immediately available. This also involved a detailed examination of the complements and qualifications of each post in the civil service in order to relate the organization of work and qualifications required for a post to the available African manpower.

The government decided to concentrate first on Africanizing those departments that the general public interacted with most, namely, provincial administration. In this way, as Tordoff puts it, the people would see for themselves that Tanganyikans were holding positions of authority and would feel that the government was no longer in the hands of foreigners. In this connection, half of the fifty-eight districts were to be headed by African district commissioners immediately.

It was also equally recognized that Africanization of the headquarters, departments, and ministries was equally critical. This was desirable not only because of national pride but also because it did not make good sense to have recently promoted African officers in the field take orders from expatriate civil servants at the center. In addition, and more importantly, certain politically sensitive posts had to be Africanized immediately. These were those of the chairman of the Public Service Commission, the commissioner of police, and the commissioner of prisons.

The Establishment Division of the prime minister's office was charged with the responsibility of planning, implementing, and supervising an accelerated Africanization program, as well as rapidly expanding training facilities in the civil service. An Africanization section was set up under a Chief Establishment officer, a post which, though initially filled by an expatriate, was to become Africanized in a short while.

These efforts notwithstanding, M.P.s and trade unionists were still unhappy with the pace of Africanization. The government was therefore forced to take early steps to satisfy their demands, and in February 1962, the prime minister announced the setting up of an Africanization Commission with the following terms of reference:

to undertake a detailed and comprehensive investigation into every cadre and grade in the civil service, with a view to ensuring that a satisfactory plan for complete Africanization of the government is proposed. However, the Commission should take great care to ensure that the expansion of the services and amenities and development of the country is not unduly sacrificed by the premature appointment of Africans before they are qualified.¹⁴

The Africanization exercise was to be undertaken diligently, but given the educational and training facilities available, as well as the small number of qualified people, the job was an uphill task, as one of the Commission's early reports noted.¹⁵ Without a concerted effort to expand the educational system, no significant results could be reached through the

educational system. Since the expansion of educational facilities could be feasible only in the long run, some short-term measures were undertaken to accelerate Africanization. These consisted mainly of the accelerated upgrading of persons already in employment; the improved use of available manpower; and the reorganization of work schedules in order to make optimal use of what was available.

For the administrative cadre, in particular, efforts to meet these short-term goals consisted of crash training programs for officers who were identified by the Civil Service Commission from among serving officers such as teachers, community development personnel, senior clerical officers, etc. The crash training programs were conducted at the Institute of Public Administration at the University College and the local government training center in Morogoro. The former had been established about the time of independence with the clear purpose of developing administrative personnel for the public service, while the latter had been in existence since the forties, except that it previously trained only chiefs.

The thrust and content of the program emphasized the juridical, control, and magisterial functions of the administrative officers, a conception that was in line with the roles and functions of the departing colonial administrators. The course content included leadership skills, administrative skills, administrative law, and the Constitution. Five such courses were run by the end of 1962, involving close to two hundred administrative officers. By end of 1963, the crash program had been able to produce enough officers to fill nearly all of the administrative officer positions, including those of permanent secretaries, something that was commended by the Africanization Commission.¹⁶

Notwithstanding the fact that the program produced many administrative officers, however, it has been suggested that the course content, as well as its overall orientation, were not very appropriate for the immediate demands and tasks to be performed by administrators so trained. This was especially so because the emphasis was on juridical aspects, whereas the immediate demands of the independence period required more of training in the management of development. This observation has been made by other commentators also when reviewing administrative training in other third world countries.¹⁷

It is my opinion, however, that this view is erroneous and simplistic and has been responsible for ill-timed reviews and changes of training programs of public administration in many countries. It is erroneous to suggest that the coming of independence reduced the need for officers skilled and knowledgeable in the maintenance of law and order and therefore the need for training of administrative officers in juridical studies. For while public officers had to shoulder the new tasks in managing development, they were to still carry on the law and order functions, and in some countries the coming of independence intensified the problems

of law and order and thus demanded a greater capability in that respect. The juridical orientation where it was emphasized, therefore, was appropriate.

Training for Development Administration

As noted before, training was required not only to prepare officers to take on the posts vacated by the departing colonial officers, but more so because administrative tasks expanded in size and scope. In respect to public administration, new roles included diplomatic relations, defense, and what has come to be known as development administration. Defense and diplomatic functions were easier to identify, as were the knowledge and skills needed by their respective personnel. What was not so clear were the knowledge and skills needed for a development administrator. To complicate the matter, there was little precedent to go by—very few other countries had gone through such a process. The situation was not made easier, either, given the existence of world-wide organizations supporting development administration, such as the United Nations, USAID, Ford Foundation, and universities in the industrialized world, with each giving their own interpretations of what development administration was.

