



TRANSFORMED LEADERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: MANAGING RESOURCES FOR ATTAINMENT OF AGENDA 2063

Editors

George Scott and Ukertor Moti

**African Association for Public Administration
and Management (AAPAM)**

Transformed Leadership for Sustainable Development in Africa: Managing Resources for Attainment of Agenda 2063

Editors

George. Scott - African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM),
Nairobi, Kenya

Ukertor Gabriel Moti - Professor of Public Sector Management and Governance, Department of
Public Administration, University of Abuja-Nigeria

African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)

Edited by George. K. Scott and Ukertor Moti

Copyright© 2020 African Association for Public Administration and Management

Includes Bibliographical References

Includes some text in French

ISBN: 978-9914-706-06-2

Published by African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)

132 Fuchsia Close, Gigiri, UN Avenue

Nairobi, Kenya.

P O Box 48677, 00100

E-mail: aapam@aapam.org | info@aapam.org

Telephone: +254 20 2629650 | +254 773 552976

Graphics and Cover Design: The Regal Press Kenya Ltd.

The views expressed in this book are the authors' and are not necessarily shared by the **African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)** or any of its agencies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4	Foreword I
5	Acknowledgements II
6	About the Editors and Authors III
9	Editors' Introduction Iv George Scott and Ukertor Gabriel Moti
14	Africa's Natural Resource Wealth: A Paradox of Plenty and Poverty Ukertor Gabriel Moti
46	Inclusion and Equality to Achieve Agenda 2063 Florence Nyokabi Wachira
60	Developing Transformational Leadership Capacity in Africa's Public-Sector Institutions to Implement the 2030 Agenda and Achieve the SDGs John-Mary Kauzya
85	Transformed Leadership and Effective Management of National Resources: The African Perspective Teferi Hailemichael
100	Managing Water Resources to Achieve the Objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals – A Case Study of Kenya Patrick Gachagua
110	Ethical Leadership and Effective Management of National Resources in Africa: The Tanzanian Experience of a Lost Link Sospeter Muchunguzi
139	Towards Resolving the Paradox of Superabundant National Resources and Africa's Unsatisfactory Socioeconomic Development: Problematics of Leadership and Beyond Robert Kemepade Moruku
173	Impact Du Leadership Transformationnel Sur La Maitrise Du Developpement Urbain En Afrique Faustin Clovis Noun

FOREWORD

Following the successful conclusion of the 38th Roundtable conference that was held from 6th to 10th 2017 in El jadidah, kingdom of Morocco, under the theme of the conference which was , ‘A Transformed leadership: Managing national resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development’. This publication is a result of the presentations made during the El Jadidah conference.

During the conference, it was noted that the theme was a continuation of focus on transformation of public administration and management within the context of implementing the African Union agenda 2063 and the global sustainable development goals. The implementation of the SDG’s is gaining speed in many countries in Africa and the world over. The SDG’s can only be achieved with the leadership of governments. They require engaging all parts of government and public administration.

The conference focused on managing Africa’s natural resources which are vast, unique and rich. Despite the numerous resources, most African countries are ranked among the poorest in the world with majority of their population living in less than one United States (1\$) a day. The continents massive wealth should be harnessed and fully utilized for the development of the Africa people.

I would like to sincerely thank Prof Ukertor Moti and Dr. George Scott for tirelessly helping with the editing and review of the various papers that make up this book. A special gratitude also goes out to the AAPAM secretariat for helping with the production of this book.

Furthermore, I would like to sincerely thank the AAPAM Executive committee for their continuous support and assurance to AAPAM to help with the betterment of this great organization. I pray that you may never get tired.

I hope that this book will be of immense help to every single one of you and the lessons learnt will eventually mirror down into our work places and help with the transformation of Public Service in Africa and help with the attainment of Agenda 2063.

Dr. Roland Msiska- AAPAM President.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) wholeheartedly thanks the Government of Morocco for hosting the 38th Annual Roundtable Conference. This book is a result of the conference presentations. We extend our special gratitude to His Excellency Mr., the President of the Republic of Morocco for honoring us with his presence during the opening ceremony.

We sincerely thank Prof Ukertor Moti and Dr. George Scott for tirelessly helping with the editing of this book.

A special gratitude goes out to the authors of these quality papers for sharing their knowledge with us. We want to appreciate the efforts you have put into ensuring that this book becomes a reality by actively cooperating with our editors throughout this entire process.

To our partners, we say a big thank you for always standing with us through your support. We want to appreciate all of you for your immense contribution towards the success of this book.

AAPAM acknowledges the secretariat for diligently working on this book. Special gratitude goes out to Ms. Jessica Omundo and Mr. Clifford Ogutu for their commitment in ensuring this book has been produced.

Our thanks goes out to AAPAM Executive committee and Council for the support in the production of this book.

Last but not least, we would like to thank every individual who have helped with the production of this book. We highly appreciate every single one of you for your efforts.

Dr. G. K. Scott
Secretary General- AAPAM.

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND THE AUTHORS

Dr. George Kojo Scott is the Secretary General of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM).

Dr. Scott is a Ghanaian National with experience in the public service spanning over 20 years serving in various capacities including Chief Director (Permanent Secretary) in the Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology and the Ministry of Aviation. He was also a part-time lecturer of Post-Graduate Courses in Public Administration and other training programs at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA). As the Secretary General of AAPAM- a Continental professional organization- Dr. Scott is responsible for the strategic development of the organization. Since his appointment in 2011, he has led the organization in hosting annual continental Roundtable Conferences, capacity development programs, seminars, research, workshops and debates in the African continent. He currently represents AAPAM at the annual sessions of the United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) on an observer status.

Dr. Scott has authored four books on thematic areas of public administration; co-edited three recently published AAPAM books; and contributed widely to internationally accredited journals. Dr. Scott is a noted expert speaker of Public Policy, Public Sector Financial Management, Governance and Leadership.

Ukertor Gabriel Moti is a Professor of Public Sector Management and Governance, Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Abuja. He is Fellow, Institute of Management Consultants (FIMC); Fellow, Certified Public Administrators of England and Wales (FCPA); Fellow, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences (JAPSS)-USA; Fellow, Guild of Independent Scholars (Florida USA). He is equally, member of the International Research and Development Institute (Research and Development Network), Nigeria; Committee for the International Conference on Management, Leadership and Governance (IMCLG), UK; Member, African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). He is also a Co-chair with Dr. Steve Troupin (of KU LUVEN, Belgium) on the African Association for Public Administration and Management and International Institute of Administrative Sciences (AAPAM-IIAS) Taskforce for Public Administration Research Capabilities in Africa, where they chair the African Panel during IIAS Annual International Conferences.

Florence Nyokabi Wachira is a career Public servant with over thirty years work experience in the civil service rising through the ranks to be Director of Recruitment and Selection in the Public Service Commission. She received recognition for exemplary service with a State Commendation by the president. She also served as a Commissioner with the National Gender and Equality Commission for six years from 2014. She has broad Working experience at policy and management

levels specializing specifically with Talent development and Diversity management. She is a firm advocate for Justice, fairness and integrity in Public Service. She holds a Doctorate Degree in Human Resource Management, A Masters degree in Gender and Development studies and another Masters degree in Human Resource Development. She is a Chartered member of the Chartered Institute of People and Development (CIPD), a full member of Kenya Institute of Management (KIM) and a Certified Professional mediator (CPM). She has written a book on ‘Essentials of Human Resource Development’ and contributed chapters to AAPAM book Projects. She has published many papers on Human Resource Management and on Gender Equality and Inclusion.

Kauzya John-Mary is the Chief of Public Administration Capacity Branch (PACB) of the Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM) in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) at the United Nations in New York, He has served in different capacities at the United Nations (UN) since 1999. Prior to joining the United Nations, Dr. Kauzya lectured at Makerere University in Uganda and worked as the Deputy Director of the Uganda Management Institute. He has also worked as an International consultant/Advisor in many African countries in various fields of governance and Public Administration. He has widely published articles and paper on governance and public administration.

Teferi HaileMichael is an Assistant Professor and Director of the Addis Center for Sustainable Development (ACSD) at Kotebe Metropolitan University in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is a local councilor at the Addis Ababa Municipal Government. He has been granted a Doctoral Degree of Public Administration by the University of South Africa; a degree of Master Public Administration, a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science & international Relations, and a Bachelor of Laws by Addis Ababa University. He has previously served the Ethiopian public service as an administrator, department head, and chief executive. Dr Teferi is President of the Ethiopian Society for Public Administration & Management (ESPAM)—The AAPAM Ethiopia Chapter, and Indivi

Sospeter M. Muchunguzi is a Tanzanian. He studied Political Science and Public Administration at a Bachelor’s Degree level and has a Master’s Degree in Public Administration at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He is currently an Assistant Lecturer at the Eastern Africa Statistical Training Centre (EASTC); a Tanzania based Centre with regional character serving Anglo-phone countries south of the Sahara. He has been involved and participated in various training programmes such as Public Integrity Restoration Initiative Programme; Anti-Corruption and Good Governance. He is experienced in Public Policy Development and Analysis; Governance and Development; Research Skills including Questionnaire Design; Data Collection Techniques; Data Analysis and Report Writing.

Robert Kemepade MORUKU holds the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree in Business Management from Delta State University; Master’s in Business Administration (MBA) degree from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; Bachelor of Science (B. Sc. Hons) degree in Business Administration from University of Benin; and the Postgraduate Diploma in Education (PGDE) from University of Port Harcourt – all in Nigeria. He has extensive teaching and researching experience spanning 20 years, as Senior Lecturer in Management, Delta State University, Abraka; Adjunct Professor of Management at the Federal University, Otuke; Senior Lecturer in Management at Novena

University, Ogume; and currently a full Professor of Management at Novena University, Ogume – all in Nigeria. He also has an extensive administrative and finance experiences in the banking industry (1989-1996) and in the university system (1997-present) in the capacity of being a head of department and associate dean of faculty; served on several University committees and as permanent member of Senate of the University.

Mr Faustin Clovis Noundjeu is a General Civil Engineer, is currently Deputy General Manager of Cameroon Real Estate Corporation (SIC). After completing his higher education from 1975-1980 at the École Supérieure Polytechnique de Yaoundé (ENSPY) and Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (Lyon), he held several positions: Chargé d'Études and Director of Urban Planning (1993-1998), Director of the Improvement of the Living Environment (1998-2000) and Technical Advisor to the Ministry in charge of Urban Development (2008-2010). He coordinated the elaboration of the Urban Sector Development Strategy in Cameroon (2009-2011) and the Strategic Plan of the Development of SIC. He has been a part-time Lecturer in Urban Engineering in several university institutions: École supérieure des travaux publics (Yaounde) (1984-1990), ENSPY (1988-1990) and in the Geography Department at the University of Yaounde I since 2011. He has participated in several studies and organized seminars on the management of local development in Cameroon. Mr Noundjeu, as a Member of AAPAM, was a Resource Person at the AAPAM network: Mombassa- Arusha - Accra-Zanzibar-Lusaka-El Jadida-Gaborone (2005-2018). He has equally served as Moderator of several conferences and workshops, such as the one organized by the World Bank in Yaounde on the Competitiveness of Cities in 2018. He is an approved expert in Building and Public

INTRODUCTION

The African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) in partnership with the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG-A) and the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) held the 38th Annual Round-Table conference in the historical city of El Jadida, Morocco, with the theme: A Transformed Leadership: Managing National Resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals. As it has been the custom of AAPAM the papers selected for the book were carefully chosen following a vigorous peer review process that culminated with this book.

The theme a Transformed Leadership: Managing National Resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals was necessitated by the need for transformed and idealistic leadership in all fields and at all levels which cut across political, socio-economical among others. On the same note, Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals are all intertwined. AAPAM over the years during its Roundtable conference has been on the forefront to propel the two very crucial plans by the African Union and the United Nations respectively.

Agenda 2063

African Union adopted the agenda 2063 in 2013 to help the continent transform into a global powerhouse. The 50 year plan aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable

development and economic growth. The first ten-year implementation plan of agenda 2063, which runs from 2014 to 2023 outlines a set of goals, priority areas and targets what the continent aims to achieve at national, regional and continental levels. This agenda is an ambitious vision and action plan intended to drive Africa's change, development and transformation. It amplifies the need for a strategic approach that prioritizes areas of managing natural resources that can unlock potential for the implementation of the Agenda 2063.

There is need for Africa to revolutionize its approaches to addressing the leadership gaps in the continent and come up with ways for Africans to plan for transformation in terms of leadership and management of natural resources in the continent. In order for the continental agenda to be successfully designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated, cross cutting capacities that revolve around transformation leadership are needed at the individual, organizational and institutional levels

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) s were rolled out by the United Nations to succeed the Millennium Development Goals which were popularly known as MDGs which expired in 2015. SDGs place poverty eradication at the top of the agenda. It addresses poverty in terms of vulnerability of

the poor to environmental degradation and through inclusive and social justice as well as through economic advancement. One thing that stands for AAPAM regarding the SDGs is the grouping of peace issues under development banner. Placing peace and security into the SDGs directs attention to conflict prevention factors such as equity, inclusiveness and economic growth.

African leaders adopted the continental Agenda 2063 and global 2030 Agenda sustainable development in 2015. The Sustainable Development Goals, a component of the 2030 Agenda, are anchored by the key objective of achieving inclusive growth and development and promoting progress on the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental (United Nations, 2016). Agenda 2063 espouses structural transformation and people centered development, underpinned by strengthened productive capacities, especially in agriculture, industry and science technology and innovation. This therefore implies that the effective implementation of national and internationally agreed frameworks requires the full cooperation and buy-in of all stakeholders, including the private sector, Public sector, civil society and development partners for both to be successful.

The Papers

The papers presented in this book are as follows:

Ukertor chapter focuses on the age old debate of the ‘Dutch Disease’ by interrogating the paradox of plenty and poverty in the face of Africa’s natural resource wealth. He notes that Africa is blessed with vast natural resources and rich environments and is generously endowed

with productive land and with valuable natural resources, which include renewable resources (such as water, forestry, and fisheries) and non-renewable resources (minerals, coal, gas, and oil), which form the basis of income and subsistence for large segments of Africa’s population and constitute a principal source of public revenue and national wealth. Under the right circumstances, a natural resource boom can be an important catalyst for growth, development, and the transition from cottage industry to factory production. Indeed, with the right approach natural resources can be used to make the transformation from a low-value economy that relies on exports of primary commodities to one with a substantial labour-intensive manufacturing base and ideally the development of these resources can be a blessing for the entire continent. Ironically, these resources have often proved to be a curse than a blessing especially to the majority of the citizens in these African countries. It is commonly agreed that one of the avenues for getting many of the poorest African countries out of the low-income trap is to provide them with a big demand push that will generate enough demand complementarities to expand the size of markets and recover the fixed costs of industrialisation. Unfortunately, in many African countries natural resource booms have only to a limited extent set off a dynamic growth process, largely due to failure to implement the right growth promotion policies and to ensure that strong institutions are in place, suggesting that it is very difficult to make the big push towards diversification and development of manufacturing in the resource-rich parts of Africa. The danger is that much of Africa is not industrialised and is stagnating in a staple trap, dependent on exports of a few mineral resources. The failure of natural resource wealth to lead to the expected economic growth and development has been attributed

to several factors, including the so-called “Dutch Disease”, rent-seeking by elites, poor governance and weak institutions. The chapter explores these causes of the resource curse and suggests ways to get out of the syndrome.

Nyokabi addresses how Inclusion and Equality is critical to the achievement of Agenda 2063. She illustrates how the African Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It aspires for a prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development and envisions an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; an Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by its people. Through this paper she argues that a truly people-driven agenda requires a bottom-up approach to governance where development is driven by the voices of the ‘African people indicating the Africa They Want’. It also requires a governance structure that ensures that all sectors of society feel their interests have been considered in decision making about issues affecting them. Such an approach calls for significant and strategic investment in people, particularly women and the youth who constitute the vast majority of Africans, but who mostly remain economically and politically marginalized. Priority should therefore be given to these marginalized and vulnerable groups in society and specifically to their possibility to contribute to the development process by empowering them with the capacity to voice their concerns and claim their legitimate rights from governments, state institutions, local authorities and other duty bearers.

Kauzya tackles the issue of developing transformational leadership capacity in Africa’s public-sector institutions to implement

the 2030 Agenda and achieve the SDGs. While the chapter touches on many issues, it accentuates that transformational leadership for a country’s sustainable development should not be taken to refer only to public sector or to political leadership at central government level. If a country must be transformed to achieve sustainable development and embrace a good society, transformational leadership must be pervasive in the entire society i.e. in public, private, civil society sectors at local, national and community levels. He illustrates that the common tendency of tasking the political leadership and government to develop the country must be revisited so that the people understand that developing a country is a task for the entire society. He concludes by observing that transformational leadership must be embraced and engraved in the entire society. If this happens, it would be in itself a big transformation. The chapter provides examples, at national level of the state of the national vision of Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Nigeria, Liberia, Libya which are transformational, acknowledging also that development strategies of twenty five African countries consulted out of the 54 have transformation as a major objective.

Teferi paper is based on detailed understanding on the paradox why Africa remains in deepening poverty level and degradation of natural resources while the African leadership places pro-poor economic growth and environmental sustainability at the centre of its economic policies, systems and institutions. He reviews the Ethiopian ‘Growth and Transformation Plan’, the Ghanaian ‘Agenda for Growth and Prosperity’, the Benin ‘Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction’, and the Cameroon ‘Growth and Employment Strategy Paper’ and notes that undeniably, African countries agree that growth is the single most crucial

factor influencing poverty. Despite this fact, poverty and inequality remain persistently high in the continent. Poverty is rising in Sub-Saharan Africa, from about 48% in 2000 when the Millennium Development Goals were launched, to about 50% of its population five years later. He recommends that good leadership is a sine-qua-non-for governance and sustainable development in Africa and to prudent management of national resources.

Gachagua presents a case study of managing water resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals from Kenya respectively. Gachagua argues that water is a key driver of economic and social development while it also has a basic function in maintaining the integrity of the natural environment. However water is only one of a number of vital natural resources and it is imperative that water issues are not considered in isolation. Managers, whether in the government or private sectors, have to make difficult decisions on water allocation and apportion diminishing supplies between ever-increasing demands. Drivers such as demographic and climatic changes further increase the stress on water resources. The traditional fragmented approach is no longer viable and a more holistic approach to water management is essential. The need for increased access to sustainable and affordable water services is a priority of the Kenyan Government within the overall policy framework of Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth creation in the country's Vision 2030. His paper discusses the water resource distribution in Kenya and the challenges the country is facing in the management of the water sector. It equally examines the approach Kenya has taken to manage its water resources to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the objectives of Africa Agenda

2063 and proposes further action for effective and efficient management of water in the country.

Mchunguzi chapter is a case study. The author tackles Ethical Leadership and Effective Management of National Resources in Tanzania. The chapter explores the nexus between ethical leadership and effective management of national resources noting that the major force is that performance of any nation, in seeking to achieve its set goals depends, to a large extent, on its leadership. This is especially so as ethical leadership translates into prudent public policy formulation and implementation, as well as good public service delivery, to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens. Mchunguzi emphasizes that a transformed leadership is needed in Africa to effectively manage national resources and enable any country to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals by promoting economic development and long-term sustainability of natural resource-based activities. Through the Tanzania experience, Mchunguzi provides suggestions on how best leadership ethics should be dealt with in order to have a transformed leadership that would ensure effective and sustainable management of national resources in Africa.

Kemepade interrogates the nexus between Africa's national resources and socio-economic development in the context of the mediating role of learning transformational leadership. Drawing on the leader-member exchange theory, the learning theory, and social capital theory, the chapter examines the role of the learning transformational leadership in mediating the nexus between Africa's national resources and its socioeconomic development in the context of the international environment.

It postulated that two factors accounted for the socioeconomic performance of Africa. These are: an immediate but largely weak capability of Africa's leadership in mediating the nexus between superabundant national resources and Africa's human condition and a remote but largely strong nexus between the international development context and Africa's human condition. Both factors contributed to the worsening poverty situation in Africa. Consequently, He recommended that Africa should nurture the role of learning transformational leadership to effectively mediate the link between its superabundant national resources and its human condition and address the international context to be able to secure the benefits of the exploitation of its national resources as well as nurturing learning transformational leaders.

Clovis examines how a transformed leadership can manage national resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and

Sustainable Development Goals. He gives critical analysis of the urban planning process in seven (07) countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia and France) and indicates that depending on the periods of observation, the different planning documents present similarities in terms of their names, the procedures for their preparation and even in their content. Among the grievances expressed by this paper is a predominantly sector-based approach to planning without effective coordination among institutional actors, without involvement of the beneficiaries, and based on out-dated standards, unreliable data, random and unnecessarily perfectionist forecasting. The urban planning system requires a rethinking. This paper extensively states that the positive transformation of the urban landscape depends on demonstrated expertise in the sector, especially Transformational Leadership, whose distinguishing feature is vision.

AFRICA'S NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH: A PARADOX OF PLENTY AND POVERTY

Professor Ukertor Gabriel Moti

Abstract

Africa is blessed with vast natural resources and rich environments. It is generously endowed with productive land and with valuable natural resources, which include renewable resources (such as water, forestry, and fisheries) and non-renewable resources (minerals, coal, gas, and oil). Natural resources dominate many national economies and are central to the livelihoods of the poor rural majority. These resources are the basis of income and subsistence for large segments of Africa's population and constitute a principal source of public revenue and national wealth. Under the right circumstances, a natural resource boom can be an important catalyst for growth, development, and the transition from cottage industry to factory production. Indeed, with the right approach natural resources can be used to make the transformation from a low-value economy that relies on exports of primary commodities to one with a substantial labour-intensive manufacturing base. Ideally the development of these resources can be a blessing for the entire continent. But historically, those resources have often proved to be a curse than a blessing especially to the majority of the citizens in these African countries. It is commonly agreed that one of the avenues for getting many of the poorest African countries out of the low-income trap is to provide them with a big demand push that will generate enough demand complementarities to expand the size of markets and recover the fixed costs of industrialisation. Natural resource wealth could be used to pursue this goal. Unfortunately, in many African countries natural resource booms have only to a limited extent set off a dynamic growth process. This is largely due to failure to implement the right growth promotion policies and to ensure that strong institutions are in place, suggesting that it is very difficult to make the big push towards diversification and development of manufacturing in the resource-rich parts of Africa. The danger is that much of Africa is not industrialised and is stagnating in a staple trap, dependent on exports of a few mineral resources. In particular, oil resources and other point resource-dependency could, with the wrong policies, lead to this scenario. The failure of natural resource wealth to lead to the expected economic growth and development has been attributed to several factors, including the so-called "Dutch Disease", rent-seeking by elites, poor governance and weak institutions. The paper explores these causes of the resource curse and suggests ways to get out of the syndrome.

Keywords: Natural Resource Wealth, Economic Growth, Natural Resource Curse, Industrialization, Dutch Disease

Introduction

The term '*resource curse*' (also known as the paradox of plenty) refers to the idea that the possession of natural resources (particularly in the form of oil or minerals) does not necessarily lead to economic success, and that resource wealth can even have a structural negative impact on long-term economic development. While it seems strange to suggest that a country could be economically (as well as socially and politically) hindered by its possession of a valuable – and often essential – economic input, scholars who believe in the resource curse suggest that, more often than not, resource-rich or resource-dependent countries are worse off compared to countries with few natural endowments.

Since the Scramble for Africa began in the nineteenth century, Africa's natural resources have attracted a lot of attention. It may come as somewhat of a surprise that the African continent was not the main supplier of any of the central raw materials of great importance in the nineteenth century global economy. For instance, of the natural resources coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber and copper, only rubber was a primarily colonial product, and four-fifths of the world's supply was derived in British Malay and the Dutch East Indies. More recently, many African countries are increasingly rich in oil, diamonds and minerals. Yet, African countries have and continue to experience low levels of economic growth and development (World Bank, 2016).

By contrast, in the second half of the twentieth century many East Asian economies have experienced very rapid economic growth and achieved Western living standards despite having no exportable resources (Patrick, 2012). In 1993 Richard Auty, an economic geographer,

coined the phrase 'natural resource curse' to describe this counter-intuitive phenomenon. Two years later, economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner initiated the big statistical literature on the subject. They found that dependence on natural resources was connected to low levels of economic growth. The relationship between economic growth (measured by the average annual growth of per capita Gross Domestic Product) and resource dependence (measured by the share of natural resources in total exports), is negative: this means that, at least for the period 1970 to 2008, the economies of countries whose wealth consisted mostly of natural resources grew at a slower rate than those with a lower share of resource wealth. Many scholars have argued that this relationship holds, on average, over different sample periods and for different measures of resource wealth (Ross, 1999). Sachs and Warner (1999), for example, claimed their findings are not easily explained by other factors or by alternative ways of measuring resource abundance or dependence. More recently, Frederick Van der Ploeg (2007) has pointed out the variety of experiences of resource rich countries, though noting that the resource curse is primarily a phenomenon of the last 40-50 years. He points to the benefits of natural resources for countries with "good institutions", free trade and high levels of investment in extractive technology (Van der Ploeg, 2007).

Many African countries are blessed with oil and mineral wealth that has the potential to transform their economies. Ideally the development of these resources can be a blessing for the entire continent. But historically, those resources have often proved to be a curse than a blessing especially, to the majority of the citizens in these African countries. Part of the cause of this curse is attributed to the

leadership crisis facing many countries on the African continent.

Leadership implies critical management of critical resource endowments in a country. Governance and leadership crises in Africa are reinforced by the inability of leaders to identify, sieve and apply relevant development policy options. There is the get - rich - quick mania in Africa, especially among the political leaders. The inordinate ambition for wealth accumulation is an offshoot of corrupt practices which are aspects of underdevelopment. An African also appears to be happy stealing from one side of his pocket and transfers the ‘loot’ to the other side of his pocket and congratulate himself for a job well done (Iheriohanma & Oguoma, 2010). Resource – rich countries in Africa are plagued by political and commercial corruption, social inequality and the instability that results from systems that fail to meet the

basic rights of its people. A continent that is rich in natural resources like oil, gas, diamonds and other extractive resources, is made poor by the human errors that are fed by greed (Coleman, 2011).

Are sub-Saharan Africa’s abundant mineral and fuel resources undermining prospects for development in the region? Countries experiencing resource curse have undesirable outcomes ranging from economic stagnation, to authoritarian rule, to violent conflict. Africa is no stranger to these maladies. With international commodity prices booming, its dependence on resource exports is unlikely to diminish anytime soon. Is Africa suffering from a resource curse? How can this be mitigated?

Africa has 23 Resource-rich countries and about 26 Resource-scarce countries, some landlocked, and some coastal.

Table 1: Resource-Rich & Resource -scarce Countries

Resource-Rich Countries	Resource Scarce Countries
Oil Exporting Countries	Benin
Algeria	Burkina Faso
Angola	Burundi
Cameroun	Cape Verde
Chad	Comoros
Congo	Djibouti
Cote d’Ivoire	Egypt
Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea
Gabon	Ethiopia
Libya	
Nigeria	Guinea Bissau
Sudan	Kenya
South Sudan	Lesotho
	Liberia
Mineral Exporting Countries	Madagascar

Botswana	Malawi
Central African Republic	Morocco
Ghana	Niger
Guinea	Rwanda
Mauritania	Sao Tome & Principe
Mozambique	Senegal
Namibia	Seychelles
Sierra Leone	Swaziland
South Africa	Togo
Tanzania	Tunisia
Zambia	Uganda

Source: *Adapted from African Development Report, 2007.*

Table 2: Landlocked and Coastal Countries

Land Locked Countries	Coastal Countries	Coastal Countries
Resource – Rich	Resource-Rich	Resource –Scarce
Botswana	Algeria	Benin
Central African Republic	Angola	Cape Verde
Chad	Cameroun	Comoros
	Congo	Djibouti
Resource –Scarce	Congo Democratic Republic	Egypt
Burkina Faso	Cote D’ivoire	Eritrea
Burundi	Equatorial Guinea	Ghana
Ethiopia	Gabon	Guinea Bissau
Lesotho	Guinea	Liberia
Malawi	Libya	Madagascar
Mali	Mauritania	Morocco
Niger	Mozambique	Sao Tome & Principe
Rwanda	Namibia	Senegal
Swaziland	Nigeria	Seychelles
Uganda	Sierra Leone	Somalia
Zambia	Sudan	Togo
	Tanzania	Tunisia

Source: *Adapted from African Development Report, 2007*

What is the Resource Curse?

The resource curse refers to a situation whereby a country has an export-driven natural resources sector that generates large revenues for government but leads paradoxically to economic stagnation and political instability. It is commonly used to describe the negative development outcomes associated with non-renewable extractive resources (petroleum and other minerals). Essentially, the resource curse refers to the inverse association between development and natural resource abundance. It has often been asserted that petroleum, in particular, brings trouble—waste, corruption, consumption, debt overhang, deterioration, falling apart of public services, wars, and other forms of conflicts, among others. Thus, natural resource abundant countries tend to grow slower than expected—considering their resource wealth - and, in many cases, actually grow slower than resource-scarce countries (ADB, 2007).

The curse of natural has been shown empirically and analysed in a number of studies. These studies, include, Auty (1990), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), and Gylfason et al, (1999), among others. They emerged late in the 20th century, as evidence accumulated on the poor growth experience of resource-rich countries in the post-world-war II period. On an intellectual level, this issue first emerged as an important international issue during the inter-war period in Latin America, after many Latin American economies suffered from the global slumping of commodity prices. However, during this time and in the immediate post-war period, the skepticism about natural resource-led development was rooted in forecasts of declining global

demand and prices. The studies based on the post-war experience have argued is that the curse of natural resources is a demonstrable empirical fact, even after controlling for trends in commodity prices. Since many poorer countries still have abundant natural resources, it is important to better understand the roots of failure in natural resource-led development.

Countries with non-renewable resource wealth face both an opportunity and a challenge. When used well, these resources create greater prosperity for current and future generations; used poorly, or squandered, they cause economic instability, social conflict, and lasting environmental damage. Why a ‘Resource Curse’? The discovery of natural resources leads to concentration of wealth in few hands—powerful officials in governments and those directly involved in drilling, mining and resource exploration (like International Oil Companies). The discovery of these resources hence becomes a blessing only to these few while it excludes the majority from any benefits. It’s upon this ground that it has been commonly referred to as the “resource curse”.

Cross-Country Evidence for the Natural Resource Curse

Some resource rich countries benefit from their natural wealth, while others don’t (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). For instance, Nigeria has been a major oil exporter since 1965 with oil revenues per capita increasing tenfold in the last 35 years. However, income per capita has stagnated since independence in 1960 making Nigeria one of the 15 poorest countries in the world. During this period the poverty headcount ratios have almost

tripled while the rich have grabbed a much larger part of income. Huge oil exports have not benefited the average Nigerian. Despite rapid accumulation of physical capital, Nigeria has suffered a declining Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and capacity utilisation of manufacturing is about one third. Two thirds of capacity, often owned by the government, goes to waste. Successive military dictatorships

and politicians have plundered oil wealth and many suspect transfers overseas of large amounts of undisclosed wealth. Oil wealth has fundamentally altered politics and governance in Nigeria.

Below (table 5) are countries that are claimed to have escaped resource curse and those that are claimed to be under the resource curse.

Table 3: Resource –free and Resource –trapped Countries

Countries claimed to have escaped the resource curse *		Countries claimed to be under the resource curse *	
Australia	18.0	Algeria	6.11
Botswana	33.0	Congo	-11.9
Canada	15.7	Mexico	10.8
Chile	7.4	Nigeria	-22.0
Ireland	22.0	Saudi Arabia	-21.5
Malaysia	19.9	Sierra Leone	-1.8
New Zealand	18.4	Trinidad & Tobago	-3.9
Norway	17.0	Venezuela	-1.8
Oman	-26.6	Zambia	-5.8
Thailand	20.0		
USA	15.1		

Source: *Matson and Tonvik (2005)*.

*Note: Resource-adjusted savings as percentage of Gross National Income

Other oil exporters such as Iran, Venezuela, Libya, Iraq and Kuwait and Qatar experienced negative growth during the last few decades. The OPEC as a whole saw a decline in GNP per capita. The gold price boom in the 1970's together with increased barriers to technological adoption helps to explain the de-industrialization and disappointing growth experience of South Africa. In contrast, Botswana has managed to beat the resource curse. Forty percent of Botswana's GDP stems from diamonds. It has the second highest public expenditure on education as a fraction

of GDP, enjoys the world's highest growth rate since 1965. Its GDP per capita is ten times that of Nigeria. The Botswana experience is noteworthy, since it started its post-colonial experience with minimal investment and substantial inequality.

Theory

The theoretical literature on the resource curse contains many mechanisms that may explain why 'more leads to less'—in the sense that the general equilibrium effect of more natural resources may actually be lower income. Below are some of the leading observations and theories about how these special characteristics

of natural resource revenues create additional challenges for countries:

The first wave of theory models to explain this was within what might be termed Dutch disease theory. The theory states that *a large increase in natural resource revenues can hurt other sectors of the economy, particularly export-based manufacturing, by causing inflation or exchange rate appreciation and shifting labor and capital from the non-resource sector to the resource sector*. Van Wijnbergen (1984) developed the first model showing how oil may reduce aggregate income through a learning-by-doing mechanism. When a country discovers oil, its population wants to spend part of the value of this as consumption of non-traded goods. Demand for these increases, pulling resources out of traded sectors, and decreasing production here. The decreased traded sector in turn means less learning by doing, and lower productivity growth than would otherwise be the case. This effect may be sufficiently strong to outweigh the initial increase in income that the oil discovery generated. Other models within the Dutch disease tradition include Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Gylfason et al. (1999), Torvik (2001), and Matsen and Torvik (2005).

The second wave of models explaining the resource curse consisted of rent-seeking models. A standard result in the rent-seeking literature is that when a new income possibility arises, it may lead to increased rent seeking that reduces the net increase in income for society. However, though the extent of rent dissipation falls short of one, the net increase in income is still positive. The more the agents are rent seeking, the less increase in total income. Note that these theories explain what is normally understood as the resource curse—that more natural resources decrease total income.

The literature on rent seeking and the resource curse thus models different reasons why the extent of rent dissipation may exceed one—in which case more natural resources may push total income down. The most famous paper within the rent-seeking tradition of the resource curse is Tornell and Lane (1999). They show how, in an economy with many groups, an increase in the marginal productivity may actually reduce growth: when the marginal productivity increases this means more income available for redistribution. Each group in the economy demands higher transfers, and the sum of these demands may make the tax rate go up sufficiently that the net marginal productivity of capital, and thus growth, is reduced. In Torvik (2002) we see that entrepreneurs can use their talent running modern firms or otherwise to undertake rent seeking in the hope of capturing some of the resource income of the economy. With more natural resources fewer entrepreneurs will run firms and more engage in rent seeking. In turn, this means that production in modern firms falls, reducing income and demand further, making it even less profitable to run modern firms. Through rent seeking more natural resources generate a negative multiplier effect, and the net result is lower income.

Causes and Effects of the Resource Curse

The resource curse has crippled many African nations since their independence. Cases like Angola, Sudan, the DRC, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria and several others, have endured the hardships brought on by the presence of highly sought after raw materials, notably oil and precious gemstones (Mbabazi, 2009). Major causes of Africa's resource curse include but not limited

to; lack of strong legal and political institutions, presence of multiple power groups (actors), dictatorial and repressive governments. All these causes stem from poor leadership and weak governance in most African states.

Weak Legal and Political institutions:

Strong legal and political institutions play an important role in the development of any country. Unfortunately most resource-rich countries of Africa are characterised by weak governance, outdated laws and weak institutional capacity. Outdated laws create a conflict of interest within the agency responsible for managing the sector (Global Witness et al, 2011). Because of the nature of political systems where power is concentrated in ruling families or powerful individuals and cabals, the legal system and other key institutions have been either weakened or marginalized (Abbas, 2009).

Presence of Multiple Power Groups:

In most African countries, there are several actors involved in the oil and mineral sector. These groups may include governments, Transnational Corporations, NGOs, and Donor Agencies among others. All actors exert a certain degree of power and multiple interests. As one of the sovereign authorities, the government is, undoubtedly, the primary actor in the country's oil and mineral sector. For example, the governments of Nigeria and Uganda are the most influential and crucial actors from licensing companies to developing national policies. With this power, however, comes a level of great responsibility since if misused, the likely benefits from the resources can become a curse to the entire nation.

Dictatorial and Repressive Regimes:

Most African countries have experienced dictatorial regimes that cling to power, to

monopolise collection of resource wealth. Many studies have demonstrated a causal relationship between natural resources and authoritarianism, finding that natural resources negatively impact democracy. Authoritarianism arises due to one-party dominance combined with weak rule of law. This incites the opposition to use non-constitutional means to compete for political power. However, when the rule of law is strong and political power is less concentrated, and distribution of resource rents is properly monitored by an independent agency, the incumbent's advantage is largely mitigated (UNDP, 2010). All the factors behind the 'resource curse' in Africa are, generally, attributable to weak governance.

Democracy:

Over the past 30 years, natural resource wealth, particularly oil wealth, has made it more likely for governments to become or remain authoritarian. This is largely due to less reliance on citizen taxes. In general, political scientists find that governments are more responsive to their citizens and are more likely to transition to democracy when government spending is reliant on citizen taxation. When countries collect large revenues from natural resources, they are less dependent on levying taxes on citizens, and thus citizens feel less invested in the national budget. Politicians and government officials are also less directly tied to citizen requests or demands (citation). Further, when resource revenues are secret, citizens do not have a clear sense of whether the resource revenues are being spent well or not. Those who outline this theory suggest that the tendency toward authoritarianism can be mitigated by increasing transparency of revenues and strengthening the links between government and citizens through citizen participation in budgeting or direct distribution of wealth (e.g., cash transfers) (UNDP, 2010).

Natural Resource Bounties and Armed Conflict: Natural resources can, and often do, provoke and sustain internal conflicts as different groups fight for control of the resources or use natural resources to finance their fighting. Since 1990, oil-producing countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Niger Delta (Nigeria), Libya and Angola are twice as likely to have a civil war compared to non-oil-producing countries. Petro-aggression; -the tendency of oil rich states to instigate or be targets of international conflict, has been observed in some cases, such as in Iraq's invasion of Iran and Kuwait but, researchers debate whether the data supports the conclusion that resource-rich countries do this at a greater rate than non-resource-rich countries (Mabikke, 2012).

The presence of (especially point-source) natural resource, rents may undermine the quality of institutions and induce armed and other forms of conflict. Unfortunately, this is and has been the reality in many African states with abundant natural resources. Under democracy politicians are less able to appropriate resource rents for their own ends besides, violent competition with other political fractions is costly as armies need to be paid and property may be destroyed. This suggests that higher natural resource rents biases the political choice away from democracy towards violent conflict especially if politicians are short-sighted; in contrast, higher income due to higher productivity in the economy makes democracy more likely (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2005). Thus, boost to natural resource rents puts democratic institutions to a survival test in African states without proper democratic institutions.

There is a growing body of empirical evidence that rents on natural resources and primary

commodities, especially oil and other point-source natural resources, increase chances of civil conflicts and wars in Sub-Saharan Africa through weakening of the state or financing of rebels, sometimes even by multinational corporations (Patrick, 2012). It is therefore, important to investigate whether civil strife and wars in countries such as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone are a result of grievance, a sense of injustice against a social (e.g., systematic economic discrimination), or greed possibly, induced by massive rents of point-source resources (Murshed, 2002; Olsson and Fors, 2004). The extent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict and the effect is nonlinear (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For instance, a country without natural resources has a probability of civil conflict of merely 0.5 percent, but a country with a share of natural resources in GDP of a quarter has a probability of 23 percent. Unfortunately, this suggests that many conflicts are driven by greed rather than grievance.

The empirical evidence also strongly suggests that natural resource related conflict is more likely to erupt in countries with a low level of GDP per capita and low rate of economic growth. All three factors determining the onset of armed conflict – natural resources, low income per capita and low growth – are prevalent on the African continent. Collier (2007) argues that post-conflict countries are especially prone to eruption of conflict, but also more likely to make necessary economic reforms. It is therefore recommended to station international troupes in post-conflict countries to preserve the peace for about a decade. The new governments can then concentrate on reform, reduce spending on the military, and invest in education and badly needed (transport) infrastructure. Unfortunately,

this is not high on the agenda of much of the developed world as ministers of development typically do not have enough clout to convince their defense colleagues to direct attention at military aid to give reform a chance and lift some of the poorest, post-conflict countries in Africa out of their poverty trap.

In this context, it is important to note that insisting on reforming towards democracies is not necessarily very helpful in countries with abundant natural resources. In fact, resource-rich democracies tend to have lower growth unless these democracies have sound and effective checks and balances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006). In many resource-rich countries the government seems unable to provide basic security to its citizens, since the wealth of resources elicits violence, theft and looting often financed by rebels and competing war lords (Skaperdas, 2002; Mehlum, et al, 2002). The effect of natural resources on the incidence and duration of civil wars features strongly in the political science literature (Ross, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In war torn countries with many rival groups, fighting over natural resources may harm the quality of the legal system and undermine property rights. .. There will thus be an erosion of property rights and a natural resource curse if the number of rival fractions is large and natural resource revenues are substantial (Hodler, 2006). Fractionalisation and fighting about natural resource bounties can also lead to over dissipation of natural resource rents. . The idea is that each group amasses more natural resources if they fight more under a poor legal system, which further undermines effective property rights. Effectively, natural resource wealth implies that opportunistic, rebel leaders crowd out ideological leaders and that government officers end up being corrupt and concerned with looting for themselves and

their cronies rather than investing in public goods for the people.

There is some cross-country empirical evidence suggesting that the resource curse is more severe in countries with many ethnic, religious fractions or languages (Hodler, 2006). . It is possible to put forward a richer theory of coalitions formed along ethnic lines competing for resources (Caselli and Coleman II, 2006). In ethnically homogenous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to winners at low cost, which rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. Of course, the rent of each member of the winning coalition is diluted. Thus, a homogenous country experiences limited fighting, in which case natural resource wealth always benefits its citizens. However, in ethnically heterogeneous societies, members of the winning coalitions can more easily recognize potential infiltrators by skin colour or other physical characteristics and exclude them.

Oil increases the likelihood of conflict, especially, separatist conflict while resources that are easily looted, such as gemstones and drugs tend to prolong conflict, but are less likely to trigger conflict. There is no significant link between (legal) agricultural production and conflict. The curse of natural resources is particularly relevant when rebel groups and rulers and their cronies fight each other over the control of point-source resources

Inefficient spending and borrowing: The amount that governments collect in resource revenues can change drastically from year to year because of changes in commodity prices and production. Several studies have shown that it is very difficult to effectively spend fluctuating and unpredictable revenues. Governments often get trapped in boom-bust

cycles where they spend on legacy projects, such as airports and monuments, when revenues are rising and then must make painful cuts when revenues decline. Resource-rich governments have a tendency to over-spend on government salaries, inefficient fuel subsidies and large monuments and to underspend on health, education and other social services. In addition, governments often over-borrow because they have improved credit-worthiness when revenues are high. This trend led to debt crises when revenues declined in Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela in the 1980s. The private sector can be similarly impacted, as it can over-invest in boom times and then experience widespread bankruptcy during bursts (Torvik, 2002).

Proponents of the resource curse hypothesis identify several channels through which natural resources may harm development. In the economic sphere, lucrative natural resources attract attention and assets from other sectors with greater long-term growth potential.

In the political sphere, the effects of natural resources depend on whether the state is able to capture resource wealth. Where the state does capture resource wealth, proceeds from resource extraction enables governments to use a mix of patronage and repression to evade meaningful accountability to the general public. Where it does not, proceeds from resource extraction enable the rebel groups that control them to finance violent insurgencies.

If one considers the definition of economic growth and the impact of the export of natural resources on natural resource rich countries, the situation presents an incomprehensible mystery which shows that wealth in natural resources and export of natural resources does not necessarily increase the GDP and

economic growth index in the long term. The largest oil producing countries in the world, such as Algeria, Angola, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and even Trinidad and Tobago, have experienced a significant decline in per capita income in recent decades where for instance, 70% of the population in Nigeria lives on less than one dollar a day, yet Nigeria earned over 340 billion dollars in revenue from the production and export of oil since 1970 (Schubert, 2006).

Many African countries are rich in natural resources. This has not always been a blessing. The huge revenues from commodity exports have been very volatile. Furthermore, these revenues are often temporary and thus sustainable fiscal policies are required to ensure appropriate investment in productive and human capital. This is a difficult task, since the volatility of commodity export revenues invites excessive public spending without proper scrutiny. The huge volatility of resource prices also harms both domestic and foreign direct investment and depresses economic growth by a large amount, especially if domestic financial institutions are poorly developed. Many resource-rich African countries also suffer from real appreciation of their exchange rates induced by the huge resource export revenues and aid flows. This greatly hampers prospects for non-resource exports in those countries. Besides, the sheer volume of resource revenues diverts attention away from the task of diversifying commodities exports with labour-intensive manufacturing exports. This is further complicated by the rise of China and India making it harder for Africa to carve a niche in labour-intensive manufacturing exports to the OECD economies.

Without proper checks and balances the huge resource revenues also encourage rent

seeking and corruption on a massive scale and tend to undermine the quality of institutions. Transparency in the allocation of mineral rights, the revenues generated, and how the revenues are spent, are thus essential information. Hence, credible international organizations preferably, organized by reform-minded African institutions could play a useful role in extending the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative into a Charter for Transparency of Resource Revenues and Payments.

Unfortunately, many natural resource rich countries have negative genuine saving. They are thus depleting their natural resource wealth faster than they are building up other assets. The key challenge is therefore how to transform the often temporary resource revenues into a productive capital. Clearly, much can be done to improve the transport infrastructure across Africa, and to invest in human capital and the skill necessary to set up a viable and competitive manufacturing base.

Institutions and the Natural Resource Curse

Natural resources are neither a curse nor a blessing. Weak institutions negatively affect growth and development and vice versa. Institutions in resource economies may play a greater role than in non-resource economies. Consequently, weak institutions may have a stronger negative impact. The two main categories which are related and which are often lacking in resource economies are: (i) Rule of law and economic freedom, which include property rights, limited government, independent judiciary, and freedom of trade. (ii) Accountability and efficiency of elites: producers versus ‘grabbers’ and other related issues such as rent-seeking, corruption and

lack of democratic ethos (Ross, 1999). Natural resource dependence causes a deterioration of institutions which consequently slows down growth. These adverse effects can be avoided to an extent if the quality of institutions is good and the political system embraces effective checks and balances. Since institutions are not necessarily cast on stone and can be improved in the course of a couple of decades (IMF, 2005), there is a challenge for resource-rich African countries to improve their institutions and soften the blows of the resource curse.

Natural Resource Bonanzas Invite Rapacious Rent Seeking: The political economy of massive natural resource rents can be horrendous especially when combined with badly defined property rights, imperfect markets and poorly functioning legal systems. Such situations provide ideal opportunities for rent seeking behaviour of enterprises, politicians and their friends, thereby diverting resources away from more productive economic activities (Auty, 2001, 2004). Self-reinforcing effects arise if rent seekers compete and prey on productive entrepreneurs and can explain wide cross-country differences in rent seeking (Murphy, et al, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995). The idea is that each country has a limited pool of talented people, who can either engage in productive entrepreneurship or in wasteful rent seeking. A larger number of rent seekers in resource-rich economies lower returns to not only rent seeking, but also to entrepreneurship with possibly large marginal effects on production. Since more entrepreneurs are likely to switch to rent seeking in times of a natural resource boom, there is a possibility of multiple (good and bad) equilibrium outcomes. More rent seekers induce negative external effects that depress profits for remaining entrepreneurs, which stimulate even more people to shift from productive entrepreneurship to wasteful

rent seeking. It is also possible that increased entrepreneurship crowds out rent seeking. In particular, private business can invent and supply new substitutes for restricted imports and thus destroy the rents of quota licenses (Baland and Francois, 2000).

The so-called voracity effect also causes a drag on economic growth in fractionalized societies as can be seen after the oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela and Mexico (Tornell and Lane, 1999). This effect implies that dysfunctional institutions and poor definition of property rights lead to a classical commons problem whereby there is too much grabbing and rapacious rent seeking of natural resource revenues. It supposes, in contrast, a fixed number of rent seekers. Capital can be allocated either to a formal sector where rents may be appropriated and an informal sector with lower returns and no appropriation or rent seeking. Competing groups in society can thus invest in private assets with relatively low returns or grab as much as they can from the stock of common natural resources. In a natural resource boom returns to capital investment in the formal sector rise, so that rent seekers can appropriate proportionately more without destroying the incentive to invest in the formal sector. This is the case if there is the possibility of sectorial reallocation or, alternatively, if the elasticity of inter temporal substitution is sufficiently high so that groups do not refrain from excessively increasing appropriation of natural resource revenues.

Aggressive rent seeking then lowers the amount of capital left for investment in the formal sector and harms growth prospects. In effect, the increased profitability of investment is more than undermined by each group of rent seekers grabbing a greater share of national wealth by demanding more transfers. As the

number of rent-seeking groups in society increases, the voracity effect becomes bigger and the growth rate declines. The surprising point is that higher natural resource wealth can make a country worse off, since the squabbling over the resource rents by rival fractions leads to excessive depletion of resources and depresses growth. This is also an important reason for the erosion of natural resource wealth and the negative genuine saving rates in much of Africa.