The Institute of Public Administration (IPA), which had just been commended on its excellent job in training personnel for the Africanization exercise, adjusted its programs in 1965, admitting essentially young secondary school graduates who would be trained in development administration, a subject that was not clear then, given the above-mentioned confusion. Records of staff meetings indicate a great debate between those who would have wanted the three-year diploma program to emphasize traditional elements of public administration, which included administrative law, public finance, and personnel management, as opposed to those who would rather include aspects of agriculture and community development as part of the diploma in public administration. In the end a multidisciplinary approach for both the short programs and the three-year diploma program was adopted to teach not only traditional courses in administration but also such courses as rural development, agricultural planning, and community development.

Camouflaged in the debate over the contents of the training was the controversy on the role of theory in the training of administrators. Those who were emphasizing the theoretical approach were also of the view that broad exposure to concepts would help to create the "development administrator," whereas those who were emphasizing the practical-oriented syllabus emphasized only the practical side: knowledge of manuals for eventual application in the field. The debate was initially contained within the Institute but by 1969 the two sides had found outside supporters who helped to fight their battles. The theoretically included group registered

the support of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, where the Institute was located; whereas the "practical-oriented" group registered the support of the Establishment Division of the president's office, the de facto owners of the institute. These differing stands were later to be translated into a struggle between the University of Dar-es-Salaam and the central establishment division.¹⁸ Suffice to note that eventually the central establishment group won the day by having the Institute move its premises away from the University to an independent location.

What is significant to note, however, about the decision to move the Institute of Public Administration, later renamed the Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe, was that the government's understanding of what was needed in the training of public administrators was now clearly defined. What it now wanted were administrators well versed in the art of public administration with as little encumbrance with matters of theory as possible. Diploma graduates in public administration were to take a program that clearly emphasized administrative law, civil procedure, the structure of the civil service, and government finance, rather than administrative theory, administrative behavior, public policy, and other theoretically related courses. The shift in curriculum saw the disappearance from the program of courses on rural development and agricultural planning. A public administrator, rather than a development administrator, was to be trained.

In all, by the mid-seventies, over 100 graduates were trained, many of whom were absorbed into the civil service to reinforce the few administrative officers who had been promoted under the Africanization exercise. This training orientation continued until about the mid-seventies, when both internal developments within the Institute as well as developments within the Establishment Division led to the change of the thrust and content of training of public administrators.

Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe

That the Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe (IDM) was set up in 1971 as a replacement of the Institute of Public Administration is somewhat erroneous, for it combined the course programs of three different training centers: those of the IPA; the Local Government Training Center at Mzumbe; as well as the Primary Court Magistrate's training program, also located at Mzumbe. IDM came to be established by an act of Parliament in 1971 incorporating the activities of the three training centers. In reviewing the changes in IPA programs subsequent to the movement to Mzumbe, one has to therefore take into account this factor.

The new status as well as the new activities demanded an expanded staff complement, and so a vigorous staff development program took place right from the start in early 1971. Much of the personnel recruited included

young graduates from universities who were then sent for postgraduate training at the University of Dar-es-Salaam as well as other universities abroad. As a result of the serious training program IDM now (1986) boasts of over 100 well-trained lecturers. Of these, only about 10 have had practical training in the public service. The Institute now runs four undergraduate diploma courses in public administration, accounting, health administration, and economic planning. The objectives of the programs are clear—to produce practitioners in the respective fields.

The programs were supposed to be different from university undergraduate courses, in that they were to include only material that relates to the practical performance of jobs in the field. Little theoretical material was to be included in the courses: the emphasis was not on knowledge acquisition but skill development.

How successful have the programs been? In terms of numbers, the Institute has been able to produce over three thousand graduates in various fields since the programs set off seriously in the mid-seventies.¹⁹ With respect to public administration programs specifically, the number of graduates is well over five hundred, and all have been absorbed in the public service. What is not certain, however, is the extent to which the practical orientation of the training has been maintained. The only evidence available from user organizations is that the IDM graduates are definitely very practical in their orientation: it is claimed they can be more immediately deployed than their counterparts from the University of Dar-es-Salaam.²⁰

It has, however, been claimed that the more recent graduates are more academic and theoretical in their orientation than the early graduates of the mid-seventies. This claim may be more difficult to substantiate, even though it may well be true; and there is at least a plausible explanation for this. During its early existence, in the early seventies, most of IDM's lecturers were picked from practitioners, magistrates, senior public administrators, etc. Starting from the mid-seventies, when the bulk of the fresh recruits started returning from postgraduate training, the staff has increasingly been dominated by people who have had no practical experience, and who have had to struggle to remain loyal to the objective of the programs by avoiding theory. It is not surprising that they may not have succeeded very much in that regard; theory may have intruded in proportions that are greater than may have been desired.

To deal with this problem, young academically oriented staff were to be attached to public organizations in order to gain practical experience. By 1982 twenty lecturers had undertaken the program of attachment. Whatever success was achieved by the program was marred by the failure of those sent for attachment to return; by 1982 only three of the twenty members of staff had returned. Because of this, the program had to be discouraged and terminated.

More important, however, is the question of whether or not the course programs, especially the public administration program, are training development managers, as the name of the Institute suggests. The Institute seems to have abandoned any distinction between public administration and development administration as soon as it assumed its name. The course content of the diploma in public administration clearly emphasizes the control aspects of the public administrator's work. The thrust has been on the juridical, administrative, and financial courses: it makes no pretense at including such courses as agricultural development, rural development, etc. Talking to a number of lecturers on this point, one had this to say:

In developing countries everybody is managing development, from a doctor to an engineer, a teacher to a district officer. There is no reason why any one of them should be designated a development administrator and go through a special training programme. All must be very well-trained in their respective fields. What is important is to remind them that they are training to work in a development environment; but they have to remain doctors, engineers, veterinarians, public administrators, magistrates, etc.²¹

In this respect, the failure to orient the public administration program in the direction of development administration may have been, in my view, appropriate.

Training Public Administrators: The University Degree Program

The University of Dar-es-Salaam, through the Department of Political Science (lately Political Science and Public Administration), has also been involved in running a degree program whose overall objectives is to prepare administration personnel. The program has been producing about eighty graduates yearly since 1976, who have in most cases been absorbed as administrative officers in the public service. The program, however, deals very peripherally with public administration, concentrating on offering general courses in political science and international relations.²² Thus no course on administrative law, government, or public finance is offered in the program. In terms of preparing graduates to be public administrators, the program is very theoretical, even for those few courses that directly deal with public administration.

Within the department there have been lively debates concerning the issues. On the one hand, many staff members question the appropriateness of just teaching courses in public administration; they would rather provide to students a broad social science-based education, which they claim is what a young public administrator needs. Thereafter, it is further advanced, the government can provide specific training, either in service

or through a special training program to the fresh public service recruits. So far, however, the debate seems to have been won by those who would rather provide a broad education, with public administration being one of many courses offered in the program. The user (employer), however, is unhappy about this situation, as evidenced by the many communications from the ministry in charge to the head of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration.²³ There is no doubt that in their view the program should address itself to the same issues as seem to be addressed by the IDM program discussed earlier.

A common ground could probably be found between the two positions and I believe that might be the best solution for an efficient and effective public administration training program. There is no doubt that a university degree program should not simply teach government regulations, structures, procedures, etc. But this is different from saying that a program that purports to be of a public administration orientation should be offering only three public administration courses to students out of a total of ten courses offered. It is incumbent on the program organizers to offer courses on public finance, public personnel management, and administrative law if the claim of the program to be of public administration is to be sustained. Otherwise the government-organized induction program for the new young recruits will be wasted dealing with basic concepts in the discipline rather than focusing on governmental organization, procedures, as well as rules and regulations.

Training of Common Cadre Personnel

It was noted earlier that the colonial government only prepared Africans for junior positions in the government. In this respect it opened up the Chief's Training School at Mzumbe and the Civil Service Training Centre for secretarial and clerical staff in Dar-es-Salaam. Given the size of the service, the secretaries, typists, and clerks available were comparatively well-trained. The coming of independence, however, brought in its wake developments that affected the overall level of competence of this group of employees. To start with most of the competent ones were promoted, after a brief training, to administrative-level positions as part of the Africanization exercise discussed earlier. Consequently the few who were left, and who must have been more junior and less competent, had to service a more expanded, yet less experienced service. Out of forty African chief clerks, for example, close to thirty-two were to be earmarked for the Africanization exercise. The posts they vacated had to have replacements and almost invariably they were replaced by personnel without the requisite qualifications.²⁴

The concentration on administrative training by the government in the early years of independence had an adverse effect on the training of

common cadre personnel. Little effort was made to expand the training offered at the Civil Service Training Centre; the intake remained at the same level of fifty trainees for the period 1962-66, despite the great expansion of government activity. To make matters worse, in 1966 the secretarial training program was moved to the Dar-es-Salaam Technical College, which could only take thirty entrants.²⁵ Since the early seventies, however, steps have been taken to redress the situation. The Civil Service Training Centre has been resuscitated; it is now properly staffed and conducting preservice and inservice training courses at a higher tempo. In addition, the government has established another secretarial and clerical training school, the Tabora Secretarial College, and through it there is a slightly larger number of secretarial and clerical personnel coming out. Despite this, however, there is still a great shortfall of trained secretarial and clerical personnel, a situation that adversely effects administrative performance.²⁶

Training for Performance Improvement

The study has so far dealt with the training of personnel to assume new and expanded responsibilities. How about training for improved performance in the same job?

If preservice training in public administration is problematic in the sense that its need and usefulness are not easily identifiable, the need for training for improved performance in the same job is even harder to identify, since the assumption is that improvement in performance should come through practice, which is best acquired on the job. This has been the government's stand since the time of independence up to the early eighties. Thus the concept of "refresher course" has not been a common phenomenon. In the plans of service of both the administrative and the secretarial/clerical cadre, there was no provision for this type of training; in-service training was tied to the taking of examinations, which was a prerequisite for promotion/advancement to a higher grade.