Natural Resource Wealth Induces Corruption:

There is much anecdotal evidence that suggests that corruption is rampant in resource-rich societies and that it is harmful for economic incentives. In fact, cross-country empirical evidence also establishes that increased corruption hampers economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 1997; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Mineral wealth may prevent the redistribution of political power towards the middle classes and thus hamper the adoption of growth-promoting policies (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). The main thrust of these explanations is that natural resource wealth has an adverse effect on institutions, since excessive natural resource revenues allow governments to pacify dissent, avoid accountability and resist modernization (Isham, et al., 2003). For example, waste, corruption and the granting of import licenses and other privileges to cronies rather than Dutch Disease effects operating through the real exchange rate seem to be why oil riches have had such disastrous effects on long-run performance of the Nigerian economy (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Resource wealth makes it easier for dictators to buy off political challengers as President Mobuto was able to do in Congo with its wealth on copper, diamonds, zinc, gold, silver and oil (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, 2004). Natural resource

riches allow politicians to bribe voters by offering them well paid, but unproductive jobs and inefficient subsidies and tax handouts (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006).

Those profiting from the natural resource sector may bribe politicians to provide specific semi- public goods at the expense of support to manufacturing, which lowers welfare if manufacturing enjoys returns to scale (Damania and Bulte, 2003). Natural resources also make it attractive for political elites to block technological and institutional improvements if that would weaken their power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). A resource bonanza encourages productive entrepreneurs to shift to rent seeking. When aggregate demand externalities are important, a natural resource bonanza can easily lower income by more than the extra income from the resource revenues and thus depress social welfare (Torvik, 2002). It is important to distinguish between countries with production-friendly institutions and others with institutions that tolerate rent grabbing (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006). Suppose that there is a fixed supply of people that have the talent to direct their activities at either rent seeking or productive entrepreneurship. Rent seeking and productive activities are thus competing activities. If there are more productive entrepreneurs, demand in the economy and profits of each entrepreneur increase. This supposes demand complementarities in production. In contrast, if more of the talented people are rent seekers (political insiders, bureaucrats, oligarchs, war lords, etc.), the gain per rent seeker declines. One can then distinguish two outcomes following a natural resource bonanza.

If institutions are strong and encourage productive entrepreneurship, profits of entrepreneurs increase. This means that

eventually less people engage in rent seeking and more in productive activities. The rent of the resource bonanza is more than dissipated. Examples of resource rich countries with strong institutions are Australia, Canada, the US, New Zealand, Iceland and Norway, but also Botswana (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003a). However, if institutions are weak, the legal system dysfunctions and transparency is low, rent seeking has a higher return and unfair take-overs, shady dealings, corruption, crime, etc. pay off. A resource bonanza thus elicits more rent seekers and reduces the number of productive entrepreneurs. In the long run profits fall and as a result the economy is worse off. Weak institutions may explain the poor performance of oil rich countries such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, diamond rich Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, and drug states like Columbia or Afghanistan. In those countries institutions are often destroyed by civil wars over the control of natural resources. Dependency on oil and other natural resources hinders democracy and the quality of governance (Ross, 1999). Summing up, among the group of resource-rich African economies there are a few countries with strong institutions that enjoy higher growth but unfortunately many others with weak institutions that suffer from low growth resulting from corruption induced by substantial natural resource revenues.

Sub-Saharan Africa, with lower income than South Asia, faces the greater challenge and need. While the two regions account for approximately 45% of the population of the developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa account for a much higher proportion of poverty in its various manifestations, generally well over 70%. 75% of the income poverty, 63% of the chronically hungry, 72% of the children out of school, 75% of the illiterate adults, 86%

of the people living with HIV/AIDS, 94%+ of the malaria deaths, 84% of the Under-5 Mortality, 86% of the Maternal Mortality, 87% of those practicing open defecation, and 73% of the stunted children (Global Profile of

Extreme Poverty- Background paper for the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2012).

Some of these include resource-rich (dependent) countries as shown in tables 3 and 4 below.

Table 4: Sub-Sahara Africa's Most Mineral Dependent States

Country	Mining product as percentage of GDP
Guinea	84.7
Democratic Republic of Congo	80
Zambia	74.8
Niger	70.6
Botswana	70
Namibia	55.4
Sierra Leone	50

Source: *Weber-Fahr, 2002.*

Table 5: Sub-Sahara Africa's Most Oil Dependent States

Country	Oil Exports as percentage of GDP
Equatorial Guinea	86
Gabon	73
Congo	67
Angola	45
Nigeria	40
Cameroun	4.9

Source: *U.S Energy Information Administration, (2010).*

Curse is Less Severe in Open Economies with Good Institutions: The pioneering study on the empirical cross-country evidence shows that resource rich countries grow on average about one percentage point less during 1970-89 even after controlling for initial income per capita, investments during the period, openness and rule of law (Sachs and Warner, 1995). Resource- rich countries with bad institutions typically are poor and remain poor. Many of them are in Africa. Other cross-country evidence strongly suggests

that natural resources – oil and minerals in particular – exert a negative and nonlinear impact on growth via their deleterious impact on institutional quality rather than via a worsening of competitiveness (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). The adverse effect of resource abundance on institutional quality and economic growth is especially strong for easily appropriable ‘point-source’ natural resources with concentrated production and revenues and thus massive rents, i.e., oil, diamonds, minerals and plantation crops rather

than agriculture (e.g., rice, wheat and animals) whose rents are more dispersed throughout the economy, and with easy appropriation of rents through state institutions. What matters is thus the appropriability of resources, which is how easy it is to realize large economic gains within a relatively short period and having control over the resources. It is important to distinguish two distinct hypotheses (Boschini, et al, 2003).

First, the institutional appropriability thesis states that natural resource abundance is only negative for economic development in countries with poor institutions. Second, the technical appropriability thesis states that the impact of institutional quality and abundant natural resources is more pronounced the more technically appropriable the country's natural resources are. The importance of good institutions increases in the technical appropriability of resources which confirms the technical appropriability hypothesis. The resource curse is thus not inevitable. Sierra Leone is hurt by diamonds, but Botswana is not. Recent cross-country evidence establishes a significant negative impact of natural resources on income per capita even after controlling for institutional quality, trade openness and geography and also for an interaction term with institutional quality and trade openness (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007). The natural resource is thus particularly severe in countries with bad institutions and low degrees of trade openness. Adopting policies towards more trade openness and improving institutional quality may thus turn the resource curse into a blessing. Natural resources do not always harm growth performance. The main lesson from cross-country evidence is that the natural resource curse is not cast in stone. Countries with high-quality institutions, well-developed financial systems and open to international

trade suffer much less from the curse and may even escape it.

Viability of Africa's Natural Resources

Many resource-rich countries in Africa are squandering their natural resource wealth. They are saving and investing less in productive assets at home or abroad no more than their mineral and energy wealth is being eroded. As a result, so-called genuine saving rates are negative for many countries in Africa. One theoretical possibility for this is anticipation of better times (e.g., anticipation of improvements in exploration technology or commodity price hikes), but this seems unlikely. Extrapolating historical commodity price trends cannot explain the magnitude of the negative genuine saving rates. This paper therefore suggests that much of the negative genuine saving rates must be explained by rapacious rent seeking. Resource-rich countries of Africa therefore need credible and transparent rules for sustainable consumption and investment to ensure that exhaustible natural resources are gradually transformed into productive assets at home or abroad.

Much of Resource-Rich Africa Has Negative Genuine Saving: Many economies endowed with abundant natural resources show poor growth even after controlling for the quality of institutions, openness, investment rates and initial levels of income per capita.. Highly resource dependent Nigeria and Angola have genuine saving rates of minus 30 percent, thereby impoverishing future generations on a massive scale. High natural resource dependence is defined as at least a 5 percent share of resource rents in GDP. The World Bank suggests that resource-rich countries with negative genuine saving such as Nigeria

or Venezuela would experience increases in productive capital by a factor of five or four if the Hartwick rule would have been followed. (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007). This is also true for oil- and gas-rich Trinidad and Tobago and copper-rich Zambia.

Aggressive Rent Seeking versus Anticipation of Better Times: There are two crucial questions to be answered. First, why is it that so many of Africa's resource-rich countries save so little? Second, is it really sub-optimal for them to save so little? Even without government and market failures, countries should save less than their rents on natural resources and postpone extraction if they expect the world price of natural resource prices to rise in the future (Vincent, Panayotou and Hartwick, 1997) or expect marginal costs of extraction to fall in the future (van der Ploeg, 2007). In anticipation of better times countries with abundant natural resources thus run a current account deficit if the rents on natural resources fall short of the imputed interest on the value of natural resource reserves.

This is more likely if the stock of reserves of natural resources is high. In practice, the adjustments to allow for future changes in resource prices are quite small if historical price trends are extrapolated (Hamilton and Bolt, 2004). Historical evidence on the US economy suggests that technical progress in extraction may be quite large if governments allow private property rights and collective learning (David and Wright, 1997). There is no reason why forward-looking governments of today's resource-rich economies should not enjoy technical progress in exploration. It then makes sense not only to borrow for necessary investments, but also to save less than the current Hotelling resource rents in anticipation of falling extraction costs. However, in many African resource-rich countries

political reasons may be more important in understanding why resource-rich countries save less than the Hotelling rents on natural resources (van der Ploeg, 2007).

Management of Natural Resource Revenues

The objective of maximizing benefits for current and future generations of citizens can be broken down into four stages, from extraction, through revenue flows to expenditure. Here the papers first discusses how efficient contracts can be written with the exploration companies and then discuss the appropriate choice of fiscal regime. The paper proceeds to emphasize the importance of transparency in natural resource expenditures and revenues and offer some suggestions for more effective public sector financial management. We then discuss the timing of natural resource expenditures and especially how this can benefit future generations as much as possible. Finally, we discuss issues of whether natural resource revenues should be used for consumption and/or investment.

Contracting and the Fiscal Regime. There is a complex interaction between licensing, contracting and taxation regimes for natural resources. They need to secure the dual objectives of efficiency and revenue transfer to the source country. Sound principles for the design of efficient contracts and the auction and allocation of mineral and energy rights should be established. Efficiency imposes a number of requirements; exploration companies should have incentives to participate and should be encouraged to extract efficient quantities and to invest in both production and exploration, and, contracts should be time- consistent for governments not to renege thereby creating uncertainty and expropriation threat.

Similarly, efficiency applies to the allocation of production and price risks between parties to the contract. This allocation of risks depends on the ability of exploration companies and governments to bear risk and to trade risk on the international capital markets. The contract should also specify environmental conditions as well as the transfer of knowledge and other assets, tangible and intangible. In resource rich countries that are ruined by armed conflict, an effort should be made to get exploitation companies involved at the peace negotiations table. This is because the exploration companies have an interest to avoid conflict, and may offer an incentive to re-employ ex-combatants. To avoid the political risk where a successful mining venture could capture the state, it may help to make mining contracts conditional with the criteria for recognition of the political regime.

In an economy with an effective legal system auctions are an attractive option, since competition between firms will secure both efficiency – maximization of net revenues – and maximum net transfer to the government. Auctions also have the merit of transparency. However, where the mining contract is multidimensional, matters become more complicated. If bidding is on a single variable – total royalty – then other aspects of the mining contract (risk sharing, knowledge transfer, and environmental safeguards) have to be established in some way and imposed as constraints in the auction of mineral rights. From a public finance point of view the government has to deal with revenue collection, revenue management and revenue disbursement (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007). Efficient revenue collection requires adequate incentives, appropriate levels of government take, early and stable revenues, cost containment and administrative

simplicity. The natural resource revenues can be collected through royalties, profit taxes or other tax packages, production sharing or equity participation by the state, bonuses, cost recovery provisions, and/or auctioning of concessions.

Institutions (corporations) charged with natural resource exploitation and revenue collection should have clear separation of roles and responsibilities with adequate staffing, skills, and resources. The legal status of such state-owned companies also requires special attention to avoid to enable them perform their functions without inhibitions. Unfortunately, this is not the case for many countries suffering from a resource curse. Tax collection should be accountable and transparent, hence corporate audits, value for money audits, tax audits and national exploitation company audits are essential. Corporate social responsibility by the natural resource exploitation companies needs to be stimulated. The government too, should publicly state its objectives with respect to revenue management from zero to peak production (stabilization, risk sharing, savings in a fund, etc.), the instruments to be used (unified budgetary and asset management, special resource revenue funds, hedging, fiscal rules, etc.), and disbursement of revenues.

The government also must explain how it is going to cope with increases in the world price of natural resources, avoid boom-bust cycles, manage the exchange rate, and coordinate the natural resource revenues with foreign-aid inflows. In particular, resource rich countries must aim to make their financial markets more efficient and attempt to diversify their economy to be less vulnerable to the adverse effects of real exchange rate volatility. Since Governments of resource rich countries are typically dependent on this source of revenues,

they can benefit from loans, future contracts, insurance and other financial instruments in order to hedge risks, gain optimal risk sharing and cope with possible resource price shocks. Commitment and sovereign default risk are important factors to take account of. Finally, the government must ascertain the estimated impact of natural resource revenues on different sectors of the economy and investigate whether there is a case for intervention in non-resource sectors to restore competitiveness and promote employment and growth. Resource rich countries should not spend their windfall profits and aim to maintain their revenues from income taxes. That notwithstanding, slashing regular tax revenues tends to weaken the linkages between the government and its people, despite the difficulties to collect taxes, a task which is often, unpopular and distortionary. The natural resource revenues can be handed out to the people, through a fund or directed at targeted public expenditures such as education and Research and Development (R&D).

Revenue Transparency and Public Financial Management: It is crucial that public and corporate accountability and transparency with regard to all activities in the exploitation of natural resources is assured. The accounts related to the production and exports of resources should be available to journalists, financial analysts and the general public. Resource rich governments should also publish what they borrow, since some are tempted to loot the public purse by saddling future generations with excessive debt using natural resource reserves as collateral. Unfortunately, many countries that are worst affected by the natural resource curse do not publish what they earn from exports and how they spend the revenues, in which case voluntary compliance is likely to fail (Kauffman et al, 2007).

Corporate ethics and codes of governance in resource rich countries with poor institutions are thus crucial. Exploitation companies should publish their payments to all governments and may use their influence individually and industry-wide to support mandatory mechanisms for disclosure. Governments on whose territory exploitation companies are registered may require mandatory reporting of revenues to all governments, encourage corporate social responsibility and punish illegal exploitation of natural resources and collusion in the perpetuation of resource-driven conflict. Mandatory compliance may help. It also ensures a level playingfield among exploitation corporations and avoids unfair competition from corporations unconstrained by human right or anticorruption concerns. It could help broaden the scope of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2003. The EITI has been endorsed by the African Development Bank and Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea and Nigeria have already produced reports. The EITI criteria are:

- Regular publication of all payments by oil, gas and mining companies to governments and payments received by governments from those companies;
- A credible, independent audit of payments and revenues applying international auditing standards; reconciliation of payments and revenues by a credible, independent administrator and publication of the discrepancies (including theft etc.).
- Fiscal rules are needed that constrain booms of expenditure. These can be conditioned on setting aside some proportion of revenues (e.g., Nigeria's excess crude account: this was

unfortunately abandoned by subsequent administrations) for future generations or on specifying that the revenues should be used for, say, education or infrastructure. Such rules have benefits in terms of economic efficiency and also make it more difficult for government to manipulate expenditure levels for electoral or other purposes.

Break the Curse - Improve Governance and Leadership

Governance is the way in which society is managed and how the competing priorities and interests of different groups are reconciled. Governance is concerned with the processes by which citizens participate in decision-making, how government is accountable to its citizens and how society obliges its members to observe its rules and laws (FAO, 2007). Governance can be briefly described as the way in which the underlying values of a nation (usually articulated in some way in its Constitution) are “institutionalized”. This has formal aspects such as separated powers, checks and balances, means of transferring power, transparency, and accountability. However, for these values to be actualized, they must guide the actions of public officials throughout the system. They must be embedded in culture. Failure in governance has adverse impacts on the society. Good governance is closely related to good leadership. Consequently, leadership is a critical component of good public governance. In this regard “leadership” is the flesh on the bones of the Constitution. It is at the heart of good governance.

The most important role of public sector leaders has been to solve the problems and challenges faced in their environment. When

people ask for more leadership in the public sector, they are looking for people who can promote institutional adaptations in the public interest. Leadership in this sense is not value neutral. It is a positive espousal of the need to promote certain fundamental values that can be called public spiritedness. Therefore, leadership is an important and crucial variable that leads to enhanced management capacity, as well as organizational performance.

Good Governance, why it's very important?

Good governance means that government is well managed, inclusive, and delivers desirable outcomes. Good governance is accountable. Accountability is a fundamental requirement of good governance. Good governance is transparent. People should be able to follow and understand the decision-making process. Good governance follows the rule of law. This means that decisions are consistent with relevant legislation or common law. Good governance is responsive. Good governance is equitable and inclusive. Good governance is effective and efficient. Good governance is participatory. These are the principles lacking in most African governance because of poor leadership quality.

Good governance can be made operational through equity, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability, regulatory quality and rule of law, control of corruption as well as sustainability, subsidiarity, civic engagement, security and political stability. Unfortunately, many African countries that are rich in natural resource are suffering from weak governance. One of the major characteristic of weak governance is corruption. This is exacerbated by lack of transparency and accountability among governments and Transnational Corporations (TNC) that are directly involved in the oil and mineral sector.

Much of the corruption found in the oil and mineral sectors happens at the beginning of the process – right when contracts are awarded to oil companies, or the oil services companies that increasingly construct and run oil infrastructure in Africa (Taylor, 2008).

In most resource-rich countries, the agreements signed between governments and TNC involved in oil and mineral development are hidden and treated with top secrecy away from public and sometimes the parliament scrutiny. The failure of governments and oil firms from disclosing what should be public information such as cost of oil exploration, environmental impact assessment as well as incident reports partly explains why violence in these countries is inevitable especially when the local populations in resource –rich areas feel excluded by governments from benefiting from the resources.

In order to suppress opposition, government forces and armed groups have vied for control of resources, with the proceeds from their sale funding more weapons, which prolongs the violence. Examples include bloody conflicts in DR Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone which have all been partly funded by the sale of blood diamonds (Tutton, 2010). It's widely believed that in African resource- rich countries where good governance is taking a firm root, resource wealth can lead to economic growth and poverty reduction. Countries like Botswana with its diamond wealth and mineral- rich Ghana have proved that Africa's wealth of resources can be a blessings and not a curse. Countries like Uganda that have recently found huge oil deposits should learn from these success stories to avert past mistakes.

Governance indicators such as: - government effectiveness, voice and accountability, political

instability and violence, the rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption are markedly weaker in oil rich African countries (see Table 6). Perhaps, surprisingly, mineral- rich countries actually perform much better and at the same level as resource-scarce countries, implying that this problem is by far most common in relation to oil exploration and revenue, at least at the present phase of the current resource boom. Governance remains the overarching and most critical challenge for natural resource exploitation and management. Although African governments bear prime responsibility for managing natural-resource wealth in a transparent, fair, and accountable way, they are only one part of an intricate web of interests and relationships, which include multinational extractive company's, foreign governments, and regional actors (Kauffman, et al. 2007).

The main governance-related challenges facing resource-rich countries can be summarized as follows:

Transparency: Transparency is the key issue in establishing accountable governance structures and fighting corruption. However, this has to start with the concession contract itself, as well as with revenues accruing from the sale of the resources: (1) Corruption in the allocation of resource concessions not only undermines governance in resource-rich countries and also entails a poor deal for their citizens. There is overwhelming evidence that concession allocation is obscure and involves a lot of corruption (Tutton, 2010); (2) Concession contracts often contain confidentiality clauses and are therefore not open to public scrutiny. Without knowing the details of the deals signed by their government, the citizens of a given country have no way of holding their politicians' accountable; and,

(3) Transparency is equally important for the revenue flows of natural-resource rents between extractive industry companies and host governments. If the companies publish what they pay and the governments publish what they earn, the revenue flows can be traced and governments can be held accountable for sustainable management of these revenues and fair distribution of the wealth.

Note:

Voice and Accountability -Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Political Stability - and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.

Government Effectiveness -Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services,

the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Regulatory Quality -Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Rule of Law -Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence).

Control of Corruption -Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Table 6: Natural Resource Abundance and Governance Indicators

Control of Corruption	Voice & Accountability	Political Stability	Govt Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law
2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006
1. Resource-rich Countries	-0.8	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.9
Oil-exporting Countries	-1.3	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.1
Mineral-exporting Countries	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.6
2. Resource scarce Countries	-0.5	-0.4	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6
3. Landlocked Countries	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7
Resource-rich Landlocked Countries	-0.6	-0.5	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7
Resource scarce Landlocked Countries	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-0.8
4. Coastal Resource-rich Countries	-0.6	-0.4	-0.7	0.7	-0.7
Coastal Resource-rich Countries	-0.9	-0.7	-0.8	-0.8	-0.9
Resource scarce Coastal Countries	-0.4	-0.3	-0.6	-0.7	-0.5
5. Africa	-0.6	-0.5	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7

Source: *Kauffman, D; Kraay, A and Mashuzi, M. (2007); Transparency.org.*

Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG): A Decade of African Governance

Over the past decade, a very slight improvement in Overall Governance performance has been registered at the continental level. The African average score of 50.0 in 2015, up one point from the score registered a decade earlier reflects the trend of improvement seen across the majority of countries over the past ten years. In total, 37 countries out of 54 have shown improvement in Overall Governance since 2006, representing 70% of African citizens. This average progress is driven by positive results in three of the four underlying categories of the IIAG that make up the Overall Governance score. In order of magnitude:- Human Development (+2.9), Participation & Human Rights (+2.4), and Sustainable Economic Opportunity (+1.8) all showed average progress since 2006. This, is progress for a majority of African citizens. However, an increase of one score point at the continental average is still too low.

Of the 37 countries to have registered improvement in Overall Governance since 2006, nine have progressed by more than +5.0 points: Côte d'Ivoire (+13.1), Togo (+9.7), Zimbabwe (+9.7), Liberia (+8.7), Rwanda (+8.4), Ethiopia (+7.0), Niger (+5.9), Morocco (+5.7) and Kenya (+5.1). None is resource-rich. Of these nine, five already feature in the top half of the Overall Governance rankings in 2015. Of them, Rwanda is the only country to feature both among the ten highest scoring and the ten most improved countries over the past ten years.

Few countries however (13 of the 37 improved countries) have registered progress in each of

the four dimensions of governance – Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development. Among the 13, seven also feature among the ten most improved countries over the decade, which underlines the value of balanced progress across all dimensions of governance. Togo is the only country to improve across all underlying 14 sub-categories.

Meanwhile, 16 countries registered a negative trend in Overall Governance since 2006, with three falling by more than -5.0 points: Libya (-18.0), Madagascar (-7.6) and Eritrea (-5.6). All of them have declined in Safety & Rule of Law in the past ten years, and more than half show decline in either Participation & Human Rights or Sustainable Economic Opportunity.

These diverging trends over the decade have led to changes within the top ten and bottom ten groups between 2006 and 2015. In the top ranking group, Lesotho (15th) and São Tomé & Príncipe (11th) have fallen out of the top ten, to be replaced by Rwanda (9th) and Senegal (10th). Mauritius remains the highest scoring country on the continent in 2015 at the Overall Governance level, and has consistently been the top ranked country over the past ten years. However, some trends within the top group point to a potential fragility of these high-ranking positions. Indeed, over the last decade, Ghana (with -2.1 score points) and South Africa (with -1.9 score points) have registered the eighth and tenth largest deteriorations on the continent. Botswana has also shown a marginal deterioration of -0.5 points. Of the top ten performing countries, only three countries – Namibia, Rwanda and Senegal – managed to improve across all categories of the IIAG. The seven other countries have deteriorated in at least one of

the four categories, with all of them showing decline in Safety & Rule of Law (see table 7).

The composition of the ten lowest scoring countries in Overall Governance has also changed over the decade. Decline of Libya since 2006 has seen it fall from the middle of the rankings at 29th to 51st in 2015. Diverging trends are also seen in this group, with five

demonstrating improved performance and four registering deterioration. Particularly worrying trends are evident in the Central African Republic, Eritrea and Libya, which also feature in the ten most deteriorated countries on the continent in the Overall Governance level in the past ten years, with Central African Republic and Eritrea declining across all four categories.

Table 7 Ibrahim Index of Governance: Overall Governance

2015 Rank/54		2015 Score/100	T r e n d 2006-2015	Remarks
1	Mauritius	79.9	+2.3	Improvement
2	Botswana	73.7	-0.5	Decline
3	Cape Verde	73.0	+1.9	Improvement
4	Seychelles	72.6	+4.0	Improvement
5	Namibia	69.8	+3.6	Improvement
6	South Africa	69.4	-1.9	Decline
7	Tunisia	65.4	+3.4	Improvement
8	Ghana	63.9	-2.1	Decline
9	Rwanda	62.3	+8.4	Improvement
10	Senegal	60.8	+3.7	Improvement
11	Sao Tome & Principe	60.5	+2.9	Improvement
12	Kenya	58.9	+5.1	Improvement
13	Zambia	58.8	+4.3	Improvement
14	Morocco	58.3	+5.7	Improvement
15	Lesotho	57.8	+0.3	Improvement
16	Benin	57.5	+0.7	Improvement
17	Malawi	56.6	+1.1	Improvement
18	Tanzania	56.5	-0.6	Decline
19	Uganda	56.2	+3.4	Improvement
20	Algeria	53.8	-0.6	Decline
21	Cote d'Ivoire	52.3	+13.1	Improvement
21	Mozambique	52.3	-1.8	Decline
23	Burkina Faso	51.8	+1.0	Improvement
24	Egypt	51.0	+3.5	Improvement
25	Mali	50.6	-4.7	Decline
26	Comoros	50.3	+3.7	Improvement
27	Niger	50.2	+5.9	Improvement

28	Liberia	50.0	+8.7	Improvement
	African Average	50.0	+1.0	Improvement
29	Swaziland	49.7	+1.0	Improvement
30	Sierra Leone	49.4	+3.8	Improvement
31	Ethiopia	49.1	+7.0	Improvement
32	Gabon	48.8	+1.5	Improvement
33	Madagascar	48.5	-7.6	Decline
33	Togo	48.5	+9.7	Improvement
35	Gambia	46.6	-3.9	Decline
36	Djibouti	46.5	+2.3	Improvement
36	Nigeria	46.5	+2.5	Improvement
38	Cameroun	45.7	-0.1	Decline
39	Zimbabwe	44.5	+9.7	Improvement
40	Mauritania	43.5	-2.7	Decline
41	Guinea	43.3	+1.9	Improvement
42	Congo	43.0	+2.6	Improvement
43	Burundi	41.9	-2.1	Decline
44	Guinea Bissau	41.3	+4.1	Improvement
45	Angola	39.2	+5.0	Improvement
46	DR Congo	35.8	+2.7	Improvement
47	Equatorial Guinea	35.4	+2.0	Improvement
48	Chad	34.8	+2.3	Improvement
49	Sudan	30.4	-0.6	Decline
50	Eritrea	30.0	-5.6	Decline
51	Libya	29.0	-18.0	Decline
52	Central African Rep	25.7	-4.9	Decline
53	South Sudan	18.6	-	-
54	Somalia	10.6	+0.3	Improvement

Source: Adapted from the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance-Mo Ibrahim Foundation

Further analysis of Table 7 indicates that In 2015, only four countries; Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles feature in the highest band in Overall Governance, representing the best performance on the continent, with a score equal to or above 71.0 points. This represents only 0.4% of the African population. Somalia and South Sudan are classified in the lowest band at the Overall

Governance level (scoring below 23.0 points), covering 2% of the continent's population.

In 2015, the vast majority of African citizens (83%) live in countries categorized as having “Medium” or “Medium-High” performance in Overall Governance (from 41.0 to 70.9 points). Over the past ten years, almost one third (16) of countries have shifted bands, most of them upwards (see opposite). Ten

countries out of 54 have moved up a band, indicating progress in Overall Governance; five from “Medium- Low” in 2006 to “Medium” in 2015 (Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Togo and Zimbabwe); four from “Medium” to “Medium-High” (Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda and Uganda); and one – Seychelles – from “Medium-High” to “High”. These countries cover 15% of Africa’s population and 18% of Africa’s GDP. Six countries; Algeria, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique and South Africa have shown decline in Overall Governance that has led to a downward band movement. Of these, South Africa has fallen from the “High” into the “Medium-High” band of countries; Algeria, Mali, Madagascar and Mozambique from “Medium-High” to “Medium”; and Libya from “Medium” into the “Medium-Low” band. These countries cover 14% of Africa’s population and 15% of Africa’s GDP. It is interesting to note that only 7 out of the 22 Resource-rich African countries are above the Ibrahim Index of African Governance Average. These are Algeria, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. The remaining 15 fall below the African Average.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Africa is a continent that is blessed with a wealth of resources including copper, diamonds, gold and oil. This wealth can be a

source of prosperity to redeem the continent from debt burdens, bad aid and foster development. Despite the enormous potential that can arise from wealth of its resources, poverty remains firmly entrenched in many African countries. Resource – rich countries have experienced several conflicts resulting into forced immigration of people, death and destruction of property and the environment, mainly attributable to bad governance. Some countries such as Botswana and Ghana with good leadership, functioning democracy and competent legal and political institutions have proved that natural resources can be a blessing rather than a curse on the African continent.

Monies for Africa’s natural resources must be directed into the right pockets and not padding Transnational Corporate greed. Companies must publish what they pay foreign governments. In order for governments to be transparent, they should disclose agreements and all laws regarding minerals to the public. Greater access to information such as the cost of exploration and environmental impact statements must be accessible to all stakeholders. African governments need to establish transparent, inclusive and independent institutions/ agencies that should strictly revise contract allocation processes develop comprehensive reforms and carry out adequate planning. A set of new laws should be developed and obsolete ones revised in order to protect the institutions responsible for managing the oil and mineral sector.

References

- Abbas, Ali J. (2009) Business and Management Environment in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Opportunities for Multinational Corporations.
- Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006), ‘Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective’, *American Political Science Review*, 100, 115–31.

- Acemoglu, D. (1995). Reward structures and the allocation of talent, *European Economic Review*, 39, 17-33.
- Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2003a). An African success: Botswana, in D. Rodrik (ed.), *In Search of Prosperity. Analytic Narratives in Economic Growth*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Acemoglu, D., J.A. Robinson and T. Verdier (2004). Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: a theory of personal rule, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2, 162-192.
- Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson (2005). Economic backwardness in political perspective, *American Political Science Review*.
- African Development Bank (2007) 'Chapter 4: Africa's Natural Resources: The Paradox of Plenty' in *African Development Report 2007*.
- Arezki, R. and F. van der Ploeg (2007). Can the natural resource curse be turned into a blessing? Role of trade policies and institutions, Working Paper 07/55, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
- Aslaksen, S. and R. Torvik (2005). A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states, mimeo. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim.
- Auty, R. M. (1993). "Why is the Diversification of Manufacturing not occurring in Azerbaijan", Background Paper prepared for ECSPE (Azerbaijan CEM), Washington DC: World Bank.
- Auty, R.M. (2001) (ed.). *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Auty, R.M. (2004). Economic and political reform of distorted oil-exporting economies, presented at The Earth Institute, Columbia University.
- Baland, J. M. and P. Francois (2000). Rent-seeking and resource booms, *Journal of Development Economics*, 61, 527-542.
- Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: a review of the issues, *Journal of Economic Literature* 35, 1320-1346.
- Boschini, A.D., J. Pettersson and J. Roine (2003). Resource curse or not: a question of appropriability, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 534, Stockholm University, Stockholm.
- Bourguignon, F. and T. Verdier (2000). Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth, *Journal of Development Economics*, 62, 285-313.
- Caselli, F. (2006). Power struggles and the natural resource curse, mimeo. London School of Economics, London.
- Caselli, F. and W.J. Coleman II (2006). On the theory of ethnic conflict, Discussion Paper No. 5622, CEPR, London.

- Coleman K., (2011) *Africa's Natural Resources: Blessing or Curse?* Collier, P. (2007). *The Bottom Billion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil wars, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56, 663-695.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2006). *Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies*, mimeo, University of Oxford.
- Damania, R., and Bulte, E. (2003), 'Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse', University of Adelaide, mimeo.
- David, P. A., and Wright, G. (1997), 'Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance', *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 6, 203-45.
- FAO (2007) *Good Governance in Land Tenure and Administration: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, Land Tenure Series 9)*.
- Fearon, J.D. and D.D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, *American Political Science Review*, 97, 75-90.
- Global Witness, CENTAL, LDI, LMI, SDI (2011) *Curse or Cure: How oil can boost or break Liberia's Post War Recovery*, September 2011.
- Gylfason, T., Herbertson, T. T., and Zoega, G. (1999), 'A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources and Economic Growth', *Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 3, 204-25.
- Gylfason, T., Zoega, G. (2002a). *Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources Matter?* CESifo Working Paper Series No. 712.
- Gylfason, T., Zoega, G. (2002b). *Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment*. Central Bank of Chile Working Papers, 1-52.
- Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries, *European Economic Review*, 50, 1367-1386.
- Humphreys, M., J. Sachs and J.E. Stiglitz, (2007) 'Escaping the resource curse' *Revenue Watch*.
- Iheriohanma E.B.J, & Oguoma O., (2010), *Governance, Leadership Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: An Explorative Discourse*. *European Journal of Social Sciences* Volume 12, Number 3.
- IMF (2005). *Building Institutions*, Chapter 3, 125-160 in *World Economic Outlook*, Building Institutions, September 2005, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
- IMF (2007). *Regional and Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa*, *World Economic and Financial Surveys*, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
- Isham, J., L. Pritchett, M. Woolcock and G. Busby (2003). *The varieties of the resource experience: How natural resource export structures affect the political economy of economic growth*, World Bank, Washington D.C.
- Johnson, S. Robinson, J. A., and Verdier, T. (2004), 'Kleptocracy and Divide-and-rule: A Theory of

- Personal Rule', *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2, 162–92.
- Krugman, P. (1987) .The Narrow Moving Band, The Dutch Disease and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic Scale Economies. *Journal of Development Economics* 27: 41-55.
- Leite, C. and M. Weidmann (1999). Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption and economic growth, WP/99/85, IMF, Washington D.C.
- Mabikke, S. B. (2012), Africa's Wealth of Resources, Blessing or Curse?, African Good Governance Network. www.hss.de/download/120120_makikke.pdf (accessed, 12, April, 2017).
- Mbabazi, P.K (2009) The Emerging Oil Industry in Uganda; A Blessing or a Curse: African Research and Resource Forum.
- Matsen,E.,and Torvik,R.(2005),‘Optimal Dutch Disease’,*Journal of Development Economics*, 78, 494–515.
- Matsuyama, K. (1992), ‘Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth’, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 58, 317–334.
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 90, 681-712.
- McPherson, C. (2004), Managing Petroleum Revenues in Developing Countries, presented at the Workshop Escaping the Resource Curse, Columbia University Workshop, 26/2.
- Mehlum, H., and Moene, K. (2002), ‘Battle Fields and Market Places’, *Journal of Defence Peace Economics*, 6, 85-96.
- Mehlum, H., K. Moene and R. Torvik (2002). Plunder & Protection Inc., *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 447-459.
- Mehlum, H., K. Moene and R. Torvik (2006). Institutions and the resource curse, *Economic Journal*, 116, 1-20.
- Murphy, K., A. Schleifer and R. Vishny (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth?, *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceeding*, 409-414.
- Murshed, S.M. (2002). Civil war, conflict and underdevelopment, *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 387-393.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2007). “Weak States and the Growth of Private Security Sector in Africa: Whither the African State?”. Institute for Security Studies, Available at <https://www.issafrica.org>.
- U.S Energy Information Administration, Washington DC. (2010).
- Olsson, O. and H.C. Fors (2004). Congo: The prize of predation, *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, 3, 321-336.
- Ollson, O. (2007). Conflict diamonds, *Journal of Development Economics*, 82, 267-286.

- Papyrakis, E., Gerlagh, R. (2003). The resource curse hypothesis and its transmission channels. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 1-13. 12.
- Patrick, S. M. (2012). "Why Natural Resources are a Curse on Developing Countries and How to Fix it". *The Atlantic*, Available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04>.
- Ploeg, F. van der (2006). Challenges and opportunities for resource rich economies, Discussion Paper No. 5688, CEPR, London.
- Ploeg, F. van der (2007). Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving rates? Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking, mimeo.
- Robinson, J.A., R. Torvik and T. Verdier (2006). Political foundations of the resource curse, *Journal of Development Economics*, 79, 2, 447-468.
- Ross, M.L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse, *World Politics*, 51, 297-322.
- Ross, M.L. (2001). *Timber Booms and the Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Ross, M.L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war?, *Journal of Peace Economics*, 41, 337-356.
- Ross, M. (2012). *The Oil Curse How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sachs, J.D. (1999). Resource endowments and the real exchange rate: a comparison of Latin America and East Asia, in T. Ito and A. Krueger (eds.), *Changes in Exchange Rates in Rapidly Developing Countries: Theory, Practice and Policy Issues*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
- Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (1995 and revised 1997). Natural resource abundance and economic growth, in G. Meier and J. Rauch (eds.), *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (1999). The big push, natural resource booms and growth, *Journal of Development Economics*, 59, 43-76.
- Sachs, J.D., and Warner, A.M. (1995), 'Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth', NBER Working Paper No. 5398.
- Sachs, J., Warner, A. (1999a). 'The big push, natural resource booms and growth', *Journal of Development Economics*, 59(1), 43-76. 20.
- Sala-i-Martin, X. and A. Subramanian (2003). Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria, NBER Working Paper 9804, Cambridge, Mass.
- Samuelson, P. A., & Nordhaus, W. D. (2000). *Ekonomija*. Zagreb: MATE.
- Schubert, S. R. (2006). Revisiting The Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed To Autocracy And Inequality? *Oil and Gas Business*.
- Skaperdas, S. (2002). War lord competition, *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 435-446.

- Taylor, S (2008) Testimony for Hearing “Resource Curse or Blessing: Africa’s Extractive Industries in a Time of Record Oil and Mineral Prices” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Witness.
- The 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2016/progress-african-governance-last-decade-held-back-deterioration-safety-rule-law/> (accessed April 23, 2017).
- Tutton, M (2010) Can Africa break its ‘resource curse’? CNN broadcast on August 23, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-23/world/africa.resource.curse_1_resource-curse-oilrich-cabinda?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed April 22, 2017).
- Transparency.org, CPI 2012 Results, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results> (10.03.2015.)
 24. World Bank, GDP Growth Annual Per Capita, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG> (23.04.2017).
- Tornell, A. and P.R. Lane (1999). The voracity effect, *American Economic Review*, 89 (1), 22- 46.
- Torvik, R. (2001). Learning by doing and the Dutch Disease, *European Economic Review*, 45, 285-306.
- Torvik, R. (2002). Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare, *Journal of Development Economics*, 67, 455-470.
- UNDP (2010) Human Development Research Paper 2010/04: Curse or Blessing, Natural Resources and Human Development.
- van der Ploeg, F. (2007), ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies’, OXCARRE, Oxford University, mimeo.
- van Wijnbergen, S. (1984), ‘The ‘Dutch Disease’: A Disease After All?’, *The Economic Journal*, 94, 41–55.
- Vincent, J.R., Th. Panayotou and J.M. Hartwick (1997). Resource depletion and sustainability in small open economies, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 33, 274-286.
- Weber-Fahr, M. (2002). *Treasure or Trouble? Mining in Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group and International Finance Corporation.
- Wick, K., and Bulte, E. (2006), ‘Contesting Resources—Rent Seeking, Conflict and the Natural Resource Curse’, *Public Choice*, 128, 457–76.
- World Bank (2006). *Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the 21st Century*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- World Bank (2016). “Africa’s Economic Growth Continues to Falter, Yet some Countries show signs of Resilience”. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/09/29>.

INCLUSION AND EQUALITY TO ACHIEVE AGENDA 2063

Florence Nyokabi Wachira

Abstract

Africa Agenda 2063 envisions a prosperous Africa whose development is people driven and inclusive; a development aimed at giving every citizen an opportunity so that ‘no one is left behind’. Such development aims to give Youth, women and People with Disability (PWD) opportunities for inclusion in decision making on issues affecting them to ensure equitable distribution of national resources. This paper examines Kenyan Government efforts at financial inclusion of women, youth and PWDs through affirmative action. The establishment of UWEZO Fund and Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) were initiated to empower women, youth and PWDs through funded entrepreneurship activities. The National Gender and Equality Commission conducted assessments to determine the impact of these funds on the target groups. Based on the findings of this Commission whose constitutional mandate is to promote equality and inclusion, the author explores the main causes of exclusion and inequality of each of the target groups and proposes ways of addressing the barriers to inclusion for each of the groups. The paper concludes that African countries must make efforts to adopt Human Rights Based approaches to development in order to ensure meaningful inclusion and participation by vulnerable groups including women and youth to address inequalities especially those based on gender roles and relations.

Key Words: Africa Agenda 2063, Equality, Equity, Inclusion, Exclusion, Human Rights

Introduction

The African Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It aspires for a prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development and envisions an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; an Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by its people (African Union ,2015). A truly people-driven agenda requires a bottom-up approach to governance where development is driven by the voices of

the ‘*African people indicating the Africa they want*’. It also requires a governance structure that ensures that all sectors of society feel their interests have been considered in decision making about issues affecting them. Such an approach calls for significant and strategic investment in people, particularly women and the youth who constitute the vast majority of Africans, but who mostly remain economically and politically marginalized. Priority therefore requires to be given to these marginalized and vulnerable groups in society and specifically to their possibility to contribute to the development process by giving them the capacity to voice their concerns and claim

their legitimate rights from governments, state institutions, local authorities and other duty bearers.

The objective of this paper is to highlight the main causes of exclusion of vulnerable populations and to propose ways through which these groups may be accorded equal access to opportunities and be included in decision making. The author begins by defining the terms inclusion, Equity and Gender equality and highlights the importance of inclusion. Then there is an analysis of the main causes of exclusion for each of the groups and key recommendations on how the barriers to inclusion of each of the groups could be addressed.

Definition of Concepts

A people driven development in any country requires that citizens are involved in a way that their needs and interests are considered at all times. This only happens through bottom-up approaches to policy development and where programs implementation is participatory and inclusive of even the most vulnerable members in the population. Such a human rights based approach is achieved through inclusion, fairness and ensuring equal access to available opportunities.

Inclusion

Inclusion or management of diversity is part of 'people first' or 'people centred' methods of management that ensure all people are involved in the development processes and focuses on improving local communities' self-reliance, social justice and participation in decision making. Inclusion acknowledges that individuals have unique and particular needs; respects individual rights to equal

opportunity and ensures that all are served with sensitivity, respect and fairness. It allows different perspectives to be surfaced in ways that enable people to learn from others and gain a better understanding of issues. The key feature of inclusion is engagement of all citizens in consultation arenas as part of the decision making process (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). It is also about ensuring that vulnerable groups in society have positions in boards, management committees alongside policy makers in the public and private Sectors.

Inclusion entails letting everyone's voice to be heard and listened to. People are given opportunity to contribute their knowledge based on their experiences to offer a better understanding of what is important to them and how things work in a particular neighbourhood or service. It creates opportunities for local people to engage and shape policy

choices, decide on services and allocate resources. It ensures that those meant to benefit from developmental initiatives are not only included in decision making but are also involved in the implementation processes. This gives people opportunity to decide how to organize society, ensuring all people in the society can benefit from its progress. Inclusion therefore is a transformative way to manage equality as an avenue to addressing equal opportunity issues and has particular relevance for individuals and communities living in areas of disadvantage and for managers and policy makers committed to tackling poverty, social exclusion and inequality.

Gender Equity and Gender Equality

Gender equity *'is the process of being fair*

to women and men.” (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2012). It is the process of allocating resources, programs, and decision making powers fairly to both males and females without any discrimination on the basis of sex and also addressing any

imbalances in the benefits available to both males and females. Gender equality refers to **equal access** for both men and women to social goods, services and resources and **equal opportunities** in all spheres of life; economic, Social and Political.




Figure 1: Equality versus Equity (Bost, 2014)

Equality focuses on creating the *same starting line for everyone*. Equity has the goal of providing everyone with the full range of opportunities and benefits – *the same finish line*. *If Equality is seen as synonymous with “levelling the playing field” then, equity will be synonymous with “more for those who need it.”* True gender equality cannot be achieved without gender equity.

Why Inclusion and Equality is Important for Africa

While addressing the World Economic Forum in 2013, H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, The President of the Republic of Kenya observed that: *‘Any growth that is not felt by the majority of the nation is not growth at all’.*

This statement by H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta aptly justifies inclusive growth. It shows the futility of having a few millionaires amongst millions of beggars which is an indicator of poor distribution of resources. According to Uhuru Kenyatta, growth for any country can only be justified on the basis of equity and inclusion.

Many governments in Africa have for long believed that the best way to improve services or utilize national resources is through National initiatives driven from the top downwards (Oakley, 1995). Such approaches fail to find out what people at the grassroots really want and therefore do not match development to needs. Such top-down approaches are partially responsible for persistent poverty and poor service delivery. Improvements in management of resources require that policy making is integrated with practice on the ground to end the artificial separation created between *‘thinking and doing’* (Chesterman, 2002).

The governance around effective utilization of Africa's national resources is perhaps one of the key reasons that majority of its people live in abject poverty. These resources exist at local/ grassroots levels where majority of the population lives but it is an indisputable fact that majority of the existing resources in Africa lie underutilized and the few that are utilized are by a few people for their benefit to the exclusion of everybody else.

Available data suggest that in most African countries, the population of men and women is almost at par but with a youth population that is large and growing. According to the International database (IDB, 2018) 63 percent of Africa's overall population was below 25 years in 2010. Top-down approaches have resulted in marginalization of this big sector of the population.

Again, global statistics indicate that approximately one billion people have some form of disability and about 80 percent live in developing countries (UN, 2011). These vulnerable groups are entitled to opportunities and services like everyone else, yet they face multiple discrimination and are among the poorest and most marginalized. Africa must go the extra mile required for inclusive and sustainable development by ensuring that women, youth and people with disabilities are involved in the management of national resources. The governance around utilization of the national resources must be both inclusive and equitable.

Making a Case For Inclusion: UWEZO and AGPO Initiatives in Kenya

In 2013, the Government established a UWEZO (Swahili for 'ABILITY/ENABLING') Fund as a flagship project of Kenya Vision 2030 (GOK, 2008) targeting the youth, women and people with disability. They were required to set up groups to access the finances from the fund to promote businesses and enterprises for socio-economic growth. This way, the UWEZO fund would promote industry, create employment and grow the economy by involving a greater proportion of the society. Following the directive, the Public Procurement and Disposal regulations were amended through legal notice No.114 of 2013 (GOK,2013) to set aside 30 percent reservations and preferences of all government tenders to the women, youth and people with disability (AGPO). This reservation would cut across all categories of goods, works and services procured by the government. Groups could also borrow funds from UWEZO to trade with the government through AGPO. Through these initiatives, 636, 065 women; 253, 382 youth and 30,725 PWDs had benefited from the Fund which had disbursed KES. 5.52 billion by July, 2017. (www.mygov.go.ke/AGPO, July, 2017)

The National Gender and Equality Commission is a constitutional Commission established in 2011 by an Act of Parliament (NGEC Act, 2011) to promote gender equality and Freedom from Discrimination. It is a monitoring body that reports to Parliament and to the President and has authority to advise and facilitate interventions to ensure inclusion of vulnerable groups in society

including youth, women and people with disability in National Development. From 2016, the National Gender and Equality Commission began to monitor progress in access and uptake of UWEZO and AGPO. The preliminary study was carried out in rural Kenya in eight (8) of the 47 counties and involved interacting with targeted beneficiaries to find out about their ability to access the funds and the procurement opportunities. The study found out that a lot of youth in rural areas did not understand the processes involved in AGPO. Those who had registered enterprises/ groups lacked knowledge and skills on matters of management, making tax returns and record keeping, drawing business plans, etc. They reported inability to get help since the procurement officers at grassroots also lacked this knowledge and were not conversant with laws and policies governing AGPO, making it very difficult for youth to access information. Although the information was put in newspapers and the Government website, it was not easily accessible to youth due to poor outreach and high cost of newspapers, hence not accessible for unemployed youth, grassroots women and PWDs.

Persons with Disability found it difficult to form groups especially because they are scattered and tended to be marginalized by those without disability. It was reported that those with visual impairment were “used” by unscrupulous business people to purport to register enterprises that were then used to tender for Government procurement. The levels of illiteracy are highest among Persons with Disability and the registration process was a challenge. In normal operations, a PWD often required to employ somebody with no disability to assist with work. This requirement reduced their ability to participate

in the program since the money they were likely to get from procurement proceeds was reduced by such expenses and thus reducing viability of their businesses. This was a serious handicap considering that most PWDs could only participate in small contracts. Other matters that came to light from the study was that many youths not only lacked legal documents like the identity cards needed to register but they also found the registration process lengthy and complicated.

For the UWEZO fund, there was a requirement that the women, Youth and People with Disability operate in groups, hold regular meetings and keep minutes of such meetings; establish bank accounts and provide evidence of savings before they could access the funds. According to the findings, many youths especially males found it difficult to form and sustain groups because of their mobility in search of new opportunities. Many felt they would do better venturing on their own than in groups. Although women had no problem with forming groups, their uptake of the funds was below expected thresholds.

In regard to representation in committees managing UWEZO funds at the grassroots, the youth and women and PWDs felt excluded since they were not allowed to vote in their representatives. The Local Member of Parliament is the patron of the fund and often picked their representative based on loyalty to them politically. This study demonstrated how initiatives meant to benefit marginalized communities could fail to achieve desired goals if the beneficiaries were not been involved in the conceptualization and in the initiation stages to address barriers.