The only exception to this general situation was the training offered by the East African Staff College to a number of senior public administrators, which was to last only for a short period. Even the decision as to who was to attend this training was ad hoc and not a part of a planned program. Since 1981, however, the government has introduced programmed training for administrators. The program has now become institutionalized, and all officers above a certain grade, (MS 10), have to attend one of these programs, commonly known as staff college programs. According to a recent study, over half the principal secretaries and about a quarter of all directors had attended the program by 1985. The program has been deemed as useful to both the trainees and their organizations.²⁷ The major payoff from this program, however, is not so much the improve-

ment in knowledge and skills on the part of the trained administrators but the popularization of training for performance improvement at the top levels of public service organizations, which made top administrators more receptive to the training of their subordinates.

We have in this part of the chapter reviewed Tanzania's efforts at training personnel for the public administration system. We noted that there has been substantial investment both in terms of finance and personnel. Thus the expatriate phenomenon is now a thing of the past, and though the number of expatriates has grown in absolute numbers as compared to the time of independence, the proportion of expatriates in the top-level jobs in the country is very insignificant.

As to what extent the local experts are tackling the problems of the country, available evidence indicates that they have been able to adapt knowledge that has been developed in foreign environments to deal with local situations. Even though public administration is still facing many problems, this is not so much because its serving officers are not adequately competent but is due to the existence of many other factors, including inappropriate pay and incentive systems, inappropriate management and supervision systems, and a host of other nontraining-related issues.²⁸ It is these issues that should be addressed by the government if the payoff from the heavy investment noted above is to be realized.

III. KENYA

As in Tanzania, the need for training administrators in Kenya was realized fairly early. This was due to the fact that the public service that had been inherited was very heavily dominated by expatriate colonial personnel who had to be replaced immediately and also due to the fact that the expansion of governmental activities demanded an expanded and diversified public service.

Training for Africanization

Unlike in Tanzania, efforts to prepare Kenyans to replace the departing colonial staff were taken several years before the country attained independence. Soon after the 1961 Lancaster House Conference, which made it clear that Kenya would soon be an independent state, the colonial administration realized the need to prepare a cadre of Africans to replace the European and Asian civil servants who would leave the country soon after independence. Of special concern was the administrative service, which was staffed by and deeply dependent on the British Colonial Overseas Service, as virtually no effort up to that point had been made to train local successors. This was partly due to colonial complacency and also because there was no tradition of formal training for the colonial service

itself. Ordinarily, officers of the Colonial Overseas Service attended a one-year preparatory course at either Cambridge or Oxford, a course that was essentially an orientation on topical subjects and highly academic in character. There was also a "private study" course at Oxford and Cambridge for colonial administrative officers with five to seven years experience, and of high promotional potential.²⁹ A few years before independence some African administrative officers were sent to this course.

Given the paucity of trained African public service personnel to be used in the Africanization exercise, training programs became imperative. As early as in 1961, therefore, the government had set up the Kenya Institute of Administration, where short training courses in public administration could be offered. The first course, with an intake of thirty officers, brought in African district assistants for a training course in administrative law and public administration. At the end of the course they were appointed as district officers. In addition to the course for administrative officers, other courses were offered for district magistrates and other community development officers.

The curriculum for these programs, especially that of public administration, was styled after those that were run at Oxford—they emphasized the juridical, law and order, and magisterial functions of the administrative officer—and compared favorably with the program offered by the Institute of Public Administration in Tanzania described earlier. The question was whether or not this course content was relevant to the needs of a newly independent country, and the question dominated the debates among the early trainees of the Kenya Institute of Administration but remained unresolved.

This issue was to be raised again in 1971 during the deliberation of the Ndegwa Commission, as well as the Wamalwa Commission the following year. The former commission showed concern at the approach to training at the Kenya Institute of Administration and wondered whether the traditional approach to the training of administrators was appropriate or not in an administrative system that was emphasizing management for change. It thus called for a restructuring of the programs at the Kenya Institute of Administration in order to ensure that the training approach adopted emphasized management as opposed to administration, since the former tended to emphasize change whereas the latter emphasized the maintenance of the status quo.³⁰

Little progress, however, was made in this direction: the training remained essentially juridical in orientation even long after all the colonial administrative officers had been replaced. This was not, however, just a function of conspiracy on the part of the Kenya Institute of Administration. Rather the orientation fit in very well with the image of an administrative officer that the government of the day, and one could indeed include even that of the present government, wanted. Unlike in Tanzania,

where the administrative officer has been made to shed his colonial counterpart's behavioral style by taking off the helmet, the khaki uniform, etc., in Kenya the district officer or commissioner and the provincial commissioner were to continue wearing uniforms, and they remain a class different from the politicians and members of the public. While acknowledging the fact that they are managers of development, they are a different set of managers from their Tanzania counterparts who are supposed to immerse themselves in the crowd. The Kenyan administrative officer is supposed to stand ahead of, indeed above, the crowd he is managing.³¹ As such, the training must be that of an elite, and for this purpose there is no better training than that given to the Colonial Overseas Service officers at Oxford. It is no wonder, therefore, that the orientation of the program at the Kenya Institute of Administration has continued so long.