Main Causes of Exclusion of Youth, Women and People with Disability

Exclusion of Youth

The Africa Youth Charter (AU, 2006) proposed several models for youth participation including: Youth Parliaments; National Youth Councils; Participation in managing their own organizations; inclusion in conferences, committees and participation in targeted projects. This, however, has not enhanced the prospects of youth inclusion in major decision making processes. Various factors contribute to this exclusion of the youth including unemployment, institutionalized prejudice, marginalization in decision making and inadequate policies and action plans on youth among others. In many countries the youth constitute the greatest proportion of educated people and are therefore a resource with bottomless and diverse potential representing a mosaic of collective dreams and expectations. They have potential to be agents of social and economic progress and could have positive consequences for Africa's development, if properly channelled.

Youth have faced institutionalized prejudice and exclusion in many quarters in the past with policy players in the public and private sectors seeing them as lacking expertise, experience, capacity, or drive to do what is expected (Awiti, 2016). In spite of high educational attainment, youth have high unemployment rates often with adverse consequences like poverty, migration and diseases. Females particularly face extremely high unemployment rates. In East Africa for example 39.1 percent Kenyans of working age are unemployed. In Tanzania,

the figure is 24 percent, Ethiopia, 21.6 percent Uganda 18.1 percent and in Rwanda, 17.1 percent (UNDP, 2017).

One of the biggest challenges is the mismatch between education achievement and industry needs for skills and competences leaving many youths educated but not employable. Another is that current education systems do not impart adequate entrepreneurial skills for self-employment. There is too much focus on examinations and not on useable practical skills. A

Study by Women Education Researchers in Kenya (WERK, 2016) highlighted the absence of values like fairness, integrity, tolerance and respect for others in education especially at the primary school levels. This has contributed to many out of school youth having no fall-back position in terms of training and work experience to enhance their prospects of employment or entrepreneurship.

Youth constitute a majority of electoral voters, yet Africa's legislative parliaments have less than one (1) percent youth participation as Members of Parliament (UNDP 2012). This continued marginalization of youth in decision making poses a threat to good governance and development. Involving the youth at all levels of governance and in decision-making processes through affirmative action at every level would provide them opportunities to influence or have a say on issues of importance to them. This is especially crucial in establishing micro-finance programs to cater for the financial needs of the youth. Youth must be involved in the conceptualization of such programs so that they own them and therefore see potential in them for self-development. These programs must incorporate an element of training in entrepreneurial, leadership and management skills for the youth including Mentorship

opportunities. Involvement of private sector by giving incentives such as tax holidays and revised taxation, to engage and mentor youth must be explored.

To enhance provision of opportunities for the youth however there is need for all involved to give more focus on youth empowerment by creating and supporting enabling conditions under which young people can act on their own behalf, and on their own terms, rather than at the direction of others. To achieve this effectively requires youth to operate in an environment of safety, closeness and appreciation; have meaningful participation and engagement and experience the exercise of power.

‘Tell me what are the prevailing sentiments that occupy the minds of our young men, and I will tell you what is to be the character of the next generation’ –Edmund Burke (1729-97).

That statement would aptly be answered by stating that whatever those sentiments are, they have been shaped through Social media. Africa’s youth have taken to social media like ‘a duck takes to water’. Governments should therefore seek to harness the innovativeness of youth in the use of ICT and convert it to useful projects that can benefit them. Otherwise Africa risks sinking to what Einstein feared for and will have a generation of idiots:

Fig. 2: Effect of Technology on human interactions (Benzburg, 2017)

The day that Albert Einstein feared has arrived



Coffee with friends



A Day in Beach



Cheering your team




Out on a date



Enjoying the sights



having dinner



Corruption in projects meant for empowerment of marginalized groups like the youth has led to these projects benefitting individuals entrusted to manage them. This has made the youth to believe that they are excluded because

they do not have resources to ‘buy’ their way into leadership.

‘Poor data equals poor decisions’.(the Star Newspaper, 4th July 2017). Addressing a

high level meeting on 'data and development in Nairobi, the Vice President of Ghana observed that many African countries do not prioritize disaggregation of population data into categories of youth, PWDs, women and these tend to be overlooked in planning and implementation. Limited data hinders measurement of well-being of different sectors of society and therefore masks inequalities.

Many countries in Africa still lack adequate youth policies and appropriate models for youth participation. Concerns have been raised worldwide and especially in Africa that existing National youth policies have not responded effectively to mainstreaming youth participation in economic activities and other national governance processes. Limited economic participation has been attributed to few countries in Africa having National Action Plans for youth employment (Corrigan,2017).

High economic growth in parts of Africa does not match Governments job creation. For example, in Kenya in 2019, the economic growth was rated at 6.3 percent but only yielded 840,000 jobs. 83.6 percent of these jobs were in poorly paid informal sector. The number of new formal jobs (favoured by the Youth) were less than 15,000 (GOK,2019). If this is viewed against University enrolment which stood at 560,000 in the same year, it is clear that the rate of creating formal jobs does not match the rate of supply of formal sector potential employees. There is also need to re-examine economic policies to ensure that not only do they sustain growth but they are also generating jobs for youth. Otherwise this sustains poor distribution of benefits of growth in communities.

Exclusion of PWDs

In regard to exclusion, Persons with Disabilities experience great difficulties in participating in national economies. Adult persons with disabilities experience various barriers linked to accessibility and linkages which are a great hindrance to participation including; Lack of universal access in structure of buildings, poverty, unemployment, poor provision of education and health Services and serious stigmatization. Physical/ environmental barriers to buildings, schools, hospitals, transport should be addressed and removed. Barriers in communication-written and spoken information may be addressed by including media, flyers, internet, and community meetings. Policy barriers-legislation that discriminates or absence of appropriate legislation to provide for an enabling framework and attitudinal-negative stereotypes, taboos and social stigma increase the level of exclusion of PWDs.

Lack of data and information on disability contributes to their invisibility in official statistics and exclusion in planning and implementation. The biggest challenge facing PWDs is lack of awareness on their rights. Many lack awareness on benefits embedded in legislation. Additionally, it is especially very difficult to find a group of Persons with Disabilities in the same locality and this limits capacity to form linkages and networks necessary to give a voice to their needs. Reduced participation in decision making and denial of civil and Political rights result in extreme poverty, inequality and high mortality rates especially among children.

Exclusion of Women- Gender Inequality

It is by and large accepted that gender equality is a fundamental matter of human rights, democracy and social justice. But overwhelming evidence shows that it is also a precondition for sustainable growth, welfare, peace and security. According to the World Bank (2009) findings, increasing gender equality has positive effects on food security, extremism, health, education and numerous other key concerns especially when the focus is on women. This has been corroborated by similar findings by the UN Women (2019) and by the World Bank (2012) that showed that focusing on women in development assistance and poverty reduction strategies lead to faster economic growth than 'gender neutral' approaches. Although, Many African economies have shown growth in recent year, sustainable development is also about good governance which would be hard to achieve until they got closer to gender parity. Headline figures often mask longer term problems not least of them an over-reliance on natural resources and chronic inequalities. According to Chissano (2014) a former president of Mozambique,

Inclusive sustainable growth is achievable only by tapping the continents greatest reserve of energy and creativity: African women and girls.

If women were in more productive and decision making roles, Africa would be moving faster and more assuredly towards sustainability in the political, economic, Social and environmental sense. Women have longstanding patterns of exclusion and lack of empowerment which has been blamed on patriarchy, culture, social

and religious challenges. They contribute 50 percent of agricultural workforce but own only 1 percent of the land. They have less control over land, inputs, seeds and credit. A study by the United Nations Entity for gender equality and empowerment of women (UN Women,2019) showed that across sub Saharan Africa, the average percentage of women legislators, senior officials and managers was only 28.7 percent.

In all African countries except Rwanda, women representation is below 50 percent threshold. The biggest challenge for Africa is failure to link gender equality to socio-economic goals. It is important to be able to illustrate to economists that gender equality is very relevant to issues of economic growth and efficiency; convince demographers that gender perspectives can strengthen their analyses and provide new insights about demographic processes, and demonstrate to statisticians the inadequacy of data that is not sex-disaggregated and respond to critical information needs related to gender equality.

Women are not able to fully participate in formal systems of power. Political culture limits women's voice at local and national levels. Yet Political processes exist precisely to make sense of what the public values and to translate this into decisions about laws, budgets and policies. Promoting gender equality and diversity is essentially a political issue and should be addressed through political responses.

When women join politics, they want to do something, when men join politics, they want to be something (Chowdhury, 2017).

Unfortunately, women continue to be largely marginalized from the political sphere, often

as a result of discriminatory laws, practices, attitudes and gender stereotypes, low levels of education, lack of access to health care and the disproportionate effect of poverty on women. Unfortunately, continued male-dominated leadership in Africa seems to forget that *“Democracy without equality in all aspects of the law and full participation of 50% of the population is another form of authoritarianism (Chowdhury, 2017)”*.

Addressing Barriers to Inclusion of Youth, Women and PWDs

Many countries in Africa are undergoing reforms to foster socio economic development for the benefit of their citizens. This provides a basis for identifying and systematically addressing barriers to full participation of all citizens in order to ensure that no one is left behind. The proposals given below are not conclusive but a good starting point towards addressing exclusion of vulnerable groups.

6.1. Addressing Exclusion of Youth

To ensure inclusion and effective participation of the youth, African Governments need to:

- i. Develop National youth policies and Action Plans that respond effectively to mainstreaming youth participation in economic activities and other national governance processes.
- ii. Involve the youth at all levels of governance and in decision-making processes through affirmative action at every level to provide with them opportunities to influence or have a say on issues of importance to them

- iii. Involve private sector by giving incentives to engage and mentor youth through incentives such as tax holidays, revised taxation.
- iv. Focus on youth empowerment that creates and supports an enabling environment where young people can act on their own behalf, and on their own terms, rather than at the direction of others.
- v. Address the big divide between education achievement and industry needs for skills by ensuring that the education systems impart adequate entrepreneurial skills for self-employment and appropriate values to the youth.
- vi. Harness strengths in youth e.g. innovativeness in the use of ICT and convert such to useful projects that can benefit them.

Addressing Exclusion of PWDs

‘There is nothing for us without us’ is a slogan used by people with disability to emphasize the need for their inclusion in line with the UN Convention on Rights of People with Disability (UNCRPD, 2006).

The slogan is commonly used by PWDs to emphasize the need for their views to be sought and included in decisions on matters affecting them. This is in line with the Rights based approach to development which views the person first and recognizes capacity, right to participate and right to social responsibility for inclusion for all. Governments should therefore:

- i. Empower PWDs through enhanced awareness of their rights. Governments should put up awareness strategies for PWDs through concerted efforts with civil society and organizations dealing with PWDs.
- ii. institute the necessary tools to protect their rights at local, national and International levels;
- iii. Identify barriers –physical, communication, policy and attitudinal and address them. Engage them and their organizations as experts in identifying and responding to access barriers.
- iv. encourage them to have a say in decisions that concern them
- v. Properly use community based rehabilitation strategies which are very effective to identify and document incidences, types and impacts of disability in community.
- vi. It is important to create a safe space for them by setting aside specific resources based on diversity within PWDs

Addressing Exclusion of Women and Gender Inequality

African Governments require to realize that gender equality is no longer only a technical and statistical perception. It should also be an understanding that the views, values and experiences of women and men are different in many ways and, therefore, it is essential that both male and female views are equally heard and recognized in society as a whole, and, of course, in social, economic and political planning and decision making. Only then can

women and men equally and democratically influence progress in society, which shapes the conditions and prerequisites of their lives. Advancing inclusion of women and gender equality requires strengthening different dimensions of women's autonomy: Economic, political, sexual and reproductive autonomy and, freedom from all forms of violence, (Alpizar, 2010).

For this to be achieved, African Governments need to:

- i. Invest more in the education of women and girls to especially, address inequality in access to secondary and higher education and poor participation in science and Technology. There is a big gender gap in science and technology field that need to be addressed. Investing in women and girl's education, health and gainful activities can have a multiplier effect on poor economies. In regard to ICTs women must be facilitated to access and use these for their social and economic development.
- ii. Address Cultural factors like religion that have been used to deny women and girls rights especially those related to mobility, employment and sexuality. Under Patriarchy, Women are subjected to male authority and power and a variety of other cultural practices which in the past were viewed as indicators of recognition of their status as women and which now hold them back. Africa must address cultural barriers including confronting negative social trends to ensure gender equality. They must fight discrimination at household levels including gender based violence (GBV) and stop early and forced marriages, Female Genital

Mutilation (FGM) and other barriers to education.

- iii. Ensure Economic empowerment increases women's access to economic
- iv. resources and opportunities including jobs, financial services, property and
- v. other productive assets, skills development and market information. Anti-poverty strategies should consider the role of social institutions and culture in limiting the access of women to employment, inheritance and finance. (World Bank, 2012)
- vi. Ensure more funds are focused on increasing income generating initiatives based on women's traditional roles in the home, health services, nutrition and agriculture. Women's economic participation and empowerment are fundamental to strengthening Women's rights and enabling women to have control over their lives and exert influence in society. Higher female earnings and bargaining power translate into greater investment in children's education, health and nutrition, which leads to economic growth in the long term.

Conclusion

Africa has a bright future which will only be realized through collective efforts of all its people. To harness these collective efforts it needs to adopt a human rights based approach to development that empowers all its people to participate in the management of national resources. National policies, laws and regulations must be inclusive and implementation of development initiatives must take into consideration views and needs of different sectors of society. Women, youth, and PWDs must be involved in the interests of equity and equality of opportunity for them to maximize their potential to contribute to development. Disability is not inability and PWDs must be sought out and included in development with the rest of society.

Africa must capitalise on labour dividends and innovativeness of its big youth population in terms of forgone productivity and consumer market growth. Africa must accept that young people are not a problem to be helped or solved but are conduits of creativity and catalysts of change. They are ambitious, creative and capable of rethinking the world and solving tomorrow's problems today. Again, Africa must address the unequal gender roles and relations that are at the basis of gender subordination and women's exclusion. Africa needs to prioritize gender equality and position it as a necessary ingredient of its socio-economic development

References

- African Union (2015): Agenda 2063, The Africa we want. Africa Union Commission, Addis Ababa
- African Union (2006): Africa Youth Charter. African Union Commission, Addis Ababa
- African Union (2016). African Charter on Human and People's Rights. AU Commission, Addis Ababa
- Alpizar D. L. (2010): "The implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the outcomes of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly and its contribution to shaping a gender perspective towards the full realization of the MDGs". Keynote speech at High-Level Roundtable during the 54th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, United Nations Headquarters NY, March 2010.
- Awiti, A. and Scott B (2016): Kenya Youth Survey Report. Aga Khan University, Kenya
- Bawumia, M(2017). Poor data equals poor decisions. The Star Newspaper, Kenya. 4th July, 2017. www.theStar.co.ke.
- Bost, A. M. (2014)Gender Equity Vs Gender equality. [www.everydayfeminism.com/2014/09/equality is not enough](http://www.everydayfeminism.com/2014/09/equality-is-not-enough)
- Benzburg, B (2017). The day that Einstein feared may have arrived. www.my.wealthyaffiliates.co. Blog
- Chesterman, D. (2002): Local Authority? How to develop Leadership For better Public Services. DEMOS, London.
- Chissano, J. (2014): Unleashing Africa's Girl Power. The Business Daily, Kenya November 4, 2014
- Chowdhury, A. K. (2017): Critical Next Steps in Enhancing Women's Equality and Empowerment. International Press Syndicate.
- Corrigan T. (2017). Getting Youth Policy right in Africa. Education Economic Development. www.africaportal.org.
- IDB (2018). International Data Base. Census Bureau. www.census.gov.
- National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) 2017. Annual Report 2016/2017.
- Oakley, P (1995) Peoples Participation in Development Projects. Oxford, INTRAC
- Republic of Kenya (2011) the National Gender and Equality Act No.15, 2011. Government Printer
- Republic of Kenya (2019). Economic growth Survey, 2019. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)

Republic of Kenya (2013). Legal Notice No. 114 on Public Procurement and Disposal (Preferences and Reservations Amendment) Regulation 2013. Government Printer

Republic of Kenya (2008). Kenya Vision 2030. Towards a globally Competitive and Prosperous Nation. Government Printer.

Republic of Kenya (2017). Economic Empowerment through procurement. www.mygov.co.ke. July, 2017.

Sullivan, H. & Skelcher, C. (2002): Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services. Basingstoke, Palgrave

UN, (2006) United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disability (UNCRPD). UN

UN (2011). Factsheet on People With Disabilities (PWDs) UNDESA. www.un.org

UNFPA, (2012) Investing in People and Equity to build a world of equal opportunity for all. Address by UNFPA Executive Director at CDU conference on Sustainable Development. Berlin, 2012

UNFPA (2019) Gender Equality. (from original 2015) UNFPA.

UNDP (2012) Enhancing youth Political Participation throughout the electoral cycle. www.undp.org/library

UNDP (2017): Human Development Index (HDI) Report. www.BDAFRICA.com. 3 May, 2017

UNWOMEN (2019). Facts and Figures: Leadership and Political Participation Report. www.UNwomen.org/en/digital library/Publications 2019/03

WERK (2016) Value Based Education in Kenya. Synthesis Report by Women Education Researchers of Kenya. [Http://Werk.co.ke](http://Werk.co.ke).

World Bank (2009): Gender Equality as smart economics. World Bank. Washington DC. www.worldbank.org/gender.

World Bank (2012). Gender Equality for Development. Development Impact evaluation. World Bank Reports

World Bank (2015): Why disability Inclusive development matters. The Promise of Social Inclusion. www.worldbank.org , 22 April, 2015

DEVELOPING TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP CAPACITY IN AFRICA'S PUBLIC-SECTOR INSTITUTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE 2030 AGENDA AND ACHIEVE THE SDGS

Dr. John-Mary Kauzya (PhD)

Abstract

With the challenges of effectively implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in the background, the author focuses this chapter on transformational leadership in Africa as one of the critical requirements for success in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS). Noting with examples that many African countries had conceived strategies for transforming their countries well before the 2030 Agenda was adopted in 2015. He suggests that the transformation envisaged in global, regional, and national development strategies requires transformational leadership that is pervasive in the entire society. Giving an analysis of the 2030 Agenda documents, he distills from them the values and principles that serve as drivers for the need for transformation including the Ps of the agenda, integration, leaving no one behind, collaboration and partnership, inclusion and accountable institutions. The chapter provides ten priority actions that constitute a model for transformational leadership and a framework for assessing the effectiveness of transformational leadership based on the Speech, Strategy, Actions and Achievements (SSAAs) of leaders. Prominent in the chapter is a focus on the critical question of what do transformational leaders transform in practice which leads to specifying that transformational leadership transform individuals (in terms of mindset), organizations, institutions, and societies (in terms of values and principles). This paper sheds more clarity on the values and principles of leaving no one behind, integration, the interplay of effectiveness, efficiency and equity which are central to the processes and outputs of transformational leadership. Strengthening Africa's management development institutes and positioning human resource managers strategically to develop capacities for transformational leadership is emphasized. This paper ends on a note that transformation leadership is critical to Africa's agenda for transformation.

Keywords: 2030 Agenda, Transformational Leadership, Effective and Accountable Institutions, Resilience, Integration, Social Equity and Human Resources

Introduction

The challenge of implementing the 2030 Agenda to achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at national level is a big one for African countries. It will require sizeable socio-politico- economic transformation conceived and implemented in an urgent manner. The deadline of 15 years up to 2030 does not give a lot of time and we have already used almost two years since January 2016. While this paper touches on many issues, it is important to point out right from the beginning that transformational leadership for a country’s sustainable development should not be taken to refer only to public sector or even only political leadership at central government level. If a country must be transformed to achieve sustainable development and embrace a good society, transformational leadership must be pervasive in the entire society i.e in public, private and civil society sectors at local, community and national levels. The common tendency of tasking the political leadership and government to develop the country must be revisited for people to understand that developing a country is a task for the entire

society. Transformational leadership must be embraced and engraved in the entire society. If this happened, it would be in itself a big transformation.

Why Discuss Transformational Leadership?

The choice of the topic on transformational leadership was dictated by the emphasis that a number of national, regional and global development strategies have put on transformation: not change, not reform as has been the case in many change strategies, For examples, at national level the statements of the national vision of Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Botswana, Nigeria, Liberia, Libya among others refer to transformation (refer to table 1 below). Development strategies of the twenty-five African countries consulted out of the 54 have transformation as a major objective (refer to table 1 below). In addition most of these countries highlight in their transformation strategies, human resource development and good governance.

Table 1; Examples of countries whose Vision refers to transformation

Country	Reference to transformation in the national vision
Uganda	Uganda Vision 2040 aims at “A transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years”
Rwanda	Rwanda’s Vision 2020 is a “government development program whose main objective is transforming the country into a knowledge-based middle-income country....”
Kenya	Kenya Vision 2030 is “a national long-term development blue-print aiming to transform Kenya into an industrializing, middle-income country providing high quality of life...”
Ethiopia	National Vision is “to transform Ethiopia from a country associated with poverty to a middle-income economy and society with deep-rooted participatory democracy and good governance based on the mutual aspirations of its peoples”.

Botswana	Vision 2036 is “a transformational agenda that defines Botswana’s aspirations and goals...”
Nigeria	Vision 2020 is an “economic transformation blueprint”; a long term plan for stimulating Nigeria’s economic growth and launching the country onto a path of sustained and rapid socio-economic development”.
Liberia	The second Liberia poverty Reduction Strategy is “the Agenda for Transformation”
Libya	The Libya 2020 Vision is a plan for transformative change by 2020. “Libyans want positive transformation now”.
Mauritius	Vision 2030 “Africa strategy being adopted to transform Mauritius into a regional platform for trade, investment and services...and into a SMART island”
Ghana	Vision 2063 “economic and structural transformation is associated with rising agricultural productivity, an integrated economy and rising per capita growth rates.”
Seychelles	Seychelles refers to SNAIP “appropriate knowledge and technological support system strengthened and supporting enhanced agricultural transformation and performance.”
Sierra Leone	Vision 2025 “there are significant opportunities and prospects for the transformation of Sierra Leone from a poor country, to that of a middle-income level country within the vision period.”
Zimbabwe	The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation “To provide an enabling environment for sustainable economic empowerment and social transformation to the people of Zimbabwe”.
Mozambique	PEDSA “The goal continues to be the structural transformation of subsistence agriculture into prosperous, competitive and sustainable agriculture”.
Malawi	Malawi’s Vision 2020 refers to ”concerted efforts to promote human and social development need to be complemented with efforts to improve labor productivity and structural transformation leading to economic diversification
Zambia	Zambia’s Vision 2030” envisages the gradual transformation of the structure of the economy from an agricultural based (primary) to an industrial based (secondary) economy.”
Algeria	Vision 2030 “Transformation to knowledge-based economy”..” establish policy developments in: industrial transformation, education reform, openness and globalization, territorial development, and health reform”
Angola	The long term strategy Angola 2025 was approved in 2008, with the major strategic objective of “transforming Angola into a prosperous, modern country, without poverty [...] and with a growing insertion in the world and regional economy”.
Burkina Faso	The PNDES’ overall goal is to achieve the structural transformation of the Burkina be economy to attain strong, sustainable, resilient and inclusive growth that creates decent jobs and improves social welfare.

Benin	Benin Vision 2025 seeks to transform Benin into “an emerging country; a well-governed, united and peaceful country that enjoys a vibrant and competitive economy, cultural influence and social wellbeing”.
Burundi	The implementation of Vision Burundi 2025 reflects Burundi’s commitment to carrying out a far-reaching transformation of the country’s society and economy in order to achieve the promotion of sustainable development by 2025.
Cabo Verde	Forum for Change - Cabo Verde 2030 “..Will strengthen the country’s vision for socio- economic transformation”.
Cameroon	Cameroon Vision 2035 “Cameroon will transform from a primary phase to a secondary import substitution phase with the manufacturing industry accounting for more than 23 per cent of the GDP”.
C e n t r a l African R e p u b l i c (CAR)	RCPCA: Ensuring economic empowerment and educational opportunities to men and women is of fundamental transformative importance... supporting the peace process as agents of a positive transformation of society. Support institutional transformation and transition toward the use of country systems”.
Chad	Vision 2030: Chad’s transformation into an emerging, integrated economic space in which reigns security, solidarity and good governance for the promotion of human development by 2030
Comoros	CSP 2016-20 “..unlock the growth potential with a view to achieving social inclusion and private sector development, and thus promote the structural transformation of the economy”.
Democratic R e p u b l i c of Congo (DRC)	Horizon 2060 “Between 2012 and 2020, the DRC will have to move from a low-income to a middle-income country through the transformation of agriculture”.
Côte d’Ivoire	2012-2015 NDP: designed to transform Côte d’Ivoire into a middle-income economy by 2020 and further reduce the poverty rate.
Lesotho	National Vision 2020: ” ..urgency for Lesotho to radically transform its economy.. transform agricultural institutions.. transformation of tertiary institutions in the education sector .. transforming institutions for business and entrepreneurship development”.
Mali	AGRA “..Africa can feed itself and the world-transforming agriculture from solitary struggle to survive to a business that thrives”.
Morocco	NDC: ”Morocco’s greenhouse gas mitigation goals rely in large part on an important transformation of the country’s energy sector”.
Namibia	Vision 2030: “transform Namibia into a healthy and food-secure nation”.
Niger	Vision 2035: “entails accompanying African states in the structural transformation of their respective economies through industrialization”.

Sao Tome and Principe	2030 Transformation Agenda: “respond to the aspirations of citizens, through the transformation of the country into a hub of maritime and air services.. a process of transformation of saotomean economy guaranteeing social progress of population in a sustainable way”
Senegal	ESP: a structural transformation of the economy through the consolidation of current engines of growth and the development of new sectors to create wealth
Somalia	The theme of the NDP is to accelerate socio-economic transformation in order to achieve the stated objectives for poverty alleviation, economic revival and societal transformation in a socially just and gender equitable manner.
South Africa	NDP 2030 identifies the task of improving the quality of public services as critical to achieving transformation.
South Sudan	Vision 2040 “achieving rapid rural transformation to improve livelihoods and expand employment opportunities”
Swaziland	NDS: “Transform state-owned media houses into independently-controlled entities that still provide public services”.
Tanzania	Vision 2025: “transforming the economy from a predominantly agricultural one with low productivity to a diversified and semi-industrialized economy with a modern rural sector and high productivity in agricultural production”.
Tunisia	EU-Tunisia Action Plan: “implement a transformative strategy for economic, social and regional development”

Source: Author

Key

*** PEDSA Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development

*** SNAIP: Seychelles National Agricultural Investment Plan

*** PNDES: National Economic and Social Development Plan


*** RCPCA: National Recovery and Peace building Plan

***NDP: National Development Plan

At continental level the 2063 Africa Agenda is described as “a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years” (Directorate of Strategic Policy Planning, African Union

Commission (AUC)). At global level, in September 2015, Global leaders from all the 193 Member States of the United Nations met in New York and adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As its exact title “Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” indicates, the Global leaders set out a “supremely ambitious and transformational vision” for the world (United Nations). At national, continental and global levels these are noble ambitions. However, transformation cannot just happen. It needs to be initiated, driven and sustained. Integrating all these into one national transformation strategy is a huge but necessary task. There is therefore, great need for transformational leadership not only in all countries of Africa but in the world as well especially since the 2030 Agenda is universal.

Diagram 1: Integrating Global and regional Transformation Agenda into National Transformation Strategy



Source: Diagram was drawn by the author

Many African countries have, since independence, gone through a lot of changes including rehabilitation, reconstruction, reform and the current drive towards transformation. One interesting fact worth pointing out is that while transformation figures prominently in global commitments especially the 2030 Agenda, African governments who are pursuing transformation of their countries in their development strategies are not necessarily doing so because of the 2030 Agenda. Most of these strategies in Africa were formulated well before the 2030 Agenda was adopted. In this regard, transformation has been an African agenda for quite some time. May be what Africa’s leadership and people need to ask themselves is the following: Has transformation taken place? To what extent? At what rate? In what areas? What will it take to speed up the transformation? This paper advances

that transformational leadership is a critical requirement for sustaining transformation.

Drivers of Transformation Contained in the 2030 Agenda

The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs contain critical underpinnings of the need for transformation. These include: the five Ps of the 2030 Agenda (ie People, Planet, Peace, prosperity, and Partnership), the notion of integration, leaving no one behind, and effective, inclusive and accountable institutions as well as transformation itself. All the 17 goals are linked to these Ps Moreover, goal 16 commits countries to developing effective, inclusive and accountable institutions. Bellow we consider some of these underpinnings

beginning with the notion of transformation itself. The gist of this is that if these principles and values that are contained in the 2030 Agenda have to be followed to the letter, governance and public administration as we know it currently will have to be transformed. And this engages transformational leadership

Diagram 2: Underlying drivers of transformation




Source: Author 2017

The Ps of the 2030 Agenda

People, planet, peace in freedom, prosperity, partnerships are what we have termed as the 5 Ps of the 2030 Agenda. If, to this, we add the challenge of poverty eradication which is central to the 2030 Agenda then we have 6Ps of the 2030 Agenda. The author believes that to succeed in forging local, national, regional and global partnerships focusing on people, striving for peace and a decent life for all (prosperity), on a sustainable planet, requires a transformational and transformed leadership effectively addressing the challenge of poverty eradication from the face of the earth equally requires transformational leadership.

Diagram 3: The Ps of the 2030 Agenda



Source: Diagram drawn by the author 2017

Transformation

It is necessary that we address “transformation” as one of the drivers of transformation in the 2030 Agenda. Though SDG 16 specifies “developing effective, inclusive, accountable institutions”, the whole 2030 agenda is “the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world to sustainable and resilient path” (United Nations, 2015). Therefore, implementing SDG 16 must be approached from the side of “transforming” rather than just “developing” institutions. Whether it is creating new institutions, readjusting, or strengthening existing ones, there is need to transform them to align with the imperatives of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In adopting the 2030 Agenda, Member States set “out a supremely ambitious and transformational vision” for the world and

so in implementing this vision transformation needs to be the driving force (United Nations, 2015)

Ten Priorities that Constitute Transformational Leadership

To sustain the momentum for transformation, the leadership must itself be transformed to privilege ten critical strategic areas that constitute a practical model of transformational public leadership. The ten practical model of transformational public leadership are :

- Leverage Community potential for transformation and sustained development.
- Engage all actors and secure their support, commitment, energies, resources

and action.

- Align development plans with national, regional, and global development goals.
- Develop competences at community, political, managerial, administrative and technical levels.
- Ensure mobilization and frugal utilization of both internal and external financial resources.
- Rely on local capabilities to ensure creativity and innovation, resilience achievements and shortfalls using the two to sustain and improve performance.
- Harness an ideology that puts people at the center of all policies, plans and actions.
- Instill values of professionalism, transparency, accountability, integrity

and ethical conduct.

- Pursue a vision for the future generations built on the achievements of today.
- and sustainability state.

It is possible to verify the above prioritized strategic leadership action areas in the Speech, Strategy, Actions and Achievements (SSAAs) of leaders. Speeches can verify the mental and ideological orientation of the leaders around the whole issue of leadership and transformation. Speech can also mobilize the population around transformational strategies which together with plans can verify how the thought and ideological orientation is translated into intent and direction. Action can verify whether the thought, ideological orientation and strategies are translated into concrete action and finally achievements/ results can be the ultimate verifier of whether leadership resolves to mobilize the power of the people and build the country's life around

the transformation and sustainable development they believe and profess.



Diagram 4: A simple model for verifying

transformational leadership effectiveness (SSAA)

Source: Author

What do they plan to do? What do they say? What do they do? What do they achieve? This model calls for a strong vision- driven results-based leadership/management/administration. Transformational leadership is driven by a shared mission, kept in motion following a

based accountability mechanisms where achievements including impact on society's development can be verified.



Diagram 5: Vision-driven results based

transformational leadership model

Source: Author

Mission-driven strategic leadership needs to include a process of arriving at critical policy and strategic decisions at any level (central and local) and implementing them in alignment with government-wide mission.

Anticipatory planning (scientific prophecy) should be a critical part of transformational leadership that puts a high premium on addressing the needs of the future from the stand point of today. Basically, transformational leadership is about the future. It requires not only a forward looking ideological orientation

scientific prophecy arrived at through data and information supported anticipatory planning processes, within an integrated leadership system , bringing within one collaborative bracket , leaders at central government, local governments and communities levels as well as leaders in civil society and private sectors organizations. The success of transformational leadership can then be verified through results

but also data and information that enable leadership to predict the future accurately in the process of forecasting and planning; detect the challenges and obstacles likely to occur in the process of implementation; and, find the solutions. Scientific prophecy systems should prepare leadership at national and local levels in private and civil society sectors to anticipate the future, prevent problems, and correct mistakes as timely as possible. For effective transformational leadership the future is always in the present!

Results-based accountability systems support transformational leadership to

remain focused on results articulating what results are expected, what data are regularly collected and reported to clearly express the results achieved. The results based system traditionally looking at effectiveness, needs to be collaborated with the needs of equity so that instead of having the 3 Es of management (Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Economy). A fourth E representing Equity, especially social equity, is added. In other words, results-based accountability needs to be accomplished within an integrated performance evaluation system that embraces process accountability, legal accountability, financial and other resources accountability. Comprehensive results-based accountability in transformational leadership needs to include values such as professionalism, ethical conduct and integrity. In many African countries, it is the shortfall in such values that has undermined achievement of results. Being mainly about society and values, transformational leadership cannot be concerned with only achieving results. It has also to be concerned with the positive mindsets and ideological convictions. In this section we discuss these.

values that the society needs to embrace as it undergoes transformation.

A country that is under transformational leadership requires an **integrated leadership system**, as opposed to one transformational leader, where the national transformation vision is shared by all leaders at national, local and community levels in public, private and civil society sectors. Sectors, ministries and government agencies must be linked to each other and collaborative leadership must be privileged.

What do transformational leaders transform and where do African countries stand?

As indicated above, transformational leadership is about creating a good society not only through tangible socio-economic development results but also through transforming institutions, organizations, and individual’s values and norms as well as




Diagram 6: Focus of transformational

leadership

Source: Author

Transforming Society

Transforming society is about transforming a number of components such as individuals, institutions, organizations, standard of living. But, most importantly, it is about transforming shared values and norms. It is about creating a good society. While every society is expected to have agreed values that bind it together depending on the context, situation, culture, traditions and beliefs that develop over its history, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is a universal agenda, contains values that are universal. These values in this sense make the 2030 Agenda an agenda about creating a good society. The universal values contained in the 2030 Agenda will basically drive transformation in a country that will seek to implement the Agenda. The values include; equity, inclusion, leaving no one behind, accountability, collaboration, good governance and resilience. Leaving no one behind

If transformational leaders have to transform African societies, they have to promote, support and sustain “leaving no one behind” in sustainable development. But first, they have to grasp and clarify the meaning of “leaving no one behind”. What does “leaving no one behind” mean in the context of implementing the 2030 Agenda and the 2063 African Union (AU) Agenda to achieve the SDGs? The way the Global leaders put the term “leaving no one behind” does not help understand or operationalize it. “We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the

world on to a sustainable and resilient path. As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind.” (Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, September 2015).

Institutions grow on the foundation of societal dominant ideology, values and norms. The emphasis the 2030 Agenda places on “leaving no one behind” has strong ideological undertones including egalitarianism, equality, equity, involvement, inclusiveness, collaboration, social security, and socio-economic welfare. When you commit to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda and achieve its 17 SDGs with their 169 targets leaving no one behind, (the disadvantaged, people living with disabilities, the children, the women, the youth, people living in abject poverty, people displaced by wars and conflict, people in remote areas, generations of the future etc), an ideology that emphasizes inclusiveness, participation, engagement, equality, equity, and most importantly, the delivery of services to all as well as social security and welfare is assumed and required. The provision of services to achieve the SDGs inevitably brings to the foreground the role of the welfare state. The framers of the 2030 Agenda did not mention the ideological underpinnings that would ensure that Sustainable Development gets achieved leaving no one behind. The values and norms that will ensure effective welfare will need development and transformation of institutions; not only those in the Public sector but also those in the private and civil society sectors as well.

However, in terms of “leaving no one behind” the current reality is such that the globe is full of socio-politico-economic imbalances. Countries are lagging behind others, regions are behind others, and individuals are behind others.

For example, with a literal understanding of leaving no one behind, it is difficult to perceive how the country with the highest GDP per capita will develop ensuring that it does not leave behind the country with the lowest GDP per capita. In such a situation leaving no one behind becomes an aspiration for which each country needs to undertake specific actions. The reality of this competitive world is such that countries are racing to be ahead of others. Individuals are struggling to stay ahead of others. According to a report by Oxfam, eight richest people in the world own more wealth than half of the world (Oxfam Report 2017). Companies are fighting to beat the competition of other companies. The slogan of leaving no one behind will not change this. Even the SDGs as they are set, just as it was with the MDGs, even when well achieved, will leave some of the people behind. This paper proposes the following as some of the realistic actions for a country with an aspiration of leaving no one behind:

- Identify and lift up those furthest behind first
- Identify and target the most vulnerable.
- Take a multidimensional approach including bottom-up approach and give voice to the vulnerable and furthest

behind to express their needs and how these needs can be met

- Avoid measuring progress in averages which mask the real poorest vulnerable people left behind.
- Ensure everyone especially the most vulnerable has opportunity and shares actions, outcomes and in the progress made.
- Involve and engage everyone especially the poorest and most vulnerable in searching for and creating solutions to the development problems and challenges.
- Start with the kind of data that can enable governments to know who the most vulnerable are, where they live and what their needs are (the needs as determined through the situation analysis involving the vulnerable).
- Put in place legal frameworks, policies, strategies and programs which are directly targeting the vulnerable populations

As Mahatma Gandhi said, “a nation’s greatness is measured by how it treats its weakest members.” Cited in Dorothy Thompson (2018) . How countries bring into the progress and development bracket the vulnerable and

furthest behind will determine success in sustainable development.




Diagram 7: Actions for aspiration of developing leaving no one

behind:

Source: Author

Transforming Institutions

In the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, institutional development is a critical undertaking. It is in fact a significant part of Goal number 16. Institutional development is taken to refer to the establishment/creation or strengthening of an organization or a network of organizations with the objective of enabling them to effectively support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of the SDGs. Institutional development therefore, is work that involves organizational design, systems design, policy, laws, rules and regulations, leadership development, human resources development, and the tedious work

of changing mind-sets, inculcating norms and values to positively change behavior and culture not only in the organization in question but in its society as well. This means that developing actors as well as factors, allocation of resources including human, material and financial resources to achieve the SDGs is all part and parcel of institutional development.

The work of developing institutions for effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda needs to be approached with systematic diagnostic analysis of the institutional situation (both formal and informal) in public, private and civil society sectors. Strong institutions are those whereby laws, rules and regulations are successfully enforced and complied with and which have been tested by not only passage of time but also changing conditions. A combination of being enforced/complied with and stability over time/change in conditions defines the strength of institutions

and consequently institutional development challenges. However, the most telling and sustainable indicators in institutional strength lie in the norms and values as well as culture and behaviours that over time become entrenched and enshrined in the institution and society such that the society cherishes and defends the institutions.

This aspect of norms, values, culture and behaviors as aspects of institutional strength makes developing and transforming institutions a very difficult undertaking. Since the implementation of the 2030 Agenda was flagged off, efforts including technical and financial support are going into developing institutions in all countries. While countries can be helped to establish institutions as

organizational structures, or systems, or procedures and processes, or even rules and laws, norms, values, and culture as well as behavior, as the most important aspects of institutions cannot be created through support from outside. The strengthening of institutions in terms of norms, values, and culture is an internal job to be accomplished by the leaders and people of the country in question themselves. In addition it takes a relatively long time. In fact we suspect that 15 years are too few to transform values, norms, mindsets and culture to entrench institutions which support a good society.

Different countries have different institutional development challenges which can be understood only after thorough diagnostic

analysis of their situation. A variety of situations can be envisaged as in the diagram below.




Diagram 8: Framework for integrated analysis of institutional strength of a country

Source: Author

In some countries (situation A) institutions in the public, private and civil society sectors are strong. In others (situations B and C) institutions may be weak in the public sector and strong in the private sector or vice versa.

Yet in others institutional weakness can be spread in all sectors (public, private and civil society). Where the public sector, civil society and private sectors are all weak, this double institutional weakness presents a formidable challenge to institutional transformation and development.

While in socio-politico-economic development

in any country, the process of developing institutions is an on-going one, always dictated by policies as responses to development challenges, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs brought about some critical underpinnings which have accentuated the need for the development of institutions through creation, re-adjustment, transforming and equipping/strengthening. These critical underpinnings include: the notion of integration, leaving no one behind, partnerships and effective, inclusive and accountable institutions as well as transformation.

Integration

The Rio+20 outcome document from 2012 calls for “...more coherent and integrated

planning and decision-making at the national, sub-national and local levels as appropriate, and to this end we call upon countries to strengthen national, sub-national and/or local institutions or relevant multi-stakeholder bodies and processes, as appropriate, dealing with sustainable development, including to coordinate on matters of sustainable development and to enable effective integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development.” (UN General Assembly Resolution September 2012) The emphasis the 2030 Agenda puts on “integration’ necessitates approaching creation, development, strengthening or transformation of institutions paying particular attention to the need for integration.

However, integration must be understood in a wider, fuller and deeper meaning to include:




Diagram 9: Deeper understanding of

integration in Sustainable Development

Source: Author

- Integration of the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, social, and environment) into one coherent sustainable development strategy. The UN General Assembly resolution clearly states that “The challenges and commitments contained in these major conferences and summits are interrelated and call for integrated solutions. To address them effectively, a new approach is needed. Sustainable development recognizes that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other and are interdependent”.(UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1/September 2015).
- Integration of global, regional, national and local development strategies/agenda.
- Integration in form of coordination and coherence of various institutional components, policies, strategies and programs which governance and public administration puts in place to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda: the Public administration which in many countries is structured around departmentalized entities integrating institutions, policies, and strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda is going to be a necessary task that will involve transformation of the institutions themselves.
- Integration of the various sectors and development activities to collaborate their inputs and out puts and creates a mutually complementally collaborative impact.
- Integration in terms of current and future policies and strategies: It is very tempting for current generations to focus on eradicating poverty or achieving any SDG at any cost and forget that sometimes a solution for today’s problem can easily be a source of a bigger problem for the future. Therefore, through a process of anticipatory governance, policy risk assessment and disaster prevention strategies, policies of the current generation need to be integrating and collaborating the way they will impact the future needs.
- Integration in terms of vertical integration of the different levels of government (central government and local government (or local authorities as they may be called). For a country to move in the same direction towards sustainable development all levels of government need to be integrated and coordinated in the planning implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the 2030 Agenda. For some countries this is easier than for others. Big countries with multi-level political administrative structures with relative autonomy there is likely to be difficulties in integration especially because of subsidiarity and sharing of mandates and competences. However, efforts have to be made to ensure that some parts of the country are not left behind in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.
- Integration of modern state/government institutions with traditional institutions so that the two join forces to cause sustainable development especially in grassroots communities. In Africa where

in many countries traditional institutions such as kingdoms, chieftainships, tribal heads, etc exist along modern governance and government institutions, there is great need for integration to avoid conflicts

- Integration of government, private sector and civil society in terms of all the three sectors working in the same direction of achieving sustainable development. The way integration is being taken in many countries needs to be reviewed to ensure that it takes a comprehensive meaning in all these different terms. For the time being there are signs that institutional integration is being taken mainly in the sense of coordination and collaboration only. It is inadequate.
- Since January 2016 when the implementation of the 2030 Agenda was flagged off, many countries have been making efforts for integration and coordination. Many of these efforts, as will be later illustrated, have been in the direction of structural arrangements for integrating the planning and implementation of the agenda. If integration is to push institutional development in its full meaning the above analysis needs to be conducted

(Adam, 2014).

and institutional development planned and implemented following results of such an analysis. As far as developing institutions for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is concerned integrating or coordinating weak institutions will not be of much help. Integrated weakness or coordinated weakness does not constitute institutional strength. Co-ordinated or integrated weak institutions remain weak.

Effectiveness, Efficiency, Economy and Social Equity in the Delivery of Public Service

In the pursuit of effectiveness in the public service, there is often a fairly unclear understanding of the difference and complimentary relationship of the two terms; effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness refers to the achievement of the intended objectives. Efficiency refers to the usage of resources of all sorts (human, material, financial etc) to produce outputs in line with the objectives paying attention to using as less as possible to produce as much as possible. There is also concern related to saving, especially in terms of financial resources. These three form what has been known as the three Es in management




Diagram 10: The four Es of Management

Source: Diagram was drawn by the author


It is important that the public service understands that its main objective is to achieve the intended objectives (effectiveness) and, in the context of the 2030 Agenda with its emphasis on achieving sustainable development leaving no one behind, social equity in the delivery of public services. Both effectiveness and social equity are important values in the 2030 Agenda. To the user of the public service this is the main issue. Efficiency on the other hand, is mainly an internal concern of the public service in the way it deploys and uses resources, in the way it operates within the systems, procedures, processes, rules, regulations etc. In a general way, the public is more concerned with the services provided (both in quantity and quality i.e effectiveness) as well as to whom it is provided and not so much with the ratios between the inputs and the services delivered (i.e efficiency).

In any case the public, even in the most transparent and open governments, does not know (either because it is not interested, or the process of knowing is cumbersome, or a combination of many factors) the input/output ratios in the delivery of public services. The public gets interest in such issues when there is a shortfall in the public services delivered (in

quality or quantity, or both or in the equitable distribution of service).

Therefore, the public service, in its quest for excellence, must operate at a point of equilibrium between effectiveness, efficiency, and social equity. It is this equilibrium that can serve as reference for measuring, monitoring, and evaluating the performance in the public service. A transformed Public Service will be judged by the people using two criteria above everything else: its effectiveness and its equity and inclusion in delivering services which meet the basic needs and expectations of the people: Not some of them but all of them. Not sometimes but all the time. Transformational leadership in the public service needs to go beyond reforms which pay attention to efficiency and enhance focus on social equity so as not to leave any one behind in the consumption of services. Public service transformation will shift from traditional public administration bureaucratic process through modern public management to bureaucracies based on outcomes and values in addition. In African countries where there are signs of insufficiencies of autocratic leadership, as well as in transactional leadership, transformational leadership will have to tread carefully making sure that in addition to the emphasis on outcomes and values, rules,

processes, procedures as well as effectiveness, efficiency and economy are respected in public



leadership.

Diagram 11: Moving from Autocratic to transformational leadership

Source: Author

Therefore, the public service, in its quest for excellence, must operate at a point of equilibrium between effectiveness, efficiency, and social equity. It is this equilibrium that can serve as reference for measuring, monitoring, and evaluating the performance in the Public Service. A transformed public service will be judged by the people using one criterion above everything else: its effectiveness in delivering services which meet the basic needs and expectations of the people: Not some of them but all of them. Not sometimes but all the time.

Public Service Performance Measurement, Monitoring and Evaluation: Need for

Standards and Indicators

In order to keep abreast with the effective and equitable performance of the public service, its leadership has a big concern over not only how to improve performance, but also how to measure performance in the public sector. What standards should serve as a basis for measurement and improvement, and what indicators should be used to determine success or otherwise? In this respect one thing needs to be clarified right from the beginning: The public service is diverse (health, education, agriculture, environment, information, culture, waste disposal, water, transport, tax administration, customs, sports, justice, forestry, tourism, diplomacy, sports, leisure parks, prisons or correction facilities, etc). It is imperative for the Government to put in place an overall policy and strategy for setting performance standards, performance indicators, monitoring and evaluating the

performance of the public service in general.

However, implementation of such a policy must be tailored to the particular services in question. While it sounds impressive to say “improve performance levels of the public service”, doing it in reality comes down to going into each of these components of the public service and planning how to improve its effectiveness, efficiency, and social equity. Likewise, because of the diversity of public services, performance standards and indicators of diverse services are likely to be different.

What is clear is that for the Public Service to be able to grasp, in real time, the exact levels of its performance, whether excellent, good, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory, it must design and implement a performance monitoring and evaluation system with clear standards and indicators for each different service that can provide both measures of effectiveness, efficiency and social equity. Clearly, the indicators for effectiveness in the delivery of primary education cannot be the same as the indicators for effectiveness in the provision of agricultural services. And these cannot be the same as those used to gauge the delivery of health services. In this era of e-government (using ICT to do government work), this performance monitoring and evaluation system as well as performance indicators should be ICT based. Given the emphasis the government in Africa puts on ICT taking such a strategic decision should be relatively easy. Engaging citizens in this process makes the evaluation more meaningful and complete.

The ministry responsible for public service should initiate a policy requiring all ministries and government agencies to set and publish

standards for the level and quality of services they provide. These must be relevant and meaningful to the users of the services (meaning that they must cover the aspects of service which matter most to the users). They must be easily understood by the common person. They must be precise and easily measurable so that the service users can easily tell whether the standards are being met or not (whether they are receiving the services promised or not). It is understood here that the standards and the indicators therefore cannot be the same across the board. For example; a hospital may want to set a standard on for how long a patient will wait in an out patient’s clinic, while a school may set a standard on how long a parent will wait to receive results of his/her child’s school test. Even if the indicators here are in terms of time measures, they still cannot be the same.

Engaging Citizens\ Service Users in Setting Performance Standards, and Indicators

Another important object in setting performance standards is that the users need to be involved if the standards have to be seen to respond to their needs. This brings back on the table the issue of citizens’ engagement in the whole process of performance improvement. The best case scenario of this is that the standards for public service delivery cannot be set by the public service itself alone. The public/users need to be deeply involved in setting the standards corresponding to their expectations. Government needs to adopt the “outside-in” concept (Sarah Jane Gilbert 16 February 2010) that involves examining and closely

collaborating with the external environment of the Public Service to understand the needs and views of the people/service users and key stake holders to be able to deliver services that correspond to what they need and want.