Training in Public Administration at the University of Nairobi

As noted above, much of the training for the Africanization of the senior administrative positions was undertaken in a series of crash training courses at the Kenya Institute of Administration. But since the civil service was growing and its scope of activities increasing, the need to increase the pool of potential recruits who would join the service at middle-level positions was realized. The University of Nairobi was offering an academic program in government and the assumption was that graduates of this program would join the government administrative service. The government went further, however, and, in association with the university's department of government, organized the degree program as part of a public administration manpower development project, incorporating into it an internship program, which would give students an opportunity to work in government while still attending the university. The scheme is reported to have operated well while it lasted, and by 1975, when the internship component was suspended because of a lack of funds, more than three hundred public administrators had been trained and recruited through this mechanism—a contribution that is quite significant.³²

Meanwhile, the undergraduate program in government has continued, and students who take courses in public administration do apply for jobs in the public service. The problem being faced now is not the absolute shortage of qualified manpower but rather shortages in certain critical skills among the many qualified servants available in the country.

Training for Performance Improvement

Work performance depends on the competence of the employees in doing their jobs. Training therefore ought to address itself to the question of improving the competence of the personnel so that they can perform

their duties much better.

Though much had been achieved in increasing the number of trained personnel, not only was the ethos for preparatory training lacking in the public service plan of work but training for performance improvement was seen as an even wilder idea. There were only a few—if any—facilities to support such training. Even when the Kenya Institute of Administration was established, the initial assumptions were that it was established to support Africanization; few thought it would still be necessary after all jobs had been Africanized, since training would now revert to the old practices of the “on-the-job” training under experienced senior officers.

As in Tanzania, the initial period after independence saw little action in the direction of performance improvement training, mainly because all the resources available had to be devoted to meeting the needs for Africanization and expansions taking place. Realization of the importance of training for performance improvement, however, came earlier to Kenya than Tanzania. During the second decade of independence, when Africanization had been completed, and the crisis in the need for new manpower had been abated, it was only proper that some attention be devoted to retraining people already in post. Thus, a number of training programs, including three-week courses in administrative skills, three-month courses in community development, and six-week courses in senior management, were launched a number of times. In all, over 539 participants attended such courses.

Notwithstanding the launching of these courses, however, performance improvement training never became a priority for the government, and no policy evolved to facilitate it. The situation was made even more difficult when the government put the responsibility for civil service training under the Directorate of Personnel, where it just became a part of the many responsibilities of the Directorate, and because of the fact that the status of the Kenya Institute of Administration has not been elevated. The situation did not change much even after the adoption of the Wamalwa Commission recommendations, which called for clearer commitment by the government to performance improvement training.³³ It was not until 1977, for example, that the Directorate of Personnel, in association with the East African Management Institute in Arusha, launched a series of six-week courses in public management for all middle-level public service personnel in ministries, provinces, and districts. The courses were greatly appreciated by participants and continued to run until the early eighties. This particular course program has been phased out, but information available is that the Directorate of Personnel, in association with the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) and the Kenya Institute of Administration, has been organizing short courses in public administration and/or management for middle-level administrative personnel, though on an ad hoc basis.

In the meantime, also, the government has proceeded to evolve a serious policy on in-service training for public service personnel that requires all public civil servants to attend refresher courses regularly for a specified duration. Also, the attendance of particular courses, as well as the passing of certain examinations administered by the Public Service Commissioner, are mandatory as the prerequisites for career advancement.³⁴

We have noted in the foregoing review of Kenya's efforts at improving the competence of its public administrative system essentially three thrusts: training for Africanization; university-based education in public administration and related subjects; as well as refresher training for performance improvement. There is no doubt that all these contributed immensely to the improvement of the level of competence of Kenya's public service. But as was the case with Tanzania, there are a number of problems in the approaches adopted, and it is not certain whether the measures have contributed effectively to improving the public administration system or not. Since this is a common question among the three countries, it will be dealt with in the concluding part of the chapter.

IV. ZAMBIA

In comparison with the other two countries, Zambia's colonial legacy in respect to the competence and capacity of its public service was much more unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the service was heavily dominated, at the senior levels, by colonial and semi-colonial personnel, with Africans occupying only junior and operational jobs, a situation that was not in consonance with the status of a newly independent state. On the other hand, the size and breadth of the service had been artificially underdeveloped, owing to the fact that many activities that in Tanzania and Kenya were performed by the national government had been performed by the federation government, which was virtually controlled by colonial and settler public servants.

With respect to the dominance of the service by the colonial officials, it is worth noting that by the time of independence in 1964 Zambia had only 4 percent of her senior civil service posts occupied by Africans, compared to 60 percent for Ghana (1957); 61 percent for Nigeria (1960); 23 percent for Kenya (1963); and 11 percent for Tanzania (1961). Independence therefore demanded that this situation be urgently rectified. Not only was it necessary to Africanize the service but it was also necessary to build up institutions that were to take on activities previously performed by the federation government, including immigration, issuance of currency, and a host of other smaller activities, which in turn required qualified staff to man them.

In theory the manpower required could be obtained either through

training or by recruiting qualified personnel. At a practical level, however, the second alternative was a nonstarter, since there were very few indigenous Zambians with the requisite training and experience because until shortly before independence, they had been excluded from apprenticeships and were only rarely accepted for other courses and training for skilled jobs. Few therefore had the opportunity to gain experience in responsible administrative positions. In addition there were almost no training facilities in the country. Whereas Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and indeed even Tanzania had resident universities or a university to which they had full access, there was no university in Zambia prior to 1966, and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland located in Salisbury (now Harare) did not cater to African educational needs. Thus in 1964 the new Zambian government had barely 100 university graduates to rely on, most of these having been trained outside the federation. This was definitely to constrain any efforts at Africanization.

The newly independent Zambia was thus faced with two tasks: to train people and, given the absence of facilities, to set up training facilities.

Training for Zambianization

The Zambianization (Africanization) program proceeded by several methods. With many established posts already vacant or expected to become vacant soon after independence, much localization occurred simply by the identification of qualified Zambians willing to fill the positions. Occasional use was also made of a constitutional provision permitting the compulsory retirement of expatriate officials before expiration of their contracts.³⁵ A third method entailed the appointment of Zambians to understudy expatriates for some time before they were confirmed in their substantive posts.

The exercise demanded skilled manpower that was definitely not available, so most of the Africans identified to fill the positions had to have some training. A Staff Training College for administrative and executive personnel was therefore established in 1966 and an impressive variety of training centers were established over and in addition to those that existed at independence. The manpower report listed two hundred separate training schemes (of various duration) as already functioning by 1969. Roughly eight out of ten of these schemes involved on-the-job training coupled with some formal training. Training at the Staff Training College proceeded impressively: by 1965, for example, over 2,700 officers had completed the ninety-five courses. Richard Jolly estimates that in 1966 about 50 percent of all senior- and middle-level civil servants received some training, while by 1969 the cumulative total output was over 23,000.³⁶

It remains difficult to assess the actual impact of the training schemes. At senior levels both Zambian and expatriate officers had reservations

about the effectiveness of the "understudy" approach.³⁷ The manpower report was to criticize the scheme on several grounds also. It pointed out, for example, that the selection procedures used for administrative and executive training tended to place too high a premium on educational qualifications, hence narrowing the pool of recruitment, and that the generally low level of basic education encountered among applicants at some levels means considerable wastage from many programs. Another problem was how to ensure that people remained in posts related to the training they had received, a difficult task given the acute shortage of personnel throughout the country.

There was, nevertheless, a considerable transformation in the composition of the civil service as a result of these efforts. Whereas less than 20 African officers had occupied posts in divisions I and II in 1956, there were over 4,500 Zambians in such posts by 1966, and over 14,500 by the beginning of 1976. The rapidity with which this change occurred is indicated in Table 6.2.

In spite of the above overall performance, Africanization proceeded at markedly uneven rates among the different sectors, depending on the qualifications and experience required to staff different levels and sectors of the service. Thus, when localization as an aggregate process is broken down according to the various functional bands of which division I and II of the service are composed, the extent to which the creation of a national public service has been more readily carried forward at junior than at senior levels, and in administrative rather than professional and technical grades, becomes at once apparent. In this, Zambia was no different from Kenya and Tanzania, which were observed earlier.

The above situation was not accidental, however, but the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the government. From the outset the government had placed considerable emphasis on early localization of stra-

TABLE 6.2
Zambianization in divisions I and II posts

Year	Established Positions	Occupied Posts	Zambians in Posts	Zambians as Percentage of Established Posts %	Zambians as Percentage of Occupied Posts %
1965	9,652	5,873	2,462	25.5	66.8
1966	11,589	8,269	4,507	38.9	71.4
1967	15,226	9,958	6,556	43.1	65.4
1968	15,198	11,469	7,662	50.1	75.5

Source: Public Service Commission Annual Reports for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, Lusaka: Government Printer.

tegic and publicly visible points of authority within the state apparatus. Thus, while at independence in 1964 there was no single Zambian permanent secretary, by 1968 only two of these posts had not been Zambianized. On the other hand, expatriate personnel were not only numerous in the superscale and professional grades, but continued to occupy many key posts: by 1968 they still headed over two-thirds of all the departments and ministries, and even by 1975 more than one-third of such posts were still headed by expatriates.³⁸

The progress of localization by ministerial sector underlines the great achievements made during the first decade of independence, while it is also indicative of severe constraints; it is itself a result of persistent manpower shortages and the great growth of public sector establishments. It is indeed possible that in particular cases the Zambianization level might even decrease significantly during the period under discussion. According to the manpower report, only two of the fourteen ministries were over 50 percent Zambianized in 1965-66; Foreign Affairs (61.39) and Health (55.0). On the other hand, there were three ministries—Transport and Works, Commerce and Industry, and Education—where Zambian officers occupied only one-sixth or less of the established posts.

When judged according to ministerial sector, the expatriate presence by 1975 appeared largely of incidental character; there were very few of them left. Their significance, however, is attributable to the fact that they were concentrated at senior levels and their proportion in that regard was high: they represented 61.4 percent of the combined total of superscale and professional grades.