Prioritizing the Management of Human Resources in the Public Service

When everything is said and done, managing the public service is essentially about two critical things: the services delivered, and the people who deliver the services. The rest (eg, money, logistics, facilities, equipment, structure, processes etc) are only facilitators. It can never be over emphasized that global, regional and national policies, strategies and commitments to sustainable development and poverty reduction need human capacities in the public sector to transform them into tangible and visible results. The knowledge, know-how and skills, networks and attitudes of personnel in the public sector are at the heart of the performance of countries because it is through them and by them that services are planned and delivered, critical innovations conceived and realized and needed reforms carried out (United Nations Committee of Experts on Public Administration - CEPA). While effectiveness of the public service can be largely seen through the nature, quality, quantity, responsiveness and equity of the services delivered, the women and men who deliver them (i.e the public servants) must be developed, capacitated, motivated and committed all the time to sustain excellent or at least satisfactory levels of service delivery.

The leadership of the Government must not take its eyes off the critical importance of the

human resource that drives the delivery of public services. It can never be over emphasized that it is the most important resource for the development of the country. It must have the requisite capacities to drive the whole process of ensuring excellence in the management and delivery of the public services. It is not possible to have an excellent performance in government without an excellent human resource in the public service.

Developing the Capacity of Capacity Builders in the Public Service

The following needs to be done to address the inadequate capacity of Capacity builders in the Public Service:

- i. **Uplift and strengthen the function of HRM to a strategic partner level in all Ministries.**

There seems to have been a fundamental fault in the reforms of the public service in many African countries. The function of human resource management in the public service has not been accorded the requisite strategic positioning (APS-HRMnet). The public service must have human resource managers capable of guiding and managing reform and transformation processes. This is a capacity that is largely lacking in the public service. The function of human resource management in every ministry must be positioned at a strategic management level instead of being left at clerical level. In countries with high performing public services, the function of HRM is always at a strategic management level and ensures proper conception and management of the reform process. HRM managers perform functions of internal advisors to reform.

Some of the challenges facing the public service might be associated with inadequate capacity for managing the human resource. The Human Resource Management Units in the public service must be given a place around the table where the leadership decides public service strategies. At the same time individual HR managers must be empowered with sufficient capacities and competencies to ensure that the people who take the lead in the public service are aligned with the needs of the future that Africa wants. There is need to adopt a model of the HRM that best enables the Government to manage the HR in the public service so as to achieve their key objectives. Such a model will enable HR managers to play the roles of; Strategy expert, Work organization expert, Employee champion, and Agent of continuous change and transformation as adviser on change management.

Basic Roles of Human Resource Managers in the Public Service in the Context of Transformation

The functions of the human resource management and the individual human resource managers must be redefined to correspond to this HR strategic management model. Currently human resource managers are focusing on managing compliance and transactions. They need to put at the core of their functions strategic HR planning and management, performance management, organizational change management, cultural change management i.e changing the attitudes, mindsets, values, norms and behavior of public servants (Gelase Mutahaba, 2015). Note that without this change, reforms, even the best designed cannot be successfully implemented.

Transformation will be in-achievable.

Resilience

The 2030 Agenda brings on board the principle of resilience. Indeed, many countries are facing many socio-politico-economic and environmental changes some of which are disastrous and catastrophic. Without having high levels of resilience many societies will not achieve sustainable development as expressed in the 17 SDGs. African countries are driving towards transformation and sustainable development. If this works out as planned these countries will be technologically advanced, relying on critical infrastructures such as telecommunications, transportation (road, air, rail, water etc), electricity, information technology, oil refineries, financial services infrastructure and many others. While these make life easy for people, a slight disruption of any of them can cause extreme pressure and hardship.

There are frameworks of international agreements which raise the criticality of the need for resilience in societies. They include:

- **The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR)**, which was adopted in March 2015, aims to achieve “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health, and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, business, communities and countries” (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018).
- **The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**, adopted in September 2015, give us a plan of action for people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership,

and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development (the economic, the social and the environmental (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development September 2015)).

- **The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)**, agreed in December 2015 in Paris, aims to achieve a legally-binding and universal agreement, which will provide a framework for transition towards low-carbon societies and economies that are able to withstand climate change (United Nations Paris Agreement, 2015).

So while transformational leadership aims at transforming African societies to create good societies as we have indicated above, one critical strategic objective of the transformation must be creating resilient societies as well.

Diagram 12: The paradigm of resilience

Source: Author

Resilient societies must embrace values, practices, norms, and institutional arrangements that enable them to anticipate change, however drastic, adapt to the change and absorb shocks without being destroyed so that they can not only bounce back after such shocks but move on taking even better trajectories derived from the lessons of the shocks. Such societies must master effective communication, mobilization, coordination, collaboration, engagement, inclusion and partnerships. This means that transformational leadership must be a highly collaborative

leadership as well.

Conclusion

Well before the world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, many African countries, the African Union and Regional groupings had already conceived the need and strategies to transform their countries for the wellbeing of their people. The 2030 Agenda and the 17 SDGs came as an additional commitment supporting Africa's resolve to positively transform the lives of the people. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda to achieve the SDGs in Africa will need transformational leadership and engagement of the people. The people and their leadership must realize and accept that they have the responsibility to develop themselves. Transformational leadership at all levels in all sectors will facilitate, organize, inspire, support, and mobilize resources both internal and external, but the people themselves must develop their countries. The 2030 Agenda being people centered is in line with this. Transformational leadership will transform individuals, organizations, institutions and the entire society through, among other things, inculcating norms and values including leaving no one behind, social equity, engagement and participation, collaboration and partnerships, accountability, justice, integration and public service. Transformational leadership will, by inculcating these values be creating a good society that is resilient and ready to

continuously face the challenges of the future that emanate from an ever changing social economic and environmental world. Seen in this light, transformational leadership is a critical requirement for ensuring sustainable development

References

- Adam, I. S., (2014). *An empirical investigation of the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation's management of Nigeria's upstream petroleum sector*, <http://openair.rgu.ac.uk>.
- Africa Union Commission. "The Africa We Want: African Agenda 2063: General Briefing Kit" (<http://www.au.int/en/> , <http://agenda2063.au.int/>
- Gilbert, S.,J., (2010). "The Outside-In Approach to Customer Service". Harvard, Business School, 16 February.
- Haas, M. (2015). *Bouncing Forward: Transforming Bad breaks into Breakthroughs* . Enliven books: New York .
- Mutahaba, G. (Editor) (2015). Human Resource Management in African Public Sector: Current State and Future Directions (Africa Public Sector Human Resource Managers' Network- APS-HRMnet). Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd:, Dar Es Salaam, 2015)
- Oxfam (2017). *Oxfam Report 2017*, (Oxfamerica.org)
- Thompson, D. (2018). *A Nation's Greatness is Measured by How it Treat Its Weakest Members*. Crossing the Line, March 2018, crossingtheline.co
- United Nations (2012). "The Future We Want" (UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/66/288, 11 September)
- United Nations (2015). "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1of 25 September, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org>)
- United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015). "The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030". Sendai, Japan, March 18, <https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction> ,)

TRANSFORMED LEADERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL RESOURCES: THE AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Teferi Hailemichael

ABSTRACT

Africa continues in deepening poverty and degradation of natural resources yet the African leadership places pro-poor economic growth and environmental sustainability at the centre of its economic policies, systems and institutions. Leadership matters, and the quest for good leadership is a sine-qua-non-for governance and sustainable development in Africa; a sine qua non-to prudent management of national resources. This paper addresses the question of what constitutes good leadership in ‘ethnically fractionalised’ Africa; the quality of leadership needed to manage and preserve Africa’s resources for posterity. It attempts to identify the shared framework Africans want for their continent and determine the leadership quality necessary for sustainable management and preservation of Africa’s resources.

Africa’s heavy dependence on its natural resources base for socio-economic growth on one hand and its critical administrative weaknesses in natural resource management on the other highlights the need for effective management of its soils, forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife to achieve sustainable development. The African state leadership therefore, must work for innovative solutions and increased financial resources to tackle the intertwined challenges of climate change, land degradation, deforestation and biodiversity loss as major concerns for sustainable development in the continent.

Keywords: *Transformational Leadership, National Resources, Effective Management*

Introduction

It is a paradox that Africa continues in deepening poverty and degradation of natural resources despite the African leadership placing pro-poor economic growth and environmental sustainability at the centre of its economic policies, systems and institutions (UNECA, 2013). Ethiopia’s ‘Growth and Transformation Plan’, Ghana’s ‘Agenda for Growth and Prosperity’, Benin’s ‘Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction’, and Cameroon’s ‘Growth and Employment Strategy Paper’ are some

illustrations. Undeniably, Africa is growing fast and, growth is the single most crucial factor influencing poverty (World Bank, 2017; Sembene, 2015). Despite this fact, poverty and inequality remain persistently high in the continent and is a major policy challenge especially, in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2017; Chimhow, 2013). Poverty continued to rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, from about 48% in the year 2000, when the Millennium Development Goals were launched, to

about 50% of its population five years later (Amoako, 2005). Indeed, the quest for good leadership is a *sine-qua-non-for* governance and sustainable development in Africa; a *sine qua non-to* prudent management of national resources (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012). The question is what constitutes good leadership in Africa. In ‘ethnically fractionalised’ Africa, quality leadership is core to management and preservation Africa’s resources for posterity.

This paper is organised into two major sections to address the research question and attain the central objective stated. The shared strategic frameworks Africans have in optimising the use of their resources for the benefit of all Africans are dealt in section three. Section four discusses transformation and transformed leadership; effective management of national resources; and public governance and management of natural resources to determine the quality of leadership Africa needs in managing and preserving Africa’s resources for posterity. Conclusion is presented in the last section.

Central Objective

The central objective of this paper is to determine the quality of leadership needed to manage and preserve Africa’s resources for posterity—a *sine-qua-non-for* governance and sustainable development for the Africa we want in a transforming world. Attempts are made to identify the shared framework Africans want for their continent and determine the leadership quality necessary in the management and preservation of Africa’s resources for sustaining development; and their approach toward inclusive growth and sustainable development

The Continent that Africans Want: The

Shared Strategic Framework

Africa is a continent of multi ethnolinguistic cultures. It constitutes 16% of the total world population with a population density of 106 people per square mile on a total land area of 29,661,703 square kilo meters, 54 sovereign states and countries, 9 territories and 2 de facto independent states (Worldometers, 2017). The Eastern Africa Sub-Region constitutes 33% of the African total population followed by the Western Sub- Region-30%, Northern Africa-19%, Central-13%, and the Southern Sub-Region-5% (Worldometers, 2017). All these people today share an African agenda, a “strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development & a global strategy to optimize the use of Africa’s resources for the benefit of all Africans” (Agenda 2063 Framework Document, 2015).

Optimising the Use of Africa’s Resources for the Benefit of all Africans

For the Benefit of all Africans: what it means

Before colonial rule, Africa was comprised some thousands of different states and autonomous groups with distinct languages and customs. The colonial policy of balkanization of the African states that ignored ethnic and cultural factors in determining national boundaries caused social fragmentation in the continent. The African leadership of the time was thus left to regard a strong central government as essential to national unity and modernization of African states (Ayee, 2005). As a result, Africa became a continent of the most ethnolinguistically diverse countries in the

world (Miguel, 2011) where most of the ethnic groups are dispersed along two or more of the present day African sovereign states; examples are: The 27 million Fulani people in countries of Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Burkina-Faso, Benin, Niger, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire; the 35 million Hausa in Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sudan; and, the 20 million Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Creative Commons Attribution, 2016). Such are the African nations - communities of people with common origin, language, and tradition spread among several states and governed accordingly (Black's Law Dictionary, 2004). That left the continent with deep social divisions and made African states State-Nations. Therefore, national in an African state is based on the social-economic-political, and legal and moral values of each ethnic community that the state governs. In African terms then a resource is national where each ethnic community in a state attaches its values to the resource in question. Subsequently, all investments on the national resource are to the benefit of each member in the ethnic community and all ethnic groups in the African state-nation; hence, African resources are for the benefit of all Africans.

Effective Governance of the National Economy Matters for Africa

In the African society of communal difference “the prospect that ethnic groups will evaluate their perceived well-being in comparison with others is well-nigh certain” (Young, 1994). This may be manipulated to result in ethnic polarisation that may ultimately

generate ethnic conflicts and eventually lead to political instability with enduring development repercussions. The potential conflict within an ethnically polarised society and its being manipulated thus hampers the rate of investment, increases public consumption, induce rent-seeking behaviour, and intensifies incidence of civil wars (Montalvo & Querolb, 2005; Gören, 2013). Ethnically fractionalised societies are prone to suffer from bad public-sector performance, which in turn hampers economic performance (Gören, 2013). Thence, effective governance of the national economy to which each ethnic community attaches its values for an inclusive growth and sustainable development remains a measure of the competence of the state-nation in Africa (Young, 1994).

Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, the African Approach

Africans aspire for “a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development” (The African Union Commission, 2015). Some propose emphasis on productive employment and others on pro-poor growth-higher income gains for low-income groups. Inclusive growth may be approached in diverse ways but all refer to growth that combines increased prosperity with greater equity (OECD, 2014). Underlying important aspects such as reducing poverty and inequality and benefiting the most marginalised; advancing poor people through increased income and improved wellbeing; participating all people in decision-making for organising the growth progression as well as in the growth itself whereby, everyone equitably shares the benefits of growing; and,

promoting sustainable use of natural resources and climate protection (Chang, 2014). Inclusive growth adopts strategic approach to sustainable development; and for growth to be sustained it must be broad-based across sectors, and be inclusive of the large part of the labour force in a state (Ianchovichina & Lundstrom, 2009).

Inclusive growth in ethno-linguistically fractionalised Africa is a question of equity, empowerment, opportunities, and participation of the members of each ethnic group. ‘Participating all people’ in the African context denotes enabling each member of an ethnic community participate, on the basis of the values of the community, in decision making whereby everyone in the community equitably shares the benefits of growing. Consequently, what is decided and benefited by the Somali ethnic community in Ethiopia, for instance, may have socio-economic and political repercussion on the same community in Kenya or Somalia, or Djibouti, or both. Indeed, for the growth to be sustainable it must also be broad based across sectors. The African sense of ‘broad based’ implies from and beyond an ethnic group; growth and development of the peoples of each ethnic group and all ethnic groups that may constitute the African state-nation. Economic sector engagement in the African way is thus best described by the economic values each ethnic community attaches to itself.

The Fulani ethnic community, for instance, forms the largest pastoral nomadic group in the world engaging in long distance trade and industrial arts that generally involve cattle (Encyclopedia of World Cultures, 2017). Agriculture is the main economic activity for the Hausa ethnic community. Besides, other Hausa people are engaged in industrial

arts with varied specializations such as tanning, leatherworking, weaving, dying, woodworking, and iron mining and trade in specific or long distance markets while others trade in (Countries and their Cultures, 2017). What matters for sustainable growth and development in Africa is therefore the growth and development of the peoples of each ethnic group and in their respective economic activity. The economic sector each ethnic community values however lags far behind to cause the growth and development of the community. Indeed, the communities can and must lead their efforts to develop (Amoako, 2005). All they need is empowerment and alignment of their goals and objectives to grow and develop into leaders; get stimulated and inspired to achieve extraordinary outcomes (Bass & Riggio, 2006) while their values are maintained and respected.

Quality of Leadership: Managing and Preserving Africa’s Resources for Posterity

State leadership transforms the social and cultural context of a society by making decisions to mobilize national resources against poverty (Zalanga, 2016). Leadership quality is designated by the ability to do what is right, relevant and attainable for the benefit of all people in the state society; and a political will, the ability to process national policies. (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012). Africa’s failure to harness its vast resources for the benefit of its people has a direct link to poor leadership that resulted from “frequent leadership change, lack of clear ideology, policy reversal and weak institutional setups” (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012). Transformation and transformed leadership is the way out.

Transformation and Transformed Leadership

There always prevails a change in every circumstance and the question is to critically identify which type of change—*developmental, transitional, or transformational*—the state is undertaking, for each necessitates different strategies, plans, and degree of engagement to succeed (Anderson & Ackerman, 2010). Developmental change signifies the improvement on what the leadership is actually performing; the skill, methods, and the standards it uses. Examples include simple work process improvements in the public service, or the civil service training. Where the change results in the replacement of the existing with a completely new state, it becomes transitional. With this change the leadership simultaneously dismantles the previous way of governance while putting a new state in place—that may include re-organizations, promulgation of new rules and standards that do not require a radical shift in culture to be effective (Anderson & Ackerman, 2010).

Transformation

Transformation implies a complete change in the character; a profound and radical change orienting the state leadership with a new direction to an entirely different level of effectiveness (Business Dictionary, 2015). It is a future oriented change and innovation enhancing long term effectiveness; the future state is so radically different from the current that people and culture must change accordingly to successfully execute the transformation (Anderson & Ackerman, 2010). Transformation in all institutional spheres as revealed in a state's social, political, economic, and technological institutions.

Institutional transformation as a fundamental change occurs along three possible dimensions—*goals, activities, and boundaries*. It denotes a substantial change in institutions involving a break with existing routines and a shift to new kinds of competencies that challenge institutional knowledge. Changes in the breadth of institutional goals, particularly realization from sector specific to state concern; and changes in the domain served by an institution are the two synchronized and major elements of goal transformations (Aldrich, 1999). The constant change in technological, social, political and economic environment demand that the African leadership to constantly adapt to the dynamic context (Mayer, Carpes, & Knoblich, 2014). Accordingly, Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals were set

The 'activities' dimension of transformation deals with actions that have a significant effect on products and services as well as on the availability of resources (Aldrich, 1999). In this regard, the African leadership (African Union, 2014) claims its commitment to, inter alia, eradicate poverty in a generation by 2025, through concentrating all their efforts towards improving incomes, creating jobs and providing basic necessities of life; realise economic transformation and industrialisation through beneficiation of natural resources—agriculture and food security; commodities strategy; industrialisation, manufacturing, beneficiation, and services; and blue and green economy. The change is determined largely by qualities of the institutions and the extent to which outside influences control their abilities to make choices about the future (Aldrich, 1999). In this regard, the African leadership has determined, as a critical success factor in the realization of Agenda 2063, the need for “effective, accountable and development

oriented institutions, efficient and strong bureaucracy, clear and pragmatic development vision and planning, public policy that supports national entrepreneurial class and builds public trust, and governance structure based on transparent laws and rules” (African Union, 2014). It has also identified critical enablers and preconditions for this success, inter-alia, the mobilisation of African resources to finance and accelerate its transformation, peace, security, democratic governance and strengthen continental institutions and integration (African Union, 2014).

Social Transformation

Social transformation signifies a fundamental change in society, as contrasted with social change, a gradual or incremental change over a period of time (Khondker & Schuerkens, 2014). The world these days has emerged particularly with ethnic identity groups in a quest for security, status, and resources by virtue of their ‘cultural difference’; ethnic identities are rediscovered and re-constructed with new claims catalogued; and thus, the multi-cultural state-nation has appeared with new ethnic claimants unyielding in their demands (Premdas, 2014).

Economic Transformation

The transformation in the economic sphere is a fundamental change in the structure of the economy and its drivers of growth and development necessarily involving;

- Relocation of resources from less to more productive sectors;
- Increase in the relative contribution of manufacturing to GDP;

- Declining share of agricultural employment to total employment;
- Shift in economic activity from rural to urban areas;
- The rise of a modern industrial and service economy;
- Demographic transition from high to low rates of births and deaths; and a rise in urbanization (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2013).

Many African countries have exhibited growth following macroeconomic reforms, better business environments, and higher commodity prices (the African Center for Economic Transformation, 2014). To ensure this growth is sustainable, African states need to vigorously promote economic transformation, thereby diversifying their production and exports; becoming more competitive in international markets; increasing the productivity of resource inputs, especially labour; and upgrading technologies used in the production process (the African Center for Economic Transformation, 2014). The African Union Agenda 2063 calls for the African economy to integrate with the worldwide economy that may require human capital development through education and training, especially in science, technology, and innovation; infrastructure expansion to link African economies and people; fostering evocative partnerships with the private sector (African Union, 2014).

Transformed Leadership

The driving force behind transformative change is leadership (Decker, Jacobson, & Organ, 2011). Transformation being

the determinant factor in all aspects of human activities, necessitates a transformed leadership for success. It requires the ability to operate pan-institutionally and to take a long-term view whilst balancing urgent short-term priorities (Trevor & Hill, 2012). For the transformation to occur the whole system has to change. In an institutional setting, the values, beliefs and behaviours of the leadership significantly influence the values, beliefs and behaviours of the people in the institution. Subsequently the leaders' values, beliefs and behaviours significantly influence the culture of the institution. Henceforth, the culture of an institution reflects the values and beliefs of the incumbent leaders and the institutionalized legacy of the values and beliefs of former leaders as witnessed in the structures, systems, processes, policies and procedures of the institution (Barrett, 2017).


Leadership is a management function, a process transformation, therefore, begins with the personal commitment of the leader to personal transformation and subsequently the culture of the institution reflects leadership consciousness

of influencing people to achieve desired goals and objectives (Metwally & El-bishbishy, 204). It is “the capacity to inspire individuals to give their best to achieve a desired result and to maintain effective relationships with individuals and the team as a whole” (Armstrong, 2014). The idea of effective leadership has transformed from the command and power view point toward the concepts of “confidence to empower others. To empower others, the leader must be transformed; able to examine his/her actions in real time to understand others- take their perspective, and simultaneously set the cadence for the entire organization toward the desired future (Marshall, 2011).

Figure 4-1: Whole-system change perspectives as viewed from Individual/Collective and Inside/Outside conditions

Source: (Barrett, 2017)

The process of whole-system change,



(Barrett, 2017). The personal commitment of a state leader is the political will, the compelling force by which transformative leadership (quality of state leadership, and/or the ability to process national policies), is exerted. A transformed leadership is thus characterised by:

- Ability to exert influence by serving

as a role model, demonstrating high performance as well as high moral standards-idealized influence;

- the ability to develop and communicate a convincing and attractive future vision- inspirational motivation;

- The involvement and participation to stimulate followers-questioning assumptions, reframing problems and challenging tasks-*intellectual stimulation*; and
- Acting as a coach or mentor and recognize the needs for achievement, growth and desires of individuals-*individualized consideration* (Felfe, Tartler, & Liepmann, 2004).

For a transformation initiative to succeed the following four conditions elaborated by Richard Barret (2017) need to be met:


- Personal alignment:** an alignment between the values and beliefs of individuals and their words, actions, and behaviours. Leaders are authentic they walk their talk.
- Structural alignment:** an alignment between the stated institutional values, and the behaviours of the institution, as institutionalised in the structures, systems,

Figure 4-2 Conditions required for whole-system change initiative to take place

Source: (Barrett, 2017)

- Values alignment:** an alignment between the personal values of followers and the stated values of the institution for the

followers to feel at home in the institution to avail their whole selves to work.



- Mission alignment:** an alignment of the sense of motivation and purpose of all followers, and the mission and vision of the institution for everybody in the institution to have a clear line of sight between the task they perform and the mission or vision of the institution to make a difference.

With transformed leadership comes transformational approach, a modern approach to leadership whose major premise is the leader's ability to motivate followers to achieve beyond their expectations (Metwally & El-bishbishy, 2014), notably in the effective

management of national resources..

Effective Management of National Resources

Management is all about resources, the efficient and effective utilisation of institutional resources. Management processes different type of resources to achieve institutional goals by ensuring their effective use in the best interest of the society. It is “the process of planning, organizing, leading and controlling the efforts of organisation members and

using all other organisational resources to achieve stated organisational goals” (Stoner & Freeman, 1989). Management is successful when it is effective in the functions necessary to achieve the desired institutional goals with effective utilisation of available institutional resources. Where the institutional goals are those to which some/all ethnic groups in the state attach their values, the resources that the institutions manage become national. In view of that national resources include notably the human, natural and environmental, fiscal and physical, and informational resources.

Management of national resources signifies the efficient and effective utilisation of resources to which all people in the state attach their values. It deals with identifying the resources that some/all ethnic groups value most—*the demand for a national resource*; whether the resource demanded is available to the satisfaction of the ethnic groups—*resources availability*; how the resources fit into the ethnic community demands—*the resource data*; and fair distribution of the national resources—*efficient utilisation/allocation*. The key elements in managing national resources effectively thus involve:

- national resource planning containing all aspects of resources management that pertain to the resources required—resource plan;
- breaking down national resources (institutional breakdown structure) required to accomplish national goals cascaded—resource breakdown structure;
- assigning responsibilities to various institutions in the national hierarchy as the resource breakdown structure meets up with the work breakdown structure—responsibility assessment matrix;

- evaluating whether there are national resources being over-allocated—resource histogram;
- identifying national tasks requiring same national resource and a national task that can only be completed by a particular national resource—resource dependency (Bowen, 2017).

With management comes the leading function, which carries along the rest of the principles of management as guidelines for the decisions and actions of leaders. Accordingly, leaders employ contemporary principles of management— amongst others such as change and conflict management; social responsibility; culture and diversity management; and team and leadership development (Leadercast, 2017). Effective management is a primary objective of leadership so that while managers are getting the work done, the leader creates vision, establishes direction, aligns, motivates and, inspires people (Decker, Jacobson, & Organ, 2011).

Leadership features all aspects of societal values; its politics, economics, culture, rule of law, and morality. It is thus political, social, economic, legal, as well as moral by its very nature. The effectiveness of the management of African national resources depends on the leadership ability to base on societal values while exploiting the resources to attain what all aspire for - inclusive growth and development.


Public Governance and Management of Natural Resource

Africa is endowed with a rich and diverse natural resource-base on which the majority of its people depend for their livelihood (UNECA, 2013). Natural resources in any African state are national resources for the people in some or all ethnic groups in the state-nation to which they attach their values. These resources are notably; land, forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife in the state nation. Critical weaknesses in administrative capacity to tackle acute set of constraints and problems that have proven intractable as a result of complex, interlocking connections among various economic, political, socio-cultural, institutional, and physical factor, have hindered effective management of natural resources in Africa (Brinkerhoff & Gage, 1992). The sustainable use of natural resources and the environment depends largely on responsible governance, the way individual members of each ethnic group in the state has right over, and gain access to land, lakes, rivers, forests, and wildlife resources (FAO, 2014). Responsible governance of natural resources particularly in socially fractionalised African states ensures social stability, sustainable use of the environment, responsible investment for sustainable development and attainment of food security (FAO, 2014).

Land remains the most preferred natural resource in Africa and the basis of survival

for the majority Africans, yet underexploited, poorly managed and widely degraded (Richard, Legrand, & Garba, 2015). Africa has got annual average, with significant water scarcity due to high evaporation and high variability of rains and the lack of necessary investments in rain harvesting. About a quarter of the African land area is covered by forest, environmental goods and services are however, threatened by rapid deforestation on the continent. Rapid urbanization as well poses environmental challenges in terms of pollution and waste management since the trend is not accompanied by appropriate infrastructures. Africa has considerable, under-exploited, new and renewable energy resources (Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2003). Poor management, limited institutional, human and financial capacities, and weak law enforcement along with the climate change factors cause renewable natural resources in Africa to deplete rapidly (Richard, Legrand, & Garba, 2015). The continuing dependence on natural resources base for socioeconomic growth on one hand and its critical administrative weaknesses in natural resources management on the other highlights the need for effective management of Africa's soils, forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife to achieve sustainable development. The African state leadership has to develop innovative solutions and increase financial resources to tackle these intertwined challenges of climate change, land degradation, deforestation and biodiversity loss as a major concern for sustainable development in the continent (Brinkerhoff & Gage, 1992).

Figure 4-3 Transformed leadership and effective management of national resources to achieve inclusive growth and development



Source: Own Computation

Conclusion

It is a paradox that Africa continues in deepening poverty and degradation of natural resources and yet African leadership places pro-poor economic growth and environmental sustainability at the centre of its economic policies, systems and institutions. The leadership commitment (motivation, competency, and responsibility) matters. Leadership is a management function with effective management as its primary objective; it's a process of influencing people to achieve desired goals and objectives. The leadership creates vision; establishes direction; aligns, motivates and inspires people; hence the management gets the work done. The constant change in technological, social, political and economic environment demands that African states' leadership should constantly adapt to a dynamic context.

Inclusive growth and development in ethnolinguistically fractionalized Africa is a question of equity, empowerment, opportunities, and participation of the members of each ethnic group. 'Participating all people' in the African context denotes enabling each member of an ethnic community to participate, on the basis of the values of the community, in decision making whereby everyone in the community equitably shares the benefits of growing. In African terms therefore, a resource is national where each ethnic community in a state attaches its values to the resource in question. Subsequently, all investments on the national resource are to the benefit of each member in the ethnic community and all ethnic groups in the African state nation—African resources for the benefit of all Africans.

Achieving what Africans aspire for their continent, inclusive growth and development to induce efficient and effective utilisation of African resources for the benefit of all

Africans, necessitates a fundamental change in the African socio-economic, political, and legal institutional setups. The leadership in Africa therefore must be transformed to achieve a transformative change in the management of national resources. Effective management of national resources in the African context denotes incisive growth and development and positioning the resources for the benefit of all African peoples. It involves resource planning, resource breakdown structure, responsibility asymmetry matrix, evaluating resource over-allocation, and identifying the degree of resource dependency.

Africa's continuing dependence on her natural resources base for socioeconomic growth on one hand and its critical administrative weaknesses in natural resources management on the other, highlights the need for effective management of its soils, forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife to achieve sustainable development. The African state leadership must develop for innovative solutions and increase financial resources to tackle the intertwined challenges of climate change, land degradation, deforestation and biodiversity loss as a major concern for sustainable development in the continent

References

- Afegbua, S. I., & Adejuwon, K. D. (2012, September). The Challenges of Leadership and Governance in Africa. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 2(9), 141-157.
- African Union. (2014). *Our Journey Towards 2063 Has Started*. Bahir Dar, Ethiopia: The Department of Internal Relations and Cooperation.
- Aldrich, H. E. (1999). *Organisations evolving*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., .
- Amoako, K. Y. (2005). *Transforming Africa: An Agenda for Action*. Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa.
- Amoako, K. Y. (2005). *Transforming Africa: An Agenda for Action*. Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa.
- Anderson, D., & Ackerman, L. (2010). *What is Transformation, and Why is it so Hard to Manage?* Durango, CO: Bing First Inc.
- Armstrong, M. (2014). *Armstrong's handbook of human resource management practice*. London: Ashford Colour press Ltd.
- Ayee, J. R. (2005). *Public Sector Management in Africa*. Tunis: African Development Bank.
- Barrett, R. (2017, February 12). *Fundamentals of Cultural Transformation: Implementing whole system change*. Retrieved from Barret Value Centre Web site: <http://www.valuescentre.com>
- Bass, B. M., & Riggio, R. E. (2006). *Transformational Leadership*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Black's Law Dictionary. (2004). *Black's Law Dictionary* (Eighth ed.). (B. A. Garner, Ed.) NY: New York: Thomson West Group.

- Bowen, R. (2017, April 03). *Key Elements of Resource Management*. (M. McDonough, Editor) Retrieved from Bright hub project management Web site: www.brighthubpm.com
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Gage, J. D. (1992). Natural Resources Management Policy in Africa: Implementation Challenges for Public Managers. *ASPA-53rd National Conference*, (pp. 1-32). Chicago, IL: University of Maryland .
- Business Dictionary. (2015). *Transformation*. NY: WebFinance Inc.
- Chang, C. (2014). *What is "inclusive growth"?* London: CAFOD.
- Chimhow, A. (2013). *Chronic Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa Achievements, Problems and Prospects*. Manchester : The University of Manchester.
- Countries and their Cultures. (2017, May 8). *Hausa--Economy: everyculture*. Retrieved from Advameg, Inc.: www.everyculture.com
- Creative Commons Attribution. (2016, October 9). *Ethnic Groupin Africa*. Retrieved from Creative Commons Attribution Wb site: <http://creativecommons.org>
- Decker, D. J., Jacobson, C. A., & Organ, J. F. (2011). *Transformation of State Fish & Wildlife Agencies: Ensuring the Future of Conservation in a Rapidly Changing World*. Washington DC: Cornell University.
- Dess, G. G., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2014). *Strategic Management: Text and Cases* (Seventh ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education. (not cited)
- Encyclopedia of World Cultures. (2017, May 10). *Fulanii: Junior Worldmark Encyclopedia of World Cultures*. Retrieved from Encyclopedia of World Cultures: [Encyclopedia .com](http://Encyclopedia.com)
- Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). (2014). *Natural Resource Management and Environment in Small Islands Developing States*. Rome: FAO.
- Felfe, J., Tartler, K., & Liepmann, D. (2004). German Journal of Human Resource Research, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2004. *German Journal of Human Resource Research*, 18(3), 262-288.
- Gören, E. (2013, April). How Ethnic Diversity Affects Economic Development. *Senra Working Papers in Transnational Studies*(14).
- Ianchovichina, E., & Lundstrom, S. (2009). *What is Inclusive Growth?* Viena: PRMED.
- Jan van den Ende, R. K. (1999). Technological Transformation in History: How a Computer Regime Grew out of existing Computing Regime. *Research Policy*, 833-851.
- Kareke Si, S., & Kithyoma, W. (2003). Renewable Energy Development . *The Workshop for African Energy Experts on Operationalising the NEPAD* (pp. 1-30). Dakar: UN.
- Khondker, H. H., & Schuerkens, U. (2014). Social Transformation, Developmen, and Globalisation. *Sociopedia.isa*. doi:10.1177/205684601423
- LeaderCast. (2017, March 25). *Leading Mangement Principles:14 Principles of Management for Effective Management Styles*. Retrieved from Leadercast Web site: <http://www.Leadercast.com>

- Macmilam, H., & Tampoe, M. (2011). *Strategic Management*. New York: Oxford Press.
- Marshall, E. S. (2011). *Transformational Leadership in Nursing*. New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, LLC.
- Mayer, M., Carpes, M., & Knoblich, R. (Eds.). (2014). *The Global Politics of Science and*. Berline: Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
- Metwally, A. H., & El-bishbishy, N. (204). *The impact of transformational leadership style on employee satisfaction*. Alexandria: University of West London.
- Miguel, E. (2011). Ethnic Diversity and Poverty reduction. In Miguel, *The Causes of Poverty* (pp. 169-184). London: McGraw.
- Montalvoa, J. G., & Querolb, M. R. (2005, January). Ethnic diversity and economic development. *Journal of Development Economics* , 76, 293–323.
- Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). (2014). *All on Board: Making Inclusive Growth Happen*. London: OECD.
- Premdas, R. R. (2014). *Management of Social Transformations - MOST*. New York NY: UNESCO.
- Richard, F., Legrand, T., & Garba, L. (2015). *A Promising Tool for Natural Resources Management in Africa*. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group.
- Sembene, D. (2015). *Poverty, Growth, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Did the Walk Match the Talk under the PRSP Approach?* New York: International Monetary Fund.
- Stoner, A. J., & Freeman, F. (1989). *Management*. New Delhi: Printice Hall of India.
- Swart, G., Wyk, J.-A. v., & Botha, M. (2014). African Political Leadership. In *Leadreship* (pp. 659-670). Nwegen: oxford.
- The African Center for Economic Transformation. (2014). *2014 African Transformation Report: Growth with Depth*. Accra, Ghana: ACET.
- The African Union Commssion. (2015). *Agenda 2063 Framework Document*. Addis Ababa: AUC.
- Trevor, o., & Hill, R. (2012). Developing Transformational Leadership Capacity. *Developing Leaders*(9), 42-47.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2013). *Economic Transformation for Africa's Development*. Washington D.C.: UNECA.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) . (2013). *Managing Africa's Natural Resource Base for Sustainable Growth and Development: Sustainable Development Report on Africa IV*. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).
- World Bank. (2017, August 20). *Africa Continues to Grow Strongly but Poverty and Inequality Remain Persistently High: World Bank*. Retrieved from World Bank Web site: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/10/07/africa-continues-grow-strongly-poverty-inequality-persistently-high>

- Worldometers. (2017, August 19). *Africa Population: Worldometers*. Retrieved from Worldometers Web site: <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/>
- Young, C. (1994). *Eethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview*. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Salanga, S. (2016). Julius Nyerere: Leadership Insights for Contemporary Challenges. In E.Obadare, & W. Adebani (Eds.), *Governance and the Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa: Leadership in Transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

MANAGING WATER RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF AFRICA AGENDA 2063 AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS – A CASE STUDY OF KENYA

Patrick Gachagua

Abstract

Water is a key driver of economic and social development while it also has a basic function in maintaining the integrity of the natural environment. However water is only one of a number of vital natural resources and it is imperative that water issues are not considered in isolation. Managers, whether in the government or private sectors, have to make difficult decisions on water allocation.

More and more, they have to apportion diminishing supplies between ever-increasing demands. Drivers such as demographic and climatic changes further increase the stress on water resources. The traditional fragmented approach is no longer viable and a more holistic approach to water management is essential.

The need for increased access to sustainable and affordable water services is a priority of the Government within the overall policy framework of Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth creation, Kenya Vision 2030 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG No. 7 target three aimed to halve the proportion of the universal population without sustainable access to clean and safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.

Increasing people's access to sanitation and drinking-water brings large benefits to the development of individual countries through improvements in health outcomes and the economy. The economic benefits of investing in drinking-water and sanitation come in form of health-care savings by health agencies and individuals; productive days gained per year (for those 15-59 years of age) and increased school attendance; time savings resulting from more convenient access to services; and value of deaths averted (WHO 2004).

This paper outlines the water resource distribution in Kenya and the challenges the country is facing in the management of the water sector. It examines the approach Kenya has taken to manage its water resources to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063. It also proposes further action for effective and efficient management of water in the country.

Keywords: Water Resource, Management, Distribution, Conservation and Water Demand Management, Water Catchment

Introduction

Water is an important natural resource to all forms of life and their existence; for mankind, it is the backbone of growth and prosperity. The growing demands for it against the limited temporal natural endowment and its increasing scarcity could result in devastating conflicts and catastrophes. Kenya as a country is facing a number of serious challenges related to water resources management. A number of these challenges are as a result of factors both within and outside the water sector.

Climate variability, destruction of wetlands and the wider catchment areas and increasing demand for water as a result of development and population pressure are factors that the sector may not be able to control but can initiate mitigation measures to ensure sustainable water resource development.

Water resources contribute enormously to economic productivity and social wellbeing of the human populace as both social and economic activities rely heavily on the quantity and quality of water.

With the increasing growth in population and the subsequent socio-economic pursuits (including urbanization, industrial production, tourism and agricultural activities) demand for water has increased rapidly. Effective management and access to water resources is vital to sustainable development and good governance. Governments across the world have spent considerable effort and resources to move toward that goal. Governments, the public, donors, and development agencies have often neglected challenges in water governance. Some of these challenges are related to policies, access to water resources, participation and water information.

The Millennium Development Goal (Target 7C) outlines the target for halving the proportion of population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015. It is noted that poor countries with access to clean water and sanitation services experienced faster economic growth than those lacking. Similarly poor countries without access had annual growth of just 0.1 percent. Almost 80% of diseases in so-called “developing” countries are associated with water, causing some three million early deaths (Moraa, 2012).

The need for increased access to sustainable and affordable water services is a priority of the Government within the overall policy framework of Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth creation, Kenya Vision 2030 and the Millennium Development Goals. A wide range of government policy documents, including the 1999 National Policy on Water Management and Development, have recognized effective water resource management as key to both basic human needs and sustainable economic development.


Conceptual Framework

In Kenya, water governance culminates in three components: accessibility to resources, water services delivery, and participation in water management. The other main issues in water in Kenya are around the quality of water, continuity of water supply and waste water treatment. Owing to the vested nature of Kenyan water resources by the state, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation spearheads water governance, management and services provision through the creation of institutions spelt out under the Water Act 2002 that was later revised in 2012. Through the Water Act, reforms focusing on commercialization of water and decentralization of management

in a participatory approach were initiated delineating regulation responsibilities for various stakeholders.

The principal mechanism to enhance transparency and accountability is underpinned on devolved water services provision and resource management under the Act. Under the Act, which is a legal framework on water resources management, the Ministry's role is limited to land-water reclamation,

drainage, irrigation, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, and resource mobilization. Additionally, the WRMA, whose role is to conserve, map, regulate and manage water resources sustainably while involving stakeholders to guarantee fair allocation of water resources, was formed under the Act's provisions. This paper analyses various decentralization types adopted by Kenya under the Water Act and helps to understand their influence in water services delivery.



Many experts seem to agree that poor access to water supply is often a result of poor policies and management practices; however, there is significant disagreement over the approach to addressing the problem (Sumila 2005). The Government of Kenya has placed water sector reforms high on its agenda, and implementation of the Water Act of 2002, which will include major institutional reforms.

Water Resource Distribution in Kenya

Kenya has a total area of about 582, 646 km². Water occupies about 1.9 percent or 11 230 km². The rest, equivalent to 571 416 km² is covered by land. 80 percent of Kenya's land area is arid or semi- arid (ASALs), implying that only 114 283 km² of Kenyan land can be profitably used for rain fed agriculture. There is however, a large potential for agriculture in the ASALs if the required investments in irrigation, water storage and water harvesting infrastructure are made.

Kenya's freshwater resources are represented by lakes, rivers, swamps, springs as well as dams, water pans and groundwater.

Water Catchments (Water Towers) - A catchment is an area where water is collected by the natural landscape. In a catchment, rainwater run-off will eventually flow to a creek, river, dam, lake, ocean, or into a groundwater system.

Kenya has Catchments in five main ecosystems—Mt. Kenya, Aberdares, Mau Complex, Mt. Elgon, and Cherangani— which provide most of the water for the major rivers in the country.

Healthy water catchments help to protect our rivers, dams and groundwater environments and provide our community with: clean drinking water, natural areas for recreation, habitat for plants and animals, healthy vegetation and waterways, reliable and clean water for stock and irrigation and opportunities for sustainable agriculture and industry

Drainage Basins- Kenya's freshwater resources are represented by lakes, rivers, swamps, springs as well as dams, water pans and groundwater.

Kenya has five major basins: Lake Victoria, Rift Valley, Athi River, Tana River and Ewaso Ngiro basins. However, only two of these basins can be rated to have surplus water resources: Lake Victoria and Tana River. The other three basins have water deficits and often rely on inter-basin water transfers to meet their basic water needs.

Kenya's Wetlands- Kenya has through the National Wetlands Standing Committee (NWSC) defined Kenyan wetlands as: "areas of land that are permanently, seasonally or occasionally waterlogged with fresh, saline, brackish or marine waters at a depth not exceeding six metres, including both natural and man-made areas that support characteristic biota". In Kenya wetlands include shallow lakes, swamps, and coastal wetlands including the mangrove swamps.

Wetlands allow interaction between water, soil, vegetation and light all the year round or during a greater part of the year. The depth of the water is such that it allows photosynthesis to occur, making wetlands productive life-supporting ecosystems. It is this association of water, light, soil and plants that typifies various wetlands of Kenya which are famous for their spectacular avifauna and fisheries resources.

Ground Water Resources- Groundwater is defined as water that infiltrates into the ground, collects or flows beneath the earth's surface, filling the porous spaces in soil, sediment, and rocks and is the source of water for aquifers, springs, and wells. The upper surface of groundwater is the water table.

(GOK MWI 2013). In Kenya, the full potential of groundwater is still unknown. However, the intensifying use and demand for water resource in Kenya reveals its strategic importance.

Ground water resources are dependent on the rock types and recharge conditions. Presently groundwater meets water supply for domestic, industries, irrigation as well as environmental needs. Wetlands for example regulate both recharge and discharge of groundwater, support habitats and provide other products and services.

Kenya's groundwater potential is extremely variable, both spatially and temporally, in quality and quantity and in terms of the level of the water table and depth. Groundwater is increasingly being recognized as an important water source for both urban and rural areas. In the ASAL areas, it is often the dominant water source for livestock and humans. Recent developments in knowledge pointed to new groundwater resources whose importance was previously not recognized. (GOK 2013).

Challenges Facing Water Sector in Kenya

Kenya faces enormous challenges in meeting human and ecological needs for water. The Kenya Vision 2030 aims at ensuring that improved water and sanitation are available for all by the year 2030 in spite of the present low service coverage; and so does the ambitious irrigation and drainage targets.

Population growth, urbanization and rising standards of living across the country has put water resources under increasing stress; while at the same time catchment degradation and poor waste management continue to reduce freshwater availability. The water shortage in

the future is expected to be more severe than the present due to increase of water demands. (Okello 2015).

Water resources in Kenya are irregularly distributed in both space and time. Surface water resources are heavily dependent on the seasonal rainfall variability, limited water storage and sustainable water catchment management. The water deficit of Athi Catchment, as other catchments indicates that they are facing tremendously severe water shortage and or stress as the large water demand is exceeding the renewable surface water resources. Further uncertainty is imposed by climate change. Lately water availability has worsened due to climate change and variability, rising population pressure and destruction of wetlands and the wider catchment areas.

This has created a negative relationship between population growth and per capita water availability.

Water Conservation and Demand Management in Kenya

Water conservation involves protection of water sources including, catchments, ground water aquifers and wetlands while Demand Management involves increasing the efficiency with which water is used. Water conservation and demand management techniques in all their forms involve: efficient irrigation methods, rain water harvesting including roof catchment for domestic purposes, delineating and zoning areas for water conservation, water shed management (protection against catchment deforestation and degradation), water recycling and re-use and protection of wetlands and important ecosystems.

The National Water Resources Management Strategy proposes a number of strategies that can be adopted to ensure the availability of water resources for human consumption, agriculture, industry and mining. The approach is based on enhancing security of supply through the provision of more dams and yet this traditional supply oriented approach to meeting increased water demand is not sustainable. It is therefore important to consider managing the demand for water to ensure sustainability. The key challenges are to establish priorities and strategies to encourage more efficient and productive use of water and to reshape institutions to better suit the new era of water constraints.

The principal strategies for water demand management can be categorized as market-based such as, water pricing and affluent charges, technology based such reduction of unaccounted for water, recycling, and conjunctive use of water and demand management in the agricultural sector. Public awareness campaigns directed at both the water users and the legislators on the benefits of water demand management; and how the stakeholders can contribute to its successful implementation, complement these. The National Water Master Plan of 1992 indicated that water demand in the important categories of domestic, industrial, agriculture including irrigation, livestock, wild life and hydropower water, will continue to increase.

Water and Sustainable Development

Water is at the core of sustainable development and is critical for socio-economic development, healthy ecosystems and human survival itself. It is vital for reducing the global burden of disease and improving the health, welfare and

productivity of populations. It is central to the production and preservation of a host of benefits and services for people. Water is also at the heart of adaptation to climate change, serving as the crucial link between the climate system, human society and the environment

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

Evidence points to water and sanitation conditions as perhaps, the world's largest single cause of disease and to improvements in this sector as being critical to sustainable progress across a broad spectrum of development outcomes, including the MDGs and food security. Safe water and improved sanitation provides a basic level of human security that, once achieved, enables families and individuals to work to uplift their standards of living.

Water scarcity, poor water quality and inadequate sanitation negatively impact food security, livelihood choices and educational opportunities for poor families across the world. Drought too afflicts some of the world's poorest countries, worsening hunger and malnutrition.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), otherwise known as the Global Goals, are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. They provide clear guidelines and targets for all countries to adopt in accordance with their own priorities and the environmental challenges of the world at large. They tackle the root causes of poverty and unite us together to make a positive change for both people and planet. The SDGs work in the spirit of partnership and pragmatism to make the right choices now to improve life, in a sustainable way, for future generations. These 17 Goals build on the successes of

the Millennium Development Goals, while including new areas such as climate change, economic inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice, among other priorities.

SDG 6, in particular, aims to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. Water scarcity, poor water quality and inadequate sanitation negatively impact food security, livelihood choices and educational opportunities for poor families across the world. Drought afflicts some of the world's poorest countries, worsening hunger and malnutrition

African Union Agenda 2063

The African Union's Agenda 2063 action plan was formed at the Organisation of African Unity/African Union 50th anniversary celebration in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2013. In terms of the plan, African leaders made a pledge to accelerate growth, development and prosperity on the continent going forward to 2063. It is a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It builds on, and seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and sustainable development.

In implementing Agenda 2063, prioritizing the mobilization of people for ownership of continental programmes is critical. There must be a principle of self-reliance, with Africa financing its own development. NEPAD, the implementing agency of the African Union, has been tasked with fast-tracking the implementation and monitoring of major continental development programmes and frameworks, including Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Kenya

has deliberately undertaken to implement Africa's Agenda 2063 and the SDGs via the Vision 2030 Medium Term Plan framework.

Water Sector Reform in Kenya

Kenya, with a population of over 40 million, faces enormous challenges in the management of her limited water resources. These include: water scarcity, water resources underdevelopment, climate variability, catchment degradation, water resources assessment and monitoring, and trans-boundary water resources. The magnitude of the issues and challenges and severity of the water crisis, that currently face Kenya cut across most sectors of the economy making water resources management a high priority requiring urgent attention.

In 1999, Kenya embarked on a radical water sector reform to improve the dire state of the water services and water resource management. Kenya's intention to reform in light of the problems faced and the lessons learnt paved the way for the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp). The Water Act of 2002 is currently the main piece of legislation for the regulation of the water sector in Kenya. All policies, regulations and bylaws, directives and administration actions from the water ministry and strategic plans and all activities by water sector institutions must be carried out in accordance with its provisions, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)-(2010).