By the time the crash program for Zambianizing the public service started giving way to the normal approaches to localization, therefore, the expatriate presence was still significant, and unless government policy emphasized the training of large numbers of Zambians, it would take some time to have adequate manpower for Zambia's public services.

Contribution by the University of Zambia

Whereas some of the manpower needs might have partly been filled by the promotion of people, the educational level of most African employees was very low, given the high demand for qualified personnel, serious efforts had to be made, therefore, to train Zambians. In this effect, therefore, a decision was made to establish a university, and the University of Zambia was opened, with the first intake of students in 1964. By 1979 the total number of graduates stood at 400, from 150 in 1964.

The university offers a program of a Bachelor's degree in political and administrative studies, mainly concerned with the traditional focus on political science and a few courses on organizations. The program is not different from those offered in any American or British university, even

though a few courses focusing on Zambia and development issues are also taught. The issue has been raised, especially in regard to the Zambian situation, of whether undergraduate courses should be work-oriented or should sharpen the mind, and opinion has been divided.³⁹

Another controversy in the department has been whether to teach public administration or politics. Pressures from the party tended to emphasize that, since what was needed was well-educated Zambians who were committed to their country, emphasis should be placed on the ideological reorientation of the students, also, rather than on training them only in the nitty-gritty issues of administration. As such, it recommended that subsequent to graduation from the university, political training and orientation should also be undertaken at the National Institute of Public Administration.

All the same, the department has continued to produce a steady supply of graduates to the civil service, it is estimated that by 1983 the government had taken into its employment about 200 public administration graduates. To what extent the locally trained graduates are more sensitive to the public than the previous colonial or expatriate administrators is a question that remains to be seen.

Performance Improvement Training

Training for Africanization as well as the preservice training of graduates may have contributed to performance improvement; if it did, it may have done so incidentally. At most they may have helped to keep the service operating at the same level. But given the inexperience of most of the officers in the new posts, a decline in performance might naturally have been expected. To counter this, a number of measures could be taken, including the training in post, either to sustain performance at certain levels or even increase it.

The Zambian government has given this a lot of attention and such training has taken place at the Citizenship College, the Zambia Institute of Public Administration (ZIPA), the Management Service Board, as well as in on-the-job training. ZIPA does the bulk of the job by training people in local government, law, administration, and executive and clerical duties. Courses offered range from a few weeks, in the case of certain clerical and administrative courses, to several years, in the law and accounting courses. While there might be little evidence to show that the courses have contributed to performance improvement, the Institute has been commended by the Annual Report of the Directorate of Personnel in 1975 as "a great linchpin in the operations of government." The Management Services Board, which has recently been reorganized, has also embarked on an ambitious training program for senior public service officials. The results are yet to be seen.

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, one may ask whether or not: (a) there are similarities in the approaches adopted by the three countries to resolve the problem of low administrative capacity and capability; and (b) whether or not there are any lessons to be learned from their experiences.

Regarding the first issue, we noted that all three countries used a similar approach in localization—they essentially promoted African administrative personnel to fill in positions held by departing colonialists. The officers, though having less education than the officers they were replacing, have managed to keep the bureaucracies going, contrary to the expectations of departing colonialists. What this proves is that the administrative activity does not require elaborate preparation, as traditional approaches to staffing public administrative organizations would contend: one acquires skills and expertise on the job. It is mainly because many of the people who were promoted under the crash Africanization programs had had work experience that they were able to keep the system going effectively.

But since they had not undergone training, or because even those who had undergone formal training had trained in the traditional law and order courses in public administration, it is difficult to expect such personnel to be innovative. As such, while they were expected to become "development administrators," with an emphasis on development and responsiveness to the citizenry, there is no evidence to show that these emerging administrators were more development-oriented than their colonial counterparts.

More seriously, however, the three countries neglected the training of technical and professional cadres in administration. Tanzania and Kenya have recently made some moves to bring technical and professional personnel into general administration, but this is being done without the benefit of training those in administration. Unless serious efforts are made to systematically train professional people in administration, the pool of people that can be tapped to fill general management in government will always remain limited.

Finally, to what extent has the training achieved its desired results: more competent and efficient public administrators?

Writing on a similar subject, Goran Hyden was of the opinion that all the training efforts have been wasted in terms of their desired goals, the reasons being that the training was inadequate in content and duration and many times inappropriate.⁴⁰

While this may be true for specific programs, it is not an adequate explanation of why even those trainees who attended well articulated pro-

grams have not been effective. One might argue that the training of administrators has not been linked to complementary reforms of the administrative system. In Zambia and Tanzania, for example, it was discovered that secretaries who had been trained in shorthand and the use of dictaphones were losing their skills because their bosses did not know how to use them, and the provision of dictaphones is considered a waste of scarce resources by the Treasury. To some extent then, the lack of a balanced administrative approach might in part explain why training efforts were not very successful. It is important, therefore, to take measures to make complementary reforms in the administrative system, if benefits of training and development of personnel are to be realized.

NOTES

1. For an argument that is supportive of this view, see E. Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), 1-34. This view is, however, partly disputed, and I think rightly so, by some other students of government, including R. H. Dorwart, *The Administrative Reforms of Frederick Wilhelm of Prussia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1953). In the study, Dorwart documents the efforts of the Prussian state to train central bureaucrats. See Dorwart, pp. 185-96.
2. B. Chapman, *The Profession of Government: The Public Service in Europe* (London: Unwin University Books, 1971) 9-46.
3. *Ibid.*, 99-130.
4. The Civil Service, vol. 1, *Report of the Committee*, London, 1966-1968, p. 2-15.
5. See P. Kellner and Lord Grother-Hunt, *The Civil Servants: An Inquiry into Britain's Ruling Class*, 138-73. In this study the authors argue, however, that the so-called reforms did not drastically change Britain's approach to training civil servants. They are still essentially trained as generalists.
6. D. C. Stone, "Guidelines for the Training of Development Administrators," *Journal of Administration Overseas*.
7. Blue Wooldridge, "Increasing the Professional Management Orientation of Public Administration Course" (Paper given at the *Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration*, New York, April 1983, pp. 10-11.
8. For a discussion on the recruitment and training of colonial officers, see R. Heussler, *British Tanganyika*.
9. See T. Golan, *Educating the Bureaucracy in a New Polity* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), chap. 1.
10. As it turned out, however, not many of the colonial officers could be persuaded to stay, and in any case it was not considered advisable to persuade many of them to remain behind. As such a large group of them left, thus creating a void that had to be filled fast.
11. An example of the thrust of the pressures is the speech by R. M. Kundya (M.P.) in Parliament in which he expressed the dissatisfaction of the trade unionists over the handling of the Africanization question. See Legco Debates, *Hansard*, 13 October 1960, col. 143-8.

12. See W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House) 195.
13. See National Assembly Debates, *Hansard*, 18 October 1961, col. 333.
14. *Report of the Africanization Commission* (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1962), 1.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Africanization Commission Report*, 1963, p. 24.
17. D. C. Stone, "Training of Development Administrators," 231.
18. The Institute moved to Mzumbe in 1970, which had a long-time local government training center. For a well-documented account of the dispute, see A. Mbaga, "Training for Administrative Development" (M.A. dissertation, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1982).
19. *Ibid.*
20. Oral communication with several principal secretaries.
21. Conversation between the author and a number of Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe, lecturers. This position seems to go against the grain of many of those in the development administration movement in its heyday or indeed even of more recent commentators on the issue. See, for example, Dean Donald C. Stone's "Training of Development Administrator." While recognizing that a doctor in a developing country will do work beyond that of his specialty, just as much, engineers and public administrators will be required to do the same. One is more inclined to agree with the statement in that we need to teach administrators professional skills in public administration while at the same time emphasizing that there are learnable skills, just as we do for doctors, teachers, engineers, and other professionals.
22. A more detailed assessment of the program will appear soon in a forthcoming publication edited by J. Katorobo, entitled *Research Priorities in Social Science in Eastern Africa*, published by the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern Africa, expected date 1989.
23. A. Mbaga, "Training for Administrative Development," 46.
24. A. Mbaga, "Training for Administrative Development," 47.
25. For a review of how inadequate secretarial services are at present and their effect on administrative performance in the public administrative system, see G. Saidi, *Public Service Productivity in Tanzania* (M.A. dissertation in Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1983).
26. *Ibid.*
27. See G. Mutahaba, "Training of Top Executive in Developing Countries: A Tanzanian Approach," *Public Administration and Development* 6, no. 1 (1986).
28. For a comprehensive review of the other factors, see C. C. Onyemelukwe, *Men and Management in Contemporary Africa* 1973, 32.
29. For an account on the training for colonial overseas services officers, see R. Heussler, *Yesterday's Rulers* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963).
30. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1971, pp. 100-109.
31. This point is well emphasized by Cherry Gertzel in her *The Politics of Independent Kenya*,

- 166-73. See also her article, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya." For an opposite view, see G. Hyden, in J. Barkan and J. Okumu, eds., *Politics and Public Policy*, 95-96, 103-106.
32. See N. Nyangira, *The Teaching of Political Science at the University of Nairobi* (Mimeo, 1985).
33. Wamalwa Report.
34. See the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission)*, 1980, 81-90, as well as the government White Paper on the Report.
35. See the *Zambian Independence Order*, 1964, sec. 16.
36. R. Jolly, "Skilled Manpower Constraint," 40. The actual output from NIPA alone was 1,830.
37. Dresang suggests that the particular method was uncongenial and not very productive. See D. Dresang, *The Zambian Civil Service*, 49.
38. Ibid.
39. The author had occasion to address himself to this debate when he acted as external examiner to the department in question in 1983.
40. G. Hyden, "Discovering the Resource Potential of the Ecology of Public Management," in AAPAM, *The Ecology of Public Administration and Management in Africa* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1986).

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—from the preface

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