In recognition of these issues and challenges, the Government has initiated a process of reform for the entire water sector. The sector is being transformed in line with national policy as outlined in the National Poverty Reduction

Strategy Paper, the Economic Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation and the Water Act of 2002, in an attempt to meet the Strategic Development Goals (SDGs).

Legal and Institutional Framework for Managing Water in Kenya:

A wide range of government policy documents, including the 1999 National Policy on Water Management and Development, have recognized effective water resource management as key to both basic human needs and sustainable economic development. According to World Bank Working Paper No. 69, Kenya's development policy is intended to raise the level of economic development and improve the population's standard of living. Efforts to develop the water sector have been based on water being both a basic human need and a catalyst to accelerate social and economic development. This objective has been articulated in various development policy documents starting with Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (Republic of Kenya 1965), which emphasized the need for the provision of major basic social services, including water.

Water Act 2002

The Water Act 2002 establishes an independent management authority, the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA), Water Services Regulatory Board (WSRB), Water Services Boards (WSB), regional catchments offices, Catchments Area Advisory Committees (CAACs) and the establishment of Water Users Associations (WUAs). The establishment of these institutions allows for decentralization, participation and sustainability in the management of water resources. The adoption of an institutional framework at various levels is considered as one of the key strategic

outcomes in the water reforms. According to the World Bank 2002, effective institutions are required at national, regional and local level to ensure that all stakeholders can contribute to the decision making process.

Sessional Paper Number 1 of 1999 on National Water Policy on Water Resources Management and Development provides the policy direction to address the above mentioned challenges. The objectives of the National Policy on Water resources management and development sessional paper No 1 of 1999 included were to; (i) preserve, conserve and protect available water resources and allocate it in a sustainable, rational, and economic way, (ii) supply good quality water in sufficient quantities to meet the various water needs, including poverty alleviation, while ensuring safe water disposal and environmental protection (NWRMS 2006).

The fundamental objectives for managing Kenya's water resources are enshrined in the Water Act (2002). Sections 11(1) and 11(2) define the National Water Resources Management Strategy in accordance with which, the water resources of Kenya shall be managed, protected, used, developed conserved and controlled. The strategy shall prescribe the principles, objectives, procedures and institutional arrangements for the conservation and control of water resources including: (i) Classifying water resources (ii) Determining the requirements of the reserve for each water resource and (iii) Identifying areas designated as protected and groundwater conservation areas. The Act therefore addressed the issues of policy formulation, regulation and service provision. However, the Separation of policy formulation, regulation and services provision functions and water resources management from water and sewerage services is the main

achievements of the water Act 2002 for efficient and effective management of water. (NWRMS 2006)

Conclusion and Recommendations

According to the Global Water Partnership (GWP), the current water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance (GWP, 2003). This means that improving governance can easily solve water problems facing many countries of the world today. A wide range of government policy documents, including the 1999 National Policy on Water Management and Development, have recognized effective water resource management as key to both basic human needs and sustainable economic development. Good governance in the water sector which involves the upholding of the policies, strategies and legislation where water service providers have to develop and manage water resources in an efficient and effective manner while being accountable to the recipients of the services must be upheld.

Effective management and access to water resources is vital to sustainable development and good governance. Governments across the world have spent considerable effort and resources to move toward that goal. Governments, the public, donors, and development agencies have often neglected challenges in water governance. Some of these challenges are related to policies, access to water resources, participation and water information.

Government has put in place a supportive legal and policy framework that will ensure the sustainable development of water resources. The vision for the water and sanitation sector is to ensure water and improved sanitation

availability and access to all by 2030. To achieve this, Vision 2030 spells out measures to be undertaken to enable universal access to water and improved sanitation by 2030. Some of the specific strategies include improving the management of water resources, enhancing storage and harvesting capacity, constructing multipurpose dams as well as water and sanitation facilities in order to cater for the growing population. It has also defined flagship projects that will enhance the achievement of the water-related MDGs.

The new Constitution provides for the right to water and sanitation and recognizes environmental management as critical to achieving sustainable development. The Constitution also underscores the need for sustainable utilization, exploitation, management and conservation of the environment and natural resources as well as ensuring ecologically sustainable development including the protection of ecologically sensitive areas.

References

- Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), (2010) *Lessons Learned and Good Practices from Support to the Kenyan Water Sector*
- Government of Kenya, GOK (1992): *National Water Master Plan*. Government Printer, Nairobi.
- Government of Kenya GOK (2016); Environmental Protection, Water and Natural Resources Sector Report; Medium Term Expenditure Framework (Mtef) Budget for the period 2017/18-2019/20
- Government of Kenya GOK (2013); *the National Policy Groundwater Resources Development and Management*; Department of Water and Irrigation
- Hirji, R., Partoni, F. M. And Rubin, D. (Eds) (1996): *Proceedings of the Seminar on Integrated Water Resources Management in Kenya*, The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
- Washington, USA. Pp. 15-129.
- K'Akumu O. A. (2006): *Toward effective governance of water services in Kenya*: University of Westminster, London UK.
- Nyika J (2018): *Decentralization as a Tool in Improving Water Governance in Kenya*: Water Policy IWA Publishing, Alliance House, 12 Caxton Street, London, SW1H 0QS, UK
- Ochillo D.O; (2012) *Groundwater Governance and Policies in Kenya Institutional Structure and Legal Settings*.
- Okello C; Tomasello B; Greggio N. and Antonellini M. (2015): *Sustainable Water Development and Decision Making under Limited Data Availability*. MDPI Basel Switzerland.
- Rampa F. (2011) *European Centre for Development Policy Management: Discussion Paper No. 124 Analyzing Governance in the water sector in Kenya* October 2011
- Rogers P. & Hall, A.W (2003): *Effective Water Governance*. TEC Global Water Partnership

Global Water Partnership Background Papers No.7, World Bank

Sumila I, Debabrata T, and R. Mukami (2005) *Water for the Urban Poor: Water Markets, Household Demand, and Service Preferences in Kenya: Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series Paper No. 5* January 2005 The World Bank, Washington, DC

World Water Assessment Programme: 2nd UN World Water Development Report: Kenya National Water Development Report (2006)

ETHICAL LEADERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA: THE TANZANIAN EXPERIENCE OF A LOST LINK

Sospeter Muchunguzi

Abstract

This work strongly emphasizes that ethical leadership is a sine qua non element since it replicates to prudent public policy formulation and implementation, as well as appropriate public service delivery that meet the needs of citizens. Thus, African countries, being development- focused, are in dire need for ethical leaders who effectively mobilize resources and possess a vision to build capable institutions for posterity. This work focuses on success and challenging stories regarding ethical political leadership in Africa and specifically, experience from Tanzania will be explored seeking to identify when and how the kernel pillars of ethical leadership laid down during the first regime of Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere were compromised leading to disorientation of the country's direction in managing resources and how the fifth regime of government is striving for restoration of a lost link in ethical leadership in government. Lastly, suggestions on how leadership ethics should be inculcated to ensure a transformed leadership for effective management of resources in Africa will be provided.

Keywords: Natural Resources, National Resources, Transformed Leadership, Sustainable Management, Ethical Leadership, Development

Introduction

This work explores the nexus between ethical leadership and effective management of national resources. The major force is that performance of any nation, in seeking to achieve its set goals depends, to a large extent, on its leadership. This is especially so as ethical leadership translates into prudent public policy formulation and implementation, as well as good public service delivery, to meet

the needs and aspirations of citizens. The post-independence period in Africa has been characterised by never-ending quest for the depressing trajectory of African economies.

Since there is a recognized link between Ethical Leadership and a country's economic performance; many analysts peg the continent's "Dutch disease", protracted economic crises and lagging recovery to the crises in ethical leadership of both politicians and bureaucrats in different political regimes.

The reason why many African countries are rich in natural resources although this has not always been a blessing could be better explained by the fact that some African countries are said to have leadership gaps in many sectors. Therefore, African countries, being development-focused, have a strong need for transformative leadership, that is, ethical leaders who effectively mobilize resources and possess a vision and related strategies to build capable institutions that will exist beyond the single leader. African countries need leaders endowed with strong political will and an engagement towards development results. This strong commitment is often recognized as lacking in African political leadership and consequently contributing to slow down development processes and development-focused policies and initiatives.

Furthermore, the trend that cropped in Africa in the 1990s kindling hopes that political reform could lead to economic regeneration seems to fall short of its prediction. It was hoped that if governments become more accountable, transparent, rule-driven and politicians would find stronger incentives to undertake the public good, expand the economy, enhance citizens 'well-being, livelihoods and institutions of accountability; fight against corruption and malfeasance by rulers in order to ensure their political survival. Hence, for this to be realized, public ethical leadership cannot be over emphasized.

In defining an ethical political leader, two areas about political action and political agency have to be considered, namely the ethics of process and the ethics of policy. The ethics of process (or the ethics of office) deals with public officials and the methods they use. The ethics of policy (or ethics and public policy) concerns judgments about policies and laws. Therefore,

an ethical political leader is one who shows the way how to make, and makes, the right moral judgments about political action and political agents, and executes them in terms of political processes, policies and laws (Kassala, 2016).

The quest for Ethical leadership as an ideal way of ensuring effective management of national resources in Africa has been one of the major desires since independence. The challenges in governance in Africa date to the early years of independence. African leaders started envisioning its development vision towards the end of 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. They convened to work as a unique and common group to overcome the crucial challenges facing Africa and their fragile states. Some of them met on the Bandung Conference (Indonesia) on April 1955 where the non-aligned movement was born (Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 2005)

The need for Ethical leadership is in essence an answer to the long lasting debate on action for development in the African context. Such concern can be traced to Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah who was of the view that in order to strengthen the African continent and to make it less vulnerable to outside influence, the continent should be united. On May 1963 African leaders created the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African continent entered then a new era when the AU was formally inaugurated in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002.

African governments have adopted several strategies to mitigate the deepening economic problems and restart economic growth through having in place solid political and administrative institutions that promote the values of good governance. It is against this background that the New Partnership for

Africa's Development (NEPAD) emerged whose one of functional focus areas is ethics and anti-corruption. The launching of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2002 whose primary purpose was "to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity-building, is also one of the signposts of the need for effective management in Africa that ensures good management of national resources. In view of the above issues raised, this work seeks to conceptually ascertain how ethical leadership is vital in Africa for the attainment of sustainable development.

This work emphasizes that a transformed leadership is needed in Africa to effectively manage national resources and enable a country to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals by promoting economic development and long-term sustainability of natural resource-based activities. This is because transformational leaders are ethical leaders who have strong personal character, a passion to do right, are proactive, have consideration of stakeholders' interests, are role models for the organization's values, transparent and ensure active involvement in organizational decision making, and a holistic view of the institution's ethical culture.

In order to discuss the likely trends that will raise the bar on improving governance in managing natural resources in Africa, this work seeks to raise important issues by addressing the question of ethical leadership and effective

management of national resources in Africa by clearly bringing out the Tanzanian experience.

Specifically, the objectives of this work will be:

- a. To exploring the needed transformative leadership to effectively manage national resources and enable a country to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and the sustainable development.
- b. To examine development trajectories in Africa; success and Ethical leadership challenges.
- c. To illustrate experience from Tanzania on the lost link on ethical leadership.
- d. To provide suggestions on how best leadership ethics should be dealt with in order to have a transformed leadership that would ensure effective and sustainable management of national resources in Africa.

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

The key conceptual and theoretical issues in this work are briefly described in this section. The aim is to contextualize and locate the work within specific conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The main conceptual and theoretical issues in this work are ethical leadership and political leadership. These are briefly described in what follows.

The Concept of Leadership

A review of the leadership literature shows that the concept of leadership is defined differently by different scholars depending on the perception of the authors who or

as descriptions of the leadership landscape that existed during certain eras or periods of human life.

Leadership refers to the capacity of persuading others towards a shared goal or a personal goal. In the view of Hopkins, et. al (2008), “leadership is the ability to get others to willingly move in a new direction in which they are not naturally inclined to move on their own”. Similarly, Woltring (2002) cited in Daniel Dei, et. al (2016) defines leadership as the “process through which an individual tries to influence another individual or a group of individuals to accomplish a goal.” In the same way, Minderovic (2001) defines leadership as the “ability to take initiative in planning, organizing, and managing group activities and projects.” Another definition by Kellerman (2008) suggests that “leadership is a process of social influence in which one person is able to enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task.” Morrison (1988) further defines leadership as the “process of creating the subordinates’ identification with the group’s mission and creating their desires to achieve the group’s goal.” Though these definitions appear different from each another, common emphasis may be inferred: leadership as a process, influence, and the accomplishment of common goals. Hence leadership implies an ongoing process through one’s ability to plan, mobilize, and supervise resources and activities that focuses on the achievement of generally shared purposes within a group.

In an endeavour to comprehend the idea of leadership, scholars have produced several theories. Traits and attributes theories of leadership were one of the first theories to be developed. Dating back to 1841, these theories focus on answering the question, “who is

leading?” The great man theory, included in this category, suggests that individuals who become leaders are born with certain traits that enhance their ability to stand out of the lot and exert leadership influence over others (Hollander, 1990). The hereditary genius, proposed by Galton (1869), is another example of individual theories in this category. This theory proposes that leadership is hereditary.

Other categories of theories were developed after World War II (1939– 1945). One of these is behavioural theories. This sort of theories emphasized that by taking into consideration diverse aspects of leadership, one may distinguish the nature of leadership and leader activity from behavioural patterns of effective leaders (Chemers, 1997). Another category during this period includes the contingency and situational theories of leadership. Theories in this category generally focus on enlisting particular behavioural characteristics of effective leadership in relation to situations; hence the term ‘great event theory.’ Individual theories within this category include contingency theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1967); situational leadership model (Hersey, 1969); and path-goal theory of leadership (House, 1971). The category of transactional theories also developed during this period. These theories emphasize the dynamics of the exchange between leaders and their followers within a group (Hollander, 1990; Costanzo, 1982).

Other relationship and influence-oriented theories of leadership have developed. Individual theories within this category include implicit leadership theory (Calder, 1977), leader-member exchange theory (Graen & Ginsburgh, 1977), and Pygmalion theory (Eden, 1990). The underlining notion for theories in this category is in-group

perception and expectations in the leader-follower relationship to enhance leadership efficiency. From the 1980s, new-genre theories of leadership have dominated leadership research. Individual theories within this category include charismatic, inspirational, transformational, and visionary leadership (Bass, 1998; Bryman, 1992), and authentic leadership (Gardner, Avolio, & Luthans, 2005; Avolio, Bruce & Gardner, 2005). Ethical leadership may be included in this category. Generally, these theories emphasize symbolic leader behaviour, visionary and inspirational messages, emotional feelings, ideological and moral values, individualized attention, and intellectual stimulation within the leader follower relationship.

In this work, the framework for reflecting on transformative leadership is based on the notion of ethical leadership. The core idea of ethical leadership seems to be predicated on the belief that “values are the glue that can hold things together, and values must be conveyed from the top of the organization,” (Treviño, Pincus-Hartman, & Brown, 2000). In agreement with Treviño et. al. (2001), Hennessy (cited in Butts, 2008) states that “ethics must begin at the top of an organization. It is a leadership issue and the chief executive must set the example.” Previous literature has found positive linkages between organizational performance and ethical leadership. One study of the National Health Service in England and Wales on “What type of leadership does the NHS need?” in particular, concludes that leaders who communicate respect for others as well as concern for the welfare of their followers can enhance job performance, satisfaction, and organizational culture that may increase productivity in general (Alimo-MetCalfe, Alban-MetCalfe, Bradley, Mariathan & Samele, 2008)

Similarly, Muller and Turner found that the ability of a leader to make sound judgment enhances productivity (Muller & Turner, 2010). Piccolo, Greenbaum, Den Hartog, and Folger (2010) have suggested that ethical leadership increases task significance, which, in turn, results in improved performance.

The drive of ethical leadership is the incorporation of morality in the value system of an organization. This may create an ethical culture that emphasizes both the desire and practice to be moral from the leader down to the follower. This is because leaders play a “key role in transmitting and diffusing values, norms, and code of ethics” (Ferrell&Ferrell, 2001). Such leadership attitude is able to induce “increased efficiency in daily operations and decision making, employee commitment, product quality improvements, customer loyalty, and improved financial performance” (Ferrell, Maignan, & Loe, 1999). Dwelling on the incorporation of ethical principles in an organizational culture, some have stressed that a strong ethical culture induces efficiency in decision making which involves all interested parties in the venture (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990).

The Concept of Ethical Leadership

Perhaps the need for ethical leadership may be seen in the many definitions that scholars have given to it. One of such is that ethical leadership stresses “good character and the right values or being a person of strong character” (Freeman & Stewart, 2006). Noting the core focus of ethical leadership, Greenleaf (1977) states “Service to followers is the primary responsibility.”

Ethics is a concept used in studying what is right or wrong, justice, fairness, virtues, duties and obligations. For the leader to be ethical, it is implied in this work that he or she is moral, accountable and not corrupt, fair and does not manipulate or abuse people for his/her own advantage. Such ethics is found in one's heart, worldview and value system. The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek word *ethos*, meaning 'character' or 'custom' and the derivative phrase *ta ethika*, was used by the philosophers Plato and Aristotle to describe their own studies of Greek values and ideals (Solomon, 2005). Ethics is first of all a concern for individual character, including what we call 'being a good person'. It is also a concern for the overall character of an entire society. The word 'ethics' refers to both a discipline and the subject matter of that discipline the actual values and the rules of conduct by which we live (Solomon, 2005; Stanford, 2005). Hence, when one talks of ethics what comes in mind for everyone is a blameless and flawless individual.

Debates on Ethics Theories in Leadership

Theory and research suggest that leaders should, and do, influence ethical behaviour. In this work, the author explores theoretical reasons why leaders should play an important role in living ethically and influencing ethical behaviour. This work looks at ethical practices from Plato and Aristotelian view points, cognitive moral development and social learning perspectives.

Theory of Virtue for Ethical Leadership

Plato and Aristotle were the greatest proponents of the theory of virtue as a cardinal

pillar for ethical leadership. Plato and Aristotle strongly emphasized that the cardinal virtues which are springboard of an ethics for a leader are: temperance, justice, wisdom, courage, generosity, fortitude, good temper, sincerity and self-respect. Although Plato's view of grooming ethical leaders was considered to emanate from training in the sciences and metaphysics; Aristotle's view was a different. For Aristotle, grooming ethical leadership depends very much on practices of maintaining the golden mean good by balancing pleasure, virtue, honour friendship, and wealth (Barine Ardone Kirimi & David Minja, 2012; Changwoo Jeong & Hyemin Han, 2013).

The gist of Aristotle's ethics is that ethics is about asking what the good for human being is and by acquiring that knowledge of what is good, what is good for everyone will be achieved. In seeking for the good, Aristotle is not looking for a list of items that form the 'good'. He assumes that a list can be compiled rather easily; for example, it is good to be friendly, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honoured and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The controversial question is whether these goods are more desirable than others (Stanford, 2005). Aristotle's search for the good is a search for the highest good and he assumes that the highest good whatever it turns out to be has three characteristics: It is desirable for itself; it is not desirable for the sake of some other good and all other goods are desirable for its sake. If ethical leadership practice is about seeking for the highest good, this raises a critical question as to whether our leaders actually practice ethical leadership.

Aristotle argues that in order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and

habits, the ability to see, on each occasion which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore, practical wisdom, as he conceives it cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. In this work, it is argued that the way to have transformed leadership for managing national resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals. Therefore, individuals must be willing to pursue the greater good. It is on the bases of this understanding and reasoning that this work explores social learning and moral development theories as foundation for strong moral development. The application of these two theories complements each other and forms a strong framework for building ethical leadership.

Aristotle further argues that unlike other species, human beings have a rational soul. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human. What sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. The questions that many could ask are: Do our parliamentarians and public servants who steal and/or abuse office have a rational soul? Are they focusing on the highest good? If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists of. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists of activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. According to Aristotle (Stanford, 2005), living well consists of doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition.

De Pree (1987) contends that leadership is a concept of owing certain things to others. Therefore, ethics will transform our leaders to

understand and internalize that that they are stewards and not owners of the power that has been entrusted to them by the citizens. Hill (1997:159) argues that authority is not an avenue for self-promotion but rather a platform from which to serve others. Leadership is based on serving, not the standard view that it is based on power and self-interest. Effective leadership calls for servant leadership. Servant leaders subordinate their own interests to the good of the whole, listening carefully, equipping others to succeed, building trust and responsibly marshalling corporate success (Hill, 1997). Thus, upbringing and training in ethics is important because the responsibility of being virtuous rests on the individual. We must acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice, in ways that are suitable to each occasion.

Theory of Cognitive Moral Development for Ethical Leadership

Kohlberg's theory (1969) in David Minja (2011) focuses on how individuals reason through ethical dilemmas and how they decide what is right. Principled individuals make decisions as they think fit by looking inside themselves and are guided by principles of justice and rights (Crain, 1985). Thus, ethical leaders are the most important source of moral guidance as followers look to leaders for indication about what appropriate and inappropriate behaviour (Trevino, Brown, 2004). The debate in different countries all over the world is whether there are moral leaders in every country in the African continent who can be depended on to provide ethical leadership and if they exist, are they afraid or just reluctant to

provide that leadership especially in the public sector. Going by Kohlberg's argument, if majority of the leadership were in level two of moral development, they would be expected to obey rules, codes of ethical practice and laws. This would considerably trim down corruption because individuals at the principled level of moral development are less likely to engage in negative behaviours such as corruption and theft, whereas, those at lower levels are more likely to engage in such behaviours and are more prone to outside influences (Greenberg, 2002). This argument possibly exhibits why some sectors are viewed as more corrupt than others due to the influence of leaders and peers have on those who join them. Despite the fact that other outside influences such as peers (Zey- Ferrell, 1982) and formal organizational systems such as ethics codes and training programs (Greenberg, 2002) affect ethical behaviour, leaders should be a means of ethical guidance due to the authority role they play. It is held that leaders' level of moral reasoning is also key in influencing the moral reasoning used by group members in their decision making (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm & Vollrath, 1990) and leadership styles have been shown to influence conformity in ethical decision making frameworks in work groups (Schminke, Wells, Peyrefitte & Sebor, 2002; David Minja, 2011).

Theory of Social Learning for Ethical Leadership

Social learning is always referred to when it comes to the question of examining how leaders influence followers. Role modelling is observed to be an indispensable leader behaviour (House, (1977), Bass (1985), and Kouzes and Posner (1987). In particular,

charismatic or transformational leaders are considered to influence followers through modelling and identification process (David Minja, 2011; Avolio, 1999).

Bandura (1977) aptly puts that a social learning perspective leaders influence their followers by way of modeling processes. Modeling is considered to be a powerful means of transmitting values, attitudes and behaviours. According to Bandura (1977), followers observe their leaders, learn what to do as well as what not to do and then act. Moreover, the effects of the behaviour will establish whether or not it will be repeated. If the consequences of the behaviour are positive, that behaviour is repeated and vice versa. Thus, modelling by leaders can influence followers to be ethical or unethical. Followers can also learn to be ethical by observing leaders who stand up for what is right, particularly if leaders are doing well. The social learning approach postulates that because of leaders' authority role and power to reward and punish, followers will keep in mind and imitate leaders' behaviours and they will do what is rewarded and avoid doing what is punished in the organization. The questions that beg answers in this case are: *why is there corruption and unethical practices in many sectors of African countries? Is it because the rules are weak or the systems to enforce them are weak or both?* Should ethical training be put much emphasis? What viable accountability framework to be put in place for leaders? Should punishment meted on unethical leaders be more severe?

Unless these questions are honestly answered and when mere rhetoric prevails, corruption and unethical practices will continue to be a daily occurrence in Africa and the dream for transforming Public Administration and Management in Africa for Managing National

Resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals. On the basis of this argument, this article asserts that enhancing acquisition of knowledge and the practice of ethical decision making process cannot be overemphasized.

Development Debate in Africa

Today the discourse on African development is increasingly focusing on capacity for leadership and governance, as well as on its role in engendering economic growth, promoting development, and ensuring poverty reduction. In this work, it is important to note that whoever goes through various literatures, two strands regarding African Leadership and development can be discerned and are pointed out in this section. In terms of the historical development of independent nations, most of the African nations are considered to be in their infancy, still heavily influenced by their colonial heritage. European colonial powers ruled most of Africa from 1885 to 1960, a period of 75 years. In 2007, Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African country to become independent, celebrated its 50th anniversary, a very short time in the lives of nations. Thus, a debate around development of the continent is categorised into two whereby the progressivists see the continent as advancing economically, politically and socially when one looks at the trend from the time of independence while others see it as not progressing and/or the rate at which Africa is making pace in development being rather disappointing due to maladministration practices given the rich in various resources a continent is bestowed with.

The first category is of those who see that Africa is making pace in progress. This optimism has

dominated the debate on Africa in recent years and contenders develop plethora of African progress and among the stated facts include the following:

First, the post-cold war era in Africa show progress in terms of political governance, economic governance, regional integration and cooperation, and results in terms of stability and economic performance. Protagonists of this view admittedly state that although the 1980s were literally a lost decade for Africa, the continent changed in very profound ways-politically, economically, and socially-albeit from very low levels. A case in point is that the number of conflicts in Africa has dropped to just five in 2005, from a peak of 16 in 2002. In the past, there was a time when more than half of African governments were military juntas. There are none as of this writing (early 2007), and the AU has served notice that it will neither recognize nor accept in its councils any leader who comes to power through unconstitutional means.

Second, since 1990 many African countries have undergone political transformation. Political competition and participatory processes improved more in Africa during the 1990s than in any other region, even if from a low base. In 1982 only one-tenth of African countries had competitively elected executives. Today the majority of leaders are competitively elected.

Third, civil society is much more engaged and vibrant, and a thriving private media is generally free to criticize most governments. Human rights are being taken much more seriously, and women are participating more in representative and decision-making bodies. Judiciaries and legislatures are being strengthened and are freer and more independent than before.

Fourth, the African Peer Review Mechanism to which about half of the African countries have submitted themselves is a welcome innovation for mutual support along this path. Its mandate is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes, and standards that are contained in the AU Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.

Fifth, in average, between 2002 and 2005 over two-thirds of African countries had single digit inflation. More than ever before countries are attaining macroeconomic fundamentals.

Sixth, net private flows into Africa rose from an average of \$6.8 billion in 1998–2002 to \$17 billion in 2005. Africa is more open and attractive to investment, both domestic and foreign.

Seventh, between 1995 and 2005, 17 sub-Saharan African countries grew at average rates exceeding 5 percent annually, up from only five countries during the previous decade. By 2005, nine countries were near or above the 7 percent growth rate threshold needed for sustained poverty reduction. The growth momentum was sustained, with overall real GDP growth rate of 5.7 percent recorded in 2006 compared to 5.3 percent and 5.2 percent in 2005 and 2004, respectively. For the second consecutive year, Africa's average growth rate remains higher than that of Latin America (4.8 percent). Twenty-eight countries in Africa recorded improvements in growth in 2006 relative to 2005, and 25 recorded improvements in 2005 relative to 2004 (ECA, 2006).

Eighth, corruption remains a problem, but many countries have begun to deal with

it seriously through institutional reform, legislation, and more robust investigation and prosecution.

Last but not least, today the discourse on African development is increasingly focusing on capacity for leadership and governance, as well as on its role in engendering economic growth, promoting development, and ensuring poverty reduction. Examples include the Report of the Commission for Africa and work on governance by the World Bank Institute, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. Moreover, there is ongoing work on governance by the Economic Commission for Africa and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as well as the establishment of several African leadership training initiatives and institutions ([David Brady](#), [Michael Spence](#), 2010).

Despite the optimism that has dominated the debate on Africa in recent years, the real challenge now is where Africa goes from here as a continent, for it remains a fact that, despite positive trends, sustainability is not yet ensured, and whether Africa will meet the Objectives of Africa Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals remains doubtful for a good number of countries (Mkapa, 2007).

The second category is that of those who see that Africa is not progressing. Subscribers to this view contend that while Africa is rich in resources, the problem of has been persistent song of Poverty. Although Africa is said to have 315 million people, one in two of people in Sub Saharan Africa survive on less than one dollar per day; 184 million people: 33% of the African population suffer from malnutrition. During the 1990s the average income per capita decreased in 20 African countries; less

than 50% of Africa's population has access to hospitals or doctors and three quarters of the 42 million people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide live in Africa. In 2000, 300 million Africans did not have access to safe water. The average life expectancy in Africa is 41 years. Only 57% of African children were enrolled in primary education, and only one of three children does complete school. One in six children dies before the age of 5. This number is 25 times higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in the OECD countries children account for half of all civilian casualties in wars in Africa. The African continent lost more than 5.3 million hectares of forest during the decade of the 1990s. Less than one person out of five has electricity and out of 1,000 inhabitants 15 have a telephone line, and 7.8 out of 1,000 people surf on internet⁵

Hence, an easy reflection that comes to one's mind is that Africa is said to have a wide range of complexities which are compounded by, inter alia, tribal divisiveness, wealth inequality, and massive unemployment and all these can be attributed to unethical selfish leadership of politicians and administrators in the public service. It is not surprising that this backwardness has been a result of Africans tending to draw their leadership and ethical practices and reflections from the events in the environment with which they have interacted for many years. In a nutshell, those who see that Africa lags behind consider problems to be both internal and external and it would be worth mentioning a plethora of them here:

First, there are those who consider that Africa lags behind due to colonial legacy. As mentioned earlier, for the majority of African countries, the period that they spent under colonial rule is still far longer than the subsequent period

during which they have enjoyed independence and self-rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that until recently the effect of colonial rule on African politics, economics, and social life has remained strong, and not just because Africans were taught and pressed to think and speak in the languages of their colonizers. It is also because at independence Africans inherited, with a few variations, the political and economic systems of their colonizers. This legacy meant that independent African states were destined from the beginning to remain small, fragile, unstable, and beholden to the departing colonial powers. So, African Countries are considered to have remained prisoners of world economy. An objective evaluation of political systems, processes, and governance in contemporary Africa has to go back to its colonial past and ask: What did Africa learn and adopt from the colonial rulers, and how has it shaped and directed postcolonial leadership, political systems, and governance on the continent?

The second fact which is also one of the tragedies of some post-colonial African countries is the use of power and ethnicity for personal economic gain. The other was the emergence of the category leaders referred to as tyrants and looters. This harms efforts at nation building and ultimately leads to political instability and economic collapse. Students of African politics (Munishi, 1989; Bayart, 1993; Chabal, 1992; Anders, 2001) show how public officials in Africa have misappropriated public resources to invest in their private businesses to provide employment for family members; to provide basic needs to their relatives such as food, clothing, shelter, and schooling for children; and to contribute to the burials of friends, clients and family.

⁵United Nations Programme-www.africa2015.org/factspoverty.

Corruption has become part and parcel of daily life and is tolerated, accepted, and institutionalized to the extent that both people who give and receive bribes have internalized that behaviour. This type of corruption takes place in a modern, rational, Weberian bureaucratic system, where there is a clear division between public and private life. Societal norms support bureaucratic procedures that emphasize equal treatment based on the unbiased application of laws. For example, merit criteria are used for hiring, promotion, and dispersing service. In such a system, corrupt behaviour violates bureaucratic procedures, organizational norms, laws, and larger societal expectations for the appropriate behaviour of its public officials. With the second situation the problem is not rogue individuals but, rather, a system where corruption is embedded in society. In this situation, corruption is institutionalized and becomes the norm rather than the exception. The extensive literature on 'patronage' and 'big man' politics stands as testimony that, for many observers of Africa, corruption is a core element of the state and society.

Third, Africa still experiences triple crisis of governance, namely, lack of accountability and rule of law, the inability to manage and resolve intra and inter-state conflicts and economic crises (Wyk, 2007)

Fourth, personal politics still dominate contemporary African Politics to the extent of leading to advanced cases of stayism. It is un-denied fact that there is a tendency to institutionalize the executive political leadership. What Robert Michel (1915/1959) calls "iron law of oligarchy" has made a substantial number of African leaders to retain their position as long as possible for personal interests through incumbency advantage

(Donelson Forsyth, 2006 & Jo-Ansie van Wyk, 2007).

Fifth, Neo-patrimonial leadership featuring presidentialism [with the leader's power being unlimited, unopposed and unchecked], clientelism, and the use of state resources and centralization of power also still features in African Politics. This makes African countries to have formal institutions but these being merely symbolic rather than democratic.

Sixth, corruption that makes some of the African states to be rule by stealing or better termed as kleptocratic states (Nic Cheeseman, Lindsay Whitfield, Carl Death, 2017).

A critical view of the above statements would suggest that although Africa has made a progress but a lot is still desired to be done and although it is not the intention of the writer, to fall into a problem of a one size fits all approach in looking into a panacea of Africa's leadership problems it would, by and large, be aptly put that good political leadership is to be exercised in the public interest rather than in leader's self-interest so as to contribute to higher levels of state and human security and help redress Africa's development dilemma. Hence, a close look at these scenarios can make one consider that blaming external factors such as aid and loans as well as imbalance world trade market cannot help draw a conclusion as to why Africa should not develop (Paul Hoebink, 2009). It is just lack of visionary, committed and ethical leadership in managing resources that brings in a problem of resources being a curse rather than a blessing to most resource rich countries in Africa. For there are some countries whose leadership commitment to ethically managing resources has shown tangible positive results. For instance, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa and Rwanda among others.

Africa's Ethical Leadership Problem and Management of National Resources

It is, by and large, acknowledged that the performance of any nation, in seeking to achieve its set goals, to a large extent depends on its leadership for the reason that effective leadership translates into prudent public policy formulation and implementation, as well as good public service delivery, to meet the needs and aspirations of citizens. That is why, in this post-independence period, there have been ceaseless searches for the rationale behind the depressing trajectory of African economies. Some Asian economies (South Korea and Malaysia) that were in some decades past faced with similar development challenges are currently being hailed as “economic miracles” (Akyuz and Gore, 2001 as cited in Kuada, 2010), while the situation in Africa is being described as a “disaster” and a “tragedy” (UNCTAD, 2004 as cited in Kuada, 2010). The reasons cited for such poor performance in Kuada's (2010) study include institutional and structural weaknesses (Yeats *et al.*, 1996; Killick *et al.*, 2001), limited attention to private enterprise development (Fafchamps *et al.*, 2001, Nwankwo and Richards, 2001), management incompetence (Kamoche, 1997) and limited staff motivation (Okpara, 2006; Okpara and Wynn, 2007). Indeed, according to Ochola (2007) and Everest-Philips (2012), Africa's poor economic development despite its vast wealth or resources is as a result of weak leadership. With exception of some countries like Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa, Rwanda, etc. it would seemingly be true as Chola (2007) clearly puts it that leadership in Africa is typically ineffective and characterized by susceptibility to the complex

global economic system. Paradoxically, the majority of the elite group in Africa who rise to leadership positions appear to have been educated in Western countries, but still lack the capacity to adapt or translate the ideas they have learned to address Africa's development challenges and to me this would be attributed to lack of ethical leaders and administrators who are not spirited to stewardship of serving the mass (Kuada, 2014).

Africa is rich in natural and human resources, presents ‘a rich mosaic of tremendous diversity of countries and peoples’ (Schraeder 2000:2), and is a continent in transformation, which scholars refer to as the ‘African renaissance’ (Mangu 2006; Schraeder 2000). However, due to bad leadership, Africa remains politically, economically and socially underdeveloped, with a legacy of poverty and hunger, civil wars and violent conflicts (Agulanna 2006; Ali and Mathews 1999; Museveni 2000). To substantiate this claim, in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016 and 2018 the Prize Committee, after in-depth review, did not select a winner. This reveals severity of the leadership crisis and governance in Africa⁶. Many African leaders lack ethical commitment to good governance, respect for human rights and rule of law, and to responsibility and accountability– all of which could guarantee that Africa's resources are harnessed towards healthy living for all citizens (Lyons and Deng 1998).

Africa's leadership crisis is manifested by trends of persistent human rights violation, bad governance, dysfunctional institutions, patronage, electoral fraud, manipulation of ethnic differences, corruption and personalisation of power hinder the prevalence of peace and social justice. Powerful political

⁶<https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize>

elites feed on the state, prey on the weak, use national resources for self-aggrandizement, and deprive citizens of collective goods such as medical care, good education and employment. When people's human needs are not met, protracted social conflicts and wars are inevitable (Burton 1990; Sandole, 2001, Mutibwa 1992; Ngwane 2003). While the struggle for independence was spearheaded by some 'first-rate political leaders, the nation-building phase has not only failed to produce leaders of comparable stature, but has also witnessed a decline in the achievements', aggravated by unethical leadership and bad governance (Adamoleku, 1988). In light of this evident crisis, it can be ascertained that national resources are being plagued due to leadership vacuum of ethical political figures and public servants and this has been done in different ways.

First, although a few differences exist, lack of Africanness and embracing a new culture irrelevant to the real challenges of leadership and development in Africa have been rampant since disguised democracy is on the lead and only those leaders who take heed to interests of super powers are the one's that are justified and considered to have three sets of ideas: economic ideas; the most far-reaching ideas of civilization; and ideas of a political and patriotic sort" (Ferry, 1897). In a further justification of the civilization aspect, the same approach is used in countries with resources by such leaders being seen as darling to superior powers and because they lack moral authority they end up being corrupt.

Second, African leaders are increasingly becoming puppets and public servants that serve such regimes have always left their professional advice. In reality, the bureaucrats are increasingly becoming detached educated

Africans forming the core of the administration and serving interests of those in power at the expense of the majority of the citizenry and what prevails is that of Africans who get into position using their political or power of knowledge in the domination and exploitation of the continent as a whole.

Third, corruption. There is now no doubt whatsoever that corruption, in its broad sense, is bad for economic growth, development, and poverty reduction. Although it does not always get reflected in the international media, it has also been established without a doubt that the vice of corruption and bribery is not the monopoly of Africa and other developing countries. The motivation and methods for corrupt behaviour may be different. How governments react to corruption may differ. Capacities to prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption and bribery cases may differ. For a country at Tanzania's level of development, the big contracts and licenses that would attract grand corruption would normally involve aid-funded projects and companies from rich industrialized countries. Hence, the debate about corruption in Africa should take a broader perspective, shifting away from the narrow confines of bureaucratic corruption, to political corruption, legislative corruption, intellectual corruption, and the whole spectrum of issues that mould societal thinking and provide the information base for decision making.

It is due to this context that scholars consider issues that are critical for leadership in Africa in order for the continent to make greater headway in growth, development, and poverty reduction to be: Leadership capacity and ability to create and/or sustain politically stable and peaceful states as well as the leadership capacity and ability to create and/or sustain

stable and viable economies. This includes the political will to create and sustain democratic, responsive, and accountable governments; constituting strong governments with effective, efficient, and capable institutions and leadership to develop and facilitate skills for contemporary Africa, business environment, local entrepreneurship, and guarantees for the property rights of the poor. This includes the advocacy and institutional promotion of a savings and investment culture as well as leadership that ensures participation and sharing, not only of political power, but of economic prosperity as well (Mkapa, 2007). In this work, it is pointed out that for all these to be realized in African countries, strong leadership with moral authority and ability to influence the citizenry to do the common good and cautiously use resources while considering the future generation cannot be overemphasized.

The deficit and crisis of ethical political and administrative leadership pose enormous challenges to Africa. Hence, strengthening ethics is fundamental to the crisis, necessitating a moral imagination, creativity and networking of actors at national and international levels. The best is still to come for Africa. The model of Botswana's economic and political success, along with the courageous leadership of icons of Africa such as Julius Kabarage Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Joachim Chisano of Mozambique and Kofi Annan's leadership at the United Nations, hold promises for Africa. The intention of this work is neither to go into details nor discuss personalities of African leaders but from these; Africa can learn to do better with transformed political leadership. Thus, education whose emphasis is on practicing ethics is cardinal to envisioning interventions towards ethical political leadership. A point of departure, partly

discussed in the subsequent section, could be why in most African countries, leaders who are politically well elected are accused of promoting corrupt practices, nepotism and abuse of office when they assume to power?.

Ethical Leadership Renaissance

A close look at the development agendas pushes one to think of what practical reality that will change dreams into reality and let me highlight a few for purposes of wanting to cement on the centrality of having ethical leadership in order to meet the Africa's Development Agenda.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sets the Sustainable Development Goals that countries aspire to achieve in the next 15 years, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (A/ RES/69/313), an outcome of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 2015, sets the agenda and means of implementation for development finance. Both resolutions contain interrelated goals and commitments on sustainable financing for development, which have a bearing on Africa's development. Development Goals in African lower middle-income countries gives a total of \$345 billion–\$359 billion per year. In total, therefore, the incremental costs of financing the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa may amount to \$614 billion–\$638 billion per year.

Agenda 2063 delineates the vision of African leaders of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union, 2015). It serves as a road map for Africa's development until 2063 that is committed to

achieving the following seven aspirations: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; an integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's renaissance; an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure Africa; an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics; an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner (African Union Commission, 2015).

Moreover, Agenda 2063 calls for strengthening domestic resource mobilization, building continental capital markets and financial institutions and reversing illicit flows of capital from the continent, with a view to achieving the following by 2025: Reducing aid dependency by 50 per cent; eliminating all forms of illicit flows; doubling the contribution of African capital markets in development finance; rendering fully operational the African Remittances Institute; reducing unsustainable levels of debt, heavy indebtedness and odious debt; building effective, transparent and harmonized tax and revenue collection systems and public expenditure.

Hence, it is vivid that Africa has major development aspirations in the broader context of a global and continental economic development agenda. This calls for substantial financial resources at a time when the global development finance landscape is changing, from a model centred on official development assistance and the coverage of remaining financing needs through external debt, to a framework with greater emphasis on the

mobilization of domestic resources. Therefore a transformed leadership well up-brought in ethical behaviour is vital for sustainable management of national resources so as to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (The Economic Development in Africa Report, 2016).

Why Ethical Leadership is Crucial for Africa's Sustainable Development

The survival of our continent, the restoration of the hope of the people in governance, the total sanitation of our society from corrupt practices rests on the shoulders of the leaders. No leader can effectively correct this anomaly except that who is ethical. This is echoed by the following statement:

...ethical leadership takes into account not only the leader but also his constituents (followers and key stakeholders)...Leaders are first and foremost members of their own organizations and stakeholder groups. As such, their purpose, vision, and values are for the benefit of the entire organization and its key stakeholders... Ethical leaders embody the purpose, vision, and values of the organization and of the constituents, within an understanding of ethical ideals (Freeman & Stewart, 2006).

In other words, an ethical leader works primarily for the interests of all his followers whom s/he considers as key stakeholders. The principle of 'the others' is paramount to ethical leadership. This explains the reason for the failure of democracy in Africa. In other words, unethical leadership is the bane of effective democratization in Africa. Democracy is by nature about the people. But immoral leaders

in Africa remove the people in the democratic enterprise and yet proclaim themselves as democrats. When the concept of citizenry is lost in any polity what we will be left with will be nothing but irresponsible and unresponsive governance as Robert Dahl argues:

I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals...I should like to reserve the term 'democracy' for a political system, one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost responsive to all its citizens (Dahl, 1971).

Hence, Ethical leadership for nation building need to be re-constructed its foundation based on reasoning and establishes mechanisms for promoting practices that pursue the greater good for all. Hence, what is intended to be discussed in this work that a strong ethical society cannot be built without emphasising on a value system that seeks to determine norms or standards for right and wrong behaviour (Zimmerli, *et al.*, 2007; Solomon, 2005).

The Challenge of Sustaining Development-Oriented Leadership and Nurturing Future Leaders for Africa: An Imperative for Every Leader at Every Level

Leadership is not a once-in-a-time activity. Leaders who emerge in Africa need to comprehend the fact that good leadership will not start and end with them and that whatever capacities developed cannot be sustained

without incessant supportive development-oriented leadership. Nurturing leaders who will ensure that the continent plays a leading role in the world is decisive for African leaders. It is, indeed, in itself a challenge for today's leaders not only in Africa at national, regional or even community levels but also at international levels. The first aspect of this challenge concerns succession planning which in effect is preparation for leadership relay in the affairs of managing a country. Every leader at any level, in any sector, or any institution has the cardinal duty of ensuring that capable and effective leadership does not end with him or her. "In the leadership relay, it makes no difference how you run, if you drop the baton" (Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza & Demetrios Argyriade, 2009).

The capacity to develop future leaders and ensure effective succession planning at all levels needs to be developed on the continent. In relation to succession, the late president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania put the problem squarely on the table during a conference in Addis Ababa, on 2nd March 1998 "*This is an area where we need to be very careful. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and sometimes all members of government, seek to amend the Constitution in their own favor even when they come to Office through, and because of the provisions of a Constitution which they have sworn to honor. Too often, for example, we have seen Presidents seek to lengthen the number of terms they serve, despite the limit laid down in the Constitution. This practice is wrong*" (Kauzya, 2007 in Pichardo and Argyriades, 2009, P. 97)

Many leaders especially at a political level are pre-occupied with succeeding themselves that often they leave a leadership vacuum or confusion behind them. "Succession is one of the key responsibilities of leadership that

needs to be emphasized for realizing Africa's Development Agenda.

Looking closely at the leadership situation in a number of African countries, especially at the apex of political leadership the critical issue of developing leadership for smooth succession has not been a priority. But we need to bear in mind that succession is not only limited to political leadership. It is a critical issue in the Public Service as well as in private and civil society organizations. It is not only an issue of replacing leaders with others physically. It is also, probably most importantly, as new challenges emerge, new knowledge, skills, networks, systems, and mindsets are in place to address the challenges.

Africa has share of destructive conflicts in the world. There is a need to look at the leadership that emerges after conflict in terms of succession planning. Political leaders who emerge after violent conflict tend to adopt the attitude of conquerors and take themselves as invincible and imperishable. This attitude needs to be resisted. Physically leaders come and go. A political leader who truly wishes to leave positive prints on the history of the development of his/her country needs to embark on an ambitious program of developing an inexhaustible pool of capable leaders for the country. In this way the reconstruction of capacities for public services and for effectiveness in the context of globalization will be premised on sure ground of sustained supportive political leadership.

Another critical aspect underlying the challenge of developing future leaders for Africa is the task of rediscovering the leadership styles or qualities that may be embedded in the past, philosophy, culture, traditions, and behaviour of Africa, that can be tapped to complement

the current western based leadership styles to mould a leadership style that fits the African condition and environment better. There is some undeniable influence in the African mindset and value system that distinguishes it from that of a more Western or Eurocentric approach and that is relevant for thinking about public administration and hence, public sector leadership development in Africa.

Creating and maintaining effective networks and partnerships, mastering negotiation techniques and alliances, and understanding the operations of global institutions such as the United Nations system, Briton wood institutions, and influence of regional blocks as well as the international financial and market systems are some of the critical elements that need to be considered in developing leadership at such levels. Most importantly, African integrative and entrepreneurial leadership capacity must be developed to enable the continent's leaders to marshal the strength of Africa's unity and its national and regional bodies to be an effective and influential player in the global arena for the benefit of Africans at large. The need for African leaders to be able to grasp the forces of globalisation is summed up by the statement by Prof. A. R Nsibambi in the following terms which he issued in 2002:

"The extreme optimists see globalization as a glass three-quarter full of opportunities. The extreme pessimists see globalization as a calabash full of problems especially exploitation and socio-economic and international political domination. Mid-point strategists must see globalization as a change process full of opportunities and challenges that must be carefully and skilfully harnessed and managed for human development." (Nsibambi, 2002 cited in Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza & Demetrios Argyriade, 2009, P. 98).

This goes to emphasise global-oriented leadership capacity as part of the human factor in global governance. Probably the best way to approach acting in the context of globalization is to start by conceptualizing global-oriented leadership as a partnership activity where leaders at local, national, regional and international levels in the public and private sectors as well as civil society engage in shared exercise of power and responsibility for the development of the community in question engaging what we will call networked/connected leadership. The network would start from the linkages between the organizations of the private sector, civil society, central government agencies operating at local level and include national, regional and global agencies.

In this way the responsibility and success or for that matter the failure of local governance would be shared among the leadership in all these sectors. Often international agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations system, and international NGOs advise governments on some policies. When such policies fail, the same institutions blame only the local institutions even in cases where the policies they strongly supported were inherently wrong. Given the framework of networked/connected local governance leadership such blame would not be appropriate. Taking into account the present political environment in an increasing globalizing world, new areas of leadership competency including management of diversity, information and knowledge management, communication technology skills, partnerships and networking, etc. need to be strengthened. The current trends in regional integration on the African continent need to be thoroughly mastered by current and future leaders especially at local governance level. Local level leaders need to have the capacity

to analyse the national, regional and global trends and take collaborative opportunities for the development of their local communities.

Hence, agreeing on shared responsibilities for Africa's failures will enable all who want to take part in the continent's renewal to focus on the partnership that is now needed to close a sad chapter in Africa's history and open a new one.

How to Restore 'Ethics'? The Lost Link in Tanzania

Though Tanzania is one of the few African countries endowed with extensive and different types of natural resources, like gold, tanzanite, diamond and other valuable raw materials, the United Nations report on human development published early in 2008 mentioned it as one of the poorest nations in the world by placing it at 47 positions out of 50 poor nations in the world (URT, 2009). Its budget is largely depended on foreign donors (IMF, 2014). Part of the problem is the growth and spread of greed and selfish syndrome; specifically among the leadership across the board-politicians, public servants, professionals, academia, the media, civil society organizations and even faith based organizations, something which has affected tax collection system, legal contracts, provision of permits and areas related to socio-economic aspects. Corruption has affected the smooth operation of a number of production industries, which are claimed to pollute the environment in the country (REPOA on behalf of the Research and Analysis Working Group, 2009; Kulcsar Laszlo, Selfa Theresa and Bain Carmen 2016, cited in Msafiri Yusuph Mkonda & Xinhua He (2017, p. 34)

One of the causes is the vanishing of societal values and ethics. Under the Arusha

Declaration, party and government leaders were disallowed to earn two incomes, hold directorship or shares in private firms, rent out houses, etc. However, with the 1990 Zanzibar Resolution, leaders were freed from the political conditions of the Arusha Declaration. This marked the beginning of the divergent and lost path which eroded all fundamental principles set by Nyerere's regime as it led to the disappearance of values such as efficiency, accountability, transparency and the fear of God in the lives of top political leaders, decision-makers and sadly enough even among the people of God (Bruce and Ndumbaro, 2002). It is against this background that work notes the lost link between ethical leadership that was considered during the first regime and the practices that followed in the subsequent regimes in the country. *Mwalimu* Julius K. Nyerere is remembered for his economic achievements and he will also always be remembered for the leadership in creating a united and politically viable, just, ethical, stable, peaceful, cohesive, and sustainable nation, where at independence there was none.

Tanzania is currently in her fifth phase of government regime. This regime is seriously and dutifully embarking on the important task of implementing J.K. Nyerere's well-known stance on the all-important question of leadership ethics which is what actually moved him to include the "Leadership Code of Ethics" in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. In an effort to restore the lost values in the public service, the fifth phase started by the removal of 32,000 ghost workers and public servants holding fake academic certificates in the payroll leading to savings of Tshs 378 billion. There have been efforts also to create anti-grafting court, dismissal of dishonest public officials and an increased control on the protection on the natural resources such

as minerals by signing three mineral laws and changes which have laid reforms in the extractive industry⁷. Having noticed the lost link of leadership as ethics, the fifth regime has prioritised areas specific-related governance namely, eliminating wasteful and unnecessary public expenditures; fighting impunity in the public service; as well as tackling corruption which is the evil that mercilessly has plagued the nation⁸

The first phase was that of Julius Kambage Nyerere (1962-1985) followed by the liberalisation second phase of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's (1985-1995). The third and fourth phase of government regimes were of President Benjamin William Mkapa (1995-2005) and President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (2005-2015) respectively. Julius Nyerere's central domestic preoccupation during the period of his presidency were fourfold: promoting the developing the Tanzanian economy through hard work, which he saw as a sine qua non for the accomplishment of most if not all other objectives; securing and retaining national control of the direction of Tanzania's economic development; creating political institutions that would be widely participatory and that would sustain the extraordinary sense of common purpose. In these early years, he united Tanzanians under his leadership and the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU). He also built a building a just society, free of severe income inequalities, in which all would share the benefits of development as it was accomplished (Pratt, 1999:3). In a policy booklet published in March 1967 on

⁷This information was extracted from the news reported by Deogratius Kamagi titled Government outlines 10 key Achievements under Magufuli in two years in the *Citizen Newspaper* on the report provided by the Information Services Department and Government Chief Spokesman, issued on 5th November, 2017; available at <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news>; accessed on 17th October, 2018

⁸Comment by Pius Msekwa on 21st November, 2019 in the *Daily News*; available at <https://www.dailynews.co.tz/new>; accessed on 23rd November, 2019

“Education for Self-Reliance”, Nyerere spelt out the values and objectives of the society he envisioned as follows:

“... we want to create a socialist society which is based on three principles: equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the resources which are produced by our efforts; work by everyone and exploitation by none” (Mesaki & Malipula, 2011 cited in Business and Government Relations in Africa, Robert A. Dibia, 2018)

Hence, at the heart of Nyerere’s core values was an affirmation of the fundamental equality of all humankind and a commitment to the building of social, economic and political institutions, which would reflect and ensure this equality. The leadership code was developed in which a set of rules with prohibited the leaders of TANU and the government from engaging in capitalist practices. It had a list of prohibitions whose fundamental purpose was to prevent leaders from becoming involved in capitalist and unscrupulous undertakings thus being ethical and accountable in their actions. In sum, *Ujamaa* was an expression of human equality, popular democracy, state ownership of property, self-reliance and freedom. To create a society where these principles would prevail, the government embarked on a systematic implementation of a number of programmes, including, nationalisation of the means of production, creation of *Ujamaa* villages in rural areas, establishment of the leadership code and implementation of education for self-reliance.

Since the socialist era of the 1970s, policy makers have been concerned about corruption. During the Nyerere years, corruption was defined as a form of oppression that undermined egalitarian values. Although we

cannot claim that there was no corruption during Nyerere’s era as reports of misuse of office, especially in the cooperatives and parastatals, grew with the expansion of the state’s economic role are reported (Bruce and Ndumbaro, 2002). But corruption incidences were kept minimal. Under the economic liberalization policies of the second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995), corruption spiralled out of control prompting donors to freeze aid in November 1994 (Kiley, 1994). However, liberalization coincided with increased corruption and, toward the end of Mwinyi’s second term; Transparency International was consistently listing Tanzania as one of the most corrupt nations in its annual rankings.

It was a time when, events completely outside the control of the government in the 1970s resulted to an extremely difficult time in the 1980s. These events included: the drought of 1973–74; the breakup of the East African Community in 1977; the war with Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1978–79; the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 as well as the commodity price crashes of the 1970s and 1980s. This situation led to pressure from outside for a country to restructure its roles as a requisite for loan or aid. With the advent of liberalization in economy and politics, little or no efforts were made to fine tune the values that had governed the Tanzanian economy during the Arusha Declaration and instead, advocates of freedom did this and individualistic tendencies were left to prevail and direction was lost because of unethical behaviour, exacerbated individualistic tendencies for self-aggrandisement and rent seeking behaviour among bureaucrats prevailed

The first is a situation where individuals misused public office for personal gain. This

type of corruption takes place in a modern, rational, Weberian bureaucratic system, where there is a clear division between public and private life. Societal norms support bureaucratic procedures that emphasize equal treatment based on the unbiased application of laws. For example, merit criteria were [are] used for hiring, promotion, and dispersing service. In such a system, corrupt behaviour violates bureaucratic procedures, organizational norms, laws, and larger societal expectations for the appropriate behaviour of its public officials.

Increase of the second situation of the problem is existence and prevalence of not rogue individuals but, rather, a system where corruption is embedded in society. In this situation, corruption is institutionalized and becomes the norm rather than the exception. The extensive literature on 'patronage' and 'big man' politics stands as testimony that, for many observers of Africa, corruption is a core element of the state and society.

In patronage systems, while there is a legal fiction of the Weberian bureaucracy, nonetheless norms, expectations, and actions of the public and their officials are based on differential application of rules, unequal access to services and preferential treatment. In short, the patronage networks - to which public officials belong - uphold the value of appropriating resources from the state to further the collective interests of the family, clan, ethnic group, region, or religion. The Tanzanian situation fits the criteria of systemic corruption. Corruption has become part and parcel of Tanzanians' daily lives as it is tolerated, accepted, and institutionalized to the extent that both people who give and receive bribes have internalised it. Reno (1998) notes that IMF and World Bank liberal reforms

are inherently limited. Indeed, as with many African countries.

Since then, Tanzania's efforts to combat corruption are built on an atomized, individualistic, legalistic definition of corruption that focuses on the misuse of public office for personal gain. This only captures part of what corruption is all about. Legalistic rational bureaucratic conceptions do not take into account the analytical reality of corruption as a political, economic, and social process that often has strong support from within the social networks to which a public servant belongs. By ignoring this reality, legalistic solutions based on institutional changes and stricter enforcement of rules are unlikely to effectively contain the widespread and systematic abuse of office supported by social networks. If legal and institutional reforms are not applied in tandem with fundamental societal changes that alter power relations and raise civic competence in dealing with corruption, then the prospects of making significant inroads into reducing corruption will remain remote (Theobald, 1999).

In societies with systemic corruption, Tanzania included, corrupt practices are embodied in existing power relations and therefore need to be analysed in regard to their effect on the lives of people engaged in their daily struggle for social, economic and political existence. While most accounts of systemic corruption note the plundering of state resources by its functionaries, it should also be recognized that officials use their positions in the state to extract resources directly from society.

While, no doubt, some of the gains from corrupt activities are for the personal benefit of individual public officials, these resources also feed social support networks based on

kinship and/or patronage ties, often of an ethnic nature (Anders, 2001; Joseph, 1998; Ekeh, 1998; Bayart, 1993). For many public officials, the obligations to these social support networks outweigh any sense of responsibility to protect public resources for a larger general good. Membership in kinship and patronage networks, fuelled by material shortages and economic hardship, force civil officials to disregard the notion of a public/private boundary line that makes possible the efficient performance of duties in western Weberian bureaucracies. In short, African civil servants are under pressure to abide by an alternative moral code that stresses their social obligations to family, friends, and clients (Ekeh, 1998). Students of African politics (Munishi, 1989; Bayart, 1993; Chabal, 1992; Anders, 2001) show how public officials in Africa have misappropriated public resources to invest in their private businesses to provide employment for family members; to provide basic needs to their relatives such as food, clothing, shelter, and schooling for children; and to contribute to the burials of friends, clients and family.

While, clearly, liberal solutions do not account for the context of embedded corruption, they should not, however, be disregarded. In 1995, during the first multi-party elections in thirty years, opposition political parties attempted to transform popular resentment against corruption into electoral support. However, the ruling party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi/Party of the Revolution) managed to manipulate this issue as well. It chose a politician untainted by scandal as its presidential candidate, thereby undercutting the opposition's ability to gain political advantage. Mkapa's approach differed from Nyerere's. Mkapa's government (Third regime) took a pragmatic approach to curbing corruption that entailed calling attention

to the problem through public campaigns, strengthening anti-corruption institutions and purging in the 'public interest' a number of state employees and urged professional bodies to become more involved in reducing corruption and overseeing the activities of their members (Lyimo, 2000). While Nyerere's approach focused on leaders with moral authority and a strong belief in humanity, equality and justice.

Beginning in 1998, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was revitalized and its budget dramatically increased. Investigations also drastically expanded during the same period, from 168 to 1,128 (Bruce & Ndumbaro, 2002). The PCB, with its own prosecutors, could investigate and bring to court corruption cases. In addition to the PCB, an Ethics Secretariat was created to curb the misuse of public office. It was designed to deal with breaches of ethics by public officials, which may or may not be corruption related.

However, the measures fell short of being unrealistic to ask (or try to force) public officials to avoid corruption when their wages are not enough to cover daily subsistence, let alone allow savings for retirement and to educate family members. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, pensions fell to ridiculously low amounts. Someone completing twenty or thirty years of service was lucky to receive \$100 after retiring.

Despite all these measures Mkapa's regime was serious about stemming official malpractice. Critics maintain that, aside from rhetorical condemnations and perfunctory changes, there was a marked absence of commitment on the part of top leaders to radically change the system or to empower the public so that they can hold accountable those who misuse positions of public trust. Daily, papers carried

articles covering corruption allegations, while the public's interactions with state officials still centered on the game of corruption. For example, an expatriate general manager of a gold mine provided anecdotal evidence of widespread high level corruption in April 2001, where he told Parliament that a never ending stream of government officials flock to the mines seeking payoffs. Despite the steps to control corruption, many Tanzanians believe that it is just as prevalent under Mkapa as it was under his predecessor.

Even some donors expressed reservations. At the end of Mkapa's first term the outgoing Head of the European Union in Tanzania encouraged greater effort by the government to purge the state of corrupt officials. One year later, at the third Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Tanzania was placed on a list of countries that did not use Japanese aid profitably (*African*, 2001). Moreover for many living in Tanzania, it was difficult to square the perceptions of reduced corruption with the reality of dealing with public officials who brazenly demand payoffs. What explains these different evaluations of the Mkapa government's commitment and ability to fight corruption? The similar trend was for the fourth phase and a point to emphasize that little focus on teaching ethical practices led to prevalence of individualistic tendencies among politicians and bureaucrats.

In a nutshell, throughout the five phases of government there are several measures to curb down unethical practices namely enacting the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (Cap. 400 of 1958) and establishment of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) to perform several functions including: investigating corruption offences, conducting research on corruption matters, raise public awareness on

corruption, prosecuting and giving advice to any entity in the fight against corruption in the country; Instituting the Ethics Secretariat in 1995 through the Public Leadership

Code of Ethics Act No.13 of 1995 in order to curb the misuse of public office by top public officials and all high ranking elected and non-elected officials were or are required to make a declaration of their assets and liabilities; Establishing good governance office. It was established with the mandate to coordinate the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and action Plan, to monitor the public leaders' ethics and abuse of power, to coordinate state organs involved in the fight against corruption, to strengthen the legal regime for fighting corruption and to link government and civil society efforts against corruption.

Despite existence of such legal frameworks, there is a widespread misuse and abuse of power; authority and leadership, lack of transparency and accountability as well as mismanagement of taxes, revenues and payments to the government. There is also lack of care and concern for the common good (public interest), trust, faith, ethics, wellbeing and welfare of weaker members of society. The country is suffering from what one scholar quoted by Kassala (2016) described as the destructive practices namely: Working by not considering others; not bothering about interests and rights of others; supersonic speed by individuals in the struggle to actualize one's interests, goals and objectives; the myth that although unethical conduct may not precisely be the right thing, it is not bad either and mentality that encourages and propels self-centred interests. Based on the Tanzanian experience, there is a need to look on the possible redress measures that are better suited

at restoring the lost direction of having ethical leadership in Africa.

Ethical Leadership- Which Way Forward? Tying it Altogether

The ethical framework presented in this work favours a value-based leadership practice that is embedded on principles. The old saying, *corruptissima republica plurimae leges* (*The more corrupt a republic, the more the laws it has*) is very applicable in our context today. Codes with legal enforceability are rules. Many African countries tend to favour a rules-based approach to governance and ethical practices. Why are laws failing to achieve a 'state of grace' in Africa today? To help resolve the paradox the following need to be taken into consideration for having a transformed leadership in Africa capable of managing national resources to achieve Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals.

First, ethical practices must engage humankind, individually and collectively. Judgments and action are human qualities, not those of processes or procedures; hence a transformational approach is required since it

people's mindsets, values and beliefs which in turn changes people's behaviour and actions.

Second, ethical leaders must be appointed to positions of authority to start influencing people and education programmes to raise the level of awareness and the importance of ethical practices in a society must be established. Third, ways to punish unethical practices must be instituted and must be seen to work and the war against unethical practices must adopt a systemic approach rather than a legalistic one.

Fourth, religion should play a key role in raising ethical consciousness of the African society. Last but not least we need to reconsider what democracy means in its idealistic form and we need to remind ourselves of the core *values* of democratic processes that all public officials should aim for in order to move up from localized ethics and communal ties since democratic *forms and practices* of majority vote, individual rights, free and fair elections, multiparty system and freedom of expression alone cannot guarantee a corruption free society with 'good systems of governance' and a country's leadership's commitment to personal ethics, social justice and impartial realization of human right.

References

- African (2001), "Japan Criticizes Uganda Aid Record", Dar es Salaam, December 6, 5. in Bruce, H and L. Ndumbaro (2002). Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration's Anti-Corruption Efforts, *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol 7 No. 1, P. 9-10; ; available at the African e-Journals Project maintained by Michigan State University Library at <http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/>
- Agbude, G. (2013). Ethical Leadership, Corruption and Irresponsible Governance: Rethinking the African Dilemma, *Department of Political Science and international Relations Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria*
- Alimo, M. et. al. (2008). The impact of engaging leadership on performance, attitudes to work and

- wellbeing at work: A longitudinal study; *Journal of Health Organization and Management* Vol. 22 No. 6, pp. 586-598 available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1477-7266.htm
- Anders, Gerhard (2001), "Rules of Networks, Kinship and Patronage: Civil Servants in Malawi as Providers and Recipients of Social Support", Paper presented at the Thirteenth Biennial Congress of the African Association of Political Science held in Yaounde Cameroon, June, 19-22.
- Ansie Van Wyk, J. (2007). Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers? ACCORD Occasional Paper Series: Volume 2, No. 1; Available at: <https://scholar.google.co.za>
- Bandura, A. (1977). *Social Learning Theory*, General Learning Press: New York City
- Bayart, J. (1993), *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman
- Bruce, H and L. Ndumbo (2002). Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration's Anti-Corruption Efforts, *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol 7 No. 1; available at the African e-Journals Project maintained by Michigan State University Library at <http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/>
- Butts, Janie B, and Rich, Karen L. (2008). *Nursing Ethics: Across the Curriculum and Into Practice*. Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett.
- Chabal, P. (1992), *Power in Africa*, New York: St Martins Press
- Chakrabarty, D. (2005). Legacies of Bandung: Decolonisation and the Politics of Culture. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(46), 4812-4818. Retrieved May 16, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/4417389
- Commission for Africa.(2005). *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*. London: Department for International Development
- Cornelli, M. (2012). *A Critical Analysis of Nyerere's Ujamaa: An Investigation of Its Foundations and Values*, A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
- Daniel D., Robert, O & Isaac, N. (2016). Striving for Effective Leadership in Africa: A Case for Ethical Leadership, *Asia-Africa Journal of Mission and Ministry*, Vol. 13
- David, B. & Michael, S (Eds). (2010). *Leadership and Growth: World Bank e-Library*, Washington DC: World Bank Publications.
- Donelson Forsyth (2006). *Group Dynamics (Fourth Edition)*; USA: Thomson Wadsworth
- Economic Development Report (2016). *Debt Dynamics and Development Finance in Africa*, UNCTAD, United Nations Publications.
- Ekeh, Peter (1998), "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement" in Peter Lewis (ed.) *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press
- Francis M. Deng & Terrence Lyons (Eds) .(1998). *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good*

Governance, Brookings Institution Press: New York

Ferrell, Odies C, Maignan, Isabelle, & Loe, Terry. (1999). A Corporate Ethics + Citizenship = Competitive Advantage. *Successful Business Through Successful Ethics Programs Proceedings*,

Center for Ethics, University of Tampa

Ferrell, Odies C, and Ferrell, Linda. (2001). Role of Ethical Leadership in Organizational Performance. *Journal of Management Systems*, Vol.13, 64–78.

Freeman, R. E. & Stewart, L. (2006). *Developing ethical leadership*. Retrieved from: <http://www.corporate-ethics.org>

Galton, F. (1892). *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences*; Macmillan: London; available at <http://galton.org>

Gardner, William L, Avolio, Bruce J, and Luthans, Fred. (2005). “Can You See the Real Me?” A Self-based Model of Authentic Leader and Follower Development. *Leadership Quarterly*, 16 (3), 343–372.

Hoebink, P. (2009). Stagnation in Africa: Disentangling Figures, Facts and Fiction- in Doing Good Doing Better; Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen, available at: <https://www.academia.edu/5952699/2009>

Hollander, E. P., & Offermann, L. R. (1990). Power and leadership in organizations: Relationships in transition. *American Psychologist: Washington*; 45, 179–189

Hopkins, M. M., O’Neil, D. A., Passarelli, A., & Bilimoria, D. (2008). Women’s leadership development: Strategies for women and organizations. *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research*, 60, 348–365.

Jeong, C., & Han, H. (2013). Exploring the Relationship between Virtue Ethics and Moral Identity. *Ethics & Behavior*, 23(1), 44-56; available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254257283_Exploring_the_Relationship_Between_Virtue_Ethics_and_Moral_Identity

KAS (2016). *Ethical Leadership and Sustainable Development: Expectations and Challenges*

After the 2015 Elections: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Kassala, C. (2016) Comments of Dr. Kasalla on “*Role of Ethical Leadership in Realisation of Sustainable Development Goals*”, reported in the Guardian Newspaper on Sunday, 7th February, 2016 available at: <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/features/role-ethical-leadership-realization-sdgs>

Chemers, M.M., (1997). *An Integrative Theory of Leadership*, Psychology Press: New York.

Kauzya, J. (2007). *The Human Factor in Global Governance: Leadership Capacity Development Perspective in Africa*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations New York

Kiley, S. (1994), “Donors Freeze Aid Over Tanzanian Tax Fraud Claims”, *Times*, London, 25 November.

- Kellerman, B. (2008). *Followership: How followers are creating change and changing leaders*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Kirimi, B.A and D. Minja (2012). *Transformational Corporate Leadership, USA: Integrity Publishers Inc.*
- Kuada, J. (2014). *Culture and leadership in Africa: a conceptual model and research agenda; Vol. 1, No.1; Department of Business Studies, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark, available at www.emeraldinsight.com/2040-0705.htm ; Accessed on 4th October, 2018)*
- Lyimo, Henry (2000), “CCM for the people, not for the rich few, says Mkapa”, *Sunday Observer*, Dar es Salaam, August 13,1,3
- Mathoko, J. (2013). *Leadership and organizational ethics: the three dimensional African perspectives*, Johannesburg, South Africa.
- Minja, D. (2011). *Ethical Leadership Practice: The Foundation of Political and Economic Development in Kenya*; available at <http://www.ku.ac.ke/schools/humanities/images/stories/docs/Research/MinjaDavidEthicalLeadership.pdf>
- Mkapa, B. (2007). *Leadership for Growth, Development, and Poverty Reduction: An African Viewpoint and Experience*, in David, B. & Michael, S (Eds). (2010). *Leadership and Growth: World Bank e-Library, World Bank Publications: Washington DC.*
- Morrison, K. (1988). *Lessons of Experience: How Successful Executives Develop on the Job*, New York: Free Press.
- Moyo, Dambisa. (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*. London: Penguin Group.
- Msafiri Y.M. &, Xinhua, H. (2017). *Tanzanian Controversy on Resources Endowments and Poverty; Environment and Ecology Research 5(1): 30-38, 2017 DOI: 10.13189/eer.2017.050104; available at <http://www.hrpub.org>*
- Muller, R. and Turner, R. (2010) *Leadership Competency Profiles of Successful Project Managers. International Journal of Project Management, 28, 437-448.*
- Munishi, G. (1989), “Bureaucratic Feudalism, Accountability and Development in the Third World: The Case of Tanzania”, in G. Joseph and D. Dwivedi (eds.) *Accountability: A Comparative Perspective*, New Delhi: Kumarian Press.
- Nic Cheeseman, Lindsay Whitfield, Carl Death (Eds) . (2017). *The African Affairs Reader: Key Texts in Politics, Development and International Relations*; United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Nsibambi, A.R. (2002). “*Globalisation and the State in Africa: Harnessing the Benefits and Minimising the costs*” in G. Bertucci and M. Dugget, *The Turning World: Globalisation and Governance at the Start of the 21st Century*, UNDESA and IIAS Publication, Washington.
- Ochola, S.A. (2007), *Leadership and Economic Crisis in Africa*, Kenya Literature Bureau, Nairobi.
- Okpara, J.O. and Wynn, P. (2007), “The effect of culture on job satisfaction and organizational

- commitment: A study of information system managers in Nigeria”, *African Journal of Business and Economic Research*, Vol. 2 Nos 2/3, pp. 9-36.
- Piccolo, Greenbaum, Den Hartog, and Folger (2010). *The Relationship Between Ethical Leadership and Core Job Characteristics*, *Journal of Organizational Behaviour* 31, Vol.2 3:259-278
- Pichardo Pagaza, I & D. Argyriade, (2009). *Winning the Needed Change: Saving Our Planet: A Global Public Service*, IOS Press, Amsterdam.
- Reno, William (1998), *Warlord Politics and African States*, Lynne: Boulder/London: Rienner Publishers.
- Robert, A. D. (Ed) .(2018). *Business and Government Relations in Africa*; Routledge Critical Studies in Public Management; Newyork and London: Routledge Taylor &Francis Group.
- Solomon, R. (1998). *Ethical Leadership, Emotions, and Trust: Beyond “Charisma”*. Jn J.B. Ciulla (Ed.) *Ethics: The Heart of Leadership*. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
- Treviño, L. K., Hartman, L. P., & Brown, M. (2000). Moral person and moral manager: How executives develop a reputation for ethical leadership. *California Management Review*, (4), 128-142. Available at <https://doi.org/10.2307/41166057>; accessed on October, 2018
- UNCTAD (2004), “Enhancing the contribution to development of the indigenous private sector in Africa”, available at: www.afrasia.org/cmsupload/1188676352_AABC UNCTAD (accessed 10 August 2018).
- URT (2009). *Poverty and Human Development Report; REPOA on behalf of the Research and Analysis Working Group*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania
- World Bank (2014). *World Development Indicators*, Washington DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/9781-4648-0163-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO, available at www.worldbank.org
- Woltring, Carol. (2002). *Leadership*. *Encyclopedia of Public Health*. Retrieved on October 04, 2018 from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404000496.html>.
- Zimmerli, Walther C., Richter, Klaus, Holzinger, Markus (Eds.) (2007). *Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance*, online book accessed at <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783540708179>

TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF SUPERABUNDANT NATIONAL RESOURCES AND AFRICA'S UNSATISFACTORY SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMATICS OF LEADERSHIP AND BEYOND

Robert Kemepade MORUKU, PhD

Abstract

The present contribution developed from the problematization of the internal leadership situation in African for the states and structural constraints of the global capitalist system for the observed unsatisfactory socioeconomic development of Africa in the midst of superabundant national resources. At heart, the study envisaged learning transformational leadership as a mediator between the national resources and the desired socioeconomic development of the continent within the context of the global capitalist economic system. Consequently was laid on the theoretical foundation of the leader-member exchange theory which was reinforced with the learning theory and the social capital theory. Qualitative content data analysis was employed which generated the findings of the study. As theoretically expected, both unsatisfactory leadership style and structural barriers in the global economic context produced the ongoing unsatisfactory socioeconomic performance of African states. Among others, it was recommended that Africa enthrones learning transformational leadership while engaging the global economic system. Based on the agency perspective and the prescriptions of institutional theory, it was recommended that efforts should be made to develop or nurture the transformational leader. Africa's electorates were urged to stimulate or pressure leaders to adopt the behavioural components of transformational leadership and vote them into elective positions.

Keywords: Leader-member exchange theory; Learning theory; National resources; Socioeconomic development of Africa; Transformational leadership; Transactional leadership

Introduction

Africa is caught in throes of developmental paradox. The paradox is conceptualized as the increasing and, therefore, yawning gap between the actual and expected socioeconomic development performance of African states in the face of the endowment of superabundant national resources. At the same time, Europe has achieved socioeconomic development from tapping these same resources through various mechanisms (Toffler, 1980: 96-127). This is different from the increasing rate of global poverty between and within nations in the midst of over-affluence. The superabundance of the national resources is evident in the inexhaustibility of these resources despite their continuous exploitation from the time of the scramble for Africa in 1885 to the present. I have been encouraged in this worthwhile research effort from the motivation of Lewis (2000, as cited in Chen, 2008), who stressed that theorists or researchers must find ways to deal with the inherent human and organizational paradoxes to make any big advances in management and organization science.

Africa faces a revolutionary transformation process, including temporal acceleration, in the increasingly complex global economic and geopolitical systems in an emergent and confusing world order. The world order is the “governing arrangement among states, meeting the current demand for order in major areas of concern” (Sørensen, 2006). The confusion shows up in the observation of the unfolding “insurgent universality” and “liquid modernity” into “anarchy as world order” (Bamyeh, 2009, in Baronov, 2010; Kaplan, 1994, in Reno, 2003; Rockhill, 2020; Williams, 2008), which borders on

growing insecurity. Africa is disadvantaged as it experiences constraints or strictures in its socioeconomic developmental process. Therefore, Africa has never before at any time in its history needed more effective leadership than it does now, which, hopefully, can drive through this process. Thus, the present development thinking problematizes leadership as a constraint on the search path to development. Consequently, therefore, Africa is thought to require *transformational leadership*, which motivated the AAPAM to assemble Africa’s scholars, scientists, or intellectuals and professionals or practitioners in public administration and management in the above-mentioned Round Table conference to brainstorm on this theoretically grounded genre of leadership.

In this contribution, Africa’s developmental problem is set in terms of (i) a proximate weak or dysfunctional African leadership mediating the connection between superabundant national resources and Africa’s socioeconomic development and (ii) a strong distal connection between the international development context and Africa’s socioeconomic development.

By these problematizations, and building on the earlier conference and spin-off versions (Moruku, 2017; 2019) I intend to make contributions in two attribution domains, which are (i) the failure to achieve improvement in the human condition in Africa because of what is here perceived as a suboptimal leadership performance for whose solution it is suggested that Africa enthrones *a learning transformational institutional leadership* for sustainable performance; and (ii) the failure to achieve improvement in the human condition in Africa because of the strictures or impediments in the international development context for whose solution it is suggested that

Africa repositions itself for economic self-determination or emancipation.

For example, Europe lives off on the resources of Africa and benefits from keeping the continent in perpetual poverty (Rodney, 1972). Rudolf Churchill frankly admitted that, “Without India...England would cease to be a nation” (Rudolph Churchill, as quoted in Herman, 2009: 178). It is also true that without Africa, Europe would cease to exist. This aligns with the position of the African Union with respect to the international context, which is the reason for creating the NEPAD with a desire for “Forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world” (NEPAD Secretariat, n. d.). The African Union Charter, among others, aspires to position “Africa as a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player and partner” (African Union Commission, 2015), in line with the reality that “wicked” problems like socioeconomic development, security, and climate change, require concerted solutions (Rittel & Webber, 1973, in Sementelli, 2007; Williams, 2008). These informed the inclusion of “leadership and beyond” in the caption of this contribution.

Although this contributor is cognizant of quantum indeterminacy with possibility of reverse causality (Dyck and Greidanus, 2017), the study is nonetheless grounded in the Newtonian paradigm of unidirectional, antecedent-consequent cause-effect relationship such that cause is theoretically positioned as antecedent to effect (Naiburg, 2003) in which there is a temporal lag from cause to effect. As such, *ceteris paribus*, or holding other things constant, a paradigm shift in leadership, as cause of the dilute socioeconomic development of Africa, would

lead to the realization of the desired level of development of the continent. At least, that is the mainstream thinking on the development philosophy, as suggested in the theme of the AAPAM 38th Round Table Conference. This is identified here as the problematization of leadership in the development of Africa. But in this contribution, it is identified as one of two system variables on the path to Africa’s development, the other being the complex international context in which Africa is embedded. The position taken in this contribution, a core argument, is that while leadership can make and has often made a difference, there is a limit to which a leader can orchestrate development in a world of globalization involving global governance in an increasingly integrated world (Stephen, 2014; Williams, 2008). Africa is embedded in the global economic system and cannot be insulated from it (Immanuel Wallerstein in McGowan, 2008: 248). Thus, the key contribution of this study that unless the international development context is addressed, the learning transformational leader whom we present as the long-awaited messiah for Africa’s economic emancipation is likely to fare only a little better than the transactional leader he will replace.

Consequently, after this introduction, the logic of the paper is set out to achieve the afore-mentioned contribution as follows. The conceptual framework is laid out in section two. Section three is used to list Africa’s wealth of national resources. This is followed up in section four with the burning issue of the rising poverty level in Africa. The researcher takes a sample of founding fathers of modern Africa as examples of great leaders and poses the rhetorical question whether they may be described as transformational leaders that Africa now seeks to enthrone, doing so to

stimulate and drive the thinking process. I then turn to establish the nexus between national resources and socioeconomic development of Africa, arguing that the transformational leader plays a mediating role in the linkage. I develop the argument, in section seven, that the international development context shares the blame for the dilute performance of African leaders because it has a debilitating effect on the economies of African countries. I follow up, in section eight, on the previous argument by suggesting that the international order must be restructured to enable Africa benefit from the exploitation of its national resources. Considering its importance for orchestrating socioeconomic development, I discuss how to develop or encourage the development of learning transformational leaders for Africa in section nine. Section ten concludes the paper.

In the context of this paper, “Africa” is a case study of what goes on in Latin America and Asia. So, occasionally, examples are drawn from comparator countries outside Africa. In a similar vein, “Europe” is used to refer to itself and as a proxy for “the developed countries”. The leader of a country is its political head with executive capacity. He takes the credit or knocks for the socioeconomic performance or lack of performance of the country.

Theoretical Basis of Desirable Leadership Type for Africa

Although there are about eighty-one leadership styles in the Mouton and Blake’s managerial grid (Koontz and O’Donnell, 1976:598-600) of leadership with only five dimensions or styles explicitly named, AAPAM and its partners in their conversation at the 38th Round Table Conference of the Association took the stance

that Africa should enthrone transformational leadership as a route to Africa’s socioeconomic development. This was a well-founded and theoretically grounded position.

In this section, therefore, the present contributor makes explicit, the framing or founding theory of the deliberations in the conference, which is the leader Member-Exchange Theory, doing so to fulfill the scholarly requirement to make explicit the theory-in-use in scholarly conversations so that readers can determine whether or not their theoretical lenses are helpful in examining the phenomena under investigation. It is compelling, in particular, that critical theorists believe that “there is no *theory-neutral observation*, description, interpretation... or whatever else” (Fleetwood, 2005: 199). As such, “the notion of disinterested enquiry is ... untenable” (Barry 2002: 35).

Two complementary theoretical explanations for this preferred type of leadership are given in this contribution, which are the Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory and the Learning Theory. These are discussed in the following two subsections.

(i) The Leader-Member Exchange Theory

The LMX Theory is a higher level theory embodying the transactional leadership theory and transformational leadership theory. This theory has gained widespread interest and currency in recent years since James MacGregor Burns (1978, in Conger, 2004) identified these two main types of leaders. He suggested that leaders on the one hand and followers on the other engage in an *exchange* of “valuable something” between them. But the two types of leaders are distinguished from one another by the *content of the exchange transactions*.

The Transformational Leadership Theory: The content in the exchange transaction of transformational leaders is the offer of a *transcendental purpose* for addressing the *higher-order needs of their followers* and the leaders themselves as their mission. When these needs are satisfied, both the leaders and followers are transformed; hence the term, *transformational* into a something transcendental, possibly, for example, spiritual state, moral purity, *such as a mission to save the world*. Thus, the transformational leader is inspirational but it involves a mutual stimulation between the leader and the led. The effective transformational leader can impact on the lives, beliefs or worldviews, and thoughts that go beyond his/her immediate followers to future generations of followers. This is the case with great religious leaders because *they are ideally real to new generation of followers*.

According to Burns (1978: 4, as quoted in Conger, 2004), “The result of transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that convert the led into leaders and may convert the leaders into moral agents”. The behavioural components of transformational leadership consist of: cultivation or display of charisma for the arousal of strong emotions, individualized consideration, provision of intellectual stimulation, and performance.

Applied to the issue of Africa’s unsatisfactory socioeconomic development, which is in the front burner, the effective leader, according to the LMX Theory, would offer *improvements in the human condition* through the provision of valued resources such as guaranteed and well-paying jobs, unblinking electricity supply, clean pipe-borne water, roads, well-equipped and well-staffed hospitals, world-class

educational institutions, adequate resources (tools) to do one’s job, and so on - all in exchange for legitimacy, power, authority, and status of the leader. But this is a far cry from the status quo in Africa, as highlighted in section three of this contribution, which constitutes the problem for the present discourse. Pointedly, it is unacceptable that an African head of state goes to the US, UK, and other advanced countries for medical attention because his countries’ hospitals are not better than “consulting clinics”. Yet, no American president or ordinary citizen comes to Nigeria, for example, for medical attention.

But there is a limit to everything, including the performance of the transformational leader, which is what he/she can and cannot do. If we do not make allowance for it, we may end up persecuting otherwise effective transformational leaders. For example, global issues such as climate change and its deleterious effects require global action guided by global ethics (Küng, 2005), not just the effort of one transformational leader in one country. Although there are unintended effects of social actions (Moroni, 2010), including the outcomes of the actions of a transformation leader, for space considerations, this conversation will not dwell on them.

The Transactional Leadership Theory: For clarity in contrast, transactional leaders nurture more mundane and instrumental relationships with their followers, such as cash for vote in political leaderships or acceptance or offer of gifts for services such as kickbacks for award of contracts. This is the more pervasive of the two types of leadership in many parts of the world.

(ii) The Learning Theory

The justification for this framework derives

from the observed continuous, dynamic complexity characterizing the total global environment. This environment, bordering on the edge of complexity and chaos, contrasted with the Lewinian environment of episodic change, creates the imperative for *acquiring a continuous learning capability* for creatively adapting to the *continuously changing environment*. It necessarily involves enrolling in a *life-long learning course* at the level of individual countries, regions, and the continent, which constitutes multi-level learning. It is useful for creating dynamic capability, *dynamic efficiency*, skills development, and capabilities for appropriate responses to environmental cues. Besides, a *static efficiency* can result from a transformational leadership style, leading to stagnation. This stagnation can be overcome to achieve a dynamic transformational leadership style in tune with the dynamics of the global total environment, which is the essence of the learning transformational leadership style. It can result also from a relapse into transactional leadership style by the transformational leader himself or his followers, who may not learn from the changed environmental circumstances or their failure to develop or grow up. Thus, formerly successful, but now irrelevant, strategies may be blindly, rigidly, or fanatically adopted to the very perdition of the country, region, or the continent.

As shown in Section 5 of the contribution, Africa has had transformational leaders in the past. Yet, Africa lags behind in socioeconomic development. My take is that the international or global context has a dampening effect on Africa's development and most of Africa's transformational leaders had/have static efficiency, which can only be remedied through the *acquisition of dynamic capability by learning for problem-driven iterative adaptation* (PDIA), which is my reason

for incorporating learning theory into the modeling of the transformational leadership style, as in the complementary theoretical framework, and the captioning of my communication presented at the conference as "The Nexus between National Resources and Africa's Socioeconomic development: The Mediating Role of Learning Transformational Leadership".

The Rising Poverty in Africa and Africa's Response

The paradox of want in the midst of plenty has been widely observed (see for example, African Development Bank, 2007; Moruku, 2016; Okaba, 2005). It has instigated both within-country migration from rural areas to urban cities and out-migration to rich countries in the developed world in a desperate search for means of survival and better living conditions but the migrants end up being enslaved, rejected, assaulted, humiliated, raped, or dehumanized (Mafu, 2019; Pennington et al., 2009).

A rising level of *poor and impoverished* Africans are suffering unprecedented adversity through loss of jobs, low-paid work, health hazards (e.g., Ebola in Liberia, meningitis stretching across the meningitis belt from West Africa to Central Africa, malaria in all of Africa), rising food and energy prices (all African countries), environmental degradation, armed conflict (South Sudan; Central African Republic, Libya), political turmoil (e.g., Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya); natural disasters such as droughts, desertification (e.g., Niger Republic, Nigeria, Somalia), landslide (e.g., Sierra Leone); poor economic performance such as

recession (e.g., Nigeria and South Africa; they, along with Brazil, just came out of it a few years ago), resource depletion, insecurity due to incessant terrorist attacks (Egypt, over the Sinai Peninsula; Kenya, Mali, Niger Republic; Nigeria, in the North-East; Somalia), bad or transactional leadership and official corruption (almost all African countries and at different times), and so on. Thus, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were developed to secure a more prosperous future for the most disadvantaged people on earth only a few years ago (2000) are unlikely to be met across board (Correll, 2008 in Lena, 2000) in Africa.

Thus, the socioeconomic development challenge in Africa is mostly a pan-African problem rather than a problem of each African country alone. So, Africa has rightly risen up to take the challenge or own up the problem through the AU with its regional economic communities (RECs) and development institutions. It is also a response to the call for delinking from the global system into a polycentric or multipolar world order of power blocs; creating an African power bloc. The African power bloc consists of Africa's development institutions, which are the AAPAM; the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG-A) and its African Local Government Academy (ALGA); and the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD). The RECs are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAs), the East African Community (EAC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The pivotal role of the AU in the development

of Africa can be seen in its agenda-setting strategic visions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which it inherited from its progenitor, the OAU, the Agenda 2030, and Agenda 2063. The AU peace missions are part of the efforts for orchestrating socio-economic development of Africa which is evident in the fact that the success of development often depends on the existence of peace and security (see also Arthur, 2017).

Africa, Transactional, and Transformational Leadership

In this section, I attempt to answer the implied question, "Has Africa ever had transformational leaders?" The attempt is to try to identify or suggest possible transformational leaders which Africa has produced, including Africans in the Diaspora. But it is a tall order because of the complexity of the subject matter and the issue of social construction of reality, particularly, that of the social construction of leaders as suggested in Grint (2004) and Moorosi et al. (2018). In fact, Johnson-Abercrombie has demonstrated in a series of compelling examples that we see what we are prepared to see (Lonie, 1991). So, how do we see leadership in Africa? Do we have or have we had transformational leaders in Africa and Africans in the Diaspora? One test to bear in mind in judging whether or not a leader is transformational is the posthumous evaluation by future generations about the impact of the leader when he has long gone. Judging from the behavioural components of transformational leadership can be helpful too.

i. Transformational Leaders of Africa and in the Diaspora

Judging from the behavioural components of transformational leadership, I consider some African and African American leaders as transformational leaders in their own right. For space constraint, I briefly highlight the transformational leadership qualities of just two leaders, namely, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Martin Luther King Jnr (African American). For detailed explanation of other possibly transformational leaders such as Gamel Abdel Nasser, Barack Obama, and Nelson Mandela, see Moruku (2019).

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana: He fought and secured independence for Ghana, which was the first Black African country to gain independence on the African continent, in 1959. Ghana proudly positioned itself as the Black Star of Africa. Africans gained identity. Ghana's independence spurred other countries to fight for their independence. Fortunately, Ghana did not go through a harrowing liberation war of the kind Algeria went through to gain independence. Fortune also smiled at Nigeria and Egypt in this respect.

Martin Luther King Jnr (African American) led the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. His famous speech, which he delivered on freedom and egalitarianism at the "March on Washington" in 1963, "I have a dream...", is a masterpiece of inspiration into transcendentalism, the realm or plane of exquisite delight such as limitless freedom and self-realization, which sits beyond our earth-bound immanent plane of failure and mundane existence. It is worth reproducing part of it here:

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the

content of their character. I have a dream that one day in Alabama, with its vicious racist, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of interposition and nullification, one day right here in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers. I have a dream ... (full text in Kumar, 2006: 103-107)

The South African global communications transnational corporation, Mobile Telecommunications Network, MTN Nigeria, has made it a caller tune and helping to inform and inspire generations to emulate King's contributions to humanity. His charge for social, political, and economic actions was for people to acknowledge and correct the persistent injustice and disparities, both nationally and internationally (Logsdon & Murrell, 2008). He wrote that humans are

...unduly separated in ideas, culture and interest, who, because we can never again live apart, must learn somehow to live with each other in peace. . . . All inhabitants of the globe are now neighbors (King, 1986, p. 617, as quoted in Logsdon & Murrell, 2008).

He played a pivotal role, such as the Montgomery bus boycott (1955-1956), the historic "March on Washington" (1963), and the "Bloody Sunday" march in Selma (1965). Following the Montgomery bus boycott, Civil Rights Act (1964) was enacted, which banned discrimination in public facilities, such as hotels and restaurants, and also prohibited employment discrimination. The Voting Rights Act (1965) was enacted, which was followed by the enactment of the Fair Housing Act (1965) that removed discrimination in the purchase and rental of housing. Painfully, he was assassinated, which dastardly act evoked protests in more than 100 cities. But he lives

on in the minds of people around the world (Logsdon & Murrell, 2008), just like “John Brown’s body is still alive in the grave”. For example, a cenotaph is raised for him, which his *enchanted followers* visit annually for inspiration.

Even now, police brutality on and killing of African Americans is traumatizing and infuriating, spurning the Black Lives Matter Movement, which surged in 2014 after a White police officer, Darren Wilson, shot Michael Brown, an unarmed African American teenager in Ferguson. The recent barbaric act of killing of George Floyd by a bunch of White American cops has incensed the world. Despite the continuing killings, as, even now, Black lives do not matter much (Beer, 2018), African Americans now enjoy a better visibility and freedom in the US than before Luther embarked on the civil rights movement. The plight of the African American remains blighted from *structural barriers* (Pfeifer, 2009)

There is no shortage of leaders here considered as transformational for establishing themselves as founding fathers of modern Africa and inspiring generations of Africans. They were able to mobilize ordinary, bare-handed, Africans to demand independence from the extraterritorial imperial powers, and where they were not favourably heard, fought against them and gained independence. Kenneth Kaunda was undeterred by the power of the colonial invaders. He told a colonial official at Lusaka Airport or so that *Zambia Shall be Free*, which became the title of his engaging book, even though he realized that his people would become “*canon fodders for imperialist guns*”. In this league are Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga of Kenya; Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; Robert Mugabe (in his earlier years) and

Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe; Ndabanigi Sitholi, Desmond Tutu, Steve Biko, and Abel Muzerewa of South Africa; Dr. J. K. Aggrey; Patrice Lumumba of Congo; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Herbert Macaulay, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. This is an incomplete list because it is not meant to be exhaustive but to be illustrative. I listed them as founding fathers of Africa, not as heads of state such as presidents or prime ministers. As fathers, they nurtured Africa in terms of ideals and visions, such as freedom, emancipation, socioeconomic development; pan-Africanism, which energized the pan-Africanists to create the Organization for African Unity or OAU in 1953 (now Africa Union), and so on. Their actions were foundational and reference continues to be made to them in retracing the African development trajectory which current prodigal sons of Africa (see some of them listed below) strayed away from; the Africa of the dream of the founders and the Africa we want in 2063, as captured in Agenda 2063, and enunciated by the African Union Commission (2015).

As stated earlier, the founding fathers had a big dream for Africa, particularly, for its unity and development and founded the Organization for African Unity or OAU (now African Union or AU) with Headquarters in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, the unconquerable country that defeated the colonial invaders; the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD), *Africa’s think tank; engine room of ideas, and social capital!* They spoke with one voice in international forums. They were self-sacrificing. Africa today is a far cry from the Africa of their dream.

Africa is the loser for the post-independent crises, which many leaders got embroiled with, including Robert Mugabe and Joshua

Nkomo. This observation is consistent with my concept of *static efficiency* and the reason why I advocate the concept of the learning transformational institutional leader, who is adaptive, creative; has dynamic capability and efficiency. So, looking at the trajectory evokes a nagging question, “What will be the level of socioeconomic development of Africa in 2063, which will be 100 years since the founding of the OAU?”

ii. Africa’s Institutional Transformational Leaders

Countries, regions, and organizations can play and have played transformational leadership roles. For example, under the leadership of General Olusegun Obasanjo (now Rtd), as a military ruler (with his fire-brand Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, as Minister of External Affairs), *Nigeria made Africa the centerpiece of its foreign policy* along with the pride of the Black man and the decolonization of Africa at the top of its foreign policy agenda. It nationalized the assets of Shell British Petroleum Company (Shell BP) to punish Britain for its role in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). With Nigeria’s leadership, the African High Command (AHC) was raised with troops drawn from African countries for possible military intervention in crisis situations in African countries. It seems that, at heart, it was meant to intervene in Apartheid South Africa, which had a field day harassing all the frontlines states (including Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia) in the name of going after freedom fighters waging guerilla warfare against it from these states. But it was held back by its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. That doctrine has since been replaced with the *doctrine of humanitarian intervention*. All of these brought down the Apartheid system

and the complete liberation of Africa from the European invaders and thieves who colonized Africa and *robbed it of its natural resources at gun point*.

In this same breath, I can say with certainty that the conveners of the afore-mentioned 38th Round Table Conference are learning transformational leaders. For the records, they are the Kingdom of Morocco, United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG-A), African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD). They constituted and provided my cherished institutional learning transformational leadership, which I strongly advocate because the institutional leader has perpetual succession and longevity equivalent to acquiring immortality. Institutional leaders act as institutional entrepreneurs who envision new institutional configurations as a means to advance the interests they value highly, yet are suppressed by extant types of logic (DiMaggio, 1988, in Ucbasaran et al., 2010).

iii. Africa’s Uninspiring and Unsatisfactory Transactional Leaders

Africa has suffered immensely from fear-inspiring personality cult figures as leaders, who have been unleashing a reign of fear on their unfortunate subjects. They qualify as destructive leaders for the civil wars they led, which destroyed the lives of Africans (see also Krasikova et al., 2013). The present contributor here goes at length to show this leadership snag because it is part of the crux of the contribution and the antithesis of the transformational leader who was the main subject of the afore-mentioned Conference. A few African leaders who performed poorly are listed to drive home the point. Drawing mainly on Wikipedia.org (2020), Field Marshall Idi

Amin Dada Oumee, was a military head of state of Uganda (1971-1974). Also known as the “Butcher of Uganda” for his notoriety in wanton execution of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans, Idi Amin was one of the cruelest despots and was a clueless dictator in African history. He led Uganda to a needless war with Tanzania. Omar al-Bashir was President of Sudan (1989-2019). He was indicted by the International Criminal Court for allegedly using the *Janjaweed* or “armed men on horseback”, Sudanese government-backed Arab militias, on a campaign of mass killings (a veritable genocide), rape, and pillage against Black Africans in Dafur region in southern Sudan (see also Masland and Bailey, 2004). Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jamus Junkung Jammeh, was president of the Gambia (1994-2017). He was a power-hungry despot, who was accused of stealing millions of dollars from the country’s coffers to fund a life of luxury. After leaving office, his assets were frozen by many countries. He was charged with human rights abuses, raping a number of women, and corruption. He attempted to illegally perpetuate himself in office against the verdict of the electorates in 2016 and was poised to create chaos in the country. So, the ECOWAS regional military force moved in and chased him out of the country.

Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga (simply, Mobutu Sese Seko) was President of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) from 1965 to 1997. During the Congo crisis, he deposed the democratically elected President Patrice Lumumba, and got him executed in 1961. He was a lifetime military dictator and constituted a burden to Africa. Jaale Mohamed Siad Barre was President of Somali Democratic Republic (1969-1991). He started well but declined in popularity after losing to Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, which

triggered the Somali Rebellion. Opposition grew against his dictatorial rule. He supervised the Isaaq genocide; the country’s economy collapsed, and he was ejected from power, leading to the Somali civil war (1991 and on-going as an unmitigated disaster). Hissene Habre was President of Chad (1982-1990). Some 7,000 Chadians who suffered mistreatment under his 27 years’ rule of the country filed a class case against him. He was found guilty of human rights violations, including rape, sexual slavery, and ordering the killing of 400,000 people, particularly in connection with the civil war waged in the country (TVC News 20/3/2017; tvcnews@tvc.ng). In 2016, a regional appeal court in Senegal confirmed the earlier adverse judgment against him. Consequently, he was sentenced to life time in prison. President Ahmed Sekou Toure was the most influential post-colonial dictator who ruled Guinea from 1958 to 1984. Soon after taking power from France, he ordered the execution of his political enemies, after framing them up as hatching a plot against him. He chased over a million Guineans out of the country. According to Posthumus (2000), who reported these atrocities, his rule went from harshness to despotism. He instituted three traditions, which operated in tandem, namely, insidious corruption, political intolerance, and suffocating security blanket. Lansana Conte continued these traditions. Others are Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, late Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (in his later days).

Viewed against the backdrop of the behavioural components of the transformational leader, Nigeria has got its fair share of uninspiring and unsatisfactory transactional leaders. Among them are late military dictator, General Sani Abacha and the current leadership of the country, President Mohammed Buhari,

also fondly called PMB. Lest their admirers take me to task, let me illustrate why I consider them candidates of uninspiring and unsatisfactory transactional leaders, taking PMB here. General Sani Abacha is taken up in a forthcoming paper.

Nigeria is experiencing an unprecedented surge in banditry, actually terrorism and Jihadism. But the government has no answer to it. Insecurity is at the highest level with daily occurrences of raping and killing of women; killing, including beheading of people, and kidnapping or abducting of people by well-armed and rampaging Jihadist Fulani cattle herdsman. Apparently, these criminals/murderers are condoned as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Mohammed Buhari, and his security chiefs have done nothing about it (see also Ocholi and Ali, 2020) and remain clueless, inscrutable, and unhelpful. The perpetrators of these heinous *crimes against humanity* are known but they are not brought to book. They are allowed to have sophisticated weapons but others who have licensed double and single barrel guns are ordered to surrender them to government. The terrorist group, Boko Haram, has breached the territorial integrity of the self-styled “Giant of Africa”. For example, Boko Haram has taken parts of the Northeast of the country, hoisting their Caliphate flag in those parts it has captured, including the home town of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Major General T. Y. Buratai. For more on this transactional leadership and his performance, see Section 6(i) below.

Mediating Between National Resources and Development

In this sub-section, I attempt to establish the link between leadership and national resources-based socioeconomic development.

Leaders can and do make a difference in tapping available national (natural and non-natural) resources for orchestrating socioeconomic development of their states. At the forefront of the capable state or developmental state is, indeed, a capable leader. According to de Vliert et al. (2010)

Among humans, leaders are essential within entire societies, regarding the collective capacity to achieve and maintain homeostatic balance and acceptable living conditions. The noun of leader is derived from ‘lode star,’ meaning the person that goes in front, and directs and inspires every one of the followers (de Vliert et al., 2010).

The capable leader allocates or directs the flow of resources to developmental ends. Lerner (2010) demonstrates this by comparing Jamaica with Singapore. Both countries attained independence at about the same time. Their per capita gross domestic products (PCGDPs) were about the same and they attained their independence at about the same time. Jamaica had abundant natural resources but Singapore was poor in natural resources. After some decades, Singapore had out-performed Jamaica, with PCGDPs in Singapore far outstripping those of Jamaica.

Ake (1979: 1) suggests that a political system qualifies to be tagged “developed”, among others, “to the extent that ... it acquires the capacity to perform a wide range of

functions such as the maintenance of order, the *extraction of resources...*” The leader in a political system holds superordinate powers as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the country. He is the personification of the state. And, although, he/she is head of the national executive council (NEC), and not a lawmaker, his/her assent to bills is required to make laws.

The LMX, like the doctrine of the Social Contract, as enunciated by Jean Jacques Rousseau, is that the leader, who is a personification of the state, covenants to provide protection and well-being for the citizens in exchange for the power and sovereignty of the citizens. It is the state that grants concessions to prospectors to extract mineral resources from the state. In Nigeria, the Olusegun Obasanjo-led federal government promulgated the Land Use Decree (1968), which vested on the state, the land of local people. It also promulgated the Petroleum Act (1968) which made petroleum and natural gas national assets. But the state does not provide protection and well-being for the people to whom God gave the resources in the first place This was the cause of the demand for outright *resource control* culminating in the well-documented Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) precedent to the armed protest (militancy) in the creeks of the Niger Delta region in the South-South Geopolitical zone of Nigeria, which is still under military occupation (for more on this, see Alamieyeseigha, 2005; Turner and Brownhill, 2004). This aligns with the position of Humphreys (2005, in Basedau and Lay, 2009) on the *‘grievance’ mechanism* for the onset of conflicts, which suggests that perceived deprivation of producing regions and social groups or indirect negative economic

consequences of resource wealth, such as the ‘Dutch disease’, price shocks or uneven distribution of revenues, create ‘grievances’ and trigger violent uprising, especially secessionism in producing regions.

The mediating role of the transformational leader in the nexus between national resources and socioeconomic development is suggested in White (1984:98-100). White suggests that there is a *complex relationship between state (leadership) action and industrialization (socioeconomic development)*, which is characterized by the rarity of unambiguous success stories. However, the success of the leader depends on: (i) *the social character and political interests* of the groups (leaders) which compose and direct the state; (ii) the *political capacity* of the state to define and propagate an ideology of industrialism; and a *technical capacity* to analyse problems, formulate feasible solutions, and *implement them completely*; and (iii) *taking a parametric stance in economic activities*, such as providing *infrastructure services* and human capital development (see also El-Mefleh, 2005; Turner et al., 2013; words in italics are unstressed in original).

Based on the Social Capital Theory (Couto, 2004), Africa’s national resources may be classified into (i) moral resources and (ii) moral and collective goods and *capital resources* which are (i) financial capital resources, (ii) physical capital resources, and (iii) human capital resources. These capital resources are related to one another. Applying a well-known business template, it is here suggested how the transformational leader can convert the much-talked about national resources of African states into Africa’s socioeconomic development.

The Learning Transformational Leader generates money as financial capital resources; physical capital resources, including technological resources (Galbraith, 1978, as cited in Vanderburg, 2009); human capital resources, and social capital resources. This is the expectation or theory, which is the “moral vision of the world” in terms of how the world of Africa should work. But, it has not worked as expected. In what follows in the subsequent section, I suggest the reasons why there is a mismatch (gap) between the expectation and reality.

Unsatisfactory Mediation Between National Resources and Development

Having established that there exists a connection between natural resources and socioeconomic development, suggesting that leaders can mediate and midwife socioeconomic development through the extraction of natural resources, I feel that I owe a duty to explain why this connection has not, contrary to expectation, satisfactorily worked out in Africa. In other words, why has Africa not realized the benefit of its resource exploitation while Europe has achieved development from these same national resources? Because it is the high point of the conversation, I necessarily go into some details.

A parsimonious number of impactful causes, traceable to *unsatisfactory leadership outcomes*, are here suggested: (i) unsatisfactory management of social capital resources; (ii) Unsatisfactory management of financial capital resources; (iii) Unsatisfactory Management of technological and human capital development; and (iv) Unsatisfactory or Short-range Strategic

Visioning. They amount to unsatisfactory socioeconomic development of Africa, a fact experienced in Bolivia and reported in Kohl and Farthing (2009). I desire to examine each of them.

i. Unsatisfactory Management of Social Capital Resources

These are relational resources that encourage collaborations and cooperation. The more a country has these resources, the more the social wealth of the country, including its unity. The less there are of these resources, the more the tendency for separatist and irredentist movements, which impair the unity of the country. The real problem is in intra-country relations. Many African countries have clear unbridgeable fault lines that divide them into ethnic enclaves, which are at each other's throats. These include the Central African Republic, Libya, Cameroun, and Nigeria. The point is that, in country after country, transactional leaders visit injustices, particularly, *distributional inequity in development assets to their own nationals* with respect to roads, electricity, clean pipe-borne water, high quality schools, health care facilities such as hospitals, and so on. Sections of the country get these without asking for them. But for others, they have to fight before crumbs are given, which fuels grievances and spark the desire for restructuring, secession, autonomy, resource control, and so on (see among others, Alamieyeseigha, 2005; Tolofari, 2004). This aligns with Fidel Castro's May Day statement that, “Humanity must understand that it will have to fight for its survival” (as quoted in de La Barra, 2006).

In many countries of Africa, internal conflicts related to the struggle for a share in the benefits of exploitation or outright control of natural resources is an ongoing scourge. In Nigeria, the military occupation and acts of

intimidation of the Niger Delta and its people is linked to the rich deposits of natural gas and petroleum. In Sierra Leone, the diamond deposits and proceeds from the diamond trade partly fueled and sustained the civil war. The crisis in the Katanga District of Congo, soon after independence from Belgium, was spurred by the natural resources, mainly copper, in the area. This is one reason why scholars suggest that Africa is suffering from a resource curse (McGowan, 2008).

What is required is for a competent (transformational) leadership to identify and genuinely address the festering and lingering injustices infecting the polity. For lessons from the international scene, Manuel Juan Carlos, president of Colombia, negotiated with and signed a peace agreement which was concluded in 2016 with the rebels of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) who had been fighting a bloody war with the Colombian Government since 1962 over land issues. He was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in consequence. A similar effort was made by late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, as president of Nigeria (2007-2009), when he negotiated with and pacified the Niger Delta youth agitators by initiating and implementing the Presidential Amnesty programme in 2008, which brought calmness to the troubled Niger Delta region. Building up to this, he worked to placate and integrate the marginalized people of the Niger Delta by picking Dr. Goodluck Ebele Joathan (Dr. Jonathan) as his running mate in the 2007 general elections. This became the route for Dr. Jonathan becoming the Vice President, and later, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the first PhD to lead the country in executive capacity and first from the Ijaw nation and the Niger Delta since the country's independence in 1960. The unity of the country was assured.

But unfortunately, when President Mohammed Buhari took office in 2019, the first thing he did was an attempt to stop the programme at its first of three stages, which incensed members of the Isaac Adaka Boro Avengers to blow up oil pipelines in the Niger Delta. But, again, unfortunately, PMB attempted to grant amnesty to the unrepentant and fanatical religious fighters of Boko Haram terrorists on a platter of gold for reasons only he knows. In a recent time, in Nigeria, religious leaders gathered in Kano in northern Nigeria along with some state governors to find ways to achieve religious harmony in the country. It was a very good initiative to root out a possible religious war that can destroy the country.

It must be acknowledged, however, that terrorists who are driven by religious fundamentalism, such as the virulent Jihadists of Sunni extraction, cannot be placated since they would not tolerate secularism in government but are bent on creating a Caliphate government of their own. As such, even moderate Moslems and Shiites (Shias) who do not support it are not spared in the onslaught such that their mosques are routinely bombed. The Boko Haram terrorists, for example, are fighting for the Islamization of Nigeria; forcefully converting Christians and others to the Sunni brand of Islam and founding a Caliphate theocracy. Leah, a teenage Christian girl from the Northeast of Nigeria, for example, was abducted and forcefully married to Shekau, the leader of the terrorist group, and converted to Islam. The group also abducted 300 secondary school girls from Chibok village in Bornu State since 2012. They have refused to negotiate with government. But the current leadership is unwilling, unable or not disposed to do anything about it.

Nigeria has moved to the state of what Newman describes as “landscapes of antagonism” (Newman, 2014) with binarisms such as Christians and others/Moslems, South and Middle Belt/North and such or vice versa (Tolofari, 2004), which have developed and which present opportunities for the emergence of situational (transformational) leadership as Gamel Abdel Nasser of modern Egypt (Bishop, 2008) and Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of Ghana did. But there is none in Nigeria for now. The leadership of the federal government of Nigeria is openly biased in favour of Sunni Islamism and looks the other way when the sect members unleash mayhem on the rest of Nigerians. Instead, it banned the Shiite brand of Moslems following a protest in Abuja in 2020 when its activists pressed for the release of their spiritual leader, El Zak-Zacky, who had long been held in the Kuje prison in Abuja. But the Sunni Jihadists, who kill and maim, are neither banned, nor brought to book, and nor branded as terrorists at the same time that the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) who bear no arms and pressing for autonomy are branded terrorists and harassed.

The grand design of the Jihadists and their sponsors in government is thought to be to dispossess Southerners of their superabundant resources. Already, the Northerner oligarchs have, at least, 80 percent of oil blocs in the oil-rich Niger Delta sub-region in the South. The leadership of the federal government is complicit, which is also evident from the pronouncement of President Mohammed Buhari when he stated that “I take responsibility for what happens during my watch”. His regime attempted to establish Ruga settlements, which are colonies of organized cattle herders in the South under the auspices of the Miyetti Allah, ostensibly implementing a putative ‘national food security policy’ of the federal

government. But it was seen as a surreptitious attempt to settle the well-armed Jihadists in Southern Nigeria antecedent to dispossessing its people of their land. To achieve this, the Jihadists have apparently been assisted to entrench themselves in the dense forests of the South from which they harass, kill and maim farmers and kidnap others for ransom. The Ruga scheme was met with stiff resistance from the South and abandoned in consequence. Nonetheless, the Jihadists have been moving to the South in their numbers with arms, hidden in trucks, despite the prohibition of interstate movement across state boundaries during the period of the COVID-19 lockdown.

Unfortunately, the Nigeria Police, the Nigerian Army, and operatives of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) who are enforcing compliance of the lockdown order of the federal government at state boundaries may be complicit by looking the other way. On surface, it was the movement of food items from the North to the South. But, in reality, it was a move for entrenchment of Jihadists in the South and encirclement of Southerners. The Jihadists are acting and replicating in Southern Nigeria what Saltman observed about the military presence of the US in more than 140 countries, with respect to the encirclement of the world’s oil resources (Saltman, 2007: 252. A concentric circle of sieges is in the making with an inner siege laid around the South or Southerners. These Jihadists fighters are drawn from Islamic countries in Africa, including Mali, Niger Republic, and Sudan.

Another plot was the attempt by the National Assembly (NASS) to pass the Water Resources Bill into law for the benefit of private open cattle breeders/grazers. A nagging question is, why is the Mohammed Buhari-led federal government intervening on behalf of private

cattle breeders as if it was government business?

ii. Unsatisfactory Management of Financial Capital Resources

Corruption is the bane of most of Africa. Custodians of government treasury have been having a field day looting the treasury. Metaphorically, it is *like entrusting fish to the rat for safe keep*. It might be convenient to subsume all of this under leadership failure; to the prevalence of transactional leaders, who are given to corruption and myopia.

A vice president of one African country is facing trial in Paris, France, for allegedly stealing public money and laundering it. The money, which was allegedly stolen, amounts to USD115 million. The money was stolen from timber (natural resource) tax and used to live an ostentatious life. He bought sports cars and a property worth USD100 million in Paris. But the ordinary citizens of that country are living below the poverty line (TV Continental News, Nigeria; World Focus Programme, 3/01/2017; Al Jazeera News, 4/01/2017).

iii. Unsatisfactory Management of Technological and Human Capital Development

Technological development and human capital development are two sides of a coin. So, they are considered together here. As suggested earlier, I subsume the tools and equipment aspect of physical capital resource under technology. Africa has relatively low technological development. The continuing competitive weakness of developing nations and their firms is fundamentally a technological weakness; a fact which weighed down even the most politically radical founding leaders of Africa such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamel Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) of Egypt (Dunayevskaya, 1973 as cited in Gibson,

2004; see Bishop, 2008 for Nasser's radicalism, including the nationalization of the Suez Canal; see Babou, 2010 for Nkrumah's role in the decolonization of Ghana). Technological and knowledge imbalances favour the developed countries and their firms. Technology feeds productivity gains and lower unit cost of production in the developed countries (see Lerner, 2010) permitting them to implement price and quality competitions, which are used to drive firms from developing countries out of the international market and out of the local markets of developing countries. This has created the problem of inaccessibility to the international market for SMEs in Nigeria. So, the wealth-generating, poverty-reducing tendencies of SMEs do not work out in Africa (Moruku, 2010).

Africa's great past is widely acknowledged but it only elicits depreciation and scorn from Europe in an era of temporal acceleration in which the past loses importance in the face of rapid changes taking place, such as technological acceleration, social acceleration, and cultural acceleration. As such, previous achievements carry little point and weight in the present. In its place, people key into the imperative of constantly keeping up-to-date and proving their worth (Ylijoki, 2010). To this contributor, the past does not just belong to the history books but is also a source of inspiration, experience, and learning (experiential earning). That is, having succeeded in doing it before, we derive the confidence that we can still do it or do more of it.

Africa's great achievements in the past include the mind-boggling and skyscraping Egyptian pyramids evidencing mastery of project management, or broadly, management which benefited Europe during the colonial encounter

(Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006); the embalment technology of Egypt for mummifying the Pharaohs, which predated that of Western orthodox medicine by about 450 years; the indigenous bulletproof technology, as recently demonstrated by militants in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) by which bullets bounce off the body of fighters; and others. These are great strides in medicine. Africa's respect for nature and knowledge of the delicate balance between human activity and the environment with impacts on the climate has only recently been realized and built into the UN endorsed "fundamental values ... essential to international relations in the twenty-first century", namely, "Respect for nature (unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed)" (Sørensen, 2006). Africans kept sacred forests, or forest sanctuaries, in which human incursions were strictly prohibited. In these sanctuaries, animals and trees flourished. Humans have entered the Anthropocene Era, which shows that human activities are the major cause of furious storms, incinerating and deadly heat waves, and so on, which resulted from Europe's rampart and environment-insensitive exploitation of natural resources. Africa's knowledge of these issues predated European awareness of them. So, when sustainable development, green marketing, and other green 'initiatives' are canvassed by Europe, Banerjee (2003) was right to ask, "Who Sustains Whose Development?"

The elevation of Western orthodoxy in medicine, for example, to universal best practice is parochialism because it brooks no alternative world views and practices. As Pedyowski (2003: 735) complains, "Science is portrayed as a homogenous activity with its 'products' implicated in various aspects

of political-economic-social exploitation/oppression". Further, "This metanarrative belies the contemporary complexity of scientific endeavor and its diverse epistemic cultures". This is accomplished by the demeaning or diminution and destruction of Africa's technological development. For example, the native gin in produced by the Ijaw people in the Niger Delta of Nigeria was declared illicit and its consumers and producers prosecuted and fined during the period of British colonial occupation, which was done to protect the British wine industry from competition; Africa's traditional medical doctors (physicians) are derided as *witch doctors and herbalists*; its orthopedic physicians are called *bone setters*; Africa's technology is called *juju, voodoo, witchcraft* and *Black magic*; Africa's futurists are called *sorcerers* (it is not that Europe's futurists are superior; even the World Bank's growth forecasts for economies routinely miss the target and repeatedly revised. The examples can be continued. These were Africa's adaptive responses to the environment which enabled Africa to survive and build its great empires and its civilization before the Europeans came to it.

Africa is taunted for its stagnation in technological development. Of course, in a "learning society" and "learning world", Africa is willing to learn from Europe and the rest of the world as Europe learned from Africa (Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006; Jeynes, 2008; Wren, 2005) and the rest of the world; actually stole Africa's intellectual property. Africa is willing to learn because, as Weick (2004: 662, in Watkins-Mathys and Lowe, 2005) puts it, it "is animated by a dialectic in which the more one knows the more one realizes the extent of what one does not know".

But, lest we forget, Europe's pharmacists or pharmacologists developed from apothecaries and alchemists in Shakespearian times. The Witch of Endor invoked what was claimed to be Samuel from the spirit world and communicated with him, which predated modern video calls on the WhatsApp social media platform. Even, Europe's video calling technology is way, way behind Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) which must be inspiring Europe to develop a technology that would not need carrying phones about but a tiny chip implanted under the skin to make communication.

Nigeria, thus, made the right move in constituting traditional medicine boards to regulate the practice of traditional medical practitioners, who operate alongside orthodox medical practitioners with good results. In some cases, traditional medicine proved more efficacious than the scientifically acclaimed orthodox medicine. To be sure, modern orthodox medicine is very valuable and admired. The point is that alternative worldviews, knowledges, and practices should be encouraged because no knowledge is superior to others (Pedynowski, 2003).

Africa has a treasure trove of technologies waiting for refinement or polishing. Leadership is required with the right policy framework to kick-start it. Japan did it during the time of the Meiji Restoration. If we take a more scientific approach, winnowing off the veneer of superstition on the indigenous technologies, much can be achieved. African roots and herbs contain active chemical compounds of immense pharmaceutical value. Currently, native practitioners extract these compounds by soaking the roots in alcohol distilled from raffia palm wine. These 'concoctions' are efficacious in treating male erectile weakness,

malaria, typhoid, arthritis, pile, and other challenging medical conditions. These can be researched and more scientific methods devised for producing tablets, syrups, capsules, injectable forms, and so on. What is needed is for embedded researchers to study the traditional practices to understand or unravel the underlying science for further development. In the same vein, the dissertations or theses of PhDs in engineering and the sciences in Africa's universities, for example, should be the seedbed for further technological development and commercialization. But, for now, they are wasting away while Africa imports the latest versions of cars and all.

iv. Unsatisfactory or Short-range Strategic Visioning

Currently, Africa suffers from leaders with short vision and without a culture of continuity from one government to another, which feeds the occurrence of abandoned projects. For example, when an outgoing government failed to complete a development project before it left office or power position, the successor government abandons the project because it will not take the credit of initiating it. This is a myopic view of governing. This myopia short-sightedness limits the planning horizon to the 4-year term in office. How can industrial policies and development strategies, for example, which normally require twenty or more years (Athey, 2010) to be formulated and implemented to achieve industrialization in this *regime of myopia*? Thus, Africa needs learning, *visionary or far-sighted*, institutional transformational leadership which would transform the horizon of Africa's vision, just as the founding fathers of modern Africa were and what the African Union is in setting the vision of "Africa Agenda 2063" in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). *I feel justified, therefore, in identifying the*

African Union and the AAPAM as visionary institutional learning transformational leaders.

Nigeria has a strategic vision called “Vision 20-2020” (V20-2020) by which it aims to achieve world ranking to be one of the 20 largest economies of the world by the year 2020. It is largely a vision in name or paper, which is yet to reflect in the actions of the leadership. We are in 2020. Yet, the country is far from attaining the grand vision and nothing is done about it except the leadership plotting to win the next general election in 2023 and rule the country. The country is in a bad shape and nothing is done about it.

As I had repeatedly suggested (Moruku, 2017; 2019) and based on the foregoing observations, I am inclined to recommend the establishment of a research university to be owned and funded by all African countries. Let it be called African University. It should be a graduate university with faculty drawn from Africa and elsewhere. It should collaborate with world-class universities around the world. Faculty should have a very light teaching load with a view to having ample time for researching and thinking. Funding should surpass the most highly funded university in the world. It should attract grants, donations in cash and kind.

National Resources and Development: The Global Context as Intervening Variable

From the listing of effective leaders above, a leading question is, “What is new about transformational leadership that we have not seen in Africa before and why is Africa still the way it is despite the transformational leaders we have engaged in the past?” In what follows,

this contributor attempts to provide answer to this question by examining the strictures or hurdles in international or world economic order.

Structural Barriers to Africa’s Development in increasingly Globalizing World

In brief, structural barriers (e.g., frozen, ossified international division of labour, global governance structures) are preventing Africa from achieving socioeconomic development. For example, the peripherilization of developing countries has a debilitating effect on their performance in the global economic system (McGowan, 2008). Pfeifer (2009) has shown how *structural barriers* stemming from the legacy of slavery, oppression, and sociopolitical disenfranchisement impacted disastrously on the life chances of the African American. Similar structures have held back Africa’s development. In the subsequent few paragraphs, the structural barriers in the global context are outlined a periodized manner.

From 1945-1960: At the close of the Second World War in 1945, the hegemonic powers especially, the US and UK, in conjunction with other major capitalist states, designed the international financial architecture on Fordist lines, which advantaged them to reap benefits in economic boom. But towards the late 1960s, this boom came to an end.

From 1973–1974: The international oil crisis erupted, which led to the quadrupling of oil prices. It upset the postwar global economic structure. In consequence, a neoliberal economic structure was adopted by the US ruling class to begin a new cycle of exploitation

of the resource-rich peripheral developing countries for its capital accumulation through the transformation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) into *instruments of global neoliberalism* overseeing the application of policy package in the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) in indebted developing countries (Harvey, 2006: 23, in Simon, 2010). A key pillar of the package was the liberalization or deregulation of the economies of indebted developing countries, which opened up their economies for penetration of foreign investment capital (TNCs).

By mid-1990s: The extraterrestrial powers engineered the financialisation of the global economy and developing countries of the world were both coerced and persuaded to follow the neoliberal path to development around the “Washington Consensus” with the World Trade Organization (WTO) serving as its institutional expression.

To ensure its hegemonic grip on other states, the US and members of its hegemonic bloc keep invading and blocking the development of, or ensuring resource flows from, developing countries. These included the invasion of Iraq over the country’s invasion of Kuwait and the repeat invasion based on a sexed-up report of an alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the Granada invasion; the invasion of Cuba; the invasion of Chile; and the invasion of the poor countries generally. Today, Iraq is in chaos and smoldering ruins. Only the invasion of the periphery, in general, is highlighted here.

Stephen (2014) makes the telling point that:

...integration into transnational production *networks* systematically *through foreign direct*

investment by transnational corporations with subsidiaries in different countries around the world erodes the ability of national authorities to direct economic development unilaterally, linking rising power societies more closely to the systemic ‘demand’ for global economic governance unleashed by economic denationalization or *transnationalization* (Stephen, 2014: 923; italics added).

In particular, the global market, on which nations depend, is increasingly governed by a global regulatory framework overseen by the WTO, which is an integrating and rule-bound mechanism governing trade matters. But the BRICS strategy is a way forward and laudable. Still in line with delinking from the “logic of the global system”, as economist Samir Amin (Madeley, 1996: 16) called for, the BRICS model is designed “to take advantage of the neo-liberal global economic system by deeply integrating with it while keeping state control intact” (McNally, 2013: 35; quoted in Stephen, 2014: 930). As such, China has “opposed neoliberalism by constructively engaging with liberal global governance” (Strange, 2011: 544; quoted in Stephen, 2014: 930).

Perennial Invasion and Militarization of Developing Countries in General

IMF loans to developing countries which experienced economic misfortune in early 1980s came tied with *conditionalities compelled the developing economies to restructure their economies to key into the neoliberal global economic structure* which ensured opening up of their ruined economies to transnational corporations and neoliberal institutions to penetrate and were exploited

for capital accumulation of the hegemonic bloc. This was undemocratic and an invasion of the economies of developing countries. As, Saltman comments,

Internationally, this [siege on democracy or undemocratic practice] takes the form of what Harvey has termed 'The New Imperialism' and others have called *militarized globalization* that includes the so-called 'war on terror', the *US military presence in more than 140 countries, the encirclement of the world's oil resources with the world's most powerful military*, etc (Saltman, 2007: 252. Words in italics are not stressed in original).

Europe has been laying a prolonged siege on Africa in the form of its predatory and thanatocratic capitalism. For example, the conditionalities of the structural adjustment loans ensured the reduction of government spending on social services for the poor in the developing countries, while prioritizing debt servicing and repayment to the IMF and private creditors of the Paris Club, which aggravated poverty and produced 'anaemic economic growth' (Kohli, 2006: 581 as cited in Turner et al., 2013). This makes poverty inescapable. Thus, as Kohl and Farthing (2009) complained, the structural adjustment was an instrument for orchestrating unsatisfactory development. It was also a mechanism for creating the *new poverty* leading to (see also Lazzarato, 2009).

Today, the ease of doing business ideology is pushed to the front burner (see also Moruku, 2013). This may be an insidious mechanism for further penetrating and exploiting the peripheral resource-rich states for the capital accumulation of the hegemonic bloc. Come to think of it. Donald Trump, the president of the US, which is a foremost hegemonic capitalist country, is walling up the US-Mexico

border to seal and tighten up (not easing up) the movement of people into the US. He also slapped a renewed travel ban on seven countries with Muslim majority in population. These include Iran, Somalia, and Yemen. So, on one hand, it seeks penetration of the economies of developing countries through globalization and ease of doing business. On the other, it is closing borders. This is a clear ambivalence.

Africa's National Resource Curse

Sure enough, the abundance of natural resources in Africa has failed to bring about a commensurate level of development of the continent. The academic debate has been dominated by the notion of an adverse effect of natural resources on peace and ultimately, socioeconomic development. Humphreys (2005, in Basedau and Lay, 2009) has helpfully compiled six causal mechanisms on the adverse effect of natural resources on peace and ultimately, on socioeconomic development. These are (1) the *internal greedy rebels mechanism* which suggests that the booty character of natural resources motivates rebels to take up arms and/or continue fighting. (2) The *external greedy outsider's mechanism* suggests that outsiders (mainly Western powers) might be ready to intervene militarily either directly or through support for internal warring factions in order to gain or maintain control over lucrative resources. (3) The '*grievance*' mechanism suggests that perceived deprivation of producing regions and social groups or indirect negative economic consequences of resource wealth, such as the 'Dutch disease', price shocks or uneven distribution of revenues, create 'grievances' and trigger violent uprising,

especially secessionism in producing regions. (4) The *crime stories mechanism* suggests that civil wars require both a motive and opportunity. The ‘feasibility mechanism’ refers to natural resources providing the means for rebel finance. (5) The *‘weak state’ mechanism* draws on the harmful effects of resource abundance on the quality of state institutions (corruption, clientelism), which in turn makes internal violent conflict more likely. (6) The *‘sparse network mechanism’* argues that rentier economies have a one-sided integration in the world economy and, hence, cannot develop these ‘thick’ terms of exchange which have been identified as conducive to peace and stability.

Thus, the debate on the failure of African leaders to realize Africa’s determination to achieve socio-economic development of the continent through the exploitation of natural resources must take into account, the geopolitical intricacies in the international, now, global context. Africa is of immense and abiding geostrategic interest to the extraterritorial powers of Europe and the US, who will not allow it to have the peace to develop.

Africa’s Continued Colonization, Exploitation, and Underdevelopment

Africa’s continued colonization and underdevelopment comes in waves. There are three such waves now, which are the wave of scramble for Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1885, the period of the early 1960s to the early 1970s with intensification of resource exploitation in Africa, and the period starting from about the mid-1970s up until now.

The first wave of territorial colonization and exploitation: The colonization and exploitation of Africa after 1885 was the scramble for the exploitation and expropriation of Africa’s natural resources with little developmental impact on the continent. Rather, it was characterized by an extensive and intensive exploitation of the natural resources of Africa for the development of the capitalist metropole. The decolonization of Africa did not result in the decolonization of natural resources exploitation. France has military defense pact with its former colonies in Africa and is willing to intervene in their defense. The case of the Tuareg Uprising had just been mentioned. France was willing and thus hovered around to intervene in behalf of Cameroun in the border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsular between Nigeria and Cameroun. Britain also formed the Commonwealth of Nations with its former colonies.

The second wave colonization and exploitation: It came through neo-imperialism or deterritorialized colonization from the early 1960s to the early 1970s intensified resource exploitation in Africa, which was again, for the benefit of the developed countries.

The third wave (phase) of resource exploitation: It started from the mid-to late-1970s and is on to the present moment.

Dragging Africa to the Bottom: Transnational Corporations-Leaders Conspiracy

Here is a conspiracy theory as an explanation. TNCs conspire with transactional African leaders in the battle for Africa’s natural resources and dragging Africa to the bottom.

A 1975 Philippine government advertisement placed in *Fortune* magazine declared: 'To attract companies like yours ... we have felled mountains, razed jungles, filled swamps, moved rivers, relocated towns ... all to make it easier for you and your business to do business here' (cited in Banerjee, 2008). This is the issue of the phenomenon of the race to the bottom in the effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign investment capital and technology in an effort to achieve socioeconomic development.

Leaders in developing countries compete with one another to offer the easiest conditions to attract TNCs, including lowering environmental protection standards. Thus, TNCs pollute environments of host communities and destroy their subsistent economies and life chances and get away with them. In Nigeria, associated gas from oil extraction continues to be flared which sends out heat and carbon particles into the breathable air. Old pipes burst and spill oil into surrounding farmlands, waterways, rivers, lakes, ponds, and swamps, which has destroyed the traditional fishing occupation of the people.

One of two dramatic cases illustrates the collusion between the state and TNCs against socioeconomic well-being of the ordinary people to whom the state should be responsible. One was the oil spill in Ogoniland in Rivers State of Nigeria. A protest against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDCN) spiraled and morphed into a major political crisis. An international playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was framed up and extra-judicially executed along with four other activists by the Nigerian government led by late General Sani Abacha, in 1995 (Osha, 2006). SPDCN was indicted in The Hague; not

in Nigeria where the company has government backing. For example, its operational facilities are heavily guarded by fierce-looking and overfed soldiers who are battle ready against members of host communities. As such, they entertain serious fears even to lodge complain against the destruction of their subsistence economy. At the same time, its head office was moved from Warri to and tucked away in faraway Abuja so that villagers are shut out from reaching and lodging complains. For the other case, see Okaba, 2005; Turner and Brownhill (2004).

Imperatives for Restructuring the World's Economic Order

The issues raised in this section are presented as a *manifesto for development* of Africa. Based on the leader-member exchange framework, Africa should present them to its leaders in exchange for voting them into political leadership positions. Political parties in Africa, should, therefore, incorporate them into their party ideologies or campaign issues.

As suggested before, Africa is passing through a revolutionary transformation process in the global geopolitical system. It has passed through a stage of subservient colonial dependency to the stage of assertiveness in global geopolitics, from a "resource curse" and on its way to "resource bliss" to tap onto its geopolitical strategic value. For too long, Africa has been docile and accepted a subaltern position as if it was an unalterable law of nature. Africa must assert itself because I have a dream that Africa will one day reach its *destiny of favour by tapping its natural resources for the benefit of its people*. Let me trace the process.

Briefly, Africa moved from (1) the *Stage of Colonial Dependency and “Resource Curse”* to (2) the *Stage of Neutrality in World Geopolitics* between the West (US and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO) and the East (USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies) by forming the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). From here it moved to (3) the *Stage of Demanding New Economic World Order* where it demanded a restructuring or remaking of the international economic order, the New International Economic Order (NIEO), through a charter of the United Nations General Assembly in May 1974 based on eight key proposals in the charter relating to trade issues. It did not materialize but Africa was not deterred. At this stage, Madeley (1996: 15-16) suggested that a better option for the resource-rich developing countries would be for them to harness the potentials of their own resources. The Egyptian economist, Samir Amin, then argued that the South would be better off ‘delinking’ from the ‘logic of the global system’. Consequently, Africa moved to (4) the *Stage of Assertiveness in Global Geopolitics*: insisting on the restructuring of the global world order, which is increasingly a hierarchical liberal world order (Sørensen, 2006); a pecking world order of unequal states based on the asymmetry of economic and military power with developing countries at the lowest rung.

The restructuring should be made along lines of the strategies for constructive engagement with the metropolitan or imperial powers. A number of initiatives can be and are being made, including (i) canvassing for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto power, doing so in cooperation with Brazil, China and India; (iii) acquiring negotiating power as against the present state of being dictated to in

which the imperial powers of Europe backed up themselves with Gatling guns in their asymmetrical and lopsided ‘negotiations’ with African rulers (Toffler, 1980: 98, 100); (iv) seeking power parity with the big powers; (v) delinking from the global system into a polycentric or multipolar world order of power blocs which is already playing out (de La Barra, 2006; Stephen, 2014; Wade, 2011: 351) which is the case with the BRICS bloc which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and the bloc of group of seven industrialized countries or simply, G7.

Developing African Learning Transformational Leadership

As it stands now, the supply of visionary and effective leaders is far short of the demand for them. So, there is an imperative to deliberately develop or source for them. In other words, reinterpreted, learning transformational leaders can be both born and nurtured/taught/developed.

Transformational leadership can be developed or institutionalized as suggested for entrepreneurship in Brandl and Bullinger (2009) by following the advice of Institutional Theory. The theory suggests that institutions are manifested in symbols as well as in social structures. As such, institutional theory outlines three constitutive elements of institutions which are (i) setting up *ideals* such as socially desirable goals, (ii) engaging in discourses through education programmes, seminars, workshops, journal publications and (iii) techniques of control by evaluating outcomes and realigning them with objectives or specifications made in discourse processes.

According to Crawford:

Institutionalization occurs when a group incorporates a belief, practice, or feeling into its repertoire of taken-for-granted knowledge of the world and its behavioral routines. Once the response is institutionalized, the problem and its solution are normalized and become, in many ways, taken for granted. The routinized information-sorting, categorization, and response become a schema that actors tend not to reflect upon (Crawford, 2009: 278).

African people should demand from their aspiring leaders the values convergent on learning transformational leaders (LTLs). But unfortunately, those who seek elective offices have a way of making big but insincere promises just to win elections and turn away from those promises as soon as they get into office. For now, leadership in Africa is seen as an opportunity to amass wealth and by converting state funds into personal wealth. Government treasury is managed as a personal account. So, money is withdrawn from government account and spent as if doing so from a personal or joint account, and with impunity (Moruku, 2016). One way to achieve this is through a clean or genuine democracy where the ballot box counts, not guns. Electorates would have the opportunity to sift and select the best ideas by electing the leader of their choice. And if they find that their judgment was in error, they should be able to recall such a leader in snap elections. Recently, Emmanuel Macron, President of France, suffered defeat in parliamentary elections following his anti-labour, pro-business law reforms. Prime Minister Theresa May of UK similarly suffered a humiliation in the country's parliamentary elections. This filtration is yet to happen in Africa such that leaders continue to sit tight in office even though they are not performing and constituting a burden and nuisance to the

people. For example, Joseph Kabila insists on staying in power until after holding the presidential election even though his mandate had expired. The opposition disagrees as it should. There is a pervasive feeling among a vast number of people in some countries that they have no government and no leader.

However, there is a ray of hope coming out from Africa, from the dark tunnel that clean democracy is in the making in some countries. For the reason of space constraint, I highlight just four countries, namely Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, and Ghana beginning from Kenya.

- a. Kenya: Mr. Raila Odinga lost the country's presidential election in August, 2017. International observers had declared that the election was free and fair thus endorsing the victory of President Kenyatta Uhuru. But Mr. Odinga was not convinced and filed a suit at the Supreme Court to challenge the result. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the claimant. The good news and commendation is that although President Uhuru Kenyatta was not satisfied with the ruling of the Supreme Court, he accepted its verdict. A rerun was fixed for October, 2017. This case demonstrated the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers, and the respect for due process. These are some of the hallmarks of a clean democracy.
- b. Nigeria: *Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan*: Nigeria held its 2015 presidential election. The incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (fondly called GEJ) was defeated. The interesting point is that even before some of the results from some states came in, he accepted defeat and congratulated the winner,

President Muhammadu Buhari. It is rare for incumbents in Africa to fail elections and accept defeat (cf Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia). More impressive was the fact that Dr. GEJ famously stated that, “My ambition is not worth the blood of any Nigerian.” The statement indicated his awareness of the preparations that were made to resort to bloody violence in the event that he refused to accept defeat. PMB had stated that he would make Nigeria ungovernable for President GEJ. Here was a president who stood firm against the machinations, including threats from Northern elements. So, the acceptance of defeat was far from cowardice. Consequently, he has received international awards and appointed UN Ambassador of Peace. So, he has been involved in negotiating to bring about peace in troubled spots in the world. This is qualifies him for consideration as a transformational leader.

- c. The Royal Kingdom of Morocco: It is a very calm, peaceful, and stable country in a rather turbulent region. In fact, it is an oasis of tranquility in a volatile and incinerating desert landscape. Its role in the efforts to resolve the conflict in Libya by hosting the meeting for talks to achieve a unity government in that country speaks for itself. Elections are calm and peaceful and transitions are smooth. The Arab Spring started from neighbouring Tunisia where Mohammed Boazizi set himself on fire in protest against state insensitivity to his plight as an unemployed university graduate selling fruits to survive; complicated by initial police brutality or mishandling of the issue. The Arab Spring played out violently in many countries

of the region but restraint prevailed in Morocco.

- d. Ghana: *John Dramani Madani*: The presidential election of Ghana was held in 2016. It was orderly conducted and calm. Nana Akufo-Addo, opposition candidate, was voted president-elect of Ghana. Outgoing president, John Dramani Madani, conceded defeat. The handing over or transition was smooth. On the day of handing over and swearing-in of Nana Akufo-Addo, the out-going president remarked that “Only history will judge the impact of my presidency” (as reported in the TV/C News 10/12/2016). Ghana has been peaceful and stable for a long time. Its unblinking electricity supply is remarkable in the light of the darkness pervading many countries in Africa.

These are great, if they are not adjudged to be transformational, leaders of Africa worth recognizing and emulating. The salient point driven home here is, Africa is painted as chaotic, unstable in the Western press (see also Basedau and Lay, 2009; Kaplan, 1994, as cited in Reno, 2003; McGowan, 2008). Robert Kaplan, in particular, suggested in a 1994 Atlantic Monthly article, “The Coming Anarchy,” that warfare and disorder in West Africa arises from “weak cultures” unable to master tasks of modernizing. Those days are getting over and Africa is moving on as the above examples illustrate as a democratic culture emerges in line with the expectations institutional theory (Moroni, 2010).

Conclusion

The present paper examined the role of the learning transformational leadership in mediating the nexus between Africa's national resources and its socioeconomic development in the development context of the international environment. In doing so, it profited from the leader-member exchange theory, the learning theory, and social capital theory. Qualitative content analysis was employed in the analysis of data. Following the analysis, it was found that two factors accounted for the socioeconomic performance of Africa. These were (i) an proximate but largely unsatisfactory leadership in mediating the nexus between superabundant national resources and Africa's human condition and (ii) a distal but strong nexus between the international development

context and Africa's human condition. Both contributed to the worsening poverty situation in Africa.

Consequently, it was suggested that Africa should enthrone a learning transformational leadership to effectively mediate the link between its superabundant national resources and its socioeconomic condition. It was also suggested that Africa addresses the international context to be able to secure the benefits of the exploitation of its national resources. Based on institutional theory, specific measures for nurturing the learning transformational leaders were suggested and of addressing the international context. Future studies should take national case studies and longitudinal studies to assess the efficacy of the policy measures suggested in the present study.

References

- African Development Bank. (2007). *African Development Report: Natural Resources for Sustainable Development in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- African Union Commission (2015). *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. Downloaded from: http://au.int/sites/default/files/document/33126-doc-01/background_note.pdf on January 2, 2019.
- Ake, C. (1979). *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development* (2e). Ibadan: University of Ibadan.
- Alamieyeseigha, D. S. P. (2005). *Thoughts on Federalism, South-South and Resource Control*. Yenagoa: Treasure Communications Resource Limited.
- Arthur, P. (2017). "Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)" *Insight on Africa*, 9(1): 1–21. Downloaded from <http://ioa.sagepub.com/9/1/1>.
- Ake, C. (1979). *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development* (2e). Ibadan: University of Ibadan.
- Alamieyeseigha, D. S. P. (2005). *Thoughts on Federalism, South-South and Resource Control*. Yenagoa: Treasure Communications Resource Limited.
- Arthur, P. (2017). "Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)" *Insight on Africa*, 9(1): 1–21. Downloaded from <http://ioa.sagepub.com/9/1/1>.

- Athey, G. (2010). "Economic Success Requires Effective Industrial Policy." *Local Economy*, 25(8): 599-606. Downloaded from <http://lec.sagepub.com/content/25/8/599> on January 16, 2013.
- Babou, C. A. (2010). "Decolonization or National Liberation: Debating the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 632(1): 41-54. Downloaded from <http://ann.sagepub.com/content/632/1/41> on February 1, 2013.
- Baronov, D. (2010). Review of: Bamyeh, M. A. (2009). "Anarchy as Order: The History and Future of Civic Humanity." In: *Contemporary Sociology*, 39(4): 417-418. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> in April, 2018.
- Banerjee, S. B. (2003). "Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the Reinvention of Nature." *Organization Studies*, 24(1): 143-180. Downloaded from: <http://oss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/1/143> on May 24, 2008.
- Banerjee, S. B. (2008). "Necrocapitalism." *Organization Studies*, 29(12): 1541-1563 Downloaded from: <http://oss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/29/12/1541> on June 02, 2010.
- Basedau, M. and Lay, J. (2009). "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research*, 25(8): 599-606. Downloaded from: <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/46/6/757> on October 3, 2010.
- Beer, C. T. (2018). "Do Black Lives Increasingly Matter?" *Contexts*, 17(1): 90-91. Downloaded from: <http://contexts.sagepub.com> on June 16, 2020.
- Brandl, J. and Bullinger, B. (2009). "Reflections on the Societal Conditions for the Pervasiveness of Entrepreneurial Behavior in Western Societies." *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 34(3): 159-173. Downloaded from: <http://jmi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/18/2/159> on September 18, 2009.
- Chen, M. (2008). "Reconceptualizing the Competition-Cooperation Relationship: A Transparadox Perspective." *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 17(4): 288-304. Downloaded from: <http://jmi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/4/288> on June 6, 2010.
- Conger, J. A. (2004). "Transformational and Visionary Leadership". *Encyclopedia of Leadership*. SAGE Publications. Downloaded from: http://www.sage-reference.com/leadership/Article_n357.html on November, 17, 2008.
- Couto, R. A. (2004). "Social Capital Theories." *Encyclopedia of Leadership*. SAGE Publications. Downloaded from: http://www.sage-reference.com/leadership/Article_n330.html on November, 17, 2008.
- Crawford, N. C. (2009). "Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking 'Man'." *International Relations*, 23(2): 271-288. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> in April, 2018.
- de La Barra, X. (2006). Who owes and who pays? The Accumulated Debt of Neoliberalism. *Critical Sociology*, 32(1): 125-709. Downloaded from: <http://crs.sagepub.com/content/32/1/125> on 13 October, 2010.
- de Vliert, E. V., Matthiesen, S. B., Gangsøy, R., Landro, A. B., and Einarsen, S. (2010). "Winters,

- Summers, and *Destructive Leadership Cultures in Rich Regions*.” *Cross-Cultural Research*, 2(4): 315-340. Downloaded from: <http://ccr.sagepub.com/content/44/4/315> on December 3, 2012.
- Dyck, B. and Greidanus, N. S. (2017). “Quantum Sustainable Organizing Theory: A Study of Organization Theory as if Matter Mattered.” *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 26(1): 32–46. Downloaded from: <http://jmi.sagepub.com/26/1/32> on May 19, 2019.
- El-Mefleh, M. A. (2005). “The Economic Role of the State in the Era of Globalization.” *Journal of the American Association of Behavioural and Social Sciences*, 8 (Fall). Downloaded from: <http://aabss.org/journal/2005/AABSS%20Article%202%Economic%20ROLE.pdf> on June 14, 2006.
- Fleetwood, S. (2005). “Ontology in Organization and Management Studies: A Critical Realist Perspective.” *Organization*, 12(2): 197-222. Downloaded from: at <http://org.sagepub.com/content/12/2/197> on October 27, 2012.
- Frenkel, M. and Shenhav, Y. (2006). “From Binarism Back to Hybridity: A Postcolonial Reading of Management and Organization Studies.” *Organization Studies*, 27(6): 855–876. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> in April, 2018.
- Gibson, D. E. and Callister, R. R. (2010). “Anger in Organizations: Review and Integration.” *Journal of Management*, 36(1): 66-93. Downloaded from <http://jom.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/1/66> on June 03, 2010.
- Gibson, N. C. (2004). “Africa and Globalization: Marginalization and Resistance.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 39(1-2): 1-28. Downloaded from: at <http://jas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/1-2/1> on April 9, 2009.
- Herman, A. (2009). *Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age*. New York: Arrow Books.
- Jeynes, W. (2008). “What We Should and Should Not Learn from the Japanese and Other East Asian Educational Systems.” *Educational Policy*, 22(9): 900-927. Downloaded from: <http://epx.sagepub.com/content/22/6/900> on August 3, 2010.
- Kohl, B. and Farthing, L. (2009). “‘Less Than Fully Satisfactory Development Outcomes’: International Financial Institutions and Social Unrest in Bolivia.” *Latin American Perspectives*, 36(3): 59-78. Downloaded from <http://lap.sagepub.com/content/36/3/59> on August 4, 2010.
- Koontz, H. and O’Donnell, C. (1976). *Management: A Systems and Contingency Analysis of Managerial Functions* (6e). Tokyo: McGraw-Hill Kogakusha, Ltd.
- Krasikova, D. V., Green, S. G., and LeBreton, J. M. (2013). “Destructive Leadership: A Theoretical Review, Integration, and Future Research Agenda” *Journal of Management*, 39(5): 1308-1338. Downloaded from: <http://jom.sagepub.com/content/39/5/1308> on January 15, 2014.
- Kumar, V. (2006). *The World’s Greatest Speeches: A Collection of the Most Famous and Motivational Speeches from Around the World*. Benin City: Mindex Publishing Company Limited.
- Küng, H. (2005). The Age of Globalization Requires a Global Ethic. *Theology*, 113(875): 323-

338. Downloaded from: <http://tjx.sagepub.com/content/113/875/323> on October 28, 2012.
- Lazzarato, M. (2009). "Neoliberalism in Action: Inequality, Insecurity and the Reconstitution of the Social." *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(6): 109–133. Downloaded from <http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/26/6/109> on December 15, 2009.
- Lerner, J. (2010). "The Future of Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital." *Small Business Economics*, 35:255–264.
- Lena, D. (2010). "Globalization, Contemporary Challenges and Social Work Practice." *International Social Work*, 53(5): 599-612. Downloaded from: <http://isw.sagepub.com/content/53/5/599> on March 4, 2014.
- Logsdon, J. M. & Murrell, A. J. (2008). "Beyond 'I Have a Dream': Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Contributions to Management Scholarship and Practice." *Business & Society*, 47(4): 411-424. Downloaded from: <http://bas.sagepub.com/content/47/4/411> on June 23, 2010
- Lonie, I. (1991). "Chaos Theory: A New Paradigm for Psychotherapy?" *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry*, 25(4): 548-560. Downloaded from: <http://anp.sagepub.com/content/25/4/548> on October 28, 2012.
- Madeley, J. (1996). *Trade and the Poor: The Impact of International Trade on Developing Countries* (2e). London: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd.
- Mafu, L. (2019). "The Libyan/Trans-Mediterranean Slave Trade, the African Union, and the Failure of Human Morality." *SAGE Open*, January-March: 1–10. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> on February 13, 2019.
- McGowan, P. J. (2008). "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings." *Armed Forces & Society*, 32(2): 234-253. Downloaded from [htHYPERLINK "http://afs.sagepub.com/content/32/2/234"tp://afs.sagepub.com/content/32/2/234](http://afs.sagepub.com/content/32/2/234) on October 13, 2010.
- Moorosi, P., Fuller, K., and Reilly, E. (2018). "Leadership and Intersectionality: Constructions of Successful Leadership among Black Women School Principals in Three Different Contexts." *Management in Education*, 32(4): 152–159. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> on June 16, 2020.
- Moroni, S. (2010). "An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions and a Dynamic Approach to Reform." *Planning Theory*, 9(4): 275-297. Downloaded from: <http://plt.sagepub.com/content/9/4/275>;
- Moruku, R. K. (2010). *Performance of Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in the Nigerian Business Environment*. Doctor of Philosophy Thesis (Unpublished). Abraka: Delta State University.
- Moruku, R. K. (2016). "Mobilizing Domestic Resources: Alternative Financing Strategy for Africa's Development in a Capitalist World of Closed Minds." *Being a paper presented at the Conference of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) in Tangier, Morocco (October 31-November 2)*.
- Moruku, R. K. (2017). "Nexus between Africa's National Resources and Socioeconomic

- Development: The Mediating Role of Learning Transformational Leadership.” *Paper presented at the 38th Round Table Conference of the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM)* held at Mazagan Beach and Resort, El Jadida, the Kingdom of Morocco (November 6-10).
- Moruku, R. K. (2019). “The Nexus between Africa’s National Resources and Socioeconomic Development: The Mediating Role of Learning Transformational Leadership.” *African Journal of Public Administration and Management*, XXVI (1): 33-67.
- Moruku, R. K. and Obeleagu-Nzelibe, C. G. (2011). “Corporate Governance, the New Poverty, and Socio-Political Conflicts in Nigeria (1986-2011).” *Nigerian Academy of Management Journal*, 6(1): 51-67.
- Moruku, R. K. and Obeleagu-Nzelibe, C. G. (2013). “The Nigerian Business Environment and Performance of Entrepreneurs: An Exploratory Study under ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Framework.” *Nigerian Academy of Management Journal*, 7(1): 9-19.
- Naiburg, S. (2003). “Mentors at the Gate: Editors Talk about Clinical Writing for Journal Publication.” *Clinical Social Work Journal*, Fall, 31(3): 295-313.
- NEPAD Secretariat (n. d.). What is NEPAD? Midrand (South Africa): NEPAD Secretariat.
- Newman, J. (2014). “Landscapes of Antagonism: Local Governance, Neoliberalism and Austerity.” *Urban Studies*, Special issue, November, 51(15): 3290–3305. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> on April 20, 2018.
- Ocholi, D. and Ali, M. (2020). “A Nation under Siege.” *The Supremacy Magazine*, February: 25-28.
- Okaba, B. O. (2005). *Petroleum Industry and the Paradox of Rural Poverty in the Niger Delta*. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
- Osha, S. (2006). “Birth of the Ogoni Protest Movement.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 41(1-2): 13-28. Downloaded from: <http://jas.sagepub.com/content/41/1-2/13> on October 28, 2009.
- Pedynowski, D. (2003). “Science(s) - Which, When and Whose? Probing the Metanarrative of Scientific Knowledge in the Social Construction of Nature.” *Progress in Human Geography*, 27(6): 735-752. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> on April 20, 2018.
- Pennington, J. R., Ball, A. D., Hampton, R. D., and Soulakova, J. N. (2009). “The Cross-national Market in Human Beings.” *Journal of Macromarketing*, 29(2): 119-134. Downloaded from: <http://jmk.sagepub.com/content/29/2/119> on August 30, 2010.
- Pfeifer, T. H. (2009). “Deconstructing Cartesian Dualisms of Western Racialized Systems: A Study in the Colors Black and White.” *Journal of Black Studies*, 39(4): 528-547. Downloaded from: <http://jbs.sagepub.com/content/39/4/528> on September 2, 2010.
- Reno, W. (2003). Book Review: “Africa Works: The Political Instrumentalization of Disorder, The Criminalization of the State in Africa.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 38(1): 90-97.

Downloaded from: <http://jas.sagepub.com/content/38/1/90.citation> on October 12, 2010.

- Rockhill, G. (2020). Book Review of Massimiliano Tomba's (2019) "Insurgent Universality: An Alternative Legacy of Modernity". *Political Theory*, June, Online First 0(00): 1-6. Website: <http://sagepub.com>. Typed from website on June 9, 2020. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0090591720930646>
- Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bourgle L'Overture.
- Saltman, K. J. (2007). Review Symposium of David Harvey (2005) "A Brief History of Neoliberalism." *Policy Futures in Education*, 5(2): 249-263. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> on March 24, 2019.
- Sementelli, A. (2007). "Distortions of Progress Evolutionary Theories and Public Administration." *Administration & Society*, 39(6): 740-760. Downloaded from: <http://sagepub.com> in April, 2018.
- Simon, R. (2010). "Passive Revolution, Perestroika, and the Emergence of the New Russia." *Capital & Class*, 34(3): 429-448. Downloaded from: <http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/34/3/429> on June 5, 2012.
- Sørensen, G. (2006). "What Kind of World Order?: The International System in the New Millennium." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41(4): 343-363. Downloaded from: <http://cac.sagepub.com/content/41/4/343> on October 15, 2010.
- Stephen, M. D. (2014). "Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge." *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(4) 912-938. Downloaded from: <http://ejt.sagepub.com> on August 16, 2019.
- Toffler, A. (1980). *The Third Wave*. London: Pan Books in Association with Collins.
- Tolofari, S. (2004). *Exploitation and Instability in Nigeria: The Orkar Coup in Perspective*. Lagos: Press Alliance Network, Limited.
- Turner, T.E. and Brownhill, L.S. (2004). "Why Women are at War with Chevron: Nigerian Subsistence Struggles Against the International Oil Industry." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 39(1-2): 63-93. Downloaded from <http://jas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/1-2/63> on October 28, 2009.
- Turner, M., O'Donnell, M., Suh, C-S., and Kwon, S-H. (2013). "Public Sector Management and the Changing Nature of the Developmental State in Korea and Malaysia." *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 24(4): 481-494. Downloaded from <http://elr.sagepub.com/content/24/4/481> on December 28, 2013.
- Ucbasaran, D., Shepherd, D. A. Lockett, A. and Lyon, S. J. (2013). "Life After Business Failure: The Process and Consequences of Business Failure for Entrepreneurs." *Journal of Management*, 39(1): 163-202. Downloaded from: <http://jom.sagepub.com/content/39/1/163> on August 23, 2013.
- Vanderburg, W. H. (2009). "The Antieconomy Hypothesis (Part 1): From Wealth Creation to Wealth Extraction." *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, 29(1): 48-96." Downloaded

from: <http://bst.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/29/1/48> on April 30, 2009.

Wade, R. H. (2011). "Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF." *Politics & Society*, 39(3): 347-378 Downloaded from <http://pas.sagepub.com/content/39/3/347> on April 23, 2012.

Watkins-Mathys, L, and Lowe, S. (2005). "Small Business and Entrepreneurship Research: The Way Through Paradigm Incommensurability." *International Small Business Journal*, 23(6): 657-677. Downloaded from: <http://isb.sagepub.com/content/23/6/657> on September 3, 2010.

White, G. (1984). "Developmental States and Socialist Industrialisation in the Third World." In R. Kaplinsky (ed.). *Third World Industrialisation in the 1980s: Open Economies in a Closing World*. New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Williams, M. J. (2008). "(In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43(1): 57-79. Downloaded from: <http://sagepublications.com> in April, 2018.

Wren, D. A. (2005). *The History of Management Thought* (5e). Denver: John Wiley & Sons, Inc

Ylijoki, O-H. (2010). "Future Orientations in Episodic Labour: Short-term Academics as a Case in Point." *Time & Society*, 47(14): 365-386. Downloaded from <http://tas.sagepub.com/content/19/3/365> on December 17, 2012..

IMPACT DU LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATIONNEL SUR LA MAITRISE DU DEVELOPPEMENT URBAIN EN AFRIQUE

Faustin Clovis Noundjeu

Résumé

Malgré les dispositifs de planification existants, la ville africaine continue d'être une concentration des maux s'exprimant en termes d'anarchie, d'insalubrité, d'insécurité, d'indigence des infrastructures de base et de pauvreté.

Cet exposé présente une analyse diagnostique du processus de planification urbaine dans sept (07) pays (Cameroun, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Sénégal, Maroc, Tunisie et la France) et relève qu'en fonction des périodes d'observation, les différents documents de planification présentent des similitudes quant à leur dénomination, aux procédures de leur élaboration et même dans leur contenu .

Les griefs qu'il formule portent notamment sur une approche essentiellement sectorielle de la planification sans coordination efficace entre les acteurs institutionnels, sans implication des bénéficiaires, s'appuyant sur des normes désuètes, des données peu fiables, des prospectives aléatoires et inutilement perfectionnistes. Le système urbain doit être réinventé.

Il mentionne que la transformation positive du paysage urbain est tributaire des compétences avérées dans le secteur, notamment du Leadership Transformationnel dont le caractère distinctif est la vision.

Le Leader Transformationnel, considéré comme visionnaire doit, dans le processus de la planification, se doter d'une performance établie pour atteindre ses objectifs. Il doit jouir d'une légitimité et d'une autonomie de décision et transcender ses propres intérêts au profit de ceux du groupe.

Enfin, l'exposé souligne que le Leadership Transformationnel ne s'improvise pas, mais se construit ou s'apprend.

Mots clés : Planification urbaine - Développement Durable - Leadership Transformationnel - Prospective

Introduction

Le phénomène d'urbanisation effrénée que subit le monde n'est pas prêt à s'inverser. Depuis 2008 (cf Nations unies), plus de la moitié de l'humanité vit en ville. Les mêmes sources indiquent qu'en 2050, la planète comptera 6,4 milliards d'urbains, soit environ les deux tiers de la population mondiale qui atteindra alors 9 milliards. Telle a été la substance de la déclaration de Quito relative à la Conférence sur HABITAT III. Donc à cette date, **plus d'un milliard d'Africains seront des citadins**, contre 400 millions actuellement et 20 millions en 1950. Une évolution radicale due à l'expansion démographique.

Sous l'effet conjugué de la croissance démographique et de l'exode rural, l'urbanisation dans les pays émergents entraîne un étalement urbain peu contrôlé, caractérisé par le développement de quartiers sous structurés composés d'habitats indécents et surpeuplés. C'est ainsi que la ville africaine continue d'année en année à être une concentration des maux s'exprimant en termes d'anarchie, d'insalubrité, d'insécurité, d'indigence des infrastructures de base, de pauvreté. Elle est le théâtre de nombreuses activités administratives, politiques, économiques, industrielles, de services, ludiques et tant d'autres diversements réparties entre le formel et l'informel. La ville africaine est donc au centre des préoccupations des Etats parce que la question du cadre de vie est indissociable de celle du développement économique, de la cohésion sociale et du développement durable.

Le développement urbain est ainsi dévoreuse de ressources naturelles (espace pour de

grandes parcelles, couvert végétal, ressources bois et autres pour la construction de logements et ouvrages...). C'est ainsi que les Etats africains s'évertuent, depuis la période de la colonisation à nos jours, à assurer la maîtrise du développement urbain. Ils ont ainsi engagé plusieurs réformes notamment sur le double plan institutionnel et structurel et également sur le type et au contenu des documents de planification qui ont finalement connu plusieurs dénominations mais sans des changements significatifs sur la production de l'espace.

Malgré l'application des modèles et des idéologies diverses de développement dans les pays africains, on se rend compte après des décennies d'indépendance que le développement économique de ces pays n'a toujours pas comblé les attentes.

Quelles peuvent être les vraies raisons de ce retard ? Les causes ne proviennent-elles pas de l'insuffisance de la maîtrise du développement urbain ? Est-ce l'absence d'une efficacité structurelle, organisationnelle ou tout simplement d'un problème de gestion managériale ?

Nos investigations présentées dans cet exposé, sur des questions urbaines dans les pays retenus, montrent que leur approche a toujours été essentiellement sectorielle et sans coordination entre les acteurs institutionnels.

Notre hypothèse de travail est que la transformation positive du paysage urbain est tributaire de la qualité des ressources humaines disponibles et notamment de la présence des leaders aptes à apporter de véritables changements.

Pour apporter éventuellement une réponse à ces questionnements, nous avons structuré le présent exposé en quatre(4) parties :

- Généralités,
- Démarche de la planification urbaine actuelle et ses limites,
- Approche prospective du développement urbain durable: rôle des leaders.

Conclusion.

Mots clés :

Planification urbaine – développement durable – leadership Transformationnel.

Généralités

Méthodologie

La démarche adoptée a été fondée principalement sur la documentation existante dans les pays retenus suivant les critères ci-après :

Disponibilités des données sur les procédures d'élaboration des documents de la planification urbaine ;

- a. Usage de la même langue, le Français ;
- b. Existence d'une stratégie et /ou d'une politique urbaines ;
- c. Inclusion de la politique écologique et le développement durable dans toute démarche.

Sur la base de ces critères, sept (7) pays ont été retenus : Cameroun, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Maroc, Sénégal, Tunisie et la France.

Cette démarche a été renforcée par des entretiens avec divers responsables de structures impliquées dans la gestion urbaine au Cameroun.

L'internet a constitué la principale base de documentation et a joué un rôle capital compte tenu des moyens disponibles et du temps limité pour parcourir les centres de documentation pouvant fournir des informations sur les expériences dans la production urbaine en Afrique. Le recours à l'internet tout en ayant été d'un précieux apport, a constitué toutefois une limite pour l'étude en ce sens que tout n'est pas nécessairement publié sur internet. Néanmoins, les documents auxquels nous avons pu avoir accès ont largement permis de répondre à nos préoccupations, à savoir les nombreuses perturbations agissant sur le système urbain actuel.

La synthèse de l'exploitation des documents et des entretiens engagés nous a amené à proposer une nouvelle orientation conduite par un Leader Transformationnel sera axée sur l'approche de la résilience et la prospective tendant à améliorer la capacité d'adaptation du système urbain dans le souci de limiter les écarts à la trajectoire idéale de la durabilité des villes.

Objectifs

L'objectif général de cet exposé est d'amener les pouvoirs publics à prendre conscience de ce que la gestion du développement urbain devrait désormais être confiée aux Leaders Transformationnels.

Et d'une façon plus spécifique, il est question de :

- Présenter une analyse diagnostique du processus de la planification urbaine dans les pays retenus et identifier ses limites ;
- Dresser le profil des Leaders aptes à assurer la transformation optimale et

décence de l'espace urbain pour une ville durable.

Définitions :

Urbanisme : ensemble des sciences, des techniques et des arts relatifs à l'organisation et à l'aménagement des espaces urbains, en vue d'assurer le bien-être de l'homme et d'améliorer les rapports sociaux en préservant l'environnement.

Planification urbaine : prosaïquement, la planification urbaine est un processus cyclique qui vise à promouvoir un développement urbain résilient et durable.

Développement urbaine durable : c'est « un développement qui répond aux besoins du présent sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs », citation de Mme Gro Harlem Brundtland, Premier Ministre norvégien (1987). Le développement urbain durable :

- tient compte de la résilience ;
- prévient les risques naturels et technologiques ;
- combat la pollution ;
- Limite l'extension urbaine et les besoins de déplacement.

Leadership : de nombreuses théories ont été développées sur le leadership. Le leadership est le « processus par lequel une personne influence un groupe de personnes pour atteindre un objectif commun. » (Peter NORTHOUSE, *Leadership – Theory and Practice*, Sage).

Leadership transactionnel : Aller à : [navigation](#), [rechercher](#)

processus d'échange dans lequel un leader

offre des récompenses à ses subordonnés (James Burns (1978)).

Leadership participatif : Cette théorie suppose Aller à : [navigation](#), [rechercher](#)

- que la conjugaison de nombreux esprits donne une meilleure décision que le jugement d'un seul esprit (, selon l'adage «à plusieurs, on est meilleur que tout seul». On doit, sans doute à Chester Barnard (1938).

Leadership transformationnel :cette théorie défendue, entre autres, par Russell Ackoff, [Bruno Avolio](#), [Bernard Bass](#) où James Burns pose comme hypothèse que les gens suivent une personne qui les inspire et qui leur donne une vision claire et convaincante. C'est une forme de relation entre le manager et son équipe qu'il transforme profondément. Au contact du leader transformationnel, les membres de l'équipe changent de comportement, de croyance et adhèrent à des buts élevés.

Le leader transformationnel mobilise un ensemble de personnes, tout en préservant l'efficacité collective vers un objectif commun. Il permet la créativité, l'initiative, la remise en cause.

Prospective : Selon Guy LOINGER ET Claude SPOHR, (2005), la **prospective** est un ensemble d'outils et un système d'organisation de la démarche pour établir un document de planification au sens de cadre de référence pour l'action, c'est à-dire pour élaborer le projet de territoire qui sert de support à l'activité de planification. La **prospective** est souvent présentée comme la recherche de réponses à deux questions « fondatrices » : *Que peut-il advenir ? Que pouvons-nous faire ?*

Ces définitions nous permettent d'appréhender

au mieux le processus et les limites de la planification urbaine telle que menée dans les pays identifiés et nous amènent à proposer une nouvelle approche de la gestion des questions urbaines.

Démarche De la Planification Urbaine Actuelle en Afrique Francophone et Ses Limites

Démarche de la planification urbaine actuelle

En Afrique, l'urbanisation a toujours été massive et brutale. Elle est la conséquence de l'étalement périphérique incontrôlé dans des quartiers précaires et pose des problèmes multiples (travail, logement, voirie, éducation et santé). A l'instar de ce qui se passe en France, les pouvoirs publics en Afrique pour y faire face, ont axé leurs efforts sur la planification urbaine et les principes de l'aménagement du territoire qui ont d'ailleurs prévalu lors de la construction des villes coloniales. Malheureusement, cette planification a été « ségrégative » avec un centre urbain à l'allure des villes occidentales, bien structuré doté de tous les services de base. Le constat que font les spécialistes en développement urbain est que ces villes présentent aujourd'hui deux visages en général, F.C. Noundjeu (2008):

- le noyau central caractérisant l'héritage colonial ;
- la couronne périphérique caractérisée par un habitat spontané ou Town Ship.

Si les problèmes sus évoqués persistent encore aujourd'hui, on doit se poser un certain nombre de questions : quels ont été les documents de planification urbaine élaborés

pour y faire face ? Qui, comment, quand et où les a-t-on élaborés ? Quelles sont les limites desdits documents ?

Pour répondre à ces questions toutes pertinentes, nous avons passé en revue l'évolution historique de la planification urbaine en France. On note par exemple qu'après la seconde guerre mondiale l'urgence était à la :

- reconstruction immédiate des villes ;
- création d'aires métropolitaines comme zone d'appui au développement local ;
- création d'un ensemble de villes nouvelles ;
- mise en place d'infrastructures de transports qui maillent le territoire ;
- réhabilitation ou la rénovation des quartiers anciens.

La planification en France à cette époque en a tenu compte.

Dans le cadre de ce travail, les documents de planification recensés dans ce pays et analysés couvrent trois périodes essentielles. On note que les changements de leur dénomination, de leur contenu ou même du processus de leur élaboration ne sont jamais un fait de hasard. Ils sont le résultat de nombreux débats entre Experts du domaine (Pouvoirs Publics, Coopérations, Secteur privé etc) dont les objectifs à chaque fois sont d'apporter des solutions aux nouveaux problèmes identifiés auxquels le pays ou la ville fait face.

L'appropriation de ces documents par certains pays africains répond-elle aux mêmes préoccupations qu'en France ? Dans les pays

retenus, les changements de dénomination ont généralement été un effet de mode, un mimétisme ou tout simplement le zèle des Experts en charge de l'urbanisme.

Les périodes fixées ci-après correspondent aux différentes dates de mutation des instruments de planification urbaine en France.

Tableau : Différents types de documents de la planification urbaine à différentes périodes

PAYS	<i>Avant 1967</i>	1967 -2000	2000 à nos jours (loi SRU ² de 2000)
	Emergence de la planification territoriale en France	Apparition des outils de planification en France LOF ⁵	Réforme des outils de planification urbaine face à de nouveaux enjeux
France	PA- PADOG ³ -PDU-	SDAU	SCOT
	PUD	POS	PLU-
Cameroun	PD – PDU - PUS	PDU – PUD -SDAU	PDU - POS –PS-PSU
Gabon	PS/PD /PZ	(SDAU) - (POS). (SPU)	SDAU
Maroc	PD	- SDAU- - (PA) -	
Tunisie	SDA -PAU	CATU ⁴ :- SDA- PAU-,	idem
Cote d'Ivoire	PD ou PU	PD ou PA PUD	SDU
Sénégal		SU- PDU ET PUD	(SDAU – PDU-PUD) ;

Source : *Faustin Clovis Noundjeu*

Définition des Abréviations Dans le Tableau Ci-avant :

Les instruments de planification urbaine qui dressent pour un horizon temporel généralement 25 ans, les grandes lignes du développement intégré des agglomérations urbaines et leurs zones d'influence directe. Ce sont des instruments stratégiques d'orientation, opposables aux administrations :

- SDAU : schémas directeurs d'aménagement et d'urbanisme ;
- SDA : Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement ;
- SDU : Schéma Directeur d'Urbanisme ;
- SU : schémas d'urbanisme ;
- PD - Plan directeur ou Plan d'Urbanisation(PU)

Les instruments réglementaires, opposables aux tiers :

- PAU : Plan d'aménagement urbain ;
- POS : plan d'occupation des sols ;
- PA : Plan d'Aménagement ;

⁵ loi d'orientation foncière 1967

⁶ loi de solidarité et renouvellement urbains (SRU) de 2000 :nouveaux enjeux urbains

⁷plan d'aménagement et d'organisation générale de la région parisienne (PADOG) 1958

⁸CATU : Code aménagement Territorial et d'urbanisme (Loi N 94-122 du 28 Novembre 1994)

- PLU : Plan local d'urbanisme ;
- PD : Plan de développement.

Instruments opérationnels

- CC : Carte Communale ;
- PAD : Plan d'Aménagement de Détail ;
- PUD: Plan d'urbanisme de détails ;
- Lotissement
- Plan de zonage

Le Schéma de Cohérence Territorial (SCOT) :

Un outil de cohérence, un document d'urbanisme aux objectifs plus larges que le SDAU), permet de mettre en perspective et en cohérence (dans le temps et l'espace) l'ensemble des programmes et contrats de mise en œuvre, l'ensemble des projets urbains (et d'aménagement) majeurs, des politiques (qui ont un impact spatial). Il est utilisé en France depuis l'an 2000 ; tandis que le SDAU était limité à la programmation des extensions urbaines et des infrastructures.

Ces instruments d'échelles différentes tentent théoriquement de définir un état futur souhaitable.

NB : dans le tableau ci-avant, les documents sont classés par centre d'intérêt, bien qu'ayant des dénominations différentes, leur contenu et le processus de leur élaboration sont presque identiques.

Limites des politiques et des instruments actuels de planification de l'urbain

Le processus d'urbanisation en Afrique a pris deux formes différentes : une forme réglementaire qui obéit aux dispositions de la réglementation en vigueur, et une urbanisation non réglementaire qui tourne le dos à celle-ci.

Cette dichotomie du processus d'urbanisation a engendré des effets nuisibles en termes d'étalement urbain incontrôlé, complexe et plus coûteux.

Après la politique réactive pour ne pas dire réactionnaire des années 80 fondée sur un urbanisme coercitif, aucune politique alternative cohérente n'a vraisemblablement été proposée.

En Afrique en général et dans les pays étudiés en particulier, les stratégies étatiques de planification urbaine, en vogue dans les années 1960 à 2000, n'ont pas eu les effets escomptés. On a pu enregistrer, pour les instruments de planification identifiés plus haut et qui se sont succédés, les mêmes griefs formulés par différents Auteurs :

en Algérie, s'agissant des instruments d'urbanisme, **Nadir Djermoune (2014)** dit que la démarche de leur élaboration, **d'inspiration française** a suivi le chemin tracé par Le Corbusier mentionné dans la Charte d'Athènes ;

au Cameroun, énumérant les difficultés et obstacles des différentes étapes du processus de planification urbaine, **Hippolyte Etende NKODO (2016)** conclut que le bilan est négatif et propose la mise en place d'un nouveau système d'instruments de planification urbaine ;

au Maroc, **Mohammed EL MALTI (2006)** trouve que le système de planification urbaine a atteint ses limites. Il doit être réinventé en introduisant des concepts nouveaux qui permettent l'inscription des actions sur la ville dans les dynamiques urbaines universelles ;

en Tunisie, les plans d'aménagement urbain, pas assez profonds dans leurs contenus,

sont difficilement suivis par les communes et deviennent rapidement dépassés. Ils doivent être repensés afin de correspondre à des outils de planification. Sami Yassine Turki et Ali Mahjoub (2014).

En définitive, on peut résumer l'ensemble des griefs formulés, comme suit :

- Les différents instruments de planification mis en place sont déphasés par rapport aux évolutions sociétales, car souvent basés sur des données peu fiables et des prospectives aléatoires et perfectionnistes ;
- Des normes de planification inadaptées et exagérément strictes contribuent également au développement d'établissements humains sur des terrains inappropriés et souvent dangereux ;
- Leur mise en œuvre confrontée à l'insuffisance des financements publics nécessaires et l'absence d'une maîtrise publique de la ressource foncière, toujours soumise à la spéculation ;
- Les documents élaborés de manière très centralisée (au niveau des différents ministères comme à l'époque coloniale, sans consulter les populations à la base), présentant un caractère uniforme, dans la mesure où il s'agit de l'importation mécanique de plans élaborés ailleurs. Ces documents transportés ont connu au niveau de leur application, inerties, réticences des autorités locales au fur et à mesure de la décentralisation du pays ;
- Les documents élaborés peu efficaces et ce pour plusieurs raisons : longs à élaborer, sans tenir compte du caractère spécifique de chaque ville et rapidement dépassés par certaines dynamiques ;

- Beaucoup d'écart entre les prévisions démographiques et les réalités. Très souvent les prévisions démographiques sont atteintes trois (3) à quatre (4) ans plus tôt que prévues (Yves MARGUERAT, G.RAGOT, 1982) ;

- Instabilité des institutions (éclatements ou fusion) et des hommes (changements répétitifs et très fréquents) à en charge de la planification urbaine.

Que faire donc pour inverser cette tendance ?

Approche Prospective du Développement Urbain Durable et Influence des Leaders Transformationnels

Approche prospective du développement urbain durable

L'étalement urbain a pour effet mécanique d'allonger les parcours et d'accroître le flux de mobilités. Dès lors qu'une préoccupation environnementale entre en jeu, dans la mesure où ces nouvelles mobilités sont liées à l'utilisation croissante des divers types de moyens de locomotion qui, malgré les progrès accomplis dans leur modernisation, contribuent néanmoins à accentuer la pollution de l'air et l'atmosphère. L'extension de l'urbanisation est donc l'un des principaux facteurs de l'artificialisation des sols, à l'origine de pressions majeures sur l'environnement. On peut donc parler de défi urbain pour le développement durable (Guy Loinger et Claude Spohr, 2005). Pour faire face aux nombreuses perturbations agissant sur le système urbain, il faut adopter une approche résilience pour améliorer la capacité d'adaptation du système afin de limiter les écarts à la trajectoire idéale de la durabilité (*Marie Toubin, Serge Lhomme, 2012*).

Certains Auteurs relèvent que l'urbanisation peut être un moteur important du développement durable de l'Afrique. Cependant, on doit nécessairement développer de nouvelles politiques de développement urbain plus efficaces. Il est maintenant admis qu'avec une bonne gestion on peut créer un phénomène d'osmose entre l'urbanisme et le développement durable. Il est donc possible d'atténuer les effets négatifs et de renforcer les effets positifs que l'utilisation abusive de l'espace peut avoir sur tous les secteurs du développement d'un pays (KING. 2011).

Pour annihiler le poids des griefs formulés plus haut, les politiques urbaines doivent veiller à améliorer les conditions d'existence et relever le défi de cette « urbanisation de la pauvreté ». Des réponses durables à l'urbanisation galopante au Sud passent par l'impératif du développement économique et humain.

Toute démarche à entreprendre risquent d'être marginales si l'on ne s'appuie pas **sur la prospective** qui doit explorer les chemins de l'avenir et *éclairer les travaux* des planificateurs et le futur des villes. L'Afrique a l'opportunité de promouvoir une urbanisation durable et d'accélérer sa transformation structurelle. Pour cela, elle doit adopter des mesures d'anticipation, de prévention et de conservation, à même de diminuer les impacts négatifs de l'urbanisation et d'augmenter l'attractivité et la viabilité des espaces urbains produits. La prospective permet à ce stade de saisir des questions que le court terme occulte pour dégager des horizons nouveaux à long terme et contribue à assurer un développement urbain durable. Pour paraphraser Guy Loinger⁹ « La prospective vise à intégrer les temps longs des devenirs « des territoires en

mouvement » pour penser les temps courts de la prise de décision ».

Alioune Badiane (2012) comme *Caren Levy*, (2014), s'accordent à dire qu'il faut « *réinventer la ville africaine et revaloriser son capital physique, socio-économique et intellectuel dans la perspective d'un développement durable.*

Cette réinvention de la ville doit nécessairement s'appuyer sur la prospective qui se nourrit du débat et du dialogue sur la construction des représentations de l'avenir. Ceci suppose un pilotage, une coordination efficace et efficiente d'où la notion de gouvernance que Edith Heurgon désigne comme « *un système de responsabilités partagées dans lequel existe une autorité de pilotage, celle du chef d'entreprise ou de l'élu...* ». Ce système ne peut être dynamique que s'il est managé par un **Leader jouant un rôle important dans la création d'une vision** et assurant une transformation visible et utile de l'espace urbain.

Dans la politique urbaine aujourd'hui, le problème ne doit plus se poser uniquement en termes de planification, mais surtout en termes de dialogue entre l'Etat et les autres acteurs. Ceci appelle à un processus de négociations, de plaidoyer, de concertation, de partenariat et d'écoute. Autrement, il en résulterait toutes sortes de dérives autoritaires, populistes ou anarchistes. Cette politique doit exiger la démocratisation des débats techniques pour que l'habitant puisse vivre, s'approprier sa cité et contribuer à ses mutations. D'où la notion de l'approche participative de la planification urbaine.

⁹Guy Loinger « La prospective régionale et locale : enjeux et débats » in Les pouvoirs locaux, les cahiers de la décentralisation n°50

Jeux d'Acteurs de la Planification Urbaine : Approche Participative de la Prospective

La participation des habitants en amont ou en aval des décisions concernant l'urbain est relativement bien rôdée en Europe, notamment avec les procédures d'enquêtes publiques et leurs améliorations progressives ; elle reste encore embryonnaire en Afrique.

Cartographie des Acteurs du Projet Urbain et Leurs Motivations

On peut distinguer des groupes d'acteurs selon l'intensité et leur relation au projet :

- **Acteurs touchés ou affectés par le projet** : les habitants, les propriétaires ;
- **Acteurs concernés ou décideurs** jouant un rôle dans la marche du projet : les élus, les administrations; ayant un pouvoir décisionnel sur le projet ;
- **Acteurs intéressés ou impliqués** sur un aspect ou l'autre du projet : les acteurs publics (liés à l'administration) des acteurs semi-publics (associations) et privés (habitants, propriétaires) ;
- **Les opérationnels** : en charge de la gestion concrète du projet : le chef d'équipe de projet, avec pour rôle de mener à bien le projet Maître d'œuvre ;
- **Les mandataires** : ou des professionnels.

Attitude des Acteurs et Interactions

Une analyse des acteurs consiste à les appréhender sous l'angle de leur attitude face au projet :

- **Les partisans** : il s'agit des acteurs favorables au projet et qui sont prêts à se mobiliser ;
- **Les convaincus** : favorables au projet, mais ne s'impliquent pas particulièrement ;
- **Les sceptiques** : des habitants qui abordent le projet avec une certaine méfiance ;
- **Les opposants** : ceux qui mettent tout en œuvre pour le faire échouer ;
- **Les indifférents et les exclus** : ceux qui dans toute démarche participative sont absents (Schindelholz, 2010).

Quel type d'approche participative dans la prospective urbaine? Ceci nous amène à présenter les différentes formes de participation consignées dans le tableau qui suit.

Synthèse des différents types de participation: typologie explications

TYPLOGIE	EXPLICATIONS
1. Participation passive	Les gens participent en étant informés sur ce qui est arrivé ou qui va arriver
2. Participation par la fourniture d'informations	Les populations participent en fournissant des réponses à des questions posées
3. Participation par consultation	Les populations participent en étant consultées, et les agents extérieurs écoutent et tiennent compte de leurs opinions. Cependant, elles ne participent pas aux prises de décisions.
4. Participation liée à des avantages matériels	Les gens participent en fournissant des ressources, mais là encore, ils ne participent pas au processus de prise de décisions.
5. Participation fonctionnelle	Les gens participent en fonction d'activités prédéterminées et après que les stratégies des projets ainsi que leur planification aient été décidées.
6. Participation interactive	Les populations participent au diagnostic des situations aboutissant à des plans d'action et à la formation ou le renforcement de groupements d'intérêts. Ces groupes s'approprient les décisions locales, en vue d'une pérennisation des activités et/ou structures mises en place.
7. Auto-mobilisation / Participation active	Les populations participent en prenant des initiatives indépendamment de structures extérieures

.Source: Fonds d'Équipement des Nations Unies, 1998.

Les deux derniers modèles présentés dans le tableau sont très importants et très appropriés permettant d'annihiler certains écueils formulés plus haut et qui ont occasionné l'échec des politiques urbaines initiées dans la plupart des pays africains étudiés.

Il convient de dire que la dimension participative et d'appropriation collective alimente la prospective urbaine (le futur est un « construit collectif ») et, de la même façon, un projet urbain fondé sur le développement durable ne peut être imaginé en dehors d'une pratique citoyenne.

La multiplicité des acteurs urbains fait en sorte que la prospective urbaine soit souvent très difficile à mener du fait que ceux-ci affichent des attentes multiples et souvent contradictoires avec des moyens financiers qui ne sont pas toujours à la hauteur des objectifs poursuivis.

Cette situation peut être maîtrisée si le mode de gestion mis en place respecte les principes de la bonne gouvernance et est conduit par un Leader Transformationnel.

Impact du Leadership sur le Processus du Renouvellement de la Planification urbaine pour un Développement durable

La Banque Mondiale (BM) dans son rapport intitulé <<Competitive Cities for Jobs and Growth: What, Who, and How (2015)>> indique que l'amélioration de la compétitivité des villes peut contribuer à éliminer l'extrême pauvreté et à promouvoir une prospérité partagée pour tous les citoyens. Ainsi, les villes pour se développer, doivent capter

les revenus de la croissance qu'elles créent, afin de les réinvestir pour l'avenir. Cette démarche propre à chaque ville (une ville étant un cas spécifique, avec ses problèmes) requiert des compétences avérées en matière de gestion urbaine, notamment le Leadership Transformationnel qui va apporter une nouvelle façon de regarder la ville, plus précisément une vision de ce qu'elle pourrait et devrait être. Le Leader Transformationnel devra se concentrer sur le futur de la ville et les changements nécessaires pour améliorer celle-ci. Comment doit concrètement procéder le leader Transformationnel unanimement considérée comme visionnaire ? Comment penser la ville de demain ?

Le Leader Transformationnel doit obligatoirement et avant tout remplir deux conditions essentielles :

- jouir d'une légitimité et d'une autonomie d'action et de décision pour ne pas être bloqué dans sa démarche ;
- prendre conscience de ce qu'il est, du contexte organisationnel, de la mission profonde de l'organisation et d'une réelle compréhension des talents avec qui il doit travailler au sein de son équipe, aux fins d'optimiser la performance d'équipe et atteindre plus facilement les résultats recherchés.

Nanti de ces qualités, il doit mettre en place un processus de planification urbaine qui peut se définir comme suit :

Élaboration d'une vision séduisante de la future ville. Il a donc une vision unique de l'avenir de la ville à un horizon lointain. Il est question ici d'appréhender le futur à travers une démarche prospective qui apporte aux processus de décision des territoires, des

représentations du futur qui se constituent en véritables visions. Ces visions se construisent à la fois dans une démarche cognitive (analyse de la réalité présente et passée, basée sur la pensée complexe et la systémique) et dans une dimension participative (recherche d'une « gouvernance maîtrisée et d'un art d'organiser l'intelligence collective »). Mark Swilling pose une question fondamentale « Qui va déterminer les futurs des villes africaines ;

Constitution d'une équipe d'experts et autres acteurs composites et pluridisciplinaires (cf II.2) susceptibles de participer efficacement à la conceptualisation de la ville ;

Développement de la notion du partage de sa vision avec son équipe : il doit avoir d'excellentes aptitudes en communication et les pouvoirs de rallier les employés à sa cause. Il doit procéder à l'organisation des séances de travail pour imprégner et stimuler intellectuellement les membres de l'équipe aux fins de favoriser l'innovation ;

Eveil de la confiance de son équipe : la confiance est un élément important dans la relation d'un dirigeant avec ses subordonnées. En se montrant fiable, le dirigeant aide à entretenir une relation honnête entre lui et ses employés ;

Conduite harmonieuse d'une gestion consciente qui amène une transformation profonde mais en douceur de sa Structure ainsi que des individus qui la composent. Cette approche force à prendre du recul et à faire différemment, pour mieux réussir à opérer dans la complexité. Elle favorise naturellement l'éclosion des talents. le talent émerge chez un individu par la prise de conscience et son désir de se dépasser, de contribuer, de s'améliorer.

L'équipe sous ce style de leadership va se consacrer à l'atteinte de cette nouvelle vision.

De plus, elle devra se concentrer davantage sur ses tâches plutôt que sur ses intérêts personnelle

Qualités non Exhaustives d'un Leader Transformationnel du Système Urbain et ses Limites

Les qualités du Leader Transformationnel

- Avoir une vision précise du secteur ;
- Disposer d'une capacité avérée de :
préciser discursivement la vision qu'il a ;
- conceptualiser, communiquer et informer ;
- transformer l'individu ou le groupe vers l'atteinte des objectifs ;
- favoriser l'acceptation des objectifs individuels et collectifs ;
- effectuer un travail au-delà des niveaux minimums spécifiés par l'organisation ;
- Avoir une passion pour réaliser de grandes choses en inspirant l'enthousiasme, en injectant de l'énergie, en fournissant un modèle de comportement qui soit cohérent avec cette vision ;
- Etre prédisposé à fournir un soutien individualisé ;
- Avoir une aptitude à modifier les valeurs de base, les croyances et les attitudes des suiveurs pour atteindre des buts plus élevés et ;
- **Sans être omniscient, il doit posséder des capacités dans le domaine technique et dans le domaine des relations interpersonnelles.**

Quelques Exemples des Leaders Transformationnels

La transformation de la plupart des villes à travers le monde ont été l'œuvre de ceux qu'on a connu comme de grands bâtisseurs que nous pouvons ainsi assimiler aux Leaders Transformationnels, bien qu'ils ignoraient la notion de la prospective ; nous pouvons néanmoins citer sans être exhaustif :

Napoléon Ier et Napoléon III, aménageurs des villes et du territoire, développeurs des transports ;

Hausmann, selon Michel Carmona, a inauguré un modèle de grands travaux qui n'a cessé d'être repris par la suite ; même s'ils sont en fait les « travaux de Napoléon III » :

Jacques Parizeau mort en 2015 au Canada, désigné comme le « grand bâtisseur du Québec moderne »¹⁰ ;

André FOUDA, Maire de la Commune Urbaine de Yaoundé de 1960 à 1980, mise en place d'une stratégie de renouvellement urbain ;

Nelson Mandela et Martin Luther King Jr. sont souvent associés à l'exercice du Leadership Transformationnel.

Catherine Privé, MAP, CRH A g, ALIA (2009) estime qu'un Leadership Transformationnel a un impact sur l'efficacité organisationnelle.

¹⁰le chef de l'opposition officielle, Pierre Karl Péladeau déclarait lors de ses obsèques *M. Parizeau* que grâce à ce dernier « la nation québécoise a franchi les portes de la modernité jusqu'aux abords du pays du Québec *M. Parizeau a profondément cru à la capacité des Québécois et des Québécoises à devenir réellement maître de leur destinée et de leur avenir.* »

Limites du Leader Transformationnel

Le Leader Transformationnel a aussi tendance à voir grand et a des difficultés à discerner les détails dans sa vision, s'il ne s'entoure pas des gens afin de prendre soin de ce niveau. Il n'est pas toujours humble.

Renforcement des Capacités

Le Leader est-il une génération spontanée ? Selon Youssef Ouadi¹¹ « Le leadership ne s'enseigne pas, mais il peut s'apprendre et E.C NOUNDJEU (2005) soutient que le renforcement des capacités n'est seulement pas l'acquisition de connaissances mais aussi la modification d'un comportement.

Certains professionnels du processus d'apprentissage en matière de leadership s'accordent à dire que « nous n'utilisons qu'une petite partie de nos potentialités (environ 10%) et que la plupart de nous feront de bons leaders s'ils s'entraînent à débloquer leurs talents ». Il faut donc tout faire pour réveiller ces talents dormants chez certaines personnes, notamment chez les élus et les personnels administratifs municipaux des pays émergents qui sont pour la plupart insuffisamment formés. Ils doivent donc être sensibilisés aux données nouvelles d'un urbain plus complexe, en évolution plus rapide et souvent peu prévisible et auquel il faut répondre par des actions transversales qui doivent associer promotion économique, équité sociale et développement durable.

Pour que la prospective urbaine se développer durablement, la détection et la formation des

¹¹Youssef Ouadi, chercheur à la [Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management](#), et fondateur de l'initiative [Learn2Lead](#)

compétences en leadership est indéniable. Pour cela, il faut impérativement faire recours aux Instituts spécialisés notamment à l'enseignement supérieur (notamment les troisièmes cycles d'urbanisme et d'aménagement).

Conclusion

Toutes les interventions liées à l'habitat et à l'urbanisation étendent leurs ramifications aux autres composantes telles que le foncier, le développement économique et social, la gouvernance, l'environnement... et exigeront une coordination qui dépassera les prérogatives du ministère en charge du secteur. Ici, le terme gouvernance prend le sens d'organisation du processus selon Edith Heurgon (2000). L'on ne peut appréhender le futur qu'à travers une démarche prospective qui apporte aux processus de décision des territoires, selon Guy LOINGER et Claude SPOHR, (2005), des représentations du futur qui se constituent en véritables visions.

La plupart des villes sont aujourd'hui confrontées à la nécessité de répondre aux mêmes défis tels que :

- la mise en œuvre d'un urbanisme négocié, pragmatique, impliquant un large panel d'acteurs, y compris ceux venus de la société civile ;
- les réponses à des demandes venues de sociétés urbaines de plus en plus segmentées ;
- l'harmonisation des politiques publiques urbaines, encore très souvent sectorielles et la prise en compte, globale et cohérente, du niveau de la décision à celui de la gestion, des différents secteurs constitutifs de l'urbain qu'ils soient économiques, sociaux, environnementaux et culturels.

Nous pensons que le développement du leadership peut constituer une issue à ce problème. Il est donc nécessaire de créer une nouvelle génération de leaders, capables de relever plusieurs défis comme ceux de la fragmentation de l'espace (John O. Igué, 2010) et surtout de maîtriser le processus de négociation qui requerra non seulement un dialogue mais aussi actions de plaidoyer et de leadership. D'où l'urgence de faire recours à un Leader, notamment Transformationnel qui a un lien positif avec la performance selon Lowe et al, (1996) ; Judge et Piccolo, (2004).

Il revient nécessairement aux pouvoirs publics de prendre toutes les dispositions pour identifier et former des compétences en leadership dans des Instituts spécialisés de l'enseignement supérieur.

Dans son intervention à la conférence Habitat III en 2016 à QUITO, Monsieur Jean Claude

MBWENTCHOU, Ministre Camerounais en charge de l'habitat invitait : « les pays respectifs à ré inventer fondamentalement l'urbanisme, d'élaborer des solutions ambitieuses et de les appliquer avec détermination, c'est-à-dire en affectant au développement urbain **tous les moyens humains** et financiers nécessaires, si l'on veut construire des villes durables dans le monde. Un défi majeur, le développement de la productivité par le renforcement des connaissances, des savoir faire, de la technologie et de l'innovation ».

Cette Citation dont je fais Mienne:

Si vous avez l'intention d'être un leader, investissez au moins quarante pour cent de votre temps à gérer votre éthique, votre caractère, vos principes, votre objectif, votre motivation ainsi que votre conduite ».

Bibliographie

- Ari Brodach et Mélanie Goffi, (2005). La politique de la ville : une trajectoire de développement urbain durable ? , Développement durable et territoires [En ligne], Dossier 4,
- Bruno Boidin, Abdelkader Djeflat, (2009). Spécificités et perspectives du développement durable dans les pays en développement , Mondes en développement 4 (n° 148), p. 7-14.
- Caren Levy, (2014). Reinventer la planification urbaine dans les pays du sud.
- Caroline Galle, Hanja-Niriana Maksim (2009), Regards croisés sur la planification urbanisme-transport à strasbourg et Genève.
- Catherine privé, (2009), l'impact du leadership transformationnel sur l'efficacité organisationnelle
- Cécile Manciaux, (2011), Afrique : l'urbanisme au cœur de la croissance économique (introduction expose).
- Edith Heurgon et Josée Landrieu. (2000), Prospective pour une gouvernance démocratique”, Editions de l'Aube
- Etende NKODO Hippolyte, (2016), Pratique de la planification urbaine au Cameroun
- Faustin Clovis Noundjeu (2008), L'influence de la qualité des ressources humaines sur le développement durable des villes : cas du Cameroun » 30TH AAPAM Rountable Conference Accra, Ghana

- Faustin Clovis Noundjeu, (2005). Building capacities to insure a good governance and sustainable urban development: principles and realities,
- Guy LOINGER, C. SPOH.(2005) Travaux et recherches de prospective) , numéro 24
- Hassan CHTOUKI, (2011). La planification urbaine au Maroc : État des lieux et perspectives.
- Jean-Paul Carrière et C. Demazière. (1998) Projet urbain et grands projets emblématiques : réflexions à partir de l'exemple d'expo 98 à Lisbonne p. 33-51.
- Jean-Philippe Dind, (2011), "Projets urbains - Intégration sociale dans des zones d'habitation". Observatoire universitaire de la ville et du développement durable (OUVDD) Institut de géographie Université de Lausanne.
- Jeune Afrique ,(2011). Villes africaines : l'urbanisation, un défi pour l'avenir.
- John O. Igué,(2010), A New Generation of Leaders in Africa: What Issues Do They Face?(p. 119-138.
- KING Livre,(2011) sur le retard de développement économique de l'Afrique. Misère, pauvreté africaines
- Luc Moutila1 , (2013), Planification Urbaine Au Cameroun : Nature, Origine Et Defis.
- Marie Toubin, S.Lhomme, Youssef Diab, D.Serre and R. Laganier (2012) La Résilience urbaine : un nouveau concept opérationnel vecteur de durabilité urbaine ? : Vol. 3, n° 1
- Mohammed EL MALTI, (2006). La politique urbaine au Maroc,
- Nadir Djermoune , (2014), Défaillance des instruments d'urbanisme en Algérie (1re partie) villedurable.org, Solutions pour un développement urbain durable.

The compilation of this book is the sequel of the 38th African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) Annual Roundtable conference held in the coastal city of El Jadida in the kingdom of Morocco in 2017. The theme of the conference was ‘A Transformed leadership: Managing national resources to achieve the objectives of Africa Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG'S)’. The authors are drawn from various African countries to capture an inspiring diverse experience across the continent in matters resource management.

The theme of this book illustrates the relevance of effective leadership in ensuring sustainable development in Africa for the attainment of Africa Agenda 2063 and global agenda 2030 and as a tool for achieving economic growth and development. It provides a platform to critically discuss the prospects for increased, improved, and effective financing for Africa’s transformation.

This book explores a great disparity between the leadership situation in the African continent and the attainment of sustainable development. It also affirms a link between effective leadership approaches, like the transformational leadership approach, and the attainment of sustainable development. It is an asset for individuals, governments and organizations focused on transformational leadership for sustainable development.

